Men, Women, and Policy Preferences:
The Great Reversal in Partisan Alignment

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This paper examines a major social cleavage—sex—in its changing relationship to policy preferences, as this relationship shapes and is shaped by political parties and the partisan attachments of men and women in American society. Some social cleavages come almost pre-packaged in these regards, as with social class and social welfare or racial background and civil rights. Others have less immediate but equally insistent implications, as with religious denomination and cultural values. Though all three leave substantial room for further impacts from political parties and party attachment.

Sex is less obvious in its expected relationships. Should men and women 'naturally' divide on issues of national security? Is this a cleavage that might be expected to have intrinsic links to cultural values? Do the lived experiences of men and women cause them to link differently to social welfare? Even to civil rights? Do all such questions receive different answers at different points in time? Or do these possibilities merely underline the expanded prospects for differing—and changing—links to policy preferences and political parties that derive from sex as a social cleavage?

Better data coupled with an analytic framework designed to address the changing relationship between social cleavages and policy preferences *by way of* partisan attachment allow a fresh approach to sex as a social cleavage in American politics. Along the way, it is possible to see the critical mediating role of partisan attachments, accompanied by—indeed producing—a change in the underlying relationship of men and women to the political parties themselves.

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Four major cleavages have received concentrated and continuing attention from scholars concerned with the societal roots of political conflicts: social class, racial background, religious tradition, and sexual subgroup.[1] Just as four major policy realms are recognized as characterizing political conflict in the United States since the Second World War: social welfare, civil rights, cultural values, and national security.[2] The dominant institutional arrangement for connecting the two, intellectually but also practically, is the political party, in its Democratic and Republican versions. And the conceptual device for following the evolution of these links is a *partisan alignment*, that is, the degree and the fashion in which social cleavages are linked to policy preferences and transferred into government by political parties. Along the way, it will be necessary to divide the two parties by a key internal division, between party activists and the party rank and file.

This becomes the framework for asking about the place of sex in American politics, distinguishing men and women as sexual subgroups. Though right from the start, sex poses a different challenge from the other major cleavages. In the abstract, the dominant expectation is that social class will be most clearly linked to public preferences on social welfare; that racial background will be most clearly linked to public preferences on civil rights, and that religious tradition will be most closely linked to public preferences on cultural values. But what is it that should be said about sex in this regard? The initial answer at the time when the American National Election study was in its

infancy was national security: men were expected to favor the use of force, women to favor instead the use of diplomacy—and we too can begin with that.[3] Yet the evolution of practical politics since that time has made this simple extrapolation look much less automatic, even just as an initial framing expectation.

At one extreme are theorists arguing for a dominant link between men, women, and public preferences on social welfare. At the other extreme are theorists prioritizing a link between men, women, and public preferences on cultural values. So the three perspectives immediately produce alternative expectations for empirical research. (Civil rights stands apart as the domain that, being much more stable in the comparative preferences of men and women, has been far less open to major theoretical amendments.) As a result, an attempt to organize an examination of the place of sex as a social cleavage within American politics since the Second World II requires an explicit framework for connecting social cleavage, policy realm, and political party by way of partisan alignment, encompassing all four major policy domains while analyzing the evolution of *this alignment* across the entire postwar period. In order to study change over time, that period is divided into three generational eras, 1950-1970, 1970-1990, and 1990-2010.

In the process and most centrally, this effort then requires *measures* capturing group membership, policy preference, and party attachment. In order to construct the partisan alignments central to addressing the main theoretical concerns here, we shall need to know the policy preferences of party identifiers, Democratic versus Republican. For this, the canonical measure of party identification is long-running and familiar, and it is used here to delineate partisan attachment.[4] Inside these parties, we shall need to

distinguish between partisan activists, those who undertake specialized activities on behalf of a political party or its candidates, as opposed to the partisan rank and file, who identify with a party but do not otherwise undertake the earmarked activities. The American National Election Study (ANES) has long carried a small battery of items that ask about specialized political activities, and these allow us to go on and distinguish the active party from its rank and file.[5]

Partisan alignments will then be the patterned relationships of policy preferences in the four leading policy domains for the two sexes, the two parties, and the four partisan populations, namely Democratic activists, the Democratic rank and file, the Republican rank and file, and Republican activists, themselves further divided by sex. A dataset capable of meeting these demands across time was generated originally, for quite other purposes, by William Claggett and Byron Shafer, then subsequently extended and managed by Regina Wagner.[6] Derived from the American National Election Study, these measures were a product of exploratory and then confirmatory factor analyses, yielding scales for public preferences on social welfare, civil rights, cultural values, and national security. In what follows, the results are presented as standardized scores, ranging from -1.00 at the liberal end to +1.00 at the conservative end of the ideological continuum.

Initial Links for Sex, Policy, and Party

Accordingly, at the opening of the postwar era, there was something of an expectation for links between sexual subgroups and policy preferences centered on the domain of national security. Yet sex was to prove more variable empirically across policy domains and more labile within those domains than the other major cleavages, namely

class, race, and religion. Viewed broadly, sex would be related to policy preferences far beyond national security. Viewed narrowly, its relationship even to national security would be different in each of the postwar periods. So Tables 1 and 2 begin with all four major policy domains in the immediate postwar period, isolating the degree to which policy preferences were aligned by party attachment, the degree to which those same preferences were instead aligned by sex, and then the composite links among party, sex, and policy.

Table 1

Most of the story of policy preference by party attachment would have been familiar to survey analysts of the time. (Table 1.A) Policy preferences were already well aligned by party on social welfare, with Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right. Those preferences were patterned in the same fashion for civil rights, but in a much weaker manner. Though if this relationship was only half as strong as the one with social welfare, it was still far stronger than a possibly emergent link to cultural values. The latter qualified as a 'partisan alignment' only for those who knew how it would evolve over the next forty years. And national security entered this comprehensive picture in an even more shadowy manner: Democrats were indeed to the left and Republicans to the right in these early postwar years, but so weakly that it was every bit as reasonable to describe both as sitting essentially *on* the national average.

Nothing about this tiny partisan division on national security promised instantiation, much less expansion, of a link to party attachments, ordinarily the key link for translating policy preferences in to political conflict. Yet this very absence acquires a

curiosity value because the years of the first postwar era, 1950-1970, were in fact the high point—the 'hot' years—of the Cold War.[7] Nevertheless, partisan alignment by liberal (dovish) or conservative (hawkish) preferences was feeble, small enough to represent sampling errors, rounding errors, or artifacts of any number of other factors. Only hindsight could suggest that a relationship this weak might instead have reflected a critical moment in the evolution of American foreign policy, as an old world structured by the long struggle between isolationists and internationalists gave way to a new world structured instead by hawks and doves in the American-led effort to restrain international communism.

