Alternative Legacies of Authoritarianism:

Pro-dictator Bias in Ideology

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Abstract

How does an authoritarian past shape voters' left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate "anti-dictator bias" in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a "pro-dictator bias" where citizens hold ideological positions corresponding to those of the dictator depending on their experiences during and after transition. In countries with negotiated transitions and stronger former ruling parties, these successors could continue mobilizing the popular base of the former dictatorship with inherited advantages from the past and by invoking nostalgia through consistent reference to previous authoritarian achievements. Such positive sentiment can facilitate individual ideological orientation close to the ideological label of the former dictatorship. I test this hypothesis with variables measuring successor party strength and the type of regime transition by combining individual-level survey data and country-level data covering 1985 to 2018 from 50 countries. I demonstrate that voters in countries with a strong legacy party immediately after the transition and a history of negotiated transition are more likely to have pro-dictator bias in ideology. The findings emphasize the role of post-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in former authoritarian societies.

keywords: authoritarian legacies, pro-dictator bias, authoritarian successor parties

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1 Introduction

Authoritarian rule may significantly shape citizens' attitudes, behavior, and general worldview. An authoritarian regime's attempts to dominate the populace with propaganda may breed explicit and tacit resistance from the people, where their grudging compliance with authority intersects with simmering anti-regime sentiment. This everyday practice of autocratic rule may leave lingering effects on citizens even after the fall of dictatorship, and recent studies have investigated an *anti*-dictator sentiment where citizens hold ideological views that contrast with those of the former dictator (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantzeskakis and Sato 2020). They find that citizens under a left-wing dictator are biased towards the ideological right, and those under a right-leaning dictator hold more leftist attitudes compared to established democracy voters. Negative experiences under dictatorship are likely to draw citizens to reject ideological orientation related to the dictator's dogmatic perspectives.

However, some citizens may still wish to remain in the shadow of an authoritarian past. While an autocrat often employs repressive tools to quell the opposition, he also needs to secure political legitimacy by satisfying a certain share of the population. The autocrat may target a few select elite in his coalition and provide private goods to them, but he can also furnish the general population with public goods based on programmatic policy goals (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2006). These satisfied authoritarian citizens might have positive views toward the dictatorship during his reign, responding to his request for political loyalty, and can continue to hold similar sentiment even after the fall of the dictatorship. Especially in countries where strong ruling elites negotiated democratic transition, these former leaders can secure the survival of the party organization, authoritarian political institutions, and even sentiment towards the former regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Albertus 2019; Slater and Wong 2018).

This paper investigates this possibility of *pro*-dictator ideological bias in

post-authoritarian democracies by expanding previous studies on anti-dictator bias (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantzeskakis and Sato 2020). These studies provide ample evidence of voters discrediting the ideology of former dictatorships as punishment for previous repressive policies. I argue that in former authoritarian states where strong successor parties survived through regime transition, voters are more likely to have favorable attitudes toward and ideological positions that align with the former regime. Strong successor parties may continue mobilizing the popular base of the former dictatorship using their authoritarian inheritance and invoking nostalgia for the past through consistent reference to and reinterpretation of authoritarian achievements.

I test this pro-dictator ideological bias with variables capturing different features of the transition period. Using data from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia, I show that successor party success explains variation in ideological bias across former authoritarian countries. Instead of revealing anti-dictator bias in all countries as previous studies have, I find that, in countries with 1) strong successor parties with electoral success in the founding election and 2) peaceful party exit before transition, voters are more likely to have a pro-dictator bias in ideological orientation compared to voters in established democracies. I further show that this pattern of pro-dictator bias is more observable among former developmental states which share a history of economic success and survival of authoritarian successor parties.

Findings from this article contribute to the growing literature on authoritarian legacies on voter attitudes and related behavior. The current paper identifies the consequences of more favorable voter attitudes toward the authoritarian past. Previous studies identified the influence of authoritarian socialization and inclusionary ruling strategies on democratic support (Mishler and Rose 2007; Neundorf et al. 2020), emphasizing their negative legacies on voter attitudes (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantzeskakis and Sato 2020). Recent research on post-communist regimes predict

left-authoritarianism that older voters lean towards leftist ideology and adhere to anti-democratic policies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020; 2017). The current paper helps to explain the authoritarian legacies in the former right-wing regimes, emphasizes key forces that facilitate the persistence of the old order, and expands the logic of alternative authoritarian legacies in different types of former autocratic regimes. The findings from this paper further demonstrate that voters may adopt dissimilar attitudes toward the past depending on the regime's"usable pasts", i.e. previous achievements of the dictator, and how its successors utilize them in their favor after the regime collapse (Grzymala-Busse 2002).

