Democratic accountability in a crisis: Analysing evaluations of government response to COVID-19 in a multi-nation state

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Abstract

Do individuals hold governments to account during a crisis? COVID-19 has emphasised the multi-level nature of governance in the United Kingdom, but popular perceptions of how these governments have handled the pandemic are yet to be explored. Existing research often suggests that voters evaluate governments on their performance, and that these evaluations have electoral consequences. However, some researchers challenge this claim, particularly during a crisis. We address these debates, examining England, Scotland, and Wales using British Election Study data. First, using OLS regression, we explore whether evaluations of the UK and devolved (Scottish/Welsh) governments' responses to COVID-19 influence support for the incumbent parties. Second, using logistic regression, we analyse the factors that associate with these evaluations. Overall, these results suggest government evaluations have electoral consequences. However, these evaluations associate with pre-existing (Brexit/national/partisan) identities, rather than personal economic/health costs of the pandemic, which may limit democratic accountability during a crisis.

Keywords: COVID-19, Territorial Politics, Identity Politics, Valence, Economic Voting.

1. Introduction

Voters' evaluations of incumbent performance play a key role in upholding democratic accountability in liberal democracies (Key 1964; Manin et al. 1999; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Healy & Malhotra, 2013). Existing research in the field of elections has shown how incumbent performance on issues of high salience has a substantial impact on citizens' electoral behaviour (Clarke et al., 2004; Jennings and Wlezien 2011; Whiteley et al., 2013; Green & Jennings, 2017). Perceptions of government performance have tended to be understood primarily (but not exclusively) as linked to economic performance: when the economy is strong voters tend to reward the incumbent party at the ballot box, and when its weak voters will punish the incumbent (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2019).

In this paper we explore whether these established patterns still hold in a time of crisis. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has seen the governments of the UK introduce an unprecedented number of measures and restrictions aimed at changing the behaviours of citizens. Enforced closures of businesses, stay-at-home orders, and public anxiety around the disease led to an historic decline in economic activity in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2021). In a pandemic, the public are also likely to have heightened awareness of how governmental decisions may affect an individual's health, freedom, and livelihood as lockdown timing, testing, and vaccine procurement faces additional scrutiny. Given the scale and salience of these changes, retrospective voting theory would suggest that voters will hold governments accountable for the economic and personal hardships that they have faced.

However, some researchers have challenged the connection between economic performance and evaluations of the incumbent. Instead, citizens may rely on heuristics to evaluate government performance, such as their pre-existing party or national identities (Bartels, 2002; León & Orriols, 2019). These patterns may be even more pronounced during a crisis, where it is possible that citizens rally in support of the incumbent (Mueller, 1973). If so, then voters' evaluations of government performance may not uphold democratic accountability as proposed.

Thus, we investigate incumbent evaluations during the COVID-19 pandemic in two steps. First, we test whether the competency evaluations have a substantial impact on stated vote intention. To do so, we use the British Election Study Internet Panel (Fieldhouse et al., 2020) and employ a multilevel approach, examining evaluations of the UK government's response to COVID-19 separately in England Scotland and Wales. We do this to better reflect the ways in which

responsibility for the pandemic response has been split across central and devolved governments. In addition to this, we also analyse respondents' evaluations of the Scottish and Welsh governments' performance. Second, we examine what factors (material economic/health change or pre-existing identities) associate with negative evaluations of government performance on specific COVID-19 policy areas.

Overall, we find that evaluations of government performance do appear to have electoral consequences. Voters who evaluate the UK and devolved governments positively are more likely to say that they would vote for the incumbent party (respectively). However, these evaluations associate more strongly with an individual's pre-existing identities (Brexit, national, and partisan), rather than with any economic loss or health difficulties that they have suffered as a result of the pandemic. Thus, these results suggest that individuals relied on in-group/out-group heuristics to evaluate government performance during the pandemic, which represents a concern for the potential for these competency evaluations to serve as a method of upholding democratic accountability during a crisis.

2. Literature Review

On the relatively infrequent occasions that the electorate are asked to go to the ballot box, they are expected to judge incumbents and challengers by their records and reward or punish them accordingly (Fiorina, 1981). As Verba (1996: 2) writes, "democratic responsiveness depends on citizen participation." This bottom-up accountability mechanism is what provides incumbents with the incentive to be 'responsive' to citizens' wishes, and then legislate accordingly (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). After all, if citizens' vote choice is not influenced at least to some degree by government performance, incumbents have little incentive to pursue policy goals that reflect citizens' interests. Retrospective evaluations of performance provide incentives for incumbents by punishing poor performance, and rewarding leaders who will govern competently (Ferejohn, 1999). There has also been considerable work, especially in the UK, on how perceptions of competence drive support for political parties. Clarke et al.'s (2004) 'valence model' has argued that vote choice at UK general elections can largely be explained by voters' perception of which party is best placed to handle the 'most important issue of the day' (see also Green & Jennings, 2017).

The existing retrospective voting literature identifies four steps that together form a 'feedback loop' between voters and elected officials (Healy & Malhorta, 2013). First, voters observe the policy choices of taken by incumbents in response to certain events and take note of the outcomes both on themselves individually and society more broadly. Second, they attribute responsibility for the events, policies, decisions and outcomes. This in turn influences their perceptions of political parties, thereby influencing their party support and vote choice. Third, voters vote choice sends a signal to officials and incumbents, influencing their policy choices. Finally, these policy choices influence the events and outcomes that voters observe.

Existing literature on voting behaviour across a range of contexts and timeframes suggests voters pay particular attention to economic considerations, with perceived changes in material circumstances (Anderson, 2007). Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2019) have found that this relationship is remarkably stable over time and contexts. In most instances, this material change relates to economic indicators and can be summarised as: if you feel that your material position has gotten worse, you blame the incumbent, update your preferences accordingly, and seek to punish them at the ballot box. Conversely, citizens (who care about economic context) reward their government if they are satisfied with their economic delivery, while they punish it if they are unsatisfied (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000). As such, this 'economic voting' has traditionally been linked to democratic accountability with a basic reward-and-punish framework.

Voters may judge incumbents based on egotropic (or personal finances) considerations or sociotropic (country's wider economy) considerations, pieces of information that are easily accessible through their bank balance or the news headlines (Kinder & Kiewer, 1981; Lupia, 1994; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013). Fiorina (1981) reduced these considerations to a very basic formula: voters only need answer the question: "Are you better off than you were four years ago?". Economic issues have been argued to be particularly important performance evaluations due to their salience; when asked about their priorities and the issue they see as the most important, citizens systematically rank economic considerations among their top issues of concern (Jennings and Wlezien 2011). Analysis from the US has also suggested that citizens hardest hit by fluctuations in the economy were most likely to place greater weight on economic performance (Singer, 2011).

But what happens to evaluations of government performance, and by extension democratic accountability, during a crisis that overwhelms public opinion and government focus? The COVID-19 pandemic represents such a crisis. Figure 1 tracks the 'most important issue' reported

by British citizens from January 2020-January 2021 and illustrates the all-encompassing nature of the pandemic. This is to be expected: currently over 125,000 citizens have lost their lives as a result of COVID-19 and more than 450,000 citizens hospitalised (UK Government, 2021). The crisis has also brought about significant economic hardship for UK citizens, with over 690,000 jobs lost and 11.4 million jobs furloughed as of April 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2021). In this paper, we explore the effects of these shocks at the individual level by examining individuals' evaluations of government performance and subsequent vote preference.



Figure 1: What do you see as the most/other important issues facing Britain today? (IPSOS MORI Issues Index)

The existing literature on democratic accountability and crises is largely divided into two branches. The first branch argues that incumbents are held to account during a crisis. For example, there is ample evidence detailing how incumbents were punished throughout, and in the aftermath of, the Great Recession (Singer, 2011; Marsh & Mikhavlov, 2012; Dassonville & Lewis-Beck, 2014; Giuliani & Massari, 2017). Indeed, research by Dassonville and Lewis-Beck (2014) and Costa Lobo and Pannico (2020) found an increase in the prevalence of economic voting during and in the aftermath of the Great Recession. There is also considerable – though not uncontested – literature on how voters affected by various natural disasters seek to punish incumbents, even if the events were well beyond government control (Montalvo, 2011; Cole et al., 2012; Achen & Bartlels, 2017). It's entirely plausible therefore that we might expect to see a similar effect among voters affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The second branch of the literature suggests that certain crises disrupt the feedback loop between voters and elected officials. When this occurs, a 'rallying' effect is observed, whereby support for incumbents increases instead. In Mueller's (1973: 209) seminal work on public opinion and international crises, he argued that, regardless of how a crisis is handled, incumbents could normally expect a "dramatic and sharply focused" increase in approval. Other scholarly work has since elaborated on the mechanisms that drive this rallying effect, with particular focus on increased salience and strength of national identity and patriotism and media coverage (Baker & Oneal, 2001; Baum, 2002; Arce, 2003; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003). This rallying effect may be so strong that, as Norrander and Wilcox (1993) argue, it can cause shifts in partisan identity in favour of the incumbent of the day.