The substantial variety of relationships between policy preference and party attachment in the three other domains did argue implicitly for the possibility of further distinctions when stratified by sex, that is, men versus women, most especially where party was inconsequential. Yet immediate further results from looking at the evidence this way were extremely modest. (Table 1.B) Thus existing differences by sex looked even smaller by comparison to the differences by party that already characterized social welfare in these early postwar years, where sex possessed less than one-sixth the aligning power of party.[8] Differences by sex were no greater in absolute terms when the focus was civil rights, though a more modest alignment by party did make them *appear* more consequential. Even then, this sexual alignment on civil rights was only a third of the alignment by party.[9]

Differences by sex were no larger in the domain of cultural values, but here, these differences stood out in two senses.[10] In the first, they were fully equal to the minimal

alignment contributed by party attachment. That made them *comparatively* more consequential. And in the second, a minimal alignment by sex for cultural values actually *reversed* the ideological relationship found everywhere else. On cultural values, but only there, men were the liberals and women were the conservatives. Finally, differences by sex on national security were similarly small in absolute terms, though in this domain they were actually larger than the counterpart differences by party. Sex otherwise returned to running in its more usual ideological direction on national security, with women more liberal (dovish) and men more conservative (hawkish).

So sex was not very useful as a predictor of policy preferences in the immediate postwar years for any of the major policy domains, though there were some further idiosyncratic twists within these modest overall relationships. Most consequentially, where policy preferences were clearly linked to party attachment, evidently on social welfare and incipiently on civil rights, sex was very secondary. If the link to sex was really no stronger in the other domains, partisan alignment was at least weak there too, with that ideological reversal by sex on cultural values worthy of the most further notice. In any case, all of this pushes the analysis on quickly to the *interaction* of the two great structuring principles, party attachment and social cleavage, treated jointly rather than separately this time.

Table 2

So Table 2 isolates the *four* cohorts defined jointly by party and sex, namely Democratic women, Democratic men, Republican women, and Republican men. The result almost inevitably increases the polarizing power of sex, that is, the ideological

distance between the farthest left and the farthest right cohort, since it doubles the number of cohorts. Yet conversely and more consequentially, it is immediately clear that, stratified this way, the four domains no longer place these four cohorts in the same ideological order from one policy domain to another. Rather, the resulting ideological continua offer three distinct patterns that are now constituted from what are, after all, only four separate domains.

Seen through this lens, the two domains that were already aligned by party attachment, principally social welfare but also civil rights, now tell an ideological story that mixes sex and party in a straightforward fashion. (Table 2.A) For both, their Democrats remain on the left and their Republicans remain on the right, so party continues to dominate sex as an organizing principle for policy preferences. Yet *within* those parties, sex continues to work as it did when considered in isolation, with women to the left and men to the right. As a result, the distance from Democratic women to Republican men does extend the ideological range beyond that of either alignment individually, that is, by party or by sex.

The parties show up in the same order when sex is considered together with them on cultural values, with Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right. (Table 2.B) Yet it is not just that men remain more liberal than women, now inside both parties. It is also the case that Democratic men are the only liberals, opposed by a cluster of what can now be seen to be three conservative cohorts. So the modest appearance of liberalism among aggregate Democrats and of conservatism among aggregate Republicans (as at Table 1.A) stands revealed as an artifact of male Democratic liberalism.

Lastly, when the same four cohorts are arrayed ideologically on national security, previous patterning by party breaks down completely, being actively displaced by patterning via sex. (Table 2.C) Women are now liberal among both Democrats and Republicans, and men are conservative, likewise for both parties. So the shadowy national alignment by party attachment on foreign affairs (again Table 1.A) collapses in the face of a simultaneously considered alignment by sex. Said the other way around, here, and here only, it is more important in these early years to know sex than it is to know party.

The final step for an analysis of partisan alignments in these immediate postwar years is to take initial relationships among social cleavage, party attachment, and social cleavage, and policy preference, stratify them further by partisan population: Democratic activists, the Democratic rank and file, the Republican rank and file, and Republican activists. On one level, these populations do complete a picture of policy alignment at any given point in time. At the same time, they acquire an augmented analytic importance, because they provide the intermediaries through which the main engines of change would have to register their impact, sometimes with party activists leading the way, other times with the rank and file playing the leadership role. So Table 3 does this too.

Table 3

Social welfare, as ever, shows a clear and strong alignment by party attachment across what are now eight partisan populations, with all four Democratic populations left of the national average and all four Republican populations right of it. (Table 3.A) In

that sense, party attachment continues to stand out as the dominant organizing principle, while sex presents no further consistent challenge to it. Civil rights offers the same overall ordering in a less polarized fashion, with all four Democratic populations again left of the national average and all four Republican populations right of it. (Table 3.B) Though with the exception of female Democratic activists, all eight of these gendered populations are also more moderate on civil rights than on social welfare, suggesting that the latter was clearly more consequential to all but those Democratic female activists.

Cultural values, never much aligned by either party or sex, does not change greatly when levels of political activism are injected into its picture. (Table 3.C) What should really be said about party, sex, and level of political activity in the realm of cultural policy is that the three principles continue to testify to an *absence* of aligning power. Five of these eight populations sit nearly on the national average, so national security shares the *lack* of an overarching party alignment. (Table 3.D) Yet where this absence makes cultural values look initially like a systematic jumble, the same absence actually clarifies the situation on national security, allowing sex to go on and organize the domain, now for all eight partisan populations, with the four female cohorts to the left of the four male cohorts. Though note once more that six of the eight populations sit close to the national average, with only activist Democratic women notably off to the left and only activist Republican men notably off to the right.

That underlines the potential dissidence of activist populations, and a final sub-focus on these activists does raise two further twists worth noting. In the first, activist Democratic women contribute the ideological left in three of the four policy domains,

albeit a very lonely left on civil rights, yet they move all the way over to the right on cultural values. Conversely, activist Republican men contribute the ideological right in the same three domains, while moving all the way over to the left on cultural values. And in the other final twist, the Republican Party possesses the lone rank and file population to contribute an ideological extreme in any of these domains, in the form of rank and file Republican women, who anchor the ideological right on cultural values.

Shifting Preferences, Shifting Cleavages, Shifting Alignments

The postwar evolution of American politics would alter this opening summary, mottled as it already was, in ways that were powerfully shaped by the substantive content of the individual domains. Party as an aligning principle would grow in importance across all four domains but in a highly unequal fashion, within which the arrival of partisanship as an aligning principle for national security became the lead story of the second postwar period. Sex as an aligning principle would simultaneously decline except, ironically, in the realm where party was strongest, namely social welfare, where the power of sex would also increase. Otherwise, cohorts jointly created by party and by sex would fall neatly into place within this larger picture, while isolating a small set of noteworthy further changes among individual partisan populations.

Table 4

In the opening postwar years, social welfare had been the domain most strongly aligned by partisan attachment, and while a further difference within parties by sex was not absent—women being more liberal than men, men more conservative than women—the difference in ideological polarization by party had been by far the greatest for social

welfare among the four major policy domains. (Table 1.A) Nevertheless, the aligning power of party attachment in this domain would increase in the second postwar period, albeit in an asymmetric fashion. (Table 4.A) The Democratic Party would be pretty much the sole vehicle for expanding an overall polarization, moving strongly leftward, while the Republican Party remained almost exactly where it had been in the preceding era.

As associated fall-out, the two parties as collective wholes became more ideologically symmetric in their aggregate preferences on welfare policy. Yet neither their increased partisan polarization nor a growing ideological symmetry would prevent the aligning power of sex from increasing as well. (Table 4.B) In proportional terms, this power would grow by nearly as much as the aligning power of party attachment, though in absolute terms, sex remained well behind party as an organizing principle. Yet the immediate point is that polarization by sex would double from the previous period, looking even larger comparatively in an era where that power was declining in the three other major domains.