This article further adds to our understanding of the role of authoritarian successor parties. Recent studies have investigated successors' advantages in their inheritance of authoritarian institutions, party organizations, and history of past success, and how these factors have contributed to the electoral success of former ruling elites (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Miller 2019). I contribute to this study of authoritarian successors by further discussing how their presence and strength shape certain voter attitudes and preferences in maturing democracies.

2 Alternative legacies of an authoritarian past

How does an authoritarian past shape voters' ideological orientation? Two recent studies find negative effects of an authoritarian past on individual ideological orientation, where citizens of post-authoritarian democracies may display anti-dictator bias in political ideology based on two principles (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantzeskakis and Sato 2020). First, autocracies are not ideologically neutral and adopt ideological stances that often align with the traditional demarcation between left and right. For example, former left-wing (LW) regimes took leftist policy positions following the Marxist-Leninist political ideology while right-wing (RW) dictatorships adopted anti-communist and

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nationalist policies on the ideological right. Second, negative evaluation of the former dictatorship after democratization can draw voters away from the "ideological brands" that the dictator propagated (Frantzeskakis and Sato 2020). As the new regime attempts to distance itself from the *ancien régime*, citizens may discredit the old ideological rhetoric and avoid expressing preferences linked to the mentality of the former regime.

While tragic events occuring under repressive dictatorships cannot be unwritten, post-transition politics can leave room for reframing the authoritarian past, enabling positive attitudes toward the dictatorship. I argue in this paper that strong authoritarian successors can facilitate citizens' positive reflection of the past in the aftermath of democratic transition, leading to a *pro*-dictator bias. As compared to the concept of *anti*-dictator bias developed in Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020), pro-dictator bias refers to an individual bias in ideology in favor of the ideological label of the former regime. Studies on anti-dictator bias emphasize backlash against the authoritarian past where post-transition citizens consider the old regime's brand unacceptable and adopt "preference falsification" in response to any authoritarian holdover (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; 1962). The repressive aspects of the former regime engender stigmatization of the past, leading citizens to distance themselves from the brand of the old regime.

While democratic transition brings about the collapse of an authoritarian regime, it does not necessarily wipe out the ruling elites, often requiring these elites to complete the transition process. Autocratic elites often negotiate with opposition leaders for their peaceful exit or even for maintenance of power after transition (O'Donnell et al. 1986). This move "toward democracy by undemocratic means" may facilitate peaceful and stable transition (O'Donnell et al. 1986; 38), but also makes authoritarian inheritance more likely via retaining the old authoritarian constitution, grassroot party organization of the party-state, and the financial resources of the former regime (Loxton and

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Mainwaring 2018; Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Slater and Wong 2018; Choi 1994).
Among 314 former authoritarian elites in Latin America, around 72.6% continued their
political career by winning elections or working in the business sector after regime
transition (Albertus 2019). Of the sixty-five Third Wave democracies, 72% of them
inherited prominent authoritarian successor parties that have gained stable electoral
support in democratic elections (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018).

Having these strong successor parties can facilitate positive evaluation of the past as
they can mobilize democratic voters through their *authoritarian advantage* and *reference*.
Previous research has found *authoritarian advantage* underlying the electoral success of
successor parties, including inheritance of a strong party brand, national party
organization and network, and abundant financial resources (Loxton 2015; Loxton and
Mainwaring 2018). The inheritance of strong grassroots party organizations can secure
the loyalty of former authoritarian voters in democratic elections, thus contributing to
stable party support after democratic transition (Cheng and Huang 2018; Miller 2019). In
these countries, the party brand from the authoritarian past can also place them on
higher ground compared to nascent opposition parties that have yet to secure strong
party brands (Miller 2019; Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). With former ruling parties'
significant advantages in brand recognition, the ideological brand of the former regime
can effectively function as a tool for mobilization.