There is some contemporary evidence of rallying effects during the COVID-19 pandemic. In a study of Dutch citizens, Schraff (2020) found that economic evaluations and social trust became less important in predicting incumbent support as the pandemic worsened. Similarly, Bailey et al. (2021) have shown that an initial increase in COVID related deaths in the UK led to an increase in support for the incumbent Conservative government in England, before 'levelling off' later on in the pandemic. This research adds to the considerable literature that has cast doubt on the abilities of voters to make these basic evaluations of incumbent performance (Healy & Malhorta, 2013). For example, in a review of the economic voting literature, Anderson (2007) argues that a lack of political knowledge and sophistication limited voters' retrospective evaluations.

If voters struggle to make these calculation, then they may rely on other factors when evaluating their government. One alternative is that voters rely on heuristics when making difficult choices like evaluating incumbent performance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Lupia, 1994; Kahneman, 2003). These heuristics can take many forms, but by far the most widely studied has been that of partisan identity. So strong is the link between partisan identity and government evaluations that some scholars have argued that economic voting has vanished, or that it simply reflects a rationalization from partisan effects (Bartels 2002; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Ladner and Wlezien 2007). There is some evidence that partisan ties are important for evaluating government responses to COVID-19. For example, Druckman et al (2020) found that partisanship influences evaluations of the Trump administration's response to COVID-19, as well as evaluations of the United States' response as a whole among those with a strong dislike of the opposing party.

The importance of heuristics relies on research from the realm of social psychology. Psychologists have identified an in-group bias when attributing responsibility for outcomes: people attribute positive outcomes to the actions of the in-group and adverse outcomes to an out-group (Taylor & Doria, 1981; Fletcher & Ward, 1988). As such, there has been considerable attention paid to how the perceptual screen of partisanship affects voters attribution of responsibility (Rudolph, 2006; Marsh & Tilley, 2010; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). However, in-group bias is not restricted to partisan identities. León & Orriols (2019) have also shown that national identity acts as a source of cognitive bias in multilevel systems (specifically in Scotland and Wales) when attributing responsibility for outcomes.

Such cognitive bias may be particularly important in the context of the UK where a considerable amount of responsibility for pandemic response was devolved to the substate level: the UK Government was responsible for pandemic response in England, the Scottish Government in Scotland, the Welsh Government in Wales, and the Northern Irish Executive in Norther Ireland.[1] The multilevel set-up also provides another level of complexity for voters who need to correctly identify which incumbent to reward or punish at election time. Comparative evidence from Spain has suggested that levels of clarity of responsibility in multilevel systems is U-shaped: clarity is highest in systems with high and low levels of decentralisation (León, 2011). Comparative work in Ontario and Scotland has found that many voters are able to accurately assign issues to different levels of government, but that this rarely played a role in influencing vote choice (Johns, 2011). Thus, given that different parties are in power in all four of the UK's governments[2], we may expect to see blame and reward laid at the feet of different incumbents in different areas.

Conversely, we may also see rallying effects occur within each constituent nation but in different directions, favouring the incumbent party in England, Scotland, and Wales. In each country, territorial identity is correlated with support for the current incumbent party (Henderson et al, 2020). If the crisis leads to an increased sense of patriotism, citizens may end up rallying around different governments.

[1] Funding levels in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales continues to be (to differing extents) a function of UK Government spending in England.
[2] The Conservative party form the UK Government (responsible for health policy in England), the Scottish National Party (SNP) form the Scottish Government, and the Welsh Labour party form the Welsh Government (alongside one Liberal Democrat, and one Independent).

3. Data

Data for our analysis comes from wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) (Fieldhouse et al., 2020), which was collected during the COVID-19 pandemic between June 3rd and June 21st 2020. At the time of writing, the BESIP consists of 20 waves between February 2014 and June 2020. The BESIP panel includes large sub-samples in each individual nation of Britain (26,934 in England, 2730 in Scotland, and 1804 in Wales).[3] As health policy is devolved, the Scottish and Welsh governments have been in charge of the pandemic response within these two nations, whereas the UK Government has acted as the *de facto* government of England.[4] As a result, we explore each nation separately. However, as restrictions eventually became localised, we also explore whether there are regional differences present within England. Sample size restrictions limit our ability to replicate this in Scotland and Wales. As we look into attitudes towards the pandemic, we include a number of explanatory variables that are consistent across each model.

3.1 Dependent variables

Determining whether governments are held to account during a crisis requires examining two questions: Do voters punish/reward incumbent parties for their response to the crisis? What factors influence these evaluations of governments' response? To investigate this, we split our analysis into two sections where we focus on examining the electoral consequences of competency evaluations, and then the factors that associate with these evaluations.

Electoral consequences: Given the different parties in power in the UK, Scottish, and Welsh governments, we examine support for the Conservatives (in all three nations), the Scottish National Party in Scotland, and Labour within Wales. We capture a respondent's propensity to vote for these parties on a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely), excluding non-responses. Propensity to vote measures allow respondents to indicate multiple or split party preferences, which are not captured by discrete measures of party support like vote choice (Van der Eijk et al, 2006). Unfortunately, the BESIP asks only about 'Labour,' which means we are unable to

[3] Northern Ireland is not included in the British Election Study

[4] We split the UK into the Government Office Regions (GOR), which separates England but does not disaggregate Scotland and Wales. Due to a flaw in current GOR variable in the latest available version of wave 20, we recreate it using local authority information.

determine whether a respondent is thinking of the Westminster or Welsh party when indicating their propensity to vote for Labour. The difference between the two is important because Welsh Labour have managed to differentiate themselves from the Westminster party (Moon 2016) and voters do evaluate parties differently when making electoral decisions in state and devolved arenas (Wyn Jones & Scully 2006). The ambiguity may influence how our results reflect vote choice in these two arenas, but addressing it is beyond the scope of this paper.

Competency evaluations: The BESIP includes three measures that evaluate the performance of the UK and devolved governments on lockdown, testing, and PPE.[5] Responses are measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from very badly to very well. We have recoded these measures into binary variables (think the government has performed fairly well/very well [1] or not[6] [0], excluding non-responses), which we treat as our dependent variables in this part of our analysis. For brevity, we focus on evaluations of lockdown as it represents the area that has the most immediate influence on the daily life of a respondent. However, we find that very similar results appear for both PPE and testing[7], which supports our conclusions.

3.2 Explanatory variables

Material consequences of the pandemic: Given the impact of the pandemic, one may expect those who have had negative experiences of COVID-19 to evaluate government performance negatively. We focus on two dimensions of personal experience of the pandemic: economic and health. We include economic measures given their prevalence within existing literature, including measures of income change and receipt of furlough. For income change, respondents were asked to indicate whether their household income has changed since the outbreak of the pandemic on a scale of "less than half what it was" [1], "decreased by between a quarter and a half" [2], "decreased by less than a quarter" [3], it is unchanged/don't know [0], or if it "has increased" [4]. For furlough, respondents were asked whether they had stopped work due to the pandemic. Those who did not stop work (or replied 'don't know') were coded as 0. Then those who stopped work were asked whether they had "received full pay" [1], "received some pay" [2], "did not receive any pay" [3].

[5] The BESIP includes a 'general' measure for the performance of the UK Government, but no equivalent measure for the devolved administrations. Thus, we focus on the separate measures to keep things consistent across each nation

[6] This includes the responses 'neither well nor badly,' 'fairly badly,' and 'very badly.'

[7] Available in the supplementary appendix

We focus on egotropic economic measures because of the large-scale disruption that individuals had to their daily life. In addition, unlike the egotropic evaluations, the conventional sociotropic measure present in the BESIP does not refer to COVID-19 specifically, but instead asks about the last 12 months. Given that lockdowns within the UK began less than four months prior to data collection (March 23rd 2020), we are not able to determine whether respondents are evaluating the effect of the pandemic or something else (e.g. Brexit) when answering this question. Consequently, we focus on egotropic evaluations, with the effect of sociotropic evaluations representing an avenue for future research.

Second, given that the pandemic is a public health crisis, it is plausible that individuals may punish the government if their health (or the health of someone close to them) is harmed. To capture the effect of health issues, we include a measure of whether a respondent has had COVID-19 (to their knowledge). The BESIP also contains two measures that capture whether someone in a respondent's family, or someone close to them, has contracted COVID-19 (to their knowledge), which we combine into one variable. Due to a low number of respondents who indicated that they (or family/someone close) had been severely ill at this time point, both of these variables were recoded to into three categories (those who did not indicate they or someone they knew had coronavirus [0][8], those with mild coronavirus who "could still do all/most daily activities" [1], and those with severe coronavirus for whom "most daily activities were not possible" or worse [2]).

Party ID: As discussed, partisan ties may influence perceptions of government policy. To capture this, we include a measure of party identification, where respondents are asked to indicate whether they "think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?" Those who initially say that they do not identify with a party are asked whether they feel a little closer to a particular party. We combine these two measures to capture whether a respondent has some sense of identification with a political party in each nation. As the 'electoral consequences' and 'government performance' questions focus on direct evaluations of a particular party, we focus on whether an individual identifies (at least somewhat) with that party [1] (Conservatives for the UK Government, the Scottish National Party and Labour for the Scottish and Welsh Government respectively) or not [0].[9]

[8] Including those who said don't know.
[9] Includes those who did not answer.

