# 1. POPULAR ATTITUDES, POPULIST ATTITUDES & POPULIST PARTY VOTES

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## **2. KEY TERMS**

\*<u>Popular attitudes</u>: Totality of political values, preferences

\*<u>Populist attitudes</u>: a sub-set of popular attitudes (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2017; van Kessel, 2015: 13)) Will of the people. Traditional national culture. Extreme ideology. Left behind.

<u>\*Other Attitudes:</u> Party identity. Class identity. Civic participation (Barber 2004) Environmentalism Gender, moral issues

\* Political preferences, behaviour:

Values and policies: Democratic. Unconstitutional. Behaviour: Voting. Conventional, unconventional protest

# **3. MODELS & HYPOTHESES**

1. Exclusive model: Populist attitudes--->populist party vote

H 1 If people hold populist attitudes, they vote for populist parties

Corollary 1a: The smaller the percent endorsing an attitude, the more likely it is to be exclusive to populist parties.

2. <u>Competition model</u>: Populist attitudes one of multiple influences

H 2 If people hold populist attitudes, they have a significant and substantial effect on political preferences, behaviour

3. <u>Diffusion model</u> Voters for governing party hold populist attitudes too

H 3 If populist attitudes have no significant effect, they will be distributed among all parties.

Corollary 3a: The higher the percentage holding a populist attitude, the more likely it will be diffused among all parties.

# **4. POPULIST PARTIES A SUB-SET OF OUTSIDER PARTIES**

\*<u>Outsider parties</u>: Not a governing party (LePen party) and/or recent (Five Star)

More than 300 Outsider parties in Europe in past two decades (Rose, 2019)

\*<u>Populist parties</u> Will of all (Rousseau).

Populist parties with 1% of vote, 1 MP: 22 in 17 European countries

Range in votes: 0 (Portugal)- 55% Italy. Median: Fin, Sweden 17.5%

Range in seats: 0 (Portugal, UK) to 61% Italy. Median: Finland 19% (See Appendix slide 8)

\*<u>Non-populist Outsider parties</u>

Personal: France: En Marche

National: Scottish National Party

Environmental: Green parties

# **5. POPULIST ATTITUDES VARY IN SIZE**

H 1 Populist attitudes are minority attitudes

<u>Undivided will of people</u> as declared by leader. Rousseau \*Government doesn't need to respect minorities (5%, ISSP)

Extreme right or left-wing ideology: (ISSP) \*Extreme right: pts 8-10 (15%) Extreme left 0-2 (11%)

Social exclusion: Left behind

\*Low education, income, class. Ethnic minorities c. 15-30%.

H 3 Attitudes popular with plurality, majority

\*Traditional national culture

\*Favour fewer, no immigrants (51%, Pew Europe, 2018)


\*Ethnic majority; identify with nation-state. Above 75%

Political exclusion

\*Government doesn't care what people like me think (50%, ISSP)

# **6. CIVIC NOT POPULIST ATTITUDES FAVOR REFERENDUMS**

In Europe 61 percent support referendums on major issues (ISSP, 2014: Q.53). A multivariate logistic regression of nine populist indicators found two significant; all eight civic influences were significant. (Rose and Wessels, 2019). The bars below show the size of the effect of significant variables independent of the direction.



#### 7. **POPULIST INFLUENCE ON VOTES, GOVERNMENT**

#### VOTES DEPEND ON

 H 1 Insiders vulnerable to protest entrepreneurs because of: Corruption.
Leadership split on personality, policy
Austerity
Ignore populist issues such as Immigration
\*Examples: Italy. Greece.

H 2 Positive Populist appeal

Defend national culture, institutions against immigration, EU \*Example: UK

H 3 Positive Non-Populist appeal

Environment: Green parties Valence: Macron En Marche. Blair 1997 What works. National independence: SNP. Catalan parties

IMPACT ON PARTY GOVERNMENT DEPENDS ON (Rose, 2019)

H 4 Whether Outsider support is decisive on an outcome, not on its size Eg Democratic Unionist 1.5% gives Conservative government its majority

Eg LePen in presidential run off makes anti-LePen candidate the winner

H 5 Whether Insiders Co-Opt or Stigmatize Outsiders Adopt and destroy Outsider: British Conservatives: UKIP Absorb in system: Austria. Denmark. Norway Stigmatize and form cartel: Germany. Sweden.

\* Timing, heterogeneity of outcomes dependent on national context and conjunctures.

## 8. APPENDIX VOTE FOR POPULIST PARTIES

Country	Party	% Votes	N Seats	% Seats	Election date
Italy	M5S	33.3	227	36.0	18.3
	LN	17.4	124	19.7	18.3
	FdI	4.4	31	4.9	18.3
		(55.1)	(382)	(60.6)	
France	FN	21.3	n.a.	n.a.	17.4
	FI	19.6	n.a.	n.a.	17.4
		(40.9)	(n.a.)	(n.a.)	
Greece	SYRIZA	31.5	86	28.7	19.7
Switzerland	SVP	29.4	65	32.5	15.10
Austria	FPÖ	26.0	51	27.9	17.10
Spain	Podemos	14.3	42	12.0	19.4
	Vox	10.3	24	6.9	19.4
		(24.6)	(66)	(18.9)	
Netherlands	PVV	13.1	20	13.3	17.3
	SP	9.1	14	9.3	17.3
		(22.2)	(34)	(22.7)	
Germany	Linke	12.6	94	13.3	17.9
	AfD	9.2	69	9.7	17.9
		(21.8)	(163)	(23.0)	
Finland	Ps	17.5	39	19.5	19.4
Sweden	SD	17.5	62	17.8	18.9
Norway	FrP	15.2	27	16.0	17.9
Ireland	SF	13.9	23	14.6	16.2
Belgium	VB	12.0	18	12.0	19.5
Denmark	DF	8.7	16	8.9	19.6
Luxembourg	ADR	8.0	4	6.7	18.10
United Kingdom	UKIP	1.8	0	0.0	17.6
Portugal	None	0.0	0	0.0	15.10
Mean		15.7	52	15.5	
SD		8.2	51	9.3	

Table 1: Electoral strength of populist parties

Parties winning one percent of vote and/or one seat in latest national election as of 31.8.19. Source for populist parties: Rooduijns et al. (2019, accessed 31.8.19).

Source: <u>Http://www.popu-list.org</u>, consulted 30.8.19

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