Religion and American Populism:

The View from the 2020 American National Election Study

James L. Guth

Furman University
Greenville SC 29613
jim.guth@furman.edu

Lyman A. Kellstedt
Wheaton College, Illinois (emeritus)
lyman.kellstedt@gmail.com

Abstract

Although the rise of right-wing populism in Western democracies has received enormous attention from social scientists, there has been much less research directed at the role of religion in creating support for populist movements. In this paper, we consider the influence of religious factors in the development of conservative populism in the United States. We find that ethnoreligious traditions have very different responses to populist themes, with Evangelical Protestants quite supportive of most populist attitudes and atheists and agnostics spearheading the opposition. Many, but not all, of these differences are explained by theological traditionalism, with the religiously orthodox in almost all ethnoreligious groups more prone to take populist stances.

Introduction

In recent years, the rise of conservative populism has attracted enormous attention from students of comparative politics. Although American scholars were slow to assess populist tendencies at home (Lee 2019), recent presidential elections have ended that neglect, as Donald Trump exploited typical populist anxieties, mimicked the style of populist leaders across the developed world, and was soon emulated by many other Republican politicians.

Despite a rapidly expanding literature, however, explanations for this American populism have failed to "converge" (Norris 2020). Most theories about populism's causes fall into two distinct categories, focusing on either *cultural resentment* or *economic stress*, although some scholars have sought to connect the two (Rodrik 2020). Each view has distinguished proponents, but cultural interpretations have dominated accounts of European and American populism on the political right, dubbed "right-wing populism" (Kaufmann 2019), "authoritarian populism" (Norris and Inglehart 2019), "national populism" (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018)—or our own preference, "conservative populism" (Guth 2019). And in the Western political context, at least, such parties constitute a large majority of all "populist" parties.

Despite the emphasis on culture, relatively little attention has been paid to religion. Cultural explanations do often entail cursory discussions on the topic, albeit in different ways. Scholars in Western Europe have noted a recent turn toward religious discourse by conservative populist movements, but usually as culture or identity markers against outsiders—especially Muslims—rather than as reassertions of active faith (Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016). In fact, such European populists tend to be *less* traditionally religious than constituents of other parties (Guth and Nelsen 2021). Other analysts do see some connection between conventional religiosity and conservative populism, especially in Eastern Europe and the US, mediated by

religion's strong ties to social traditionalism, at least a minor feature of these movements (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 446-447). But few studies address conservative populism's attraction for different ethnoreligious groups. This question may be irrelevant in Europe, where secularization has eroded any influence of what was often a single national religious tradition (see Norris and Inglehart 2019), but the varying appeals of populism may be crucial in the United States, with its persisting religious vitality and significantly greater religious diversity.

In previous work on the 2016 American presidential election, we found distinctive religious contributions to the "Populist Syndrome," an attitudinal complex comprising support for strong leaders, "rough politics," nativism, white nationalism, and other populist themes (Guth 2019). All these emphases echoed strongly among white Evangelical Protestants, the largest religious constituency in Trump's 2016 electoral coalition (Kellstedt and Guth 2019) and, subsequently, his most steadfast supporters. Our findings confirmed Bonikowski' s claim that Evangelicals were "ardent" populists and "central" to any analysis of Trumpist populism (2019, 119). In addition, we showed that orthodox religiosity also supported populist attitudes, even beyond the Evangelical community. Conversely, ethnoreligious minorities and the growing cohort of secular citizens, especially atheists and agnostics, were arrayed on the anti-populist ramparts, with other religious communities distributed along a continuum, less strongly committed on either side.

Our present purpose is quite simple: to revisit the "religious" location of American conservative populism after four years of the Trump administration. During that period, religious appeals were a prominent feature of the Republican political strategy, as the notoriously non-religious president surpassed even his GOP predecessors in cultivating religious conservatives. Other religious groups (and secularist organizations) mobilized to oppose administration

4

policies. As a result, we expect that the Populist Syndrome has persisted, but think that four years of populist leadership in Washington might well have changed some of its features, suggesting possible fluidity in key attitudes.

The analysis proceeds as follows: First, we provide a brief overview of prominent themes in the literature on conservative populism, focusing on its "cultural" side. Then, using the American National Election Study of 2020, we derive empirical measures tapping those themes and examine the religious connections with each dimension of populist politics, assessing the effects of membership in ethnoreligious traditions and the influence of other religious variables. Then, we test whether the traits attributed to conservative populists "hang together," confirming that a Populist Syndrome still exists, but with some interesting modifications since 2016. Finally, we then assess the interaction of religious, socioeconomic and political factors on the syndrome and speculate about the future of "religious" populism.

Theory: Populist Themes

Although efforts to confirm or reconcile competing theories about the origins of conservative populism continue (Rodrik 2020), we bypass these controversies by focusing on universally acknowledged themes of conservative populist rhetoric and ideology (cf. Weyland and Madrid 2019). Despite significant disputes over conservative populism's origins, a broad consensus exists on certain characteristic attitudes and traits. In previous work, we examined many aspects of populist style and politics in great detail, but those traits coalesce in larger configurations, combined both in theory and empirically. In the next few paragraphs we delineate those configurations.

