

International Mediation and The Responsibility to Protect

Obinna F. Ifediora
The University of Queensland
obinna.ifediora@uq.edu.au

Abstract

Studies on international mediation for the prevention of genocide or atrocities in the context of implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle have argued that effectiveness hangs on coercive strategies, particularly sanctions measures. Following the coercion premise, this paper posits that judicial and military mechanisms are equally essential elements of effective coercion campaigns. Drawing on the UN doctrines of R2P and the rule of law in conflict, as well as the concepts of power, directive, and multiparty mediation in international relations, I analyse the successful cases of Kenya and Guinea. The evidence supports the proposition: success depends on complementing sanctions with judicial and military mechanisms. Significantly, these coercive instruments must be concurrently deployed to successfully influence the conflict parties' or perpetrators' behaviour and decision-making.

Keywords: R2P, International Mediation, Genocide, Atrocities, ICC, Coercion

1. Introduction

Studies on international mediation for the prevention of genocide or atrocities, in the context of implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, have argued that effectiveness depends on diplomatic and coercive strategies, involving the threat or use of sanctions mechanisms because such robust tactics play a central role in influencing the conflict parties' or perpetrators' behaviour and decision-making.¹ Described by one scholar as 'atrocities crime mediation,'² as opposed to conflict mediation in the international arena, the primary goal is to prevent or stop acts of genocide or atrocities, which may require, but not necessarily, resolving the proximate causes of the dispute that triggered violence and targeted attacks on civilians, resulting in grave violations of international human rights norms.

Following the coercion premise of atrocities crime mediation, this paper posits that military and judicial mechanisms are equally important components of effective coercion, as both forms of coercion complement sanctions instruments to influence the belligerents' or perpetrators' actions and choices. In essence, my central proposition is that the success of atrocities crime mediation depends on the concurrent deployment of sanctions, judicial, and military devices. Examples of military measures include an arms embargo and threats of military intervention, while judicial tools involve an investigation by UN-mandated Commissions of Inquiry or the International Criminal Court (ICC) and threats of arrest, indictment, or prosecution. I stress that when simultaneously employed, these coercive mechanisms are more effective in influencing the disputants' choice of the mediator's directives and solutions, so they accelerate changes in perception and decision-making that

¹ Babbitt 2014; Welsh 2015; Sharma 2015; Hultman 2019.

² Welsh 2015, at 105-112.

prevent genocide or atrocities. Therefore, this paper contributes to the R2P's responsibility to prevent agenda – that is, early, decisive, and collective diplomatic and coercive actions undertaken by the international community to prevent, or halt escalating atrocities and avert genocide. So, I recommend that future studies should explore the determinants of successful deployment of multidimensional coercive mechanisms, involving sanctions, judicial, and military devices, in atrocity crime mediation.

To explore the propositions outlined above, I adopt multiple conceptual approaches, centring on the UN doctrines of R2P and rule of law in conflict societies, and the concepts of power, directive, and multiparty mediation in international relations to analyse the successful cases of Kenya and Guinea. I employ qualitative and content analysis methods, drawing on primary and open data sources. The main sources of data include the UN Security Council resolutions and presidential statements; the European Parliament resolutions; publications of the US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs; the African Union (AU) Assembly and Peace and Security Council decisions and communiqués, as well as the decisions and communiqués of the Authority of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), some of which are contained in the online repository database “reliefweb,” hosted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; the ICC press releases and statements; the report of the International Commission of Inquiry in Guinea; Kofi Annan's memoir *Interventions*. Annan was the chief mediator of the AU Panel of Eminent Personalities that mediated the conflict in Kenya; the International Crisis Group (ICG) reports, prepared by analysts who observed the peace processes; the communiqués of the International Contact Group for Guinea; the narrative book of the mediation and reform processes in Kenya, *Back from the Brink*. The authors include officers of the AU Coordination and Liaison Office of the Panel who witnessed the mediation initiative and had access to confidential reports and documents, some of which were reproduced in the book. I also draw on reliable media reports, such as The New

Humanitarian, Voice of America, and France 24, to supplement the data. The article has two major components, the analytical framework, and case studies, and I will proceed accordingly.

2. Analytical Framework

In this section, I discuss the UN doctrines of R2P and rule law in conflict societies, and the concepts of power, directive, and multiparty mediation in international relations to highlight their relevance for analysing and understanding the success of atrocity crime mediation. I stress that sanctions, judicial, and military tools are essential components of effective coercion operations and must be concurrently deployed to successfully influence the conflict parties' or perpetrators' behaviour and choice of the mediator's directives and recommendations.

The UN General Assembly endorsed the R2P principle during the 2005 World Summit, committing the Member States and the international community to prevent genocide or atrocities, especially war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and stipulating measures Member States and the global society can adopt to realize these objectives, including diplomatic and peaceful mechanisms as enshrined in Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter, as well as coercive approaches as envisaged by Chapter VII, thus:

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.³

³ United Nations, 'World Summit Outcome,' 2005, para. 139.

This provision is now widely known as ‘Pillar Three’ of R2P, encapsulating the idea of a ‘timely and decisive response.’⁴ The most relevant proviso in the paragraph for the analysis of successful atrocity crime mediation is ‘collective action through UN Security Council should peaceful means be inadequate.’ This stipulation anticipates combining Chapters VI and VII tools, rather than a sequenced approach. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put it, ‘timely response would include pacific measures under Chapter VI of the Charter [and] coercive ones under Chapter VII.’⁵ In essence, although the UN Charter placed the mediation mechanism in Chapter VI as a peaceful tool for preventing genocide or atrocities,⁶ the concept of atrocity crime mediation underlines coercive actions under Chapter VII because conventional mediation adheres to the conflict parties’ interests and therefore unsuitable. In other words, mediation for the prevention of genocide or atrocities integrates noncoercive (mediation) and coercive (sanction, judicial, and military) tools. This understanding recalls what Dag Hammarskjöld described as ‘Chapter Six and Half’ measure in the context of UN preventive diplomacy and underscores the hallmark of the R2P’s responsibility to prevent agenda.⁷ The relevance of this insight for analysis is that the effectiveness of atrocity crime mediation hangs on the willingness of the international community to support mediation with coercive devices.