Beyond that, when the two principles of stratification were put back together as sexes within parties, it became clear that most of the shift leftward among Democrats on social welfare, and hence much of the augmented polarization overall, was contributed by Democratic *women*. (Table 4.C) Democratic men, Republican men, and Republican women had hardly moved from the previous period. But Democratic women moved strongly leftward, taking the aggregate party with them as they did. In that sense, there was nearly nothing going on inside the Republican Party on social welfare, nearly

nothing among Democratic men either. Yet Democratic women more than made up for that lack of activity as a force for change within the nation as a whole.

Civil rights had been the policy domain in the opening postwar years that was either the main realm on its way to being organized by party in the future or the one testifying most strongly to the power of random variation: a measure taken at that point in time could not really distinguish between the two possibilities. (Table 1.A) Yet this successor period was to make it clear that civil rights had belonged in the first category, emergent alignment, and not in the second, random noise. (Table 4.A) Social welfare would remain the most strongly aligned of the four major policy domains, but civil rights was just as clearly the fastest growing. And hereafter, there could be no reasonable doubt in the matter. Though in the process, civil rights was to diverge from social welfare in a different key regard.

For in fact, the power of policy alignment by sex, weak in all four domains during the earlier period, declined all the way to zero in the rights domain, even as it was doubling for social welfare. (Table 4.B) At a minimum, then, the incipient alignment by sex that had also characterized the first period proved *not* to have been a harbinger of anything. Moreover, a focus on party and sex jointly did not change this perception. (Table 4.C) What had previously been a continuum from Democratic women on the left to Republican men on the right became just a neat division between aggregate Democrats and aggregate Republicans, with a slight increment of ideological conservatism this time among Republican men.

All of this looked very different with cultural values. If social welfare featured the most powerful partisan alignment and civil rights the fastest growing counterpart—national security, examined below, would be the surprise addition to the power of partisanship—then cultural values stood out as the *lagging* partisan domain. (Table 4.A) The power of party attachment increased even here, and hindsight would confirm that cultural values was evolving in ways parallel to the other policy domains in the longest run. Yet further projections from the actual change during this second period would have been challenged by the fact that if there was to be a domain that remained comparatively immune to the aligning power of party, then that domain was just as clearly cultural values.

More indisputable was the disappearance of an alignment by sex. (Table 4.B) What had been the realm where sex was marginally most powerful among the four great policy realms became a domain where the aligning power of sexual subgroups effectively disappeared.[11] This meant that the real product of a further division of partisans by sex on cultural values was its guarantee that the growing but still modest alignment on party attachment was not some kind of interactive artifact. Rather, men and women now stood at effectively identical positions within each of the parties, which had certainly not been true in the opening postwar years, when Democratic men had been the left wing and Republican women the right. (Table 4.C)

In any case, each and all of those evolutionary changes were less impressive than those coming to the policy domain of national security, which was effectively transformed. Originally, national security served as the model of a major substantive

realm that was *not* drawn into, or even much impacted by, party politics. Yet in this second postwar period, national security was to leapfrog over cultural values to achieve a clear and indisputable partisan alignment of its own. (Table 4.A) Where partisan polarization had been effectively absent in the opening period, it now appeared very unlikely that random variation could explain a revised party alignment on this scale. Indeed, if this alignment still lagged the one characterizing civil rights, it was already larger than civil rights had been in the immediate postwar years, when the rights domain was only just hinting that it too might be disciplined by party attachment. (Table 1.A)

So a realm where party attachment had been an effective irrelevance in those early postwar years took on clear partisan outlines of the conventional sort, with Democrats left of the national average and Republicans to its right. Yet at the same time, the structuring principle that had been most obviously identified with national security, namely sex, effectively disappeared as an organizing principle. (Table 4.B) Back then, national security had not just featured the only clear out-performance by sex over party. This out-performance had been buttressed by a horseback theoretical expectation, to the effect that men would 'naturally' by more hawkish (conservative) and women more dovish (liberal). As a result, both that out-performance and this crude expectation had disappeared.[12]

The implication is that any interpretation of policy alignments characterizing the security domain was being driven by major changes in the concrete focus of foreign affairs itself. The old basis for organizing policy conflicts in this domain, pitting isolationists against internationalists, was giving way to a new basis for organizing those conflicts, rooted in pursuit of the Cold War and pitting (hawkish) preferences for a strong

defense against (dovish) preferences for active diplomacy.[13] By the second postwar period, the conflation of these two substantive principles was effectively gone, a Cold War focus having just as clearly emerged as the essence of foreign policy. Moreover, with the coming of the Vietnam War, an earlier national consensus on combating international communism had likewise disappeared, fueling this newly partisan alignment while further diminishing the previous role of sex.[14]

Nevertheless, the triumph of party over sex was impressive in its own right. Not only did new-found differences between the parties wipe out older differences between the sexes. Sex was no longer an organizing principle even *inside* the two parties. (Table 4.C) In the immediate postwar years, Democratic women and Republican women had actually lined up against Democratic men and Republican men on national security. In the successor period, Democratic women and *Democratic* men not only lined up on the same side; they sat on the same ideological point. Just as Republican men and Republican women lined up on the opposite side, at essentially their shared point. In order for this to happen, given the previous positioning of the four cohorts, Democratic men had to move twice as far to the left as Democratic women, while Republican women had to move nearly twice as far to the right as Republican men. Both obviously did.

Table 5

Injecting four partisan populations into this collective story does nothing to undermine its individual accounts of policy alignment. What it brings to the forefront instead is the difference between domains where all four Democratic populations were left of all four Republican populations while being roughly congruent within parties,

versus those domains where new aggregate positions were largely the product of major moves by one or two populations among these eight. So presenting partisan populations in this way simultaneously underlines a new-found partisanship while isolating the populations that were *not* part of this general movement. To that end, Table 5 lines up all eight from left to right for the second postwar era, 1970-1990, comparing them with all eight for the preceding period, 1950-1970.

With social welfare, the domain most strongly organized by partisan attachment, the bulk of each party was now basically aligned with the aggregate party position. (Table 5.A) This had already been true for both parties in the preceding era, but with a curious twist. Three of the four Republican populations had been strongly conservative, creating an inaugural partisan homogeneity that left only rank and file Republican women as noticeably more moderate. In turn, three of the four Democratic populations had like-wise shown a real ideological homogeneity around moderate liberalism, while it was activist women who were off by themselves on the liberal extreme.

By the successor period, both parties had become even more—considerably more—united, becoming increasingly polarized as they did so. The Republican story was just a more extreme version of its predecessor: three of the four Republican populations were now strongly conservative, converging at roughly the same ideological point, while rank and file Republican women remained more moderate than the rest of their party. In a roughly parallel manner, three of the four Democratic populations were now strongly liberal, sitting at almost exactly the same ideological point, though this time it was rank and file Democratic men who had become the dissenting moderates, while the bulk of the

party in effect joined the activist Democratic women who had been the lone *dissenting* population in the previous period.

