Defensive Issue Linkage

Exploring the Origins of Environmental Content in Trade Agreements

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Work in Progress

Abstract

In this paper, I suggest a novel mechanism through which issue linkage in international relations can arise, termed "defensive issue linkage": As the scope of one issue area expands, it begins to touch upon an increasing number of previously unrelated issues, both domestic and international. Actors operating in these previously unrelated issue areas become worried about potential interference and begin mobilizing. Thus mobilized, these interest groups seek carve-outs to preserve their traditional policy space, and attempt to exert more direct influence on the policy channels of the expanding issue area. To demonstrate this mechanism, I focus on the example of trade and environmental policy, where political linkages have rapidly increased since the early 1990s. Drawing on historical evidence from the U.S. and interviews conducted in Europe, I show that environmental civil society groups have been important drivers of the emerging political linkage between the environment and trade. Further, environmental groups have tended to mobilize when trade policy expanded in scope, often citing threats these new trade rules pose to environmental policy as their primary concern. In addition to this qualitative evidence, a quantitative analysis of all preferential trade agreements signed between 1989 and 2016 finds that the presence of environmental civil society groups is positively associated with the prominence of environmental content in trade agreements, and that this relationship is moderated by trade agreements' economic scope.

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1 Introduction

Issue linkage is a well-documented and prominent phenomenon in international relations. It describes a situation in which two issues that were historically treated separately become politically linked. Two areas that have become increasingly intertwined over the last 30 years are trade policy and the environment: Before the 1990s, trade and environmental policies operated largely separately for centuries. Yet, this separation has recently become muddled: when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed in 1995, countries agreed to institute a Committee on the Environment, and many hoped that a "Green Round" that placed environmental issues at the center of negotiations would soon follow. In 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became the first international preferential trade agreement with a substantial environmental side-agreement. Since then, environmental clauses have become a frequent component of trade treaties, and have continuously increased in their breadth and strictness. Most recently, the U.S. government was forced to improve the environmental provisions in the new NAFTA, or USMCA, before House Democrats agreed to vote in its favor. Further, recent multi-regional deals, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) were met with forceful protest movements in which large environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, played a central role.

Understanding the origins of this novel political linkage between trade and the environment is important in its own right, as trade and the environment are two of the most important areas of international cooperation. We may further be able to learn how issue linkage arises more generally from this salient example.

Existing work tends to characterize the emergence of trade-environment linkages as either a tactical exercise, where environmentalists seek to use trade as an opportunity to spread

environmentalism abroad, or as a form of veiled trade protectionism. In this paper, I propose an alternative channel through which issue linkage may have occurred, which I term "defensive issue linkage": I argue that as trade policy increased in breadth and depth, it started encroaching on environmental policies that have traditionally been separate from the trade regime. Actors in the environmental policy space perceived this as a threat and began to mobilize around trade in response. Their key demand was to carve out policy space for environmental measures and to maintain the prevalence of traditional channels of environmental policy, such as Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). Multilaterally, the pressure exerted by the environmental community led to the creation of a committee on the environment at the WTO, which is tasked, for example, with discussing how trade policy and multilateral environmental treaties can coexist (Goldstein & Toenshoff, 2021). Environmentalists' pressure also resulted in the emergence of environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements. Some of these serve as direct carve-outs for environmental policies, but we also observe more proactive clauses that attempt to improve environmental conditions in treaty partners (Blümer, Morin, Brandi, & Berger, 2020). I argue that such proactive clauses are not the primary reason for environmentalists' mobilization around trade. However, the combination of carve-outs and proactive clauses may render trade policy more palatable to the general public, whose attention is drawn to trade through environmentalists' lobbying. Even if, as I find, environmental groups themselves remain sceptical of the efficacy of proactive environmental clauses, left-leaning policy makers and the environmentally-minded public might respond well to such clauses (Perlman & van Lieshout, 2019).

The paper proceeds in six sections. The next section outlines the novel linkage mechanism, as well as competing theories. Section three provides a more detailed description of expanding trade rules and their possible impact on the environment. The following section uses qualitative evidence to show that environmental groups have been key drivers of the trade-environment linkage and that they first mobilized due to a perception of threat. The

section begins with a historical analysis focused on the U.S. - one of the earliest drivers of the linkage between the environment and trade. It highlights how the environment first became embedded in the U.S. negotiation strategy for NAFTA and the multilateral Uruguay Round. In addition, section four provides more recent evidence from interviews with policy-makers and environmental NGOs in Europe. These interviews confirm that, to this day, a perception of threat emanating from the scope of economic agreements is a powerful motivator for the mobilization of environmental groups. Lastly, section five presents a regression analysis where I show that the variation in the environmental content of preferential trade agreements is consistent with the idea of "defensive issue linkage". Section six concludes.

2 Theory and Previous Literature

The novel form of issue linkage described in this paper may be termed "defensive issue linkage". It is characterized by reactivity to the expanding scope of an issue area: As the scope of one issue area - call it A - expands, it begins to touch upon an increasing number of previously unrelated policies, both domestic and international. Fearing that A's new policy instruments may interfere with or even override policies created through the traditional channels of another area - B - actors in B begin to pay increased attention to A. Thus mobilized, B's interest groups can follow two potential strategic responses: they can seek carve-outs from A's policy instruments to preserve their traditional policy space, or they can attempt to exert more direct influence on the policy channels of A. In practice, we may see a hybrid of these two responses. Importantly, this channel of "defensive issue linkage" applies only if two conditions are met: First, a policy area (in this case trade policy) has to be expanding. Second, actors in policy area B (environmental NGOs) have to be present, active, and sufficiently influential to have an effect on policy.

