Too Much Democracy? Exploring the Link Between Majoritarian Institutions and Disparities in the American States

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Abstract: In the field of American state politics, the tension between majoritarian institutions and equality has largely been ignored. Do state institutions that empower majority preferences exacerbate disparities in social outcomes? Under what conditions do majoritarian institutions exacerbate inequalities in the American states? Our argument is that equality is most likely to be threatened under majoritarian institutions when (1) there are systemic participatory biases and/or (2) there are widespread prejudices about particular groups in society. We find that more majoritarian institutions are associated with larger disparities between white and black life expectancy and poverty rates across the American states, but not differences in educational attainment. We also find that this effect is moderated by racial context, with majoritarian institutions being associated with greater disparities for states with diverse racial contexts and smaller disparities in more homogenous states. These findings suggest that majoritarian institutions operate to the benefit of the white majority, while coming at the cost of minority population outcomes when a racial threat is perceived, and presumably, public opinion is biased.

A key benchmark of democratic performance is the extent to which public opinion is reflected in public policy. If responsiveness is lacking, institutional reforms—aimed at strengthening the electoral connection between public opinion and elite decision-making—are often proposed. Political scientists champion these reforms. Yet, institutions that strengthen the electoral connection may conflict with another cherished democratic value: equality. As Abizadeh (2021) writes, "when push comes to shove, majoritarianism ultimately jettisons the democratic commitment to equality" (743). Comparative studies find empirical support for Abizadeh's (2021) claim; majoritarian institutions are systematically related to higher income inequality among developed countries (e..g, Birchfield & Crepaz 1998)

In the field of American state politics, the tension between majoritarian institutions and equality has largely been ignored. That is not because the American states lack variations in majoritarian institutions. To the contrary, a key difference in institutional design across the American states is the extent to which elected officials are held accountable by constituents. Institutions related to campaign finance laws (Barber 2016; La Raja and Schaffner 2015), voter registration laws (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Wolfinger, Rosenstone, and Rosenstone 1980), ballot initiatives and popular referendum (Gerber 1996; Matsusaka 2018), and legislative professionalism (Maestas 2000; Squire 1993) strengthen the role of the median voter and increase electoral incentives for elites to follow public opinion (LaCombe 2021). States also vary substantially in disparities across economic, educational, and health metrics (e.g., Hero 1998; Gamm and Kousser 2021).

How are majoritarian institutions related to social inequalities across the states? Under what conditions do majoritarian institutions exacerbate inequalities in the American states? Our argument is that equality is most likely to be threatened under majoritarian institutions when (1)

there are systemic participatory biases and/or (2) there are widespread prejudices about particular groups in society. For both reasons—either participatory biases or biased public opinion, increasing electoral incentives may actually push elected officials towards a less pro-equity stance than would be observed under other institutional designs.

To test the conditions under which these majoritarian institutions exacerbate inequality, we estimate dynamic panel and two-way fixed effect regression analyses on various racial disparities in health, educational attainment, and poverty across the fifty American states. We find that more majoritarian institutions are associated with larger disparities between white and black life expectancy and poverty rates, but not differences in educational attainment. In two-way fixed effects models, we also find that this effect is moderated by racial context, with majoritarian institutions being associated with greater disparities for states with diverse racial contexts and smaller disparities in more homogenous states. These findings suggest that majoritarian institutions operate to the benefit of the white majority, while coming at the cost of minority population outcomes when a racial threat is perceived, and presumably, public opinion is biased.

When Does Responsiveness Exacerbate Equality?

We argue that who participates and the popularity of prejudiced beliefs play a critical role in determining the extent to which majoritarian institutions exacerbate inequality in the states. Majoritarian institutions will exacerbate inequality under two conditions: when there are systemic participatory biases in the political process and when the majority public opinion is prejudiced. There are likely other conditions that increase state inequalities and our analyses include a range of other variables. But, for determining whether majoritarian institutions translate into gross disparities in social outcomes, who participates and the extent to which

constituents are prejudiced play a crucial role in pushing elected officials towards more particularized policies that, years later, widen inequalities on key social outcomes.

Participatory Bias

If there are systemic biases in who participates in politics, then majoritarian institutions are more likely to lead to larger social inequalities. Politicians strive to respond to their constituents (Miller and Stokes 1963), yet, the messages they receive may very well be distorted if there are systemic participatory biases. A long strand of research finds that the American electorate is indeed biased towards wealthy, educated, politically interested, healthy citizens (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2018; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Burden et al. 2017; Pacheco and Fletcher 2016). This participatory bias extends to the fifty states as well although there is variation in the size of these biases (Hill and Leighley 1992; Avery and Peffley 2005; Avery 2015; Pacheco 2021).