In the Supplement to the doctrine-setting position paper, *An Agenda for Peace*, then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that the purpose of coercive mechanisms like sanctions in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking endeavours is to change the ‘behaviour of a party.’⁸ Invariably, sanction tools must target the party’s actions, specifically

⁴ United Nations, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, at 2.

⁵ United Nations, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, para. 11c.

⁶ For a fuller account of the peaceful means in the Third Pillar, see Bellamy 2015.

⁷ For informative discussions of the R2P’s responsibility to prevent agenda, see Woocher 2012; Sharma and Welsh 2015.

⁸ United Nations, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, 1995, para. 70.

the violation of human rights norms. Likewise, and more important for understanding and interpreting the multifaceted coercive approach being advanced in this paper, Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali's successor, also observed that one of the objectives of introducing judicial tools in 'conflict societies,' as opposed to 'post-conflict societies,' involves 'putting an end to serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.'⁹ So, by establishing a Commission of Inquiry to investigate potential acts of genocide or atrocities or when the ICC undertakes the same function within its mandate in the Rome Statute or occasions where the UN Security Council authorized ICC intervention, the goal must involve influencing the parties' behaviour or decision-making on stopping the offending actions. The underlying assumption in this context is that the *act* is already occurring, hence the urgency to avert further escalation of atrocities or genocide requires early insertion of judicial tools. As Ban Ki-moon discussed and suggested in the UN policy-setting paper on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, thus:

If [investigation was] undertaken early in a crisis, at the first sign that a State is failing to meet its obligations relating to the responsibility to protect, such on-site missions can also provide opportunities for delivering messages directly to key decision makers on behalf of the larger international community, for example, by trying to dissuade them from destructive courses of action that could make them subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Court or ad hoc tribunals.¹⁰

This policy guidance encompasses the threat of arrest, indictment, and prosecution to change the parties' conduct and choices. Moreover, it underlines the analytical relevance of judicial mechanisms concerning 'collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII' to support the peaceful tool of mediation. All this entails that effective atrocity crime mediation under Chapter VI must incorporate Chapter VII measures, involving sanctions and judicial measures.

⁹ United Nations, *The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies*, 2004, para. 38.

¹⁰ United Nations, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 2009, para. 53.

The use of military tools in mediation is not novel, although there is no specific UN policy on mediation and military support, except for UN peacekeeping and peace processes. Nevertheless, in exploring the role of coercive approaches in facilitating mediation effectiveness, conflict mediation scholars, such as William Zartman, Michael Greig, and Paul Diehl, have noted the significance of military mechanisms in relation to what they called ‘ripening’ or ‘softening’¹¹ conflicts and the parties. These concepts refer to any activities the mediator undertakes to move the belligerents from violent to non-violent behaviour and the negotiating table, thereby accelerating the settlement of the dispute. Such measures may include shuttle diplomacy or offers of incentives or pressure campaigns to create the right conditions for mediation events, like establishing a balance of power between the parties. They may comprise military aid to strengthen the weaker party and stimulate a hurting stalemate, making negotiated settlement more attractive.¹² However, as I noted above, from the R2P perspective, settlement is not a condition for preventing genocide or halting atrocities, and while some scholars¹³ have alluded to the ripening function of sanctions, here I underline military devices as equally essential components for ripening operations.¹⁴

The concept of power mediation in international relations is especially relevant in understanding the importance of military measures for the purpose of shaping the disputants’ actions and choices. The concept describes the mediation practice where great powers, like the US, undertake mediation initiatives and use their vast military resources to manipulate the

¹¹ Zartman 1986; Greig and Diehl 2006. For an application of the concept of ripening in international mediation for the prevention of genocide or atrocities, see Babbitt 2014, at 32.

¹² Zartman and De Soto 2010, at 35-39; Zartman and Anstey 2012, at 24-25; Greig and Diehl 2012, at 181.

¹³ Babbitt 2014, at 31-32. See also Ifediora 2021, at 305.

¹⁴ For a helpful analysis of robust strategies involving military tools like arms embargoes in the context of the R2P’s responsibility to prevent agenda, see Woocher 2012.

belligerents' behaviour and decision-making.¹⁵ Saadia Touval's idea of 'coercive mediation,' illustrated by the US mediation in Bosnia's 'civil war and accompanying atrocities,' underlines the significance of 'economic and military' tools.¹⁶ The analytical relevance of the concept of power is to incorporate military tools as a crucial element of effective atrocity crime mediation.

Likewise, the concept of directive mediation describes the mediator behaviour or strategy that is based on coercion or manipulation.¹⁷ It represents an 'intrusive role,'¹⁸ where the mediator controls the process and substance, which is also a feature of power mediation. Here, the mediator uses coercive tools to convince the disputants to accept the mediator's directives. More importantly, directive mediation helps to understand the mediator's strategic choice. Bercovitch and Wells¹⁹ have explained that the mediator's choice of strategy is based on 'contextual factors,' such as the nature of the conflict, the parties' characteristics, and available resources. So, the 'nature of conflict' in atrocity crime mediation would refer to the grave breaches of international human rights, humanitarian, and criminal law. Equally, the 'nature of parties' would refer to civilian populations as the primary targets of violence.²⁰ Also, 'available resources' would involve the mediator's capacity to deploy coercive instruments. Kofi Annan's choice of directive strategy with the support of the international community, especially the US, which earned him the moniker, a 'dictator,'²¹ was influenced by what he called 'Half A Million Rwandan Ghosts'²² in relation to his atrocity crime mediation in Kenya.

