

Administrator Political Orientations and Views on Federal Encroachment

Abstract

Does a public administrator's political orientation color how they perceive the actions and activities of the federal government? Recent studies have focused on examining this question with respect to the general public, but not administrators directly – leaving our understanding of these effects nascent. Using a long-running national survey, I measure the impact of state administrators' party identification and ideology on several measures of federal encroachment. I find that self-identified Democratic and liberal administrators are less likely to believe that the federal government is encroaching on state actions and hold more positive evaluations of encroachment when it occurs, compared to other administrators. Additionally, I find that these beliefs are conditioned on the composition of the federal government, with the largest differences occurring under a Democratic-controlled White House and Congress.

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Evidence for Practice:

- Public administrators carry their partisan and ideological beliefs with them into the workplace. How they perceive the actions of the federal government is defined, in part, by these beliefs, with Democratic and liberal administrators more supportive of federal government actions relative to others.
- Public administrators live in a world defined by federalism. Who controls federal government colors the beliefs of administrations with respect to federalism, with liberal administrators holding more consistent beliefs compared to Democratic, Republican, and conservative administrators.
- Public administrators should reflect carefully on their individual beliefs in the workplace and determine if these beliefs are representative of how their community views the policy process, or if the beliefs represent an opportunity for bias to seep into public service.

The role and meaning of federalism represent a long and important debate within the American administrative and political system (Derthick 2001). The strength of federalism relies, in part, on the opinions of mass publics and elites on issues such as decentralization and the encroachment of federal government.¹ While politicians and the public often assume that administrators are free from political bias (Weber 1958) this belies the fact that administrators must juggle multiple and competing values while on the job (Rosenbloom 1983). These competing values and the personal beliefs of administrators seep into bureaucracy. This article looks at potential administrator bias in one important aspect of their jobs – federalism.

Prior studies demonstrate that the views of politicians and the public on decentralization are conditioned by ideology and political party. Politicians are opportunistic in their support of decentralization – with federal government control strategically linked to decentralizing appeals of governmental actions (Bulman-Pozen 2014; Kincaid 2004). Republicans espouse decentralization but will centralize national policy when they control the presidency – this trend is evident in evaluations of the Reagan (Conlan 1986), George W. Bush (Conlan 2006; Conlan and Dinan 2007), and Trump (Rose and Goelzhauser 2018) administrations. Conversely, Democratic elected officials are generally supportive of centralization, but will support decentralizing various policies and procedures when Republicans control the White House (Nathan 2006).

Citizens' support for decentralization also depends on their ideology and partisan affiliation (Dinan and Heckelman 2020; Wolak 2016). Using survey data collected by the Pew Research Center – these studies found that citizens mirror the opportunistic centralization preferences of politicians. Democratic and liberal citizens tend to support centralization. Meanwhile Republican and conservative citizens tend to support decentralization. This support is

nonetheless based, in part, on control of federal government with Democrats and liberals being more supportive of decentralization and conservatives less supportive when Republicans control Congress and the White House (Dinan and Heckelman 2020, 241).

These studies have helped administrators better understand when citizens will support decentralization-based appeals – and in turn pressure elected officials to support these proposals (Erickson, Wright and McIver 1993). While these studies are certainly valuable, social scientists have yet to investigate if public administrators behave in a similar way – even as contemporary research has found that other elements of the administrative process are correlated with an administrator’s partisanship. For example, Palus and Yackee (2016) find that administrators’ partisan affiliation can impact their perceived level of discretion within agencies.

I contribute to this research area by analyzing how public administrators’ political beliefs and control of the federal government impact their views of federal actions using several waves of the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) survey (Yackee and Yackee, 2021). The ASAP survey is valuable as it provides a measure of administrative actions from the agents’ viewpoint. I leverage the survey questions that inquire about: 1) perceptions of federal encroachment on state activities, and 2) whether that encroachment is viewed positively or negatively by administrators. These are ideal questions to evaluate federal perceptions as the survey questions have been asked across all arrangements of the federal government (Republican, Divided, and Democratic federal control) while simultaneously being fielded during a period when rates of decentralization by federal officials remained constant, 1994-2008 (Cole, Hissong, and Arvidson 1999; Kincaid 1999).

Estimating a series of empirical models, I find that a state administrator’s perception of federalism is similar to a typical citizen. Democratic and increasingly liberal public

administrators are less likely to perceive recent federal actions as encroaching on state agencies. Furthermore, Democratic and liberal administrators hold more positive views of federal actions compared to other types of administrators. Finally, administrators' views of encroachment are colored in familiar, but not identical, ways by control of federal offices. Republican, Democratic, and conservative administrators are likely to shift preferences on decentralization depending on which party controls the federal government.

These findings have important implications. Like citizens, administrators' views of federal activities are affected by their political values as well as who occupies federal office. Administrators should be aware of how their personal orientations might encourage biases within government. This awareness can better equip administrators to better understand how the political environment influences their own preferences in their decision-making tasks. While previous scholarship has explored how political principles control administrative agents (Scholz and Wood 1998, Wood 1988), this analysis underscores that administrators' own views play a role within bureaucratic structure. Additionally, this article raises several questions about the scope and role of intergovernmental relations in the administrative state and advances a series of arguments for researchers to take into consideration.

Public Administrators, Competing Values, and Federalism

I review several strains of research in the public administration and political science disciplines to guide the theoretical expectations of the article. First, I evaluate the competing values that public administrators face when making decisions. I emphasize on how the value of neutrality is often in competition with other public service values in such a way that it can influence the

preferences of administrators. I then review recent findings within federalism research that connect citizens' partisan and ideological beliefs with their opinions of the federal government. Finally, I explore the existing literature on how public administrators navigate a federal system illustrating that scholars have yet to consider how the core beliefs of administrators may influence their views on federal actions.

Competing Values in Public Administration

Public administration has long identified the shifting trade-offs within bureaucratic structures. Prior scholarship emphasized the importance of hierarchy and neutrality in the bureaucratic system (Weber 1958). Put simply, a competent public administrator was expected to dispatch the tasks of the legislative and executive branches quickly and obediently.

However, this earlier conceptualization of public administration fails to account for the realities of discretion administrators have while on the job. Wilson (1967), one of the first scholars to describe the tradeoffs in bureaucracy, notes that bureaucrats must adjudicate problems of accountability, equity, efficiency, responsiveness, and fiscal integrity while carrying out tasks. Because of these trade-offs, Wilson concludes that there are "inherent limits to what can be accomplished by large hierarchical organizations" (6) and political actors must choose whether to emphasize bureaucratic discretion or adherence to political goals but cannot maximize on both.