Civil rights had been roughly similar in that first postwar period, though some differences brought practical consequences. (Table 5.B) All four Democratic populations had been left of center with all four Republican populations right of it, so the presumption of an incipient partisan alignment was not incorrect. Beyond that and here too, rank and file Republican women had been more moderate than the rest of their party, while it was Democratic activist *men* who were far more liberal than the rest of theirs. Yet with the exception of those male Democratic activists, all partisan populations had been simultaneously less engaged, and hence closer to the ideological center, on civil rights as opposed to social welfare.

In the successor period, the Republicans reached a rough internal homogeneity on civil rights that was similar to their homogeneity on social welfare, with all their partisan populations clearly conservative. To make this happen, rank and file Republican women needed to move the most, solidly rightward, and they had done so. But the Democrats now took a different path, featuring a sharp divide that pitted party activists, both male and female, against their putative rank and file, likewise both male and female. So while all four Republican populations were clearly conservative, the ideologically extreme populations were the Democratic activists on the left, while the most ideologically moderate were the two Democratic ranks and files.

Cultural values brought a very different distribution, to accompany a very different story. (Table 5.C) In the immediate postwar years, a cultural alignment built

around partisan attachment and sexual subgroups, with both featuring only weak relationships to policy preferences on cultural values, had been ultimately just a jumble. Four of the eight partisan populations sat essentially on the national average, apparently unmoved by cultural issues. Democratic men, both activists and the rank and file, were off to their left. And rank and file Republican women plus activist *Democratic* women were off to their right. In that sense, the existing weak partisan and weak sexual relationships were more or less entirely a gift of Democratic men.

What followed in the successor period was an array of partisan populations anchored by Democratic activists on the far left, both men and women this time, and by Republican rank and files on the moderate right, also both men and women. In order for this to happen, Democratic activist women needed to make a major move to the left while rank and file Republican men had to make a clear move to the right, and both did so. Though the ultimate testimony to weak partisan alignment and a non-existent alignment by sex remained the fact that four of the eight populations still sat essentially at zero, while the two populations at each ideological extreme were comprised of one male and one female subgroup.

That left the lead story of partisan (re)alignment in this second postwar period to national security once again. (Table 5.D) This domain had begun the postwar years with the weakest partisan alignment of the four, distinguished additionally by an ever so slightly stronger alignment by sex. A picture of this alignment by way of eight partisan populations rather than just four had reinforced that picture. Even among the highly participatory, the activists of each party had actually been on *opposite sides* of the

ideological continuum: female Democratic activists liberal and male Democratic activists conservative, female Republican activists liberal and male Democratic activists conservative. Yet six of these eight populations had offered ideological scores less than +/- .05, including all four rank and file populations.

That was the array that blew apart in this successor era, energizing an alignment based on party while dismissing an alignment based on sex. The Republicans became effectively homogeneous, with all four partisan populations in essentially the same (moderately conservative) position. But at the same time, the Democrats split sharply *inside* their party, with the two activist populations moving strongly off to the left, while the two rank and file populations were only moderately liberal. In order to produce this alignment, Democratic men, both activist and rank and file, had to move clearly to the left, just as Republican women, again both activist and rank and file, had to move clearly to the right. Which all four did, as the overall alignment attests.

An Expanding Partisan Alignment.

There were three (nested) lead stories to policy alignment in the modern era, 1990-2010. First was the onward march of party attachment as an aligning principle, now reaching everywhere and driving everything in the same direction. Yet this time, the comparative pacing of this onward march within the individual policy domains—strongest in the previously least aligned, more leisurely in the previously most aligned—was driving toward a convergence of the resulting alignments. And all the while, the evident resurgence of sexual subgroups within those evolving parties was giving partisan alignments a strong further coloring, with only one evident exception.

Table 6

Social welfare, long the dominant registry for the power of party attachment, remained imposing and continued to polarize in the modern era. Yet where fresh polarization had been contributed almost entirely by a move leftward on the part of Democrats in the preceding era, the fresh partisan increment characterizing the modern world was contributed almost entirely by a move rightward on the part of Republicans. (Table 6.A) At the same time, the division by sex that had characterized social welfare in the previous period continued, in the same fashion and in a slightly augmented form. (Table 6.B) And putting the two back together only affirmed the growing power of both, with Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right in both sexes, but women to the left and men to the right inside both parties. (Table 6.C) An additional move rightward among Republican men completed the explanation of why men as a composite social group ended up farther from the national average than women.

Civil rights told a story of continuity as well—actually two stories—but the result needed to be distinguished from the counterpart picture on social welfare. Civil rights too produced a clear, and this time larger, increase in partisan polarization. (Table 6.A) Like the one for social welfare, this featured a considerably larger move to the right by Republicans, with only a marginal move leftward among Democrats. Yet the overall shift was sufficient to make civil rights fully the equivalent of social welfare when seen through the aligning power of party attachment. That said, what did *not* happen was also noteworthy. Having shown no further alignment by sex in the preceding era, civil rights continued to offer by far the smallest such impact in the modern world. (Table 6.B) And

a look at party and sex together only underlined both developments: Democrats remained on the left and Republicans on the right, yet there was still nearly no difference between men and women inside the two parties. (Table 6.C)

The truly distinctive story of policy alignment in the modern world then belonged to cultural values. Previously the lone domain that was not indisputably aligned by party, culture now assumed a clear partisan alignment and in the manner characterizing the other three, namely Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right. (Table 6.A) If this remained the weakest of four parallel alignments, it was no longer subject to any reasonable argument for its absence. Yet at the same time, the aligning power of sex also expanded. Men were now clearly conservative and women clearly liberal on cultural policy, and this was not only the largest change in policy alignments by sex; it was change that represented a complete reversal from the opening period, when men had been liberal and women conservative. (Table 6.B) And like social welfare but unlike civil rights, a look at party and sex together showed Democrats of both sexes on the left and Republicans of both sexes on the right, with women to the left and men to the right inside each party. (Table 6.C)

Finally, national security continued its move toward partisan convergence, while bringing a fresh sexual division to robust life as well. As the domain that had come into alignment by party during the preceding period, national security continued its new-found polarization. (Table 6.A) Indeed, if it did not catch social welfare and civil rights in absolute terms, it came very close to doing so. Yet at the same time, national security resurrected the alignment by sex that had characterized it in the first postwar period, with

women to the (dovish) left and men to the (hawkish) right. That alignment had declined to zero in the second postwar era; it rebounded robustly in the third, to produce what became the largest gap by sex of the four major domains. (Table 6.B) And here too, joint consideration of party and sex produced the expected ordering: Democrats of both sexes were to the left and Republicans of both sexes to the right, with women to the left and men to the right inside each party. (Table 6.C) Lastly and within all of that, the liberalism of Democratic women on national security—Or perhaps it was the moderation of Democratic men?—stood out additionally.

For the four policy domains as a whole, then, the power of party attachment continued to rise. Social welfare, previously the most strongly aligned, continued on that path but added the least to partisan polarization this time. Just as cultural values, previously the least strongly aligned, added the most for this third postwar period. Yet civil rights caught up with social welfare in this regard, while national security actually came close. Moreover, all four domains went on to produce the combination of party and sex as aligning principles that separate examinations of each would have predicted. For social welfare, cultural values, and national security, this meant Democratic women and Democratic men on the left versus Republican women and Republican men on the right, with women otherwise left of men inside each party. Only civil rights, now every bit as polarized by party, showed no separable impact by sex, continuing to exhibit no such impact when party and sex were considered jointly.