¹⁵ Touval 1992; Kleiboer 2002; Favretto 2009.

¹⁶ Touval 1996, at 558-9.

¹⁷ Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch and Wells 1993.

¹⁸ Zartman and De Soto 2010, at 35-39.

¹⁹ Bercovitch and Wells 1993, at 12-21.

²⁰ See Babbitt 2014; Welsh 2015; Sharma 2015; Hultman 2019.

²¹ Griffiths 2008, at 11.

²² Annan 2012, at 184.

Equally notable is that the current UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, has recommended ‘a creative and adaptable strategy’²³ of mediation because of the nature of contemporary conflicts that may involve genocide or atrocities. The analytical importance is that atrocity crime mediators must adopt a directive strategy that includes sanctions, judicial and military tools to be effective in shaping the parties’ behaviour and decision-making.

The concept of multiparty mediation is also important for analysing the success of atrocity crime mediation, as it portrays the mediation initiative that involves several state and non-actors.²⁴ State actors may include power mediators and non-state actors may encompass international organizations like the UN and regional organizations, such as the AU and ECOWAS. Although multiparty mediation is prone to coordination and forum-shopping problems, the collaborative efforts of many actors contributing unique resources and skills can prove instrumental for effective mediation. The significance of the concept is that it supports the R2P’s emphasis on early and decisive collective action through the UN Security Council. Also, because small power mediators like the AU or ECOWAS often do not have material resources that could be used for effective coercion campaigns, multiparty mediation enables the involvement of power mediators like the US and its allies, known as the Group of Friends or Contact Groups, who can contribute the required coercive assets to influence the disputants’ or perpetrators’ actions and decisions.

Finally, the lack of standard criteria for assessing the success or failure of conflict mediation makes the goal of mediation paradigm an essential analytical concept for interpreting the success of atrocity crime mediation.²⁵ The goal of the mediation model focuses on the

²³ United Nations, United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, 2017, para. 27.

²⁴ Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999.

²⁵ Kleiboer 1996.

objective of mediation as stipulated in the mediation mandate and assesses whether the aim has been achieved.²⁶ Following the R2P doctrine and its emphasis on operational prevention of genocide and atrocities, I focus on assessing whether atrocity crime mediation prevented genocide or averted the escalation of atrocities. Accordingly, I underscore that the prevention of genocide or escalating atrocities, as opposed to holding perpetrators accountable for atrocities, is a more measurable standard for evaluating the success of mediation for the prevention of genocide or atrocities. This is because pursuing accountability, while important, is beyond the mediator's competence. The ICC and ad hoc tribunals are the institutions for ensuring accountability to prevent future atrocities and fight impunity.

3. Case Studies

In this section, I utilize the explanatory concepts outlined in the previous section to analyse and interpret the successful cases of Kenya and Guinea, showing that success depended on the simultaneous deployment of sanctions, judicial, and military tools. While there are differences in both cases, they share a few characteristics that justify the selection and analytical significance. First, both cases involve an election dispute, as the proximate trigger of atrocities. In Guinea, disagreement over election eligibility criteria led to the atrocities. In Kenya, a dispute over election outcome resulted in violence and atrocities. Second, the ICC determined that the targeted attacks on civilians in both cases amounted to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Third, the international community adopted coercive measures to support mediation. Fourth, both cases involved AU-led mediation with the support of the UN and Contact Group, although ECOWAS later assumed the lead role in Guinea with the same international assistance.

²⁶ Bercovitch 2011, at 28.

3.1 Kenya: 2007-2008

This analysis will show that in addition to the diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions implemented by the US, the UK, the EU, the UN Security Council supported the ICC investigation, and the US Department of State threatened to sever military cooperation with Kenya and sent out a letter threatening specific individuals with prosecution, and Rwanda called for military intervention. Then, Kofi Annan, the AU chief mediator adopted a directive strategy, and in conversation with President Mwai Kibaki, restated that the international community was prepared to adopt further coercive measures against Kibaki. So, here we have economic sanctions, the ICC investigation, the US threat of prosecution and withdrawal of military assistance, and the Rwandan request for military action amidst AU mediation. Also, we have a power mediator (the US) and multiparty mediation, as the UN provided technical support to AU mediation. Atrocity crime mediation achieved the goal of preventing further escalation of atrocities, and so was a success. Ultimately, the concurrent deployment of sanctions, judicial, and military tools by the international community influenced Kibaki's decision-making and choice of the mediator's recommended grand coalition government.

The proximate cause of the conflict that triggered violence and atrocities was a dispute between the two main political parties, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU), over the result of the 27 December 2007 presidential election. In controversial circumstances, the Electoral Commission declared the incumbent president and PNU leader, President Mwai Kibaki, the winner. The opposition party ODM and its leader, Raila Odinga, accused Kibaki and the PNU of electoral fraud and called on their supporters to a mass demonstration. The protest led to a violent confrontation with Kibaki's followers, while ethnic militias aligned with both ODM and PNU attacked civilians based on party affiliation and ethnic identity. The attacks resulted in the killing of more than 1,200 people, and the ICC later confirmed that crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing were committed.

