Public Perceptions of "Fake News" in the United States and Japan

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Concerns about the spread of misinformation and its implications for democratic participation have increased worldwide. The concept of fake news and its implications largely has been studied within a western context. There are few studies that examine empirically how fake news and misinformation are manifested in East Asian democracies. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the way that fake news is perceived in Japan and the United States. While research on misinformation has proliferated, much of it focuses on the message source. Studies primarily treat the audience as a target that is subject to manipulation. This paper views the audience in more active terms as it examines the public's understanding of fake news in the American and Japanese contexts. The paper addresses the following questions in comparative perspective: What does the term "fake news" mean to the public? To what extent does the public perceive misleading information to be present in media coverage of politics and elections? What sources do Japanese and American voters use for political information? Where are Japanese and American voters exposed to misleading information? Finally, how do voters' views of misleading information differ based upon their political orientations, such as political interest, party identification, and support for leaders, and their media use habits?

The paper is primarily an exploratory analysis that examines the similarities and differences in public perceptions of fake news and its implications in Japan and the U.S. The study uses data from original surveys conducted by the authors to empirically investigate the research questions. We begin by examining the concept of "fake news" as it is understood in the two nations. To provide context for the exploration of fake news, we provide an overview of the public's reliance on and their perceptions of the reliability of particular types of media. We then probe more deeply into the audience's understanding of fake news through multivariate analyses. Ogasahara developed a novel methodology for analyzing Japanese voters' perception of fake news by asking respondents whether they perceived news items from fact-checking websites as accurate or misleading. Owen took a more conventional approach of analyzing differences in Americans' perceptions of fake news and the consequences they assign to the proliferation of misinformation. An attempt was made throughout the paper to match the items in the Japanese and American surveys to the extent possible.

Understanding Fake News in Japan and the U.S.

A spate of academic investigations attempting to apply rigor to the notoriously slippery concept of "fake news" have emerged in the wake of the term's popularization in the public lexicon (Tandoc, et al., 2017; Wardle, 2017; Waldrop, 2017; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Allcott, Gentzkow, and Yu, 2018; Clayton, et al., 2019). Two distinct definitions can be derived from these inquiries that facilitate our inquiry into the fake news phenomenon as it is manifested in Japan and the United States. One definition emphasizes the spread of false information by news organizations, media platforms of ideological groups, blogs, and social media. Gelfert defines this notion of fake news as "the deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misleading claims as news, where the claims are misleading by *design*" (Gelfert, 2018: 86). The fact that fake news is specifically designed to be false sets it apart from other forms of misinformation that may be spread due to an unintentional misstatement of fact or misunderstanding. This definition encompasses a broad range of fake news items, including stories fabricated for profit,

political propaganda, conspiracy theories, hoaxes, and outright lies. Another perspective views fake news as a label that is applied to news stories and information, however factually accurate, that a politician does not like and seeks to refute. President Donald Trump and his surrogates have popularized this strategy of applying the fake news label to discredit stories and news organizations with whom they take issue.

There are notable differences in how fake news has been formulated in Japan and the U.S. However, the connotations of fake news in the two countries have been coalescing over the past few years. Fake news in the United States runs the gamut from misleading claims to the strategy of labeling to discredit news stories and media organizations. Trust in the media generally is substantially lower in the U.S. than in Japan, which makes American media more of a target for criticism be it deserved or unwarranted. The term "fake news" in Japan initially was confined to the first definition and primarily was equated with misinformation. Fake news stories were largely associated with rumors that emerged in conjunction with discrete events, such as natural disasters. However, the use of fake news as a label to denigrate factual stories as exemplified by Donald Trump has emerged during the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Mainstream news organizations also have begun to criticize one another with accusations of media bias and publishing misleading stories (Nakai, 2018). In its many forms, fake news in the U.S. disseminates widely across a range of mass media and social media platforms. Fake new as predominantly misinformation in Japan appears to be more narrowly clustered than in the U.S., and circulates heavily in micro-networks that are community-based (Shepard, et al., 2019).

The media environment in Japan provides a solid contrast to that in the U.S. Both countries have a large and diverse media presence. As of April 2017, the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association's membership consisted of 104 newspapers, 4 wire services, and 22 television stations, for a total of 130 companies. Many other magazines and Internet-based publications do not belong to the Association but are widely read and influential. While the digital era has witnessed the rise of many independent news sources in the U.S., 90% of the most prominent media are consolidated among six dominant corporations, down from fifty corporations in 1983. 80% of the top online news sites are owned by the largest media companies (Rapp and Jenkins, 2018). As we shall see, trust in the media in Japan is far higher than in the U.S., although it has been declining over the past decade, especially among younger people. Newspapers, in particular, are perceived as a watchdog against the government by less than one-third of the public (Nakai, 2018).

Fake News in Japan

The term, "fake news" emerged as a popular word in Japan in 2017. NHK, a Japanese public broadcaster, aired a Saturday drama program entitled "fake news" in 2018. Nippon TV broadcasted a variety program called "The most useful school in the world" and invited associate professor Hiroyuki Fujishiro to teach "fake news" to the audience in 2019. The term "fake news" is currently popular even among college students. However, there are far fewer studies of fake news in Japan (see Kiyohara, 2019) than in the U.S. .Most of the studies of Japan introduce the notion of fake news in the U.S. when they explain the term (Taira, 2020 and 2017; Sasahara, 2018). Also, Japanese newspapers show the central frame of fake news as an American political phenomenon (Cheng and Mitomo, 2018). In the U.S., the term most frequently is associated

with disinformation about political phenomenon; however, in Japan the term is used for disinformation on the Internet with a much broader perspective. Before it became popular in Japan in 2017, the notion of fake news was often associated with disinformation and misinformation circulated by chain mail and Twitter during natural disasters.