Rosenbloom (1983, 2013) further defines these competing values, sorting them into three categories: managerial, political, and legal. The managerial function of administration captures the neutrality and efficiency values espoused by Weber. Conversely, the political function captures values of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, while the legal

function covers values of adjudication. Rosenbloom argues that tasks from the three functions have been enshrined within public administration. Consequently, these approaches will compete as they “have different origins, stress different values and structural arrangements, and view individuals in remarkably different ways” (1983, 225). As it is not possible for administrators to consistently prioritize neutrality within their jobs, other values will pull at them. Beyond this, administrators have partisan values from their personal lives. When neutrality is not consciously – or unconsciously – prioritized, administrators’ decisions may be affected. Put differently, under what circumstances does neutrality or partisanship win out?

Examples of the limitations of bureaucratic neutrality demonstrate under what conditions bureaucrats may be more likely to neglect this value. For instance, Wood (1988) finds that a political appointee and a merit-based civil servant administrator will have different responsiveness to political actors. Palus and Yackee (2016) provide an updated example. Using ASAP survey data, the authors show that when administrators have the same partisan orientation as the governor and state legislature, these administrators believe that they have less policy discretion compared to working with political officials of the opposite party. The authors assert this takes place because co-partisan elected officials are more likely to tighten control over administrators while crafting various policies.

The individual-level orientations of public administrators can also violate the neutrality principle and influence administrator’s preferred decisions on the job. For example, Kropf, Vercellotti, and Kimball (2013) found that Democratic election administrators support of provisional voting was tied to the level of Democratic support in local constituencies while Republican election officials support was not conditioned on local-level partisanship. Beyond election administration, Bell et al. (2021) found that conservative street level bureaucrats favored

more burdensome administrative policies compared to their liberal counterparts for a means-tested college access program in Oklahoma. These articles highlight how access to critical services for citizens – such as voting and education – can be influenced by the partisanship of the administrator.

I now turn to reviewing recent literature on federalism. While scholars have evaluated how administrators perceive the amount of decentralization occurring at a given time broadly (Bowling and Wright 1998) – they have yet to evaluate how the political values of administrators influence their perceptions on federal-state relations. This is surprising as prior research identified that the orientations of administrators can influence their views of the administrative structure and various actions.

Citizens' Views on Federalism

Prior research has often leveraged survey data to understand how individuals evaluate the role of federalism within their political and policy preferences. Schneider and Jacoby (2013) find that Democratic and Republican citizens have distinct preferences on which level of government should be responsible for executing policies. This finding has been replicated in single state studies (Thompson and Elling 1999), single time point (Konsiky 2011) and longitudinal surveys (Cole and Kincaid 2006).

Previous conclusions have found that support for decentralization is highly correlated with partisan and ideological identifications. Citizens who identify as Republicans are more supportive of decentralization compared to individuals who identify as Democrats. Likewise, conservatives are more supportive of decentralization relative to liberals (Dinan and Heckelman 2020; Schneider and Jacoby 2003). Moreover, Republican and conservative individuals tend to

hold more consistent beliefs on centralization relative to Democratic and liberal individuals. These views are driven by citizens' core beliefs on the roles of federal and state government.

An additional, more recent, vein of this research has focused on exploring if citizens' preferences for government change depending on the political composition of government. Essentially, does the political party occupying various government offices influence preferences on federalism? Scholars have found that control of state level office – the state legislature and governor – is not associated with a change in federalism preferences (Konisky 2011; Wolak 2016). However, changes in who occupies national level office does impact preferences. Wolak (2016) finds that citizens are more supportive of decentralization when their preferred political party does not control the presidency. Dinan and Heckleman (2020) provide further insight. Estimating a logistic regression which accounted for the effects of both partisan and ideological identifications against partisan control, the authors found that “Democrats and liberals become more supportive [of decentralization], and conservatives less supportive, when Republicans control the Presidency and Congress” (241).

In the next section I tie these two literatures together to investigate the intersection of administrator beliefs and views on federal actions.

Federalism and Public Administrators

The intersection of an administrator's beliefs about the outcomes of recent devolution efforts has been explored to some extent. Previous scholarship has worked to identify how federal actions are viewed by administrators. Several of these pieces were authored in response to the devolution revolution – measuring how administrators viewed the decentralization rhetoric of, predominantly conservative, politicians in the 1990s. This research found that administrators

thought that the interest in devolution during the 1990s was insincere and did not deeply impact administrative actions (Cole, Hissong, and Arvidson 1999).²

Cho and Wright (2001, 2004) provide the most detailed examination of this question to date. Using ASAP survey data and confirmatory factor analysis, the authors find that state public administrators perceived that fiscal and regulatory decisions devolved from the national to state level between 1994 and 1998 (2004, 464-65). The devolution was modest, and the authors concluded that the results suggested a “devolution evolution”. This push “made state administration more responsive, more representative, more competent, more significant, more organized, more controlled, and broader in scope and size.” (Bowling and Wright 1998, 61). While these findings are important, these studies do not address how the personal orientations of state administrators influenced their perceptions of federal government.

Expectations

Considering past research, public administrators live in a world defined by federalism (Bowling and Wright 1998). They are also, like citizens, partisan and ideological (Bell et al. 2021). I expect that individual-level partisanship, ideology, and the partisan makeup of the federal government are important determinants of administrators’ perceptions and support of federal encroachment.

Based on the question wording in the ASAP survey, I structure the hypotheses around federal encroachment. Following the centralization literature, federal encroachment should elicit similar reactions from administrators compared to decentralization (e.g., support for decentralization would be positively correlated with increasing federal encroachment). As

Walker (2000) and Derthick (1987) note, American federalism has been marked since the 1950s by a centralization bias where the national government takes on greater responsibilities while simultaneously relying on states for implementation. This leads to frequent negotiations between federal and state actors to implement laws and policies. Several studies have measured this trend across various policy arenas and public laws (Kincaid 1998; Krause and Bowman 2005). These empirical studies have found evidence of decentralization and encroachment engendering similar responses. When the federal government attempts to take – or increase – their control of various public policies, state actors push back through negotiation or failure to implement to maintain control over the policy area.