Amidst the violence and atrocities, Kibaki and Odinga had rejected several offers of mediation by African leaders, including from Archbishop Desmond Tutu, four former African Heads of State and Government: Joaquim Chissano, Kenneth Kaunda, Quett Masire, and Benjamin Mkapa, and a serving president, Yoweri Museveni, among others. Kibaki's position was that the crisis was an internal matter that must be resolved through Kenya's conflict resolution institutions, particularly through the judicial system. Odinga distrusted Kenya's institutions and preferred international assistance. The AU could bridge the divide between Kibaki and Odinga. So, following intense diplomatic pressure and threats of sanctions by US President George Bush and the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown,²⁷ Kibaki invited the AU Chairman, President John Kufuor, to Nairobi for talks. In essence, diplomacy and the threat of sanctions influenced Kibaki's decision-making on the benefits of a mediated solution.

Kufuor's mediation between 8 and 10 January 2008 failed, as Kibaki rejected a World Bank-facilitated peace deal, which had been negotiated between ODM and PNU senior officials and business leaders. According to the International Crisis Group report, Kibaki rejected the peace because of a provision that recommended an inquiry instead of mediation.²⁸ However, Kufuor succeeded by proposing a mediation and announcing that the parties have agreed to an AU-led mediation with Kofi Annan as the chief mediator. Yet, Kibaki's announcement of a coalition government on January 11, which included a member of the ODM alliance as vice president, illustrated his reluctance to a mediated settlement. In response, the EU Parliament adopted a broad package of sanctions on January 17, voting for "all further budgetary support to the government of Kenya to be frozen until a political solution to the

²⁷ For a detailed examination of the background, see Jepson et al. 2014. For an insightful analysis in the context of the R2P's responsibility to prevent agenda, see Sharma 2015.

²⁸ International Crisis Group, 'Kenya in Crisis,' 2008, at 22-3; Voice of America, 'AU mediation effort in Kenya ends in failure,' 2009.

present crisis has been achieved.’²⁹ Two days after, the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Mitchel, visited Nairobi to restate the rationale for EU sanctions and demands.³⁰ The EU sanction was substantial because Kenya depended on foreign aid to run several refugee camps on its territory, and so was significant in influencing Kibaki’s choice of mediation.

As the US, the UK, and the EU adopted diplomatic and sanctions measures, Annan, with his expanded Panel that included two co-mediators, Benjamin Mkapa and Graça Machel, arrived in Nairobi on 22 January. Formal sessions of mediation, known as the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation, commenced a week later. On 1 February, the parties adopted the agenda and timetable, which stipulated that the resolution of the electoral dispute, the proximate cause of the conflict that triggered violence and atrocities, must be within two weeks – an ambitious timeline influenced by the urgency to stop ongoing atrocities. Nevertheless, the negotiation took much longer time than Annan anticipated, and success was only possible when the international community complemented diplomatic pressure and sanctions with judicial and military tools. Negotiations on Annan’s recommended grand coalition government deadlocked because Kibaki rejected an executive prime minister position for Odinga, arguing that the constitution had no such provision. Odinga refused to accept any political position without executive powers. To induce compliance and manipulate Kibaki’s choice of sharing executive power with Odinga, the international community expanded the scope of coercive measures, introducing further sanctions, complemented by judicial and military instruments.

In a statement to the US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, noted that the State Department had

²⁹ European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Kenya,’ 2008, at 18.

³⁰ See Jepson et al. 2014.

‘made it clear that there will be “no business as usual” with Kenya until there is a real, concerted effort by both the Kenyan Government and its opposition to resolve the issues which generated this tragedy.’ This threat referred to sanctions that would include the severance of military support to and cooperation with Kenya on the war terror in East Africa, which underlines the military component of the coercion campaign. In addition, Frazer stated that ‘a strong message of accountability’ will help to prevent the escalation of atrocities. This was a threat of prosecution.³¹ Consequently, the International Crisis Group report noted the US State Department sent letters to thirteen individuals threatening prosecution.³²

The threat of prosecution by the US overlapped with multilateral efforts already underway through the ICC and the Security Council. The Security Council had adopted a presidential statement expressing deep concern about the crisis and its regional impact on peace and security, stressing ‘the need to avoid impunity ... and [called] for those responsible for violence to be brought to justice.’ And the ICC commenced a preliminary investigation into the events. The AU Assembly – the supreme organ of the Organization that comprises the 55 Heads of State and Government of the Member States – adopted a resolution calling for accountability. Moreover, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda called on Kenya’s military to intervene, consistent with article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, relating to the right of a Member State to request intervention. Furthermore, the EU and several other states threatened targeted sanctions, involving travel bans and asset freezes, against government and opposition officials and their family members.³³ So, there is now the complement of sanctions, judicial,

³¹ The United States Senate, ‘The Immediate and Underlying Causes and Consequences of Kenya’s Flawed Election,’ 2008, online resource.

³² International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya in Crisis,’ 2008, at 28.

³³ United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2008, at 1; International Criminal Court, ‘OTP Statement in Relation to Events in Kenya,’ 2008; African Union, Assembly Decision, 2008, para. 8; Financial Times, ‘Kagame urges Kenyan army to act,’ 2008; International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya in Crisis,’ 2008, at 28; Jepson et al, 2014, at 31-2.

and military devices designed to influence Kibaki's decision on Annan's recommended 'grand coalition government' deal. The concurrent deployment of these tools worked, as Annan referred specifically to the stipulated penalties in conversation with Kibaki.