National identity: As discussed, previous research has shown that national identity is heavily correlated with trust and support for devolved institutions and their policies. As such, we include a measure of national identity in our models. In the BESIP, respondents were asked to rate their Britishness, Englishness, Scottishness (if in Scotland), and Welshness (if in Wales) on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very strongly). From this information we create a measure of relative territorial identity (RTI) by subtracting a respondents' 'Britishness' score from their 'Scottishness/Welshness/Englishness' score, thus creating a 13-point scale.[10] This measure is present within existing research (e.g. Henderson et al, 2020), and we include it to better reflect the multilevel nature of national identity in Britain, where most citizens feel a sense of belonging to multiple national identities (see Cohen 1995; Moreno 1988; McCrone and Bechhofer 2015; Henderson et al. 2020). The resulting RTI measure is a scale that ranges from 'British not Scottish/Welsh/English' to 'Scottish/Welsh/English not British', with a midpoint that marks 'Equally British and Scottish/Welsh'. Non-respondents are excluded.[11]

Brexit: Given its enduring salience (see Figure 1), attitudes towards Brexit may also influence responses to the pandemic. While the vote took place in 2016, Hobolt et al (2020) found that Brexit-related identities continue to be important to individuals, serving to polarise them as effectively as partisan identities. Brexit position also correlates with trust in MPs, trust in Westminster, and satisfaction with UK democracy (Jennings et al, 2020). Consequently, we include a measure of Brexit position to explore whether it associates with COVID-19 evaluations. The Conservative Party campaigned on a promise to "Get Brexit Done" (Cutts et al 2020), which may prompt a partisan response among Brexit supporting voters when evaluating their performance. In contrast, and despite the splits within the UK-wide Labour Party, both the Scottish National Party and Welsh Labour have advocated for remaining part of the European Union (Carrell, 2016; Wyn Jones, 2016). As personal perceptions may have changed since 2016, we include a measure of how a respondent would vote if a referendum were held now (Re-join the EU [0], Stay out of the EU [1], I would not vote [2]), excluding non-respondents.

Demographics: As for demographic measures, we include age (interval variable), gender (male [0], female [1], education (whether a respondent had an undergraduate or postgraduate degree [1]

[10] We normalise this scale between 0 and 1 to aid interpretation.
[11] We do not include support for Scottish independence because constitutional preference measures are not present for England and Wales. We also feel that these sentiments will be captured by party support and national identity measures.

or not [0]), ethnicity (white British [0], not white British [1])[12], and social grade. For the latter variable, those who are either unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers or unemployed (D or E) are [1], whereas the others are [0]. We exclude the very few non-responses for these measures.

4. Analysis

4.1 What are the electoral consequences of the pandemic?

Our first step in exploring whether governments are held to account during a crisis is to determine whether evaluations of governments' response to COVID-19 have electoral consequences for the incumbent party. To examine whether this is the case, we include four linear regression step-models of propensity to vote for the incumbent party of government in each nation. The first model includes demographic controls and material consequence variables. The second model adds evaluations of government performance. The third includes Brexit and national identity measures, whereas the final model includes party identification. Full models are provided in the supplementary appendix. For ease of interpretation, we only present the findings from the third model (excluding party identification) in the main body of the article. We also exclude socio-demographic values from our figures, although these are of course available in the supplementary appendix.

Overall, evaluations of government response to COVID-19 associate with support for the incumbent party across all three nations, but pre-existing identities moderate these effects. First, positive evaluations of the UK government have a large effect on support for the Conservatives in all three nations (Figure 2). The inclusion of identity measures serves to moderate this effect significantly, with this moderation being largest when party identification is included within the model. Party identification has the largest effect on propensity to vote for the Conservatives, as expected. The same is then true of Brexit position (in all three nations) and national identity (in Scotland and Wales), which align with the party's pro-Brexit and unionist positions. However, the effects of lockdown evaluations remain significant even after the inclusion of identity measures. Thus, pandemic competency evaluations do appear to associate with a respondent's likelihood to support the incumbent party of the UK government at this point in the pandemic.

[12] Such a recoding may mask important differences between ethnic minority groups, but respondent numbers restrict our ability to explore them here.



Figure 2: Regression coefficients derived from linear regression predicting the likelihood that the respondent would vote for the Conservative Party

Pandemic competency evaluations also influence support for the incumbent parties of the devolved governments (Figure 3). In Scotland and Wales, those who evaluate the devolved government positively were more inclined to support the SNP and Labour respectively. As with support for the Conservatives, the inclusion of identity measures moderates these effects greatly. Party identification and Brexit position (to a much lesser degree) are important for both parties, but national identity only important for support for the SNP. The lack of effect for Labour in Wales, as well as for the Conservatives in England, may reflect how these parties attract support from across the territorial cleavage within these nations. One notable difference between Scotland and Wales is that the effect of competency evaluations is smaller for Labour in Wales, which may be due to the difficulties in using this measure to separate voter preference for Welsh Labour from Labour in Westminster. Future research should explore this in more detail with a measure that can capture the multilevel nature of the party system in Wales.



Figure 3: Regression coefficients derived from linear regression predicting the likelihood that the respondent would vote for the Scottish National Party in Scotland and Labour in Wales

However, while competency evaluations do appear to have electoral consequences, respondents do not appear to punish parties directly for their negative economic or health experiences of COVID-19. First, personal economic consequences have little consistent effect on party support. While those who stopped work were more likely to support Labour in Wales (particularly those who received no pay), stopping work and receiving furlough have no effect for support for the SNP or the Conservatives in all three nations once we include identity measures. Moreover, income change has no effect on support for the Conservatives in Scotland or Wales. Those who lost over half their income were very slightly more likely to support the SNP, but there is no effect on Labour in Wales.

Second, there are few consistent direct health effects on party support. Those who experienced mild coronavirus were slightly more likely to support the Conservatives in England and less likely

to support Labour in Wales, whereas those with severe coronavirus symptoms were slightly less likely to support the Conservatives in England. Those who knew someone with severe coronavirus symptoms were less likely to support the Conservatives in Scotland, but these effects are far smaller than those present for pre-existing identities and competency evaluations. Thus, neither the health nor economic consequences of the pandemic appear to have a consistent or prominent direct effect on incumbent party support in all three nations, which does not support the presence of 'pocketbook' voting at this stage of the pandemic. One answer for this trend is that these evaluations are endogenous with competency evaluations, which we shall explore in the next section.

Finally, we find few regional differences within England (see appendix). Positive evaluations of government response have a consistent effect in every region, ranging from a 1.47-point increase in Conservative support the East of England to a 2.33-point increase in the North West. Furthermore, there are very few differences in terms of the identity, material, and demographic variables. Thus, these results suggest that there are few regional differences in the factors influencing party support at this stage of the pandemic.

4.2 Evaluations of governments' response to COVID-19

The second step in exploring whether governments are held to account during a crisis is to examine what influences these evaluations of governments' response to COVID-19. To explore this, we include three logistic regression step-models for performance on lockdown in each nation, as well as the English regions. The first model includes health and economic circumstances, alongside demographic controls. The second model adds measures of Brexit position and national identity. The final model adds measures of party identification. Full tables for all models provided in the supplementary materials. Figure 4 visualises the results of our full model predicting whether a respondent thought the UK government did a good job of handling lockdown. Figure 5 visualises our full model predicting whether a respondent thought the Scottish/Welsh governments did a good job of handling lockdown.



Figure 4: Log-odds derived from logistic regression predicting whether respondent thinks UK Government has done a good job on lockdown

Overall, the material consequences of coronavirus have very little consistent effect on evaluations of government response to the pandemic. In particular, having experienced a fall in household income (of any level) is not associated with negative evaluations of the UK or devolved administrations in all three nations, although those who have had their income increase are slightly more likely to believe the UK government is doing well in England and (particularly) Wales. Similarly, stopping work and receiving furlough has no significant effect in all three nations. The lack of an effect from economic circumstances is present even within the basic model (demographics and material consequences), which suggest that there is little association between COVID-19 induced personal economic loss and government evaluations at this point.

Furthermore, the health consequences of the pandemic have little consistent effect on evaluations of government performance across all three nations. In England, there is a very small negative effect on evaluations of the UK government for those with severe coronavirus. In Scotland, those who have had severe coronavirus are far more negative of the UK government, but there is no equivalent effect for the Scottish government despite the devolved nature of pandemic response. Similarly, having coronavirus has no effect on evaluations of the UK or Welsh governments in

Wales. Thus, these results suggest that there is no consistent association between the economic or health costs of the pandemic and evaluations of government performance at this stage.



Figure 5: Log-odds derived from logistic regression predicting whether respondent thinks Scottish/Welsh Government has done a good job on lockdown

Instead, there is a far stronger association between pre-existing identities and evaluations of governments' pandemic response, which support the presence of a 'rally' effect. First, identifying with the incumbent party has a sizeable positive effect on evaluations of government performance. In all three nations, identifying with the Conservatives has a large positive effect on evaluations of the UK government's performance over lockdown. A similar effect is also found for identifying with the SNP and evaluations of the Scottish government. In Wales, Labour party identity is associated with positive evaluations of the Welsh Government, but this is lost once Brexit position is added to the model. Thus, these results appear to support the view that incumbent party identifiers are rallying behind their chosen party.