I build on the recent evaluations finding that Democratic and liberal citizens tend to be less supportive of decentralization than Republican and conservative ones (Schneider and Jacoby 2003; Dinan and Heckelman 2020). On the one hand, I predict that both Democratic and liberal public administrators will have more favorable views of national actions as opposed to those with less Democratic or liberal political orientations. I can evaluate these beliefs in two ways: perceptions on whether federal encroachment is occurring, and support for or against observed federal encroachment. These two hypotheses are stated formally below:

Hypothesis 1: Democratic (liberal) administrators are less likely to perceive that federal encroachment is occurring while Republican (conservative) administrators will be more likely to perceive encroachment as occurring.

Hypothesis 2: Democratic (liberal) administrators will have more favorable views of federal encroachment while Republican (conservative) administrators will hold less favorable views on encroachment.

On the other hand, public administrators may, like citizens, condition their beliefs about encroachment on which party controls the federal government (Wolak 2016; Dinan and Heckelman 2020). In other words, are administrators more supportive of federal actions when their preferred political party is in control? If so, I expect administrators to condition their support for encroachment in the following ways:

Hypothesis 3a: Democratic (Republican) administrators will be less (more) likely to perceive encroachment and be more (less) supportive of encroachment when Democrats control federal government – the opposite will occur when Republicans control federal government.

Hypotheses 3b: Likewise, liberal (conservative) administrators will be less (more) likely to perceive encroachment and be more (less) supportive of encroachment when Democrats control federal government – again, the opposite will occur when Republicans control federal government.

Federalism and the ASAP Survey

I evaluate the federalism preferences of administrators by leveraging four waves of the ASAP survey. ASAP originated in the 1960s. The survey was sent to state administrative agency heads evaluating these administrators' characteristics, responsibilities, and attitudes towards government. The survey evaluates the preferences of state administrators in over 110 different agencies in all 50 states. Beginning in 1994, follow-up telephone surveys with a random sample of non-respondents have also been conducted. These follow-up surveys find nonsystematic difference between respondents and non-respondents, which suggests that the ASAP data are

representative, “covering the full range of administrative agencies across the 50 states” (Palus and Yakee 2016, 699).

The 1994, 1998, 2004, and 2008 survey waves of ASAP provide the necessary information to evaluate the association between political orientation and federalism preferences. Beginning in the 1994 wave, ASAP added a series of new questions that assessed administrators’ views of federal encroachment over previous years. The 1994 wave was also the first to have administrators record their ideology within the survey.

Additionally, the four waves of the survey cover all three federal arrangements necessary to evaluate the role of federal composition. Throughout each wave, federal-state relations saw the established pattern of negotiation (Dethick 1987) – with the federal government attempting to expand its control in various public policies and states pushing back by attempting to control the implementation process.

In 1994, Democrats controlled the presidency as well as Congress. This period was marked by the early policy success and failures of the Clinton administration in healthcare reform, crime, and gun control (Bowman and Pagano 1994). The administration had recently expanded federal government powers through various public safety bills. Two examples are the Brady Act, which expanded federal regulations on firearms, and the Violent Crime Control and Violent Enforcement Act which increased federal oversight of drug, criminal justice, and law enforcement policymaking within the states. The period also saw attempts to increase federal regulation fail – most notably through the Clinton’s attempt to reform healthcare policy. Many of these federal policies were implemented via federal mandates, and states responded by requesting waivers for additional flexibility and control over policy.

In 2004, Republicans controlled both the White House and Congress. While media attention was focused on international affairs, intergovernmental feuds remained common (Krane and Koenig 2005). The federal government expanded policy negotiations in domestic areas traditionally reserved to the states. Election administration became more centralized with the passage of the Help America Vote Act. Standard testing in schools was established under No Child Left Behind. Health policy was impacted by the Medicaid Modernization Act. In the shadow of 9/11, the US Congress drastically increased federal control through the passing of the PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Act and new federal agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration, were established.

Federal government in Washington was divided in the 1998 and 2008 waves of the survey. While less legislation passes under periods of divided government, the familiar push-and-pull of federal-state negotiation remains. The 1998 wave occurred in the wake of the devolutionary push by Congressional Republicans with the main intergovernmental issue focusing on the budget surplus and federal spending (Weissert and Schram 1997). This period marks the most explicitly devolutionary policy change across the period of study, with the passage of welfare reform which provided states with substantial discretionary authority in defining and implementing welfare policy. However, the federal government also attempted to expand control in public policy. For example, health policy expanded with the establishment of the State Children's Health Insurance Program. Federalism in 2008 revolved around topics of states securing relief from federal directive, while simultaneously having to adapt to new federal mandates (Dinan 2008). States began implementation of the REAL ID Act in this period, simultaneously the federal government reauthorized and expanded the PATRIOT Act. The

federal government also created new policy negotiations in energy with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

Dependent Variables

I use six dependent variables to measure administrators' perceptions of the federal government. To evaluate Hypothesis 1, I rely on the following survey question which asks administrators' opinions on federal encroachment in the states.³

“In the past four years have National actions – court decisions, statutes, or regulations – infringed on the reserved powers of the States?”

For this question, respondents could indicate that there was no federal encroachment (zero), to indicating that there was a high level (five) of federal encroachment.

To evaluate Hypothesis 2, I use a series of four questions, and a scale, to evaluate whether federal encroachment was viewed negatively or positively by administrators.

“In your opinion, how would you rate, negatively or positively, the impact of the following types of national actions on your agency?”

Administrators could rate the impact of administrative regulations, mandates, statutory preemptions, and federal court decisions.⁴ Each of the four questions were ordered into a five-point scale ranging from negative two (having a very negative view of national actions), to positive two (having a very positive view national actions). A score of zero indicates neutral or no impact of national actions.

Finally, I create an additive scale of all national actions. The scale ranges from negative eight (having a very negative view across all four national actions) to positive eight (having a very positive view across all four national actions).

Independent Variables

I leverage two independent variables of interest. The first variable is a measure of administrator party identification. Respondents can identify as Democratic, Republican, or Independent. Independents are used as the reference category.

The second independent variable is a continuous measure of administrator ideology. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale for both social issues and fiscal issues.⁵ I take the arithmetic mean of a respondent's response to these two questions to produce a single measure of ideology. A score of one indicates a very conservative respondent, while a score of seven indicates a very liberal respondent.

Control Variables

I also include several control variables in the models to account for potential spuriousness within models. These measure characteristics of the administrator, characteristics of the agency, and state political context. Table 1 reports summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables.