Table 7

Carving these cohorts by level of political activity, so as to contrast activists and their rank and files, helps to highlight the particular populations that were driving one or another of these changes, while providing the crucial evidence for asking whether it was the active party or its much larger body of passive identifiers that were contributing to these modern changes. On the first question—Are there tensions within these parties by level of activity?—female Democratic activists stood out for being well off to the left of their party on cultural values and national security. Conversely, the male Democratic rank and file was distinguished by being extremely moderate in the same two domains, while the female Republican rank and file sustained its reputation for moderation, most especially on social welfare. On the second question—How much do such tensions matter collectively?—the Republicans showed up as much more homogeneous than the Democrats on civil rights, cultural values, and national security, that is, everywhere except social welfare.

Displayed this way, the partisan array on social welfare, when constituted from eight partisan populations rather than just four cohorts, retained its overall contours. (Table 7.A) Three of the four Republican populations remain strongly and homogeneously conservative, with some moderation surviving among rank and file Republican women. Just as three of the four Democratic populations remain closely clustered and moderately liberal, though the dissident population here was Democratic female activists, additionally off to the left. Yet even the two populations that were most moderate previously, rank and file Democratic men and rank and file Republican women, had

polarized additionally in the modern world, while the largest further contribution to the sharp Republican move rightward came from male Republican activists.

With civil rights, the two partisan halves of the story became different. (Table 7.B) The four Republican populations were the closest to homogeneous among any of the four policy domains, at a uniformly and strongly conservative position. Yet the Democratic Party was split sharply between its activists and their (putative) rank and file. Democratic activists were nearly as liberal as their Republican opposite numbers were conservative, but the Democratic rank and file contributed the two most moderate populations, opening a clear gap with their own activists. Though within every piece of this expanded array, for civil rights but nowhere else, there was again no serious further difference by sex.

Cultural values, however, the domain that acquired an indisputable partisan alignment only in this modern period, showed a very different situation below its aggregate surface. (Table 7.C) In the preceding period, both parties had featured an internal divide pitting activists against their own rank and files on cultural values. Indeed, that was the crucial underpinning for an alignment *tamping down* the organizing power of partisanship. In the new world, however, all eight populations were in their appropriate ideological positions for an array organized by party, with all four Republican populations conservative and all four Democratic populations liberal. Though it is important to go on and note that the Republican Party was far more ideologically unified than its Democratic opponents within this total picture.

So this was a policy domain that ought to have stressed the Democratic Party much more than the Republicans, though for this to be the case, two further things had to happen. First, Republican activists, both male and female, had to move all the way from marginal liberalism to strong conservatism on cultural policy. They did indeed do so, in the process creating the largest ideological shift by any partisan population in any policy domain in the modern world. At the same time, female Democratic activists had to move off from their male counterparts, leftward, and well off from their rank and file among both sexes, which they also did. Along the way, the male Democratic rank and file became the most moderate partisan population, sitting almost as close to rank and file female Republicans as to their own female (Democratic) activists.

Lastly, national security, having acquired a clear partisan alignment in the preceding era, mixed the Republican story on civil rights with the Democratic story on cultural values for this third period. (Table 7.D) Among Republicans, all four partisan populations were again roughly homogeneous, a trifle less so than with civil rights but actually more so than with social welfare. But among Democrats, the same internal divisions characterizing cultural values—female activists well off to the left, the male rank and file only modestly liberal at all—now characterized national security too. For the Republicans, this represented a strong move to the right by all four partisan populations. For the Democrats, it required female activists to split off from their male counterparts to the left, while the male rank and file edged marginally to the right. Which, of course, both did.

Partisan Balance and Sexual Subgroup

That is a comprehensive picture of partisan alignments by sex. As a social cleavage, sex proves both more complicated and more labile than social class, racial background, or even religious denomination. It rises, falls, and rises again as an impact on policy alignment. It moves in different ways in different policy domains. It is even capable of reversing ideological direction. The poor are never the ones most opposed to social welfare; racial minorities are never the ones most opposed to civil rights; and evangelicals are never the ones most opposed to cultural traditionalism. Yet men and women occasionally swap policy preferences as social groups, while changing the strength of those preferences frequently and idiosyncratically across the postwar period.

All that said, one critical further difference between men and women still helped reshape American politics in a major way, an impact that should not be lost inside the complicated and labile pattern of impact by sex on individual policy realms. For over and above those impacts—and this must be a main point in any conclusions about sex as a social cleavage—differences by sex remained clearly tied to changes in *party balance* for the nation as a whole. From the immediate postwar years and into the modern era, albeit again in fits and starts, men and women as sexual subgroups changed their partisan attachments. Specifically, the Democrats became more female and the Republicans more male, and the trade-off was not equal. Men moved more than women; Republicans gained more than Democrats; and the country as a whole became less Democratic and more Republican.[15]

What was driving this particular—and self-evidently consequential—change? Any effort to unpack this change must begin with the actual distribution of the sexes

inside the two parties, followed directly by this distribution for the eight partisan populations that result when the original four, that is, activists and their rank and files for Democrats and Republicans, are subdivided further into men and women. Yet for all the impressive differentiation by sex that becomes visible when eight populations are stratified in this way, the result remains an essentially static picture, when it is not actively misleading. So the analytic story must then move on to the question of which subgroups, stratified by sex, were in fact driving a changed partisan alignment, and what was driving their specific contributions.

With the answer to that in hand, an ideal world would allow a further focus on the particular men and particular women who changed parties across time. Most pointedly, what was it about their policy preferences that caused them to change the most powerful shaping influence on policy alignments, namely their own party attachment? Alas, our data—or any of which we know—do not allow the isolation of these two key populations on a scale sufficiently large and systematic to be reliable. On the other hand, there is a silver lining: what can still be done is to extract the policy domains, now by sexualized partisan cohorts, that are farthest out of line with—and in that sense most alienated from—the existing preferences of the active parties.

Table 8

In the immediate postwar period, both aggregate parties were comprised of a majority of women. (Table 8.A) Though within this parallel majority, the Democrats were more male and the Republicans more female. Yet by the modern era, the two parties not only leaned in the opposite direction; they actually fronted opposing

majorities. The share of Democratic identifiers who were female had increased substantially, as had the share of Republican identifiers who were male. Moreover, not only had the two subgroups moved in opposite directions when stratified by sex. They had actually reached the point where each party had a different demographic majority: Democrats were now majority-female and Republicans majority-male.[16]

That difference gained consequence in some regards but actually lost it in others when stratified further by partisan population. Without their activists, the two rank and files in the immediate postwar years had been a trifle less distinguishable by sex. (Eras 1 in Table 8.B) Both had still showed female majorities; the Democrats had still been the more male of the two. Yet what had caused the composite parties to augment this distinction was a much more striking difference in the sexual makeup of the two activist populations. On balance, Republicans were slightly female-led, though this female edge was little different from that of their rank and file or, for that matter, of the Democratic rank and file. Yet the Democrats were much more clearly male-led, with a majority of male activists that appeared even larger because it was substantially different from the sexual composition of their own rank and file, or of the two Republican populations.