For example, in March 2011, disinformation became an issue during the Great East Japan Earthquake as news of an explosion and a fire at the Cosmo Oil Chiba refinery began to circulate. The news media reported extensively on the explosion. Soon after, a rumor began to circulate on Twitter, chain mail, and the Japanese domestic social networking service, mixi. It stated: "harmful material has become adherent to clouds and is falling with rain. When you go outside, bring an umbrella or a raincoat. Don't let your body be exposed to rain!!!" (Ogasahara, et al., 2019: 4). The rumor spread rapidly and created anxiety among people engaged in Twitter hubs where the message was circulated. The following day, Cosmo Oil, a local government, and a national newspaper denied the misinformation, and circulated a tweet to deny it rapidly and dispel the rumor (Ogasahara, et al., 2019; Shepard, et al., 2019). Another example coincides with an earthquake in Japan in April 2016. A rumor accompanied by an unrelated picture was circulated on Twitter: "A lion is walking round in a city after the lion escaped from Kumamoto Zoo because of the earthquake" (Endo, 2018). This message was retweeted more than 20,000 times within an hour, and caused more than 100 calls to the Kumamoto Zoo. The author of the tweet was arrested on fraudulent obstruction of business. It was the first case where the person who circulated disinformation on the Internet at the time of a natural disaster was arrested on fraudulent obstruction of business in Japan (Kohara, 2016).

Another important notion of fake news in Japan can be introduced with the case of curation sites. Issues with curation sites can be illustrated by a case involving WELQ, a curation site on medical and health information managed by a big IT company, DeNA. WELQ transmitted a lot of content including false medical information. DeNA circulated a great deal of disinformation to boost the ranking of their content on Google to gain ad revenue. The issue intensified because it was managed by a big company and involved medical and health sites with the risk of damaging people's health. As a result, WELQ was closed in December 2016. The WELQ issue is a very popular illustration of a fake news case to gain ad revenue in Japan (Taira, 2017; Okuyama, 2019; Yamaguchi, 2019).

As we have seen, the notion of fake news in Japan has been used for misinformation and disinformation and false rumors on the Internet in general. However, this is not to say that there is no political fake news in Japan. For example, the false claim that "A Korean man who raped two Japanese girls in Seoul was found not guilty" was shared on Twitter and Facebook more than 20,000 times in 2017. *Buzzfeed* investigated why a man made up the story and shared it on social media. The reason was that he wanted to gain ad revenue because he learned he would be able to gain ad revenue from the 2016 presidential election case (Hatachi and Ito, 2018). The thing in common between the WELQ issue and this political fake news is gaining ad revenue as motivation of spreading fake news.

The trend of politicians applying the fake news label to stories they seek to discredit has been on the rise. In May 2020, Yomiuri Newspaper reported "Japanese government relinquished the original plan to deploy Aegis Ashore , ground-based air defense missile systems to Akita City because of a strong antagonism by the local people, and would consider another place in

Akita prefecture" (Yomiuri Newspaper online, 2020). Then, Minister of Defense, Taro Kono tweeted, "Yomiuri Newspaper spearhead "fake news" this time" (@konotarogomame, 2020). Later, although he said the decision was not related to the news, he announced that they gave up the plan to deploy Aegis Ashore to Akita Prefecture (Nikkei Newspaper, 2020; Kono Taro official website, 2020).

However, there are not enough studies of Japanese voters' perception of political fake news. Thus, it is noteworthy that the online survey conducted by Ogasahara and Kiyohara in conjunction with the 2017 Lower House election included an open-ended item where respondents could indicate their perceptions of an information item as fake news. They were asked to record their reactions to the statement: "the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) garnered more Twitter followers than the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)." In fact, this statement was true, and many newspapers wrote about it. According to the Sankei newspaper, CDPJ opened a Twitter account on October 2, and the number of followers had reached 134,000 on October 5, which was ranked number one among political parties (The Sankei News, 2017). However, there was a rumor on some curation sites called "Matome Sites," such as "NAVER Matome," that the CDPJ might buy Twitter accounts. *Buzzfeed* fact-checked the rumor and reported that it had no premise in fact (Hatachi, 2018). Based on the survey, Ogasahara (2019) suggested that many of news items perceived as "fake news" by respondents were ones covered by traditional media. Thus, there is still room for discussion about the meaning and implications of political fake news in Japan.

Fake News in the United States

The concept of fake news in the U.S. has become popularized in both the real world of politics and in academia. The term has taken on range of meanings—fake news as satire, fake news for profit, political propaganda, and reckless reporting by news organizations. However, fake news is nothing new in the American context. The earliest newspapers made up stories and hoaxes to entertain readers and increase their audience. The practice of "yellow journalism" that featured sensational, outlandish, and fabricated stories was a hallmark of American media more than a century ago and left a lasting legacy in the tabloid press (Love, 2007).

The definition of fake news has shifted radically in more recent decades. In the 1980s until the current era, the term "fake news" referred to news satire and comedy programs, such as the *Daily Show*, the *Colbert Report*, and "Weekend Update" on *Saturday Night Live*. These programs are fake in that they mimic real news programs, but the information they provide is real news delivered with a humorous twist. Studies indicate that people who watch these fake news satire programs become more informed about politics due to their exposure to the shows (Jones and Baym, 2010). The viewer needs to know something about the news to get the joke. Exposure to forms of fake news predicated on misinformation have the opposite effect of contributing to the public's low level of political knowledge (Kuklinski, et al., 2000; Kahne and Bower, 2017).

The more insidious concept of fake news does not involve humorous political critique, but instead seeks to purvey information that deliberately deceives. One manifestation of fake news has been associated with unsubstantiated stories distributed for profit. Fictitious stories are

made to read as if they are real news articles and are posted on websites having the appearance of legitimate news platforms or blogs, such as *Infowars*, *The Rightest*, and *National Report*. Fake sites use social media interactions and algorithms to disseminate content to specific ideological constituencies. Fabricated stories are spread virally by social bots, automated software that replicates messages by masquerading as a person. During the 2016 presidential campaign, fake news stories were manufactured in overseas troll factories in Russia and Macedonia whose intent was to meddle in the election (MacFarquhar, 2018). Erroneous reports claimed that Pope Francis had endorsed Donald Trump for president and that Hillary Clinton had sold weapons to ISIS. Among the widely viewed stories about the 2020 election include the report that Trump's father was a member of the KKK and that Joe Biden called Trump supporters the "Dregs of Society" (Gilbert, 2019).

In the run-up to the 2020 presidential contest, wealthy conservatives set up fake local news websites across the country to push out stories that would damage Democratic contenders (Fisher, 2019). Websites made to emulate local news platforms, such as the *Arizona Monitor* and *The Kalamazoo Times*, have emerged in news deserts where legitimate local news organizations have disappeared. Numbering in the hundreds, these sites are run by ideological and partisan activists, groups, and companies, such as Locality Labs, which is run by conservatives in Illinois, with masked political agendas (Coppins, 2020).