In his memoir, Annan recalled, thus:

“In my meeting with Kibaki, I pressed him, explaining I was in regular contact with key members of the international community. “The international community is picking up that this failure to make a deal is because of the PNU's unwillingness to move. There will be consequences from them if this fails.”³⁴

Annan's reference to personal 'consequences' to Kibaki, if the deal failed, must be understood in the context of the coercive mechanisms already deployed by the Security Council, the ICC, the EU, the AU, the US, Rwanda, and other state actors, which encompassed sanctions, investigation, threats of prosecution, and severance of military partnership (i.e., an arms embargo) and military intervention. These multifaceted coercive strategies convinced Kibaki to share power with Odinga, and both signed the Agreement on the Principles of the Coalition Government on the same day Annan conversed with Kibaki – 28 February 2008. Significantly, the threat or use of sanctions, judicial, and military tools accelerated Kibaki's decision-making on resolving the political crisis, and specifically the choice of Annan's recommended 'grand coalition government,' as the only viable solution to the disputed presidential election, which was the proximate cause of the violence that triggered atrocities. Overall, the atrocity crime mediation involved sanctions, judicial, and military instruments, these multidimensional coercive measures averted the escalation of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and prevented a genocide.

³⁴ Annan 2012, at 200. Quotation marks are in the original text, but I have modified the text for clarity.

3.2 Guinea: 2008-2010

Like the previous case, this analysis will show that ECOWAS applied military measures, particularly arms embargoes; the French government, in coordination with the US and ECOWAS, threatened to intervene militarily, the AU implemented targeted sanctions, the UN established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate acts of atrocities and determine the crimes that have been committed and recommend measures to prevent further escalation, and the ICC Prosecutor initiated an investigation, all of which amounted to a threat of prosecution. Importantly, this was a multiparty mediation led by the AU and ECOWAS under the auspices of the international Contact Group that included the UN Security Council and the US, as the power mediator. The mediator, ECOWAS, directed the mediation process by choosing venues for the sessions and recommending solutions to the crisis, and the goal was to prevent the escalation of atrocities. Eventually, the simultaneous deployment of sanctions, judicial, and military mechanisms influenced President Dadis Camara's decision to surrender power to his subordinates and embrace the mediator's recommended solution.³⁵

The proximate cause of the violence and atrocities was a dispute between the military junta that came to power through a coup and a group of civil societies and labour unions over the timetable and eligibility for an election to restore constitutional order. In December 2008, President Lansana Conté passed away. Although the constitution stipulated that the Prime Minister, then Ahmed Souaré, should become the interim president, a group of junior military officers, known as the National Council for Democracy and Development (or CNDD in French), seized power and appointed Captain Dadis Camara the leader. Camara promised to organize elections within two years, by December 2010 to restore democracy and constitutional order. However, Guinea's broad-based, well-established, and powerful opposition group,

³⁵ For a helpful analysis in the context of R2P and preventive diplomacy, see Kikoler 2015.

known as the Forum of Active Forces (or Forces Vives in French) supported the CNDD but made two clear demands: 1) that the promised elections should be brought forward to 2009, and 2) that CNDD members should not be eligible to contest for elective offices.³⁶ Essentially, the dispute between the CNDD and Forces Vives was about election scheduling and eligibility for election.

In January 2009, at its summit in Addis Ababa, the AU Assembly established the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G) to support and oversee the process of restoring constitutional order. Co-chaired by the AU Special Representative to Guinea, Ibrahima Fall, and ECOWAS President, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the ICG-G members included the UN Security Council and the EU. From a mediation perspective, the ICG-G's objective was to facilitate negotiations between the CNDD and Forces Vives on election scheduling and eligibility, which would contribute to the overall conduct of a credible election. Thus, the first session of negotiation occurred in February 2009, focusing on establishing a transitional government and adopting a timetable for election. The meeting concluded with the ICG-G mandate, including the establishment of a national transitional council (NTC) to oversee voter registration and elections to be held in 2009 and a demand that Camara formalizes commitment that 'the Prime Minister and members of CNDD would not run in the next elections.' Notably, the mandate stipulated for 'a continuation of the investigation' of past atrocities committed by the military regime during a protest organized by the Forces Vives between 2006 and 2007,³⁷ which neither the CNDD nor the ICG-G pursued, as they focused on elections. So, the ICG-G mediation succeeded in facilitating an agreement on an earlier election in December 2009, rather than December 2010, but there was no concrete agreement on eligibility – Camara and

³⁶ France 24, 'Government pledges cooperation with junta,' 2008.

³⁷ United Nations, Final Communiqué of First session of the International Contact Group on Guinea, 2009, paras. 6-7, 11-15. The Human Rights Watch has detailed report on the previous atrocities committed by the military regime, see Human Right Watch, 'Dying for Change,' 2007.

the CNDD did not formalize the oral commitment to neutrality in the electoral process. So, the dispute between the parties was now about eligibility to contest in elections.

As a result, progress on the registration of political parties and accreditation of candidates for the presidential election stalled, as Camara, facing calls from Forces Vives to demonstrate neutrality, suggested he may run for the presidency, arguing that a civilian may not be able to control the military's grip on power. Several reports indicated that Camara took steps to consolidate his hold on the levers of state authority. For example, he unilaterally expanded the membership of the proposed NTC from 163 to 244 so he could alter the composition and control of the Council. Further, he appointed senior military officers based on ethnic affiliations and mobilized ethnic militia to intimidate the opposition. Camara's actions fragmented the military ranks as the officers passed over on promotions and appointments protested and spurred the civil society to act.³⁸

By August 2009, the Forces Vives had lost hope of persuading Camara and the CNDD not to run in the elections and thus adopted a more confrontational stance, demanding Camara's resignation and calling for a national rally to protest the military's apparent quest for constitutional power. The CNDD administration rejected Forces Vives's application for a permit, thereby rendering the assembly 'unlawful' under Guinea's law. Essentially, the CNDD had set the stage for a deliberate attack on civilians who would converge at the Conakry stadium to exercise their legitimate right to assembly. Meanwhile, ECOWAS anticipated the attack when the ECOWAS Authority, comprising the 15 Heads of State and Government of the Member States, adopted a communiqué, which called for 'an enhanced presence in Guinea ... to [among other things] assure the implementation of the chronogram for the holding of