Many theorists argue that populism is a "thin" ideology stressing a few central themes on the nature of the political system (Mudde 2007). The crucial one might be summarized as

"majoritarian anti-pluralism." Populists see the remedy for national and personal ills in a return to rule by "the [true] people," even if that means excluding minorities from the political process—or perhaps from the nation itself. This populist revival requires a strong leader to take unconventional, unconstitutional or even illegal action to restore national greatness. Thus, populism has "inherent tendencies toward authoritarianism" (Weyland 2020, 391). "Thin populism" rejects both pluralism and procedural safeguards in favor of majoritarian popular sovereignty, expressed through a charismatic leader (Norris 2020, 6). We summarize this package as *majoritarian rough politics.*

Other "thin" traits involve antagonism toward traditional political elites and other cultural authorities. First of all, populists distrust politicians and share a sense of national decline, feeling that both their country and its citizens have seen better days. The nation has been betrayed by political leaders and institutions, explaining both its declining fortunes—and the faltering prospects of its citizens. Economic opportunity is gone and populists often see themselves as victims of economic globalization and other international forces beyond their control. Not only do they lack confidence in conventional political leaders, but they also distrust specialized expertise, preferring to rely on the superior judgment of ordinary people, rather than that of scientists, journalists or bureaucratic professionals. Here we consider three additional attitudinal structures: *distrust of politicians, declinism,* and *distrust of experts.*

All these "thin" perspectives are shared by populists left and right, but conservative populists add specific "second-order" themes to their worldview, themes more directly related to public policies. One universal component is the reassertion of national identity. Indeed, as Jan-Werner Müller puts it, "populism is always a form of identity politics" (2016, 3). At one level, this reassertion usually entails the rejection of limits to national sovereignty posed by multilateral

commitments, whether in the form of the European Union, the UN, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, or NATO. National identity politics also valorizes "traditional" or majority ethnic culture and norms, sometimes including historic religious traditions, against "newer" or minority entrants to the society, often giving rise to anti-immigrant sentiments, nativism, preference for white ethnic power, and (in both Europe and America), anti-Muslim sentiment (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Kaufmann 2019; Jardina 2019; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018). In the American case, Theda Skocpol sees "ethno-nationalism" and "Christian conservatism" as the twin pillars of Trump's populist appeal (2020, 17). Whitehead and Perry (2020) combine these pillars in "Christian nationalism," for them a distinct movement but better viewed as one component of American conservative populism. We call this American variant of national identity politics *white nationalism.*

As populism is always a "moralistic interpretation of politics" (Müller 2016, 19), other cultural accounts posit the reassertion of traditional morality as a key feature. Even those who see populism as a rejection of globalization or neo-liberal economics concede that this reaction is often expressed as moral traditionalism, sexual chauvinism, anti-feminism or demands for law and order (Rodrik 2020). Capturing these tendencies in a broader framework, Ronald Inglehart argues that conservative populists reject new *postmaterialist* values in favor of older *materialist* ones (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Or in Hooghe and Marks' (2008) formulation, populists oppose "green-alternative-libertarian" values in favor of "traditional-authoritarian" ones. Whatever the terminology, conservative populists are uncomfortable with new moral frameworks and their advocates, lamenting the legalization of abortion, gay marriage and LGBTQ+ rights, and rejecting new gender roles (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2019; Guth and Nelsen 2021). Thus, American conservative populists should score highly on *social traditionalism.*

7

A final value dimension that may draw on nationalist and traditionalist sentiments but can also feed off economic stress is *welfare chauvinism* (Kros and Coenders 2019). Ennser-Jedenastik (2017, 293) sees this as "an important element in the agenda of the populist radical right" everywhere. Welfare chauvinists want public benefits confined to "worthy" members of society—primarily "hard-working" native citizens—and denied to "lazy" and "unworthy" immigrants, aliens, or minority groups. Such attitudes fester when ethnic and cultural diversity increases in a society (Van der Meer and Reeskens 2021), and often become racialized (Harell, Soroka and Ladner 2014). Although American analysts have not usually employed this term, they have often described the same phenomenon in public opinion (Edsall 2014).

Although scholars debate the relative weight of these "cultural" dimensions, most would concede that they all play some role in fostering conservative populism. We find that these dimensions are tightly knit in a broader populist syndrome, although one with some interesting modifications since 2016. Despite these changes, religious variables still make a distinctive contribution to our understanding of American conservative populism.

Theory: Religion

In examining religion, our concepts are drawn from the insights of two theoretical frameworks. The first is *ethnocultural* theory, used primarily by historians, who contend that competing ethnoreligious groups have constituted the building blocks of American political party coalitions (for a review and summary, see Swierenga 2009). Thus, the older British and Western European Protestant traditions have usually been the core of the GOP, and ethnoreligious minorities, such as Catholics, Jews and Black Protestants have preferred the Democrats. A more recent competing perspective is the *religious restructuring* or *culture wars* theory, drawn from the sociology of religion, which posits that most ethnoreligious traditions are now divided along

8

theological lines between the "orthodox" (sometimes "traditionalists" or "conservatives") and religious "progressives" (sometimes "liberals"). These new theological tendencies, rather than the historic traditions, are now the primary factor shaping religious politics, with the orthodox favoring the GOP, and the progressives, the Democrats (Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 1991; Kellstedt and Guth 2019). Finally, the growing inroads of secularization have added the religiously unaffiliated ("Nones") to the Democratic side—especially if they claim a consciously "secular" or "secularist" identity (Campbell, Layman and Green 2021). Both perspectives provide some insight into the religious location of conservative populist attitudes.

Data and Methods

We use the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) to analyze conservative populism and examine its religious nexus. As the "gold standard" for political science surveys, the ANES provides a cornucopia of tested measures and a large *N* (7453) in the post-election sample. And the survey has multiple items tapping the dimensions described above. Almost all the variables used here are highly reliable scores derived from principal components analyses (PCA), facilitating multivariate analysis and giving us considerable confidence in the robustness of our results. Indeed, alternative specifications using fewer or more variables produce remarkably similar results. We describe the specific content of each measure as we examine the dimensions, but more detailed information can be found in the Appendix.

