

Personality, Context, and Support for Autocracy in Latin America

Introduction

At the end of the 20th century, after years of dictatorship reigning, it seemed that democracy had won the political battle (Abramowitz 2018). Yet, after several decades of democracy's triumph the world is now witnessing a reversal of this trend. In previous episodes of backsliding the major threat to democracy came from military coups, totalitarianism, or communism (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). In the current era, the main threat to democracy's survival is the preferences of some of its citizens who support autocratic forms of government. In fact, since the Cold War ended most democratic breakdowns have occurred by elected governments (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Given that democracies are now increasingly vulnerable from within, it is of utmost importance that we understand why do some individuals prefer autocracy while others support democracy.

Latin America is especially vulnerable with respect to this rejection of democracy among the public. According to data from the *AmericasBarometer*, since 2016 there has been a significant decrease in the average support for democracy in the region. While in 2014 66% affirmed that democracy is the best form of government, in 2018 only 57% said so. Perhaps more alarming is the fact that this rejection of democracy coincides with increasing levels of support for autocracy. In 2018, data from the *Latinobarómetro* showed that on average across all countries, 15% of Latin Americans believed that an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic one. Likewise, data from the *Americas-*

Barometer shows that in 2018 almost 40% of Latin Americans justify military coups when crime or corruption are high and 24% of citizens support executive takeovers (i.e. the president closing congress and courts and governing without these) when the country is facing difficult times. This evidence shows that in many countries an important proportion of people would entertain non-democratic political systems to rule their countries. The sad fact remains that, despite all the devastation that autocratic governments have caused to humanity, many still believe that these are desirable.

Clearly, this is not a new question in the literature as several authors have sought to understand why citizens reject democracy and subsequently support autocracy. Modernization theories tell us that economic development and the expansion of education foster tolerance and interpersonal trust that support democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Nevertheless, we know that empirical evidence for these theories is inconclusive, specially for developing countries (Booth and Seligson 2009). Further works have focused on the importance that short-term factors have for citizen democratic support. For some, individuals increase their support for democracy when they perceive that it delivers clear short-term improvements to their quality of life (Booth and Seligson 2009; Bratton and Mattes 2001). Others argue that those who perceive that their life has improved under democracy are nonetheless *more* likely to support autocratic measures that imply the concentration of power in the hands of incumbent officials (Singer 2018). All of this implies that current theories for why some individuals support autocracy while others prefer democracy are inconclusive and even contradictory.

My theory of personality and support for autocracy seeks to advance this debate by arguing that differences in people's personality - as exemplified by the Big Five model - explain why some individuals support autocracy while others prefer democracy. Personality traits speak to individuals overall patterns of behaviors in regards to the ways in which they relate with the social world. Hence, given a set of environmental conditions people develop political attitudes that are largely shaped by stable individual level

differences that speak to the overall style of a person's adjustment and engagement with the social world (McCrae and Costa Jr 2010). The Big Five model of personality summarizes human personality in five broad traits: Openness Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Emotional Stability. While these do not attempt to cover all possible personality traits (as these are extremely broad), scholars have agreed that the Big Five captures the most basic and fundamental differences in personality traits (McCrae and John 1992).

I hypothesize that one of the Big Five traits has important consequences for understanding individual support for autocracy and democracy. Specifically, I argue that people with a closed personality - those who score low in the personality trait of openness to experience - support autocracy because they seek political and social structures that repress diversity and enforce homogeneity (Kruglanski 2013; Mondak 2010). Likewise, since closed people are particularly affected by external threats that bring about uncertainty and disorder in society, they tend to support autocratic leaders that seek to restore order. In contrast, people who seek diverse social interactions and enjoy being exposed to a variety of ideas - individuals who score high on openness to experience - tend to prefer democratic structures that encourage citizen participation in politics and freedom of thought. Previous arguments about individual support for autocracy, based solely on structural factors or the effect of economic growth and government performance, miss the critical way that basic human characteristics interact with contextual factors to shape political preferences.

Perhaps more importantly, personality's effect on people's support for autocratic forms of governance is also shaped by contextual conditions. That is, the ways in which low openness to experience influences people's tendencies to support autocracy (and reject democracy) is influenced by the political and social contexts in which they live in (Benet-Martínez 2008). Given that personality's effect in the social world is influenced by environmental stimuli, it is necessary to understand how closed personalities interact with

environmental cues to shape their support for autocratic forms of governance. A long-standing literature in political science, and particularly scholars looking at the Latin American case, has sustained that when democratic countries are experiencing economic, political, social, and security issues, citizens become disenchanted with democracy and, subsequently, are more likely to support autocratic forms of governance (Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011; Smith and Sells 2016). Contextual conditions regarding the state of the economy, crime, corruption, and social unrests are particularly important for understanding citizen rejection of democracy in the Latin American case precisely because these contextual conditions are central to politics and have previously ignited authoritarian sentiments among the population (Perez 2003; Singer 2018; Smith and Sells 2016).

In this paper I argue that individuals with a closed personality are predisposed to support autocratic forms of governance because these repress diversity and enforce uniformity of thought and action (H1). As established before, the effect of personality on individuals' support for autocratic forms of governance is heightened under certain conditions of threat that are particularly important for the Latin American case. Specifically, I argue that closed personalities are particularly affected by two kinds of contextual factors: crisis and civil disobedience threats.

Crisis threats speak to contexts in which the economy's performance is bad, crime and insecurity are high, and corruption among public officials is widespread. Civil disobedience threats, refer to contexts filled with social unrests, massive protests against authorities, and disobedience towards authorities in power. Crises threats have the potential to increase closed individuals support for autocracy because these create a sense of uncertainty and a threat to personal well-being. Likewise, civil disobedience threats increase support for autocracy among closed personalities because these threats imply heightened disorder and disruption of the status-quo. Therefore, I argue that crises and/or civil disobedience threats heighten closed personalities support for autocratic forms of gover-

nance, because these ignite their needs for security and order. In contrast, during normal times, closed people will remain ambivalent towards their support for autocracy (H2).

In this paper, I provide empirical evidence for both the direct and conditional relationships between the personality trait of low openness and citizen support for autocratic forms of governance. To do so, I rely on existent public opinion data from the *Americas-Barometer* for 2010 and original survey experiments that I conducted in Chile and Ecuador in 2019 to evaluate my hypotheses. In what follows, I present an overview of the existent literature with respect to citizen support for autocracy in Latin America. Following that, I develop my argument and hypotheses with respect to the relationship between closed personalities and support for autocratic forms of governance. The next section provides the data, methods, and results that evaluate my argument. Finally, I conclude with some implications of my research.

What we (think) we know about autocratic Attitudes

Given this, how can we explain autocratic attitudes amongst Latin American citizens? We should be able to answer this question by examining the literature on democratic support. As per the *civic culture* and modernization literatures, the expansion of education and economic growth allows societies to develop and foster democratic principles of fairness, equality, trust, and tolerance (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The expansion of such values along with an increase in social capital are theorized to cultivate citizen support for democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009). Scholars have shown that there is no lack of democratic values in Latin America. In fact, the political culture of the region is quite compatible with democracy (Booth and Seligson 1984; Seligson and Booth 1993; Smith and Sells 2016). However, evidence in support of modernization theory in Latin America is mixed as the effects of interpersonal trust, social capital, and tolerance on citizen support for democracy are not stable across different contextual and temporal spaces (Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2001b, 2007). Finally, while increas-

ing levels of education and income increase individuals' support for democratic ideals (i.e. polyarchy), this does not affect their willingness to support non-democratic forms of governance (Carlin and Singer 2011). Indeed, recent evidence shows that more educated individuals are equally likely as less educated ones to support autocratic measures - such as the president closing the other branches of government or limiting the opposition's political rights (Singer 2018).

If long-term factors give us little leverage to explain citizens' support for autocratic measures, we might find some answers by looking at short-term explanations. Citizens may value democracy as an end in itself, but they also judge it based on its performance and, thus, the kind of governments that it produces. For many individuals, support for democracy stems from its capacity to deliver improvements in the quality of life, representation, and good governance. Therefore, when these demands are not met democracy's legitimacy weakens. Hence, good economic and political performance bolsters democratic support as it improves citizens' quality of life; while bad economic times may create frustration with democracy as it fails to meet citizens' expectations (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Likewise, people who see their situation improve under democracy - its winners - are more likely to support the democratic status quo. Given these findings in the literature, some think that democracy's losers are individuals who are more likely to embrace autocratic attitudes (Booth and Seligson 2009). Additionally, perceptions and experience of corruption, as well as crime victimization have been found to diminish citizen support and trust in democratic institutions (Carlin and Singer 2011; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010; Perez 2003).¹

On the other hand, recent arguments have suggested that it is the so-called "winners" - those who see their political and economic interests being protected under the current

¹However, there is evidence that such effects are conditional on economic performance: when things are good voters are willing to forgive crime and corruption - at least moderate levels of these; it is in bad times that citizens' tolerance of violence and corrupt politicians lowers Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013).

government - the ones willing to cede power to leaders as a way to protect their status in society. Contrary to the standard arguments in the legitimacy literature, in this view, citizens who perceive an improved (national or personal) economy, consider that corruption is not widespread, and/or those who feel secure are likely to delegate authority to incumbents who seek to bypass the other branches of government or limit the opposition's civil liberties and political rights (Singer 2018; Svolik 2019). And while these arguments are attractive explanations for the recent rise of "delegative democracies" in some countries in Latin America, their evidence only explains citizens support for greater consolidation of power in the executive. Thus, they are unable to explain individuals' continued support for the dissolution of other government branches (e.g. Congress and the Courts) (Singer 2018).