With their strength remaining intact through transition, these authoritarain sucessors
can frequently employ *authoritarian reference* back to the *usable pasts* emphasizing the
achievements of the former autocratic regime and using those images from the past to
promote their programmatic competence to democratic voters (Grzymala-Busse 2002;
Miller 2019; Slater and Wong 2013). While some successor parties that secured their
survival by breaking from the past in the early years of transition collapsed due to their
weakened party brand, other successors who retained their links to the past have

continued to survive after decades of democratization (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Grzymala-Busse 2018). Thus, the presence of strong authoritarian successor parties during and right after transition may facilitate frequent use of authoritarian references and voters' positive evaluation of the former autocrat, which can result in the formation of political attitudes and perferences favorable to the authoritarian past (Chang et al. 2007; Kang 2018; Wu 2008; Neundorf et al. 2020).

For example, in South Korea and Taiwan, electoral competition following political liberalization was shaped between parties representing the state and civil society, where the ruling party consolidated its power in the conservative political sphere while civil society was struggling to establish organizational structure and party identity as a reliable alternative (Choi 1994; Fell 2018). The successor parties' advantages in strong organization and an image of competency contributed to their electoral dominance in subsequent democratic elections, with many political elites evoking nostalgia for the achievements of the former regime (Kang 2018; Kim 2014; Wu 2008; Cheng and Huang 2018). The level of authoritarian nostalgia, or positive evaluation of former dictators, is high in both countries, with a significant share of citizens selecting Park Chung-hee and Chiang Ching-kuo as the best leaders in their history (Chang et al. 2007; Kim 2020; Global Views Research 2019). This nostalgic sentiment is identified as one of the central determinants of voting behavior in recent elections, with party supporters favorably identifying with party brands (Kim 2014; Kang 2018; Wu 2008).

Based on my discussion on potential trajectories after regime transition, I emphasize authoritarian successor party success as one of the key political factors that may facilitate more positive authoritarian legacies on political preferences among post-authoritarian voters. Instead of assuming that voters in post-authoritarian regimes regard the past as negative and avoid identifying with the ideological label of the past, I test the following hypothesis on factors that may shape the post-transition political sphere and variation in

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the ideological orientation of citizens:

> **Hypothesis 1a (H1a)**: Citizens are more likely to have *pro*-dictator bias in ideology if authoritarian successor parties maintain their electoral success in the founding election after transition.

> **Hypothesis 1b (H1b)**: Citizens are more likely to have *anti*-dictator bias in ideology if former ruling parties fail to secure electoral support in the founding election after transition.

Similarly, based on the discussion of the peaceful or violent exit of former autocratic elites and its influence on post-transition politics, I test the following hypothesis on the type of authoritarian party exit:

> **Hypothesis 2 (H2)**: Citizens are more likely to have pro-dictator bias in ideology if the former ruling elites peacefully negotiated democratization, rather than being violently removed from power before democratization.

Lastly, I test my arguments with citizens in developmental states as a distinct category of former authoritarian states that share a history of economic success and negotiated democratization (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Slater and Wong 2018; Cheng and Huang 2018). Authoritarian successor parties in these countries still dominate politics through an authoritarian advantage by winning sizeable vote shares, occupying the same ideological positions as former dictators, and through authoritarian reference evoking nostalgia for the bygone regime (Kang 2018; Chang et al. 2007; Cheng and Huang 2018). These distinctive features of former developmental states may lead to pro-dictator bias favoring the ideological beliefs of the former regime. The former developmental states emphasized national security, anti-communism, and economic growth, which place them on the ideological right. However, contrary to the former RW regimes, I expect that

former developmental state voters will show pro-dictator bias due to their history of peaceful regime transitions and strong successor parties:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Citizens from former developmental states will show pro-dictator bias in contrast to anti-dictator bias in former LW and RW regimes.

3 Research design

I test the pro-dictator bias in political ideology by merging individual survey datasets included in the World Values Survey (WVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), and the Comparative Study of Electoral Stytems (CSES). The combined dataset includes around 500,000 respondents from 1985 to 2018 across 50 countries collected across different regions of Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and established democracies.[1] The number of respondents included in the analysis varies depending on the availability of certain variables, ranging from 150,000 to 500,000 observations depending on the model specification. I analyze the level of ideological bias by examining how far individual voters' ideological positions in former authoritarian regimes are away from those in established democracies.