This channel is related to, but distinct from, the channels underlying issue linkage found

in existing literature. Haas (Haas, 1980, pp.370-2) helpfully distinguishes between "tactical" and "substantive" issue linkage. Substantive linkage occurs when knowledge and ideas evolve such that actors come to recognize two previously separate issues as logically connected. Tactical issue linkage, in contrast, can be understood as one actor introducing issues into the negotiation agenda that are not intellectually connected to the original issue being negotiated. Such tactical linkage can be used to "gain additional bargaining leverage by making one's own behavior on a given issue contingent on others' actions toward other issues" (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985), or what Oye terms "extortion linkage" (Oye, 1993). In the example of trade and the environment, powerful countries may utilize trade policy to push for better environmental performance abroad by making liberalization contingent on protection of the environment. Indeed, some have argued that economically powerful trade partners, in particular the U.S. and the EU, frequently use access to their large domestic markets in order to encourage change in third countries' domestic and international behavior (Aggarwal, 2013; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; Jinnah & Lindsay, 2016; Poletti & Sicurelli, 2016). Based on such tactical considerations, Lechner (Lechner, 2016) posits that countries should be more likely to include clauses such as environmental and social rights provisions, if their treaty partner is performing poorly in those areas. Yet, she finds little evidence for this hypothesis.

Existing theories of tactical issue linkage tend to assume a general sense of optimism among the actors seeking the linkage. Policy makers, or lobby groups, demand issue linkage, because they see it as an effective tool to further their agenda - an opportunity to be ceased. In contrast, the defensive channel proposed here arises from a sense of threat: As one policy area expands, it (potentially inadvertently) begins to override or curtail traditional channels of others. Actors in these other areas begin mobilizing and linking their traditional area of interest to the expanding policy field, not as a form of opportunism, but to guard against undue interference. In the example presented in this paper, environmental groups observe

the ever expanding scope of trade agreements and begin working on trade policy in order to preserve the integrity of environmental policy. This account aligns with the psychological concept of "loss aversion" where individuals care more about preventing losses and preserving the status quo than they care about potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Further, it is clear that defensive issue linkage is not purely tactical. Rather, by recognizing that trade policy can have an impact on countries' ability to conduct environmental policy, environmentalists realize that there is a substantive linkage between trade and the environment.

Next to a perception of threat due to A's expanding scope, "defensive issue linkage" depends on the presence of relatively powerful groups working within issue area B, who are able to mobilize and capture the attention of policy makers in issue area A. In the example of trade and the environment, I argue that environmental NGOs have been important actors in pushing forward the linkage between trade and the environment. Although civil society groups often lack financial resources, they can wield influence through multiple important channels: Through so-called "outside lobbying", they have a unique ability to influence public opinion and mobilize voters around an issue, which in turn impacts policy-makers who need to please their constituents (Kollman, 1998; Wouters & Walgrave, 2017; Burstein & Freudenburg, 1978; King & Zeng, 2001). By drawing attention to new issues, civil society can help shape the agenda - an important pre-condition for policy change (Mortensen, 2010; Baumgartner, Frank & Mahoney, Christine, 2005). Further, environmental groups are often able to provide crucial information to policy makers, which helps shape their understanding of complex issues (Austen-Smith, 1993; De Figueiredo, 2002). In the context of this paper, for example, environmental groups can highlight the connections between environmental policy and novel international trade rules, which other interest groups may pay little attention to.

An important alternative explanation for issue linkage between trade and the environment is that of "veiled protectionism". Morin et al (2018) find that the number of environmental

clauses is higher in PTAs between states that face high levels of import competition. This result agrees with other work in the political science and economics literature, which warns against the role of environmentalism in trade policy as a potential form of shielding one's economy against foreign competition ((Lechner, 2016; Bhagwati, 1996; Krugman, 1997). Of course, environmental rules can in theory be used as a justification for protectionist behavior. For example, "levelling the playing field" in terms of environmental standards may benefit import-competing producers in more developed countries, as it raises their competitors' cost of production. Thus, we may expect increased import competition to be positively correlated with the number of environmental clauses found in preferential trade agreements. While this explanation can coexist as a parallel channel besides "defensive issue linkage", I find little quantitative evidence that import competition by itself is a powerful determinant of environmental provisions in trade agreements.

3 Issue Expansion and Interference in Practice: Trade and the Environment

Trade policy, both at the multilateral and bilateral level, has increased significantly in scope over the last decades. Its rules cover an ever broader array of economic policies, and its legal "teeth" have become sharper.

Multilaterally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been providing the framework for trade policy since its inception in 1947. Early negotiation rounds focused mostly on the lowering of tariffs. Non-tariff issues, including technical barriers to trade, or standards, were first introduced in the 1970s' Tokyo Round. However, these early rules on non-tariff issues had little effect: Only a small subset of member countries subscribed to the agreements, rules remained vague, and important issues, such as production and process standards, were exempt. In addition, a consensus-based dispute settlement mechanism di-

minished the ability of member states to hold each other accountable. Thus, GATT rules on non-tariff issues were often ignored (Barton, Goldstein, Josling, & Steinberg, 2008, p.135). The Uruguay Round negotiations, which took place between 1986 and 1994, resulted in an unprecedented breadth of trade rules. New, more substantial agreements on standards were concluded, along with agreements on intellectual property rights, investment measures, and services. What's more, all member states signed onto these additional agreements and members equipped the newly founded World Trade Organization with a much stricter enforcement mechanism. There are many examples of the thus expanded WTO rule book coming into conflict with environmental policies: The Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), mandate that environmental measures should not be "more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective." The phrase "no more trade-restrictive than necessary" is seen by many environmentalists as so restrictive that it could invite challenges to a wide range of domestic environmental measures. The Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), contains clauses that directly contradict the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): While TRIPS Article 27(3) imposes private intellectual property rights on plant-varieties, the CBD recognizes that local communities have a collective right to the benefits deriving from information on plant-varieties and traditional knowledge (Article 8 - j).

Even before the trade regime's rules were expanded and its dispute settlement mechanism strengthened, the GATT had seen a number of controversial rulings on environmental policy. For example, in 1991, a GATT dispute panel ruled against a U.S. ban on Mexican tuna imports, which had been adopted in order to protect dolphins who can get caught and killed in tuna fishers' nets. The ruling was so contested, because it seemed to imply that existing trade rules placed strict constraints on countries' environmental policies: First, it suggested that any extrajudicial enforcement actions to protect the environment were in violation of the GATT. Second, in the eyes of the environmental community, the ruling showed that

Figure 1: Increase in the Number and Economic Depth of PTAs



Agreement Depth Measure is taken from Dür et al.'s depth RASCH index, rescaled to range from 0 to 10. Each dot represents one agreement, the line shows a smoothed loess trend.

the legitimacy of trade restrictions would be judged based solely on *what* was produced, not taking into account *how* it was produced (Esty et al., 1994). With this background in mind, the strengthened dispute settlement mechanism at the WTO was worrisome to environmentalists, especially since the WTO rules still did not explicitly allow discrimination based on production and processing methods.