Although lacking a full range of religious measures, ANES 2020 has enough items to evaluate the insights of the ethnocultural and religious restructuring theories. First, detailed questions on religious affiliation, ethnicity and race allow us to assign respondents into specific

9

religious traditions, following the RELTRAD scheme used by most political scientists and sociologists (for taxonomies, see Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009, and Steensland et al. 2000).[1]

Testing the restructuring approach is a little more complicated, as the ANES has several items that allow us to operationalize "orthodox" or "progressive" religious worldviews more or less directly. In previous work, we used these measures individually as predictors of populist attitudes, but here we use a summary measure, a principal components analysis (PCA) score of view of the Bible; thermometer ratings for "Christian fundamentalists" and "Christians"; a summary of religious identifications[2]; and status as a "born-again Christian."[3] Although we might have preferred items such as belief in God, the afterlife, etc. that might be more appropriate to religious traditionalists of all faiths, this measure clearly differentiates among Americans from broadly Christian backgrounds, producing a continuum from the most secular to the most traditionalist. In addition, we tap *religiosity*, combining religious service attendance and the importance of religion in one's life (*theta=.77*). Although not a direct measure of traditionalism, the "orthodox" predominate among the highly observant, and progressives among the less faithful. Although religiosity might be added to the traditionalism measure, we kept it

---

[1] A version of this paper (Guth 2021b) was written before the ANES denominational data was available and used the alternative scholarly short-hand definition of Evangelicals as "born-again" Protestants, and Mainline Protestants as those "not born-again." Although the results are very similar to those reported there, denominational data produces somewhat stronger coefficients for religious tradition measures.

[2] The identification scale was created from ANES items as follows: (3) "Traditionalists" include anyone taking "Evangelical," "fundamentalist," "Pentecostal/charismatic," or "traditional" identities; (2) "None" includes all not responding or choosing "none" as a response; (1) *Progressive* includes "progressive," "spiritual but not religious," or "non-traditional;" and (0) *Secular* includes all choosing that identity.

[3] The four "restructuring" items produced a single PCA component with an eigenvalue of 2.849 and these loadings: views of the Bible (.81), "Christian fundamentalist" thermometer (.81), "Christian" thermometer (.78), religious identification scale (.70), and "born-again" status (.67). *Theta* reliability= .81.

separate, as religious participation sometimes produces different results than theological orientation, especially in multivariate analysis.

Religion and "Thin" Populism: Political System Beliefs

To examine the impact of religious factors on each "thin" dimension of conservative populism, in the following tables we report their bivariate correlations and then turn to OLS regression to assess the direct influences of ethnoreligious traditions and theology on each dimension. (We include controls for age, gender, income and education in the analyses, but do not report the results except for occasional observations in the text.)

Majoritarian Rough Politics

We begin with majoritarian rough politics, a key feature of populist "style." This score is derived from items tapping beliefs that majorities should rule and minorities adapt to that rule; that a strong leader is necessary, unconstrained by Congress or the courts; that force should be used to stop civil protests; that people are "too sensitive" in political discussions; that compromising leaders are "selling out" their followers; and that firearms should be more easily available to citizens. The score also includes the standard authoritarianism scale (*theta*=.77).

We might expect that religious factors play an important role here. Cynthia Burack (2020) found that "imprecatory prayers" expressing many themes of rough politics were characteristic of "right-wing" clerical leaders (almost all from the Evangelical tradition) and might well influence their followers (as might the language of populist politicians). As the first column in Table 1 shows, ethnoreligious traditions have distinctive positions. White Evangelicals indeed are the most "populist," followed at a distance by white Catholics, Latino Evangelicals, Eastern Orthodox, Latter-day Saints, and Mainline Protestants, who are very near the sample mean. Atheists and agnostics occupy the anti-populist pole, the counterpart to white

Evangelicals, just as in our 2016 study (Guth 2019, 24). Jews, the unaffiliated ("Nothing in Particular"), Black Protestants, members of World Religions (Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Baha'is), and Latino Catholics follow in decreasing levels of opposition. Finally, religious restructuring variables also have clear ties to this majoritarian bent: conservative theology has a very strong correlation and religiosity, usually another marker of orthodox belief, has a solid positive tie as well.

Of course, these religious variables are interrelated in complex ways: Black Protestants and white Evangelicals tend to be more religiously committed than mainline Protestants, for example, and secular citizens are unlikely to hold conservative theological views. To ascertain the relative influence of ethnoreligious affiliation and religious restructuring variables, we ran an OLS regression. As the second column shows, the ethnoreligious coefficients drop considerably from the bivariate level, but those for Evangelicals and white Catholics still point toward greater populism, and those for Black Protestants, atheists and agnostics, and Jews still contribute to opposition. But conservative theology retains all its power, suggesting that the large bivariate correlations for Evangelicals and atheists/agnostics are partly an artifact of their traditional religious beliefs (or lack of them). Note, however, that anti-populism *increases* among Black Protestants once the effects of their conservative theology are held constant. Even in this religious community, then, conservative belief has populist implications.

One restructuring measure behaves strangely, however. Although conservative theology and religiosity are highly correlated (*r=.70*), the religiosity coefficient "flips signs" in the regression and predicts *less* support for majoritarian rough politics. This suggests that (atypical) "liberal" religiosity produces antipopulist sentiments, *not* that religiosity has a moderating effect on orthodox believers. (In fact, bivariate data shows that the populism score rises with each

increase in both religiosity and traditional theology.) Altogether, religious variables explain an

impressive 30 percent of the variance. And these effects are independent of demographic

influences: including education, income, age and gender in the analysis has virtually no effect on

the religious coefficients and adds only four percent to the variance explained (data not shown).[4]

[Table 1 about here]

Distrust of Government

Distrust of government and government officials is a trait universally ascribed to

populists. Our score is derived from nine standard items asking how often the government in

Washington can be trusted to do what's right, whether government is run for the benefit of a few

big interests, how much tax money is wasted, how many politicians are corrupt (two items),

whether politicians care about people, whether they are trustworthy or whether they only care

about the rich *(theta=.78)*. Even with this robust measure our analysis produces ambivalent

results for the theory, showing little religious impact. This is primarily due to the pervasive

political distrust characterizing Americans: when everyone is cynical about politicians, few

variables explain the extent of that cynicism.

Despite this limitation, in 2016 we found weak tendencies for Evangelicals to be more

distrustful, and religious minorities of all sorts somewhat more positive, but the effect of other

religious variables was small and inconsistent, with religious variables explaining only six

percent of the variance (Guth 2019, 23). By 2020 the influence of religion was even more

attenuated. As Table 1 shows, Evangelicals were mildly more cynical and and some religious

---

[4] Although the impact of the demographic factors varies from dimension to dimension, higher education tends to
reduce all populist traits and women are less populist, but age and income have only a few very modest effects.

minorities a little less so, but the ethnoreligious picture is very mixed. Conservative theology pointed to a little *more* trust, and religiosity, a little less. Perhaps the finding for conservative theology reflects the impact of Trump's appeal to conservative believers, although his constant attack on the "deep state" may have limited that effect. Nevertheless, the variance explained by religion is even less than in 2016—only 2 percent. Clearly, religion was even less of a contributor to political cynicism than it had been four years earlier.