The main empirical analysis includes two parts: The first empirical part directly tests the influence of successor party traits on ideological bias. I create an outcome variable measuring the *Ideological Bias* of post-authoritarian voters in three steps. First, I calculate the average voter ideology only from established democracies by each birth-year cohort from each survey cycle included in the dataset. In this way, I can use these average values as reference points and account for trends in ideology shifts across age-cohorts in different survey years. Second, I subtract these averages of ideology from the left-right

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[1]The full list of countries in the dataset and descriptive statistics of key variables are summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix.

self-placement of post-authoritarian voters so that this difference can represent how the individual ideology of post-authoritarian voters deviates from the average of established democracy voters that did not experience the history of authoritarianism. This step is similar to the approach of Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) who included voter ideology in established democracies as a counterfactual level that post-authoritarian voters might have held if they had not experienced the authoritarian past. Since the first empirical part employs direct comparisons among former authoritarian regimes, I use the difference in ideology as the main measure of ideological bias. Third, I recode this variable such that a positive value indicates *pro*-dictator bias and a negative value indicates *anti*-dictator bias. Since the typical measures of ideology code left-right ideology on a 0-10 scale, I simply reverse-coded the ideology difference among former leftist regime voters so that citizens who self-identify with leftist ideology take higher values. This coding strategy enables a more straightforward interpretation of regression coefficients, with a positive value showing greater pro-dictator bias and a negative value meaning anti-dictator bias.

I use two explanatory variables from former-authoritarian countries, measuring country-level variation in the fates of authoritarian successors: *Succesor Vote Share* measures the vote share of successor parties in the founding election after regime transition, which is retrieved from Jhee (2008) (H1). I include this variable as a measure of successor parties' strength during and in the direct aftermath of the transition. Studies on authoritarian successors have identified a strong party structure, a national party network, and the party brand of competence as the key determinants of their post-transition success (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Slater and Wong 2013; Miller 2019). I also include *Violent Party Exit* that records the fate of former ruling parties before democratization (H2). I use the dataset from Miller (2019), which codes 1 if a ruling party is ousted violently before democratization and 0 otherwise.

I also include a variable measuring the time trend since democratization in order to

account for temporal trends in survey responses and ideological positions after a regime transition. I use the actual year of democratization for each country included in the dataset. With the key variables described above, I run models of the following form:

$$IdeologicalBias_{ijt} \quad = \quad \alpha \; + \; \beta Legacies_j \; + \; \epsilon \tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}} \; + \; X_{ijt}\gamma \; + \; Survey_k \; + \; v_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where i is each individual respondent in former authoritarian country j. $Legacies_j$ includes the two predictors, *Successor Vote Share* and *Violent Party Exit*, described above. $\tilde{T}$ denotes a time trend of the number of years since democratization at year c, at the time of the survey year, t ($\tilde{t} = t - c$). I also include individual-level covariates, X_{ijt}, in the model to control for the effects of these underlying variables on individual ideology. I include *Gender* and *Age* variables to account for differences in ideological orientation across gender and different age-cohorts. I also include *Education* levels in the expectation that citizens with higher education attainment will be less likely to identify with authoritarian brands. I use survey dummies to account for within-survey variation for all the surveys included in this paper (ESS, WVS, CSES). To account for different sampling designs across countries and years, I cluster standard errors at the country-year level.

The second empirical analysis tests dissimilar patterns of ideological bias across different types of post-authoritarian democracies (H3). The main findings from Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) show that post-authoritarian voters will have an anti-dictator bias, former LW (RW) regime voters are likely to report rightist (leftist) ideology. In addition to the LW and RW categories, I include former-developmental states as a category of countries where former dictatorships adopted rightist ideology, but the inheritance of authoritarian advantage and reference leads us to expect an individual bias toward the ideological label of former regimes. The main comparison of interest is the ideological position of post-authoritarian voters compared to those voters in

established democracies as a comparison group. The main outcome variable is ideological self-placement, which uses a 0-10 scale measuring the left to right ideological position of individual voters. The regression analysis with regime-type dummy variables takes the following form:

$$LR_{ij\tilde{t}} = \alpha + \beta Left_j + \gamma Right_j + \delta Devs_j + \epsilon \tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}} + Survey_k + X_{ijt}\theta + \pi Growth_j + u_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

where i denotes each individual respondent in country j. The main outcome variable, $LR_{ij\tilde{t}}$, is the left-right self-placement of respondents. *Left*, *Right*, and *Devs* indicate left-wing, right-wing, and developmental-state regimes, respectively. The interpretation of the main coefficients from this analysis is slightly different from the first part; here, a positive coefficient indicates a more rightist ideological bias while a negative coefficient denotes a more leftist ideological tendency.

