

Quasi-Judicial Oversight of Legislative and Executive Branches at the Local Level

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Abstract

Oversight is a function commonly associated with the legislative branch of government at the federal and state level. To a lesser extent, the concept is extended to the judicial branch in the form of court cases clarifying the powers between the legislative-executive-judicial branches. However, at the local level, the judicial branch may not be limited to oversight of co-equal branches through court cases alone. In the state of California, there exists county-level civil grand juries which are housed in the judicial branch. Civil grand juries, which have endured since the state's founding constitution of 1850, have complete discretion to investigate the operations of local government officials, departments, and agencies. These civil grand juries represent quasi-judicial oversight of local legislative and executive branches of government. How responsive are local legislative and executive branches of governments to such oversight? To answer this question, I explore the relationship between local quasi-judicial oversight, local government responsiveness, and local public opinion using a case study approach.

Keywords: oversight, monitoring, compliance, principal-agent relationships, local government, civil grand jury, California

Introduction

Our understanding of oversight is garnered from U.S. congressional oversight of the executive branch (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), judicial review of executive actions (Humphries and Songer 1999), legislative acts (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011), state government actions (Whittington 2005), and even international organizations (Fjelstul and Carrubba 2018). Additionally, a host of theoretical models of oversight (Miller 2005; Strayhorn, Carrubba, and Giles 2016) contribute to our abstract understanding of oversight. But oversight is not only conducted at the international, federal, or state level.

For over a decade, scholars of local politics have persuasively argued the utility of studying local political actors, institutions, and behaviors (Trounstein 2009; Warshaw 2019). And in addition to exploring questions of representation, accountability, and the allocation of public goods, local politics is accessible and diverse. According to the Census Bureau, as of 2017, there are 90,075 local governments throughout the United States (US Census Bureau n.d.). Oversight by elected county boards, city councils, and special districts is alive and well. But, our general understanding of oversight is not yet informed by these actors and institutions.

Furthermore, elected boards and councils are not the only institutions that oversee. In the state of California, with its 4,444 local governments, there exists county-level civil grand juries which are housed within 58 local county courts. Civil grand juries, which have endured since the state's founding constitution of 1850, have complete discretion to investigate the operations of local government officials, departments, and agencies. These civil grand juries represent quasi-judicial oversight of local legislative and executive branches of government.

Accountability, Representation, and Transparency

In working towards a theory of quasi-judicial oversight of local government, the concepts of accountability, representation, and transparency are informative. In political science, we typically focus on accountability through elections. Electoral accountability features the relationship between voters and elected officials. Two recent articles highlight this relationship with respect to local city councils and county sheriffs (Bucchianeri 2020; DeHart 2020). These articles demonstrate how accountability is exercised by voters at the local level over two unique dimensions of policy: municipal affairs and law enforcement. Thus, accountability at the local level is alive and well, but simply understudied.

The study of representation has produced a deep reservoir of knowledge (Mansbridge 2011; Pitkin 1967). And recent research is examining representation from traditional delegate and trustee theories, and from empowerment and inclusion perspectives. Additionally, scholars are increasingly examining representation at the local level (Warshaw 2019). One facet of representation at the local level which is emerging is the use of non-electoral mechanisms (Bovenkamp and Vollaard 2019). Non-electoral representation includes claims based on "expertise, shared experience, or common identity" (198). Thus, representation can be the result of a dynamic process between electoral and non-electoral claims.

The final strand of research to consider is that on transparency. There is a tension between transparency and secrecy in democracies (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2011). Additionally, transparency in government includes openly providing data, replying to public records requests, allowing for auditors and inspector generals (Feldman 2017), and maintaining whistleblower protections (Santoro and Kumar 2018). At the local level, prior research suggests that the public has strong demands for transparency (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007). Thus, as

transparency becomes ubiquitous, what role can secrecy, the antithesis of transparency, generally play in democracy, and particularly at the local level?

What's the Opposite of Accountable, Representative, and Transparent?

A theory of quasi-judicial oversight of local government should feature elements of accountability, representation, and transparency. To keep the theory tractable, we can operationalize each of these concepts into binary measures of being or not being. For example, a local government can be accountable or not accountable, or representative or not representative, or transparent or not transparent.