Since the 1990s, there has also been a sharp rise in the number of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Similar to the multilateral agenda, the number of issues covered by such agreements has also tended to increase over time. Figure 1 plots all agreements concluded since 1980 and their economic depth, as measured by the Depth data set contained in the "Design of Trade Agreements" project (Dür, Baccini, & Elsig, 2014). New issue areas that are increasingly part of preferential trade agreements include investment provisions, rules on public procurement, and stricter guidelines for intellectual property rights.

Again, there are many examples where this expanding scope of trade agreements can come into conflict with environmental policy: Some agreements go much further than the

TBT and SPS agreements in harmonizing standards, for example instituting automatic mutual recognition of standards between trade partners. This worries environmentalists, who are afraid of a so-called "race to the bottom" or "regulatory chill" in product standards due to outside competition. Economically deep trade agreements also often contain investment chapters with Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. Traditionally part of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), ISDS allows foreign investors to sue governments for direct or indirect expropriation. Many fear that ISDS opens prudent environmental regulation to legal challenges mounted by multinational corporations. Recent cases, such as Swedish energy provider Vattenfall's ISDS claim against Germany after the country decided to pull out of nuclear energy, have rendered the institution very unpopular with environmentalists.

The increase in the depth of economic provisions found in trade agreements has co-occured with a rise in the number of environmental provisions found in these agreements. Figure two plots the number of environmental provisions found in preferential trade agreements, as well as the number of provisions scaled by the number of articles in an agreement. The latter may serve as an indicator for the relative importance of environmental measures in the treaty text. Provision counts are taken from the TREND data set, as coded by Morin et al (2018).

Some of these environmental provisions appear to have been explicitly designed to avoid interference by the trade regime: For example, some agreements contain clauses that exempt environmental measures from challenge through ISDS. Others uphold the legal prevalence of existing MEAs or explicitly reinforce members' right to adopt standards that are more stringent than international ones. Other clauses are more proactive, mandating, for example, that countries have to continually improve their environmental regulations (Blümer et al., 2020). Both kinds of clauses may arise through a "defensive" mechanism. The former may be seen as a direct safeguard that serves the purpose of preserving the traditional environmental policy domain. Indirectly, the latter type of clauses may also follow defensive mobilization by

Figure 2: Increase in the Number and Importance of Environmental Provisions in PTAs



The Count of Environmental Provisions is computed using the TREND dataset. Article numbers are collected by the author.

interest groups: First, once mobilized around trade, groups may begin to develop concepts of how to improve environmental conditions through trade. This should be the case especially if groups don't believe that trade rules can be contained sufficiently. Second, proactive clauses might not endear environmental groups themselves to trade agreements, but they may render trade agreements more palatable for the general public and sympathetic politicians, who are alerted to the potential conflict between trade and environmental policy by the lobbying work of environmental groups.

4 Qualitative Evidence on Defensive Issue Linkage

To test whether the channel of "defensive issue linkage" exists, the following section provides two pieces of qualitative evidence. First, I explore the historical origins of environmentalism in trade policy within the U.S. Second, I provide insights from interviews conducted with trade lobbyists of the EU's largest environmental organizations and a number of European

members of parliament and their aids. The cases of the U.S. and the EU were chosen because these two parties are highly influential in shaping the content of of multilateral and preferential trade agreements. Further, the EU and the U.S. should present a difficult test for defensive issue linkage: Both are exceptionally economically powerful, so that groups may be motivated by the ability to use economic incentives to improve environmental conditions abroad.

The idea of defensive issue linkage leads to a number of observable implications that can be tested using qualitative evidence: First, the initial mobilization of environmental groups should coincide with a broadening in the scope of trade agreements. Second, groups should cite the threat emanating from trade policy, rather than the opportunities it presents, as their main concern. Third, environmental groups should have an apparent impact on trade policies. In the historical analysis, we would expect to find that environmental measures only become included in U.S. trade policy once environmental groups mobilize. We would also expect the content of trade policy to reflect some of the environmentalists' main concerns. In the context of interviews, politicians and their aids should cite environmental groups as an influential source of information. The following sections find evidence in line with these expectations.

4.1 Early History of Environment and Trade in the U.S.

If one had to determine the birth year of the political connection between the environment and trade, 1993 would be a good candidate. The year saw the first conclusion of an environmental side agreement with the creation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which was attached to NAFTA. At the same time, the multilateral Uruguay Round negotiations were in full swing and environmental groups in developed countries were putting intense pressure on their administrations. In this section, I will illustrate why U.S. environmentalists first mobilized around trade and show that the

pressure they exerted likely had an effect on final policy outcomes. The analysis will focus on the United States, as the U.S. initiated the NAAEC and also acted as one of the main drivers of environmental reform within the GATT. To summarize what I find below: Environmentalists first started caring about international trade policy, not primarily because of the possible benefits presented by strategically linking trade and the environment, but due to a perception that new trade rules may pose threats to the environment and countries' freedom to pursue environmental policies. Further, the rise in civil society pressure coincided with an increase in legislative proposals to attach environmental measures to trade policy. The temporal pattern and content of policies suggests that environmental groups had a real impact - new clauses were introduced only when they began to mobilize, and legislative proposals tended to reflect their main demands.

In the U.S., environmental groups paid little attention to trade until the early 1990s, when they began forming trade coalitions and lobbying politicians on the contents of trade deals. Esty identifies two events that triggered environmental groups' interest: The debate over NAFTA and a number of controversial GATT dispute settlement panel recommnedations regarding the environment (Esty et al., 1994, p.27).