I further include individual-level controls of age, gender, and education (X), the time trend since democratization (T), and survey dummies following the model specification from Equation (1). I extend the analysis by including an additional country-level covariate of pre-transition economic growth rates ($Growth_j$) to account for the effects of former regimes' economic performance on political attitudes of post-authoritarian voters (Jhee 2008). The variable measures the average economic growth rate over two years prior to the transition base year (t) and was collected from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.[2] All standard errors are clustered by country-year.

Table 1: Authoritarian Successors and Pro-dictator Ideological Bias

	Dependent variable:					
	Ideological Bias					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Successor Vote Share	0.009***	0.009***			0.011***	0.011***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)			(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Violent Party Exit			−0.119***	−0.146***	−0.035**	−0.063***
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Age		0.012***		0.011***		0.010***
		(0.0003)		(0.0004)		(0.0004)
Gender		0.105***		0.107***		0.103***
		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.012)
Education		−0.050***		−0.053***		−0.065***
		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Constant	−0.013	−0.276***	0.208***	−0.031	−0.057***	−0.180***
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Survey FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	219,082	217,957	158,049	157,221	155,511	154,712

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with robust standard errors clusted at the country-year level. Models include survey fixed effects (FE), time trend since democratization, and individual-level variables. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4 Results

4.1 Authoritarian successors and ideological bias

Table 1 reports the regression results predicting individual *Ideological Bias* across post-authoritarian voters. Models 1-2 use *Successor Vote Share* from the founding elections as a predictor, Models 3-4 include *Violent Party Exit* as a main explanatory variable, and Models 5-6 use both variables in the analysis. Results in Models 1-2 show a positive relationship between successor party vote share and ideological bias. When former ruling parties secure higher vote shares after regime transition, citizens are more likely to have an ideological orientation that is favorable to the ideological label of the former dictator. The results are robust after including individual-level controls.

The effect size of *Successor Vote Share* is comparable to that of *Age*. Results show that the expected influence on ideological bias from a successor party winning around 20% more vote share (one standard deviation) compared to the mean is equivalent to the increase in ideological bias between voters in their 60s and mid-40s (one standard deviation of the age variable, 16.8 years). Given previous research that socialization under different regimes leads to substantial differences in political attitudes across citizens both with and without direct experience under dictatorship (Mishler and Rose 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017), the similar effect sizes indicate the importance of the successor party's electoral performance on the formation of voter preferences after transition.

Violent Party Exit in Models 3-4 show consistent negative coefficients: voters from countries with a history of a violent ruling party ouster are less likely to identify with the ideological label of the former dictator. Considering that successors in only one out of eight countries that experienced violent party exit succeeded electorally after transition,

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[2]The variable does not include observations from many of the former-Soviet countries due to data availability. This reduced the number of observations included in the main data analysis.

Figure 1: Authoritarian successor party vote shares in founding election and ideological bias: the figure shows predicted effect sizes of *Ideological Bias* across the level of *Successor Vote Share* using results from Model 6 in Table 1

the results are consistent with the findings from *Successor Vote Share*. The coefficients remain unchanged when the two variables are included in the same regression equation (Models 5-6). The combined results show that the success of former ruling parties explains the ideological orientation of post-authoritarian voters.

4.2 Developmental-state voters and pro-dictator bias

The previous section described the ideological bias within post-authoritarian regimes, but the directions of this bias may vary depending on different features of the regime transition. This section continues to examine factors leading to a pro-dictator bias by focusing on former developmental states as an exemplary category that shares strong former ruling parties and a history of negotiated regime transitions. I expect that while voters in former leftist and rightist regimes may show anti-dictator bias, former developmental state voters will have a pro-dictator bias in ideology.

Results in Table 2 support this argument. The table first confirms the findings from Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020): respondents from former RW regimes have more left-leaning ideological tendencies (negative coefficients) and voters from LW regimes

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have more right-learning self-placement (positive coefficients) compared to voters in established democracies. Regarding developmental state voters, coefficients in Table 2 show that these voters have more rightist ideologies compared to established democracy voters, showing distinct voter attitudes from former developmental states. Even through RW regimes and former developmental states adopted rightist ideology as their main ruling strategies, the differing fates of the two regime types resulted in opposite patterns of ideological bias among their voters. The effects are robust after accounting for individual and country-level covariates.