I include a binary measure of administrator race (coded one if the respondent is non-Caucasian). I also control for administrator gender (coded one if the respondent identifies as female). I include a continuous measure for administrator age and a measure of administrator age-squared, to account for the potential non-linear effects of age. I also control for administrator salary, measured as the log of respondent income normalized in 2018 dollars.⁶ I include a binary

measure to account for administrators who are merit-based appointees (coded one if the respondent is a civil servant). Finally, I include a trio of continuous variables to account for administrator experience: the number of years the administrator has been employed in state government, employed in the agency, and employed in their current position.

Additionally, I account for several agency characteristics including an ordinal measure of agency size and the agency budget, measured as the log of the agency budget normalized in 2018 dollars. I also account for an agency's dependency on federal funding using three variables: whether the agency receives any funding from a federal entity, the number of federal entities that the state agency receives funding from, and the proportion of the state agency's budget that is derived from federal funding.

I account for state political context with two binary variables. The first binary measure is coded as one if the state's governor is Democratic and the second variable is coded as one if the state's legislature is controlled by Democrats.

Finally, across models I include a series of fixed effects to account for; 1) agency function, 2) state, and 3) survey-year. To keep models easy to interpret I do not report these effects in the results tables.

[Insert Table 1 here.]

Results

In Table 2, I test and find support for hypothesis 1. The dependent variable is the measure of amount of perceived federal encroachment on state activities. A positive coefficient indicates that the administrator believes that there are higher levels of federal encroachment on state actions. Conversely, a negative coefficient indicates that the administrator believes that there are lower levels of federal encroachment on state actions. As ordered logistic regressions are not directly interpretable, I include two predicted probability values for statistically significant variables to the right of the coefficient. The values can be interpreted as the change in the probability that an administrator believes there is no federal encroachment (the lowest outcome category) and that there is high encroachment (the highest outcome category).

Examining Model 1, I find that both measures of political orientation are correlated with perceptions of encroachment. Democratic and liberal public administrators are less likely to think that the federal government are encroaching on states activities. Compared to an Independent administrator, the reference category, a Democratic administrator is 4.5 percent more likely to state the federal government is not encroaching on state activities, and 2.9 percent less likely to state that there is a high level of encroachment. Republican administrators do not vary significantly compared to Independent administrators. Looking at ideology, I observe that the average very liberal administrator compared to the average very conservative administrator is 7 percent more likely to state that there is no federal encroachment in state activities and is 4.8 percent less likely to state that there is a high level of federal encroachment.

I find that length in current position and the log of agency budget also correlate with administrator views on federal encroachment. Administrators who have held their positions for longer periods of time and administrators who operate agencies with larger budgets are more likely to indicate that the federal government is encroaching on state activities, on average.

[Insert Table 2 here.]

I now test hypothesis 2, assessing support for federal encroachment, in Table 3. In all models, positive coefficients indicate greater support for federal encroachment, while negative values indicate decreased support for encroachment. Model 2 estimates a multiple regression of support for encroachment across all national activities. The dependent variable is a 16-point index– with higher values indicating greater support for federal activities. The coefficients in this model are directly interpretable. Models 3-6 are ordered logistic regressions for each national action individually – national regulations, mandates, preemptions, and federal court decisions, respectively. Predicted probabilities are reported to the right of significant coefficients in these models and can be interpreted as the percent change in the probability that the administrator views the national action positively.⁷

I find that Democratic administrators view national actions more positively than Independents – the reference category. A Democratic administrator ranks national actions 0.30 points higher, on average. Across action types, Democratic administrators are 2.5 percent more likely to view national regulations positively, 2.3 percent more likely to view national mandates positively, and 1.5 percent more likely to view federal court decisions positively. Party affiliation is not associated with opinions on national preemptions.

Across all five models in Table 3, increasingly liberal ideology is also associated with higher favorability regarding national actions. Compared to a very conservative administrator, a very liberal administrator scores 1.12-points higher on the administrative actions scale. Likewise,

the average very liberal administrator, compared to the very conservative administrator is associated with a 3.2 percent increase in the likelihood of favorably viewing national regulations, a 9.6 percent increase in favorably viewing national mandates, a 2.0 percent increase in favorable viewing national preemptions, and a 5.3 percent increase in the probability of favorably viewing federal court actions.

The administrator orientation variables are the only variables which consistently correlate with increases in support for national actions. In addition, non-Caucasian administrators correlates with greater support for federal regulations, and civil service employees correlates with greater support in the additive model of federal actions, federal regulations, and federal mandates. Conversely, administrator age, income, years employed in the current position, the log of the agency budget, and the number of federal agencies funding the state agency correlate with less support for federal encroachments. Years in the current position, agency budget, and number of federal agencies providing funding are the most consistent predictors of decreasing support for federal activities.

[Insert Table 3 here.]

Having found evidence of administrator orientations correlating with perceptions of federalism – I now see if these evaluations are conditioned on control of the federal government. Taking the dependent variables from Models 1 and 2, I estimate four additional models which interact administrator partisanship and ideology, across the three types of federal government compositions – unified Democratic, divided, and unified Republican. I include the same set of

control variables in the new models. To save space and focus discussion on hypothesis 3, I only report predicted probability figures in the main text. Tabular results, as well as marginal effects plots and appropriate hypotheses (as discussed in Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006), are included in the supplemental appendix.⁸

The results of the analysis find partial support for the hypothesis that the party in control of Washington associates with administrators' views of federal encroachment. Yet how administrators' political values associate with federal control are distinct from findings in previous studies.

In Figure 1, I report the predicted probabilities across perceptions of federal encroachment on state activities. The y-axis can be interpreted as the probability that the administrator feels that there is no encroachment by the federal government into state affairs. Thus, higher values along the axis suggest that the respondent feels there is greater separation between federal and state affairs. Looking first at differences across arrangements of federal government control, I observe that when Democrats have total control of federal government, administrators – regardless of party identification – are less likely to state that there is no federal encroachment occurring. Compared to divided government, Democratic administrators are about 12 percent less likely, Republican administrators are 11 percent less likely, and Independent administrators are 10 percent more likely to feel that encroachment is occurring, respectively. Under a Republican federal government, administrators' party identifications do not associate with significantly different beliefs in federal encroachment compared to divided government. Looking within federal arrangements, I find that Democratic public administrators are less likely to state there is federal encroachment compared to Republican administrators, when the federal government is divided or controlled by Democrats. Democratic administrators are about 5

percent and 8 percent more likely to state that there is no federal encroachment, respectively. Conversely, when there is unified Republican control of government, Republican administrators report the highest probability of feeling that there is no federal encroachment – although this is not a statistically significant difference.