Therefore, if performance theories cannot provide an explanation for why there are citizens who profess autocratic attitudes in countries with strong and stable democratic institutions and neither can they explain citizens' acceptance for the elimination of the democratic status quo, then we still need an explanation for why autocratic attitudes are still prevalent among Latin American societies. And even if performance arguments shed some light on the conditions under which citizens are willing to cede authority to incumbents, they cannot explain why citizens within countries experiencing the same economic, political, and social changes differ in their preferences towards supporting autocratic forms of governance.

The Argument

Building from personality theories, I argue that personality characteristics - specifically having a closed personality - influence individual responses to stimuli coming from their political and social worlds. Latin America is a region characterized by a history of centralization of power, as well as political and social exclusion. Hence, individual predispositions that speak of individuals' propensity to be intolerant of diversity and to seek the

establishment of hierarchical structures have important implications for our understanding of autocratic attitudes in the region. Moreover, while citizens living within a country are affected by the same national-level phenomena, their reactions vary depending on their unique personality characteristics (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). As such, I hold that while personality predisposes individuals to be supportive of autocracy, certain contextual factors in individuals' environments ignite the effect of personality on citizen support for autocracy. Such an approach allows us to explain why in spite of improvements at the country level (e.g., increasing education and income), we still observe an important proportion of Latin Americans supporting autocratic rule. This approach also helps bridge conflicting arguments regarding the effect of government performance on autocratic attitudes. Differences in human cognition regarding whether one seeks difference and diversity as a threat shape the ways in which individuals' perceive and evaluate political and social events influencing, in turn, their willingness to over-delegate authority to incumbents paving the way for autocracy. Put simply, some individuals have a latent predisposition to prefer autocracy over democracy. Yet, contextual factors ignite the effects of personality on people's support for autocratic forms of governance.

Shedding light on the individual-level differences that lead some to support autocratic forms of power offers several contributions. First, it allows us to explain why citizens living within the same country and experiencing the same structural phenomena have differential preferences towards autocratic versus democratic arrangements. Second, it provides a way to understand how personality characteristics may act as a buffer for contextual factors that the literature identifies as leading to increased citizen support for autocratic forms of governance. Third, while there has been some exploration on citizen support for autocratic regimes in Latin America, most of it has focused on individual's demographic profiles, or their attitudes and experiences with the economy, crime, and corruption (Booth and Seligson 2009; Singer 2018). And while these are important, the empirical evidence shows contradictory and unsatisfactory results. Finally, my argument

focuses on different aspects of citizen support for autocratic forms of governance. I employ different measures that tap onto various aspects of autocratic attitudes among the citizenry that allows me to cover a wide range of attitudes that characterize Latin Americans' political authoritarianism.

Personality & Politics

Personality traits are stable individual level differences in people's reactions to various environmental stimuli. These traits speak to the overall style of a person's adjustment and engagement with the social world: how one thinks, acts, and feels about things in general. It is a person's unique signature of how she or he expresses oneself in a range of situations and over a relatively long period of time (McAdams and Pals 2006). Research has found that personality is shaped by genetic differences and early childhood experiences and that, while it varies minimally throughout one's life, it has limited susceptibility to social and contextual influences later in life (Costa and Paul 1996; McAdams and Pals 2006). Personality differences can explain why some citizens prefer autocratic arrangements over democratic ones precisely due to individual coping strategies in the face of different political events.

Citizens are exposed to a variety of stimuli that necessitate the development of strategies and behaviors to cope with varying circumstances. Economic changes, crime threats, social unrest, and corruption scandals are some of the political issues that citizens encounter in their day to day exchanges with politics. These situations create uncertainty in individuals' minds as they do not know what will happen nor what they can do about changing economic, social, and political circumstances. After all, ordinary citizens have limited influence regarding how politicians deal with everyday issues. However, citizens *do* have opinions as regards to the ways they believe politics should work and they develop political attitudes and behaviors that speak to their position vis-à-vis current issues. That is, people develop political beliefs that meet their existential and epistemic needs to

reduce uncertainty, develop a sense of security, and simplify reality in order to provide some assurance that they have the ability to manage changing issues of the day (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Jost et al. 2003).

Clearly, people will develop different attitudes *depending on the ways in which they respond to political stimuli*. Given a set of environmental conditions, individuals' adjustment and engagement with the social and political world is largely shaped by their dispositional traits: by "stable individual level differences in people's motivational reactions to circumscribed classes of environmental stimuli" (Denissen and Penke 2008, p.1286). For the most part, research in psychology has agreed on a holistic model of personality known as the Big Five Factor Model developed through lexical analyses. This model of personality has been applied across various cultures and languages and the evidence has been consistent with a five-factor depiction of trait structure (Mondak et al. 2011). Therefore, the Big Five model argues that human individuality can be summarized by the following traits:

Openness to experience describes interest in and curiosity for new experiences and ideas, as well as a propensity to engage in high risk behaviors and a positive response to novel stimuli. Its opposite is close-mindedness, which implies a preference for predictability and established routines, ideas, and traditions. **Conscientiousness** describes socially prescribed impulse control that eases task and goal oriented behaviors: delaying gratification, following norms, planning, and organizing. **Emotional Stability** describes even temperedness and speaks to the control of impulses and emotions, which contrasts with negative emotionality, or the greater propensity to feeling anxious, nervous, and tense. **Agreeableness** contrasts a prosocial orientation with others that contrasts with antagonism. It describes individuals that are usually cooperative, sympathetic, altruistic and seek to avoid confrontation and conflict with their peers. **Extraversion** implies a sociable, lively, active approach and positive emotionality towards the social and material world. This is in contrast with introversion, which involves withdrawal, passivity, and

shyness as regards individuals interaction with their environments (Caprara and Vecchione 2013; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008).

The Big Five traits represent personality at the broadest level of abstraction; each of the aforementioned dimensions summarize distinct and more specific personality differences (John and Srivastava 1999). Given their social components, it is of no wonder that scholars have sought to explain certain political attitudes and beliefs with reference to individuals' personality differences. Most of this literature has focused on explaining political ideology, partisanship, participation in politics, and economic and social attitudes in the United States and Western Europe (Caprara et al. 2006; Gerber et al. 2011, 2010; Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017). The most consistent finding from these works shows that individuals high in Openness to Experience usually identify with a liberal/left-leaning ideology and parties, while - although to a lesser extent - those who are highly Conscientious tend to identify with conservative ideologies and parties (Alford and Hibbing 2007; Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). Similarly, scholars have found that these traits are related to people's support for liberal/conservative social and economic policies and that the strength and, sometimes, the direction of the effects varies across sub-populations (Gerber et al. 2010).

Since Adorno et al. (1950)'s influential work on *The Authoritarian Personality* where the authors identified specific personality characteristics linked to autocratic attitudes - namely submission, cynicism, aggression, rigidity, and conventional values - most of the research has gravitated towards identifying individual-level characteristics associated with intolerance of difference, prejudice, and social polarization (Altemeyer 1998; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). However, few studies have theorized about the relationship between personality traits - as exemplified in the Big Five - and citizen support for autocratic forms of government. Existent work focuses on citizen support for punitive measures against minorities and social deviants and the use of such outcomes is labeled as autocratic attitudes. However, such attitudes do not ask whether citizens sup-

port autocratic measures such as the executive limiting the opposition's political rights or eliminating Congress or the Courts; which are outcomes that the literature on Latin America has looked at. Nor does existing research theorize about citizen preference for autocracy over democracy. Given that most of this research has been conducted in the U.S and Western Europe - contexts where democracy is stable - it is possible that scholars have assumed that citizens in these countries naturally prefer democratic regimes.² This is precisely why Latin America provides a good case for understanding what makes some citizens support autocratic governance. While democracy has survived for 40 years since the last wave of democratization in Latin America, it is certainly not as developed as in the West. This gives us some room to theorize about the nature and roots of citizen preference for autocratic versus democratic political arrangements.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Individuals who have a closed personality are more likely to support autocratic forms of governance than those who have an open personality.*

Personality and Contextual Triggers: Crisis Threats

The ways in which low openness to experience shapes individuals' autocratic attitudes can be noted through a focus on the political history of the Latin American region since the Third Wave of democratization, and specifically on the contextual factors that have been crucial in influencing citizens' positions towards autocracy and democracy. First, historically Latin America has struggled with weak and unstable economic development and high levels of income inequality among its population (Booth and Seligson 2009; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013). The existence of these "pockets of underdevelopment" have led many scholars affirm that such factors posit an important obstacle for democracy to flourish and sustain itself (Kline, Wade, and Wiarda 2018). Indeed, as Przeworski et al. (2000) famously found economic development might not be necessarily linked to


²Recent work has found that some citizens in the United States support military coups under conditions of high crime and corruption. However, scholars argue that these attitudes should not be of concern given that the proportion of individuals holding such preferences is comparatively low. See (Zechmeister 2018).

the onset of democracy, but it is connected to its sustainability and survival. The fact is that unstable economies and high levels of inequality have led many citizens to become disenchanted with the prospects of democracy, subsequently leading some parts of the population to seek non-democratic alternatives as a way-out (Smith 2005).