³⁸ The New Humanitarian, 'Guinea: Timeline – toward peace and prosperity?' 2009; Radio France Internationale, 'Even the head of state can't control the situation, says President Dadis Camara,' 2009; International Crisis Group, 'Guinea: Reforming the Army,' 2010, 'Putting the Transition Back on Track,' 2011.

credible elections in 2009.’ Likewise, the AU Peace and Security Council demanded compliance with the ICG-G decisions relating to the CNDD’s neutrality and threatened ‘targeted sanctions against the President of the CNDD.’³⁹ Thus far, only the threat of sanctions has been adopted by the AU, while the ICG-G overlooked the provision for an investigation of past atrocities. Such an investigation, as the policy guidance on implementing R2P suggested, may have had an impact on Camara’s decision-making.

At its session in September 2009 at the UN headquarters, the ICG-G authorized ECOWAS to undertake the requested ‘enhanced presence’ through a formal mediation of the crisis. Particularly, the ICG-G directed ECOWAS to revitalize the dialogue and secure Camara’s commitment to neutrality in the electoral process. Besides granting ECOWAS’s request, the ICG-G, which included the UN Security Council, did not take any robust measure to change Camara’s behaviour. As such, before the deployment of ECOWAS-led ICG-G mediation, Forces Vives and its supporters of over 50,000 people assembled at Conakry Stadium on September 28 to demand Camara’s resignation. In response, the CNDD deployed security forces to disperse the crowd, whose use of excessive force resulted in 150 fatalities, rape, and sexual assault on over 100 women, and injuries to thousands of people.⁴⁰ The intentional attack on civilians prompted a coercive international response to prevent further escalation. Specifically, the French government supported the use of force to protect civilians, while the US resolved that Camara could not remain as a leader.⁴¹ So, now we have the complement of threats of sanctions and military instruments implemented by the AU and France to change Camara’s decision.

³⁹ ECOWAS, Final Communiqué of Thirty Sixth Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, 2009, at 33; African Union, Peace and Security Council Communiqué, 2009, at 6-7.

⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch, ‘Bloody Monday,’ 2009.

⁴¹ Radio France Internationale, ‘France wants international force in Guinea,’ 2009.

At the first session of the ECOWAS-led ICG-G mediation, known as Ouagadougou Talks – named after Burkina Faso’s capital city, whose President, Blaise Compaoré, acted as the ECOWAS mediator – at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja on 17 October, ECOWAS Authority ‘welcomed’ the UN Secretary-General’s decision to ‘establish the Commission of Enquiry to investigate’ events of 28 September and deployed sanctions and military devices, noting that

In view of the atrocities that have been committed, and the steps taken by the CNDD authorities to acquire new weapons, the Authority decides to impose an arms embargo on Guinea under the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and related Materials, and directs the President of the ECOWAS Commission to take all necessary measures to obtain the support of the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations in the implementation and enforcement of the embargo.⁴²

Ban Ki-moon acted swiftly and inaugurated the Commission of Inquiry on 28 October ‘to investigate and determine what crimes were committed, identify those responsible, and make recommendations for accountability. Equally, the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ‘confirmed that the situation in Guinea is under preliminary examination.’ Also, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed ECOWAS’s measures and implemented targeted sanctions on visas, movements, and assets belonging to Camara and CNDD officers.⁴³ So, now we have the full complement of sanctions, judicial, and military devices.

As the Ouagadougou Talks between the CNDD and Forces Vives progressed, Compaoré proposed an agreement that would allow Camara and the CNDD to participate in

⁴² ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS leaders call for suspension of legislative elections in Niger, want new transition authority in Guinea,’ 2009, online source.

⁴³ United Nations, Terms of Reference for the Commission of Inquiry for Guinea, 2009, paras. 1-2; International Criminal Court, ‘ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Guinea under examination,’ 2009; African Union, Peace and Security Council Press Statement, 2009, at 3-5.

the elections, contradicting his mandate to ensure that those in positions of power remain neutral. Indeed, ECOWAS Authority had

Urged [Compaoré] to take all appropriate steps to reestablish dialogue among Guinean political actors with the aim of ... ensuring that the Chairman and members of the CNDD, the Prime Minister and those who hold high offices in the new transitional authority will not be candidates in the forthcoming presidential elections.⁴⁴

Forces Vives rejected the peace plan. As Compaoré's idea to accommodate suspected perpetrators falters, UN investigators under the auspices of the Commission of Inquiry established by Ban Ki-moon interviewed Camara and the head of his security detail, Lieutenant Aboubakar Diakité, on 3 December 2009. Subsequently, media reports noted that an argument ensued between Camara and Diakité over responsibility for the atrocities. Camara had claimed that the crimes were instigated by rogue military officers led by Diakité, and in response, Diakité shot Camara in the head in what appeared as a failed assassination attempt. Camara was flown out to Rabat, Morocco, for medical treatment.⁴⁵ Here, the application of judicial mechanisms of investigation and threat of prosecution complemented sanctions and military measures already implemented to alter Camara's and Diakité's perception, behaviour, and decision-making, and impacted the entire top echelon of the CNDD.

By way of ramping up the pressure using military and judicial measures, ECOWAS President, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, in a statement to the press on 14 December, threatened to authorize a 'humanitarian and civilian protection force.'⁴⁶ In other words, direct military intervention to prevent atrocities, and ECOWAS has a reputation for such robust operations.

⁴⁴ ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS leaders call for suspension of legislative elections in Niger, want new transition authority in Guinea, 2009,' online resource.