Turning to administrator ideology, I again find perceptions of encroachment vary across the composition of federal government. The average very conservative administrator has a 9 percent probability of stating there is no federal encroachment under a Democratic federal government, while the average very liberal administrator has a 23 percent chance of stating there is no federal encroachment. Conversely, under Republican federal control, a very conservative administrator has a 36 percent probability of stating there is no federal encroachment, while a very liberal administrator has a 23 percent chance of stating that there is no federal encroachment. Under divided government, beliefs that encroachment is occurring do not vary significantly across ideology. Additionally, I find that liberal administrators hold more consistent feelings on federal encroachment, unlike previous research (Dinan and Heckelman, 2020). Across all configurations of partisan control, liberal administrators have a 7 percent range in observing federal encroachment. Conversely, conservative administrators report a 27 percent range in observing encroachment depending on the composition of the federal government.

[Insert Figure 1 here.]

Figure 2 reports the multiple regression results illustrating administrators' support for federal encroachment across compositions of federal government. The dependent variable ranges

from negative eight for respondents who viewed all federal encroachments negatively to eight for those who viewed all federal encroachments positively.

Examining administrator party identification, I find that administrators who identify as Republicans or Independents shift beliefs on federal encroachment depending on who controls federal government – while Democratic administrators maintain consistent views. Republican administrators shift from a low of -2.6 on the federal actions index under a unified Democratic government to a high of -1.4 under a unified Republican government. Likewise, Independent administrators shift from a low on the federal action index of -2.3 under Democratic federal government to a high of -1.3 under unified Republican government. Looking between identifications, Democratic administrators score 0.9 and 0.4 points higher on the federal actions index compared to Republican administrators under unified Democratic and divided government, respectively. Again, Republican administrators show the greatest support for federal action of all groups when Republicans have unified control of government.

Shifting to administrator ideology, I find that the average very conservative administrator scores -3 on the federal actions index under unified Democratic government, while the average very liberal administrator scores -0.2 on the index. Similarly, a very conservative administrator scores about -2 on the federal actions index under divided government, while a very liberal administrator scores -0.2. Administrator ideology does not associate with a significant difference in the level of support for federal action under unified Republican control of government. I also find that very liberal administrators hold more consistent views on federal actions – regardless of the make-up of federal government – compared to very conservative administrators. Across all partisan configurations, liberal public administrators' support for federal activities shifts 0.3 points, while conservative public administrators shift a significant 1.5 points.

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

Overall, I find partial support for hypothesis 3. State administrators' views on federal government depend on who controls federal government. However, I find that liberal administrators hold consistent views on federal encroachment, while Democratic, Republican, and conservative administrators' views on federal encroachment shift in response to federal control. These differences appear to be the most pronounced under unified Democratic government.

Discussion

Using ASAP survey data, I find evidence in support of the proposed hypotheses. State administrators' perceptions of federal government are associated in similar ways to those of mass publics. I find persistent evidence that Democratic and liberal administrators are less likely to view the activities of the federal government as encroaching and are more likely to have positive evaluations of federal actions compared to more Republican and conservative administrators. Additionally, in line with previous research, I find that these perceptions of federal encroachment are driven by the composition and orientation of federal government.

The finding that liberal administrators hold more consistent views than Democratic, Republican, and conservative administrators was unexpected when compared to Dinan and Heckleman (2020) – who found that conservative citizens held the most consistent beliefs on

federalism. Theory is silent as to why who holds consistent views on federalism changes. It may be that individuals who choose a career in public service vary systematically in some way compared to the general public. It could also be that because the outcome variable survey questions were phrased around federal encroachment as opposed to decentralization might have explain this shift. Future research will need to disentangle why the stability of these preferences shifted.

Additionally, scholars of public administration need to further investigate how political orientations impact the views and values of administrators. While scholarship has begun to evaluate the role that political core values play within bureaucracy (Bell et al. 2021), this analysis further illustrates that these orientations play a significant role in how administrators view government actions. More research must be dedicated to exploring: 1) where these biases exist, 2) the strength of these biases, and 3) the how these biases can be mitigated. By investigating this line of research, public administrators can better prepare practitioners for the value and ethical considerations within a career of public service.

Of note to scholars of federalism, this research raises several important questions that should be investigated. For 25 years, federalism scholars have debated the devolution revolution within American politics (Nathan 1996). Most of the research has failed to find evidence of American politics and policy decentralizing over this period (Bowman and Krause 2005; Cole, Hisson and Arvidson 1999) with Cho and Wright (2004) going so far as to argue that in fact what was occurring was a devolution evolution.

This article adds important context to this debate. The 1990s marked the first time in a generation that the Republican party controlled the US Congress – and later gained trifecta control of federal government. My research finds that this transfer of power was not costless and

likely changed perceptions of the national-state relations for administrators. It very well could be that the devolution revolution was driven, in part, by the changing perceptions of administrators as opposed to changes in the actual level of devolution within the US. This could aid in explaining why federalism scholars have failed to find evidence of devolution occurring during this period. Future scholarship needs to more closely evaluate the causal linkage between administrators' ideological perceptions and beliefs in devolution.

Conclusion

Above all, this article has important implications for practitioners. Administrators carry their political orientations with them into the workplace. How much these orientations lead to biases that are cause for concern will need to be evaluated in future research. On the one hand, it may be that administrators' orientations reflect the values of the community being served – or under-represented groups within the community. Put differently, an administrator may have a legitimate reason for trading the value of neutrality for another public service value. In this case, the bias of administrators provides an opportunity for the constituencies' preferences to be better expressed within the policy-making process (Sowa and Selden 2003, Miller 2013).

Conversely, if these orientations are reflective only of the administrator, the biases noted in this article are concerning. In this scenario, administrators fail to act impartially for no apparent benefit. How administrators can resolve these biases is challenging. Biases are unconscious decisions, and individuals are unlikely to realize when they are shaping their actions. One potential solution lies with agencies and politicians. When decisions within bureaucracy are likely to rely on interactions between federal and state governments, institutions

and procedures should be developed to incentivize administrators to prioritize neutrality over other public service values.

Bach and Wengrich (2019) provide a starting point to undertake this challenge. The authors argue that a potential solution to resolving this problem is to rely on behavioral insights (252-54). Behavioral insights is a framework of leveraging research designs and methods from behavioral economics when designing policy. The authors point to the Behavioral Insights Team, originally an office in the Cabinet of the United Kingdom, as an example. The team deploys randomized control trials in testing potential policy interventions. The team then takes the results of these studies to coordinate with other policymakers as to how to best design public policy. This example is limited, only working to resolve one potential workflow (policy analysis) that can be affected by an administrator's orientation. Yet, it provides a starting point on how administrators can think about institutional design if their goal is to minimize the impact of an administrators' orientations.