Moreover, it is not only that economic development has historically been considered a major obstacle for democracy in the region, it is also the case that the economy is so important for Latin American politics that political elites have been historically divided along an economic dimension (Herbert et al. 2010). Certainly, the centrality of the economy is also present among the minds of Latin American citizens. Evidence of this is the fact that citizens in the region constantly place the economy - or some aspect related to it (e.g. unemployment) as the most important problem affecting their countries.

Figure 1 shows data from the *AmericasBarometer* from 2006 to 2018 for the percentage of people across Latin America and the U.S. who believe that the economy is the most important problem facing their countries. The data shows that, on average from 2006 to 2018, 37% of people across all Latin American countries considered that the economy is the most pressing problem affecting their country. In contrast, only 10% of U.S. citizens consider the economy to be the most important problem in their country. Furthermore, data from the most recent wave of the *AmericasBarometer* shows that impressive 56% of people in Latin America consider that the national economy has worsened over the last year, versus only 23% in the U.S.

The data just mentioned shows that when we compare Latin America to more economically developed countries - such as the U.S. - we observe that citizens in the region perceive the economy as a factor that creates a sense of insecurity and threat. Given that economic issues are central to Latin American politics and the fact that an important proportion of citizens believe that it is the most pressing issue in the country, we have enough reason to believe that poor economic conditions constitute a major threatening factor to the lives of many Latin Americans. To the extent that political elites in Latin America




Source: Americas Barometer

Figure (1) Economy as the Most Important Problem

shape their discourses mostly around economic issues and place these at the center of the stage, as is documented in Herbert et al. (2010) and if people believe that the economy is a continuous pressing issue in Latin America then, we have reason to believe that economic factors are central to the ways in which individuals form their political attitudes. Moreover, if existent literature is correct and citizens who perceive that the economy is performing badly are more likely to see in authoritarianism a viable and desirable solution to these problems (Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011; Smith 2005); then, we have enough reason to assert that poor economic conditions can be considered by the Latin American public as a major threat to their well-being and that these threats may have the capacity to increase authoritarian sentiments among certain sectors of the population.

Along with the economy, issues with respect to political corruption have become crucial shapers of the Latin American political arena. This is specially the case since the Odebrecht scandal rose to light in 2016 exposing the corrupt acts of numerous politicians across various Latin American countries (Orta 2017). The scandal involved Brazilian construction conglomerate Odebrecht (hence the name) paying bribes to public officials and secretly contributing to political campaigns in exchange for the concession of construction projects across various countries in Latin America. As a result, dozens of executives and politicians have been arrested or are under investigation on grounds that they accepted bribes from Odebrecht officials and overcharged construction contracts in their countries (BBC 2019) .

Even though corruption became a major concern after the Odebrecht scandal came to light, Latin American citizens have expressed their concerns with respect to political corruption for quite a long time. Figure 2 below shows the percentage of individuals across each Latin American country who believe that corruption among public officials is widespread. As we can see, there is great variation across and within countries with respect to people's evaluations of how widespread corruption is among public officials.



Source: Americas Barometer

Figure (2) Corruption Evaluations Latin America

In some countries corruption was particularly high around 2008 and 2010, while in others it has reached its highest values in the last couple of years. Importantly, the average sentiment among Latin Americans shows that most individuals believe that corruption is a major problem in their countries. The average percentage of individuals believing that corruption is widespread from 2004 to 2018 hovers around 79%. Moreover, democratic institutions across Latin America seem to be unable to control corruption. Figure 3 below presents data for 2018 for Latin America and some OECD countries from VDEM for their political corruption index that assesses the pervasiveness of different types of corruption at the executive, legislative, and judicial level. In this index, higher values correspond to increasing levels of corruption.




Figure (3) Political Corruption Latin America & OECD Countries

Again, there is great variation with respect to levels of corruption across Latin American countries with Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica at the bottom and Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua at the top. Yet, we can also observe that the values for this in-

dex, among Latin American countries - lean towards the upper end of of the corruption index. Most of the countries in Latin America - with the exception of Chile, Uruguay, and, although to a lesser extent, Costa Rica - show much greater levels of political corruption than OECD countries (e.g., the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom). This implies that corruption is not only a major concern for Latin American people, but also that institutions are corrupt and political elites have been unable to fight it. Moreover, the values that we observe for OECD countries show that corruption is a much more important concern in Latin America than in these countries. Finally, this comparison allows us to understand how corruption might be perceived by individuals as a threat to their well-being, which, in turn, has the power to influence their political attitudes.


The impact of corruption on support for autocracy relies on the notion that citizens feel threatened by such circumstances leading them to lose faith in democracy. The literature in comparative political behavior has documented that perceptions of widespread corruption and high levels of corruption victimization lower democratic attitudes among the public (Cruz 2006; Salinas and Booth 2011; Seligson 2001a). Thus, high levels of corruption imply that citizens must abide by a set of norms and expectations that are not clearly defined and, as such, are unpredictable. Moreover, high levels of corruption mean that public officials are using public funds for private gain, which, in turn, affects citizens' prosperity and well-being. For all these reasons, there seems to be something about corruption that has the ability to make citizens - or at least a proportion of them - feel threatened and disappointed with how institutions are working. This, in turn, could pave the way for individuals to look in non-democratic rulers or forms of governance as a possible alternative.

A final element constituting crisis threats that influence Latin Americans' positions towards autocracy and democracy are levels of insecurity in individuals' environments. Scholars have long noted that Latin America has historically faced major problems with crime and insecurity. For instance, in 1990, the region had a homicide rate that was more

than twice the world average with only Sub-Saharan Africa having a higher rate than Latin America (Perez 2003). In spite of making improvements with respect to citizen security and violence, evidence still shows Latin America as the most violent region in the world (Calva 2019).


Figure 4 reports crime victimization using data from the *AmericasBarometer* from 2004 to 2018 for Latin America, as well as United States and Canada. The figure employs a question that asks individuals whether they have been a victim of a crime in the past 12 months. As such the figures show the percentage of individuals that gave a positive answer. As we can observe, the mean level of crime victimization across Latin American countries varies widely but it seems to be the case that there has been an increase in crime victimization in all countries, whereas the level of crime in the U.S. and Canada has remained low.

Figure 5 shows the average percentage of people who have been victims of a crime across the Americas. As with the case of the economy and corruption, the average percentage of people who report being crime victims in Latin America (20%) is higher than in the U.S. and Canada (12 %). The sole exceptions to this are Jamaica and Panama that report lower levels of crime victimization than their Latin American counterparts, as well as lower levels than U.S. and Canada.



Source: Americas Barometer

Figure (4) Crime Victimization 2004-2018



Source: AmericasBarometer 2004-2018

Figure (5) Crime Victimization 2004-2018

Reporting crime victimization rates across Latin American countries, however, does not provide a complete picture. In spite of this being a crucial statistic to understand the security climate in the region, it might obscure general feelings of insecurity among the population. Fortunately, the *AmericasBarometer* includes in all its waves a question that asks respondents for their perceptions of (in)security in their neighborhood.³ According to this question, in 2018, 45% of respondents in Latin America reported feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods. In contrast, only 14% in the U.S. and 8% in Canada report feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods. This evidence shows two important facts: one, that crime victimization and feelings of insecurity are widespread in the Latin American region. Second, the evidence also shows that insecurity is a major problem in the Latin American region especially when compared to more developed countries (e.g. U.S. and Canada).

These two facts are important because high levels of crime and insecurity have the potential to decrease people's satisfaction with democratic institutions and with the way that democracy works in their country (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010; Perez 2003). Crime can have a detrimental effect on people's support for democracy because it may lead the citizenry demand that governments employ authoritarian and iron-fist strategies to combat crime and insecurity. Evidence has shown that, when insecurity is high, people demand harsh punishments for offenders without judicial proceedings and they may be even willing to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for improvements in the security realm (Karstedt and LaFree 2006).

Taking into consideration the central role that the economy, corruption, and crime have had in Latin American politics we can expect that these three areas are focal points in which Latin Americans place emphasis when evaluating their country's situation and the way that their government is handling them. This implies that we can consider the economy, crime, and corruption as possible contextual factors that ignite feelings of threat

³Specifically, the question asked: Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe.

among the population when conditions are bad. Now, not everyone should be equally affected by poor economic development and high levels of corruption and crime. That is, it is not the case that every single citizen in Latin America will resort to authoritarian forms of governance as a way to cope with these threats.

Recall that I hypothesized that closed individuals are predisposed to support various forms of autocratic governance because these suppress diversity and enforce uniformity, which aids closed people in their quest for reducing difference of thought and action. I also argued that low openness' relationship to autocracy relies on the idea that people who are high on this trait are also particularly bad in coping with threatening and insecure situations (Johnston, Lavine, and Federico 2017). The literature on personality psychology tells us that individuals with closed personalities are less able to consider different points of view and ideas when adapting to changes in their environments (McCrae 1996). Due to their heightened sensitivity towards threat, closed individuals become more supportive of political measures that imply a suppression of liberties of those who are perceived as a threat and a heightened political intolerance under conditions of psychological distress and uncertainty (Haas and Cunningham 2014). Moreover, closed people in contexts experiencing economic distress, political turmoil and high levels of insecurity are more likely to be supportive of autocratic structures as these may be perceived as an effective way out of the crisis (Kruglanski 2013).