In the Appendix, I extend the empirical analysis to investigate 1) the trajectory of the main effects over time and 2) between-cohort differences in ideological bias in post-developmental states. I find that the pro-dictator bias continues in these countries even 25 years after regime transition (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). The between-cohort analysis shows different generational trends in ideological orientation among former developmental states (see Figure 2 in the Appendix): the anti-dictator bias originates from preference falsification against the authoritarian past among younger voters in LW regimes and among all voters in RW regimes (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; 1975). On the contrary, the pro-dicator bias mainly comes from older voters' preference alignment with the former dictator, with weak or no observable ideological bias from established democracy voters among younger cohorts. The finding is more striking because some younger cohorts from the former developmental states show a pro-dictator bias even when they did not experience authoritarian socialization or indoctrination under dictatorship. This may indicate further evidence of the lingering influence of favorable appreciation of the past regime shaped by a strong authoritarian successor party immediately after a regime transition, and how such images can prolong identification with the ideological labels of the former dictatorship.

Table 2: Ideological bias in left-wing, right-wing, and developmental-state regimes

	Dependent variable:		
	Ideological identification		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Developmental	0.061***	0.075***	0.225***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Leftist	0.023***	0.026***	0.027***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Rightist	−0.085***	−0.088***	−0.121***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Survey FE	Y	Y	Y
Time trend	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	N	Y	Y
Pre-transition controls	N	N	Y
Observations	521,955	493,242	348,031

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with robust standard errors clusted at the country-year level. Models include survey fixed effects (FE), time trend since democratization, individual-level variables, and pre-transition country-level variables. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5 Conclusion

Dictators adopt various tools during their its authoritarian rule, which results in different trajectories of legacies in the new democratic regime after transition. The main focus of this paper was to emphasize that authoritarian histories are not identical to one another, and that this variation can leave dissimilar legacies on democratic voters. Strong successor parties with authoritarian advantage and the ability to reference the authoritarian past can employ electoral strategies that breed positive legacies of the authoritarian past, leading voters to adopt an ideological position that is close to the ideological label of the former leader.

Former ruling parties often play an important role in shaping democratic design, party structure, or party system institutionalization (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Miller 2019; Riedl 2014). The findings from this paper add to our understanding of the role of

successors in facilitating political attitudes and preferences favorable to the authoritarian past. Given the continued performance of authoritarian successors, future studies on the positive legacies of authoritarianism can expand our understanding of how parties can shape other behavioral traits of post-authoritarian voters.

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A Appendix

A.1 Descriptive statistics: List of countries used in the analysis and descriptive statistics

Table 3: List of countries used in the analysis and descriptive statistics

	Number of observations	Transition base year	Regime ideology†	Successor party vote share (%)‡	Violent party end*
Argentina	4582	1983	RW	0	Y
Australia	8369	1990	-	-	-
Austria	12364	1990	-	-	-
Belarus	5336	1990	LW	4.6	N/A
Belgium	19587	1990	-	-	-
Brazil	12639	1985	RW	7.8	N
Bulgaria	12165	1990	LW	30.4	N
Canada	14580	1990	-	-	-
Chile	6354	1989	RW	29.4	N/A
Colombia	10518	1958	RW		
Czech Republic	23002	1990	LW	14	N
Denmark	15342	1990	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	412	1978	RW	41.6	Y
Ecuador	1198	1979	RW	0	Y
El Salvador	1213	1982	RW	29.8	N
Estonia	16305	1990	LW	0	N
Finland	20646	1990	-	-	-
France	19129	1990	-	-	-
Georgia	4410	1990	LW	0	Y
Greece	12031	1974	RW	0	N/A
Guatemala	1000	1985	RW	0	N
Hungary	16508	1990	LW	10.9	N
Indonesia	2991	1999	RW (DS)	19.9	N
Ireland	22881	1990	-	-	-
Italy	6004	1990	-	-	-
Korea, Rep.	8280	1987	RW (DS)	35.9	N
Latvia	4163	1990	LW	5.8	N
Lithuania	9748	1990	LW	61.1	N
Netherlands	22130	1990	-	-	-
New Zealand	8516	1990	-	-	-
Norway	21976	1990	-	-	-
Peru	10530	1980	RW	0	N
Poland	25804	1990	LW	9.2	N
Portugal	20703	1990	RW	0	Y
Romania	11760	1990	LW	0	Y
Russian Federation	19598	1990	LW	N/A	N/A
Serbia	3498	1990	LW	N/A	N
Slovak Republic	11732	1990	LW	14.7	N
Slovenia	17210	1990	LW	63.9	N/A
Spain	20367	1978	RW	0	N
Sweden	18022	1990	-	-	-
Switzerland	23470	1990	-	-	-

