Feeling Insecure and Blaming Immigrants: relationship between subjective risks and welfare chauvinism

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Abstract

We argue that subjective insecurity plays an important role in explaining welfare chauvinism, which is defined as the restriction of immigrants' access to social benefits and public services. Additionally, macroeconomic performance and welfare regime are closely related to opinions towards welfare usage by migrant groups. To test these propositions, we utilize data from the 8th round of European Social Survey and supplement it with country-level indicators. By using a multilevel ordered logit approach, we found that level of subjective unemployment and income risks are not overlapping with the objective measures, and self-assessed insecurity has a strong and positive effect on welfare chauvinism. At the macro level, higher degrees of GDP growth decrease welfare chauvinism, and Central and Eastern European welfare regime increases the likelihood of exclusionary attitudes in relative terms. The results are robust across different estimation techniques and inclusion of alternative contextual factors.

Key words: Subjective risk, immigration, welfare chauvinism, multilevel model, public opinion, European Social Survey, welfare regime

1. Introduction

The rise in immigration flows to Europe over the last decades, and particularly after refugee influx in 2015, public and scholarly debates gained momentum. Not only the labor market consequences but also its effect on welfare state policies started to be extensively investigated. On the one hand, migration could increase the burden on welfare states if immigrants are net recipients of social assistance and other social policy instruments. On the other hand, citizens might oppose the access of immigrants to these benefits and public services due to economic and ethnic competition. In this regard, welfare chauvinism, which is the roughly the belief that the welfare state should be responsible only for its own citizens, has therefore received increased attention in recent years. While there is ample evidence on the strong relationship between opinions about groups deserving welfare benefits and nationality, attitudes towards immigrants' eligibility are complex. Almost in every nation, majority of public supports either conditional access based on previous contributions through work and taxes or based on citizenship. Nevertheless, there are also European countries where a large part of individuals favour restricting the social benefits and public services to compatriots only and fully exclude immigrants.

The aim of the paper is to examine the individual and contextual determinants of immigrants' deservingness of social rights and offer a better understanding of the micro and macro level foundations of welfare chauvinism. To this end we consider both objective and subjective factors that affect individuals' perceptions on competition for public resources. Even though, income, education, labor market status can be theoretically significant in explaining welfare attitudes, it has been repeatedly shown in previous research that material gains and losses tend to have low or no explanatory power. Due to perceived competition and symbolic threats, people might have less tolerant inclinations towards out-group members such as immigrants. We develop an index based on three measures of subjective insecurity and examine their impact on welfare chauvinism in relation to other individual and contextual factors. People's beliefs about more uncertain labor market and income prospects would aggravate the supposed effects of competition and render them less tolerant to migrant groups. Likewise, low growth rates might boost feelings about insecurity and reduce inclusive welfare attitudes by increasing the self-assessed risks about unemployment and income. Moreover, subjective assessment of insecurities could depend on the type of the welfare state and generosity of social expenditures.

Our findings reveal that the level of subjective unemployment and income risks are not overlapping with the objective measures, and self-assessed insecurity has a robust and positive effect on welfare chauvinism. The results are not altered by the inclusion of alternative contextual variables and estimation techniques. Moreover, we demonstrate that even for the most socio-economically advantaged respondents, subjective risk increases the likelihood of chauvinistic welfare attitudes. These suggest that self-assessed employment and income status of individuals have a large bearing on opinions about immigration policies, and such aspects should also be addressed in integration programs. When we look at the macro level explanations, higher degrees of GDP growth decrease welfare chauvinism. While previous research is inconclusive on the relationship between welfare chauvinism and welfare state type, we find strong and positive impact of Central and Eastern European regime. Finally, our results on the share of immigrants are in accordance with the contact theory, and the greater share of foreign-born population decreases welfare chauvinism.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize a number of theories about the determinants of migration attitudes, how these are shaping welfare nationalism and leading to exclusionary preferences. The third section presents core arguments of the paper with respect to the links between subjective insecurity, economic growth, welfare regime and chauvinism. In the fourth section operationalization, data and empirical methodology are discussed. The fifth section of the paper displays our findings and compare them with earlier research. In the sixth section, we offer few concluding remarks on implications of selective solidarity in European countries, and briefly discuss limitations of our research and future directions.

2. Individual and Contextual Determinants of Welfare Chauvinism

2.1 Labor Market Status, Cultural Threat, and Ideology

In the literature, economic and cultural anxieties are discussed as the two most important sources of anti-immigration prejudices. These fears can be instigated by individual level determinants that lead to economic precariousness such as unemployment, low incomes, welfare dependency and skills. People who perceive are more likely to be at competition with immigrants for the resources they themselves need, such as jobs or welfare benefits, would have adverse opinions on migration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Kurer 2020). Nevertheless, despite its intuition, labor market competition theories usually fall short of explaining the

attitudes towards immigrants, and as a result more recent work focuses on the perceptions rather than objective threats in the labor market. In addition to labor market competition, ethnic competition and threat theories are offered as explanations why anti-immigration views might prevail. According to these models, individuals identify with one group, and distributional conflicts are perceived as zero-sum games in which members of one group wins at the expense of another group (Esses et al., 1998). Similar to the expectations of labor market competition theories, individuals who are economically disadvantaged feel most threatened, and hold more negative attitudes towards migrant groups.

Borrowing from the realistic and symbolic threat theories, welfare chauvinism at the individual level can also be explained by the perceived competition between natives and immigrants. Social benefits are believed to be scarce, and others' receipt of welfare payments and public services come at the cost of ingroup members (Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). A direct implication of these models is a higher welfare chauvinism among individuals who have more to lose if the immigrants are given the same access to welfare provisions. For example, unskilled employees, unemployed, and people who are dependent on transfer payments would be more opposed to the inclusion of migrants. In contrast, socio-economically advantaged groups who might not fear competition and do not typically receive welfare benefits can be more open to inclusion and favor granting social rights to immigrants.