Second, there are large associations between Brexit position and government evaluations in all three nations. Those who support 'stay out' and would not vote are far more inclined to evaluate

the UK government positively in all three nations, yet evaluate the Scottish and Welsh governments negatively. Given the divergent positions of the incumbent parties on Brexit, these results may suggest that 'rejoin' supporters are taking partisan positions when evaluating government response to the pandemic. These effects tend to be similar in size to that found for party identification, which supports the continued prevalence and importance of Brexit positions found within existing research (e.g. Hobolt et al 2020, Jennings et al 2020).

Third, relative national identity also associates strongly with evaluations of the UK government's response to the pandemic (Figure 6), but in opposite directions in England when compared to Scotland and Wales. Endorsement of the UK government tends to be low, even among those with the strongest singular British identity within all three territories. However, the slight positive effect for RTI in England demonstrates that those with stronger sole British identities are more critical of the UK government than those who prioritise their Englishness. Recently, the incumbent Conservative Party has made large efforts to mobilise English identity (see Henderson & Wyn Jones, 2021), which may encourage English identifiers to support the party's actions.



Figure 6: Marginal effect of RTI on the probability of thinking that the UK Government has done well in handling lockdown

In contrast, British identity appears to represent a bulwark against negative perceptions of the UK government in Scotland and Wales. Within these two nations, those who prioritise their Britishness report far more positive evalutaions of the UK government's performance than those who prioritise their Scottish or Welsh identities, with the differences being far larger than what is present within England. One explanation for this may that these results show a centre-periphery rally effect within these two nations, with individuals viewing the centre (UK) government more negatively as they prioritise their sub-state identity. The actions of the incumbent Conservative Party may exacerbate this, as their mobilisation of English identity has been accompanied by a commitment to 'hyper-unionism' within recent years (Kenny & Sheldon, 2020). Consequently, those with weaker British identities may be less inclined to view the party and their actions positively.

When looking at the devolved administrations, relative national identity has an effect but it is lost within the full model. For example, there is a positive effect of Scottish identity on evaluations of the Scottish government, but it is lost once party identity measures are included, which may suggests that respondents are evaluating their performance based on their position on the territorial cleavage. RTI has a similar positive effect on evaluations of the Welsh government in Wales but these effects are lost once we include party and Brexit measures, which may be due to the endogeneity between these variables (see Henderson et al., 2020).

Alongside pre-existing identities, there are some slight demographic differences. First, older people tend to evaluate the UK government positively in England, with a similar effect lost in Scotland and Wales once we include identity measures. Older respondents are also more positive in their evaluations of the Welsh government. These results are potentially surprising given how the health issues associated with COVID-19 increase with age. Second, women tend to be more positive in their evaluations of government response to the pandemic. Gender has a slight positive effect on evaluations of the UK government in England, with a larger effect also found in Scotland but not Wales. A similar positive effect is found for evaluations of the Welsh government but is lost for the Scottish government once identity measures are included. Third, ethnic minorities are more negative in their evaluations of the UK government than White British respondents are in England and (particularly) Scotland where the effect is near that of identifying with the incumbent party. This may reflect that fact that these groups have been particularly hard hit by the pandemic (Mathur et al., 2020). A similar effect is present in Wales but is lost once identity measures are included. There is no ethnicity effect for evaluations of the either the Scottish or Welsh

governments. In contrast, the effects of education are minimal, whereas social grade does not have an effect across all three nations.

Finally, there are few regional differences present within England (see appendix). In terms of pre-existing identities, party identity has a large positive effect in every region. The same is true of supporting Brexit, albeit with some greater variation across the regions (from 0.66 in the North East to 1.49 in Yorkshire the Humber). For national identity, there is only a significant effect in the South East, which is notably larger than that found for England as a whole. Furthermore, we find few regional differences in the material consequences of the pandemic. Those who suffered from severe coronavirus symptoms were more negative of the UK government in the East Midlands and the South West, but not elsewhere. Similarly, loss of income only has an effect in London and Yorkshire the Humber. Thus, evaluations of the UK government tend to be consistent across the English regions at this point in the pandemic.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Initially, the association between negative competency evaluations and lower vote intention appear to suggest that governments are held to account during crises. In all three territories, those who feel that the UK and devolved governments have not responded well to the COVID-19 pandemic are less likely to vote for the incumbent party. While weaker than party identity, these effects tend to be similar to national identity and Brexit position, which are important polarising cleavages within the United Kingdom (Henderson et al, 2020; Hobolt et al, 2020). As a result, these results appear in line with existing valence models (e.g. Clarke et al, 2004; Green & Jennings, 2017), suggesting that voters are holding parties accountable for their performance on the most important issue facing the country.

However, the extent to which these competency evaluations will respond to government performance is questionable given their associations with pre-existing identities. Overall, pre-existing identities correlate strongly with both party support and evaluations of government response to the pandemic in Britain. These associations are also consistent across England's regions at this stage of the pandemic. In particular, we find that identifying with the incumbent party associates prominently with evaluations of the UK government in all three nations, and evaluations of the devolved government in Scotland. As a result, these results support existing research of economic voting that stresses how partisan identity tends to overwhelm economic

circumstances when an individual is evaluating government performance (e.g. Bartels 2002; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Ladner and Wlezien 2007). In particular, they build on the connection between partisan identity and evaluations of government response to COVID-19 present in Druckman et al (2020), showing that such partisan ties associate strongly with evaluations of government response across sub-state nations and at both a state and sub-state level.

We also build on Druckman et al's (2020) work by showing that other political identities, beyond partisanship, associate with evaluations of government performance. For instance, those in support of Brexit are more inclined to evaluate the UK government's performance well (with the opposite true of the two devolved governments in Scotland and Wales). Given the pro-Brexit position of the current Conservative leadership, plus the anti-Brexit positions taken by the SNP and Welsh Labour, it does appear that individuals are using their Brexit position as a heuristic for evaluating the performance of the incumbent. Consequently, these results support both Hobolt et al's (2020) work on the continued importance of Brexit identities and the importance that heuristic cues have during in a crisis.

Furthermore, we find that relative national identity has an important, but differential, effect on competency evaluations in within Britain. In Scotland and Wales, we find evidence of a centre-periphery rally effect for evaluations of the UK government. Here, those who prioritise their British identity are more likely to indicate that the UK government is handling the pandemic well. These evaluations decline drastically as relative Scottish/Welsh identity increases. Interestingly, we do not find an effect for national identity in our full models for evaluations of the devolved Scottish and Welsh governments. In Scotland, it is likely that this is because of the strong endogeneity between relative identity and SNP identity. We do find a centre-periphery effect for evaluations of the Welsh government initially, but these effects are lost once Brexit and partisan identity are added. The absence of these identity effects may reflect how Brexit, national, and party identities are endogeneous within one another. Isolating these identities is difficult and remains an avenue for future research.

However, the opposite pattern is present in England, although the differences are less drastic. Here, increased prioritisation of Britishness is associated with less positive evaluations of the UK government. However, one important implication of the divergent effects for evaluations of the UK government is that they stress how relative British identity has different political connotations within the two Celtic nations when compared to England, which supports recent work on this

topic (e.g. Henderson et al, 2020, Henderson & Wyn Jones 2021). As a result, researchers must be careful to explore and account for the possibility of these different understandings of state identity when investigating national identity within multi-level states.

In contrast, the limits to retrospective voting are evident as there are few consistent significant effects for both the health and (particularly) economic costs of the pandemic across both steps of our analysis, even when we include them in a model with only demographic controls. Neither economic loss (in terms of income or employment) or harm to health (to yourself or family/someone close to you) have a consistent effect on evaluations of the UK and devolved governments' response to the crisis at this stage of the pandemic. There are some notable effects, such as those who experienced severe coronavirus symptoms in Scotland being far more negative of the UK government than those who did not. However, such effects are not present for the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales, which suggests that voters are not responding to the performance of the incumbent responsible for COVID-19 response within these territories. Rather than relying on personal experience of the crisis, it seems that individuals are using their pre-existing identities as heuristics that inform their evaluations of government performance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Lupia, 1994; Kahneman, 2003). Thus, these results represents a challenge to the existing research that claims governments are held to account during a crisis.

There are also some important demographic effects present in these results. For instance, women tend to be more positive in their evaluations of the UK government in England and Scotland (and the devolved government in Wales). However, our analysis indicates that women are less likely to support the Conservatives in England, which suggests that such positive evaluations of the UK government are not motivated by partisan identity. As a result, the presence and motivations of such gender differences in both government support and competency evaluations require further investigation. Moreover, ethnic minorities tend to evaluate the UK government far more negatively, particularly in Scotland where the effect is similar in size to that of Conservative party identity. Such effects are not present for evaluations of the Scottish and Welsh governments and we find that ethnic minorities are also far less likely to vote for the Conservatives, so this may reflect that the Conservative Party are being blamed specifically. The measure for ethnicity is limited by sample size, which prohibits further detailed analysis here, which is required in future research.