Until we can better understand how representative administrators' preferences are of the constituents they serve, administrators must be reflective on the role that their personal political orientation may play in their perceptions of government. Failing to do so could lead to administrators providing sub-optimal recommendations to elected officials and the public (for example see, Dovidio and Fiske 2012). Federalism will continue to be part of the administrative structure within the United States. Practitioners and scholars must continue to increase our understanding of federalism's effects to better navigate the administrative system.

Endnotes

¹ I define federal encroachment as the national government taking either new or increasing control of a policy or process previously in the domain of subnational government.

² While welfare reform – a decentralizing policy – did occur over this period, this was an outlier compared to most other policies implemented this period (see Kincaid 1998).

³ Throughout the survey the 1994 wave omits the “In the past four years” clause, instead it reads “Have National actions altered your State’s . . .”

⁴ Cho and Wright (2001, 2004) include federal court decisions in their investigations of state federalism. Findings do not change if I exclude federal court decisions from the additive scale.

⁵ In the 1994 wave, respondents indicate their ideology on a single seven-point ideology scale.

⁶ I take the log of all financial variables in the models to control for potential non-linear effects.

⁷ This corresponds with outcome four of five in the associated survey questions.

⁸ Additionally, because control of federal government is a time dependent variable, year controls are excluded from the analysis to allow the models to estimate.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables:</i>						
State Encroachment	2971	2.66	1.73	3.00	0.00	5.00
All Encroachments	3651	-1.70	2.40	-2.00	-8.00	8.00
Regulations	3762	-0.41	0.80	0.00	-2.00	2.00
Mandates	3753	-0.49	0.87	-1.00	-2.00	2.00
Preemptions	3702	-0.52	0.79	0.00	-2.00	2.00
Court Decisions	3739	-0.30	0.77	0.00	-2.00	2.00
<i>Independent Variables of Interest:</i>						
Political Party						
Democrat	3893	0.40	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00
Republican	3893	0.29	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00
Independent (Reference Category)	3893	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00
Ideology Self-Identification	3905	3.78	1.34	4.00	1.00	7.00
<i>Respondent Variables:</i>						
Race or Ethnicity (1 = non-Caucasian)	3978	0.89	0.31	1.00	0.00	1.00
Respondent Gender (1 = Female)	4012	1.24	0.43	1.00	1.00	2.00
Respondent Education (1 = Post-Baccalaureate Edu.)	3977	0.62	0.49	1.00	0.00	1.00
Respondent Age	3914	51.45	8.00	52.00	25.00	83.00
Respondent Age Squared	3914	2711.38	829.07	2704.00	625.00	6889.00
Log (Respondent Income, \$2018)	3809	11.63	0.52	11.68	4.19	13.20
Civil Servant	3910	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00
Years Employed in State Government	3984	15.99	10.27	15.00	0.00	52.00
Years Employed in Agency	3972	12.02	9.98	8.00	0.00	52.00
Years Employed in Position	3967	5.50	5.20	4.00	0.00	50.00
<i>Agency Characteristics:</i>						
# of Agency Employees						
0-25 (Reference Category)	4058	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00
25-100	4058	0.27	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00
101-500	4058	0.27	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00
501-1000	4058	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.00	1.00
1001-5000	4058	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00
Over 5000	4058	0.06	0.24	0.00	0.00	1.00
Log (Agency Budget, \$ 2018)	3814	3.61	2.07	3.39	0.00	9.96
<i>Federal Dependence Variables:</i>						
Agency Receives Federal \$	3969	0.75	0.43	1.00	0.00	1.00
# of Federal Agencies Giving \$	3886	1.94	1.79	2.00	0.00	7.00
Proportion of Budget from Federal Gov.	3920	1.54	1.32	1.00	0.00	4.00
<i>State Context Variables:</i>						
Democratic Governor	4052	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00
Democratic State Leg.	4052	0.41	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00

Table 2: Determinants of Administrator Observing Federal Encroachment

	(1)		
	State Encroachment	Predicted Probabilities	
	b/se	(% Change of R. selecting the lowest category "No Encroachment")	(% Change of R. selecting the highest category "Yes, High Encroachment")
<u>Administrator Orientation:</u>			
Democrat	-0.269** (0.102)	4.48	-2.93
Republican	0.083 (0.108)		
Ideology Self-Identification	-0.071* (0.039)	7.00	-4.76
<u>Administrator Characteristics:</u>			
Non-Caucasian	-0.161 (0.142)		
Female	0.003 (0.102)		
Post-Baccalaureate Edu.	-0.115 (0.082)		
Respondent Age	-0.047 (0.042)		
Respondent Age Squared	0.000 (0.000)		
Log (Respondent Income, \$2018)	0.144 (0.108)		
Civil Service Employee	-0.118 (0.103)		
Years Employed in State Government	0.002 (0.006)		
Years Employed in Agency	0.003 (0.006)		
Years Employed in Position	0.014* (0.009)	-10.20	9.66
<u>Agency Characteristics:</u>			
<u>Agency Size:</u>			
25-100	-0.064 (0.143)		
101-500	-0.027 (0.157)		
501-1,000	-0.053 (0.198)		
1,001-5,000	-0.043 (0.205)		
Over 5,000	0.282 (0.265)		
Log (Agency Budget, \$2018)	0.076* (0.034)	-11.75	9.06
<u>Federal Dependency of Agency:</u>			
Agency Receives Federal \$	-0.208 (0.143)		
# of Federal Agencies Giving \$	0.040 (0.029)		
Proportion of Budget from Federal	-0.001 (0.046)		
<u>State Political Context:</u>			
Democratic Governor	0.171 (0.109)		
Democratic State Leg.	0.218 (0.148)		
Agency Function FE	Yes		
State FE	Yes		
Year FE	Yes		
τ1	-2.346 (1.681)		
τ2	-2.158 (1.681)		
τ3	-1.561 (1.680)		
τ4	-0.475 (1.680)		
τ5	1.005 (1.682)		
N. of observations	2355		
AIC	7623.701		
BIC	8159.780		

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. One-tailed tests, robust standard errors. Ordered logistic regressions. Predicted probabilities reported to the right of the coefficient. The effect can be interpreted as the change in probability that the respondent select the various categories moving from the minimum to the maximum observed values of the IV while holding all other control variables at their observed values.