Besides the individual level factors, welfare chauvinism can be related to the sociotropic concerns people hold about the well-being of the society they live in rather than their own self-interest. The group identity, which can be based on class, ethnicity, industry, or nation as a whole could have a larger impact on opinions about immigration (Ford, 2011; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). While some of the characteristics that form the group identity will overlap the personal characteristics, there can also be mismatches between them. A highly educated and securely employed individual could have higher degrees of welfare chauvinism and restrictive attitudes towards immigration, despite the potential gains from cheaper and complementary labor, if the collective concerns are overwhelming.

In the limited number of studies, it has been found that strict forms of welfare chauvinism are associated with low education, income, and occupational status (Mewes and Mau, 2012; Larksen et al., 2018). Yet, it is also affirmed that subjective perceptions such as personal assessment of income, or own perception of being at risk are linked to chauvinistic attitudes (Heitzmann et al., 2018; Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). Moreover, the effect of subjective and objective individual economic risk on welfare chauvinism is carried by respondents' perception of ethnic threat (Kros and Coenders, 2019). With regards to sociotropic concerns, it

has been demonstrated that economic and cultural fears from migration are prevalent for immigration preferences whereas ethnic prejudice has a modest effect (Solodoch, 2020). Lastly, there is a strong and direct relationship between the idea that migrants would increase the fiscal burden and restrictive immigration policies (Gerber et al., 2017). These suggest that even individuals who are not necessarily are at risk of actual or perceived competition might still opt for exclusive welfare programs and be inclined to leave out immigrant groups.

Cultural anxieties that are related to migration include a fear of the unknown and an aversion to become exposed to new beliefs and customs. If the members of a particular ethnic or cultural group perceive differences in values, norms, and beliefs with the immigrants, they are more likely to have prejudices and favor anti-immigration policies (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Stephan et al., 1999). These symbolic threats would be more pronounced if the sensed social distance from the immigrant groups is higher. The existence of outsiders could serve to raise the cohesion within the group, and hence could be used as a tool by politicians and people controlling the social and cultural practices. The difficulty of operationalization and lack of cross-country data make it hard to distinguish the impact of perceived collective threats on immigration attitudes. However, in the existing studies it has been found that there are substantial differences between societies, and while in some nations, the sociotropic economic issues are found to be more prevalent, in other nations, the cultural conflicts are key to the determination of the public views on refugees and migrants (Hainmuller and Hopkins, 2014).

Ideological positions and values at the individual level are also discussed to be critical to anti-immigrant views. Right wing ideologies and particularly authoritarian tendencies are claimed to be increasing the negative outgroup attitudes mainly because of the perceived threat by immigrants to maintenance of order, eminence of group norms and stability (Yoxon et al., 2019; Duckitt 2006). In a similar vein, a positive link between universalistic values and opinions about migrants have been identified while the opposite holds for traditional values. Unsurprisingly people who are more supportive of redistribution and ascribe a greater responsibility to government for provision of needs also tend to favor inclusionary policies for migrants. Nonetheless, it has been also argued that these associations are conditional on the level of cultural embeddedness and size of the immigrant group in the country (Davidov et al. 2020). The studies that explore the impact of ideology and values on welfare chauvinism repeatedly found that authoritarian and right-wing political ideology raises negative sentiments towards immigrants (Mewes and Mau 2012; Crepaz 2020). Also, cultural, and economic threats do not systematically mediate the effect of authoritarianism on welfare chauvinism, which

implies that ideology and values work separately from their influence on individual's economic and social status.

2.2 Economic Development, Migrant Population and Welfare State

The above-mentioned individual level determinants of welfare chauvinism do not operate in isolation and they are certainly shaped by the contextual factors. Individuals might feel more threatened by immigrants economically or culturally depending on the socio-economic environment they are living under, which in turn can elevate the anti-immigrant biases. For example, slow economic growth, recessions, and high unemployment rates are expected to increase anxieties about migration, and see them immigrants as competitors (Kuntz et al., 2017; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). As a corollary, better economic conditions might ease labor market stress and make people less worried about potential threats from migration. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between macro-level economic indicators such as level of development measured by GDP per capita, and unemployment is mixed. On the one hand, it has been found that greater wealth is negatively associated to welfare chauvinistic attitudes, while unemployment rates have a positive impact (Mewes and Mau, 2013). On the other hand, numerous studies revealed that there is no systematic link between level of development, unemployment, and perceptions about immigrants' entitlement to welfare benefits (Heizmann et al., 2018; Eger and Breznau 2017).

According to contact theories, the share of foreign-born population would influence the sentiments on migration. Living in the vicinity of immigrant communities and interacting with them can reduce negative perceptions through socialization, and it is suggested individuals that have direct contact with migrants would have more positive attitudes than individuals who lack contact with these groups (Abrams et al., 2018). However, the size of the group might also be seen as a danger, especially on scarce welfare resources and negative personal experiences with migrants can lead disproportionately adverse opinions. Indeed, it is proposed that the existence of large immigrant populations create fiercer competition and lead to higher levels of prejudice, which imply that could mean that people from regions with larger migrant groups exhibit more perceived group threat (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). Given the contrasting theoretical expectations, it is no surprise that empirical research is inconclusive. Even though some studies find that the presence of immigrants was associated with opposition to immigration and greater welfare chauvinism, others argue that neither the real nor the perceived size of immigrant

groups matters for anti-immigrant attitudes (van der Meer and Reeskens, 2020; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; van der Waal et al., 2013; Crepaz and Damron 2009).

The final set of contextual elements under consideration involves the type of the welfare state and level of social expenditures in the country. One of the widely discussed feature of universal welfare regimes is the stronger sense of solidarity and greater tolerance among the citizens for outgroup members including immigrants. Hence, social democratic states are anticipated to be more inclusionary as opposed to liberal states with regards to policies that target migrant populations, and conservative welfare states lie in the middle (Dallinger 2010). Not only, the type of social programs guides the opinions of the majority population concerning whether certain groups are deserving welfare benefits, but also the existing rules about entitlement and welfare access of immigrants are effective in shaping normative views (van der Waal et al., 2013; Larsen, 2020). Furthermore, it has been shown that universal welfare systems and particularly decommodification reduce the perceptions of group-based competition for welfare services and generate solidarity among citizens (Crepaz and Damron, 2009). However, it should be noted that the share of conditional entitlement among Scandinavian citizens are quite similar to other European countries, and rather than selectivity welfare states might lower chauvinism through decreasing income inequality (van der Waal et al., 2013).