However, it is important to acknowledge that there are some limitations with this study. First, the data was collected relatively early in the pandemic. As a result, the material effects may not be as widespread and the policy divergence was not as large. These results may change as the pandemic progresses and the material consequences become more widespread, particularly as the restrictions and economic support became increasingly regionalised. Yet, vote intention for the incumbent Conservative Party has remained rather stable throughout most of the pandemic (YouGov 2021), which does not suggest that voters are shifting from what we observe here.

Second, our measures do not distinguish between voting in Westminster and devolved elections. These issues are problematic, particularly for Labour in Wales, as voters do treat these dimensions differently. Currently, these issues are unavoidable, as this wave of the BESIP does not include such multilevel distinctions. In addition, it does not include other aspects of multilevel politics (such as evaluations of the First Minister of Wales), which may be important to explore given the multilevel nature of both the electoral system and the response to the pandemic. Exploring these points is an avenue for future research, but it would require the collection of more recent multilevel data. Third, we do not explore what happens when these identities conflict. For example, Brexit support and Conservative party identity result in more positive evaluations of the UK government and a higher propensity to vote Conservative. Yet, not all Conservative identifiers are supporters of Brexit. We lack the space for such exploration in this paper, but these interactions may have interesting consequences for how individuals respond to the pandemic.

Despite these limitations, our findings are key to understanding how the public respond to largescale crises, particularly in how they evaluate and punish/reward government performance during crises. These results do suggest that the pandemic will have electoral consequences for the incumbent parties within Britain's multilevel system. Yet, these evaluations are influenced by pre-existing identities rather than the health or economic consequences associated with the pandemic, which calls into question the extent to which these competency evaluations represent true measures of government performance. Such results are concern for democratic accountability as they suggest that government supporters may be willing to overlook their actions during a largescale crisis, thus not holding them to account for their potential failings. Similarly, government opponents may not be willing to acknowledge that a government has performed well on an action, and alter their perceptions and reward them accordingly. If these divisions persist, collaboration between state and devolved authorities may be inhibited, with the potential for this to place greater strain on the constitutional settlement of the United Kingdom.

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Supplementary Materials

Section S1: UK Government Evaluations in England

Table A1: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt lockdown evaluations in England

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	1.24***	0.62***	0.22*
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.09**	0.15***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.35***	-0.11**	-0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.04	-0.13**	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.49***	-0.39***	-0.32***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Income less than half	-0.14	-0.18	-0.16
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.00	0.07	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.21***	0.20**	0.19**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)

Table A1: Continued

Stopped work and received full pay	0.02	0.04	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.02	0.02	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.09	0.01	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.11	-0.23*	-0.22*
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.05	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.17**	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
RTI (0-1)		0.30*	0.34*
		(0.14)	(0.15)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.52***	1.09***
		(0.04)	(0.04)
I would not vote		0.77***	0.76***
		(0.09)	(0.09)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			1.14***
			(0.04)
Constant	-1.01***	-1.95***	-2.06***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Observations	23908	21681	21681
Pseudo R^2	0.029	0.108	0.147

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt PPE evaluations in England

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	0.37***	-0.18	-0.54***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.46***	-0.20***	-0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.04	-0.05	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.23**	-0.16	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Income less than half	-0.14	-0.17	-0.15
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.08	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.07	0.05	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.01	0.02	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.02	0.06	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)

Table A2: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.09	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.08	0.03	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Had severe coronavirus	0.15	0.12	0.14
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.11	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.22**	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
RTI (0-1)		0.50**	0.54**
		(0.16)	(0.17)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.45***	1.07***
		(0.05)	(0.06)
I would not vote		1.20***	1.19***
		(0.10)	(0.10)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.94***
			(0.05)
Constant	-1.31***	-2.42***	-2.51***
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	23908	21681	21681
Pseudo R^2	0.013	0.074	0.099

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt testing evaluations in England

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	-0.22*	-0.80***	-1.19***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.53***	-0.28***	-0.31***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.01	-0.10	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.25***	-0.21*	-0.15
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Income less than half	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.16	-0.17	-0.18
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.02	0.01	-0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.11	-0.11	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.06	0.14	0.18
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)

Table A3: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.29*	-0.24	-0.23
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.07	-0.09	-0.14
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.16	-0.20	-0.19
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.22**	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
RTI (0-1)		0.46**	0.50**
		(0.17)	(0.17)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.38***	0.99***
		(0.05)	(0.06)
I would not vote		1.09***	1.08***
		(0.10)	(0.10)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.99***
			(0.05)
Constant	-0.97***	-1.99***	-2.07***
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	23908	21681	21681
Pseudo R^2	0.015	0.068	0.096

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Section S2: UK Government Evaluations in Scotland

Table A4: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt lockdown evaluations in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	1.25***	0.55	0.36
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.25*	0.37**	0.42**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.08	0.06	-0.03
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.01	0.03	0.08
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.64*	-0.71*	-0.73*
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.33)
Income less than half	-0.28	-0.39	-0.25
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.01	-0.01	0.08
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.17	-0.09	-0.11
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.23)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.40	0.26	0.26
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.01	0.24	0.31
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.38)

Table A4: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.09	-0.08	0.04
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.42	0.20	0.17
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.27	-0.24	-0.32
	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Had severe coronavirus	-1.08**	-1.25**	-1.30**
	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.12	0.29	0.35
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.49	-0.54	-0.54
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.32)
RTI (0-1)		-1.96***	-1.45***
		(0.27)	(0.30)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.40***	1.12***
		(0.14)	(0.15)
I would not vote		1.65***	1.61***
		(0.30)	(0.30)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			1.01***
			(0.16)
Constant	-1.73***	-1.20***	-1.55***
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Observations	2461	2241	2241
Pseudo R^2	0.032	0.154	0.175

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt PPE evaluations in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	0.08	-0.43	-0.57
	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.47)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.12	-0.16	-0.14
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.20	0.03	-0.03
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.27	0.35	0.38
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.34	0.70*	0.71*
	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Income less than half	0.22	0.05	0.17
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.45)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.05	0.12	0.18
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.32	-0.29	-0.30
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.29)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.13	0.16	0.16
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.26	0.04	0.08
	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.40)

Table A5: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.03	0.13	0.22
	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.09	-0.38	-0.42
	(0.56)	(0.62)	(0.64)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.22	0.19	0.15
	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.35)
Had severe coronavirus	-1.23*	-1.13	-1.15
	(0.62)	(0.70)	(0.71)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.72*	-0.45	-0.41
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.34)
RTI (0-1)		-2.10***	-1.78***
		(0.33)	(0.36)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.60***	1.42***
		(0.22)	(0.24)
I would not vote		1.83***	1.80***
		(0.36)	(0.36)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.61**
			(0.19)
Constant	-1.82***	-1.66***	-1.86***
	(0.24)	(0.38)	(0.40)
Observations	2461	2241	2241
Pseudo R^2	0.017	0.152	0.159

Table A6: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt testing evaluations in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	0.01	-0.67	-0.89
	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.09	0.10	0.13
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.41**	-0.33	-0.42*
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.00	0.08	0.14
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.21)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.11	0.10	0.12
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Income less than half	0.16	0.10	0.28
	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.46)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.06	0.13	0.22
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.41	-0.30	-0.31
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.31)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.18	0.21	0.22
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.16	0.40	0.47
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.19	-0.16	-0.04
	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.42)

Table A6: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.27	0.17	0.12
	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.55)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.66*	-0.59	-0.66*
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.74	-0.70	-0.72
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.34	-0.11	-0.05
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.31	-0.15	-0.14
	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.38)
RTI (0-1)		-1.25***	-0.72*
		(0.31)	(0.36)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.32***	1.05***
		(0.20)	(0.22)
I would not vote		0.87*	0.82*
		(0.39)	(0.39)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.98***
			(0.21)
Constant	-1.64***	-1.50***	-1.86***
	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.40)
Observations	2461	2241	2241
Pseudo R^2	0.021	0.093	0.112

Section S3: UK Government Evaluations in Wales

Table A7: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt lockdown evaluations in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	1.18***	0.39	0.22
	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.14	0.20	0.25
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.28*	-0.15	-0.20
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.12	-0.04	0.08
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.19)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.90**	-0.64	-0.62
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Income less than half	0.19	0.04	0.13
	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.08	0.20	0.22
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.19	-0.00	0.08
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.22)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.57*	0.68*	0.60*
	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.41	-0.38	-0.17
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.46)

Table A7: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.11	0.37	0.41
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.18	-0.68	-0.64
	(0.42)	(0.61)	(0.63)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.35	-0.36	-0.34
	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.26	-0.14	-0.15
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.15	-0.38	-0.44
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.14	0.27	0.24
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.36***	1.05***
		(0.17)	(0.18)
I would not vote		0.81**	0.75*
		(0.30)	(0.30)
RTI (0-1)		-1.50***	-1.24***
		(0.35)	(0.35)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.95***
			(0.18)
Constant	-1.33***	-1.21**	-1.41***
	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Observations	1629	1502	1502
Pseudo R^2	0.033	0.119	0.142