To understand groups' reasoning behind their new-found interest in trade more fully, we can look to internal records from the time of initial mobilization: In 1991, the Sierra Club, one of America's largest and most influential environmental organizations, decided to form a Working Group on Trade Agreements. Excerpts from the September 1991 board meeting minutes illuminate the group's motivation for this change:

> *Carl Pope said the Sierra Club needs to state its position about the United States adhering to international treaties that give bureaucrats the authority to override laws that the Club has worked hard to get in place. A particular concern is GATT power to override American environmental laws. (...)*

After these remarks were made, the board passed a resolution, which read:

> *The Sierra Club urges the U.S. government to seek changes in any international agreements, such as GATT, which purport to prevent the United States from pursuing strong laws applying to U.S. nationals to protect the environment, including laws assuring that imported products are produced in an environmentally acceptable manner. (...)*

The Club's official trade policy, which was finalized and adopted one year later, accordingly focused on preserving nations' ability to make environmental regulations and restrict imports and exports to protect their domestic environment.

The Sierra Club was not alone with its new trade policy stance. A letter addressed to the Senate Finance Committee, formulated by 14 major environmental groups, including Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the National Audubon Society, outlined very similar concerns. It stated that the groups reject the rules proposed under the Uruguay Round due to their "intrusion into the right of state and federal governments to set appropriate environment, health, safety, conservation and animal welfare standards." Citing the tuna-dolphin case, the letter complained about the proposed language in SPS and TBT agreements and about the revealed shortfalls of GATT arbitral panels. It demanded that, at a minimum, states should be free to set environmental standards, including those related to product and processing methods. Further, the groups asked for environmental subsidies to be classified as Non Actionable in the Subsidies Code, meaning that they could not be challenged. Lastly, they demanded more transparency in dispute settlement and expressed their opposition against the formation of a Multilateral Trade Organization without a comprehensive environmental protection mandate (Ward, 1993).

Such letters formed part of increasingly intense pressure environmental groups were putting on trade policy-makers. In response to this, the GATT Working Group on En-

vironmental Measures and International Trade, technically established in 1971, convened for the first time in November 1991 (Fletcher, 1999). Within the U.S., Democrats in Congress proposed including environmental measures in the U.S. negotiation position. Notably, when the U.S. determined its original negotiation stance prior to the rise of environmentalists' pressure, no such demands had been made. Despite business groups' vehement opposition, a sense of Congress resolution was passed, which mandated that the President "should seek (...) to address environmental issues (...)" in the Uruguay Round. Further, responding to the backlash against controversial GATT rulings, a 1994 Congressional initiative called for a moratorium on challenges of environmental policies through the GATT, at least until a multilateral "Green Round" had been held (Trade, 1994). While the Clinton Administration did not bring all environmentalists' demands to the international negotiating table, it did seek some last-minute changes to alleviate the groups' worst fears. For example, it tried (unsuccessfully) to get the controversial "least restrictive trade" wording removed from the SPS and TBT agreements. One of the few environmental successes in the Uruguay Round came with the creation of a permanent Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE), which had been backed by the U.S. and European countries and strongly opposed by developing nations. Thus, while the newly created WTO, in the eyes of environmentalists, did not adequately provide for the sovereignty and prevalence of environmental policy making, the substantive link between trade and the environment had become much more institutionalized (Goldstein & Toenshoff, 2021).

At the same time as the Uruguay Round, NAFTA also captured the attention of enviornmentalists. As the first major agreement negotiated with a developing country, the deal sparked fears of a potential race to the bottom in regulations and increased environmental degradation, especially along the U.S.-Mexican border (Esty et al., 1994, p.27). NAFTA further raised concerns that higher U.S. standards could be challenged as non-tariff barriers under the new agreement or be watered down in efforts to harmonize regulations (Fletcher,

1999).

Congressional testimony by environmental groups helps illustrate their motivation in more detail. The picture that emerges is one of a combination of tactical and defensive considerations. Many groups demanded clean-up efforts along the U.S.-Mexican border and better enforcement of Mexican environmental laws. This may be interpreted as a push for tactical issue linkage, where NAFTA was used as a tool to improve Mexican environmental protections. However, sovereignty concerns also seemed to play a central role: Large grass-roots driven groups, such as the Sierra Club and Greenpeace, made it very clear that they opposed any NAFTA rule that could undermine the U.S.' ability to implement strict environmental laws. Challenges to environmental provisions as non-tariff barriers remained a key worry (Dudley, 1993). More moderate groups also focused heavily on the U.S. ability to implement environmental rules. The Defenders of Wildlife, for example, pushed for clarification on production and processing methods, so that the U.S. may keep enforcing existing federal conservation laws (Schlickeisen, 1993).

NAFTA negotiations were concluded in August 1992. After much pressure from Congress, the Bush administration included unprecedented levels of environmental clauses. Among them were many provisions that sought to preserve domestic sovereignty and MEA prevalence. These included conditional protections for stricter environmental regulations, and the encouragement of upward harmonization of standards. The burden of proof to show that environmental measures were inconsistent with NAFTA was placed on the challenging party. NAFTA also gave explicit precedence to the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and CITES - three important MEAs. Nonetheless, many groups remained concerned about NAFTA's unpredictable consequences on environmental standards and pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border.

A few months after the ink had dried on the treaty text, presidential elections pitted incumbent President George Bush against Bill Clinton. On the campaign trail, faced with

NAFTA's continued lack of popularity among labor and environmental movements, Clinton promised to negotiate side-agreements before ratifying NAFTA. Negotiations on the NAAEC began in September 1993. The eventual agreement went beyond safeguarding domestic measures. It established a Commission on Environmental Cooperation, mandated the enforcement of environmental standards and established a dispute settlement mechanism for environmental clauses (Fletcher, 1999). This side agreement, paired with NAFTA's original environmental provisions, was enough to neutralize environmental opposition to NAFTA by splitting the environmental community in half. The agreement enlisted the support of several large organizations, including the Audubon Society, and the World Wildlife Fund, who notably did not support the outcome of the Uruguay Round(Cameron & Tomlin, 2001, p.199). At the same time, large environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, Public Citizen and Friends of the Earth maintained their opposition to NAFTA, citing insufficient efforts to "lift the threat to U.S. environmental laws or to open up the NAFTA dispute process to the public" (Pope, 1993) as primary reasons for their continued scepticism.

While there is, therefore, some evidence for tactical motives among environmental groups, it is also clear that one of the main drivers of environmentalists' initial mobilization in both, NAFTA and multilateral negotiations, was the fear of an expanding trade regime interfering with environmental policy making. The pressure exerted by environmentalists in light of these fears appears to have led to important policy innovations.