By the modern era, however, everything had changed. Both rank and files remained majority-female, but now solidly so among Democrats and only marginally so among Republicans. (Era 2 in Table 8.B) By extension, what had been a two percentage-point gap in the early years (47-53 Democratic versus 45-55 Republican) had become an eleven-point gap in the modern world (38-62 Democratic versus 49-51 Republican). Yet at the same time, the sexual balance among party activists had actually—and strongly—

reversed. Where the Democrats had been male-led in the opening years (54-46 men over women), they were now clearly female-led (52-48 women over men). And where the Republicans had been female led in that opening period (54-46 women over men), they were now even more solidly male-led (56-44 men over women). Within each party, then, there had been a net shift between the sexes of sixteen percentage-points.

Those are the main partisan differences by sex. They sketch out the relationship between party attachment and sexual subgroup. In the process, they provide a set-up through which some additional questions about men, women, and American politics could be examined. Yet for purposes of studying partisan change, and especially for locating the change engine driving it, this way of proceeding is not just misleading. It actually percentages the data in the wrong direction. In effect, this way of presenting the data will always overstate the place of a social group that is increasing as a share of a party in decline, while understating the place a social group that is increasing as a share of a party enjoying substantial growth—even though the latter is ordinarily the critical vehicle for political change, which in the case of sexual subgroups and party balance, it clearly was.

Table 9

So Table 9.A percentages the same data in the opposite direction: not men and women as a share of each partisan category, but Democrats and Republicans as a share of each sexual subgroup. This allows the analysis to compare the impact of partisan change within sexual subgroups, looking at the comparative scope of increases and decreases for each party and contributing more appropriately to a judgment about the comparative size

of the two effects.[17] Percentaged this way, the relationship between sexual subgroup and party attachment in the immediate postwar years still does not look terribly different at first glance. (Era 1 in Table 9.A) Both the Democrats and the Republicans again have female majorities, and the Democrats again look ever so modestly male by comparison to the Republicans.

Yet the modern era—and hence, a picture of change between the early years and this modern era—now appears strikingly different. (Era 2 in Table 9.A) Women as a composite social group have still moved away from the Republicans and toward the Democrats, just as men have moved away from the Democrats toward the Republicans. But the *comparative* change by sex, among men as opposed to women, and hence the share of the change contributed by each, looks different indeed. Women do still move up as a share of the Democratic Party, from 58% to 62%, but men move up so much more as a share of the Republican Party, from 40% to 49%. So party balance, as opposed to sexual balance, offers a net increment of five percent to the Republican Party. And this is arguably the largest contribution of sex as a social cleavage to partisan alignments over time.

By way of perspective, had the Republicans possessed this extra five percent of net support in the first postwar era, all else being equal, Thomas E. Dewey would have been president in 1948, defeating Harrry Truman, and Richard M. Nixon would have been able to get there in his first try in 1960, defeating John Kennedy, rather than having to wait for a retest in 1968. By the same token, had the Democrats not shed the same five percent in the modern era, Al Gore would have been president in 2000, defeating George

W. Bush without the need for a court challenge; John Kerry would have gone on to unhorse Bush in 2004, had the latter survived the 2000 contest; and Hillary Clinton would have become President in 2016, acquiring a majority in the Electoral College and not just the popular vote.

So a five-percent net swing, courtesy of party attachment by way of sexual subgroup, becomes not just a sizable share of all party identifiers, but a figure of some practical consequence. But what was it that drove a noteworthy share of previously Democratic men to adopt Republican Party attachment while another, lesser, but still substantial share of previously Republican women crossed over to the Democrats? Once again, definitive answers to those questions would require examination of the individuals —male and female, Democratic and Republican—who actually changed parties across the postwar era. Once again, even the best social surveys cannot come close to providing those data.

On the other hand, it is possible to narrow the search for party switchers through a two-step process. Step one involves removing the activists, both Democratic and Republican, from the overall sample. These are the individuals who, by definition, do the active work of one or the other parties, and previous research has established that they are disproportionately unlikely to change partisan allegiances.[18] After their removal, step two refocuses on the Democratic and Republican rank and files, asking *which* Democratic men and *which* Republican women were most stressed by the policy choices that the active parties put before them. This is a way to isolate the policy domains where

various sexualized populations were farthest from the programmatic preferences of their own party.

Table 9.B provides the evidence for step one by repeating the analysis in Table 9.A for the four (now-sexualized) rank and files: Democratic women, Democratic men, Republican women, and Republican men. Percentages in this table are different from those for the two parties as aggregate wholes, since activists on both sides are removed from the tallies. Yet the grand contours of the story change very little. In the opening period, the Democratic rank and file continues to contain majorities of both men and women, while the Democrats remain ever so modestly more male than the Republicans within those parallel majorities. (Era 1 in Table 9.B) In the modern world, by contrast, the Republican Party once more gains a share of men (31% up to 39%) that is considerably larger than the counterpart share of women (50% up to 53%) that is gained by the Democratic Party. (Era 2 in Table 9.B) As before, this is a five-point net advantage to the Republicans.

Table 10

But now, it is possible to ask (at Table 10) which of the four rank and file party cohorts had the largest policy incentives to make this change:

- In the first postwar period, rank and file Republican women were the cohort farthest out of line with their party, especially in the domain of social welfare, and they remain the Republican cohort most out of line with their party in the modern world, forty years later. So while net gains across time favored men and Republicans, there were also women who moved toward the Democrats. And among them, the

cohort with the most incentive for doing so was in fact rank and file Republican *women*.

- Yet what jumps out of the table in the modern world is the impressive concentration of policy domains that contributed the largest differences between the rank and file and their putative activist leadership: these are in turn to be found among Democratic *men,* over and over. They are the ones, these Democratic men, who were disproportionately encouraged to move toward the Republicans: on civil rights, and on cultural values, and on national security, in ascending order of encouragement.

So that in the end, Republican women who were pressed by considerations of public policy on social welfare remained the ones most encouraged to move to the Democrats, the ones with the strongest incentives to drive a female increase among Democratic identifiers. Yet Democratic men engaged by anything other than social welfare—by civil rights, by cultural values, or by national security—were the ones who became most consistently incentivized by the leadership of their own party to move to the Republicans. And they did indeed move in numbers more than twice as large as the female shift in the other direction.