Table A8: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt PPE evaluations in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	-0.37	-1.17*	-1.33**
	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.17	-0.17	-0.14
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.45*	-0.23	-0.28
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.08	-0.12	-0.02
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.03	0.26	0.28
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Income less than half	0.93*	0.64	0.73
	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.23	0.19	0.21
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.44)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.23	0.19	0.28
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.72**	0.79**	0.71**
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.97	-0.93	-0.70
	(0.76)	(0.79)	(0.79)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.69	-0.56	-0.55
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)

Table A8: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.25	-0.94	-0.94
	(0.50)	(0.68)	(0.69)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.31	0.58	0.62
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.40	-0.30	-0.32
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.40)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.17	-0.49	-0.52
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.20	-0.03	-0.09
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.34)
RTI (0-1)		-1.62***	-1.41***
		(0.41)	(0.43)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.55***	1.27***
		(0.23)	(0.24)
I would not vote		1.44***	1.39***
		(0.34)	(0.35)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.81***
			(0.21)
Constant	-1.06***	-1.15*	-1.30**
	(0.31)	(0.46)	(0.47)
Observations	1629	1502	1502
Pseudo R^2	0.034	0.130	0.146

Table A9: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt testing evaluations in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	0.04	-0.60	-0.70
	(0.49)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.13	0.16	0.18
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.39*	-0.13	-0.17
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.04	0.03	0.09
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.44	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.48)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Income less than half	0.38	0.11	0.17
	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.58)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.36	0.67	0.68
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.27	0.14	0.20
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.31)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.79**	0.88**	0.83*
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.38	-0.62	-0.48
	(0.64)	(0.79)	(0.80)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.41	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.42)

Table A9: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.84	-1.63	-1.61
	(0.64)	(1.09)	(1.10)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.37	0.64	0.66
	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.02	0.07	0.08
	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.01	-0.26	-0.28
	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.46	-0.28	-0.32
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.37)
RTI (0-1)		-1.13**	-0.98*
		(0.42)	(0.43)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		1.75***	1.57***
		(0.23)	(0.25)
I would not vote		1.35***	1.31***
		(0.37)	(0.38)
Not a Conservative identifier			0.00
			(.)
Conservative identifier			0.53*
			(0.22)
Constant	-1.65***	-2.21***	-2.32***
	(0.34)	(0.47)	(0.46)
Observations	1629	1502	1502
Pseudo R^2	0.023	0.118	0.125

Section S4: Scottish Government Evaluations in Scotland

Table A10: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Scottish Govt lockdown evaluations in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	-0.22	0.14	0.16
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.21*	0.15	0.14
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	0.13	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.01	0.02	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.24	0.22	0.12
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.26)
Income less than half	-0.16	-0.15	-0.16
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.30)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.15	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.27	0.28	0.29
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.37	0.33	0.27
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.32)

Table A10: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.30	0.16	0.15
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.09	0.17	0.11
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.15	-0.18	-0.16
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.07	0.01	-0.04
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.02	0.05	0.01
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
RTI (0-1)		0.82***	-0.05
		(0.23)	(0.26)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		-0.84***	-0.72***
		(0.13)	(0.13)
I would not vote		-1.11***	-0.79**
		(0.30)	(0.29)
Not a SNP identifier			0.00
			(.)
SNP identifier			1.11***
			(0.15)
Constant	0.35	0.20	0.34
	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Observations	2461	2241	2241
Pseudo R^2	0.007	0.050	0.081

Table A11: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Scottish Govt PPE evaluations in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	-0.59*	0.03	0.04
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.21	0.15	0.14
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.14	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.05	0.15	0.11
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.57**	0.53*	0.46*
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Income less than half	0.06	0.10	0.11
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.13	-0.04	-0.09
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.17	-0.09	-0.10
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.06	0.15	0.15
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.30)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.03	-0.03	-0.10
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.27)

Table A11: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.37	0.44	0.38
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.07	-0.07	-0.02
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.29)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.05	0.05	0.01
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.03	0.13	0.11
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)
RTI (0-1)		1.12***	0.29
		(0.25)	(0.27)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		-0.33*	-0.20
		(0.13)	(0.13)
I would not vote		-0.52	-0.19
		(0.31)	(0.29)
Not a SNP identifier			0.00
			(.)
SNP identifier			0.94***
			(0.14)
Constant	-0.44*	-1.34***	-1.22***
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Observations	2461	2241	2241
Pseudo R^2	0.012	0.031	0.056

Table A12: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Scottish Govt testing evaluations in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	-1.32***	-0.92**	-0.94**
	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.34**	0.30*	0.29*
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.12	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.09	-0.05	-0.09
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.08	-0.15	-0.24
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Income less than half	-0.13	-0.15	-0.15
	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.24	-0.17	-0.21
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.21	-0.18	-0.19
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.06	-0.03	-0.09
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.10	-0.35	-0.36
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.28)

Table A12: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.41	0.38	0.32
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.23	-0.16	-0.12
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Had severe coronavirus	0.01	0.01	0.04
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.08	0.12	0.09
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.04	0.11	0.09
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
RTI (0-1)		0.99***	0.28
		(0.26)	(0.28)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		-0.28*	-0.17
		(0.14)	(0.14)
I would not vote		-0.20	0.08
		(0.30)	(0.30)
Not a SNP identifier			0.00
			(.)
SNP identifier			0.80***
			(0.14)
Constant	-0.29	-0.97**	-0.85**
	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Observations	2461	2241	2241
Pseudo R^2	0.021	0.033	0.051

Section S5: Welsh Government Evaluations in Wales

Table A13: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Welsh Govt testing evaluations in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	0.83**	1.08**	1.08**
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.50***	0.44**	0.43**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.23	-0.35*	-0.35*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.09	0.09	0.09
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.52	-0.41	-0.41
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Income less than half	-0.43	-0.22	-0.19
	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.22	0.46	0.47
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.13	0.25	0.25
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	-0.15	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.27	0.15	0.15
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)

Table A13: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.11	-0.35	-0.36
	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.12	-0.41	-0.43
	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.03	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Had severe coronavirus	0.30	0.19	0.15
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.13	0.15	0.14
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)
RTI (0-1)		0.46	0.44
		(0.29)	(0.29)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		-0.58***	-0.51***
		(0.15)	(0.15)
I would not vote		-0.97***	-0.89**
		(0.28)	(0.28)
Not a Labour identifier			0.00
			(.)
Labour identifier			0.23
			(0.14)
Constant	-0.27	-0.18	-0.27
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Observations	1629	1502	1502
Pseudo R^2	0.028	0.045	0.047

Table A14: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Welsh Govt PPE evaluations in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Wal_ppe_well			
Age (0-1)	-0.64*	-0.67	-0.66
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.29*	0.24	0.25
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.35**	-0.40**	-0.40**
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.06	0.24	0.24
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Income less than half	0.32	0.31	0.30
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.69*	-0.45	-0.46
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.05	0.15	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.27	0.38	0.38
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.27	-0.22	-0.22
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.38)

Table A14: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.32	-0.50	-0.50
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.06	-0.25	-0.24
	(0.38)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.09	0.09	0.08
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.08	-0.14	-0.13
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.26	0.22	0.22
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
RTI (0-1)		-0.71*	-0.70*
		(0.29)	(0.28)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		-0.12	-0.14
		(0.15)	(0.16)
I would not vote		-0.14	-0.17
		(0.28)	(0.28)
Not a Labour identifier			0.00
			(.)
Labour identifier			-0.08
			(0.15)
Constant	-0.25	0.18	0.21
	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Observations	1629	1502	1502
Pseudo R^2	0.023	0.027	0.027

Table A15: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Welsh Govt PPE evaluations in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Brexit and RTI	Model (3) + Party identity
Age (0-1)	-0.99**	-0.91*	-0.90*
	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.35*	0.37*	0.38*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.47**	-0.47**	-0.48**
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.23	0.17	0.17
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.11	0.15	0.15
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Income less than half	0.36	0.33	0.32
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.11	0.09	0.08
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.26	0.32	0.32
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.25	0.31	0.31
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.12	0.09	0.09
	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.16	-0.26	-0.26
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)

Table A15: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.24	-0.80	-0.78
	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.35	0.40	0.39
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Had severe coronavirus	0.12	0.07	0.09
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.23	0.21	0.21
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.04	0.04	0.03
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
RTI (0-1)		-0.41	-0.40
		(0.31)	(0.31)
Rejoin the EU		0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU		-0.03	-0.07
		(0.17)	(0.17)
I would not vote		0.51	0.48
		(0.30)	(0.30)
Not a Labour identifier			0.00
			(.)
Labour identifier			-0.11
			(0.16)
Constant	-0.67**	-0.58	-0.53
	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Observations	1629	1502	1502
Pseudo R^2	0.034	0.043	0.043

Section S6: Predicting propensity to vote for Conservatives (in England)

Table A16: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Conservative PTV in England