4.2 Interview Evidence on Mobilization in Europe

In order to understand the origins of more recent political mobilization within the environmental community in another country context, in depth interviews were conducted in three European capitals (Brussels, Berlin and London) in summer 2019. In total, seven staff members of environmental NGOs, two members of the European Parliament, five staffers of members of the European parliament and one staffer of a member of the German Bun-

destag were interviewed. While this sample may seem small, it contains current or former trade campaigners of some of the largest and most vocal environmental NGOs. The sample further includes staffers and members of the EU parliament's international trade committee representing multiple countries and parties. The sample was determined by contacting all large environmental NGOs operating in Brussels, as well as members of all left-leaning and green parties represented in the European Parliament. The interviews with politicians focused on members of left-leaning and green parties, as those parties are most likely to champion environmentalists' concerns. Responsiveness and availability during the summer months determined the ultimate sample population and size.

Interviews were semi-structured with a list of questions that varied slightly depending on the organizations' history with trade campaigning and the politicians' experience in trade committees. Sample lists of interview questions can be found in the appendix.

Before going into more detail, a quick summary of the findings: Constraints on sovereignty, especially in the form of ISDS and regulatory cooperation, are still a key worry. This led many groups to mobilize around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). More generally, the current trade system as it stands is often perceived as a risk, rather than an opportunity. Many environmental groups and green parliamentarians would like to see a trade regime that helps enhance environmental practices around the world. Yet, they have very little faith in the ability of current environmental clauses to improve partner countries' behavior. Groups also have little confidence that system will eventually becoming a sharper tool for environmental cooperation and enforcement.

During interviews, staff members of environmental groups were asked about their general conception of international trade policy: Did they regard it as an opportunity to spread environmentalism, or a threat to be mitigated? The answers were surprisingly unanimous: All interview participants clearly stated that trade was primarily a threat. When pressed on the merits of sustainability chapters and environmental provisions in existing agreements,

the most common response was that "we don't really believe that the EU trade policy at the moment can really help in terms of environment." Even examples from the U.S., which has some agreements that include more stringent dispute settlement for environmental clauses, did not seem to inspire optimism. Speaking about U.S. agreements, an environmental lobbyist told me that "to date, there hasn't been an environmental organization that has really been saying ah, this is great and we've used it and it's been successful."

Despite such pessimism, most of the organizations that were interviewed had developed conceptions of how trade could be used as a tool to promote environmentalism: For example, some spoke of ways in which they could imagine leveraging trade's stricter enforcement mechanisms to police environmental performance. Yet, these visions were typically followed by qualifications such as: "I mean you're never going to change this. Because the way of thinking in DG Trade is liberalization." Participants showed little faith in existing mechanisms and, while their work on trade and the environment had clearly led them to develop visions for tactical issue linkage, they did not trust that current policies were fit to fulfil that purpose. Given this scepticism towards a more tactical linkage between the environment and trade, and the need for NGOs to use their scarce resources wisely, it is unlikely that the possibility to export environmental norms through trade policy has had a large mobilizing effect on organizations.

Instead of optimism, all environmental groups I spoke to expressed serious concerns about specific clauses of modern trade agreements, particularly rules around regulatory cooperation and ISDS. This worry was especially prevalent in the context of TTIP, a very broad and economically deep agreement between the EU and the U.S., for which negotiations started in 2013. The agreement sparked mass protests across Europe, with environmental groups acting as some of the central players. It was put on ice in 2016 after the election of Donald Trump, although some European politicians, including the German economy minister, had already declared the agreement dead. Many groups increased their level of trade mobilization

in response to TTIP. One very large international NGO told me that they increased their staff working on trade policy in Brussels from one person to four people at the height of the anti-TTIP protests. Another trade expert I interviewed was hired by a large environmental organization in 2015, explicitly to cover the TTIP negotiations.

What made TTIP stand out to environmental groups? It was not, as more tactical theories of issue linkage would suggest, the opportunity to raise the bar on environmental protections internationally. Instead, deep concerns over the EU's potential loss of sovereignty seemed to drive environmentalists onto the streets. One key feature of TTIP was that most economic gains were to arise from a harmonization of standards, rather than tariff cuts. The power of large U.S. corporations made the prospect of regulatory cooperation seem threatening. During TTIP negotiations, many environmentalists perceived a U.S. business lobby, or, as one environmental lobbyist put it, "the US offensive interest", that was working to undermine European standards. The process of regulatory cooperation after an agreement had been reached thus raised deep concerns about giving up control over the policy-making process. One environmental group summarized their worries as follows:

> *What they want is to make sure that for them the right people are involved in the regulatory process at the right time. So, they want to make sure that Canada or the US is informed as soon as possible whatever one of the member states even is interested in regulating, so they get some early access to the decision making and maybe get some input. Basically, a privileged lobbying position, you would call it. And this also to influence the regulatory process and also to make sure that the rules that are adopted in a certain country do not go against let's say business interests. (...) But it's all about yeah, let's say, control, maybe controlling, yeah, it's all about influencing as much as possible the regulatory process (...).*

Beyond TTIP and CETA, a UK based environmental NGO stated that for them, the

biggest issue with a potential post-Brexit US-UK agreement also revolved around regulatory cooperation. Their head of policy explained that: "It's just such an obvious way in which you inject arbitrary power into the domestic ability to make rules."

Undue influence of foreign businesses and loss of sovereignty were also the main arguments cited in opposition to investor state dispute settlement. With TTIP and CETA, the agreement negotiated in parallel with Canada, the European Commission tried to include ISDS in its trade treaties for the first time. A trade lobbyist and legal professional working for a big European environmental NGO elaborated on his views on investment arbitration:

> *ISDS and investment chapters (...) get you a nice little tool. (...) it gives you some legal advocacy. I've done some legal advocacy and what you do is you take provisions in legal texts and you tell politicians or regulators that you can't really do that because it's contrary to this and that provision that you have signed up to.*

Further, the "deterrent effect" due to costly lawsuits, or regulatory chill, was often invoked by interviews participants. Similar to the panel decisions in the GATT/WTO that fanned environmentalists' fears in the 1990s, two particular ISDS cases provided salient examples of undue interference in domestic policy. First, energy company Vattenfall's case against Germany in response to the country's decision to close all nuclear power plants in reaction to the nuclear accident in Fukushima not only scared the environmental community, it also provided it with a powerful tool. According to one environmental campaigner, the German public was much easier to mobilize against trade agreements with investment chapters, because it was already paying attention to ISDS. A second case that was frequently cited and has been covered extensively in the media is Phillip Morris' challenge of plain packaging laws in Australia.