Besides welfare regime, level of social expenditures and specific labor market policies might protect individuals against economic risks. Also, comprehensive programs improve distributional outcomes, promote equality of opportunity, and decrease income inequality (Larsen, 2006). However, higher level of social expenditures might make citizens to fear larger losses if migration is expected to cause welfare retrenchment or to pay more taxes in order to finance the generous programs. This might increase the resentment against immigrants and lead to support of exclusion of them from public services and assistance (Facchini and Mayda 2009). Nonetheless, empirical research considering the relationship between generosity of spending and welfare chauvinism reveal that social expenditures have a positive impact and in countries where spending is higher attitudes towards inclusion of immigrants are relatively more positive (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Mewes and Mau, 2013). These findings point out that support for welfare states and social programs would not be necessarily undermined by migration as opposed to the alleged trade-off.

3. Subjective Insecurities and Welfare Chauvinism

The literature on the determinants of welfare chauvinism is very rich and burgeoning. Our aim is to extend it by focusing on subjective insecurity and its interaction with contextual factors. As described above there are only few studies that use measures of subjective income and economic risks in their empirical analysis. Yet, subjective or attitudinal data also reveals important complementary information to objective indicators, especially given the fact drivers economic risks are compounded and complex. We develop an index based on three measures of subjective insecurity and examine their impact on welfare chauvinism in relation to other individual and contextual factors. First component looks at the likelihood of unemployment in the near future. It is well known that job loss can have dramatic material and immaterial consequences for employees, and subjective assessment if such a risk might significantly influence policy preferences (Duman and Kemmerling, 2020). Hence, we argue that the greater subjective unemployment risks would translate into negative attitudes towards immigrants even when individuals are not essentially in disadvantaged positions. People's beliefs about more uncertain labor market prospects would aggravate the supposed effects of competition and render them less tolerant to migrant groups.

Figure 1 displays the unemployment rates in the survey year and share of respondents who declared that it is very likely and likely to be unemployed and looking for work over the next 12 months. The countries are ranked by the unemployment rate and it can be seen that the relationship between objective and subjective risks are not perfectly aligned. While in Spain and Italy both are high, in Estonia, Russia and Poland subjective assessment of job loss is well above the other countries with similar levels of unemployment. On the other hand, in Belgium and Finland, perceptions of job loss are more optimistic in comparison to the total unemployment in these economies. The deviations can be a result of other worries about labor market prospects and ability of maintaining employment, which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, regardless of its source, these divergences indicate that certain individuals feel less secure in the labor market, and potentially are more threatened by the heightened competition from immigrants. Thus, in addition to objective measures of unemployment risk, we claim that personal assessments would have an effect on welfare attitudes towards migrant groups.

Figure 1. Unemployment Rates and Subjective Job Loss Risk across Countries

Source: Author's calculations based on ESS and World Bank Data.

In addition to unemployment risk, we consider subjective living standards and chances of income losses in the next months. While income and other objective measures of socio-economic status are frequently used in analysis of public opinion, subjective indicators are hardly incorporated. Even though, subjective assessment of living conditions is linked to objective indicators such as income, occupation, and education, these tend to be imperfect measures of where individuals position themselves in the social ladder. Hence, personal evaluations of living standards and expectations about income might better capture the subtle aspects of social status (Operario et al., 2004). It has been found that subjective class positions are explanatory for redistributive preferences even after controlling for objective indicators such as income, education, and labor market status (Duman, 2019). If more individuals in an economy consider themselves as materially deprived and suppose that their income prospects would not get better, they would become more hostile towards outgroup members. Thus, like unemployment risks, perceived inferiority of living conditions and expected income losses would elevate the perceived threats from migration and citizens become less supportive of inclusive social benefits.

As can be observed from Figure 2, there is a lot of variation across countries with respect to whether individuals think they are having difficulties to live with present income and likelihood of not having enough money for household necessities over following year. It should be noted that only respondents whose income fall in the highest three brackets are included in

the figure below. In other words, these are the relatively richest households in their respective countries, and yet in Italy, Latvia, Russia, a significant percentage of them believe they are materially deprived and will have problems with future incomes. Unsurprisingly, the shares are much higher among lower income categories, suggesting that there is an overlap between objective and subjective measures but even the wealthiest individuals in some nations have considerable insecurities about their living standards. For example, in Italy and Latvia more than 60% of the respondents stated that they it is difficult or very difficult to live on present incomes among the poorer households while this ratio is nearly 12% in Norway and 24% in Germany. Once again, these figures suggest that it is not purely the income level determining the subjective income insecurities, and the more insecure respondents see themselves the higher chances of welfare chauvinism.

Figure 2. Living Standards and Subjective Income Risk across Countries



Source: Author's calculations based on ESS.

Our above discussion clearly suggests that the level of subjective unemployment and income risks are not solely based on the objective measures and can be affected by the broader economic and social circumstances. For example, in countries that have stable growth, people might be less worried about their future labor market and income prospects. It has been asserted that volatility of growth has an influence on beliefs about social competition and more individuals attribute reasons for having economic failures to non-personal causes (Duman, 2013). Likewise, low growth rates might boost feelings about insecurity and reduce inclusive

welfare attitudes by increasing the self-assessed risks about unemployment and income. For example, it is shown that European public became less positive toward immigration during economic crisis (Isaksen, 2019). Thus, we argue that at the country level, instead of national income, rate of economic growth would be crucial. Moreover, subjective assessment of insecurities could depend on the type of the welfare state and generosity of social expenditures. In the literature, it has been shown that generosity of social benefit schemes is explanatory for the varying levels of job and employment insecurity across different countries (Bloomberg et al., 2012). In line with earlier studies, we also expect universal and higher social expenditures to reduce chauvinism not only due to greater extent of safety nets against economic risks, but also by decreasing subjective insecurities and by making people less anxious about potential competition from immigrants.