It is generally assumed that local governments which are not accountable, not representative, and not transparent are absent within representative democracies, like the United States. However, I argue that civil grand juries, as they exist in the State of California, are precisely this. The fact that these political institutions exist, in the manner that they do, is not meant to begin a normative argument as to whether they should exist or not. Rather, their existence warrants an examination of their implications within representative democracies and on the behavior of political institutions and political actors.

A Brief History of California Civil Grand Juries

The 1849 Constitution of California mentions the term grand jury once. Section 8 declares: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,... unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury”. After reviewing the constitutional convention proceedings (Browne 1850), it does not appear that the concept of grand juries resulted in any recorded debate during the state’s founding.

The state’s constitution was revised again in 1879. And the 1879 Constitution does have additional language regarding grand juries. In Article 1, Declaration of Rights, Section 8 reads as follows: “Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a Magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county.” Unlike 30 years earlier, during this constitutional convention, there was a robust debate about the existence, purpose, and utility of grand juries (Stockton and Willis 1880). While the debate was multi-faceted¹, it essentially boiled down to two sides: support or opposition to grand juries. Supporters of grand juries prevailed. Nearly a hundred years would pass before the constitutional text about grand juries were altered again.

In 1974, the state legislature voted to put Assembly Constitutional Amendment 60, later known as Proposition 7, on the statewide ballot. The proposition reorganized Article 1, repealed Section 8, and created Section 23. Section 23 simply read as: “One or more grand juries shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county.”

The significance of this change was twofold. First, Proposition 7 placed the concept of grand juries in its own section. Unlike the prior 95 years where the concept was grouped with prosecution of offenses, this standalone section clarified the prominence of grand juries in the state's system of governance. Secondly, the amendment clarified that more than one grand jury could be drawn and summoned within a county. While beyond the scope of this manuscript, it

¹ The debate consisted of 13 state constitutional convention delegates: 5 delegates (Campbell, Barbour, Beerstecher, Huestis, and Freeman) spoke in opposition to grand juries, and 9 delegates (Waters, Herrington, Estee, Brown, Barry, Laine, O'Donnell, and Shafter) spoke in support of grand juries.

would be interesting to see how many counties employed this new discretionary power since 1975.

This brief history serves to demonstrate that California’s civil grand juries were a contested political institution in the early years of the state. However, as time passed, the presence of this local institution, which is not electorally accountable, not representative of county populations, and not transparent in its agenda setting, proceedings, or decision making, is firmly established. The focus now turns to the oversight function of civil grand juries, and the implications of this oversight on the behavior of local political institutions and actors.

How Civil Grand Juries Work

California’s civil grand juries are enabled to oversee operations of local governments: cities, counties, school boards, and special districts². Civil grand juries operate in each of the state’s 58 counties and are domiciled in the county court system. The typical process for civil grand juries includes the following: formation, investigation, and report. The figure below visualizes this process.



The formation process begins every year when a county court system seeks applications from citizens residing in the county to serve on a civil grand jury for a one-year term. The selection process for applicants is prescribed by state law. While applicants self-select into the process, in order to be chosen to serve on a grand jury, you have to be interviewed by the court and possess the “necessary qualifications”, and eventually be randomly selected³. The necessary

² According to the California Special Districts Association, “Special districts are local governments created by the people of a community to deliver specialized services essential to their health, safety, economy and well-being. A community forms a special district, which are political subdivisions authorized through a state’s statutes, to provide specialized services the local city or county do not provide.” “Learn About Districts.” n.d. Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.csda.net/special-districts/learn-about>.

³ “CHAPTER 2. Formation of Grand Jury [893 - 913].” n.d. Accessed August 23, 2020. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&division=&title=4.&part=2.&chapter=2.&article=2.

qualifications include citizenship status, 18 years of age or older, no criminal convictions, and not an elected official.

The investigation process occurs after the civil grand jury has formed. According to the California Court’s website⁴, these juries have three functions:

- “Investigating and reporting on the operations of local government (which is known as the "watchdog " function a civil, rather than criminal function),
- “Issuing criminal indictments to require defendants to go to trial on felony charges, and
- “Investigating allegations of a public official’s corrupt or willful misconduct in office, and when warranted, filing an "accusation" against that official to remove him or her from office. The accusation process is considered to be "quasi-criminal" in nature.”

What the civil grand jury investigates is the prerogative of the civil grand jury itself.

There are no limitations, besides only being able to investigate local government operations and officials within its county, placed on civil grand juries. Typically, the source of investigations derives from citizen complaints, grand jury members themselves, or referrals from the prior grand jury.