Table 3: Determinants of Administrator Support for Federal Encroachment

	(2) All Encroachments b/se	(3) Regulations b/se	Predicted Probability (% Δ in who view national actions positively)	(4) Mandates b/se	Predicted Probability (% Δ in who view national actions positively)	(5) Preemptions b/se	Predicted Probability (% Δ in who view national actions positively)	(6) Court Decisions b/se	Predicted Probability (% Δ in who view national actions positively)
<u>Administrator Orientation:</u>									
Democrat	0.298** (0.112)	0.277** (0.096)	2.51	0.233* (0.093)	2.29	0.085 (0.097)		0.187* (0.101)	1.48
Republican	-0.113 (0.118)	-0.106 (0.099)		-0.028 (0.098)		-0.070 (0.101)		0.001 (0.100)	
Ideology Self-Identification	0.171** (0.043)	0.061* (0.034)	3.23	0.161** (0.035)	9.59	0.083* (0.037)	1.91	0.110** (0.036)	5.28
<u>Administrator Characteristics:</u>									
Non-Caucasian	0.211 (0.154)	0.265* (0.125)	2.48	0.187 (0.133)		0.029 (0.135)		0.196 (0.141)	
Female	0.046 (0.103)	-0.025 (0.089)		0.140 (0.086)		0.014 (0.092)		-0.015 (0.094)	
Post-Baccalaureate Edu.	0.040 (0.093)	0.053 (0.076)		0.080 (0.076)		0.035 (0.079)		-0.110 (0.080)	
Respondent Age	-0.047 (0.046)	-0.093** (0.039)	-46.03	-0.039 (0.038)		-0.005 (0.044)		-0.002 (0.039)	
Respondent Age Squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	54.68	0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	
Log (Respondent Income, \$2018)	-0.277** (0.089)	-0.332** (0.083)	-42.53	-0.202** (0.067)	-6.36	-0.096 (0.082)		-0.038 (0.084)	
Civil Service Employee	0.283** (0.112)	0.314** (0.093)	2.91	0.162* (0.091)	1.62	0.146 (0.099)		0.113 (0.097)	
Years Employed in State Government	0.008 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)		0.003 (0.006)		0.003 (0.006)		0.003 (0.006)	
Years Employed in Agency	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)		-0.006 (0.006)		-0.007 (0.006)		-0.009 (0.006)	
Years Employed in Position	-0.032** (0.010)	-0.036** (0.008)	-9.79	-0.025** (0.008)	-8.82	-0.017* (0.008)	-2.43	-0.003 (0.008)	
<u>Agency Characteristics:</u>									
Agency Size:									
Under 25	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)	
25-100	-0.030 (0.146)	-0.051 (0.121)		-0.025 (0.114)		0.058 (0.124)		-0.111 (0.122)	
101-500	-0.097 (0.166)	-0.072 (0.140)		-0.071 (0.131)		-0.057 (0.139)		-0.055 (0.137)	
501-1,000	0.067 (0.214)	0.194 (0.176)		0.056 (0.180)		0.177 (0.185)		-0.332* (0.171)	-2.51
1,001-5,000	-0.083	0.045		0.066		-0.197		-0.254	

Over 5,000	(0.219) 0.038 (0.289)	(0.190) 0.018 (0.246)		(0.175) 0.112 (0.236)		(0.189) 0.038 (0.248)		(0.187) -0.045 (0.271)	
Log (Agency Budget, \$2018)	-0.122** (0.035)	-0.073** (0.031)	5.95	-0.070** (0.029)	-6.37	-0.085** (0.030)	-3.00	-0.056* (0.031)	-4.19
<u>Federal Dependency of Agency:</u>									
Agency Receives Federal \$	0.038 (0.164)	0.142 (0.132)		-0.025 (0.131)		0.047 (0.143)		-0.182 (0.143)	
# of Federal Agencies Giving \$	-0.109** (0.035)	-0.091** (0.028)	5.01	-0.114** (0.029)	-6.87	-0.050* (0.029)	-1.25	-0.027 (0.029)	
Proportion of Budget from Federal	-0.020 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.044)		-0.029 (0.042)		-0.021 (0.043)		0.046 (0.040)	
<u>State Political Context:</u>									
Democratic Governor	-0.130 (0.115)	-0.060 (0.096)		-0.086 (0.096)		-0.018 (0.100)		-0.097 (0.100)	
Democratic State Leg.	-0.088 (0.161)	-0.058 (0.145)		-0.040 (0.133)		-0.178 (0.148)		-0.103 (0.142)	
Agency Function FE	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
State FE	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	2.593* (1.558)								
τ_1		-9.477** (1.363)		-5.583** (1.224)		-3.051* (1.471)		-2.713* (1.354)	
τ_2		-7.109** (1.360)		-3.351** (1.222)		-1.293 (1.469)		-0.910 (1.350)	
τ_3		-4.641** (1.355)		-1.368 (1.220)		2.237 (1.470)		2.255* (1.351)	
τ_4		-1.539 (1.365)		1.674 (1.238)		4.961** (1.506)		5.381** (1.405)	
N. of observations	2894	2969		2962		2929		2958	
AIC	13009.587	6986.933		7421.474		6433.370		6482.670	
BIC	13540.952	7538.563		7972.887		6983.753		7033.958	
R-squared	0.137								


* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. One-tailed tests, robust standard errors. Model 3 is a multiple regression, models 4-7 are ordered logistic regressions. Predicted probabilities reported to the right of the coefficient. Predicted probabilities can be interpreted as the percent change in probability that a respondent will view the federal action positively moving from the minimum to the maximum observed values of the IV while holding all other control variables at their observed values.

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Administrator Observing Encroachment Across Federal Government Composition



Notes: 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.

Figure 2: Predicted Administrator Support of Federal Encroachment Across Federal Government Composition



Notes: 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.