Table 1

Policy, Party, and Sex by Substantive Domain, 1950-1970

	A. By Party		B. By Sex	
	Dems	Reps	Wom	Men
Social Welfare	-.16	+.24	-.03	+.04
Civil Rights	-.08	+.12	-.03	+.04
Cultural Values	-.03	+.04	+.03	-.04
National Security	-.01	+.02	-.03	+.04

Table 2

Sexes within Parties by Substantive Domain, 1950-1970

A. Domains Aligned by Party over Sex

	Dem Wom	Dem Men	Rep Wom	Rep Men
Social Welfare	-.18	-.15	+.19	+.30
Civil Rights	-.12	-.03	+.09	+.15

B. Domains Aligned by Party and Sex

	Dem Men	Dem Wom	Rep Men	Rep Wom

Cultural Values	**-.10**	**+.01**	**+.02**	**+.05**

C. Domains Aligned by Sex over Party

	Dem Wom	Rep Wom	Dem Men	Rep Men
National Security	**-.06**	**-.01**	**+.04**	**+.05**

Table 3

Policy, Party, and Sex among Partisan Populations*, 1950-1970

	DAcW	DRFW	DRFM	DAcM	RRFW	RRFM	RAcW	RAcM
A. Social Welfare	**-.27**	**-.17**	**-.15**	**-.12**	**+.14**	**+.27**	**+.36**	**+.43**

	DAcW	DRFW	DAcM	DRFM	RRFW	RRFM	RAcW	RAcM
B. Civil Rights	**-.28**	**-.10**	**-.05**	**-.03**	**+.07**	**+.13**	**+.16**	**+.22**

	DAcM	DRFM	RAcW	RAcM	DRFW	DAcW	RRFM	RRFW
C. Cult'l Values	**-.14**	**-.09**	**-.02**	**-.01**	**-.00**	**+.02**	**+.03**	**+.08**

	DAcW	RAcW	DRFW	RRFW	DRFM	RRFM	DAcM	RAcM
D. Nat'l Security	**-.13**	**-.04**	**-.04**	**+.00**	**+.03**	**+.04**	**+.04**	**+.08**

***Democratic Activist Women = DAcW; Democratic Rank & File Women = DRFW; Democratic Rank & File Men = DRFM; Democratic Activist Men = DAcM; Republican Rank & File Women = RRFW; Republican Rank & File Men = RRFM; Republican Activist Women = RAcW; Republican Activist Men = RAcM**

Table 4

Changing Alignments, 1970-1990: Policy, Party, and Sex

	A. By Party		B. By Sex	
	Dems	Reps	Wom	Men
Social Welfare				
1972-1988	**-.23**	**+.25**	**-.07**	**+.07**
1952-1968	**-.16**	**+.24**	**-.03**	**+.04**

Civil Rights				
1972-1988	**-.18**	**+.19**	**+.00**	**-.00**
1952-1968	**-.08**	**+.12**	**-.03**	**+.04**
Cultural Values				
1972-1988	**-.06**	**+.07**	**-.00**	**+.00**
1952-1968	**-.03**	**+.04**	**+.03**	**-.04**
National Security				
1972-1988	**-.12**	**+.13**	**-.01**	**+.00**
1952-1968	**-.01**	**+.02**	**-.03**	**+.04**

C. By Party and by Sex

	Dem Wom	Dem Men	Rep Wom	Rep Men
Social Welfare				
1972-1988	**-.28**	**-.16**	**+.20**	**+.32**
1952-1968	**-.18**	**-.15**	**+.19**	**+.30**
Civil Rights				
1972-1988	**-.18**	**-.18**	**+.22**	**+.16**
1952-1968	**-.12**	**-.03**	**+.09**	**+.15**
Cultural Values				
1972-1988	**-.06**	**-.05**	**+.06**	**+.07**
1952-1968	**+.01**	**-.10**	**+.05**	**+.02**
National Security				
1972-1988	**-.12**	**-.12**	**+.13**	**+.14**
1952-1968	**-.06**	**+.02**	**-.01**	**+.05**

Table 5

Changing Alignments, 1970-1990:
Partisan Populations by Sex

A. Social Welfare

	DAcW	DAcM	DRFW	DRFM	RRFW	RRFM	RAcW	RAcM
1972-1988	**-.29**	**-.29**	**-.28**	**-.13**	**+.15**	**+.31**	**+.38**	**+.34**
1952-1968	**-.27**	**-.12**	**-.17**	**-.15**	**+.14**	**+.27**	**+.36**	**+.43**

B. Civil Rights

	DAcM	DAcW	DRFW	DRFM	RRFM	RRFW	RAcM	RAcW
1972-1988	**-.46**	**-.33**	**-.15**	**-.10**	**+.17**	**+.21**	**+.14**	**+.27**

1952-1968	-.28	-.05	-.10	-.03	+.13	+.07	+.22	+.16

C. Cultural Values

	DAcW	DAcM	DRFW	DRFM	RAcW	RAcM	RRFM	RRFW
1972-1988	-.25	-.22	-.02	-.02	- .01	-.01	+.08	+.09
1952-1968	+.07	-.13	+.02	-.08	-.02	+.00	+.00	+.08

D. National Security

	DAcW	DAcM	DRFW	DRFM	RAcW	RRFW	RAcM	RRFM
1972-1988	-.31	-.25	-.09	-.09	+.12	+.13	+.13	+.14
1952-1968	-.13	+.04	-.04	+.03	-.04	+.00	+.08	+.04

Table 6

Changing Alignments, 1990-2010:
Policy, Party, and Sex

	A. By Party		B. By Sex	
	Dems	Reps	Wom	Men
Social Welfare				
1992-2008	-.24	+.35	-.06	+.10
1972-1988	-.23	+.25	-.07	+.07
1952-1968	-.16	+.24	-.03	+.04
Civil Rights				
1992-2008	-.24	+.35	-.01	+.04
1972-1988	-.18	+.19	+.00	-.00
1952-1968	-.08	+.12	-.03	+.04
Cultural Values				
1992-2008	-.16	+.22	-.06	+.07
1972-1988	-.06	+.07	-.00	+.00
1952-1968	-.03	+.04	+.03	-.04
National Security				
1992-2008	-.21	+.30	-.08	+.11
1972-1988	-.12	+.13	-.01	+.00
1952-1968	-.01	+.02	-.03	+.04

C. By Party and by Sex

	Dem Wom	Dem Men	Rep Wom	Rep Men
Social Welfare				
1992-2008	-.26	-.21	+.27	+.43

1972-1988	-.28	-.16	+.20	+.32
1952-1968	-.18	-.15	+.19	+.30
Civil Rights				
1992-2008	-.24	-.23	+.37	+.34
1972-1988	-.18	-.18	+.22	+.16
1952-1968	-.12	-.03	+.09	+.15
Cultural Values				
1992-2008	-.20	-.11	+.16	+.26
1972-1988	-.06	-.05	+.06	+.07
1952-1968	+.01	-.10	+.05	+.02
National Security				
1992-2008	-.28	-.12	+.25	+.34
1972-1988	-.12	-.12	+.13	+.14
1952-1968	-.06	+.02	-.01	+.05

Table 7

Changing Alignments, 1990-2010:
Partisan Populations by Sex

A. Social Welfare

	DAcW	DAcM	DRFW	DRFM	RRFW	RRFM	RAcW	RAcM
1992-2008	-.35	-.25	-.25	-.20	+.23	+.40	+.48	+.55
1972-1988	-.29	-.29	-.28	-.13	+.15	+.31	+.38	+.34
1952-1968	-.27	-.12	-.17	-.15	+.14	+.27	+.36	+.43

B. Civil Rights

	DAcM	DAcW	DRFW	DRFM	RRFM	RRFW	RAcM	RAcW
1992-2008	-.39	-.38	-.22	-.19	+.32	+.35	+.40	+.48
1972-1988	-.46	-.33	-.15	-.10	+.17	+.21	+.14	+.27
1952-1968	-.28	-.05	-.10	-.03	+.13	+.07	+.22	+.16