Declinism

Speculation about the possible impact of the Trump regime seems more warranted on another "populist" dimension: declinism, a central feature of populist ideology. In 2016 Evangelicals and other religious traditionalists saw the country on the "wrong track" and suffering economically, attitudes bolstered by Evangelical identification and conservative theology (Guth 2019, 23-28). Do we still find this attitude among American religious populists? Or are they more optimistic after four years of a congenial administration? Our declinism score comes from 13 items on respondents' sentiments about the national situation: whether they felt hopeful, afraid, outraged, angry, happy, worried, proud, irritated or nervous; whether the country was on the wrong track; whether the economy was worse; whether the income gap was larger; and whether opportunity for mobility had declined (*theta*=.91). A much more elaborate measure than the one we used in 2016, it taps even more effectively sentiments about national fortunes.

But here we find a dramatic religious change. In Table 1 all the signs have "flipped" from their direction in 2016, as the religion variables fostering declinism then now work against it. Evangelicals (and to a much lesser extent, other white traditions), theological conservatives, and the observant are all more *positive* about the "state of the union" than are ethnoreligious minorities, theological progressives, and secularists. Once again, conservative theology proves

most potent in the regression, but ethnoreligious tradition retains some influence, with Black Protestants again becoming *more* antipopulist when theology and religiosity are controlled, although atheists and agnostics are not more pessimistic than their "theology" would predict.

The key to this religious conversion, of course, is that a populist occupied the White House after 2017, producing sentiments among his followers at odds with characterizations by theories of populism. Obviously, not all features of conservative populist ideology are constants: some are situational, shaped by the dictates of oppositional politics. Once populists are in power, the incentives for emphasizing themes useful in opposition may diminish or even reverse, creating a different configuration of attitudes. The evidence here shows the religious impact on populists' sentiment about their nation's future had thoroughly reversed from 2016. "Populist" and anti-populist religious groups had traded places on this "core" feature of populist ideology.

Distrust of Experts

One populist "thin" trait that has received much scholarly and journalistic attention has been distrust of expertise and trust in the judgment of ordinary people (Collins et al. 2020)**.** This trait takes various forms, depending on whether the "expert" is scientific, academic, journalistic or even bureaucratic. The populist propensity is to prefer the judgment of common folks to that of any knowledge elite. Among American populists—and those elsewhere—this has recently been exhibited in antagonism toward expert judgments on evolution, global warming, and the covid19 pandemic, whether issued by scientists or government officials. Similarly, populists distrust the "mainstream" media and journalistic expertise, echoing their leaders' complaints about "fake news," and preferring "alternative facts." Although we initially expected some differences in the assessment of scientific expertise and evaluation of the media, we found that two separate measures were highly correlated. Thus we have created a global *distrust of experts*

score from 12 individual ANES items: seven assessing trust in science and scientists and five eliciting confidence in journalists and the media (*theta*=.85).

Religion has a substantial impact on regard for expertise. As the last section of Table 1 shows, white Evangelicals and atheists/agnostics once more occupy polar positions. Latter-day Saints and Latino Evangelicals are less skeptical, while religious minorities are generally somewhat more trusting. As expected, conservative theology and religiosity point strongly against respect for expertise. The regression reveals the power of conservative theology, but does not eliminate the impact of membership in many ethnoreligious traditions, especially Evangelicals' greater distrust and Black Protestants' more positive response to expertise. Inclusion of demographic variables modestly increases the variance explained (most of this is from education's effects) from 22 percent to 26 percent, but does not alter the religious coefficients, except for several that actually *increase* under controls (data not shown).

To summarize: examination of religious influences on the "thin" traits of conservative populism reveals both continuity and change. On majoritarian rough politics, religious patterns look remarkably similar to those in 2016: Evangelicals and those adhering to conservative theology are still prone to adopt this facet of populist politics, while ethnoreligious minorities, religious progressives, and secularists form the opposition. Almost identical patterns appear on another feature of conservative populism: distrust of professional expertise. But on two putative marks of conservative populism, distrust of politicians and declinism, the weight of religion has shifted: the "conservative" religious variables no longer point consistently toward political distrust, while on declinism, they push in a distinctly more *optimistic* direction. Just as public economic assessments are increasingly determined by partisanship, rather than real conditions (Gerber and Huber 2010), declinism may rise and fall with transitions in the White House.

16

Perhaps it is not surprising that assessments of political processes and participants should change with the identity of those in charge, but policy preferences of conservative populists should exhibit greater stability. Indeed, these aspects of the ideology should have even stronger connections to religion (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009)**.** And that is just what we see. Table 2 reports on the influence of religion on white nationalism, traditional social values, and welfare chauvinism.

White Nationalism

In the massive literature on recent American electoral politics, an array of theories has argued for the centrality of "identity" factors. Many focus on ethnic identity, whether expressed as a "positive" identification with "whites" (Jardina 2019) or, more frequently, as anti-immigrant sentiment, nativism, "white power" ideologies, or Islamophobia (cf. Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018; Skocpol and Tervo 2020). Although some approaches reference "white Christian" or "white Protestant" as part of the phenomenon, religion seldom plays any direct role in the analysis. Others see a larger role for religion, as in Whitehead and Perry's work on "Christian Nationalism" (2020; see also Guth 2021a). Despite these different foci, we may have a case of the blind men and the elephant: all these "identity" variables are powerfully related.

We created a White Nationalism score from scales and individual items tapping several attitudes stressed in the literature cited above: toward immigration and immigrants (12 items); preference for white political power (four items); whether discrimination exists against minorities (seven items); whether diversity is good or bad for America; a preference for the US to shun international commitments (four items); nativist sentiments (four items); belief that all

Americans must speak English; and finally, a thermometer rating for "Muslims," capturing

attitudes toward that important religious reference group (*theta reliability*=.93).