Fake news can be equated with political propaganda designed to sway the public's political conscience. Candidates contesting for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination have been subject to extensive cyber propaganda that has tapped into sensitive issues, such as immigration and race. Sources from inside and outside of the United States have launched coordinated efforts using social media #hashtags, posts, and memes to intentionally spread misinformation. Racially inflammatory memes have been used against Sen. Kamala Harris (D-CA). A false story about Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) alleged that a blackface doll appeared on a kitchen cabinet in the background of her New Year's Eve Instagram livestream (Korecki, 2019).

Conspiracy theories, hoaxes, and lies also are considered an aspect of fake news. "Pizzagate," the false story during the 2016 election that Hillary Clinton and her associates were running a child sex ring out of a pizza restaurant in Washington, D.C., is an example of a hoax with real world consequences. A man traveled hundreds of miles to rescue the alleged victims and fired a gun into the restaurant that was filled with families. Following the 2018 midterm elections, another man inspired by the "Pizzagate" hoax lit a fire in the restaurant (Zadrozny, 2019). Like "Pizzagate," some hoaxes don't go away, and seem to reappear periodically. The hoax that billionaire George Soros has been paying people to rig voting machines in favor of Democrats has circulated for several election cycles despite being repeatedly debunked (Funke, 2018). Trump's presidential campaign launched a "birther" conspiracy attack on Sen. Harris, claiming that she was not eligible to run for vice president. A similar conspiracy theory was used against President Barack Obama during his presidential bids (Wright, 2020).

Fake news also has been construed as reckless reporting by news organizations that forgo proper sourcing and fact checking of stories. This definition coincides with the shift in journalistic norms in the new media era, where the need to get the story out fast is paramount.

The fact that the media have become sloppier in their reporting and make mistakes gives ammunition to those who denigrate the press, like Donald Trump. While misinformation produced in this way does not conform to our definition of fake news as being designed to deliberately deceive, some Americans consider press mistakes to be fake news.

Another definition of fake news emerged with the election of Donald Trump—fake news as a label used by Trump and his surrogates to discredit news stories he dislikes (Hepworth, 2017). Trump repeatedly has tagged press estimates of the crowd size at his inauguration as fake news, arguing that it was vastly understated. His former press secretary, Sean Spicer, was made to reinforce Trump's claims, even as photographic evidence demonstrated that Trump's inaugural crowd was far smaller than that of Barack Obama. Trump declares that stories are "fake news" on almost a daily basis, which plays to his base of supporters. He also has used the term "hoax" as a synonym for "fake news" to describe information he seeks to discredit. The Mueller probe into Russian interference in the 2016 election which has resulted in the indictment and conviction of several of Trump's intimate associates is a frequent target of these attacks. Trump's FAKE NEWS mantra epitomizes the definition of fake news as an intentional act of deception. In an interview with veteran CBS News correspondent Lesley Stahl, Trump defended his constant attacks on the press and his charges of "fake news." He told Stahl in front of an audience of journalists, "You know why I do it? I do it to discredit you all and demean you all so when you write negative stories about me, no one will believe you" (Rosenberg, 2018).

Japan Study

Data

Two online questionnaire surveys were conducted for figuring out Japanese voters' perception of fake news both soon after the 2017 Japanese Upper House election and the 2019 Japanese Lower House election. Ogasahara and Kiyohara conducted the former survey consisting of 1,000 total valid responses from males and females aged between 18 to 69 years in 2017. The online research company excluded respondents who errored on questions for checking cursory respondents (e.g. "In this question, please choose right edge option"). The main variables are political party support, news media usage for electoral information, frequencies of perception of fake news during the election, and the contents of the perceived fake news.

Ogasahara conducted the 2019 survey consisting of 1,440 total valid responses from males and females aged between 20 to 80 years. This survey was carried out as the second wave of an online panel survey which planned to measure the filter bubble effect of social media usage. The first wave survey was conducted in October 2018, and the valid sample size was 2,400. Respondents who errored on questions for checking cursory respondents were excluded from the following analyses (the online research company did not exclude the data). The main variables are the same ones as on the former survey and measured credibility of television news, newspapers, and shared news via social media.

Measures

Operationally, fake news was defined in the 2017 survey as 'fake or suspicious information relating to candidates or political parties.' The perception of fake news was

measured based on the number of news stories that respondents subjectively perceived as representing "fake news." Respondents who were exposed to "fake news" once or more during the election were asked to explain the contents via an open response format and answer source of the fake news.

Although there are various scales for media credibility, the most general measure is a combined index of unbiasedness, objectivity, accuracy, and trust of the media (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Flanagin and Metzger, 2000; Kiousis, 2001; Johnson & Kaye, 2004), and trust is used in all media credibility scales. Respondents in the 2017 Lower House election survey were asked to rate the trust of each medium. Respondents in the 2019 Japanese Upper House election survey were asked to answer questions about the unbiasedness, objectivity, accuracy, and trust of each medium using the same 5-point scale (strongly agree/agree/neither/disagree/ strongly disagree). Scores were combined into a credibility index for each medium. (Cronbach's alphas for the indexes of television news, newspapers, shared news via social media were .92, .94, and .95 respectively).

Media Reliance in Japan

In Japan, using the Internet for election campaigns was strictly regulated until the Public Officials Election Law was reformed in 2013, when the ban on using the Internet for election campaigns was lifted. Since then, political parties and candidates have been able to update their election campaign information on their websites and social media during the election campaign period. They also can send emails to voters for election campaign purposes. Voters can share election information online on social media.