Therefore, to the extent that negative changes in the economy, crime, and corruption - what I term *crisis threats* - are perceived as threatening situations by closed individuals; we can expect that such circumstances will heighten support for autocratic forms of governance among this group. This argument implies that the personality trait of low openness to experience not only has a direct hypothesized relationship with support for autocracy, but also that this relationship varies depending on the contextual conditions regarding the state of the economy, crime, and corruption. In contexts with negative outcomes regarding the economy, crime, or corruption closed individuals should feel partic-

ularly threatened by these conditions, heightening, in turn, their support for autocracy. In contrast, closed people living in contexts with low levels of threat (i.e. relatively good economic performance and low levels of corruption and insecurity) should be virtually unaffected by these conditions so that their attitudes towards autocracy should remain the same (i.e. the relationship is flat).

In the case of open individuals, since they are already inclined to pursue novelty and are attracted to consider different ideas and points of view their natural inclination towards supporting democratic structures of power that protect these inclinations should make them be unaffected by poor economic, political, and security conditions in their environments. Since people high in openness take into consideration a wide-array of information in order to form an opinion, then we can expect that, when facing threatening circumstances in their environments, open individuals will look for solutions that include several opinions and points of view. This should guide open individuals to protect democratic procedures of citizen participation in the face of challenges and insecurity.

Poor economic performance and rising levels of corruption and crime are structural circumstances that affect how closed personalities engage with the political world so that these increase their support for autocratic forms of governance. Nevertheless, there are also other potential set of factors that might ignite authoritarian feelings among those with a closed personality and that are particularly relevant in the Latin American case.

Personality and Contextual Triggers: Civil Disobedience Threats

Latin America is a region characterized by its richness in social protests. Since the 1990s, social protests marked an important contribution in making people's opinions heard with respect to the introduction of neoliberal policies in various countries in the region that sought to tackle the economic problems that Latin American countries were facing (Álvarez and Escobar 1992). Moreover, social movements have even been crucial actors in defining the fate of incumbent leaders. For instance, during the 1990s three presidents

in Ecuador were overthrown as a result of mass protests: Abdalá Bucaram in 1996, Jamil Mahuad in 2000, and Lucio Guitiérrez in 2005 (Hurtado 2017). The Ecuadorian case is by no means the only one. Mass protests played a fundamental role in the 2003 resignation of Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and in the recent resignation of Evo Morales. The 2001 Argentinean "*cacerolazo*" was pivotal in the resignation of then president Fernando de la Rúa and that led to a period of significant political instability in the country. Even before the Third Wave of democratization, protests and social movements were important actors in paving the way from autocracy to democracy, as exemplified by the Chilean case (Oxhorn 1994).

Even though social movements and protests may be seen as positive by various segments of the population, they - in fact - create pockets of resentment among those who disagree with such manifestations. This is because protests may create disruptions in citizens' regular day to day activities. Moreover, while many protests are perceived as fair and even necessary others, specially violent ones, may be seen as unjustified (Simpson, Willer, and Feinberg 2018). Many people may see in protests a disruption to authorities' ability to manage the country's issues. After all, the idea of an important proportion of citizens manifesting against government's policies implies a sense of civil disobedience that may activate feelings of threat among those who have a need to maintain order and submission to authority.

For instance, in October 2019 indigenous movements in Ecuador led a major protest against Lenin Moreno's government latest policy that sought to implement a series of austerity measures to deal with the country's economic crisis. Ecuadorian society quickly polarized into those who were for and those who were against the mass protests. Among those who were against the indigenous movement, several manifested a desire for the government and the military to use extremely harsh measures against protesters that even involved the use of guns and bombs in "humanitarian zones". Others even manifested their desire for former president Febrés-Cordero - notably known for his authoritarian

rule and abuse of human rights - to be in power during the protests. This anecdotal evidence exemplifies the idea that during social protests, many individuals perceive such episodes as a threat to society's order. As protests take over capital cities and disrupt people's daily activities, many see these events as something that must be severely punished via authoritarian measures.

Similar evidence can be extracted from the protests that occurred in Chile during the later months of 2019. In October 2019, what started as a student protest against fair hikes quickly turned into massive nationwide protests against the Chilean system, which - according to protestors - has only exacerbated inequality and halted social mobility in the country. The protests quickly turned violent, with both demonstrators committing crimes and acts of violence as well as members of security forces who responded with excessive force (Human Rights Watch 2019). According to data from the *Estudio Longitudinal Social de Chile*, a longitudinal study in Chile carried out by the Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social (COES), 34% of Chileans support the use of police violence to suppress pacific protests (Gerber et al. 2017). And in the context of the 2019 protests, data from a public opinion survey carried out by Activa research in the midst of the protests shows that 42.8% of Chileans support the presence of military forces on the street to control protests (Activa Research 2019).

Instances of civil disobedience become particularly important given the recent wave of massive protests in Latin America. I have already mentioned what happened in Ecuador and Chile, but similar episodes have occurred in Bolivia, Haiti, and Colombia. Although the exact reasons why such massive demonstrations against authorities in power differ vastly across countries, in all of these cases we can see that societies have polarized between those who are against and those who are in favor of these protests. Such polarized scenarios have the potential to instill autocratic sentiments among those who disagree with massive protests and view these as illegitimate.

As with the previous contextual threats, it is important to recognize that not every

single citizen will react by showing an increase in support for autocratic forms of governance. This is where personality comes in. Since open individuals are permeable to new ideas and are motivated to examine different worldviews (DeYoung, Peterson, and Higgins 2005), we can expect that these people are willing to accept some level of societal disorder that might be caused by protests because these imply that plurality of opinion is being respected. In contrast, closed individuals are neglectful of plurality and have a desire for maintaining order. Moreover, closed people are affected by marked increases in threats to and disruption of societal order, cohesion, stability, and traditional values, which increases attitudes of submission to authority, aggression towards social deviants, and of conventionalism in a quest to protect the status-quo (Duckitt and Sibley 2017).

Taking this into consideration, I propose another contextual factor that should ignite authoritarian sentiments among closed personalities: episodes of civil-disobedience. Such circumstances, are characterized by groups of citizens disobeying elected authorities, usually through the implementation of social protests that affect citizens' ability to carry out their daily activities. These conditions can range from pacific to more violent, but the main factor of importance is that there is a generalized sense among certain sectors of the population that such demonstrations create disorder and do not allow authorities to govern properly.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *Closed individuals under conditions of crisis or civil disobedience threats heighten their support for autocratic forms of governance. During normal times, closed individuals' support for autocracy should be lower.*

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *Open individuals are unaffected by conditions of crisis or civil disobedience threats so that their support for autocracy should always be low.*

Evaluating the Argument: Data & Results

Closed Personalities & Autocracy: Direct Effects

For hypothesis 1, which states that closed people are predisposed to support autocracy - I use data from the *AmericasBarometer* for 2010. In this wave, the surveys included the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) in 18 Latin American countries, which is a widely held measure of the Big Five. This data also contains a series of questions that allow me to tap onto individuals' support for autocratic measures and forms of governance, while at the same time allowing me to control for a host of factors that the literature has argued to be important for citizen support for autocracy. LAPOP's surveys are nationally representative studies based on stratified and clustered samples of 1,500 or more voting-age individuals interviewed in their homes (Project 2016). Since the theoretical argument is focused on the Latin American case, I focus on attitudes towards autocracy in 18 countries in the region. Furthermore, I restrict the sample to these countries and this year because items that assess personality traits and support for autocracy are only available in this wave.

Before I evaluate my first hypothesis, I explain how I measure support for autocratic forms of governance. This is important because, unlike other studies that usually focus on one or two variables, I seek to capture the different ways that support for autocracy manifests itself in the citizenry by looking at various variables that tap into this construct. First, people may support autocratic measures that weaken certain characteristics of a democratic system, but that do not necessarily imply its destruction. For instance, individuals may manifest discontent with democracy as the most desirable form of government. People may also be against other citizens participating freely in the political arena, specially those who may be seen as a threat.

To measure people's support for the weakening of democracy, I create three measures using LAPOP's data. I begin by using the standard measure for democratic support:

whether democracy is the best form of government that we have. I recode this variable so that higher values represent greater rejection to this statement. Second, I create an index of political intolerance from four questions asking respondents whether those who say bad things about their country's form of government should have the right to vote, to conduct peaceful demonstrations, to run for public office, and to make public speeches. I reverse code these variables so that higher values represent less tolerance towards governments' critics and combine them into an index of political intolerance ($\alpha = 0.85$). Third, I include an index that taps into respondents' disapproval of citizen participation and engagement in politics. This index is comprised of three variables that asks respondents their approval of people participating in: a) legal demonstrations, b) a group to solve community problems, and c) political parties' campaigns. Again, these variables are reverse coded so that higher values imply more disapproval of these actions ($\alpha = 0.73$).

I also look at the extent to which citizens are willing to let a single authority concentrate power to the point that it undermines the system of checks and balances or interrupts the democratic order altogether. I begin by using three questions that ask respondents the extent to which they are willing to let the executive: a) limit the opposition's political rights, b) bypass Congress, and c) bypass Courts. I combine these three variables into an index of delegation of authority to the president ($\alpha = 0.78$). Second, I employ two questions that ask individuals their support for the executive a) Closing Congress and b) Closing the Supreme Court and governing without these when the country is facing very difficult times, which is known in the literature as self-coups. I create a variable that equals the sum of these two variables to form a single measure of citizen support for self-coups ($\alpha = 0.77$). Finally, I use three variables that ask respondents for their support for military coups in their countries when a) unemployment b) corruption and c) crime are high. I combine these three variables into an index of support for military coups ($\alpha = 0.76$).