Finally, the report process commences towards the end of the grand jury’s one-year term. Across California’s 58 county civil grand juries, there is variation in the number of reports issued. Some juries issue a single report, while others file multiple reports. Regardless of the quantity of reports, each report contains background information, findings, and recommendations. In the next section, I will explore the organization of these reports.

Legally Defined Reporting and Response Requirements

California civil grand jury reports have legally defined reporting requirements as stated in California Penal Code, Part 2, Title 4: Grand Jury Proceedings. Section 933 reads: “Each grand jury shall submit to the presiding judge of the superior court a final report of its findings and recommendations that pertain to county government matters during the fiscal or calendar year.”

Recall that civil grand juries can investigate any city, county, school board, or special district located within county boundaries⁵. There are approximately 4,440 local governments in California. Thus, this number represents an upper bound of potential civil grand jury investigations each year. Below is a table of each county and the number of local governments located within its boundaries.

County	#	County	#	County	#
Alameda	88	Madera	35	San Joaquin	130
Alpine	6	Marin	84	San Luis Obispo	61
Amador	31	Mariposa	8	San Mateo	91
Butte	71	Mendocino	73	Santa Barbara	74
Calaveras	48	Merced	86	Santa Clara	93
Colusa	50	Modoc	40	Santa Cruz	57
Contra Costa	105	Mono	29	Shasta	71
Del Norte	27	Monterey	104	Sierra	16

⁴ “Civil Grand Jury.” n.d. Accessed August 23, 2020. <https://www.courts.ca.gov/civilgrandjury.htm>.

⁵ According to Section 933.6 of Title 4, Civil grand juries can also investigate non-profit corporations established by or operated on behalf of a public entity, which increases the number of entities that can be investigated.

El Dorado	78	Napa	26	Siskiyou	82
Fresno	168	Nevada	45	Solano	66
Glenn	46	Orange	132	Sonoma	106
Humboldt	101	Placer	70	Stanislaus	104
Imperial	54	Plumas	50	Sutter	42
Inyo	37	Riverside	146	Tehama	46
Kern	163	Sacramento	148	Trinity	31
Kings	65	San Benito	23	Tulare	161
Lake	40	San Bernardino	162	Tuolumne	35
Lassen	40	San Diego	164	Ventura	75
Los Angeles	346	San Francisco	10	Yolo	53
				Yuba	47

Civil grand jury reports can contain findings and recommendations. Both elements must be responded to by the entity that it relates to. In other words, state law requires that entities investigated by a civil grand jury, and the findings and/or recommendations issued by a grand jury in its report, must be responded to.

With respect to findings, a respondent can agree with the finding or disagree wholly or partially with a finding. When a respondent disagrees, they must explain why they disagree with the finding itself. With respect to recommendations, an entity has four response options: implemented, yet to be implemented, further analysis required, and will not be implemented. Again, an entity is required to explain their response for the latter three options listed.


Each report issued by a civil grand jury essentially establishes a dyad between itself and the investigated entity. The connection is built from the findings, recommendations, and responses. These dyads could serve as the conceptual unit of analysis.

Empirical Analysis: Case Study of the County of San Diego Civil Grand Jury

My empirical analysis employs a qualitative method that relies on a single-county case study (Gerring 2004) and utilizes a politics in time approach (Pierson 2011). My unit of observation is the county of San Diego, located at the southern end of the state, and specifically the county civil grand jury. Of historic note, the county is one of the state’s original 27 counties⁶. From 1970 to 2018, the county’s population has increased from 1.3 million to 3.3 million⁷.

⁶ “Chronology - California State Association of Counties.” n.d. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.counties.org/general-information/chronology>.

⁷ “DataPile - California State Association of Counties.” n.d. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.counties.org/post/datapile>.



The county government maintains a website for the civil grand jury⁸. This website includes an overview, informational video, purpose, goal, members, and reports. As stated on the Purpose web page⁹: “San Diego County's first grand jury was impaneled in 1850 pursuant to the first California Penal Code. The grand jury in California is unusual in that its duties include investigation of county government as provided by statutes passed in 1880. Only a few other states¹⁰ provide for grand jury investigation of county government beyond alleged misconduct of public officials. Today, grand jurors are officers of the court and work together as an independent body representing all the people of the county.”