According to the surveys, television was the main news source for voters in both elections. In 2017, 44% of respondents used television for news almost every day, and 22% watched television for news a few times a week. In 2019, 35% of respondents used television for news almost every day, and 20% watched television for news a few times a week. Soft news on TV is also popular among respondents. Called "wideshow" in Japanese, these programs feature entertainers, journalists, specialists, such as professors, comedians, and athletes as the cast who talk about news and current events. These programs would be similar to satire news programs, like *The Daily Show*, and morning news shows, such as *Good Morning America*, in the U.S. In 2017, 22% of respondents used soft news almost every day and 24% used soft news a few times a week. In 2019, 17% of respondents relied on soft news on TV almost every day, and 20% used soft news a few times a week. Print newspapers remained one of the main news sources for both elections. In 2017, 23% of respondents read print newspapers almost every day, and 12% a few times a week. In 2019, 25% of respondents read print newspapers almost every day, and 13% a few times a week. Portal news sites, such as Yahoo!Japan, were popular news sources for both elections. In 2017, 21% of respondents used portal news sites for news almost every day, and 18% a few times a week. In 2019, 12% of respondents used portal news sites almost every day, and 11% a few times a week. Following these sources, news apps, such as LINE NEWS, were popular. In 2017, 11% of respondents used news apps for news almost every day, and 12% a few times a week. In 2019, 6% of respondents used news apps almost every day, and 7% a few times a week. Radio is less popular than news apps. In 2017, 4% of respondents used radio almost every day, and 5% a few times a week. In 2019, 6% used radio almost every

day, and 6% a few times a week. Video sharing sites, such as YouTube, niconico, and social media, as well as curation sites called "Matome site," such as "NAVER Matome," were not as popular as election news sources during both elections. Although the study was conducted online, the findings showed that online news sources were not frequently used in both elections. (See Figure 1 and Figure 2.)

Figure 1
Media Use for the 2017 Lower House Election in Japan



*The election period started October 10 and ended October 22, 2017.

Figure 2
Media Use for the 2019 Upper House Election in Japan



Election media use in Japan differed slightly by party identification. (See Figure 3.) Compared to the U.S., there are many political parties in Japan. The party which has the most seats in the Diet, Liberal Party of Japan (LDP), has formed a coalition with the third largest party, KOMEITO. Moreover, there are more opposition parties, such as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ). Therefore, as a matter of convenience, we divided respondents into two groups--ruling parties and opposition parties. In the 2017 Lower House Election, LDP won 284 seats and KOMEITO won 29 seats. Ruling parties gained more than two thirds of the seats. As for the opposition parties, we put all other parties together. JCP lost 9 seats but got 12 seats, and the number of CDPJ seats increased to 55 seats from 15 seats as a result of the 2017 Lower House election.

Figure 3 suggests that those who supported ruling parties were likely to access election news online more often than those who supported opposition parties for the 2017 Lower House election. Those who supported opposition parties most frequently used (almost every day and a few times a week) mass media, such as TV news, TV soft news, and newspapers among all respondents. On the other hand, those who supported ruling parties used slightly more online news, such as portal news sites, news apps, video sharing sites, social media, and the Matome site as well as radio than those who supported opposition parties, and independents.

Figure 3
Election Media Use in Japan by Party Identification for the 2017 Lower House Election



As for the 2019 Upper House election, Figure 4 shows those who supported opposition parties were more likely to use TV and newspapers as election news sources than those who supported ruling parties. Independents watched TV soft news more than opposition parties. Regarding online news sources, there were almost no differences between those who supported

ruling parties and opposition parties. However, those who supported ruling parties continued to prefer the Matome site compared to those who supported opposition parties and independents

Figure 4
Election media Use in Japan by Party Identification for the 2019 Upper House Election



Reliability of News Media in Japan

Trust in election news sources in the 2017 and 2019 elections is depicted in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Opposition party supporters have significantly higher trust in mass media sources (television news and newspapers) in general. However, we should interpret the results carefully because the average age of independents is significantly higher than that of other groups.

Figure 5
Trust on Election News Source in the 2017 Japanese National Election with Political Identification



Figure 6
Credibility on Election News Source in the 2019 Japanese National Election with Political Identification



Source of "Fake News" in the 2017 Japanese Lower House Election

Figure 7 shows the source of the "fake news" in the 2017 Japanese Lower House election. Over the half of the respondents who were exposed to fake news answered television was the source. The ratio of social media was far lower level; Twitter, Facebook, LINE (an application similar to WhatsApp) were 20.3%, 3.7%, and 1.4%, respectively. Although the response "television" did not indicate which type of TV program, respondents perceived television was the main source of "fake news."

Figure 7
Sources of Fake News in the 2017 Japanese Lower House election



A Multivariate Analysis of Perceptions of Fake News in Japan

Ogasahara adopted a different method for analyzing Japanese voters' perception of "fake news" in the 2019 survey. He mainly selected misleading news items from fact-checking websites and asked respondents whether they perceived them as fact or false. (See Table 1.) The following four misleading news items were analyzed; 10IP and RDCA were positive news items for ruling parties (Liberal Democratic party and Komeito), and RTFP and CTMU were negative. All of the news items were determined to be "false" or "misleading" by Japanese national newspapers or fact-checking NPO (FIJ: FactCheck Initiative Japan). The exposure rate to each news item was 15.0% (10IP), RDCA (25.3%), 9.7% (RTFP) and 18.6% (CTMU), respectively. The four news were:

1) "After LDP took the reins of government, the investment profit of pension reserve has grown 10 times compared to one during DPJ (Democratic Party in Japan) administration." (10IP)

2) " This election is the election whether voters select parties who discuss constitutional amendment (ruling parties) or ones who refuse to even discuss it (opposition parties). " (RDCA)

3) Prime Minister Abe responded in a Diet discussion "Raising tax to wealthy class is a foolish policy." (RTFP)

4) "Consumption tax revenue has been used to make up deficiency of tax revenue caused by tax cut for big companies and wealthy class. (originally it was pledged to use only for social security cost)" (CTMU)

Table 1
Notes for the misleading news items in the 2019 Japanese Upper House election

News item	Note
10IP	The PM Abe's remark at the debate of party leaders on June 19, 2019. Newspapers and fact-checker determined it was false and the correct ratio was about 4 times.
RDCA	The PM Abe's remark at the debate of party leaders on July 4, 2019. Asahi Shimbun (liberal national newspaper) and the leader of the coalition party stated the remark was not correct. However, Sankei Shimbun (conservative national newspaper) reported that opposition parties had refused to discuss constitutional amendment.
RTFP	In a YouTube video of Diet discussion, PM Abe responded "It (raising tax to wealthy class) is a foolish policy". Buzzfeed Japan determined it was fake because the video was considerably edited from the original TV video and "it" did not indicate the raising tax. However, it was true that PM Abe was opposed to raising tax to the wealthy class at the discussion.
CTMU	The statement of a leader of a small party in a stump speech. Fact-checker determined it was misleading because all of consumption tax income was used for social security. However, it was true that income tax and corporate tax have been cutting while consumption tax was raised.