A final component of citizen autocratic support relies on individuals' preferences for

an authoritarian system over a democratic one. To measure the extent to which individuals are willing to support rulers with authoritarian tendencies, I use a question that asks respondents whether they think that their country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation. Second, I use a variable that asks individuals whether they prefer a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people or electoral democracy. Finally, I tap onto people's preference for autocracy as a form of government by employing a question that asks respondents whether they believe that a) democracy is preferable to any other form of government, b) it does not matter whether a regime is democratic or not, and c) under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. The first two categories are combined into a single one measuring support for democracy/ambivalence, while the third one comprises support for autocracy. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for my outcomes of interest.⁴

I decide to analyze the outcome variables independently for theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, these variables are measuring different aspects of people's support for autocratic governments. While the variables are related, analyzing them separately allows me to understand if the effects of openness is consistent across different measures of support for autocracy. Empirically, although the variables load distinctively on three different factors, when grouped into indices the alpha coefficient is low. For instance, when I combine the variables for rejection of democracy, political intolerance, and against participation the alpha coefficient returned a value of 0.40. The same happened with the other two groups of variables. This may imply several things. For one, it could be that these variables are measuring the same latent factor but they do so very imprecisely (i.e. with a lot of random measurement error). It could also be the case that the items

⁴I carried out confirmatory factor analyses to see if this classification is supported by the data. Indeed, the results from the factor analysis show that there were only three factors with an eigenvalue greater than one. Furthermore, the results showed that the variables loaded on the expected factors. For the results of the factor analysis see the Appendix.

themselves are not a particularly strong indicator of an underlying construct. Taking this into consideration, I proceed to analyze each of the outcomes of interest separately.

The use of such wide range of dependent variables that assess different aspects of citizen autocratic support possesses numerous advantages over studies that focus on one or two outcomes of interest. For one, this approach allows us to understand the pathways through which individuals may support one form of autocratic rule but not another. Second, it helps us understand the circumstances under which citizens support the *weakening* of democracy versus those in which they support its erosion. Hence, this approach permits to uncover the different forms of autocratic support that exist among the citizenry and that have important consequences for the future of democracy.

As I focus on personality's effects on support for autocracy, I control for a series of demographic factors and theoretical cofounders that might affect this relationship. In crafting my models I have sought to keep them relatively parsimonious. To control for theoretical cofounders, I include factors that the literature has found to be important in influencing people's attitudes towards autocracy and democracy. As such, I include a measure of interpersonal trust that allows me to control for modernization theory's argument that interpersonal trust should foster support for democracy and weaken preferences for autocracy. To account for perceptions of government performance, I control for executive approval, perceptions of the national economy, corruption evaluations, and perceptions regarding insecurity in one's neighborhood. Finally, to account for individuals' demographic characteristics I include sex, age, level of education, whether the respondent resides in an urban or rural area,⁵ and a measure of quintiles of wealth that captures people's income⁶.

⁵Respondents' residence in an urban or rural area is coded by LAPOP based on census data for each country

⁶Respondent's wealth is calculated by looking at household ownership of a series of goods and then conducting a factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households while incorporating differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas. For more information on this measure see: Córdova (2009).

I use various types of regression models to account for the nature of each dependent variable. For continuous outcomes (rejection of democracy as the best form of government, political intolerance index, delegation of authority index, military coups index, and index of disapproval of citizen participation) I use OLS models. For binary outcomes, I use logistic regression (support for iron fist rulers, support for strong rulers, and preference for autocracy over democracy); while for variables that combined binary outcomes I use a binomial count logistic regression (support for self-coups). All the models include survey design effects that account for the complex survey design inherent in LAPOP's data. I also include fixed effects per country to control for differences in citizen support for autocracy that are not accounted by the variables included in the analysis.

Results: Hypothesis 1

Figures 6, 7, and 8 below present quantities of interest regarding the effect of being closed on individuals' autocratic support. For models with binary dependent variables (iron fist, self-coups, strong rulers, and autocracy versus democracy) I present predicted probabilities, while for models with continuous outcomes I present linear predictions. All the graphs are derived directly from my models and, as such, show the effect of personality while holding the rest of the covariates at their mean or modal values. Full results are presented in the appendix.

The figures show that the effect of a closed personality on various forms of autocratic support ranges from 6% to 15 %, depending on the outcome. This is an important effect, especially when compared to variables that have been traditionally linked to support for democracy and rejection of autocracy. For example, in my models, as education increases from its minimum (no education) to its maximum (18 plus years of education) support for autocracy declines by about 10% an effect comparable to the one of increasing levels of a closed personality trait. Clearly, there is something about being closed that makes some individuals more prone to support autocracy and reject democratic forms of governance.




Figure (6) Closed Personalities & Support Democracy's Weakening




Figure (7) Closed Personalities & Support Concentration of Power




Figure (8) Closed Personalities & Support Autocracy as a Form of Government

Regarding the effects of other personality predictors on citizen support for autocracy, only emotional stability has an effect somewhat comparable. Emotional stability is significantly related to seven (out of nine) dependent variables assessing autocratic support. As individuals are more emotionally stable - that is, as they react more calmly to stressful events and are less easily upset - they are less likely to support various forms of autocratic governance. The nature of the relationship between emotional stability and political attitudes, in general, is elusive. Most of the studies have found inconclusive findings for a relationship between emotional stability and political attitudes and behaviors (Gerber et al. 2009; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Vecchione and Caprara 2009).

Nonetheless, some studies have reported significant findings with respect to the relationship between emotional stability and political attitudes. Mondak (2010) found in an American sample that emotionally stable individuals are less likely to turn out to vote. More importantly, Marcus et al. (1995) found that less emotionally stable individuals display greater intolerance towards minorities and, specially, the protection of their civil liberties. It could be the case that citizens who tend to react with greater anxiety to stressful events (such as economic, social, and/or political crises) are willing to support autocratic leaders who promise to bring quick solutions to stressful issues. Future work should devote attention to the relationship between emotional stability and support for autocracy in Latin America and beyond.

Regarding the rest of the covariates that were included to control for other theoretical explanations of autocratic support, only education and interpersonal trust rendered consistently significant results across all outcomes of interest. As expected, individuals who report higher levels of interpersonal trust and with higher levels of education are less likely to support various forms of autocratic governance. These findings go in line with what other studies have reported regarding the predictors of citizen rejection of democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Singer 2018). However, it is important to note that the inclusion of these control variables does not affect the signifi-

cance and substantive impact of (low) openness on people's support for autocracy.

Finally, although much work has placed significant attention on governments' performance as key drivers of public support for autocratic measures and forms of governance, I find that these factors are inconsistently related to my outcomes of interest. In some cases, positive economic, political, and security conditions are related to less support for autocracy. In others, these factors lead to greater autocratic support, and for some variables there is not a significant relationship. This leads me to think that the hypothesized relationship between perceptions of the economy, crime, and corruption and support for autocracy might be moderated by personality.

The Conditional Effects of Closed Personality Characteristics

During June and July of 2019, I carried out online survey experiments in Chile and Ecuador through Qualtrics. I chose Chile and Ecuador as my two countries representative of Latin America to gain variation in levels of development and democratic experience. I recruited participants who were 18-years or older via Facebook by placing ads on users' newsfeed that said: "Researchers from the University of Minnesota are interested in your opinion. Click here to fill out a 10-minute survey and participate in a lottery for a Samsung Tablet". Previous research in comparative political behavior has used Facebook ads to recruit participants for online studies outside the U.S. (Samuels and Zucco 2013). Moreover, to improve the quality of the survey and have a broader coverage of the Chilean and Ecuadorean public, I oversampled rural areas and individuals residing outside big cities in both countries. I also targeted individuals who are older than 50 years of age, as evidence in Latin America has shown that younger people are less likely to use Facebook on a daily basis (Zechmiester and Lupu 2019). While mine is a convenience sample, several studies have shown that these samples are well suited for experimental work (Mullinix et al. 2015). Further evidence shows that the relationships between personality and polit-

ically relevant outcomes do not substantially differ in online convenience samples versus nationally representative ones (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016).

After eliminating duplicates (e.g. individuals taking the survey more than once), individuals who resided outside Chile and Ecuador, and fraudulent IP addresses, I ended up with a sample of 1,025 respondents of which 561 lived in Chile and 464 in Ecuador. After the consent form and asking respondents to provide their age (as a double-check so as not to include minors), the survey asked individuals to answer the Mini-IPIP, a 20-item battery designed to measure personality traits. Afterwards, I included a series of questions asking individuals for their perceptions on the economy, crime, corruption, and the executive's performance. Following that, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a) crisis threats b) civil disobedience threats and c) control group.

In each condition, respondents were presented with a prompt that mimicked an editorial piece from a local newspaper. For the crisis condition, the prompt presented a scenario in which the country was undergoing very rough times. The economy is shrinking, unemployment is high, corruption among public officials is extremely widespread, and crime levels are rapidly increasing. In the civil disobedience treatment, respondents were presented with a scenario in which massive protests were taking over the streets and disrupting citizens' daily lives. Moreover, citizens were portrayed as disobeying authorities, which limited their ability to govern effectively. Finally, for the control condition I presented a piece about pop-culture relevant to each country. The samples in each conditions were mostly balanced, with 347 respondents in the crisis condition, 339 in the civil disobedience condition, and 339 in the control condition.