C. Cultural Values

	DAcW	DAcM	DRFW	DRFM	RRFW	RRFM	RAcW	RAcM
1992-2008	-.38	-.26	-.17	-.07	+.16	+.25	+.27	+.28
1972-1988	-.25	-.22	-.02	-.02	+.09	+.08	-.01	-.01
1952-1968	+.07	-.13	+.02	-.08	+.08	+.00	-.02	+.00

D. National Security

	DAcW	DAcM	DRFW	DRFM	RAcW	RRFW	RAcM	RRFM
1992-2008	-.45	-.24	-.25	-.07	+.33	+.23	+.41	+.35
1972-1988	-.31	-.25	-.09	-.09	+.12	+.13	+.13	+.14
1952-1968	-.13	+.04	-.04	+.03	-.04	+.00	+.08	+.04

Table 8

Sexes within Parties across the Postwar Years

A. Party Attachment by Sexual Subgroup

		Men	Wom
Era 1, 1952-1968	Dems	48%	52%
	Reps	45%	55%
Era 3, 1992-2008	Dems	40%	60%
	Reps	51%	49%

B. Partisan Population by Sexual Subgroup

		Men	Wom
Era 1, 1952-1968	DAcs	54%	46%
	DRFs	47%	53%
	RRFs	45%	55%
	RAcs	46%	54%
Era 3, 1992-2008	DAcs	48%	52%
	DRFs	38%	62%
	RRFs	49%	51%
	RAcs	56%	44%

Table 9

Parties within Sexes across the Postwar Years

A. Sexual Subgroup by Party

		Dems	Reps
Era 1, 1952-1968	Men	60%	40%
	Wom	58%	42%
Era 3, 1992-2008	Men	51%	49%
	Wom	62%	38%

B. Sexual Subgroup by Partisan Population

		DRFs	RRFs
Era 1, 1952-1968	Men	50%	31%
	Wom	50%	33%
Era 3, 1992-2008	Men	41%	39%
	Wom	53%	32%

Table 10

Ideological Distance from Party Activists by Sex across the Postwar Period

		DRFW	DRFM	RRFW	RRFM
Era 1	Social Welfare	+.02	+.04	<u>-.25</u>	+.12
	Civil Rights	+.06	+.13	-.06	-.12
	Cultural Values	+.06	-.04	+.09	+.01
	National Security	+.01	+.08	-.01	+.07
Era 3	Social Welfare	+.05	+.10	<u>-.29</u>	-.12
	Civil Rights	+.16	<u>+.21</u>	-.09	-.12
	Cultural Values	+.15	<u>+.25</u>	-.12	-.03
	National Security	+.10	<u>+.28</u>	-.05	-.15

[Programmatic disjunctions greater than .20 are underlined.]

[1] These are the four great social cleavages likewise used by Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks in a related earlier work, Manza and Brooks, *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Their Chapter 5, on "Gender", is an especially rich tour of the alternative ways in which this cleavage has been treated.

[2] One assembly and defense of these four is William J.M. Claggett and Byron E. Shafer, *The American Public Mind: The Issue Structure of Mass Politics in the Postwar United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), especially in Part I, "The Structure of Public Preferences", which is the original source of the measures used and extended here.

[3] Attempts to put some empirical data behind these early postwar impressions might include Tom Smith, "The Polls: Gender and Attitudes toward Violence," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48(1984), 384-396. Smith begins his review with a quote from Lady Macbeth—"unsex me here"—and goes on to note that "Women and men differ both in their use of violence and their approval of violence across a wide range of social conditions including foreign affairs . . .", 384.

[4] This is the standard two-part question, asking for a party identification first, then for strength of identification among those who offer one or for a regular partisan leaning among those who do not. For the canonical use, see "The Impact of Party Identification", Chapter Five in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, abr. ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1964). For subsequent reflections thereon, see Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Stokes, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Party Identification", Chapter 6 in *The New American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

[5] In William J.M. Claggett and Philip H. Pollock, III, "The Modes of Participation Revisited, 1980-2004", *Political Research Quarterly* 59(2006), 593-600, the authors concluded that the diagnostic behaviors for political activism were campaign participation and financial contribution, and we have used this focus in our own measure of activism.

[6] William J.M. Claggett and Byron E. Shafer, *The American Public Mind: The Issue Structure of Mass Politics in the Postwar United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[7]For the comprehensive narrative: John Lewis Gaddes, *The Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2007).

[8]There would be a retrospective argument that social welfare should have provided a consistent and ongoing contribution to partisan alignments by sex, whereby women were expected to lean liberal and men conservative, though the results of any early effort to establish such a relationship were quite modest, as with Robert Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences*", Public Opinion* 50(1986), 42-61.

[9]In these opening years, there was also some expectation about the role of sex with regard to civil rights, courtesy of a belief that women, being more removed from arguments about appropriate rules and procedures for civic life, would be less concerned with adjusting them. This shows up, for example, in Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 131-149

[10]The expectation that women would reflect an overall cultural conservatism in American society more automatically than men was also available as grounds for a hypothesized theoretical difference by sex on policy preferences in the domain of cultural values, as in Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), 216-217.

[11]Both civil rights and cultural values had allowed theories about the inherent influence of sex in the immediate postwar years. (See notes 7 & 8 above.) Supporters of those theories then acquired stray reasons within the data from these years to believe that the initial postwar period supported—or at least did not actively contradict—those theories. So one of the side-products of this successor period was to make these views no longer tenable, certainly not as 'inherent' influences from sexual subgroups for either civil rights or cultural values.

[12]In the short run, this was grist for yet another theory about the inherent substantive influence of sex, a theoretical perspective that argued that differences between men and women on social welfare were the ones that should be treated as 'natural' to this particular cleavage. The expansion of the difference between men and women on welfare preferences in the second postwar era, coupled with its disappearance on national security, provided a bit of support for this view. Though this would prove very temporary, in that national security would not just overtake social welfare in the growth of associated differences by sex in the third postwar period; national security would actually return to being the domain where sex differences in policy preference were most important.

[13]Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926).

[14] Alonzo L. Hamby, *The Imperial Years: The United States since 1939* (New York; Weybright and Talley, 1976); Charles DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990).

[15]This is most commonly approached through the slightly different notion of a 'gender gap', the difference between male and female *vote choice*, rather than through party attachment. A thorough introduction to the gap as conventionally defined, including alternative definitions and alternative theories for the rise and evolution of the phenomenon, is Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks, "The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections: When? Why? Implications?", *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1998), 1235-1266.

[16]A historical precursor to analyses of the gap as defined by vote choice rather than party attachment is Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, "A Sex Cleavage in the Presidential Election of 1920", *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 19(1924), 519-520.

[17]An interesting echo of the analytic tension between percentaging by party versus percentaging by sex can be seen in the economic realm in Annette Bernhardt, Martina Morris, and Mark Handcock, "Women's Gains, Men's Losses? The Shrinking Gender Gap in Earnings", *American Journal of Sociology,* 101(1995), 302-328.

[18]Sharply different interpretations of this commonly observed political fact can be found in Ala Abramowitz, *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) versus Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, *Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009).