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Evaluations	Model (3) +Brexit and RTI	Model (4) +Party identity
Age (0-1)	4.71***	3.40***	1.30***	0.09
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.14*	-0.19***	-0.03	-0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.85***	-0.55***	-0.05	-0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.70***	-0.62***	-0.68***	-0.26***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-1.24***	-0.86***	-0.32***	-0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Income less than half	-0.34*	-0.31*	-0.27*	-0.18
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.20	-0.23	-0.11	-0.12
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.38**	0.19	0.10	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.07	-0.11	-0.14	-0.02
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.13	-0.14	-0.16	-0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.05	0.07	-0.05	0.01
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.13)

Table A16: Continued

Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.67***	0.60***	0.31***	0.15*
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.17	-0.08	-0.36**	-0.33**
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.16	-0.16	-0.15	-0.14*
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.41***	-0.32***	-0.18*	-0.11
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
UK_lockdown_well=0		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)	(.)
UK_lockdown_well=1		3.95***	2.86***	1.79***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Rejoin the EU			0.00	0.00
			(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU			3.94***	2.30***
			(0.06)	(0.06)
I would not vote			0.07	-0.04
			(0.14)	(0.12)
RTI (0-1)			-0.04	0.04
			(0.21)	(0.17)
Not a Conservative identifier				0.00
				(.)
Conservative identifier				4.52***
				(0.06)
Constant	3.46***	2.53***	1.55***	1.42***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Observations	22184	22184	20514	20514
R^2	0.1070	0.2995	0.4814	0.6711

Section S7: Predicting propensity to vote for Conservatives (in Scotland)

Table A17: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Conservative PTV in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Evaluations	Model (3) +Brexit and RTI	Model (4) +Party identity
Age (0-1)	3.01***	2.09***	-0.14	-0.61*
	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.27)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.49**	-0.61***	-0.32*	-0.16
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.10)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	0.07	0.13	0.25	0.00
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.40	-0.39	-0.31	-0.09
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.13)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-1.09***	-0.66**	-0.29	-0.35*
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.18)
Income less than half	-0.51	-0.27	-0.48	-0.01
	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.04	-0.01	-0.32	-0.03
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.26)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.04	0.14	-0.04	-0.14
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.15)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.28	0.06	0.02	-0.00
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.20)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.62	-0.62	-0.31	0.03
	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.29)

Table A17: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.84** (0.32)	-0.74*(0.34)	-0.55(0.29)	-0.02(0.25)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.34	-0.58	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.38)	(0.26)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.38	0.53	0.51*	0.24
	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.17)
Had severe coronavirus	0.05	0.49	0.42	0.19
	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.12	-0.26	-0.15	0.05
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.29	-0.07	-0.43	-0.30*
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.15)
UK_lockdown_well=0		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)	(.)
UK_lockdown_well=1		3.89***	2.33***	1.38***
		(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.17)
Rejoin the EU			0.00	0.00
			(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU			2.89***	1.45***
			(0.21)	(0.16)
I would not vote			-0.63	-0.64**
			(0.34)	(0.21)
RTI (0-1)			-4.23***	-2.01***
			(0.32)	(0.25)
Not a Conservative identifier				0.00
				(.)
Conservative identifier				5.75***
				(0.19)
Constant	1.79***	1.25***	4.00***	2.36***
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.29)
Observations	2329	2329	2161	2161
R^2	0.0564	0.2411	0.4583	0.7085

Section S8: Predicting propensity to vote for Conservatives (in Wales)

Table A18: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Conservative PTV in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Evaluations	Model (3) +Brexit and RTI	Model (4) +Party identity
Age (0-1)	3.55***	2.32***	0.60	0.12
	(0.73)	(0.67)	(0.53)	(0.37)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.49*	-0.57*	-0.23	-0.10
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.15)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.35	-0.18	0.29	0.17
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.15)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-1.00**	-0.87**	-0.90***	-0.41*
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.18)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-1.43**	-0.88*	-0.55	-0.52
	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.32)	(0.27)
Income less than half	0.44	0.18	-0.44	0.05
	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.43)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.36	0.24	-0.12	0.01
	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.42)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.09	-0.08	-0.54	-0.14
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.23)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.53	0.04	0.01	-0.31
	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.21)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-1.26	-1.11*	-1.14**	-0.22
	(0.67)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.49)

Table A18: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.55(0.45)	-0.63(0.47)	0.09(0.48)	0.20(0.40)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-1.28*	-1.07*	-0.81	-0.77
	(0.61)	(0.54)	(0.64)	(0.42)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.29	-0.13	0.34	0.50
	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.31)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.53	-0.44	-0.44	-0.45
	(0.54)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.39)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.59	0.63	0.16	-0.10
	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.27)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.37	-0.62*	-0.12	-0.25
	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.22)
UK_lockdown_well=0		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)	(.)
UK_lockdown_well=1		4.04***	2.61***	1.73***
		(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Rejoin the EU			0.00	0.00
			(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU			3.78***	2.29***
			(0.25)	(0.20)
I would not vote			0.32	0.16
			(0.39)	(0.30)
RTI (0-1)			-2.36***	-1.02**
			(0.42)	(0.33)
Not a Conservative identifier				0.00
				(.)
Conservative identifier				5.01***
				(0.21)
Constant	2.90***	2.28***	2.45***	1.47***
	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.32)
Observations	1496	1496	1407	1407
R^2	0.0765	0.2719	0.4807	0.6907

Section S9: Predicting propensity to vote for SNP

Table A19: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for SNP PTV in Scotland

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Evaluations	Model (3) +Brexit and RTI	Model (4) +Party identity
Age (0-1)	-3.73***	-3.51***	-0.99*	-0.84*
	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.39)	(0.33)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.51*	0.27	0.20	0.07
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	0.10	0.04	-0.16	-0.06
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.01	-0.04	0.04	-0.19
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.17)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	1.16**	0.98**	0.67*	0.34
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.26)
Income less than half	0.76	0.91*	0.89	0.88*
	(0.51)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.37)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.05	0.19	0.47	0.30
	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.29)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.17	0.17	0.31	0.24
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.21)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.09	-0.06	0.26	0.29
	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.27)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.99*	0.71	0.05	-0.17
	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.36)	(0.29)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.15	-0.02	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.38)	(0.32)

Table A19: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.45	-0.44	-0.14	-0.35
	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.46)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.03	0.05	0.08	0.29
	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.34)	(0.37)
Had severe coronavirus	0.28	0.27	0.15	0.17
	(0.58)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.46)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.52	0.48	0.30	0.16
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.13	0.14	0.29	0.24
	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.23)
Scot_lockdown_well=0		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Scot_lockdown_well=1		3.24***	2.15***	1.45***
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Rejoin the EU			0.00	0.00
			(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU			-2.18***	-1.79***
			(0.20)	(0.16)
I would not vote			-3.07***	-1.89***
			(0.54)	(0.51)
RTI (0-1)			7.19***	3.62***
			(0.33)	(0.38)
Not a SNP identifier				0.00
				(.)
SNP identifier				4.21***
				(0.18)
Constant	6.34***	4.42***	0.69	1.62***
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.33)
Observations	2348	2348	2171	2171
R^2	0.0617	0.2010	0.4825	0.6395

Section S10: Predicting propensity to vote for Labour (in Wales)

Table A20: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Labour PTV in Wales

	Model (1) Demographics & Material	Model (2) +Evaluations	Model (3) +Brexit and RTI	Model (4) +Party identity
Age (0-1)	-3.40***	-3.73***	-2.04***	-2.01***
	(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.50)	(0.45)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.75**	0.55*	0.28	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.16)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	0.70**	0.78***	-0.16	-0.09
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.17)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.54	-0.56*	-0.31	-0.42*
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.19)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.32	-0.04	-0.62	-0.67
	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.46)	(0.35)
Income less than half	-1.39	-1.29	-0.32	0.21
	(0.75)	(0.69)	(0.49)	(0.45)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.29	-0.42	-0.12	0.06
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.35)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.31	-0.34	-0.03	0.06
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.25)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.25	0.30	0.46	0.32
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.29)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	1.19*	0.93	1.01	0.83*
	(0.54)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.41)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.39	0.48	-0.04	-0.38
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.29)

Table A20: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	1.82*	1.85**	1.78*	1.31*
	(0.72)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.60)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.52	-0.60	-0.98*	-0.77*
	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.32)
Had severe coronavirus	0.70	0.54	0.49	-0.02
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.50)	(0.40)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	0.13	0.15	0.63	0.46
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.32)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.34	0.29	0.05	0.30
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.30)
Wal_lockdown_well=0		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(.)	(.)	(.)
Wal_lockdown_well=1		1.57***	0.89***	0.70***
		(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.18)
Rejoin the EU			0.00	0.00
			(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU			-4.06***	-2.64***
			(0.23)	(0.21)
I would not vote			-4.13***	-2.77***
			(0.48)	(0.39)
RTI (0-1)			1.00*	0.54
			(0.48)	(0.42)
Not a Labour identifier				0.00
				(.)
Labour identifier				4.33***
				(0.18)
Constant	5.85***	5.18***	6.97***	5.20***
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.38)
Observations	1493	1493	1402	1402
R^2	0.0778	0.1155	0.3624	0.5929

Section S10: Predicting propensity to vote for Conservatives (in England's regions)

Table A21: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Conservative PTV in North East, North West, and Yorkshire & the Humber