⁴⁵ The Christian Science Monitor, 'Can Guinea avoid a violent power struggle?' 2009; The Guardian, 'Guinea aide admits shooting Moussa Dadis Camara,' 2009.

⁴⁶ British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Ecowas Mulls Guinea Intervention Force,' 2009.

In addition, Ban Ki-moon published the Commission of Inquiry's report on 18 December, which confirmed that crimes against humanity have been committed and accused Camara, Diakité, and two other senior military officers in charge of the army's special services, Captain Claude Pivi and Lieutenant-Colonel Moussa Thégboro Camara of bearing 'individual criminal liability and command responsibility.' General Sékouba Konaté, who replaced Camara, was described as an individual with likely criminal responsibility. The report proposed the involvement of the ICC.⁴⁷ Essentially, the CNDD's top brass was now suspected criminals, under severe personal sanctions, and faced the possibility of military action to remove them from power. Undoubtedly, these multifaceted coercive measures involving sanctions, judicial, and military tools weighed heavily on Camara's and Konaté's decision-making, as they considered the mediator's directives and proposed solution to give up power.

Consequently, Konaté asked Forces Vives to name a prime minister who could work with the CNDD on 11 January 2010. In a dramatic turn of events, instead of returning to Conakry, Camara, who had been undergoing treatment in a hospital in Rabat, was inexplicably flown to Ouagadougou, where he held a closed-door meeting with Compaoré and Konaté on 15 January. In a press statement after the meeting, Camara announced the Ouagadougou Joint Declaration, which, for all intent and purpose, was an agreement to transfer power to Konaté. Significantly, military and judicial tools complemented sanctions devices to sway Camara's choice of giving up power and political ambition.⁴⁸ In other words, the concurrent deployment of sanctions, judicial, and military devices accelerated Camara's decision-making on surrendering power to Konaté. This was a resounding success of atrocity crime mediation.

⁴⁷ British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Ecowas mulls Guinea intervention force,' 2009; United Nations, 'Report of the International Commission of Inquiry in Guinea,' 2009, para. 215.

⁴⁸ Voice of America, 'US, France push for elected government in Guinea,' 2010, 'Guinea opposition debating military offer to name civilian PM,' 2010; Reuters, 'Guinea's Camara to stay abroad, two proposed for PM,' 2010.

4. Conclusion

Following recent studies on international mediation for the prevention of genocide or atrocities in the context of implementing the R2P principle, which argue that concerted diplomatic efforts and coercive approaches, especially the threat or use of sanctions mechanism, are the significant sources of effectiveness, as such measures are necessary for influencing the conflict parties' or perpetrators' behaviour and decision-making, this article stressed that judicial and military tools are equally essential elements of effective coercion. I argued that success depended on the concurrent application of sanctions, judicial, and military tools, and used an analysis of the two successful cases of Kenya and Guinea to illustrate my proposition. In essence, sanctions, judicial and military instruments are indispensable components of successful atrocity crime mediation. Thus, I recommend that subsequent studies should examine more broadly the determinants of simultaneous deployment of sanctions, judicial, and military mechanisms in atrocity crime mediation.

References

- African Union. Assembly Decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.187(X), 2 February 2008.
- . Peace and Security Communiqué, PSC/PR/Comm. (CCIV), 17 September 2009.
- . Peace and Security Council Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM(CDLXXIV), 5 December 2014.
- . Peace and Security Council Press Statement, PSC/PR/BR.1(CCVI), 15 October 2009.
- Annan, Kofi A. *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).
- Babbitt, Eileen F. “Mediation and the Prevention of Mass Atrocities.” In *The International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P Cause?* eds. Mónica Serrano and Thomas G Weiss (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 29-47.
- Bellamy, Alex. *The First Response: Peaceful Means in the Third Pillar of the Responsibility to Protect* (Muscantine: The Stanley Foundation, 2015).
- Bercovitch, Jacob. *Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Wells. “Evaluating Mediation Strategies: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” *Peace & Change* 18 (1) (1993), 3–25.
- British Broadcasting Corporation. “Ecowas Mulls Guinea Intervention Force.” 14 December 2009. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8411456.stm>.> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Crocker, Chester A., Osler F. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1999).
- ECOWAS. “ECOWAS Leaders Call for Suspension of Legislative Elections in Niger, Want New Transition Authority in Guinea.” *reliefweb*, 17 October 2009. <<https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/ecowas-leaders-call-suspension-legislative-elections-niger-want-new-transition>.> accessed 4 March 2022,
- . Final Communiqué of Thirty Sixth Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Ref.: ECW/CEG/ABJ/36, 22 June 2009. <<https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/36th-ECOWAS-Summit-Abuja-22-June-20091.pdf>.> accessed 4 March 2022.
- European Parliament. “Resolution on Kenya.” 17 January 2008. <<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-0018&language=EN&ring=B6-2008-0024>.> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Favretto, Katja. “Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias.” *American Political Science Review* 103 (2) (2009), 248–263.