An interesting aspect about this statement is the claim of the civil grand jury serving as an “independent body representing all the people of the county”. The juxtaposition of a governmental entity being both independent and representative harkens back to the 1879 constitutional convention debate on the existence of civil grand juries. In that debate, Mr. Dennis Willey Herrington of Santa Clara county, speaking in support of the institution, proclaimed: “There is a power that is growing and gaining strength in this land, that by its influence may oppress the poor, and the Grand Jury system will be the sole protection against it. I undertake to say, that we are not free even from the toils of the ambitious on this land.” However, Mr. Charles J. Beerstecher of San Francisco city and county, speaking in opposition, declared: “One objection, above all others, that I have to the Grand Jury system is this: the system removes individual responsibility - divides the responsibility among many.”

The county’s civil grand jury has the following goal¹¹: “The goal of the San Diego County Grand Jury is to serve as a sentinel — a group of impartial citizens that can review the methods and operations of the County of San Diego and its 18 incorporated areas to determine whether they can be made more efficient, effective and responsive to the needs of the community. Jurisdiction also includes school districts, joint power authorities and certain non-profit corporations operated and established by local government within San Diego County.” In

⁸ “Grand Jury.” n.d. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/grandjury.html>.

⁹ “Purpose.” n.d. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/grandjury/purpose.html>.

¹⁰ I do not know what other states also allow for civil grand juries to conduct investigations of local governments

¹¹ “Goals.” n.d. Accessed August 27, 2020. <https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/grandjury/goals.html>.

declaring itself “a sentinel - a group of impartial citizens” the grand jury speaks to one ideal of democratic representation: impartiality. However, during the 1879 constitutional convention debate, Mr. Clitus Barbour of the city and county of San Francisco, who vehemently opposed the existence of grand juries, roared: “When they get through, the District Attorney rises in Court and praises the Grand Jury for the arduous services they have rendered, and the Grand Jury, in return, tickles the District Attorney with resolutions about his promptitude, and give him a lift for the next election. They have accomplished nothing; achieved nothing; done nothing that in any manner can be one particle of use in the administration of criminal justice”. The concern he was speaking to is that grand jurors cannot be impartial because they were selected, at the time, by district attorneys and judges.

There are 6 fiscal years worth of reports¹² available on the county’s civil grand jury website: from 2013-2014 to 2018-2019. During this six-year period, a total of 82 reports were issued by the civil grand jury. Recall that the County of San Diego has 164 local governments within its boundaries ([See Appendix](#)). This means that the civil grand jury, given its discretionary power to investigate any local government within the county boundaries, could investigate up to 164 entities each year. And each year the grand jury can issue reports that contain findings and recommendations, which these local governments would be legally obligated to respond to.

However, during the 6-year period, only 27 out of 164 local governments were investigated by the county. This means that just 16% of local governments had their operations investigated by the civil grand jury. 18 governments were investigated once during this period, 6 were investigated twice, 2 were investigated three times, and 2 were investigated every year ([See Appendix](#)). The table below shows the number of reports and number of governments investigated by fiscal year.

Fiscal Year	# Reports	# Governments Investigated
2013-2014	14	6
2014-2015	14	8
2015-2016	13	17
2016-2017	17	11
2017-2018	13	7
2018-2019	11	19

The last part of this case study is to focus on a specific year and an associated report. During the 2018-2019 fiscal year, the county civil grand jury issued 11 reports. Across these

¹² “Reports.” n.d. Accessed August 28, 2020. <https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/grandjury/reports.html>.

eleven reports, 19 local governments were investigated, 74 findings were declared, and 53 recommendations were made. Below is a table that summarizes the findings and recommendations by report.

Title of Report	Findings	Recommendations
City of San Diego Housing Commission—Achievement Academy ¹³	0	0
Charter School Oversight by San Diego County Small School Districts	4	3
Del Mar Bluffs—The Weak Link in Transportation	3	2
Electric Scooters—Innovation or Disruption?	5	3
Promoting Quality Foster Care in San Diego County—Who Protects Our Most Vulnerable Children?	19	10
Human Trafficking-San Diego Needs Essential Services	9	12
Compensation of San Diego County Board of Supervisors	3	1
San Diego County Detention Facilities-Inspection Report and Inmate Mental Health	4	3
MTS and NCTD—Make Something Good Even Better	7	5
San Diego Psychiatric Services—Tri-City’s Shutdown of Psych Units... Tip of the Iceberg?	8	3
School Safety in San Diego County—How Prepared Are We for Another Active School Shooting?	12	11
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>53</i>

¹³ The grand jury issued a report that lauded the City of San Diego’s Housing Commission, and therefore included no findings or recommendations.