Online Supplemental Appendix

Table A1: Tabular Results for Figures One and Two

	Figure 1: Is Federal Gov. Encroaching		Figure 2: Support for Encroachment	
	A1: Party ID b/se	A2: Ideology b/se	A3: Party ID b/se	A4: Ideology b/se
Democrat	-0.378** (0.146)	-0.278** (0.101)	0.346* (0.147)	0.289** (0.111)
Republican	0.033 (0.154)	0.110 (0.106)	-0.043 (0.163)	-0.132 (0.116)
Democratic Federal Government	0.733** (0.153)	1.394** (0.262)	-0.512** (0.184)	-1.066** (0.328)
Republican Federal Government	-0.454* (0.194)	-0.829* (0.322)	0.457** (0.176)	0.733* (0.314)
Democrat x Democratic Federal Gov.	0.011 (0.199)		0.253 (0.244)	
Democrat x Republican Federal Gov.	0.534* (0.260)		-0.624** (0.240)	
Republican x Democratic Federal Gov.	0.130 (0.213)		-0.229 (0.265)	
Republican x Republican Federal Gov.	0.140 (0.258)		-0.075 (0.254)	
Ideology Self-Identification	-0.078* (0.037)	-0.049 (0.051)	0.165** (0.042)	0.145** (0.053)
Ideology Self-Identification x Democratic Federal Gov.		-0.161* (0.065)		0.154+ (0.081)
Ideology Self-Identification x Republican Federal Gov.		0.165* (0.084)		-0.142+ (0.080)
Non-Caucasian	0.147 (0.141)	0.125 (0.142)	-0.240 (0.153)	-0.203 (0.153)
Female	0.012 (0.100)	-0.000 (0.100)	0.083 (0.102)	0.080 (0.102)
Post-Baccalaureate Edu.	-0.094 (0.080)	-0.094 (0.080)	0.031 (0.092)	0.034 (0.092)
Respondent Age	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.041 (0.045)	-0.043 (0.046)
Respondent Age Squared	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Log (Respondent Income, \$2018)	0.134 (0.107)	0.127 (0.108)	-0.273 (0.089)	-0.274 (0.088)
Civil Service Employee	-0.120 (0.100)	-0.132 (0.100)	0.317** (0.110)	0.317** (0.110)
Years Employed in State Government	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)
Years Employed in Agency	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)
Years Employed in Position	0.014+ (0.008)	0.014+ (0.008)	-0.027** (0.009)	-0.028** (0.010)
Agency Size	0.039 (0.045)	0.046 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.047)
Log (Agency Budget, \$2018)	0.072* (0.034)	0.064+ (0.034)	-0.138** (0.034)	-0.133** (0.034)
Agency Receives Federal \$	-0.237+ (0.141)	-0.258+ (0.141)	0.006 (0.161)	0.007 (0.161)
# of Federal Agencies Giving \$	0.040 (0.029)	0.046 (0.029)	-0.098** (0.034)	-0.102** (0.034)
Proportion of Budget from Federal	-0.008 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.008 (0.048)	-0.010 (0.048)
Democratic Governor	0.188+ (0.108)	0.161 (0.108)	-0.134 (0.113)	-0.116 (0.113)
Democratic State Leg.	0.203 (0.146)	0.181 (0.145)	-0.118 (0.158)	-0.079 (0.158)
Agency Function FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant			-0.247 (1.215)	-0.146 (1.225)
τ_1	-2.996** (1.137)	-2.913* (1.156)		
τ_2	-2.807* (1.136)	-2.724* (1.156)		
τ_3	-2.206+ (1.135)	-2.124+ (1.155)		
τ_4	-1.120 (1.134)	-1.035 (1.154)		
τ_5	0.361 (1.135)	0.455 (1.155)		
N. of observations	2355	2355	2894	2894
AIC	7875.411	7861.449	13414.890	13416.304
BIC	8402.852	8377.298	13937.008	13926.420
R-squared			0.134	0.132

+p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Two-tailed tests, robust standard errors. Models A1 and A2 are ordered logistic regressions, models A3 and A4 are OLS regressions.

Table A2: Marginal Effect Predications and Findings

Figure Title	Dependent Variable (Y)	Independent Variable (X)	Moderating Variable (Z)	Predicted Relationship	Finding
A.1	Observing Encroachment	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Administrator Party	Under increasing levels of Republican administrator identification, a negative trend for Democratic federal control. A positive trend for Republican federal control.	Unsupportive. Across all levels of administrator party identification, negative marginal effect when there is Democratic federal control. Under Republican federal control, non-significant effect for Democratic and Republican administrators. Positive effect for Independent administrators.
A.2	Observing Encroachment	Administrator Party	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Under increasing levels of Republican federal control, a negative trend for Democratic identified administrators. A positive trend for Republican identified administrators.	Partial support. Positive marginal effect for Democratic administrators under Democratic and split federal control, non-significant effect under Republican control. Republican administrators are non-significant across all levels of federal control.
A.3	Observing Encroachment	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Administrator Ideology	Positive trend under Democratic federal control. Negative trend under Republican federal control.	Supportive. Under Democratic federal control ideology is negative and becomes non-significant at sufficient levels of liberalism. Under Republican federal control ideology is positive and becomes non-significant at

					sufficient levels of liberalism.
A.4	Observing Encroachment	Administrator Ideology	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Negative trend across increases levels of federal Republican control. Positive effect under Democratic federal control, negative under Republican federal control	Partial support. Marginal effect is negative overall. Positive under Democratic federal control non-significant under split and Republican federal control.
A.5	Feelings Towards Encroachment	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Administrator Party	Under increasing levels of Republican administrator identification, a negative trend for Democratic federal control. A positive trend for Republican federal control.	Supportive. Under Democratic federal control, non-significant effect for Democratic identified administrators. Negative effect under split and Republican federal control. Under Republican federal control, non-significant effect for Democratic identified administrators. Positive effect under split and Republican federal control.
A.6	Feelings Towards Encroachment	Administrator Party	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Under increasing levels of Republican federal control, a negative trend for Democratic identified administrators. A positive trend for Republican identified administrators.	Partial support. For Democratic identified administrators, positive marginal effect under Democratic and split federal control. Non-significant effect under Republican federal control. For Republican identified administrators, non-significant across all arrangements of federal control.

A.7	Feelings Towards Encroachment	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Administrator Ideology	Positive trend under Democratic federal control. Negative trend under Republican federal control.	Supportive. Under Democratic federal control ideology is negative and becomes non-significant at sufficient levels of liberalism. Under Republican federal control ideology is positive and becomes non-significant at sufficient levels of liberalism.
A.8	Feelings Towards Encroachment	Administrator Ideology	Federal Gov. Arrangement	Negative trend across increases levels of federal Republican control. Positive effect under Democratic federal control, negative under Republican federal control	Partial support. Marginal effect is negative overall. Positive under Democratic and split federal control non-significant under Republican federal control.

Figure A1




Figure A2




Figure A3




Figure A4




Figure A5




Figure A6




Figure A7




Figure A8