Taiwan	11546	1996	RW (DS)	52.1	N
Ukraine	15546	1990	LW	0	N/A
United Kingdom	21203	1990	-	-	-
United States	6109	1990	-	-	-
Uruguay	3718	1984	RW	0	N
Venezuela, RB	1161	1958	RW	N/A	Y

† RW: Right-wing, LW: Left-wing, DS: Developmental state. Regime ideology
entries are from (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020)

‡ Jhee (2008)

∗ Miller (2019)

A.2 Overtime trend

This section further investigates the temporal trend since democratization in ideological bias. I use the following regression by interacting $\tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}}$ with the three regime type dummies. (All the notations in the following equation are identical to those from Equation (2).):

$$
\begin{aligned}
LR_{ij\tilde{t}} = {} & \alpha + \beta_1 Left_j + \gamma_1 Right_j + \delta_1 Devs_j + \epsilon \tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}} \\
& + \beta_2 Left_j \times \tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}} + \gamma_2 Right_j \times \tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}} + \delta_2 Devs_j \times \tilde{T}_{\tilde{t}} \\
& + Survey_k + X_{ijt}\theta + \pi Growth_j + u_{ijt}
\end{aligned}
$$

Panels in Figure 2 show distinct patterns across the three regime types. Results from left-wing regimes (top row) suggest that anti-dictator bias appears after 11-14 years since democratization.[3] While voters tend to follow ideological orientation of the former regime shortly after the transition period, they develop political attitudes distancing from the former dictator once the new regime is consolidated. Voters from right-wing regimes also show anti-dictator bias with left-leaning ideology. Under the strict assumption of linearity, right-wing regime voters start to show anti-dictator bias earlier than left-wing regime voters, after 6-12 years since democratization, depending on model specifications.

What distinguishes developmental-state voters from other post-authoritarian voters is their greater bias towards the former dictator's ideology. Voters from these countries transitioned to the new democratic regime with the ideological orientation inherited from the previous regime, and this ideological bias is estimated to last more than 17-27 years after democratic transition. This suggests that the pro-dictator bias persisted rougly more than one generation of voters, much longer than estimates found in other regime types. This pattern is also distinguishable from the right-wing regimes, which share a similar ideological spectrum but followed a more leftist turn after the transition. The coefficients from these two types of regimes are statistically different from each other (F=155.97, p <0.001).

A.3 Cohort effect

Results in Figure 3 show patterns of ideological bias across different age-cohorts and confirms distinctive trends with developmental-state voters. I found a reverse in ideology bias similar to left-wing voters found in Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020), but with two important differences. First, while generational differences exist in both regime types, the reverse in ideology bias occurs in the later-age cohorts in former developmental states with voters born in or before 1960s, compared to 1950s cohorts in left-wing regimes. The ideological legacies of the former regime lasted longer with voters in former developmental states, and a larger share of citizens possess pro-dictator

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[3]Based on the first two models in Table 2; results from the last model show that the bias is always present since democratization.

Figure 2: Overtime trends of ideological placement, comparing left-wing, right-wing, and developmental states with established democracies. The figures are estimated from regression models included in Table 2.

Figure 3: Ideological bias across age-cohorts: dots denote average ideological self-placement per each age-cohort and vertical spikes show 95% confidence intervals. The figure includes estimates from established democracies and a post-authoritarian regime type in order to better illustrate comparison in ideological bias across different cohorts.

bias. Second, while younger voters in left-wing regimes show stronger anti-dictator bias and rightist ideology, those voters in developmental states are not distinguishable from established democracy voters in their self-identified ideology. The 1970s cohort suggests anti-dictator bias, which may be driven by the overlap of their critical socialization period with the democratization period of late 1980s and early 1990s in these countries, but this trend dissipates with further younger voters. Instead of developing anti-dictator bias, younger voters in this regime type show an indistinguishable pattern in their ideological position.

These findings correspond to the previous studies that analyzed the generational divide in political attitudes and behavior in post-authoritarian regimes, with older voters having more positive views towards the former regime and negative attitudes toward democracy (Mishler and Rose 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017).