Measuring Autocratic Support

Immediately after the experiments, respondents were asked a series of questions that measured various forms of autocratic support. I started by asking whether democracy is the best form of government or whether autocracy is more desirable, and a third option

were respondents could state that they are ambivalent. Following that, I asked the standard question used to measure democratic support, which measures individuals' level of agreement with the statement: democracy may have problems but is the best form of government that we have. I reverse-code this question to get a measure of people's rejection of democracy I also assessed people's support for strong rulers by asking respondents how much they agree with the following statement: "there are people who say that we need a system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from congress or the courts."

I assessed individuals' support for self-coups and military coups by asking whether it is justified that the president closes congress or the courts (self-coups) and whether the military should take over power (military coups) during difficult times. Finally, I assessed support for government censorship and limitation of political rights and civil liberties by asking two sets of questions. The first one relied on two questions that asked individuals' level of agreement with the government a) censoring media that criticizes it and b) prohibiting meetings from groups that criticize it. The second one asked whether it is justifiable that the president limits the voice and vote of the opposition.

Since these variables are all measuring people's support for different forms of autocracy, I conducted exploratory factor analysis to see if there are any underlying constructs that allow me to reduce the number of variables included in the analyses. Unlike with the *AmericasBarometer* data, I do not have clear expectations as to how the variables used to measure autocratic support might load on different factors especially because the wording of the questions was different in my surveys. The results from the factor analysis rendered only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. I also conducted parallel analysis as a robustness check, which resulted in three factors to be retained. Given that solely using eigenvalues as a guideline for factor retention might be biased, I decide to compute a three-factor solution. The rotated factor loadings are presented in the appendix.

Following these results I created three indices. The first one is a scale measuring people's support for autocracy as a regime and it is composed by the variable asking for preferences between autocracy or democracy and the one regarding democracy rejection ($\alpha = 0.50$). The second scale measured people's support for the concentration of power in a single leader by combining support for the executive closing congress and the courts, as well as support for strong rulers who do not have to bother with congress or the courts ($\alpha = 0.62$). Third, I created a scale measuring public support for the limitation of political rights and liberties by combining the variables that assessed support for the limitation of the opposition's political rights and the one measuring support for government censorship ($\alpha = 0.67$). The only variable that did not load significantly into any of these three factors is the one measuring people's support for military coups. As such, I analyze this variable separately. Finally, since the factor analysis suggested that the variables loaded on a single factor, I also combining all the variables into a single scale of general autocratic support ($\alpha = 0.70$).

At the end of the survey, I asked respondents for a series of demographic questions that will allow me to control for these variables that are crucial in political behavior. In this set of questions, I asked for respondents' sex, income, highest level of education attained, whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area, and self-identified ethnicity. In what follows, I present the results that evaluates my second and third (conditional) hypotheses. To ease interpretation, I present figures for these conditional hypothesis that interact the personality trait of low openness with each treatment condition and evaluates its impact on citizen autocratic support. Tables with full results for these models, as well as descriptive statistics for the variables used are presented in the appendix.

Evidence from Survey Experiments

In this section, I present evidence in support of my conditional hypotheses. Recall that I argued that closed individuals are particularly affected by crisis and civil disobedience

threats and that open people should not be affected by these conditions. This implies that I expect to observe a significant interaction between low openness to experience and crisis/civil disobedience threats. Therefore, we should observe that, under normal conditions, closed individuals *should not* manifest a high level of support for autocracy. In contrast, under crisis and civil disobedience threats closed people should manifest *an increased* support for autocracy as these contexts activate these individuals' needs to protect order in society and their aversion to threat and uncertainty.

For these models, I recoded low openness to experience so that those who placed themselves in the lower quartile (i.e. below 0.25 on a 0 to 1 scale) were considered as open, those between 0.25 and 0.50 were considered ambivalent, and those above 0.5 were considered closed. I decide to recode the variable measuring closed personalities due to two main reasons. First, looking at the distribution of this variable, the number of observations above 0.5 start to decline significantly. This is especially important because it implies that the number of observations per treatment group will diminish substantially as we move up the scale making it difficult to find a significant interaction between low openness to experience and exposure to treatment. Second, using an ordinal measure of low openness to experience allows me to see if crisis or civil disobedience threats seem to particularly affect people who are in the middle of the scale. This is usually difficult to assess using a continuous variable because there is no clear cut regarding the boundaries for the middle category. Finally, other researchers have used scale transformations on personality variables in order to deal with non-normal distributions (Mondak 2010).

Figures 9 and 10 below present the results for models in which the interaction between closed personalities and each of the threat treatments (crisis and civil disobedience) - while controlling for the set of demographic variables and for whether the respondent voted for the incumbent government or not - rendered significant results. That is, the figures show the effect of having either an open, closed or ambivalent personality under contexts of threat (i.e. treatment group) in comparison to normal conditions (i.e. control

group). Overall, I found that crisis or civil disobedience threats ignited closed personalities' support for autocracy for three out of the five scales that I created to measure autocratic support.




Figure (9) Support for Autocracy as a Regime

Figures 9 and 10 reveal three important conclusions. First, that closed individuals are indeed affected by crisis and civil disobedience threats so that these conditions increase their support for various forms of autocratic governance: support for autocracy as a regime, support for the limitation of political rights and government censorship (although this effect was stronger for those in the middle category than for closed personalities), and a general support for autocracy. Second, unfortunately, I did not find any significant interactions between personality and threat regarding people's support for the concentration of power in a single authority or support for military coups. Although





Figure (10) Support for Autocracy & Limitation of Rights

I was expecting to find that threats ignite support for autocracy among closed personalities with these outcomes, I believe that these null results might be due to two main reasons.

For one, the scale regarding support for the concentration of power implies citizen support for leaders either closing or eliminating altogether the other branches of government. The null effects could be due to the fact that people in Ecuador and Chile are interpreting these questions as support and an over-delegation of power to the incumbent, and in Chile and Ecuador presidents Sebastian Piñera and Lenin Moreno are not very popular. Therefore, people are projecting their disapproval of these leaders onto the questions attempting to tap public support for the concentration of power in a single authority. Second, in the case of military coups, in Latin America the military have historically overthrown governments in cases of severe economic or political crises. It could be the case that since people are already primed by these historical experiences, any exposure to a threat will have a weak impact on their support for military coups.

The results from the experiments also show us that open individuals are virtually unaffected by conditions of crisis or civil disobedience threats. Open individuals who were assigned to the control condition show very similar attitudes towards autocracy as those that were assigned to the threat condition. This brings support for my third hypothesis, which stated that openness should be unaffected by conditions of crisis and disobedience threats because individuals who are high on this trait are predisposed to be able to manage uncertainty and threat. Moreover, their unconditional need to support and protect tolerance of diversity makes open individuals particularly prone to protect democratic structures of power.

Finally, in the figures we can also observe that open individuals under normal conditions seem to have a higher level of support for autocratic forms of governance and measures. In contrast, in the presence of threats - either crisis or civil disobedience - open-minded people drop their support for these autocratic outcomes. Although the differ-

ences are not significant, it is interesting to note that this could imply that open individuals might in fact be affected by contextual threats of crisis and civil disobedience and that these make them decrease their support for certain forms of autocracy. That is, under normal conditions open people might actually be willing to support certain non-democratic measures, but it is under contexts of threats that these individuals activate their predispositions to protect tolerance of diversity and seek to defend democratic structures of power that might be in danger.

Discussion & Conclusion

Since the Third Wave of democratization, scholars have long studied democracy's prospects in the Latin American region. While the literature has made enormous advances, we still know little regarding the types of individuals that are willing to support autocratic forms of governance. Likewise, we are limited in our knowledge regarding the conditions under which individual-level characteristics become more (or less) consequential for predicting individuals' support for autocracy. Given this, by bridging the comparative politics and political psychology literatures I seek to fill the gaps in current theories of citizen (non) democratic support and argue that to understand why some individuals embrace autocratic forms of governance we need to understand basic human dispositions to be open to different ideas and to engage in cross-cutting social interactions.

The arguments that I have presented posit that when it comes to understanding citizens' support for autocracy we need to take a look at individuals' personalities and their reaction to environmental stimuli to explain their emergence and manifestation in the political world. I propose that to understand the roots of citizen autocratic support we need to explore how basic human dispositions influence the ways in which people react towards the different stimuli that they receive from their political and social worlds. Some individuals are closed in their political views and unwilling (or poorly motivated) to engage with diversity. However, other individuals are completely the opposite: inclined

to seek novelty and cognitive exploration. By exploring personality, we can understand why some citizens living in the same country and experiencing the same national-level phenomena manifest different political attitudes and preferences. Likewise, by looking at how basic human dispositions (i.e., personality traits) interact with the environment we can begin to understand the shifts that we observe in public opinion with respect to citizens' support for autocratic forms of governance.

In this paper, I have shown that closed individuals are predisposed to prefer autocratic structures of power over democratic ones. Moreover, I have also shown that closed individuals exposed to crisis (poor economic performance, high levels of corruption, and rampant crime) and civil disobedience threats are particularly affected by such conditions so that these activate their predispositions and heighten their support for autocracy. This implies that a closed personality has both a direct and conditional relationship to citizen autocratic support. closed people tend to support autocracy because it represses diversity and enhances uniformity. Likewise, this personality trait and its effect on political attitudes is activated by conditions of crisis and disobedience threats. These two arguments allow us to understand the kinds of individuals who are more likely to support autocracy, as well as the conditions that heighten these preferences.