Logistic regression analyses for predicting the exposure to each misleading news item and multiple regression analyses for predicting the belief to each news item were performed. (See Table 2 and Table 3.) Independent variables were demographic variables (age, sex, education period), political interest, party identification (ruling parties dummy and independent dummy, opposition parties was the reference group category) support for the Abe administration, frequency of exposure to electoral news sources during the 2019 election period, and media credibility.

The logistic regression analyses indicate that 1) political interest was significantly associated with exposure to all misleading news items, 2) support for the Abe administration was positively associated with exposure to positive news items for LDP (10IP and RDCA) and negatively associated with negative news items for LDP (RTFP and CDMU) , and 3) exposure to

newspapers and the online election campaign were positively associated with exposure to all misleading news items. (See the Appendix for additional statistics.)

The multiple regression analyses indicate that 1) political interest was not associated with the belief in misleading news items except CDMU, 2) support for Abe administration was positively associated with positive news items for LDP (10IP and RDCA), and 3) exposure to newspapers was negatively associated with the belief in positive news items for LDP.

These results suggest the following findings. First, support for the Abe administration: an index of political preference was a predictor of exposure to misleading news items. Respondents were likely to be exposed to news items consonant with their political preference and likely to have avoided to news items dissonant with their political preference. Second, support for the Abe administration could be a predictor for belief in misleading news items. Respondents supporting the Abe administration were likely to believe news items to be positive for LDP. And third, frequency of exposure to newspaper information was a predictor of both exposure to and disbelief in misleading news items. Newspaper usage seemed to be positively associated with higher literacy in Japan.

Table 2
Logistic regression analyses predicting exposure to misleading news items in the 2019 Japanese national election

	10IP	RDCA	RTFP	CTMU
	B	B	B	B
Sex	-.128	-.500**	.077	-.003
Age	.029***	.024***	-.002	.002
Education	.114**	.081*	.168*	.065
Political interest	.441***	.491***	.481***	.476***
Political identification (ruling parties dummy)	-.076	.141***	.025	.012
Political identification (independents dummy)	.572*	-.803***	-.201	-.403†
Support for Abe administration	.237**	.124†	-.390***	-.471***
TV news	.018	.011	.017	.013
Newspaper	.022†	.034**	.037*	.023†
News website	.025†	.023	.025	.024†
News App	.017	.027	.020	.028
Online election campaign	.023*	.026*	.046***	.028**
Credibility (Television news)	-.029	-.064†	-.031	-.059
Credibility (Newspapers)	-.010	.016	.014	.014
Credibility (Friends on social media)	.023	.013	.086*	.055*
Intercept	-7.103***	-5.595***	-6.614***	-3.378***
Nagelkerke R^2	.201	.269	.193	.196

Note: †: p<0.1, *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001

Table 3
Multiple regression analyses predicting the belief for misleading news item in the 2019 Japanese national election

	10IP	RDCA	RTFP	CTMU
	β	β	β	β
Sex	.061	-.011	-.027	.003
Age	-.152†	-.103	.023	-.120
Education	-.057	-.082	-.044	-.087
Political interest	.082	.081	.078	.182**
Political identification (ruling parties dummy)	.050	-.097	.084	-.075
Political identification (independents dummy)	-.004	-.041	.046	-.047
Support for Abe administration	.351**	.497***	-.169	-.143
TV news	.058	.018	.038	.111
Newspapers	-.169*	-.130*	-.118	-.119
News websites	-.053	.058	-.097	.053
News Apps	.020	-.109*	.008	-.109
Online election campaigns	-.055	-.030	.208†	.061
Credibility (Television news)	.098	.021	-.284	-.126
Credibility (Newspapers)	-.149	-.093	.273	.066
Credibility (Friends on social media)	.047	.107	-.120	-.061
Adjusted R^2	.215	.273	-.033	.068

Note: †: p<0.1, *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001

United States Study

Data

The U.S. study employs data from two original cross-sectional surveys of adult American citizens online conducted by Owen and the Civic Education Research Lab (CERL) at Georgetown University. The first survey was fielded from March 26-30, 2018 (n=1,295) during the run-up to the midterm elections. The second survey was conducted two years later from April 1-13, 2020 (n=1518) during the presidential nominating campaign. Respondents were recruited via Mechanical Turk (MTurk) based on their status as eligible voters and accessed the surveys on the SurveyMonkey platform. Participants received a stipend for their participation. The limitations of using MTurk for survey data collection have been documented (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012; Chandler, Mueller, Paolacci, 2014). Huff and Tingley (2015) suggest a method for building a survey pool by recontacting respondents with particular characteristics relevant for the study who have taken part in prior research using MTurk. For this study, participants were recruited for characteristics, such as political party and ideological identifications, directly through the MTurk platform for an additional fee. Democrats and Republicans were oversampled, and there were fewer self-identified Independents than in the

American voting population. This oversampling of partisans was intentional, as the study was designed to examine subgroups within the major political parties, such as Republicans who supported and did not support Donald Trump. MTurk samples tend to have a higher percentage of liberals than conservatives than is present in the population. However, MTurk samples closely mirror the personality and value-based motivations associated with ideologies from across the political spectrum (Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner, 2015). The MTurk worker recruitment strategy employed here largely mitigated the concern with oversampling liberals.

Measures

Reliance on media for election news and information in 2020 was measured for television, print newspapers, print magazines, radio, online news, social media, and video-sharing sites (frequently/sometimes/rarely or never). The survey included a number of items asking respondents to evaluate the news media. An item asked how much bias respondents see in news coverage of politics (a lot/moderate amount/very little/none). Respondents also were asked about how reliable they felt social media are in conveying political information compared to traditional media sources, such as television news and newspapers, or if they are equally reliable. Finally, the survey included items asking how much respondents trust news they received from their friends on social media and the news media (a great deal/some/very little/not at all).