The report titled “Compensation of San Diego County Board of Supervisors”¹⁴ discusses an easily understood public matter: compensation for the county’s five elected Supervisors. The report is organized into the following sections: executive summary, background, methodology, discussion, facts and findings, recommendations, requirements and instructions. The report was filed on May 29, 2019 and contained the following three findings and single recommendation:

- Finding 01: Elected officials who set their own compensation and pensions may have an inherent conflict of interest.
- Finding 02: A charter amendment to limit the ability of elected officials to set their own compensation would eliminate any perception of a conflict of interest.
- Finding 03: A charter amendment would give voters the ability to influence the compensation of their elected officials.
- Recommendation: Consider placing on an upcoming ballot an amendment to Section 402 of the County Charter which would incorporate one of the following options for setting County Supervisors’ compensation (exclusive of possible cost of living increases) with one of three options.

On July 24, 2019, the Chief Administrative Office of the County sent a letter¹⁵ to the Presiding Judge of the San Diego Superior Court with the county’s responses to the civil grand jury’s findings and recommendation:

- Finding 01 Response: The County of San Diego Chief Administrative Officer disagrees with this finding. The law requires certain elected officials to set their salaries therefore it is not an inherent conflict of interest in the legal sense of the term.
- Finding 02 Response: The County of San Diego Chief Administrative Officer disagrees with this finding. It is not possible to conclude perceptions of a conflict of interest will be eliminated by a charter amendment.
- Finding 03 Response: The County of San Diego Chief Administrative Officer agrees with this finding.
- Recommendation Response: The Board of Supervisors will consider this recommendation.

In a search of the county’s major local newspaper, the San Diego Union Tribune, there does not appear to be an article related to the grand jury’s report or the county’s response. The lack of news coverage suggests that matters reported on by the civil grand jury do not warrant the public’s attention. However, in October 2019, the County Board of Supervisors approved pay increases¹⁶ for four other countywide officials: District Attorney, Sheriff, Clerk, and Treasurer. At the time, Supervisor Greg Cox was quoted by the newspaper as stating: “I realize when you talk about salary increases for elected officials it’s never an easy subject to bring up.” Interestingly, back in spring 2017, prior to the sitting of the grand jury that issued the report on compensation, the county Board of Supervisors voted to approve a pay increase for themselves.

¹⁴ San Diego County Civil. 2019. “Compensation of San Diego County Board of Supervisors.” <https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/grandjury/reports/2018-2019/BoardofSupervisorsCompensationReport.pdf>.

¹⁵ County of San Diego. n.d. “County’s Response to the Civil Grand Jury's Report.” https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/grandjury/reports/2018-2019/CoSD_Response_Master.pdf.

¹⁶ Diego, Nbc San. 2019. “County Board of Supervisors Approve Pay Raises For Top Elected Officials.” NBC San Diego. October 30, 2019. <https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/pay-raises-elected-officials-board-supervisors/2060853/>.

Concluding Remarks

Developing a theory of quasi-judicial oversight of local government will take more than a single case study. However, the case study above suggests that California's civil grand juries can be a useful, and arguably, rare empirical referent by which to develop a robust theory that can be extended with future research.

I believe this future research can offer two theoretical advances in the literature on oversight and accountability of political actors and institutions. The first advance is extending principal-agent models of oversight to incorporate a third-party actor with perfect discretionary investigatory power. The canonical principal-agent model assumes information asymmetry and moral hazard (Miller 2005). Extensions of this model have veered towards multiple principals and multiple agents (Gailmard 2009; Voorn, Genugten, and Thiel 2019). What has not yet informed theoretical models has been the empirical existence of a quasi-judicial actor that has complete discretion to access information from an agent without costs. California civil grand juries are an empirical representation of such an actor.

The second theoretical advance can be to demonstrate that political institutions can be held accountable by non-electoral, quasi-judicial actors. Accountability is a consistently explored area in political science and economics (McGee 2019; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; Przeworski, Stokes, Stokes, and Manin 1999). And much of the literature seems fixed on the normative idea that accountability must require dynamic, democratic, and electoral engagement. However, California civil grand juries essentially represent the opposite of this normative notion: they are housed in the judicial branch, grand jurors are interviewed by locally elected judges and then randomly selected, and they operate in secret. How can these non-democratic actors ensure the accountability of democratic political institutions?