Once again, white Evangelicals are the most adamant adherents of White Nationalism,

with atheists and agnostics on the other end. Both conservative theology and religiosity are

strongly related to this score, and the regression results show that conservative theology is the

driving force among religious variables, while religiosity drops and once more "flips signs."

Membership in many ethnoreligious groups retains significance, perhaps reflecting the "ethnic"

part of their identity. Once more demographic variables are largely independent of religious

measures—but add only four percent to the variance explained by religion (data not shown).

[Table 2 about here]

This analysis shows that most of the theories related to nationalist explanations of

populism have a good bit of validity. The American populist version of white nationalism has not

only been evident in Trump administration policies, but is imbedded in grass-roots sentiment.

And religion plays a significant role, as Evangelicals and other religious conservatives are the

chief proponents of this dimension of populist ideology, with ethnoreligious minorities, religious

liberals, and secularists aligned on the other side.

Social Traditionalism

Most analysts of conservative populism concede a role for social traditionalism. For

some, traditionalism is simply a marker for those disadvantaged by the globalized economy: the

modestly educated, rural residents, or the blue-collar population—who inevitably hold

traditionalist attitudes because of their social position (Rodrik 2020). Other scholars, however,

join Norris and Inglehart (2019) in positing a causal role for the persisting value conflict between

materialist (and socially traditionalist) populations and the *post-materialist* (and socially liberal)

vanguard as central to the rise of populism. However it is described, social traditionalism usually has deep religious roots.

Our social traditionalism score is derived from 18 items tapping attitudes on gay rights, abortion, feminism, "postmaterialist" values, and the death penalty (*theta*=.87). The second section of Table 2 shows the impact of religious variables. The correlations reveal a yawning gap between Evangelicals and the atheist/agnostic camp, with most ethnoreligious groups taking their accustomed positions: the predominantly white groups modestly on the traditionalist side, and ethnoreligious minorities, on the other. Social conservatism is also powerfully linked to conservative theology and religiosity, confirmed by the regression, which shows that conservative theology is buttressed by religiosity—which does not change signs in this analysis. With both theology and religiosity included, coefficients for most ethnoreligious minorities drop out, except for Black Protestants, for whom it increases once again. On the other side, coefficients for Evangelicals, white Catholics, Latter-day Saints, and non-affiliates remain significant and positive. Religion explains two-fifths of the variance, an impressive result. Once again, sociodemographics have little impact on the religious coefficients and add only 3 percent to the variance explained (data not shown).

Welfare Chauvinism

Finally, we examine welfare chauvinism, based on 13 ANES items, with seven asking about affirmative action or other assistance to Blacks and six items on support for greater social welfare spending (*theta*=.91). In a "racialized" American context, this measure gets at the heart of welfare chauvinism. How does religion influence such attitudes?

To borrow from Yogi Berra, the results are "*déjà vu* all over again," replicating those for white nationalism and social traditionalism, albeit with a slightly smaller gap between

19

Evangelical and atheist/agnostic camps. Ethnoreligious minorities—especially Black Protestants—oppose chauvinism, perhaps unremarkably. At the bivariate level, both conservative theology and religiosity are associated with chauvinism. Once more, the regression reveals the strength of conservative theology, but membership in most ethnoreligious traditions retains significant influence in the expected directions. Religious variables explain 28 percent of the variance and demographic factors add only 2 percent (data not shown).

For the "policy" dimensions, then, several conclusions are warranted. First, the impact of religious variables on all three dimensions is quite similar. True, religiosity does not "flip signs" on social traditionalism, and Black Protestants are especially distinctive on welfare chauvinism, but overall the patterns are much alike. Second, all the policy dimensions reveal the powerful influence of conservative theology, but also some continuing distinctiveness of ethnoreligious traditions. Evangelical populism, for example, is clearly due to more than Evangelicals' conservative theology. Third, the impact of ethnoreligious tradition is sometimes changed when controls for theology and religiosity are introduced. Black Protestants often become *more distinct,* while the dramatic effects of being atheist/agnostic are largely eliminated.

Putting It All Together: Religion and the "Populist Syndrome"

The strong similarity of religious responses suggest that these putative conservative populist dimensions are strongly interrelated. To confirm this, we ran a secondary PCA of the seven dimension scores. The PCA produced two factors, with all dimensions except distrust of government loading strongly on the first component, confirming that distrust was not a distinguishing feature of conservative populism during the Trump years. The other six scores formed a remarkably "tight" dimension, with very high loadings for white nationalism (.91), social traditionalism (.90), welfare chauvinism (.88), majoritarian rough politics (.89), and

20

distrust of expertise (.83)—but also optimism about the nation's condition (-.69 for declinism), a major shift from 2016. And the resulting score has very impressive reliability (*theta=*.90). We think this score aptly captures the conservative populism described by most observers.[5]

To conclude, we put conservative populism in a broader political context, examining the influence of religion as mediated by political factors. Table 3 reports bivariate correlations of the Populist Syndrome with religious and political variables, as well as two OLS regressions: the first with religious variables only (again with demographic controls), and the second incorporating partisanship and ideology. The correlations show a very familiar pattern, with Syndrome scores ranging from the very populist Evangelicals to the strongly anti-populist atheists and agnostics, with the historic white traditions mildly on the Populist side and the ethnoreligious minorities arrayed on the other. Conservative theology and religiosity have strong positive correlations with the Syndrome. (Demographic variables again have a modest impact: education works against populism and women are marginally less populist.) Politics, naturally, is connected, with both Republicans and conservatives adopting populist ideology.