The surveys contained a number of items that examine the public's diverse perceptions of the concept of "fake news" as well as the sources of fake news. The 2020 study included the questions: Do you think there is a difference between fake news and misinformation? (yes/no). Both the 2018 and 2020 surveys asked respondents which definition of "fake news" they believed to be most accurate. Respondents were given the options of satire, such as the daily show; false stories written for profit by people who are not journalists; political propaganda; reckless reporting by news organizations; inaccurate information presented as an objective news story; conspiracy theories, hoaxes, and lies spread through the media; or a label used by Donald Trump to discredit news stories. They could expand upon their response by answering an open-ended question. In 2020, respondents were asked about the source of fake news, specifically how much fake news do they receive from trolls, sponsored ads, bots, news media organizations, friends, pages you follow, and family (a lot/some/very little/none).

Respondents in 2020 were asked questions about the implications of fake news and misinformation that were used as dependent variables in logistic regression equations. Do you think the term fake news reflects an actual problem with the accuracy of news or a label applied by politicians to coverage that they consider to be unfavorable? (actual problem/label). Which of the following best represents your feelings about politicians labeling the press "the enemy of the people"? (the label is accurate/the label undermines press freedom). How much of a threat do you believe misinformation is to our democracy? (not much of a threat/a serious threat). The independent variables were as similar to those used in the Japanese study as possible, as the data sets were collected prior to the authors' collaboration on this project. Independent variables in the equations included demographic indicators for sex, age, and highest level of education. Political interest was an index constructed from items measuring how interested in politics respondents were and how closely they followed the 2020 presidential election (Cronbach's α = .873). Dummy variables were constructed for Republican and Democratic party identification,

with Independent as the reference category. A Trump supporter variable reflected a respondent's preference for Donald Trump "if the election were held today." A number of items took into account respondents' media reliance and trust (reliability). These include the frequency of their use of television news, newspaper news, news websites, candidate websites, media trust, and trust of friends on social media.

Media Reliance in the United States

Many Americans were paying attention to news about the presidential election when the GU-CERL study was conducted in April 2020, as the coronavirus pandemic was starting to take hold in the U.S. Half of the survey respondents reported that they followed election news very closely and another 41% somewhat closely. The public's attention to the presidential election dwindled as news about COVID-19 became a more pressing source of concern and gained prominence in the press. According to a May 2020 Pew Research Center report, 19% of the public was following election news very closely with 33% fairly closely (Jurkowitz, 2020).

Television remains a central source of election news for Americans, as 71% of respondents used TV for news at least sometimes and 44% relied on it frequently. 87% of respondents used online news frequently (59%) or sometimes (28%), although this percentage may be exaggerated as the study was conducted online. Social media was used at least sometimes to follow election news by 70% of respondents. Notably fewer people relied frequently on print newspapers (15%), print magazines (11%), and radio (17%) for election news. (See Figure 8.)

Figure 8
Election Media Use in the U.S. 2020



Election media use in the U.S. differed by party identification. (See Figure 9.) Republicans (52%) were more inclined to watch election news frequently on television than Democrats (44%) or Independents (36%). However, Democrats (67%) and Democrats (59%) were much more likely to get their election news frequently online than Republicans (49%). The percentage of Republicans (39%) and Democrats (38%) who frequently got election news from social media was nearly identical and higher than that of Independents (31%). 23% of Republicans frequently attended to radio news about the election compared to 14% of Democrats and 15% of Independents. Republicans also were slightly more likely to access election news frequently through print newspapers and magazines than Democrats.

Figure 9
Election Media Use in the U.S. by Party Identification
(% Frequently)



χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$ for all categories

Reliability of the Media in the United States

The vast majority of American voters (84%) perceive that there is at least a moderate amount of bias in news coverage of politics. 38% of respondents in 2020 believed that there was a lot of bias in the news, 46% indicated that there was some bias, and 16% perceived little or no bias. There were significant differences in perceptions of bias in the news based on party identification. (See Figure 10.) Republicans (52%) were far more likely to believe that there was a lot of bias in the news compared to Democrats (25%), especially, and Independents (46%). 53% of Democrats felt that the news was somewhat bias while 40% of Republicans and Independents felt this way. Almost a quarter of Democrats felt that there was little or no bias in news coverage of politics compared to 7% of Republicans and 14% of Independents.

Figure 10
Perceived Bias in the News by Party



χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$

Traditional media was viewed as more reliable than social media in reporting news by half of the respondents. 23% of respondents considered social media to be more reliable than traditional sources and 26% felt both sources were equally reliable. (See Figure 11.) There are statistically significant ($p \leq .01$) differences in views of media reliability based on party identification. Democrats (58%) were notably more inclined to view traditional media as more reliable compared to Republicans (44%) and Independents (46%). Conversely, a higher percentage of Republicans (33%) considered social media to be more reliable, followed by Independents (19%) and Democrats (17%). Independents (35%) were the most likely to rate both equally compared to Democrats (25%) and Republicans (23%).

Figure 11
Reliability of Traditional and Social Media by Party



χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$

Differences in trust of news received from social media friends and the media also differs significantly by party identification. As Table 4 indicates, a higher percentage of respondents trusts the news media (29%) a great deal than social media friends (16%). Partisans are more likely to trust their social media friends a great deal than are Independents. The greatest differences, however, are in trust of the news media. Democrats (39%) are far more likely to trust the media a great deal than Republicans (22%) and Independents (19%). Only 16% of Democrats do not trust the media at all compared to 38% of Republicans and 33% of Independents.

Table 4
Trust Social Media Friends and News Media by Party

	Total	Republican	Independent	Democrat
Social Media Friends				
A Great Deal	16%	20%	11%	17%
Some	56%	57%	56%	56%
Little/Not at All	28%	23%	33%	27%
News Media				
A Great Deal	29%	22%	19%	39%
Some	44%	40%	48%	45%
Little/Not at All	27%	38%	33%	16%

χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$

Public Perceptions of "Fake News"

There is little agreement among the general public in the U.S. about the meaning and implications of fake news. A majority of respondents to the 2020 GU CERL survey (57%) thought that there is a difference between fake news and misinformation. 66% believed that fake news reflects an actual problem with the accuracy of news rather than a label applied by politicians to coverage they consider to be unfavorable (34%). A more detailed examination of the findings of the studies in 2018 and 2020 confirms the lack of public consensus about the fake new concept. Trends in public perceptions about fake news across the two years remained fairly stable. In both survey years, the belief that fake news is inaccurate information presented as an objective news story was held by the highest percentage of the public (38% in 2018 and 34% in 2020). The percentage of people who perceived that fake news is a label used by Donald Trump to discredit stories he dislikes declined slightly from 18% to 14%. At the same time, the percentage of respondents who defined fake news as false stories written for profit by people who are not journalists increased slightly in 2020 along with the percentage who considered it to be political propaganda. 9% of the public considered fake news to be reckless reporting by news organizations in 2018 compared to 6% in 2020. A small percentage in each year believes fake news consists of conspiracy theories, hoaxes, and lies spread through the media or that it is satire, like the *Daily Show*. (See Table 5.)