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Appendix: List of 164 Local Governments in County of San Diego, California

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|---|--|---|
| 1. County Of San Diego | Regional Airport Authority | 69. Valley Center Fire Protectn Dist |
| 2. City Of Carlsbad | | 70. Cuyamaca Water District |
| 3. City Of Chula Vista | 43. Quantification Settlement Agreement Joint Powers Authority | 71. North County Dispatch Joint Powers Agency |
| 4. City Of Coronado | | 72. Jacumba Community Services District |
| 5. City Of El Cajon | 44. Metro Wastewater Joint Powers Authority | 73. Heartland Communications Facilities Authority |
| 6. City Of Escondido | 45. San Diego Model School Development Agency | 74. San Diego Regional Building Authority |
| 7. City Of Imperial Beach | 46. California Municipal Finance Authority | 75. North County Fire Prot Dist |
| 8. City Of La Mesa | 47. California Qualified School Bond Joint Powers Authority | 76. San Diego Pooled Insurance Prog Auth For Municipal Entities |
| 9. City Of National City | 48. Encinitas Ranch Golf Authority | 77. Fairbanks Ranch Community Services District |
| 10. City Of Oceanside | 49. Regional Solid Waste Association (Rswa) | 78. Whispering Palms Cmty Svcs Dist |
| 11. City Of San Diego | 50. San Diego County Energy Authority | 79. San Miguel Consolidated Fire Protection District |
| 12. City Of Solana Beach | 51. Imperial Valley Schools Joint Powers Authority | 80. San Diego County School Risk Management Authority |
| 13. City Of Encinitas | 52. San Diego Regional Public Safety Training Institute | 81. Lakeside Fire Protection Dist |
| 14. City Of Del Mar | 53. Encina Wastewater Authority | 82. Leucadia Co Water District |
| 15. City Of Poway | 54. Encina Financing Jp Agreement | 83. Olivenhain Municipal Water District |
| 16. City Of Santee | 55. Public Agencies Self-Insurance System | 84. Otay Municipal Water District |
| 17. City Of San Marcos | 56. San Diequito River Valley Regional Open Space Park Jpa | 85. Questhaven Munic Water Dist |
| 18. City Of Vista | 57. San Elijo Joint Powers Authority | 86. Ramona Cemetery District |
| 19. City Of Lemon Grove | 58. Vista Jt Powers Financing Auth | 87. Ramona Municipal Water District |
| 20. Alpine Fire Protection District | 59. Heartland Fire Training Authority | 88. Vallecitos Water District |
| 21. Bonita-Sunnyside Fire Protection District | 60. San Diego Workforce Partnership Inc | 89. South Bay Irrigation District |
| 22. North County Cemetery District | 61. California Maritime Infrastructure Authority | 90. Tri-City Healthcare District |
| 23. Greater San Diego County Resource Conservation District | 62. San Diego Geographic Information Source District | 91. Valley Center Cemetery District |
| 24. Fallbrook Healthcare District | 63. Water Conservation Garden Authority | 92. Sweetwater Authority |
| 25. Fallbrook Public Utility District | 64. Rancho Santa Fe Community Services District | 93. Oceanside Building Authority |
| 26. Grossmont Healthcare District | 65. Descanso Comm Servs Water Dist | 94. San Diego Metropolitan Transportation Development Board |
| 27. Helix Water District | 66. Deer Springs Fire Protectn Dist | 95. San Diego Association Of Governments (Sandag) |
| 28. Lakeside Water District | 67. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Prot Dist | 96. Public Agency Self Insurance System |
| 29. Lower Sweetwater Fire Prot Dt | 68. Rural Fire Protection District | 97. Santa Margarita-San Luis Rey Watershed Planning |
| 30. Mission Resource Conservation District | | |
| 31. Palomar Health District | | |
| 32. Pomerado Cemetery Dist | | |
| 33. Rainbow Mun Water District | | |
| 34. Rancho Santa Fe Fire Protection District | | |
| 35. Rincon Del Diablo Mun Water Dt | | |
| 36. San Diego Co Water Authority | | |
| 37. Santa Fe Irrigation District | | |
| 38. Upper San Luis Rey Resource Conservation District | | |
| 39. Valley Center Municipal Water District | | |
| 40. Vista Fire Protection Dist | | |
| 41. Vista Irrigation District | | |
| 42. San Diego County | | |