	Full Model North East	Full Model North West	Full Model Yorkshire & the Humber
Age (0-1)	-0.12	0.10	-0.30
	(0.46)	(0.27)	(0.33)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.45*	-0.07	-0.10
	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.12)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.13	-0.05	-0.09
	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.32	-0.48**	-0.18
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.16)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.58	-0.08	-0.36
	(0.40)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Income less than half	-0.31	0.20	-0.29
	(0.54)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.44	-0.23	-0.03
	(0.40)	(0.23)	(0.29)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.07	-0.08	0.04
	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.17)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.25	-0.52	0.07
	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.28)

Table A21: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.15	-0.35	-0.08
	(0.44)	(0.24)	(0.28)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.20	0.12	0.28
	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.42)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.26	0.43*	0.00
	(0.31)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.55	-0.41	-0.21
	(0.63)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.07	-0.07	-0.47**
	(0.31)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.09	-0.17	-0.29
	(0.35)	(0.17)	(0.19)
UK_lockdown_well=0	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
UK_lockdown_well=1	2.19***	2.33***	1.85***
	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Not a Conservative identifier	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Conservative identifier	4.47***	4.44***	4.53***
	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Rejoin the EU	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU	2.10***	2.10***	2.33***
	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.18)
I would not vote	-0.29	0.14	-0.39
	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.37)
RTI (0-1)	-0.70	0.82	0.32
	(0.78)	(0.46)	(0.66)
Constant	2.02***	0.85**	1.36***
	(0.50)	(0.28)	(0.37)
Observations	1006	2595	2215
R^2	0.6373	0.6627	0.6621

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A22: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Conservative PTV in East Midlands, West Midlands, and the East of England

	Full Model East Midlands	Full Model West Midlands	Full Model East of England
Age (0-1)	0.34	0.99***	-0.02
	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.11	0.02	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.37**	-0.04	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	-0.13	-0.50***	-0.20
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.09	-0.30	-0.05
	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Income less than half	-0.12	-0.53	-0.48
	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.66*	-0.30	0.02
	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.23)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.03	-0.15	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.45	-0.23	0.40*
	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.17)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.18	0.29	-0.18
	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.47)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.04	0.29	-0.17
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.23)

Table A22: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.72	0.37	0.08
	(0.73)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.30	0.20	-0.32
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.81	-0.28	-0.52
	(0.58)	(0.38)	(0.31)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.55*	0.11	0.23
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	0.20	-0.12	-0.08
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)
UK_lockdown_well=0	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
UK_lockdown_well=1	1.56***	1.79***	1.47***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Not a Conservative identifier	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Conservative identifier	4.13***	4.11***	4.40***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Rejoin the EU	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU	2.61***	2.54***	2.43***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)
I would not vote	-0.25	0.25	-0.29
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.29)
RTI (0-1)	-0.62	-0.32	-0.10
	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.46)
Constant	1.94***	1.30***	1.57***
	(0.37)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Observations	1925	1896	2342
R^2	0.6759	0.6748	0.6594

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A23: Regression coefficients (and standard errors) for Conservative PTV in London, South East, and South West

	Full Model London	Full Model South East	Full Model South West
Age (0-1)	-0.69*	0.03	0.47
	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.28)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.19	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.20	-0.07	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.03	-0.31*	-0.23
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.14)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.02	-0.40*	-0.32
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Income less than half	0.38	-0.28	-0.40
	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.29)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.44	-0.11	-0.24
	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.23)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.03	-0.12	0.13
	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.15)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	-0.34	0.18	0.19
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.07	0.03	0.20
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	-0.48	-0.05	0.26
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.28)

Table A23: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	-0.13	0.01	-0.06
	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.17	0.23	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Had severe coronavirus	0.02	-0.30	-0.07
	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.29)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.24	-0.07	-0.20
	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.23	-0.01	-0.43*
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.20)
UK_lockdown_well=0	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
UK_lockdown_well=1	2.04***	1.60***	1.61***
	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Not a Conservative identifier	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Conservative identifier	4.95***	4.65***	4.53***
	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Rejoin the EU	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU	2.08***	2.24***	2.30***
	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.17)
I would not vote	0.39	-0.12	-0.17
	(0.41)	(0.26)	(0.29)
RTI (0-1)	0.09	0.07	0.38
	(0.45)	(0.37)	(0.57)
Constant	1.60***	1.53***	1.09***
	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.29)
Observations	2467	3504	2556
R^2	0.6629	0.6854	0.6837

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Section S11: UK government lockdown evaluations in England's regions

Table A24: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for lockdown in North East, North West, and Yorkshire & the Humber

	Full Model North East	Full Model North West	Full Model Yorkshire & the Humber
Age (0-1)	0.11	-0.07	0.30
	(0.47)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.07	0.07	0.39***
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.11)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.37*	-0.15	-0.17
	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.11	0.00	-0.36*
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.14)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	0.09	0.34	-0.77**
	(0.47)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Income less than half	-0.09	0.12	-0.95*
	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.38)
Income decreased between quarter and half	0.06	-0.03	0.13
	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.11	0.12	-0.02
	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.17)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.25	0.01	0.18
	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	-0.37	0.01	-0.03
	(0.45)	(0.27)	(0.28)

Table A24: Continued

Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.50	0.08	-0.37
	(0.47)	(0.23)	(0.26)
Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.48	-0.06	-0.41
	(0.42)	(0.32)	(0.43)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.12	0.04	0.24
	(0.30)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.46	-0.31	0.33
	(0.64)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.19	0.12	0.01
	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.17	-0.04	-0.10
	(0.35)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Not a Conservative identifier	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Conservative identifier	1.34***	1.43***	1.02***
	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.13)
RTI (0-1)	-0.11	0.46	-0.65
	(0.64)	(0.45)	(0.49)
Rejoin the EU	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU	0.66**	0.98***	1.49***
	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.14)
I would not vote	0.25	0.42	1.09***
	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.25)
Constant	-1.38**	-2.14***	-1.74***
	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.34)
Observations	1070	2747	2329
Pseudo R^2	0.117	0.147	0.176

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A25: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for UK Govt lockdown in East Midlands, West Midlands, and the East of England

	Full Model East Midlands	Full Model West Midlands	Full Model East of England
Age (0-1)	-0.11	0.14	0.30
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.27)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.03	0.19	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.13	0.08	-0.03
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.28	-0.16	-0.15
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.27	-0.11	-0.69**
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Income less than half	-0.08	-0.21	0.34
	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.06	-0.01	-0.20
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.23)
Income decreased less than quarter	0.07	-0.10	0.13
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.28	0.54*	0.01
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.19)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.32	0.54	-0.12
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.42	0.25	-0.60*
	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.26)

Table A25: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	1.11*	0.09	-0.65*
	(0.44)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	-0.11	-0.20	-0.03
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.66*	-0.33	0.05
	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.36)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.23	-0.04	0.05
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.14	0.19	-0.04
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Not a Conservative identifier	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Conservative identifier	1.33***	0.99***	1.01***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)
RTI (0-1)	0.21	0.07	0.63
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.41)
Rejoin the EU	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU	1.08***	1.35***	1.15***
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)
I would not vote	0.78**	0.88**	1.01***
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)
Constant	-1.87***	-2.04***	-1.98***
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.26)
Observations	2050	2008	2482
Pseudo R^2	0.159	0.145	0.144

Table A26: Logistic regression coefficients (and standard errors) for lockdown in London, South East, and South West

	Full Model London	Full Model South East	Full Model South West
Age (0-1)	0.36	0.30	0.47
	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	0.28*	0.18*	0.09
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)
A-Level or lower	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undergraduate or higher	-0.03	-0.09	-0.28**
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Social Grade ABC	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Social Grade DE	0.14	0.20	-0.08
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.13)
White British	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Not White British	-0.29*	-0.03	-0.38
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Income less than half	-0.75*	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.30)
Income decreased between quarter and half	-0.05	0.06	-0.10
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.23)
Income decreased less than quarter	-0.11	0.15	0.11
	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.14)
It hasn't changed	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	0.30	0.23	0.05
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Not stopped work/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stopped work and received full pay	0.34	-0.39	0.26
	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.29)
Stopped work and recieved some pay	0.33	-0.03	0.12
	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.23)

Table A26: Continued

Stopped work and did not receive any pay	0.20	-0.42	0.12
	(0.36)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Not had coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Had mild coronavirus	0.18	-0.25	-0.15
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Had severe coronavirus	-0.13	-0.18	-0.60*
	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.29)
Do not know someone with coronavirus/Don't know	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Know someone who had mild coronavirus	-0.18	0.03	0.28
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Know someone who had severe coronavirus	-0.36	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Not a Conservative identifier	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Conservative identifier	1.01***	1.18***	1.18***
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)
RTI (0-1)	0.15	1.15**	0.15
	(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.46)
Rejoin the EU	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Stay out of the EU	1.27***	0.89***	0.97***
	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.12)
I would not vote	0.82**	0.85***	0.64*
	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Constant	-2.43***	-2.50***	-1.92***
	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.26)
Observations	2599	3699	2689
Pseudo R^2	0.164	0.138	0.148