Clearly, sovereignty concerns and a fear of undue policy interference through new trade rules has been a powerful force mobilizing environmental groups during the most recent

protest waves against multi-regional, economically deep trade agreements.

When interviewing legislators, they tended to confirm that environmental groups' concerns had impacted their thinking on trade policy. Left-wing and green Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voiced the exact same concerns over ISDS and regulatory cooperation. They also confirmed that environmental groups were helpful sources of information in the policy-making process. One Member of the European Parliament stated that:

> *I find their lobbying on these topics quite effective. Because they have (...) highly skilled professors, a clear line of thinking, they have people doing the knitty-gritty work of drawing up amendments, people who are doing the advocacy in the public.*

NGO lobbying further helps policy makers to get progressive issues, such as the environment, onto the parliamentary agenda by attracting the public's attention. According to one parliamentarian:

> *...public attention around a topic helps. If there is no public debate it's also more difficult to get attention to this topic in the European Parliament and if it's not held outside, then there are sometimes 3,4,5,27 other things to do during the day. So, this is something always influencing.*

Overall, environmental groups stated that they had a good connection to parliamentarians in the EU Parliament's international trade committee, INTA, and while some bemoaned the seeming lack of interest within the European Commission, a former civil servant at DG Trade claimed that environmental NGOs had "pretty good access." Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that the strong preferences of environmental groups tend to translate into at least some adjustments to the EU's trade policy. The next section provides a systematic

analysis of trade agreement content to determine whether the hypothesized relationship between environmental civil society strength and environmental provisions in PTAs is borne out in the data.

5 Regression Analysis

5.1 Data and Model Specification

While regression analysis may not be able to provide causal evidence, it can show whether the patterns found in the data are consistent with the channel of "defensive issue linkage". The mechanism proposed in this paper leads to a number of observable implications: First, if environmental groups have an impact on trade policy, the presence of environmental civil society groups should be positively correlated with the relative prominence of environmental clauses in trade agreements. Second, if environmental groups are mobilized due to a perception of threat that derives from the increasing scope of economic policies, the economic depth of an agreement should moderate the association between environmental groups and environmental agreement content. Lastly, if, as I propose, environmental groups are less easily mobilized based on opportunities to spread environmentalism abroad, the relative difference in environmental performance between treaty partners should not significantly moderate the relationship between environmental groups and agreement content.

To test whether these observable implications are reflected across agreements, I consider all preferential trade agreements concluded between the years of 1989 and 2016 (468 in total). Analyses are provided at the agreement-level. For country-specific variables, I consider the characteristics of the country with the highest GDP. This reflects the fact that larger markets hold more power in international economic negotiations and may therefore have more influence on a trade agreement's content.[1] The main outcome variable - the relative promi-

[1]Alternative specifications, which use GDP-weighted averages for country-level variables produce quali-

nence of environmental clauses in preferential trade agreements - is constructed by dividing the number of environmental provisions (as coded by Morin et al.) by the number of articles found in a trade agreement.[2] Testing for the *relative* prominence of environmental provisions should alleviate some concerns that agreement depth and the number of environmental provisions are both determined by the same unobserved variables which affect the length of an agreement, such as the effort expended when writing an agreement, the attention policy makers paid to an agreement, or the bureaucratic capacity of the treaty partners. In order to measure environmental civil society strength, I rely on data provided by the Yearbook of International Organizations.[3] A simple measure for environmental civil society within a country is constructed by summing the number of environmental organization headquarters within that country's territory. As the resulting index is very skewed, I use the natural logarithm of this measure.

An agreement's economic depth is measured using the depth index provided by Dür et al (2014). It is constructed using a latent trait analysis approach called the Rasch model. This index captures 48 binary variables that pertain to components of "deep" trade agreements such as services liberalization, investment measures and standards (Dür et al., 2014). Crucially, the 48 components used to construct this index refer only to economic, and not to environmental aspects of trade agreements. While this market access depth measure is important, it should be treated with caution. Final agreement depth should be very closely

tatively equivalent results.

[2]While this outcome variable can largely be thought of as a "fraction", some articles contain more than one environmental provision. Thus, it is theoretically possible for this ratio to be above 1. Indeed, two agreements (Jordan-US 2000 and EC Switzerland Bilaterals I 1999) contain more environmental provisions than the number of articles. The US-Jordan 2000 agreement is such a stark outlier that it is excluded from the main analysis of this paper. In a robustness check that includes the US-Jordan agreement, the results remain largely unchanged.

[3]I am not claiming that the Yearbook of International Organizations contains data on all environmental organizations. Instead, it captures a subset of organizations which are especially internationally oriented. The measures used here rely on the assumption that the number of overall domestic environmental groups are correlated with the number of groups listed in the Yearbook and that the factors driving inclusion in the yearbook are not biased in a way that affects the regression results.

associated with the agreement depth groups expected during the negotiation stage. However, since the agreement text, and thus market access depth, is usually finalized *after* environmental civil society groups have lobbied on agreement content, its final value is determined post-treatment. NAFTA, as described in a previous section, provides a powerful example of continued environmental lobbying after market access provisions had been set in stone, and the consequent writing of an environmental chapter. However, this convenient sequencing of events is the exception rather than the rule. Thus, while the co-existence of deep market access provisions and environmental clauses is suggestive, it should not be interpreted as causal evidence.

My analysis further inclues Yale University's Environmental Performance Index (EPI) (Hsu & Zomer, 2014), which is a commonly used measure to capture countries' environmental performance. Theories of tactical issue linkage would expect that large countries with a high EPI will attempt to increase environmental performance in smaller treaty partners with a low EPI through the inclusion of more extensive environmental provisions. To test this, I include the EPI of the largest treaty partner (by GDP) and the difference between the largest treaty partners' EPI and the lowest EPI found among all treaty members.