We categorized countries into five; Central and Eastern European, Continental, Liberal, Southern European, and Social Democratic. Even though specific social assistance programs might resemble across regimes, this broad classification reveals the essential components of the welfare states in each nation. From Table 1, it becomes evident that social expenditures Central and Eastern European and Liberal welfare regimes, on average, are quite similar and are lower than the rest of the categories in respect to social expenditures. On the other hand, Southern European welfare states have slightly higher spending than the other types. However, it should be noted that there is variation within categories. For example, Iceland and Israel have the lowest levels, around 15% of GDP whereas France as a continental welfare state has the highest share with 32%, which is followed by Italy and Finland, 29%. Regimes also differ in terms of self-reported unemployment and income risks. On average, individuals in Social Democratic welfare states feel securer on all three measures of subjective insecurity independent of social spending, which implies that not only generosity but also universality of benefits matters. At the other end of the spectrum, we have Southern European countries with high levels of social spending exhibit greater degrees of subjective risks, particularly on job and income losses. In parallel to social expenditures, there is also within cluster variation. For example, more than 19% of the respondents asserted that it is very likely to be unemployed in Spain while this ratio is 10% in Portugal.

Table 1. Social Expenditure, Welfare State and Subjective Risks

Welfare State	Social Expenditure	Unemployment Risk	Living Standards	Income Risk
Central and Eastern Europe (LT, EE, CZ, PL, RU, HU, SI)	19.6	7.8	7.2	8.6
Continental (CH, NL, DE, AT, BE. FR)	24.5	7.2	2.5	3.4
Liberal (IL, IR, GB)	19.0	6.9	7.0	6.1
Southern European (PT, ES, IT)	26.0	14.5	8.2	14.5
Social Democratic (IS, NO, SE, FI)	23.5	5.4	1.7	3.0

Notes: Social expenditures are measured as % of GDP, unemployment risk, living standards and income risk columns show % of individuals who opted for very likely and very difficult.

Source: Author's calculations based on ESS, Eurostat and World Bank Data.

Based on the divergence between objective and subjective measures of insecurity, we propose that self-reported economic hardships and unemployment risks are associated with higher degrees of welfare chauvinism irrespective of the material conditions and socio-economic status of the individuals. Additionally, we suggest that people in countries with low growth rates will feel less secure about their socio-economic position and favor more restrictive policies towards immigrants. Lastly, we argue that generosity of social spending and welfare state type have important effects on perceptions of socio-economic securities and through this channel on attitudes towards immigrants. Based on the earlier studies, we also argue that social democratic welfare states promote inclusionary rights to access benefits and public services. Therefore, our hypotheses are as follows:

H_1: Subjective risks increase welfare chauvinism even after controlling for labor market status, income, and demographic characteristics.

H_2: Low levels of economic growth are likely to lead to attitudes that are less welfare chauvinistic.

H_3: Social democratic welfare states are likely to lead to attitudes that are less welfare chauvinistic.

4. Data and Empirical Strategy

4.1 Description of Data

To examine the relationship between subjective insecurities and welfare chauvinism, multilevel approach is adopted since both individual and country level variables are relevant for the analysis. Our dependent variable, welfare chauvinism is based on a survey question from the 8th wave of European Social Survey (ESS). The only other round where the same question was included is the 4th wave, which was undertaken in 2008. However, this year was marked by severe economic downturn in Europe, hence we believe that using the later wave can help us to isolate the effects of financial crisis. The following question in ESS indicate welfare chauvinism. "Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view". People can then choose one of the following answers: (1) Immediately on arrival; (2) After living in [country] for a year; (3) Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; (4) Once they have become a [country] citizen; and (5) They should never get the same rights. This is the only available survey question attempting to directly gauge welfare chauvinism and it is widely used by the researchers, which makes our results comparative. Evidently, this variable does not cover all potential approaches to granting immigrants welfare access. For example, neither limits to certain types of immigrants, nor restrictions to certain types of welfare resources are possible to derive from the questionnaire item.

Our main independent variable is subjective insecurity, which is operationalized by three survey questions. For unemployment risk, we first consider survey question that asks about the likelihood of getting unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 months, and surveyors can opt for a range of answers from not at all likely to very likely. The higher the probability a respondent attaches to be unemployed, the more likely s/he feels insecure about her/his current job. The second question used to construct the index looks at the feelings on household income, and individuals are given the following options: (1) Living comfortably on present income, (2) Coping on …, (3) Difficult on …, (4) Very difficult on…). The final question for subjective insecurity asks about how likely it is that the household will not have enough money for necessities in the next 12 months, and they rank it from this happening from not all likely to very likely. As can be expected, the harder the individuals find to live with their household income, the more likely that they feel insecure and threatened by supposed competition from

immigrants. Because the index components have ordinal values, standard methods of performing factor analysis are not suitable. The details of how we build our main independent variable are explained in the following section.

To test whether the effect of subjective insecurities is equal across countries, we condition employment and income risks on GDP per capita growth and type of welfare state. In most of the previous studies GDP per capita is used as a measure of level of development, however, growth rates might have a more straightforward bearing on future expectations and people might feel less hopeful if economy is underperforming in relative terms. We take the average of past three years to control for the very sudden changes in economic growth. With regards to social welfare state, as discussed earlier, a positive association has been identified between generosity and welfare inclusion. From, our cursory analysis spending alone is not closely associated with subjective assessment of risk. Hence, we classify the countries according to their welfare regime and suggest that in comparison to social democratic welfare states, individuals in other regimes are expected to have more negative attitudes towards immigrants due to higher degrees of perceived risk. Data for growth rate, social spending and coverage of benefits are derived from World Development Indicators, Eurostat, and Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset. Table 2 gives an overview of the core variables used in the empirical analysis.