Table 5
Public's Definitions of "Fake News"

	2018	2020
Inaccurate information presented as objective news stories	38%	34%
A label used by Donald Trump to discredit news stories	18%	14%
False stories written for profit by people who are not journalists	14%	17%
Political propaganda	12%	15%
Reckless reporting by news organizations	9%	6%
Conspiracy theories, hoaxes, and lies	6%	8%
Satire, such as the *Daily Show* or *SNL Weekend Update*	4%	5%

Respondents to the survey provided additional insights into their thoughts about fake news in their answers to an open-ended question. These responses reflect the strong ideological divide in perceptions of fake news. A Trump supporter stated: "Fake news is propaganda by the deep state to take out politicians (President Trump) that don't fit in with their narrative." Trump opponents associated fake news with pro-Trump media, especially Fox News. While most people attributed the fake news moniker to Trump, a few associated fake news with Barack Obama: "A label used by Barack Obama to try to channel people away from social media and back to traditional news sources like CNN which are easily controlled by monied and corporate interests." Some people dismissed the entire concept of fake news. One respondent called fake news: "A trendy symbolic word to cause distractions and divided the public—there is no such thing as fake news but there is disinformation."

The definition of fake news that people adopt depends upon their political orientations. (See Figure 12.) There were significant differences in how people defined fake news based on their partisan identification. The largest partisan difference was in perceptions of fake news as a label used to discredit information. 22% of Democrats and 11% of Independents believed that fake news is a label used by Donald Trump to discredit news stories compared to only 1% of Republicans. Independents (38%) were slightly more inclined to claim that fake news is misinformation presented as objective fact than Democrats (34%) and Republicans (32%). Independent (3%) were notably less likely to believe that fake news equates to reckless reporting than Republicans (9%) and Democrats (9%). More Republicans than Democrats or Independents viewed fake news as false stories generated for profit, political propaganda, and satire. A slightly higher percentage of Democrats (10%) than Republicans (8%) and Independents (7%) considered fake news to be conspiracy theories and hoaxes. The differences based on party identification are statistically significant (χ^2 p=.00).

Figure 12
Definition of "Fake News" by Party Identification



Respondents to the 2020 survey were asked how often they received fake news from a variety of sources. As Figure 13 depicts, over 80% of respondents mentioned that they received fake news at least sometimes from trolls—people who intentionally post inflammatory or controversial content online. Over 70% of voters indicated that they get fake news from sponsored ads and bots—automated accounts that executive commands and post content with little human intervention. News media organizations were cited as the source of fake news by 64% of respondents, which is nearly the same percentage (62%) as a frequent source of fake news. Family (52%) and pages the respondent followed (53%) were perceived to be the less prominent fake news sources.

Figure 13
Sources of Fake News



Multivariate Analysis

To more closely examine the factors that influence the public's perceptions of fake news and its consequences, we performed a series of logistic regression analyses. The dependent variables were whether the respondent believed that 1) the term fake news reflects an actual problem or a label applied by politicians to coverage that they consider to be unfavorable; 2) politicians labeling the press the "enemy of the people" is accurate or undermines press freedom; and 3) misinformation is not much of a threat or a serious threat to our democracy. The independent variables were included for sex, age, education political interest, Republican, Democrat, Trump supporter, TV news, newspaper news, news websites, candidate websites, credibility of the media, and credibility of friends on social media. (The findings are presented in Table 6 with additional statistics in the Appendix.)

The first model estimated the probability that a respondent believed the term fake news reflects a label applied by politicians as opposed to an actual problem. Trump supporters clearly believed that fake news is a real problem; this variable was the strongest predictor in the equation. Republicans considered fake news to be a problem, while Democrats viewed the term as a label. People who were interested in politics, relied on news websites, and trusted the news media were more likely to think that fake news was a label as opposed to a problem. The use of candidate websites was associated with the belief that fake news was an actual problem. Age was the only demographic variable that was significant, with older people being more inclined to think that fake news is a problem than younger people. None of the other variables in the equation were statistically significant. The model was moderately strong based on the pseudo R^2 value of .313 (Nagelkerke).

Of the three models, the predictors did the best job of estimating whether politicians labeling the press as the "enemy of the people" undermines press freedom (Nagelkerke R^2 = .490). Being a Trump supporter was strongly associated with believing that the statement is accurate, a trend that is similar to the finding for fake news as an actual problem. The findings for party identification also were in keeping with the results of the prior equation, as Republicans tended to believe that view that "the press is the enemy of the people" is accuate and Democrats felt that it undermines press freedom. Following news websites and trusting the media were significant predictors of the belief that the statement undermines press freedom, while the reverse was apparent for using candidate websites. Older men were the most inclined to agree that "the press is the enemy of the people." Higher education was related to a belief that denigrating the media undermines press freedom. Political interest, TV news reliance, newspaper news reliance, and trust of friends and social media were not statistically significant.

The third equation predicted the view that misinformation was a serious threat to our democracy. The pseudo R^2 (.103) was the weakest among the three equations. The strongest indicator that a respondent believed that misinformation was a threat to democracy was political interest followed by Democratic party identification, reliance on news websites, and trust in the news media. The Trump supporter and Republican variables were not statistically significant. The belief that misinformation is not a serious threat to democracy was related to reliance on TV news and candidate websites. Age was the only demographic variable that was statistically significant, as being older corresponded to a belief that misinformatin was a threat to democracy. Relying on newspapers and trusting friends on social media were not statistically significant.