To account for the potential channel of veiled protectionism, I control for the volume of imports and exports in the year prior to an agreements' signature. To do so, I rely on data from the BACI dataset where available, and on Comtrade data otherwise. As neither of these sources provide trade data for Taiwan, treaties with Taiwan had to be excluded from the analysis.

A number of additional controls are included in the regression model: First, I control for the (logged) GDP per capita of the biggest treaty partner, the (logged) GDP per capita of the other treaty members, and the (logged) distance between treaty members. Second, a democracy variable is included to account for the fact that the strength and impact of civil society should vary with a country's level of democracy. To measure democracy, I

rely on the Varieties of Democracy data set's electoral democracy index. This index is based on a country's freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage. It thus captures the kind of institutions that would be conducive to civil society lobbying and politicians' responsiveness. Third, many environmental clauses are path-dependent and countries often copy and paste prior agreement texts. Thus, I include a moving average, which reflects the mean number of environmental clauses a country included in its trade agreements in the ten years prior to an agreement's signature. Lastly, all regression models include year-fixed effects.

For ease of interpretation, all results shown in the main body of this paper are calculated using ordinary least squares regressions. As the outcome variable is censored at 0, I run the same regressions using a Tobit model. Tobit regression models produce estimates that have the same magnitude, sign and level of significance as the OLS results. Regression results for the Tobit model can be found in the appendix.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Democracy	0.66	0.26	0.02	0.94
EPI	54.41	10.93	25.30	78.00
EPI Difference	11.97	14.68	0.00	52.70
Prior Environmental Clauses	15.62	16.59	0.00	109.80
Economic Depth	4.98	2.58	0.00	10.00
Count Env. Headq.	48.12	140.23	1.00	1023.00
Log Count Env. Headq.	2.12	1.77	0.00	6.93
Log GDP PC	8.81	1.42	5.28	11.32
Log GDP PC Others	8.13	1.50	3.16	11.32
Log Exports	1.40	6.45	-6.91	17.30
Log Imports	3.43	6.16	-6.91	18.56
Log Distance	7.61	1.13	2.61	9.89
Number Env. Provisions	18.67	26.06	0.00	137.00
Fraction Env. Provisions	0.18	0.15	0.00	1.04

5.2 Regression Results

Regression results are presented in table 1. Model one includes all variables of interest and controls. To test whether the impact of environmental civil society is moderated by the economic depth of an agreement, model 2 interacts the economic depth of an agreement with the measure for environmental groups. Model 3 interacts the difference in EPI levels with the measure for environmental groups instead, to test whether the potential for improving environmental conditions abroad increases the association between civil society presence and environmental agreement content. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the biggest agreement partner, since countries' trade agreements are unlikely to be independent from each other.

As is apparent, the association between the presence of environmental groups and the relative importance of environmental clauses is positive and statistically significant. A one percent increase in the count of environmental headquarters within a country is associated with a rise in the fraction of environmental provisions scaled by the total number of articles by 0.019. This is not trivial, given that the mean fraction found in the data is 0.18. These values imply that, all else equal, a country with an environmental civil society similar to that of Japan (which hosts 41 environmental organizations registered in the YIO) will include, on average, five more environmental provisions in a trade agreement of average length (92 articles) than a country with the environmental civil society strength of Turkey (host to two international environmental organizations listed in the YIO).

In addition, economic depth and the difference in EPI levels are also positively and statistically significantly associated with an increase in the relative importance of environmental clauses. Interestingly, I find no statistical evidence that import competition is associated with an increase in the relative prominence of environmental content.

To illustrate the estimated effects found in models two and three, figure 3 presents marginal effect plots of the estimated relationship between environmental groups and en-

Table 2: OLS Regressions, Models 1-3

	Fraction Environmental Provisions/Number of Articles		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log GDP PC	−0.001	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Log GDP PC Others	0.005	0.006	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Log Imports	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log Exports	−0.0002	−0.001	−0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log Distance	−0.015	−0.016	−0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	0.001	0.024	0.001
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Prior Env. Provisions	0.001	0.0004	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Economic Depth	0.012**	0.003	0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
EPI	−0.001	−0.0005	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
EPI Difference	0.002***	0.002***	0.001
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.001)
Log Count Env. Headq.	0.019***	−0.007	0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Log Count Env. Headq. * Economic Depth		0.004**	
		(0.002)	
Log Count Env. Headq. * EPI Difference			0.0002
			(0.0002)
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
SEs Clustered By	Biggest Country	Biggest Country	Biggest Country
Observations	468	468	468
R-squared	0.308	0.319	0.309
Adjusted R-squared	0.246	0.257	0.246
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Environmental Groups, Moderated by Economic Depth/EPI Difference



vironmental agreement content. The left-hand graph illustrates the strong moderating effect of economic depth: The association between environmental groups and environmental trade agreement content only becomes statistically different from zero, when agreement depth is above average. In contrast, environmental groups' correlation with environmental provisions does not appear to be moderated significantly by the difference in EPI between treaty partners. This is in line with the theoretical expectations of defensive issue linkage and with the qualitative findings that environmental groups seem to become particularly active when they perceive trade policy as a threat.

5.3 Robustness checks

A number of robustness checks were conducted to confirm that these results are not merely an artefact of the exact regression specifications used above:

First, Tobit regressions, which may be more appropriate for data censored at zero, produce qualitatively equivalent results. Second, one may be worried that the findings presented

here are mostly driven by the U.S. and the EU and do not represent a broader trend. However, excluding agreements concluded by the U.S. and the EU does not alter the regressions' findings. The main findings presented above also hold when using an alternative way of specifying country-level variables, where I compute GDP-weighted averages across all treaty partners.