Parallel to the literature we have four different groups of individual level control variables; demographic (age, gender, education, being a migrant and location of residency), socio-economic status (income, labor market status, contract type and benefit dependency), political orientation (left-right scale and conservative values) and welfare legitimacy (attribution of greater government responsibility for provision of standard of living for elderly, unemployed and childcare). Additionally, we include foreign-born population as a percentage of total population in the main model. Certainly, there might be other contextual variables that may affect welfare chauvinism, but we have a restricted sample of countries and not all country-level factors can be added to the model simultaneously. For each model we include a maximum of three country-level variables and substitute the main country-level controls with GDP per capita, unemployment rate, flow of immigrants and income inequality in the subsequent analysis. Table A1 in the Appendix shows summary statistics for all variables.

Table 2. Mean Values for Core Variables across Countries

	Welfare Chauvinism	Living Standards	Income Risk	Job Loss Risk	GDP Growth	Foreign Born (%)
AT	2.38	1.85		1.59	-0.27	17
BE	1.98	1.80	1.82	1.72	0.86	16
CH	1.94	1.55	1.68	1.72	0.69	28
CZ	2.69	2.21	2.10	1.97	2.42	7
DE	1.94	1.65	1.65	1.57	0.86	13
EE	2.30	2.17	1.95	1.99	2.25	15
ES	1.74	2.02	2.06	2.21	1.5	13
FI	2.20	1.86	1.84	1.78	-0.64	6
FR	2.03	1.91	2.12	2.01	0.43	12
GB	2.20	1.69	1.87	1.69	1.62	13
HU	2.80	2.27	1.99	1.72	3.57	5
IE	2.00	1.88	2.06	1.81	10.86	17
IL	1.98	2.17	1.73	1.69	1.43	23
IS	1.68	1.52	1.63	1.53	2.59	12
IT	2.34	2.14	2.32	2.02	-1	10
LT	2.44	2.30	2.68	2.19	3.43	13
NL	2.30	1.57	1.64	1.70	0.71	12
NO	1.97	1.42	1.48	1.56	0.53	14
PL	2.44	2.08	2.04	2.11	2.98	2
PT	1.82	2.18	2.47	1.86	1.06	10
RU	2.65	2.62	2.44	2.17	-0.56	8
SE	1.76	1.40	1.42	1.44	1.79	16
SI	2.44	1.70	2.03	1.89	1.21	12

3.2 Empirical Strategy

Factor analysis is a widely used technique to reduce many variables into fewer numbers of factors, by extracting maximum common variance from all variables and putting them into a common score. However, in standard methods of performing factor analysis, variables are assumed to be continuous and follow a multivariate normal distribution. As reviewed in the previous section, variables that are utilized to form our core independent variable, subjective risk, are ordinal. Thus, we generate a matrix of polychoric correlations to estimate factor scores and calculate the index for subjective insecurity based on these scores. For simplicity, let us suppose that Z_1 and Z_2 are two ordinal items with m_1 and m_2 categories. If we assume that variables, Z_1^* and Z_2^* are the underlying variables, which are normally distributed, their combined distribution can also be assumed to be normal bivariate with a correlation ρ. Then, polychoric correlation becomes the correlation ρ in the bivariate normal distribution

$N(0,0,1,1,\rho)$ (Eq. 1) of the latent variables Y_1^* and Y_2^*. The equation is as follows and can be estimated by maximizing the function of maximum likelihood of the multinominal distribution:

$$P[X = i, Y = j] = p_{ij} \int_{ai-1}^{ai} \int_{bj-1}^{bj} \frac{1}{2\pi\sqrt{1-\rho^2}} \exp^{-\frac{1}{2(1-\rho^2)}(x^2-2\rho xy+y^2)} dxdy \qquad (1)$$

$$lnL = \sum_{i=1}^{m_1} \sum_{j=1}^{m_2} n_{ij} log p_{ij} \qquad (2)$$

Given that our dependent variable has an ordered character, we use a multilevel ordered logit regression model. A linear estimation technique is not suitable because the distances between the response categories are not necessarily of equal and the values attached to these categories are ordinally ranked. An ordered logit model does not assume that the distances are meaningful as such, and therefore offers a better option to analyse the categorical data. Furthermore, our analysis includes both country and individual-level variables, hence we use a multilevel approach. We estimate models with random intercept for national clusters as well as random slope for the effect of contextual factors on subjective employment and income risks. Thus, with multilevel modeling we can study the impact of national variables on individual opinions while at the same time recognizing that all respondents within a country receives the same level-2 treatment and perfectly correlate on level-2 measures. Additionally, this type of methodology informs us on the proportion of variation that is caused by level-1 or level-2 variables. The dependent variable in our estimation is ordered, hence the following mixed-effects ordered logistic regression is used:

$$p_{ij} = \Pr(y_{ij} = 1 | x_{ij}, X_j) \qquad (3)$$

$$Logit\,(p_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + \beta_2 X_j + \beta_3 x_{ij} X_j + u_{0j} \qquad (4)$$

$$\mathrm{Var}(u_{0j} | x_{ij}, X_j) = \sigma^2_{u_0|} x, X \qquad (5)$$

where x_{ij} is the set of level-1 variables including set of demographic characteristics, ideological stance, and welfare legitimacy, and X_j is the set of level-2 variables including GDP per capita growth welfare state type and share of foreign-born population. The variance term u_{0j} includes the level-1 and level-2 variances and covariance between intercept and slopes. The model enables to examine the country level factors on welfare chauvinism directly as well as through

their effects on subjective insecurity. We use Stata 15 meologit and post-estimation commands for all regressions that are presented in the following section. Likelihood ratio (LR) test, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are used to compare the strength of random intercept versus random intercept and slope models. For robustness checks, we also replicated our main model using a linear multilevel model, with random intercept and slope.