Table 6
Logistic Regression Analysis of Perceptions and Consequences of Fake News

	Problem or Label	Press Freedom	Threat to Democracy
	B	B	B
Sex	-.168	-.285*	-.005
Age	.011*	.011*	.014**
Education	.021	.073*	-.049
Political interest	.401***	.037	.672***
Republican	-.650***	-.586***	.241
Democrat	.339*	.448**	.301*
Trump Supporter	-1.193***	-1.860***	.016
TV News	-.072	.078	-.220***
Newspapers	.072	-.011	-.005
News websites	.244***	.731***	.295***
Candidate Websites	-.172*	-.394***	-.119*
Credibility (Media)	.562***	.460***	.211***
Credibility (Friends on social media)	.087	-.019	.097
Intercept	-1.234*	.029	-3.489
Nagelkerke R^2	.313	.490	.103

Discussion and Conclusion

The issue of "fake news" has sparked interest and concern in both Japan and the United States. However, the problem is far more widespread in the U.S. than in Japan, especially regarding *political* misinformation. Among the most publicized instances of misinformation in Japan are stories dealing with natural disasters, such as tsunamis and earthquakes. In many cases, the inaccuracies were effectively corrected by government officials and news reports. Only recently in Japan have there been some instances of "fake news" being used as a label to discredit legitimate stories which has become a prevalent practice in the U.S.

To provide context for understanding the "fake news" phenomenon in both countries, this paper has examined the public's media reliance and trust in the media. Television news remains important as a source of political information in both countries. However, some notable differences in media reliance are evident that are consequential for the dissemination of misinformation. In Japan, more people are exposed to election news through traditional media than online news. Newspapers are more important in Japan than in the U.S., where people rely more heavily on online news across a range of platforms. The Japanese public perceived that television is the main source of fake news. The use of social media and video-sharing sites for political information is substantially more prevalent in the U.S. than in Japan. As such, misinformation in the U.S. is brokered through a wider variety of sources across traditional and new media platforms. The American study found that the public considers trolls, sponsored ads, and bots—sources associated with social media and online platforms—to be greater sources of fake news than news organizations. Because social media use for politics is more constrained in Japan, the proliferation of fake political stories in these channels is more limited. Further, party identification is more consequential for people's political media preferences in the U.S. than in Japan. In addition, trust in the media is relatively high in Japan, especially when compared to the U.S. This trend may account for the fact that attempts to discredit press stories by labeling them "fake news" are uncommon and ineffective in Japan, especially when compared to the U.S. Media trust in the U.S. is highly partisan, as Republicans are significantly more inclined to distrust the press than Democrats. Partisanship is not a factor in determining media trust in Japan.

To gain a deeper understanding of the public's perceptions of fake news and misinformation, multivariate analyses were performed using the Japanese and American surveys. It is important to keep in mind that the analyses took different approaches to examining the public's perceptions about fake news which makes it impossible to compare the findings directly. However, the analyses identified factors that are associated with voters' perceptions of fake news in both countries. The Japan study indicated that political interest was a better predictor of exposure to misleading news items than political preference, especially party identification. Support for the Abe administration was significantly related to people's perceptions of fake news stories. There was, in fact, evidence of selective exposure to news items based on a person's support for the Abe administration. In the U.S. study, partisanship and support for Donald Trump were, on balance, somewhat better predictors of people's perceptions of fake news and its consequences than political interest. Trump support was the strongest indicator of respondents' viewing fake news as a real problem and believing that the press is the enemy of the people, although it did not significantly predict the opinion that misinformation is a threat to democracy.

People with higher levels of political interest were more likely to view fake news as a label applied by politicians to stories they dislike than an actual problem and to consider misinformation to be a serious threat to democracy. Media variables also help to explain the public's perceptions of fake news. People in Japan who read newspapers often to receive election news are not likely to believe misleading news items as being true compared to those who do not read newspapers. Newspaper usage was not related to perceptions of fake news and its consequences in the U.S. However, the use of news websites and candidate websites was related to their views of fake news. In addition, Americans' opinions about the credibility of the media were significantly related to their beliefs about fake news.

While the notion of "fake news" has been popularized in Japan and the United States, the differences in how the term has been manifested in the two countries are notable. The political and media environments in each country, as well as variations in the public's orientations toward political news, contribute to these differences. Comparative studies delving deeper into the sources, nature, and consequences of fake news in Japan and the U.S. would contribute to our understanding of this complex and rather elusive concept.

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APPENDIX

Table A1
Logistic regression analyses predicting exposure to misleading news item in the 2019 Japanese national election
Exp (B), Omnibus Chi Square, H-L Test

	10IP	RDCA	RTFP	CTMU
	Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)
Sex	.880	.607	1.080	.997
Age	1.029	1.024	.998	1.002
Education	1.121	1.084	1.183	1.067
Political interest	1.554	1.633	1.618	1.610
Political identification (ruling parties dummy)	1.641	2.570	1.254	1.514
Political identification (opposition parties dummy)	1.771	2.231	1.222	1.497
Support for Abe administration	1.268	1.132	.677	.624
TV news	1.019	1.011	1.017	1.013
Newspapers	1.023	1.035	1.038	1.024
News websites	1.026	1.023	1.025	1.025
News Apps	1.017	1.028	1.021	1.029
Online election campaigns	1.023	1.026	1.047	1.029
Credibility (Television news)	.971	.938	.970	.943
Credibility (Newspapers)	.990	1.016	1.014	1.015
Credibility (Friends on social media)	1.023	1.013	1.090	1.057
Intercept	.000	.004	.001	.023
Omnibus Chi Square Significance	.000	.000	.000	.000
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Significance	.913	.505	.275	.760

Table A2
Logistic Regression Analysis of Perceptions and Consequences of Fake News in the United States
Exp (B), Omnibus Chi Square, H-L Test

	Problem or Label	Press Freedom	Threat to Democracy
	Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)
Sex	.845	.752	.995
Age	1.011	1.012	1.014
Education	1.021	1.076	.953
Political interest	1.493	1.038	1.958
Republican	.713	.639	1.273
Democrat	1.916	1.796	1.351
Trump Supporter	.303	.156	1.106
TV News	1.074	1.081	.803
Newspapers	.931	.989	.995
News websites	1.277	2.076	1.344
Candidate Websites	.842	.675	.888
Credibility (Media)	1.091	.981	1.102
Credibility (Friends on social media)	.570	.631	1.235
Intercept	.291	1.029	.031
Omnibus Chi Square Significance	.000	.000	.000
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Significance	.246	.755	.068