- Financial Times. “Kagame Urges Kenyan Army to Act.” 30 January 2008. <<https://www.ft.com/content/dae796b8-cf7c-11dc-854a-0000779fd2ac>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- France 24. “Government Pledges Cooperation with Junta.” 25 December 2008. <https://www.france24.com/en/20081225-government-pledges-cooperation-with-junta->> accessed 6 March 2022.
- Greig, Michael J., and Paul F. Diehl. *International Mediation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
- . “Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy.” *International Interactions* 32 (4) (2006), 355–384.
- Griffiths, Martin. *The Prisoner of Peace: An Interview with Kofi A. Annan* (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008).
- Hultman, Lisa. “Mediation and the Prevention of Violence against Civilians.” In *Research Handbook on Mediating International Crises*, eds. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, and David Quinn (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2019), 296–309.
- Human Rights Watch. “Bloody Monday | The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea.” 17 December 2009. <<https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/17/bloody-monday/september-28-massacre-and-rapes-security-forces-guinea>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Response to a Nationwide Strike: Background.” 2007. <<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/guinea0407/4.htm>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Ifediora, Obinna F. “Formulative Strategy: Why the African Union-led International Mediation in South Sudan Failed to Prevent Atrocity Crimes.” *International Studies Perspectives* 22 (3) (2021), 301–20.
- International Criminal Court. “ICC Prosecutor Confirms Situation in Guinea under Examination.” 14 October 2009. <<https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-guinea-09-10-14>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “OTP Statement in Relation to Events in Kenya,” February 5, 2008. <<https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/765584/pdf/>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- International Crisis Group. “Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on Track.” September 23, 2011. <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/guinea-putting-transition-back-track>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “Guinea: Reforming the Army.” 23 September 2010.

- <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea/guinea-reforming-army>>
accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “Kenya in Crisis.” 21 February 2008. <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-crisis>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Jepson, G. Justin, Neha Sanghrajka, Jimmy Ochieng, and Martin Griffiths. *Back from the Brink: The 2008 Mediation Process and Reforms in Kenya* (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 2014).
- Kikoler, Naomi. “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the Responsibility to Prevent in Practice.” In *The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, eds. Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 304–323.
- Kleiboer, Marieke. “Great Power Mediation: Using Leverage to Make Peace.” In *Studies in International Mediation: Essays in Honor of Jefferey Z. Rubin*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 127–140.
- . “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (2) (1996): 360–389.
- Radio France Internationale. “Even the Head of State Can’t Control the Situation, Says President Dadis Camara.” 29 September 2009. <http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/117/article_5279.asp> accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “France Wants International Force in Guinea.” 5 October 2009. <http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/118/article_5357.asp> accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “Guinea: New Deal Outlines Elections in Six Months.” 16 January 2010. <http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/121/article_6548.asp> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Reuters. “Guinea’s Camara to Stay Abroad, Two Proposed for PM.” 15 January 2010. <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guinea/guineas-camara-to-stay-abroad-two-proposed-for-pm-idUSTRE60E55E20100115>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Sharma, Serena K. “The 2007–8 Post-Election Crisis in Kenya.” In *The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, eds. Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 280–304.
- The Christian Science Monitor. “Can Guinea Avoid a Violent Power Struggle?” 14 December 2009. <<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2009/1214/Can-Guinea-avoid-a-violent-power-struggle>> accessed 4 March 2022.
- The Guardian. “Guinea Aide Admits Shooting Moussa Dadis Camara.” 16 December 2009. <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/16/guinea-aide-shoot-camara>>

accessed 4 March 2022.

The New Humanitarian. “Timeline - toward Peace and Prosperity?” 29 September 2009. <<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/85835/guinea-timeline-toward-peace-and-prosperity>> accessed 4 March 2022.

The United States Senate. “The Immediate and Underlying Causes and Consequences of Kenya’s Flawed Election.” 7 February 2008. <<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45361/html/CHRG-110shrg45361.htm>> accessed 5 March 2022.

Touval, Saadia. “Coercive Mediation on the Road to Dayton.” *International Negotiation* 1 (3) (1996), 547–570.

———. “The Superpowers as Mediators.” In *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jefferey Rubin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 232–248.

Touval, Saadia, and William Ira Zartman, eds. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985).

United Nations. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, A/63/677, 12 January 2009.

———. Final Communiqué First Session of the International Contact Group on Guinea, Letter Dated 11 March 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, (annex), Security Council, S/2009/140, 12 March 2009.

———. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, Letter Dated 18 December 2009 Addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General, (annex), Security Council, S/2009/693, 18 December 2009.

———. Terms of Reference for the Commission of Inquiry for Guinea, Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, (annex), Security Council, S/2009/556, 28 October 2009.

———. Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council, S/PRST/2008/4, 6 February 2008.

———. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, General Assembly/Security Council, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 25 January 1995.

———. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,

- Report of the Secretary-General, Security Council, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004.
- . United Nations Activities in Support of Mediation, Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, A/72/115, 27 Jun 2017.
- . World Summit Outcome, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.
- Voice of America. “AU Mediation Effort in Kenya Ends in Failure.” Archived 10 October 2009. <<https://www.voanews.com/archive/au-mediation-effort-kenya-ends-failure>.> accessed 18 April 2021.
- . “Guinea Opposition Debating Military Offer to Name Civilian PM.” 11 January 2010. <<https://www.voanews.com/a/guinea-opposition-debating-military-offer-to-name-civilian-pm-81228532/111394.html>.> accessed 4 March 2022.
- . “US, France Push for Elected Government in Guinea.” 4 January 2010. <<https://www.voanews.com/a/us-france-push-for-elected-government-in-guinea-80745592/111258.html>.> accessed 4 March 2022.
- Welsh, Jennifer M. “Mediation and Sanctions: Applying Conflict Prevention Tools in Atrocity Crime Settings.” In *The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention*, eds. Serena K Sharma and Jennifer M Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 103–118.
- Woocher, Lawrence. “The Responsibility to Prevent: Toward a Strategy.” In *The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, eds. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 36–49.
- Zartman, I. William. “Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation.” In *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, eds. Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Services Institute, US Department of State, 1986), 205–228.
- Zartman, I. William, and Mark Anstey. “The Problem: Preventing Identity Conflicts and Genocide.” In *The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder*, eds. I. William Zartman, Mark Anstey, and Paul Meerts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3–34.
- Zartman, I. William, and Álvaro de Soto. *Timing Mediation Initiatives*. (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2010).