The study of public support for autocracy is void if we do not take into consideration the psychological factors that make some individuals predisposed to support autocracy over democracy. Likewise, scholars need to take into account how basic human dispositions interact with environmental factors to shape political and social attitudes. This is why, I argue that the main way through which we should be studying autocratic tendencies in the population is through the interaction between personality characteristics and contextual factors that put citizens in a unique position in the political world. By taking into consideration all of these factors we are able to form a coherent and holistic theory that explains the existence of authoritarian attitudes in Latin America and beyond.

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Appendix

The first part of this appendix includes information regarding descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models. Tables 1, 2, and 3 present summary statistics for the variables coming from the *AmericasBarometer*, tables 4, 5, and 6 present summary statistics for the variables included in the survey experiments.

Table (1) Summary Statistics: Dependent Variables AmericasBarometer

	N	mean	sd	min	max
Self-Coups	31,473.00	0.13	0.30	0.00	1.00
Support Military Coups	32,152.00	0.33	0.39	0.00	1.00
Delegation of Authority	31,859.00	0.36	0.27	0.00	1.00
Iron Fist	33,971.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Strong Leader vs. Electoral Dem.	33,475.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Autocracy Preferable to Democracy	32,648.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Democracy Not Best Form of Govt.	33,185.00	0.30	0.28	0.00	1.00
Political Intolerance	34,176.00	0.47	0.27	0.00	1.00
Against Activity	34,724.00	0.32	0.24	0.00	1.00

Table (2) Summary Statistics: Personality Variables AmericasBarometer

	N	mean	sd	min	p25	p50	p75	max
Closed-Mindedness	31,230.00	0.27	0.23	0.00	0.08	0.25	0.42	1.00
Extraversion	31,447.00	0.70	0.21	0.00	0.50	0.67	0.83	1.00
Emotional Stability	31,409.00	0.65	0.23	0.00	0.50	0.67	0.83	1.00
Agreeableness	31,447.00	0.76	0.20	0.00	0.58	0.83	0.92	1.00
Conscientiousness	31,426.00	0.77	0.20	0.00	0.58	0.83	0.92	1.00

Table (3) Summary Statistics: Control Variables Americas Barometer

	N	mean	sd	min	p25	p50	p75	max
Executive Approval	33,786.00	0.57	0.25	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.75	1.00
National Economy	34,141.00	0.41	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00
Perceived Security	34,671.00	0.58	0.31	0.00	0.33	0.67	0.67	1.00
Corruption Public Officials	32,944.00	0.73	0.28	0.00	0.67	0.67	1.00	1.00
Interpersonal Trust	34,164.00	0.58	0.31	0.00	0.33	0.67	0.67	1.00
Wealth Quintile	34,812.00	0.48	0.36	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00
Education (years)	34,752.00	0.52	0.24	0.00	0.33	0.56	0.67	1.00
Sex	34,927.00	0.51	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Rural/Urban	34,927.00	0.32	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Age	34,875.00	38.91	15.87	16.00	25.00	36.00	50.00	98.00

Table (4) Summary Statistics: Outcome Variables Experiments

	N	mean	sd	min	max
Autocracy vs. Democracy	1,014.00	0.37	0.42	0.00	1.00
Strong Ruler no Congress/Courts	1,015.00	0.48	0.34	0.00	1.00
Close Congress	1,018.00	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Close Courts	995.00	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
Support Military Coups	1,017.00	0.37	0.32	0.00	1.00
Support Govt. Censorship	1,020.00	0.25	0.24	0.00	1.00
Limit Opposition's Political Rights	1,012.00	0.27	0.27	0.00	1.00
Democracy Worst Form of Govt.	1,016.00	0.43	0.32	0.00	1.00

Table (5) Summary Statistics: Personality Variables Experiments

	N	mean	sd	min	max
Low Openness to Experience	1,001.00	0.38	0.21	0.00	1.00
Low Openness to Experience (Ordinal)	1,001.00	0.97	0.83	0.00	2.00
Conscientiousness	1,007.00	0.73	0.22	0.00	1.00
Extraversion	1,019.00	0.42	0.23	0.00	1.00
Agreeableness	1,012.00	0.68	0.23	0.00	1.00
Emotional Stability	1,000.00	0.53	0.22	0.00	1.00

Table (6) Summary Statistics: Control Variables Experiments

	N	mean	sd	min	max
Sex	1,021.00	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00
Income	1,015.00	7.81	4.80	1.00	17.00
Education	1,016.00	13.75	3.58	1.00	20.00
Voted for Incumbent	1,017.00	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00

Tables 7 and 8 show the rotated factor loadings for the *AmericasBarometer* and my experiments' data, respectively.

Table (7) Rotated Factor Loadings: AmericasBarometer Data

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
Support Autocracy	.0897092	.1247371	.3194791	.874326
Strong Ruler	.1060458	.1486876	.3856201	.8179434
Iron Fist	.0915247	.1735959	.353616	.8364434
Self-Coups	.06761	.4310478	.1154435	.7962994
Military Coups	.1042999	.3212762	.203685	.8444155
Delegation of Authority	.2718841	.358512	.1170834	.7838397
Reject Democracy	.3724094	.0671228	.203823	.815262
Political Intolerance	.5225296	.0942791	.0358448	.7167894
Against Public Contestation	.5576291	.0553185	.0561405	.6828379

Table (8) Rotated Factor Loadings: Experiments Data

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
Autocracy vs. Democracy	.1899383	.2579854	.4680516	.6782947
Strong Ruler no Congress/Courts	.3046062	.2454824	.2964132	.7590926
Close Congress	.6156987	.1422048	.0923196	.59217
Close Courts	.6028554	.1358321	.1174531	.6043198
Support Military Coups	.2269504	.2678803	.2741752	.8015616
Support Govt. Censorship	.1366061	.5970908	.1688352	.596316
Limit Opposition's Political Rights	.1688389	.5807798	.121738	.6193681
Democracy Worst Form of Govt.	.1129388	.192599	.4319599	.7635611

Figure 11 shows a comparison for the distribution of the two variables of low openness to experience in my experiments' data.





Figure (11) Low Openness to Experience Distributions

Tables 9, 10, and 11 below present the full results that evaluate my first hypothesis. Again, the results show that across all models, being closed increases individuals' support for autocracy and that closed individuals consistently support different aspects of autocratic governments in Latin America. This implies that this personality trait allows us to understand how individuals with a predisposition to be intolerant of diversity and wary of novelty are more likely to see in autocratic structures of power a desirable alternative to democracy.

Tables 12, 13, and 14 show the complete results for the regression models employed with my experiments' data.

Table (9) Personality & Weakening of Democracy

	(1) Reject Democracy	(2) Political Intolerance	(3) Against Participation
Low Openness	0.101*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.009)	0.098*** (0.008)
Extraversion	-0.040*** (0.010)	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.065*** (0.008)
Conscientiousness	-0.091*** (0.011)	-0.018 (0.010)	-0.077*** (0.008)
Agreeableness	-0.056*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.010)	-0.039*** (0.008)
Emotional Stability	-0.038*** (0.009)	-0.019* (0.009)	-0.020** (0.007)
Executive Approval	-0.076*** (0.009)	0.098*** (0.009)	-0.006 (0.007)
National Economy	-0.017** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)
Perceived Security	-0.021** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)
Corruption Public Officials	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.006)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.006)	-0.034*** (0.005)
Wealth Quintile	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)
Education (years)	-0.087*** (0.009)	-0.096*** (0.009)	-0.068*** (0.007)
Sex	0.014*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)
Rural/Urban	0.010* (0.005)	0.009 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	26462	27088	27390

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (10) Personality & Concentration of Power

	(1) Over-Delegation	(2) Self-Coups	(3) Military Coups
Low Openness	0.117*** (0.010)	0.446*** (0.085)	0.065*** (0.013)
Extraversion	-0.092*** (0.010)	-0.031 (0.085)	-0.028* (0.013)
Conscientiousness	-0.072*** (0.010)	0.040 (0.095)	0.031* (0.014)
Agreeableness	-0.028** (0.010)	-0.205* (0.098)	0.036* (0.014)
Emotional Stability	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.125 (0.083)	-0.043*** (0.013)
National Economy	0.034*** (0.005)	0.143** (0.048)	-0.033*** (0.008)
Perceived Security	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.140* (0.059)	-0.053*** (0.009)
Corruption Public Officials	-0.037*** (0.006)	-0.211*** (0.060)	-0.003 (0.009)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.219*** (0.058)	-0.049*** (0.009)
Executive Approval	0.185*** (0.008)	0.632*** (0.083)	-0.067*** (0.012)
Wealth Quintile	0.001 (0.004)	-0.041 (0.044)	0.010 (0.007)
Education (years)	-0.129*** (0.009)	-0.538*** (0.083)	-0.144*** (0.012)
Sex	0.001 (0.003)	-0.216*** (0.033)	0.009 (0.005)
Rural/Urban	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.163*** (0.040)	-0.004 (0.007)
Age	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.000)
Observations	26804	25229	26866

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (11) Personality & Autocracy as a Regime