I also try a number of alternative specification for key variables: Since the strength of civil society is potentially endogenous to trade policy, I use data from 1987, which predates the rise in environmental provisions to re-estimate civil society strength. The results remain unaltered. Further, theory suggests that countries might worry more about inter-industry than intra-industry trade. Thus, my measure for imports might not capture import competition accurately. In an alternative specification, I weight observations by intra-industry trade intensity as suggested by Kucik (2012). To do so, I first create weights for intra-industry competition:

$$z_k = \frac{|x_k - m_k|}{x_k + m_k}$$

where x and m are the exports and imports of an industry k. This measure takes a value of 0 if there is high intra-industry trade and 1 if there is low intra-industry trade. The total value of imports of the good mk are multiplied by 1-zk to obtain the level of import-competition. Imports are then aggregated to arrive at the overall measure: $\sum_k m_k * (1 - z_k)$. Weights are calculated at the HS2-level. This alternative way of measuring imports has no effect on the models' main findings and the estimated effect of import competition remains indistinguishable from zero. Lastly, since EPI might be an imperfect proxy for environmental regulations within a country, I try an alternative measure: The number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) the agreement partners have ratified. As trade agreements sometimes mandate MEA ratification, MEA membership is endogenous to

the environmental content of trade agreements. I thus use data from 1987 as a proxy. The results are very similar to those found using the EPI measure.

6 Conclusion

This paper has proposed an alternative mechanism through which issue linkage between two topics in international relations may arise: defensive issue linkage. This channel is to be understood not as a substitute, but as a complement to existing theories on the origins of issue linkage. It builds on the insight that interest groups may mobilize around a new topic due to a perception of threat and loss aversion, rather than a perception of opportunity. As the scope of agreements in one issue area, in this example trade policy, expands, it may begin to interfere with previously unrelated areas, such as environmental policy. Actors operating in the latter mobilize and begin focusing on trade policy in an effort to preserve policy space. This mobilization of interest groups can further the political linkage between two issues: Environmentalists' efforts may translate directly into rules and institutions that are designed to protect and exempt domestic and international environmental policy from trade rules. Alternatively, they may lead to efforts by policy makers to, at the very least, render trade agreements more palatable to the public by including provisions that promote environmental goals.

To illustrate the existence of defensive issue linkage, this paper has built on a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence. A historical analysis of the U.S. environmental community's demands on trade and interviews conducted in Europe have shown that environmental groups tend to mobilize when the scope of trade policy increases. In line with the expectations of this paper, groups cite fears of trade policy interfering with and hindering environmental policy as their main motivation for mobilization. The qualitative evidence has also shown that environmentalists' lobbying activities appear to have an impact on policy

makers. A systematic quantitative analysis of agreement content and civil society strength has revealed a robust, positive relationship between the presence of environmental groups and the relative importance of environmental provisions in trade agreements. This relationship is moderated by the level of economic market access found within a trade agreement, which can be thought of as a measure of the potential threat emanating from an agreement.

The findings reveal multiple avenues for future work: First, the results presented here were constrained by a lack of direct data on the lobbying efforts of NGOs across the world. A more direct measure of the actual level of civil society mobilization around specific trade agreements would greatly improve the quantitative analysis. Second, future research might explore whether the defensive issue linkage mechanism is unique to the example of trade and the environment, or whether it also applies to linkages across other issues in international relations. Lastly, future work might explore the temporal and spacial dimension of linkage between trade and the environment: Environmental groups might, for example, learn from past experiences with environmental chapters, and more experienced trade campaigners might help mobilize groups within new treaty partners.

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Excerpt Relevant Interview Questions - for NGOs

1. How much would you say in terms of time and resources that go into different activities is spent on international trade and advocacy around it versus other issues that you work on?

2. Do you have a sense of when (organization) first started focusing on trade?

3. I'm going to ask you a few questions about the trade preferences of the organization. First, very generally, some organizations see international trade as a potential threat to the environment, but given that there are a lot of environmental clauses in trade agreements, it might also be an opportunity to enhance environmental performance. Where does (organization) fall on this?

4. Are you optimistic that in future, the environment will become more or a priority in trade policy?

5. Are there any specific environmental clauses that you are advocating for? Any clauses that you think would be really helpful if they were included in agreements?

6. When it comes to the effect of environmental clauses: For example, the EU tends to mention climate agreements. Do you find that at all helpful as something you can refer to in your advocacy? Is it easier to pressure policy makers on something they committed to in a trade agreement?

7. (Specific follow up questions after the first statements): You said that TTIP really sparked your organization's interest in trade. What is it about the US and that agreement specifically that led you to pay attention to it?

8. More broadly, the EU negotiates many trade agreements at any one time. How do you concretely decide which one to spend a lot of time and effort on?

9. Do you know how your organization first acquired trade expertise when you started campaigning on trade?

Excerpt Relevant Interview Questions - for Legislators

1. What, would you say, are the main concerns for (Party) in trade policy?
2. In the last legislative period, what role did environmental questions play in trade policy making?
3. What is your party's view with regards to current sustainability chapters? Are you optimistic about their effectiveness?
4. Yesterday, Ursula von der Leyen told the Green party that the EU can use its trade policy to spread its values abroad. Are you similarly optimistic about the role trade policy can play?
5. I have a few questions specifically about CETA and TTIP. Whare were the main worries of (party) when it came to these agreements?
6. Did you change any of your policy demands based on the public protests?
7. Are there NGOs that you talk to frequently? Are there strategies with which these organizations can reach you more easily?
8. When you gather information about a new trade agreement, who do you talk to? Do you talk to any NGOs?
9. Do you ever get contacted by NGOs from trade partners?
10. (If legislator voted against CETA): Is there anything that, had it been part of the agreement, had convinced you to vote in favor?

11. (If legislator voted in favor of CETA): What convinced you to vote in favor of CETA?

Tobit Regression Results

Table 3: Tobit Regressions, Models 1-3

	Fraction Environmental Provisions/Number of Articles		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log GDP PC	−0.002	−0.004	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Log GDP PC Others	0.005	0.006	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Log Imports	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log Exports	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log Distance	−0.013**	−0.014**	−0.013**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Democracy	0.017	0.037	0.017
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Prior Env. Provisions	0.001	0.0004	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Economic Depth	0.014***	0.006	0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
EPI	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
EPI Difference	0.002***	0.002***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log Count Env. Headq.	0.019***	−0.004	0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Log Count Env. Headq. * Economic Depth		0.004**	
		(0.002)	
Log Count Env. Headq. * EPI Difference			0.0002
			(0.0003)
LOGSIGMA	−2.075***	−2.082***	−2.075***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Year Fixed Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	468	468	468
Log likelihood	270.781	273.442	271.051
Akaike information criterion	−461.562	−464.885	−460.103
Bayesian information criterion	−295.623	−294.797	−290.015
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		