[Table 3 about here]

Model 1 shows that religious variables are powerful predictors of conservative populism, with conservative theology again leading the way, while many of the ethnoreligious traditions retain significant influence in expected directions. Indeed, religion alone explains well over a third of the variance in Syndrome scores. And Model 2 shows that most ethnoreligious influences are mediated by partisanship and ideology, as their coefficients are reduced to

---

[5] This finding also suggests caution about efforts to pinpoint which of these factors is the "most" powerful in influencing the behavior of particular religious groups, given their extremely high intercorrelations (cf. Marsh 2021).

insignificance. This should not be a surprise: ethnicity and religion are now dominant features of American party coalitions (Kellstedt and Guth 2019; Margolis 2020**)** and populist styles and attitudes have been assiduously adopted by Republicans**.** But note that religious restructuring still *adds* to the explanation, even when partisanship and ideology are in the equation: conservative theology retains an significant added "punch," while religiosity once more reverses signs and has a modest negative effect. In all, Model 3 explains 71 percent of the variance.

Summary and Conclusions

Our exploration of the way religion shapes key dimensions of conservative populism reveals much continuity since 2016, as well as significant changes. Most attitudinal dimensions constituting populism then were still present four years later: the majoritarian rough politics, disdain for expertise, white nationalism, social traditionalism, and welfare chauvinism were, if anything, more tightly integrated in a populist belief system than in 2016. On the other hand, declinist perceptions had given way to optimism about the national condition. Both continuity and change may reflect the impact of the Trump presidency, constantly emphasizing populism's central themes on the one hand, but providing hope to supporters, on the other.

Similarly, religious contributions to conservative populism in 2020 look much like those in 2016. Evangelicals still formed the religious vanguard of conservative populism, with atheists, agnostics and "secular' citizens leading the resistance. The older "white" mainline Protestant, Catholic, and LDS traditions provided some populist support, while most ethnoreligious "minorities" were on the other side. Within many of these communities (especially among

mainline Protestants and white Catholics) the religiously orthodox and observant were more tempted by populism than their progressive and generally less observant brethren.[6]

All these tendencies fed into the party system, with the strongest Republican religious constituencies exhibiting the most pronounced populist tendencies, not only on substantive policy, but also on political process and style, contributing to what we have called the "rough politics" element of the party. Still, the populism measure may capture a powerful political force not entirely encapsulated in traditional partisanship and ideology. For example, if we include it with partisanship and ideology in a stepwise binary logistic regression of the 2020 presidential vote, it enters the equation *first*, before the traditional predictors, suggesting that it adds something new to the electoral equation.

What does all this augur for the future of conservative populist politics? To the extent that populist preferences are influenced by religious developments, we might see two different scenarios. For optimists on the left, the declining Evangelical population and faltering American religiosity, combined with burgeoning numbers of ethnoreligious minorities and unaffiliated Americans, might seem to augur well for a more civil, moderate or even "progressive" political process. On the other hand, those very trends might well exacerbate the "culture wars" confronting American society, with the Republican party increasingly embodying populist people (and a "populist style" of rough politics) and the Democrats capturing the opposition, perhaps demanding a return to "the regular order," but often tempted to emulate the style of their

---

[6] This was true even in the Jewish community, where Orthodox and Conservative Jews fell on the populist side of the national mean, while Reform and unaffiliated Jews were strongly antipopulist.

opponents if necessary to win. Indeed, if recent events are any indication, this latter possibility

seems more likely, albeit much less auspicious for the future of the United States.

References

Bonikowski, Bart. 2019. "Trump's Populism: The Mobilization of Nationalist Cleavages and the Future of US Democracy." In Kurt Weyland and Raúl Madrid, eds. *When Democracy Trumps Populism: European and Latin American Lessons for the United States,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 110-131.

Burack, Cynthia. 2020. "Let Death Seize Upon Them: Populism in Political Prayers of Imprecation." *Politics and Religion* 13(3), 492-516.

Campbell, David, Geoffrey Layman, and John Green. 2021. *Secular Surge: A New Fault Line in American Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collins, Harry, Robert Evans, Darrin Durant, and Martin Weinel. 2020. *Experts and the Will of the People: Society, Populism and Science.* London: Palgrave Macmillan,

Eatwell, Roger, and Matthew Goodwin. 2018. *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy.* United Kingdom: Penguin Random House.

Edsall, Tom. 2014. "The Rise of 'Welfare Chauvinism' in the United States." *New York Times*, December 16. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/opinion/the-rise-of-welfare-chauvinism.html

Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz. 2018. "Welfare Chauvinism in Populist Radical Right Platforms." *Social Policy and Administration* 52(1), 293-314.

Gerber, Alan, and Gregory Huber. 2010. "Partisanship, Political Control and Economic Assessments." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1), 153-173.

Guth, James. 2019. "Are White Evangelicals Populists? The View from the 2016 American National Election Study." *Review of Faith and International Affairs* 17(3) (Fall), 20-35.

Guth, James. 2021a. "Protestant Clergy and Christian Nationalism," *Perspectives in Religious Studies* 48(2), 135-147.

Guth, James. 2021b. "Religion and American Populism," presented at the GIRES International Conference on Religion and Politics in the United States, (online), July17-18.

Guth, James, and Brent Nelsen. 2021. "Party Choice in Europe: Social Cleavages and the Rise of Populist Parties," *Party Politics* 27 (3), 453-464.

Harell, Alison, Stuart Soroka, and Kiera Ladner. 2014. "Public Opinion, Prejudice and the Racialization of Welfare in Canada." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (37)14, 2580-2597.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2008. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1):1-23.

Hunter, James D. 1991. *Culture Wars*. New York: Basic Books.

Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kaufmann, Eric. 2019. *Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities*. New York: Abrams Press.

Kellstedt, Lyman, and James Guth. 2019. "Religion and Electoral Behavior in the United States, 1936-2016. In Akan Malici and Elizabeth Smith, eds. *Political Science Research in Practice,* 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 117-136.

Kros, Mathijs, and Marcel Coenders. 2019. "Explaining Differences in Welfare Chauvinism Between and With Individuals Over Time." *European Sociological Review* 35(6), 860-873.

Lee, Frances. 2020. "Populism and the American Party System: Opportunities and Constraints." *Perspectives on Politics* 18(2): 370-388.