	(1) Iron Fist	(2) Strong Ruler	(3) Autocracy vs. Democracy
Low Openness	0.303*** (0.076)	0.709*** (0.105)	0.434*** (0.105)
Extraversion	0.016 (0.081)	-0.370*** (0.103)	-0.245* (0.101)
Conscientiousness	0.073 (0.083)	-0.197 (0.115)	0.055 (0.109)
Agreeableness	0.061 (0.086)	-0.256* (0.118)	-0.152 (0.115)
Emotional Stability	-0.260*** (0.074)	-0.357*** (0.105)	-0.254** (0.098)
Executive Approval	0.082 (0.070)	-0.467*** (0.109)	0.024 (0.100)
National Economy	-0.195*** (0.045)	-0.205** (0.063)	-0.128* (0.059)
Perceived Security	-0.203*** (0.053)	-0.146* (0.072)	-0.437*** (0.070)
Corruption Public Officials	0.278*** (0.057)	-0.187* (0.076)	-0.213** (0.071)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.228*** (0.052)	-0.320*** (0.071)	-0.232** (0.071)
Wealth Quintile	0.019 (0.042)	0.140* (0.055)	0.038 (0.053)
Education (years)	-1.118*** (0.072)	-0.874*** (0.100)	-0.374*** (0.101)
Sex	-0.074* (0.029)	-0.075 (0.039)	-0.055 (0.039)
Rural/Urban	-0.046 (0.038)	-0.063 (0.052)	-0.041 (0.052)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)
Observations	26929	26592	26013

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (12) Support for Autocracy - Experiments Models

	Autocratic Support	Autocratic Support	Autocracy as Regime	Autocracy as Regime
Middle × Crisis	-0.001 (0.038)		0.007 (0.058)	
Closed × Crisis	0.029 (0.037)		0.117* (0.056)	
Middle × Disobedience		0.064 (0.037)		0.089 (0.057)
Closed × Disobedience		0.084* (0.038)		0.147* (0.058)
Open	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Middle	-0.045 (0.027)	-0.053* (0.027)	-0.062 (0.041)	-0.056 (0.041)
Closed	-0.041 (0.029)	-0.050 (0.029)	-0.089* (0.044)	-0.067 (0.044)
Control	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)	

Crisis	-0.001		-0.041	
	(0.026)		(0.040)	
Open × Control	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Open × Crisis	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Middle × Control	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Closed × Control	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Conscientiousness	0.053	0.043	-0.017	-0.012
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Introversion	-0.074*	-0.112**	-0.031	-0.036
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Agreeableness	-0.042	-0.108**	-0.100	-0.022
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Emotional Stability	-0.054	-0.035	-0.057	0.022
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.063)
Sex	0.010	0.033	0.011	0.045

	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Income	-0.006***	-0.005**	-0.008**	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	-0.007**	-0.010***	-0.014***	-0.018***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Voter for Winner	0.074***	0.095***	0.069**	0.074**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Chile	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Ecuador	0.107**	0.135**	0.037	0.072
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Disobedience		-0.033		-0.051
		(0.025)		(0.039)
Open × Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Open × Disobedience		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)

Middle × Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Closed × Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Observations	648	635	647	634

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (13) Support for Autocracy - Experiments Models

	Concentration of Power	Concentration of Power	Limitation of Rights	Limitation of Rights
Middle × Crisis	-0.079 (0.060)		0.049 (0.042)	
Closed × Crisis	-0.013 (0.058)		0.031 (0.040)	
Middle × Disobedience		0.029 (0.059)		0.091* (0.040)
Closed × Disobedience		0.061 (0.060)		0.070 (0.041)
Open	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Middle	-0.022 (0.042)	-0.045 (0.042)	-0.043 (0.029)	-0.036 (0.029)
Closed	-0.026 (0.045)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.031)
Control	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)	

Crisis	0.060		-0.032	
	(0.041)		(0.028)	
Open × Control	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Open × Crisis	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Middle × Control	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Closed × Control	0.000		0.000	
	(.)		(.)	
Conscientiousness	0.055	0.048	0.068	0.095*
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Introversion	-0.143*	-0.192**	-0.023	-0.061
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Agreeableness	0.003	-0.140*	-0.075	-0.116**
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Emotional Stability	-0.059	-0.109	-0.059	0.006
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Sex	-0.027	-0.010	0.030	0.036

	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Income	-0.004	-0.003	-0.007***	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.003	-0.009*	-0.010***	-0.007**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Voted for Incumbent	0.064*	0.110***	0.073***	0.089***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Chile	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Ecuador	0.145*	0.155*	0.106*	0.068
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Disobedience		-0.001		-0.045
		(0.040)		(0.027)
Open × Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Open × Disobedience		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)

Middle × Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
Closed × Control		0.000		0.000
		(.)		(.)
age		-0.001		-0.003***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Observations	647	635	647	634

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (14) Support for Military Coups

	Crisis	Disobedience
Middle × Crisis	0.078 (0.063)	
Closed × Crisis	-0.049 (0.060)	
Middle × Disobedience		0.059 (0.060)
Closed × Disobedience		0.026 (0.060)
Open	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Middle	-0.068 (0.044)	-0.071 (0.043)
Closed	0.009 (0.047)	0.001 (0.046)
Control	0.000 (.)	
Crisis	-0.020 (0.043)	
Open × Control	0.000 (.)	
Open × Crisis	0.000 (.)	
Middle × Control	0.000 (.)	

Closed × Control	0.000	
	(.)	
Conscientiousness	0.139*	0.074
	(0.061)	(0.061)
Introversion	-0.068	-0.126*
	(0.062)	(0.063)
Agreeableness	0.010	-0.071
	(0.061)	(0.063)
Emotional Stability	-0.032	0.012
	(0.065)	(0.066)
Sex	0.071*	0.090**
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Income	-0.009**	-0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	-0.002	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Voted for Incumbent	0.116***	0.119***
	(0.028)	(0.027)
Chile	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)
Ecuador	0.146*	0.186**
	(0.065)	(0.066)
Control		0.000
		(.)
Disobedience		-0.042
		(0.040)

Open × Control		0.000
		(.)
Open × Disobedience		0.000
		(.)
Middle × Control		0.000
		(.)
Closed × Control		0.000
		(.)
Observations	644	633

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (15) Support for Autocracy - Continuous Measure

	Autocratic Support	Autocratic Support	Autocracy Regime	Autocracy Regime	Concentration of Power
Crisis × Low Openness to Experience	-0.043 (0.071)		0.106 (0.108)		-0.140 (0.112)
Disobedience × Low Openness to Experience		0.059 (0.075)		0.106 (0.112)	
Low Openness to Experience	0.052 (0.056)	0.011 (0.056)	-0.036 (0.085)	0.012 (0.085)	0.069 (0.089)
Control	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)
Crisis	0.024 (0.031)		-0.040 (0.047)		0.085 (0.049)
Control × Low Openness to Experience	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)
Conscientiousness	0.077* (0.038)	0.050 (0.038)	0.010 (0.057)	0.014 (0.058)	0.071 (0.060)
Introversion	-0.095* (0.037)	-0.124** (0.039)	-0.051 (0.057)	-0.032 (0.059)	-0.161** (0.060)

Agreeableness	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.095* (0.039)	-0.057 (0.057)	0.028 (0.060)	0.025 (0.060)
Emotional Stability	-0.046 (0.040)	-0.027 (0.041)	-0.049 (0.061)	0.031 (0.062)	-0.052 (0.063)
Sex	-0.004 (0.018)	0.029 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.027)	0.032 (0.027)	-0.036 (0.028)
Income	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Education	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Voted for Incumbent	0.077*** (0.017)	0.093*** (0.017)	0.077** (0.025)	0.080** (0.025)	0.071** (0.027)
Age	-0.002*** (0.001)		-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Chile	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Ecuador	0.090* (0.040)	0.145*** (0.042)	0.003 (0.062)	-0.012 (0.064)	0.141* (0.064)
Control		0.000		0.000	

		(.)		(.)	
Disobedience		-0.009		-0.015	
		(0.032)		(0.048)	
Control × Low Openness to Experience		0.000		0.000	
		(.)		(.)	
Observations	648	635	647	634	647

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (16) Support for Autocracy - Continuous Measure

	Concentration of Power	Limitation of Rights	Limitation of Rights	Military Coups	Military Coups
Crisis × Low Openness to Experience		0.013 (0.077)		-0.843 (0.689)	
Disobedience × Low Openness to Experience	0.021 (0.117)		0.080 (0.080)		0.019 (0.714)
Low Openness to Experience	-0.013 (0.089)	0.084 (0.061)	0.089 (0.060)	0.623 (0.546)	0.684 (0.544)
Control	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)
Disobedience	0.019 (0.050)		-0.025 (0.034)		-0.059 (0.303)
Control × Low Openness to Experience	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)
Conscientiousness	0.053 (0.060)	0.105* (0.041)	0.113** (0.041)	0.849* (0.361)	0.526 (0.367)
Introversion	-0.200** (0.062)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.082 (0.042)	-0.507 (0.362)	-0.786* (0.378)

Agreeableness	-0.127*	-0.023	-0.098*	0.230	-0.167
	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.362)	(0.381)
Emotional Stability	-0.100	-0.040	0.018	-0.237	0.230
	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.380)	(0.389)
Sex	-0.013	0.013	0.032	0.377*	0.555**
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Income	-0.003	-0.005*	-0.004	-0.050**	-0.047**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Education	-0.008*	-0.008**	-0.007*	-0.008	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Voted for Incumbent	0.108***	0.072***	0.088***	0.658***	0.756***
	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Age	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.010	-0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Chile	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Ecuador	0.160*	0.084	0.087	0.868*	0.839*
	(0.067)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.394)	(0.411)
Control		0.000		0.000	

		(.)		(.)	
Crisis		-0.013		0.255	
		(0.034)		(0.306)	
Control × Low Openness to Experience		0.000		0.000	
		(.)		(.)	
Observations	635	647	634	644	633

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$