Agency	Dist	
98. Serra Cooperative Library System	119. Bonsall Unified School District	141. National Elem Sch Dist
99. Southern Ca Intergovernmental Training-Development Center	120. Borrego Springs Unif Sch Dist	142. Palomar Community College District
100. San Diego Unified Port District	121. Cajon Valley Union School District	143. Oceanside Unif Sch Dist
101. Yuima Municipal Water District	122. Cardiff Elem Sch Dist	144. Poway Unified School District
102. Borrego Springs Fire Protection District	123. Carlsbad Unif School District	145. Ramona City Unif Sch Dist
103. Lake Cuyamaca Recreation And Park Dist	124. Chula Vista Elem Sch Dist	146. Rancho Santa Fe Elem Sch Dist
104. Mootamai Municipal Water Dist	125. Coronado Unif Sch Dist	147. San Marcos Unified Sch Dist
105. Morro Hills Community Services District	126. Dehesa Elem Sch Dist	148. San Diego City Unif Sch Dist
106. Pauma Municipal Water District	127. Del Mar Union Elem Sch Dist	149. San Dieguito Union High School Dist
107. Pauma Valley Community Services District	128. Encinitas Union Elem Sch Dist	150. San Pasqual Union Sch Dist
108. Pine Valley Fire Protec Dist	129. Escondido Union Elem Sch Dist	151. Santee School District
109. Rincon Ranch Comm Services Dist	130. Escondido Union High Sch.Dist	152. San Ysidro Elem Sch Dist
110. Canebrake County Water District	131. Fallbrook Union Elem Sch Dist	153. Solana Beach Elem Sch Dist
111. Julian Community Services District	132. Fallbrook Union High School Dist	154. South Bay Union School District
112. Valley Center Community Services District	133. Grossmont Union High School Dist	155. Spencer Val Elem Sch Dist
113. Borrego Water District	134. Jamul-Dulzura Union School Dist	156. Sweetwater Union High Sch Dist
114. Wynola Water District	135. Julian Union Elem Sch Dist	157. Vallecitos Elem Sch Dist
115. San Luis Rey Municipal Water Dist	136. Julian Union High School Dist	158. Vista Unified Sch Dist
116. North San Diego County Transit Development Board	137. Lakeside Union Elementary School District	159. Warner Unified School District
117. Padre Dam Municipal Water District	138. La Mesa-Spring Valley Elem	160. Valley Center-Pauma Unified School District
118. Alpine Union Elem Sch	139. Lemon Grove School District	161. Grossmont Cuyamaca Community College District
	140. Mountain Empire Unif Sch Dist	162. Southwestern Community College District
		163. Mira Costa Community College District
		164. San Diego Community College District

Appendix: List of San Diego County Local Governments Investigated by Fiscal Year

Name of Local Government	FY 13-14	FY 14-15	FY 15-16	FY 16-17	FY 17-18	FY 18-19	Total
Bonsall Unified School District						1	1
Cajon Valley Union School District						1	1
Chula Vista Elem Sch Dist						1	1
Dehesa Elem Sch Dist						1	1
Rancho Santa Fe Elem Sch Dist						1	1
Santee School District				1			1
Spencer Val Elem Sch Dist						1	1
Escondido Union High Sch.Dist						1	1
Julian Union High School Dist						1	1
Sweetwater Union High Sch Dist						1	1
Poway Unified School District				1			1
Warner Unified School District						1	1
City Of Chula Vista			1				1
City Of El Cajon			1				1
City Of La Mesa			1				1
City Of Lemon Grove			1				1

City Of Oceanside			1				1
City Of Santee			1				1
North San Diego Water Reuse Coalition			1				1
San Diego Convention Center Corporation		1					1
San Ysidro Elem Sch Dist			1			1	2
San Dieguito Union High School Dist				1		1	2
Carlsbad Unif School District				1		1	2
San Diego City Unif Sch Dist	1	1					2
City Of Escondido			1	1			2
San Diego Co Spl Schs Oper By Co Supt			1	1			2
North San Diego County Transit Development Board				1	1	1	3
San Diego Metropolitan Transportation Development Board			1		1	1	3
City Of San Diego	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
County Of San Diego	1	1	1	1	1	1	6