Margolis, Michele. 2020. "Who Wants to Make America Great Again? Evangelical Support for Donald Trump. *Politics and Religion* 13(1), 89-118.

Marsh, Wayde Z.C. 2021. "Putting US First: How Outgroup Hostilities and Defense of the Status Quo Motivate White Evangelical Affect Toward Candidates in U.S. Elections 2004-2016." *American Politics Research* 49(5): 534-547. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532673X211021852

Marzouki, Nadia, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy (eds). 2016. *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Mudde, Cas. 2017. *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2020. "Measuring Populism Worldwide." *Party Politics* (online).

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068820927686

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rodrik, Dani. 2020. "Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism: Economics, Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism." Working Paper 27526. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge: MA.

Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 2020. "The Elite and Popular Roots of Contemporary Republican Extremism." In Theda Skocpol and Caroline Tervo (eds.) *Upending American Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press, 3-27.

Smidt, Corwin, Lyman Kellstedt and James Guth. 2009 (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Steensland, Brian, Lynn Robinson, W. Bradford Wilcox, Jerry Park, Mark Regnerus, and Robert Woodberry. 2000. "The Measure of American Religion." *Social Forces* 79(1), 291-318.

Swierenga, Robert P. 2009. "Religion and American Voting Behavior, 1830s to 1930s." In Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 69-94.

Van der Meer, Tom, and Tim Reeskens. 2021. "Welfare Chauvinism in the Face of Ethnic Diversity." *European Sociological Review* 37 (1), 89-103. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa037

Weyland, Kurt. 2020. "Populism's Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States." *Perspectives on Politics* 18(2): 389-406.

Weyland, Kurt, and Raúl Madrid. 2019, eds. *When Democracy Trumps Populism: European and Latin American Lessons for the United States.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Whitehead, Andrew and Samuel Perry. 2020. *Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States* New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Wuthnow, Robert. 1988. *The Restructuring of American Religion.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Table 1. Religion and Process Traits of Conservative Populism: (*Pearson's r and OLS betas*)

	Majoritarian Rough Politics		Distrust Government		Declinism		Distrust Experts	
	r=	*b=*	*r=*	*b=*	*r=*	*b=*	*r=*	*b=*
Ethnoreligious Tradition								
White Evangelical	.27***	.06***	.05***	.05**	-.18***	-.05***	.28***	.13***
White Catholic	.08***	.08***	-.04***	-.04*	-.07***	-.06**	-.00	.03*
Latter-day Saints	.03*	.01	-.01	-.02	-.06***	-.04***	.05***	.03*
Latino Evangelical	.07***	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.06*	.00	.06***	-.01
Mainline Protestant	.02*	.02	-.08***	-.07***	-.05*	-.05***	.00	.03*
Eastern Orthodox	.04***	.00	-.04***	-.04*	-.03*	.00	.03**	-.00
Latino Catholic	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.02	.03*	.03*	-.03**	-.05***
Nothing in Particular	-.08***	.02	.07***	-.01	.05***	-.03	-.01	.06***
World Religions	-.04***	.02	-.04***	-.05***	-.01	-.04***	-.06***	-.02
Jews	-.10***	-.02*	-.04***	-.06***	.06***	.01	-.09***	-.03**
Black Protestant	-.06***	-.14***	.02*	.01	.13***	.18***	-.04***	-.12***
Atheist/Agnostic	-.28***	-.05**	.01	-.04*	.18***	.03	-.25***	-.06***
Conservative Theology	.51***	.51***	-.03*	-.05**	-.33***	-.39***	.42***	.36***
Religiosity	.30***	-.07***	.03*	.03	-.20***	.05**	.25***	-.01
R squared=	*Religion*	**.30**		**.02**		**.16**		**.22**
R squared=	*Controls*	**.34**		**.04**		**.18**		**.26**

Source: American National Election Study 2020.

***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05.

Table 2. Religion and the Ideology of Conservative Populism: (Pearson's *r and OLS betas*)

	White Nationalism		Social Traditionalism		Welfare Chauvinism	
	r=	*b=*	*r=*	*b=*	*r=*	*b=*
Ethnoreligious Tradition						
White Evangelical	.29***	.10***	.34***	.11***	.29***	.13***
White Catholic	.10***	.11***	.06***	.06***	.14***	.12***
Latter-day Saints	.03***	.02	.08***	.05***	.06***	.05***
Latino Evangelical	.02	-.04***	.07***	-.02	.01	-.04***
Mainline Protestant	.06***	.06***	.02*	.02	.07***	.10***
Eastern Orthodox	.02	.00	.03*	.00	.03	.01
Latino Catholic	-.06***	-.06***	-.00	-.01	-.05***	-.05***
Nothing in Particular	-.07***	.05***	-.10***	.08***	.01	.07***
World Religions	-.06***	-.01	-.05***	-.01	-.04**	-.00
Jews	-.07***	-.00	-.09***	-.01	-.07***	-.03*
Black Protestant	-.04***	-.10***	-.04**	-.13***	-.24***	-.26***
Atheist/Agnostic	-.29***	-.05***	-.32***	-.02	-.22***	-.03*
Conservative Theology	.50***	.46***	.54***	.50***	.38***	.41***
Religiosity	.31***	-.04**	.44***	.08***	.22***	-.06***
R squared=	*Religion*	**.30**		**.40**		**.28**
R squared=	*Controls*	**.34**		**.43**		**.30**

Source: American National Election Study 2020.
***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05.

Table 3. Religion, Politics and the Populist Syndrome (*Pearson's r* and OLS *betas)*

	Pearson's *r=*	**Model 1** **Religious Variables** **(with controls)** *b=*	**Model 2** **+** **Political Variables** *b=*
Ethnoreligious Tradition			
Evangelical	.32***	.11***	.02*
White Catholic	.09***	.09***	.02
Latter-day Saints	.06***	.04***	.00
Latino Evangelical	.05***	-.03*	-.00
Mainline Protestant	.02**	.05***	.01
Eastern Orthodox	.04**	-.00	.01
Latino Catholic	-.03*	-.04***	.01
Nothing in Particular	-.05*	.05***	.03***
World Religions	-.05***	.00	.02**
Jewish	-.09***	-.02*	.00
Black Protestant	-.09***	-.18***	-.01
Atheist/Agnostic	-.31***	-.05***	-.02
Conservative Theology	.54**	.42***	.18***
Religiosity	.34**	-.03*	-.03**
Political Factors			
Party ID (GOP)	.76***		.41***
Ideology (Conservative)	.74***		.37***
Adj. R squared=		*.36*	*.36*
Adj. R squared=		*.39*	*.71*

Source: American National Election Study 2020.
***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05.