5. Findings and Discussion

Table 3 displays the results of the multilevel multivariate ordered logit analyses under four specifications, starting with our core independent variables -insecurity, GDP growth and welfare state type- and adding demographic, socio-economic, political and welfare legitimacy controls. All models of interest are compared to a simple null-model where no independent variables are included. The full sets of results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. AIC and BIC are reduced noticeably between the 1st and 4th model, suggesting that full model is correctly specified. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests support the utilization of random intercept and slope model, which means that subjective insecurity does not only vary across countries but there is also diversity within countries. Figure A1 and A2 exhibit random slope and intercepts by country, and both are different from zero in most cases. Same specifications are also run with linear multilevel techniques, and results are disclosed in Table A3 in the Appendix.

As can be observed, subjective insecurity has a positive and significant effect on welfare chauvinism, and the coefficient is robust across specifications. For a one unit increase in subjective risks, the odds of welfare chauvinism versus more inclusionary stances are 1.07 and 1.12 times greater, given the other variables are held constant in the model. Hence, in line with our argument, the less secure people feel the more exclusionary they become towards immigrants. Our findings are comparable to previous examinations where subjective economic risk is disclosed to have a direct and positive effect on welfare chauvinism in the UK and Netherlands after economic egalitarianism and ethnic threat perceptions are accounted for (Kros and Coenders, 2019). We show that a more comprehensive measure of subjective insecurity is also explanatory for welfare chauvinism even when we control for a long list of individual and contextual factors across several European countries. In fact, objective measures of risk, except education lose their explanatory power once self-assessment of job and income losses are added to the models.

When we look at the macro level explanations, higher degrees of GDP growth decrease welfare chauvinism. The coefficient of economic performance gets smaller as we add more control variables, however, it is still significant. This is confirming our proposition that better economic performance can improve the objective and subjective well-being of individuals and make them less anxious about migration. In terms of regime, the reference category is social democratic welfare state, and it can be seen that both in liberal and Central and Eastern European systems, exclusionary attitudes are higher. While previous research is inconclusive on the relationship between welfare chauvinism and welfare state type, we find strong and negative impact of Central and Eastern European regime as well as a smaller and adverse effect of Liberal regime. Finally, our results on the share of immigrants are in accordance with the contact theory, and the greater share of foreign-born population decreases welfare chauvinism.

In Figure 3, we illustrate the effects of subjective insecurity on welfare chauvinism, and for clarity, we only include the least inclusive outcome. It shows the probabilities of someone being chauvinistic in comparison to other alternatives (inclusion and conditional inclusion) according to the level of subjective assessment of risks. Our results demonstrate that the likelihood of being welfare chauvinistic is higher when perceived insecurities are larger. If subjective insecurity is zero, the chance of respondents having most exclusionary attitudes is slightly less than 5% whereas the probability increases to a little over 11% if insecurity is at the highest level. To elucidate the effects of self-assessed risk on welfare attitudes towards immigrants, we also look at the predictive margins for the most objectively secure individuals. This group is defined by university education, permanent employment, no social benefit dependency and belonging to the highest income category. Even for these respondents, subjective insecurity has a positive and significant, around 1%, impact on the most chauvinistic welfare attitudes.

Table 3. Subjective Insecurity and Welfare Chauvinism

	1	2	3	4
Subjective Insecurity	0.07*	0.11*	0.11**	0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP Growth	-0.07**	-0.07*	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Liberal	0.64**	0.56**	0.44*	0.38*
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Continental	0.28	0.25	0.3	0.24
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)
South European	-0.11	-0.16	-0.11	-0.1
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Central and Eastern Europe	1.02**	0.96**	0.70**	0.67**
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Foreign Born	-2.60*	-2.83*	-2.92*	-2.84*
	(1.24)	(1.23)	(1.21)	(1.13)
Cut 1	-2.31**	-2.55**	-1.83**	-2.55**
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Cut 2	-1.48**	-1.69**	-0.95**	-1.67**
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Cut 3	0.70**	0.52	1.34**	0.63
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.33)
Cut 4	2.67**	2.52**	3.45**	2.75**
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.37)
Demographic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-Economic	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Orientation	No	No	Yes	Yes
Welfare Legitimacy	No	No	No	Yes
# of Obs.	32046	23078	20970	20805
# of Countries	23	23	23	23
Country Level Variance (null model = 0.328)	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08
AIC	92764.4	64060.5	54892.6	54468.7
BIC	92915.2	64237.5	55067.5	54643.5

Note: Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Demographic variables include age, gender, education, being a migrant and residency. Socio-economic variables include contract type, employment status, welfare dependency and income. Political orientation includes left-right scale and conservative values. Welfare legitimacy includes an index based on opinions about government responsibility for providing living standards for elderly, unemployed and childcare. * an ** denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.

Figure 3. Welfare Chauvinism and Subjective Insecurity



Source: Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on the 4th specifications of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants.

Figure 4 repeats the same exercise for GDP growth, and in line with our theoretical explanations, it is evident that higher economic growth is decreasing welfare chauvinism. When GDP per capita is contracting at 1% (Italian case), the likelihood of stating most exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants is around 8% which decreases to less than 4% if GDP per capita approaches to 10% (Irish case). Once again, below findings are similar to the previous research that identify a varied but important effect of economic crisis on viewpoint of European public towards migrant groups (Isaksen, 2019). Since we argue that growth rates are better at capturing fluctuations in economic performance than national income levels, our results are divulging the association between crisis and welfare chauvinism. We also look at probability of welfare chauvinism across different welfare state categories in Figure 5. In comparison to Social Democratic regimes, it is visible that Continental and South European regimes do not have different effects. The contrasts of predictive margins are very close to zero. On the other hand, for Liberal welfare states the likelihood of asserting welfare chauvinism is approximately 2% higher than Social Democratic ones and this ratio goes up to 4.5% for Central and Eastern European counterparts. To isolate the effects of social spending and GDP per capita from the welfare regime, we explore the predictive margins when these indicators are set to the highest and lowest values of the sample, yet welfare state type continues

to be differentially related to chauvinism. This implies that there are regime specific effects which might be about solidarity induced in Social Democratic states.

Figure 4. Welfare Chauvinism and GDP per capita Growth



Source: Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on the 4th specifications of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants.