Appendix on Measurement of Populist Themes

Majoritarian Rough Politics

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA, with an eigenvalue of 3.134.
theta= .77.

		Loading
V201429	Use force to suppress protest	.71
V202417	Minorities must conform	.66
V201626	People too sensitive about political language	.61
	Pro-gun scale (*theta*=.78)	.61
V202337	Should be easier to buy guns	
V202341x	Oppose background checks	
V202344x	Oppose banning assault rifles	
V202347x	Oppose buyback of assault rifles	
V202416	Majority Rule	.59
V202266 to V202269	Authoritarianism scale (*theta*=.66)	.57
V202413	Favor strong leadership	.55
V201372x	Better no limits to presidential power	.49
V202409	Compromise is betrayal	.48

Distrust Government

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA, with an eigenvalue of 3.303.
theta= .78.

		Loading
V202410	Politicians don't care about people	.72
V202415	Politicians only care about rich	.69
V202425	Corruption widespread in government	.67
V201236	Many in government corrupt	.64
V202412	Politicians main problem in country	.62
V202411	Politicians are untrustworthy	.62
V201235	Government wastes money	.52
V201233	Can't trust government to do right	.47
V201234	Government run by a few big interests	.45

Declinism

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA, with an eigenvalue of 6.326.
theta=.91.

		Loading
V201120	Worried about the country	.83
V201123	Nervous about the country	.81
V201116	Afraid for the country	.79
V201118	Angry about the country	.78
V201122	Irritated about the country	.78
V201117	Outraged about country	.77
V201119	Unhappy about the country	.74
V201121	Not proud about the country	.73
V201114	Country is on wrong track	.66
V201115	Not hopeful about the country	.65
V201327	Economy is worse	.53
	Mobility scale (*theta=.66)*	.44
V202304	Only rich get ahead	
V202305	Rich keep others from getting ahead	
V202317	Hard to get ahead today	
V202320	Mobility less than 20 years ago	
V201400x	Income gap is bigger	.40

Distrust of Experts

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA, with an eigenvalue of 4.604.
theta= .87.

		Loading
V202158	Cool toward Anthony Fauci	.79
V202175	Cool toward journalists	.73
V202310	Science not important to covid decisions	.71
V202173	Cool toward scientists	.68
V201377	Don't trust news media	.65
V202312	Schools and media lie	.61
V202308	Trust people, not experts	.59
V202309	Help not needed from science experts	.54
V201376	Government won't undermine media	.53
V202383x	Risk of vaccines outweigh benefits	.51
V202331x	Oppose vaccine requirement in schools	.51
V201375x	Journalists have too much access	.50

White Nationalism

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA, with an eigenvalue of 9.183. *theta*= .93.

		Loading
V201426x	Favor building wall with Mexico	.78
V202245x	Return unauthorized immigrants home	.76
Unilateralism	Four-item scale	.75
V202239x	Immigrants raise crime rate	.68
V202236x	Oppose allowing refugees in	.67
V202232	Decrease legal immigration	.66
V202424	Important to follow American customs	.64
V202233	Immigrants take jobs	.63
V201417	Be tough with illegal immigrants	.60
V202423	Send immigrant children back	.60
V202494	White influence in U.S. low	.59
V201420x	End birthright citizenship	.59
V202496	Hispanic influence in US high	.59
V201423x	Important to speak English	.59
V202371	Diversity bad for country	.58
V202242x	Oppose path to citizenship	.56
V202497	Asian influence in US high	.54
V202168	Cool toward Muslims	.54
V202270	Better if world more like US	.53
V202248x	Separate children of detained immigrants	.53
V202421	Important to have been born in US	.54
V202422	Important to have American ancestry	.54
V202504	Being American important to identity	.47
V202273x	US better than other countries	.44
V202566	I fly the American flag	.41
V202565	I buy American goods	.38
V202495	Black influence in US high	.26

Social Traditionalism

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA analysis, with an eigenvalue of 5.569. *theta= .87.*

		Loading
V201411x	Trans must use bathroom of birth gender	.73
V201336	Pro-life	.68
V202183	Cold toward #MeToo movement	.66
V201408x	Oppose service protection for gays	.65
V202265	More emphasis on traditional values	.65
V201416	Oppose gay marriage	.64
V202224	Don't need more elected women	.62
V202292	Women's complaints cause problems	.56
V201415	Oppose gay adoptions	.55
V202291	Women seek special rights	.54
V202264	Not adjust traditional morals	.53
V201640	Women seek power over men	.50
V202532	Women not discriminated against	.49
V201414x	Oppose laws protecting gays from job bias	.48
V201345x	Favor death penalty	.44
V202160	Cold toward feminists	.40
V202315	Postmaterialism: Economy most Important	.39
V202313	Postmaterialism: Order most important	.31

Welfare Chauvinism

Unrotated first principal component score from a PCA, with an eigenvalue of 6.364. *theta= .91.*

		Loading
V201258	Oppose government assistance to Blacks	.79
V202490x	Government treats Blacks better	.75
V202493x	Police treat Blacks better	.73
V202527	No discrimination against Blacks	.72
V202300	Blacks should work way up	.72
V201320x	Cut federal aid to poor	.71
V201255	Oppose guaranteed jobs and income	.71
V201314x	Cut federal welfare spending	.70
V202303	Blacks should try harder	.70
V201246	Government should provide fewer services	.69
V201252	Oppose government health insurance	.67
V202252x	Oppose preferential hiring	.65
V201305x	Spend less on public schools	.54