Figure 5. Comparison of Welfare Chauvinism to Social Democratic Regime



Source: Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on the 4th specifications of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants. 0 = Social Democratic, 1 = Liberal, 2 = Continental, 3 = Southern European and 4 = Central and Eastern European.

Table 4 estimates the relationship between subjective insecurity using alternative macro level covariates, namely unemployment rate, social expenditures and income inequality using the full specification. As can be seen, self-assessment of risks maintains their explanatory power across all models, and magnitude of the coefficient is 0.12 for differing contextual factors. This supports our hypotheses that subjective insecurities are highly relevant for welfare chauvinism, and its impact is not contingent on the objective socio-economic position of the individuals or the macro level indicators. Figure A3 in the Appendix presents marginal effect of subjective insecurity across three models, and in sum, there is a significant and positive impact in all three specifications. The impact gets larger for higher levels of self-reported risj when inequality is considered. We also revealed that unemployment rate is significantly and negatively associated with exclusionary preferences. This appears to be counterintuitive but higher unemployment might shift the blame from immigrants to mismanagement of the economy and more systemic causes. In the literature, there is no agreement on the effect of unemployment rate and various studies found no link between unemployment and perceptions about immigrants' entitlement to welfare benefits (Heizmann et al., 2018; Eger and Breznau 2017).

When we consider social expenditures, no link between the extent of government spending and welfare chauvinism is detected. This could be due to the opposing effects of comprehensive programs. On the one hand, they will provide safety nets to citizens and on the other hand, they increase the opportunity cost of perceived immigrant competition (Larsen, 2006; Facchini and Mayda 2009). In the last column of Table 4, we added inequality measured by Gini coefficient, which turns out to be positively and significantly related to welfare chauvinism. Hence, more unequal countries tend to be also less tolerant towards immigrants. Finally, if we look at the impact of welfare regime on attitudes, Liberal cluster is no longer different than Social Democratic one. In this sense, our results are quite comparable to researchers who highlighted that regime differences in welfare chauvinism can be fully attributed to their differences in income inequality (van der Waal et al., 2013). Nevertheless, coefficient on Central and Eastern European welfare state maintains its significance even when inequality is included, which signal that there are regime specific elements beyond income distribution, unemployment rate and social expenditures shaping opinions about immigrants' welfare access.

Table 4. Subjective Insecurity and Welfare Chauvinism (Alternative Macro Covariates)

	Unemployment Rate	Social Expenditure	Inequality
Subjective Insecurity	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployment Rate	-0.43*		
	(0.21)		
Social Expenditure		-0.13	
		(0.24)	
Inequality			0.6**
			(0.21)
Liberal	0.21	0.15	0.26
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.25)
Continental	0.23	0.22	0.38
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.23)
South European	0.3	-0.08	0.38
	(0.40)	(0.28)	(0.31)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.62**	0.51*	0.85**
	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.22)
Foreign Born	-3.11**	-3.51	-2.02
	(1.20)	(1.82)	(1.13)
Cut 1	-2.82**	-2.91**	-4.07**
	(0.38)	(0.84)	(0.61)
Cut 2	-1.93**	-2.03*	-3.18**
	(0.39)	(0.84)	(0.60)
Cut 3	0.37	0.27	-0.88
	(0.39)	(0.84)	(0.58)
Cut 4	2.48**	2.39**	1.23*
	(0.43)	(0.85)	(0.60)
Demographic	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socio-Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political Orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare Legitimacy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Level Variance	0.07	0.07	0.08
# of Obs.	20805	20805	20805
# of Countries	23	23	23

Note: Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Demographic variables include age, gender, education, being a migrant and residency. Socio-economic variables include contract type, employment status, welfare dependency and income. Political orientation includes left-right scale and conservative values. Welfare legitimacy includes an index based on opinions about government responsibility for providing living standards for elderly, unemployed and childcare. * an ** denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.

6. Concluding Remarks

We explored the association between individual characteristics, contextual factors, and welfare chauvinism across several European countries. Our results demonstrate a clear support for the notion that subjective perceptions risk is explanatory for welfare chauvinism even after controlling a long list of variables on demography, socio-economy, political orientation, and welfare legitimacy. In contrast, objective features such as labor market status, income and social benefit dependency are not relevant. Hence, our first contribution is bringing a rigorous investigation of subjective risks on attitudes towards immigrants. Second, we consider macro-level variables and revealed that economic growth and welfare regime are significantly linked to chauvinism. Higher growth decreases the probability of exclusionary attitudes, which is also confirmed in several studies that identify a negative impact of crisis on tolerance to migrant groups. Finally, we show that in comparison to Social Democratic regime, especially Central and Eastern European cluster is raising welfare chauvinism. This effect is unchanged when social expenditures and income inequality are added, pointing out that there are regime specific features shaping the welfare attitudes. Earlier research usually focuses on Western Europe and overlook Central and Eastern European countries; thus, we contribute to the literature by expanding the geographical coverage and highlighting the differences between welfare regimes.

Welfare chauvinism and its role in raising prejudices against migrants is becoming the center of many studies and policy analysis in the recent years. The vast cross-country differences in terms of citizens' willingness to share social benefits with the immigrants versus favoring restrictions could hint at the future direction of policy making. Central Eastern European region and especially several countries like Hungary and Czechia display significantly higher chauvinistic attitudes, which already have a negative impact on the debates about migration policies across Europe. This might imply that sustainability of welfare systems that are based on solidarity and inclusion can be shaken even in societies where there is no visible change in the ethnic composition. Given that perceptions about economic risks are sufficient to fuel welfare chauvinism, future integration measures should tackle these issues and attempt to improve expectations of citizens. Additionally, universal and generous social policies, exemplified by the Social Democratic welfare model, can be used to decrease exclusionary preferences.

Despite the empirical extensions and contributions of our paper, there are few limitations. First, we only looked at the influence of different individual positions in the welfare state

system in a general way by depicting only the mean consequences of these positions for welfare chauvinism. Nonetheless, macroeconomic performance and welfare regime might moderate the association between subjective insecurity and attitudes towards immigrants. Due to the limited sample, we are unable to control for interactions but in future research can delve into the interrelation between welfare system arrangements and individuals' objective and subjective risks. Second, the lack of individual-level longitudinal data makes it impossible to establish causality between welfare chauvinism and self-assessment of employment and income losses. Even though there is no match between higher flows of immigrants and subjective insecurity, this might lead to a change in immigration policy, which in turn might make people more anxious about migration.

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Appendix

Table A1. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Welfare Chauvinism	42403	2.191	1.05	0	4
Age	44232	49.143	18.613	15	100
Gender	44378	.526	.499	0	1
Education	44387	1.907	.868	0	3
Born in Country	44370	.106	.308	0	1
Residence	44337	1.099	.928	0	3
Left-Right Scale	38583	5.157	2.239	0	10
Conservatism	43184	2.142	1.215	1	5
Work Contract	35622	.331	.634	0	2
Labor Market Status	44387	1.229	1.385	0	3
Source of Income	43694	2.225	1.702	1	8
Household Income	36445	5.189	2.734	1	10
Responsibility for Elderly	44125	8.17	1.825	0	10
Responsibility for Unemployed	43838	6.735	2.272	0	10
Responsibility for Childcare	43744	7.84	2.116	0	10
Living Standards	43863	1.948	.833	1	4
Income Risk	40612	1.973	.901	1	4
Job Loss Risk	43080	12.906	21.618	1	55
GDP Growth	44387	1.757	2.649	-1	10.86
Foreign Born	44387	.129	.054	.02	.28
Social Democratic	44387	.133	.34	0	1
Continental	44387	.268	.443	0	1
South European	44387	.132	.338	0	1
Central and Eastern European	44387	.303	.46	0	1
Liberal	44387	.164	.37	0	1
Immigrant Flow	44387	.013	.008	.003	.03
Inequality	44387	.319	.037	.25	.4
Unemployment Rate	44387	.08	.038	.04	.22
Social Expenditure	44387	.224	.048	.15	.32

Table A2. Subjective Insecurity and Welfare Chauvinism – Full Models

	1	2	3	4
Subjective Insecurity	0.07*	0.11*	0.11**	0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP Growth	-0.07**	-0.07*	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Liberal	0.64**	0.56**	0.44*	0.38*
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Continental	0.28	0.25	0.3	0.24
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)
South European	-0.11	-0.16	-0.11	-0.1
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Central and Eastern Europe	1.02**	0.96**	0.70**	0.67**
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Foreign Born	-2.60*	-2.83*	-2.92*	-2.84*
	(1.24)	(1.23)	(1.21)	(1.13)
Age	0.01**	0.01*	0	0
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Educ	-0.13**	-0.17**	-0.16**	-0.16**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Immigrant	-0.68**	-0.67**	-0.74**	-0.73**
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Residency	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Contract		0.01	0.04	0.04
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
In education		-0.36**	-0.29**	-0.33**
		(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Unemployed		-0.19	-0.16	-0.18
		(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Non-employed		0.01	0.04	0.04
		(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Pensions		-0.08	-0.12	-0.12
		(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Social Benefit		-0.15	-0.12	-0.09
		(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Income		-0.01	0	0
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left-Right			0.13**	0.12**
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Conservatism			0.20**	0.20**
			(0.02)	(0.02)
Welfare Legitimacy				-0.09**
				(0.02)

Cut 1	-2.31**	-2.55**	-1.83**	-2.55**
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Cut 2	-1.48**	-1.69**	-0.95**	-1.67**
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Cut 3	0.70**	0.52	1.34**	0.63
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.33)
Cut 4	2.67**	2.52**	3.45**	2.75**
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.37)
# of Obs.	32046	23078	20970	20805
# of Countries	23	23	23	23
Country Level Variance (null model = 0.328)	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08
AIC	92764.4	64060.5	54892.6	54468.7
BIC	92915.2	64237.5	55067.5	54643.5

Note: Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.

Table A3. Subjective Insecurity and Welfare Chauvinism – Linear Mixed Model

	1	2	3	4
Subjective Insecurity	0.04**	0.06**	0.05**	0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP Growth	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Liberal	0.34**	0.30**	0.27**	0.24**
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Continental	0.15	0.19	0.17*	0.14
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
South European	-0.01	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.57**	0.51**	0.37**	0.36**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Foreign Born	-1.58**	-1.80**	-1.83**	-1.77**
	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.58)
Age	0	0	0	0
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Educ	-0.07**	-0.10**	-0.08**	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Immigrant	-0.37**	-0.36**	-0.38**	-0.37**
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Residency	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Contract		0	0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
In education		-0.20**	-0.16**	-0.18**
		(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Unemployed		-0.12	-0.1	-0.11
		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Non-employed		0	0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pensions		-0.04	-0.06	-0.06
		(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Social Benefit		-0.08	-0.05	-0.04
		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Income		0	0	0
		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Left-Right			0.06**	0.06**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservatism			0.10**	0.10**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Welfare Legitimacy				-0.05**
				(0.01)

# of Obs.	32046	23078	20970	20805
# of Countries	23	23	23	23
Country Level Variance (null model = 0.096)	0.027	0.025	0.024	0.023
AIC	98479.7	98622.1	98479.7	98622.1
BIC	67956.3	68149.4	67956.3	68149.4

Note: Models reflect the results of linear multi-level analyses and standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** denote 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels.

Figure A1. Random Intercepts by Country



Notes: Intercept residuals are calculated with 95% confidence intervals and represent the empirical Bayes predictions of the random effects based on 4th specification of Table 3.

Figure A2. Random Slopes by Country



Notes: Slope residuals are calculated with 95% confidence intervals and represent the empirical Bayes predictions of the random effects based on 4th specification of Table 3.

Figure A3. Welfare Chauvinism and Subjective Insecurity (Alternative Macro Variables)



Source: Marginal effects are estimated at covariate means and based on each specification of Table 3. The outcome is the most exclusive response category on welfare attitudes towards immigrants. UR = unemployment rate (%), Soc Ex = social expenditures (% of GDP) and Ineq = Gini coefficient.