Participatory biases are of less concern if the political preferences of active citizens are representative of the electorate as a whole. While some research suggests marginal differences in preferences between voters and nonvoters (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), more recent research finds that Republicans and conservatives are overrepresented by voters (Leighley and Nagler 2014). Differences in opinion are even bigger when looking at political acts beyond voting; those who made large campaign contributions are considerably more conservative on economic issues compared to all citizens, all voters, and even all contributors (Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018). Because politically active individuals are less likely to need government support, public officials hear less about issues related to basic human needs (Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018), which may encourage less pro-equity policy proposals, which eventually lead to more social inequality.

Work at the local level suggests that participatory biases explain why economic inequalities are higher in New York towns with direct elections compared to towns with appointed tax accessors (Sances 2015). The effects of elections on income inequality in his study were substantial; by one estimate, the difference in effective tax rates between the richest and poorest homes were 26 percentage points higher in towns with elections (Sances 2015). In the case of New York towns, the reality of unequal participation led to incentives that made elected accessors more biased in their decision making than they would have been if appointed. Sances (2015) points out that income inequality existed in all towns regardless of how the accessor was selected. However, the bias was exacerbated by the presence of elections.

Prejudiced Public Opinion

Even if there were no participatory biases, we suspect that majoritarian institutions will lead to more unequal outcomes if the majority of citizens oppose equality for all. This opposition may arise because of explicit or implicit prejudices or a general belief system that inequality is caused by individual behaviors instead of institutional structures. In reality, it is difficult to separate the two factors since prejudices are often intertwined with beliefs about attributions of blame. For instance, Americans who score high on the racial resentment scale tend to explain racial inequality in terms of individual behavior instead of structural inequalities (Kam and Burge 2018). Likewise, in regards to health disparities, individuals are more likely to blame poor health on individual behaviors instead of biological or systemic factors when groups suffering ill health are defined in racial, class, or gender terms (Gollust and Lynch 2011). Individualism (Feldman 1983; Smith & Stone 1989; Cozzarelli et al. 2001) and racial animus (Rabinowitz et al. 2009) are also significant factors explaining public opinion towards poverty and welfare programs.

The argument that majoritarian institutions might be exacerbate inequalities—precisely because of prejudiced public opinion—is at the core of the debate over direct democracy. Critics of direct democracy suggest that minority rights are endangered when citizens vote directly on legislation. Unlike institutions of direct democracy, a representative democracy holds elected officials accountable for their decisions—both through electoral incentives and nonelectoral constraints—which provides a check on a powerful, prejudiced majority. In the case of minority rights, elected officials are less likely to make outwardly biased decisions than voters, even if they are no less prejudiced (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2015). While some studies find little evidence that direct democracy hurts minorities (e.g., Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch 2002), others find that states with direct democracy have anti-minority policies, such as laws defining English as the official language (Preuhs 2005), affirmative action bans (Chavez 1998), same-sex marriage bans (Lewis 2011), and are also more likely to have the death penalty (Gerber, 1999; Caron 2021). These anti-minority policies, in turn, have obvious implications for the equality of social outcomes.

Hypotheses

We suspect that strengthening majoritarian institutions in the American states will lead to inequalities in and of itself, but in states where the inputs are biased either because of who participates or prejudiced opinions, elected officials will have even greater incentives to promote proposals with particularized benefits. In turn, inequalities widen. This provides us with specific hypotheses about conditions under which equality is threatened under majoritarian institutions.

Majoritarian Hypothesis: States with strong majoritarian institutions have larger disparities than states with weak majoritarian institutions.

Participatory Interaction Hypothesis: The effect of majoritarian institutions on state inequalities will increase as the amount of participatory bias increases.

Opinion Interaction Hypothesis: The effect of majoritarian institutions on state inequalities will increase as the prejudice of state residents increases.

Measuring Social Inequality in the American States

To test our hypotheses, we collected data from a variety of sources on state racial disparities related to the health, education, and income. Due to the challenging nature of finding reliable state-level estimates disaggregated by race, there is significant variation in the sample size depending on the outcome, with some outcomes having over 30 years of reliable data and others only having a decade at most. For all outcomes, our dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between state-level estimates by race. Larger values indicate larger inequalities between white and black populations. Given the difficulty of generating reliable state-level estimates for small populations, we filtered out observations that were less than 3% black.[1]

Health

To measure racial disparities on health in the states, we use data from Harper et al. (2014) who collect data on life expectancy for black and white populations from 1990-2009. Life expectancy at birth is an estimate of the number of years a (black or white) newborn is predicted to live based on period life table calculations (see Harper et al. 2014). We generate measures of

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[1] While this threshold is arbitrary, we feel it balances the tradeoff between producing reliable state level estimates and not losing important state level variation. Roughly 25% of our sample (579 state-year observations) fell below this threshold.

the absolute value for the difference between black and white life expectancy at birth. Figure 1 shows the trend overtime in all 50 states. While the disparity has been shrinking overtime, in 2009 there is still a nearly 4-year gap between white and black life expectancy with the largest gap being 8.5 years. The states with the largest average disparities are found in the Midwest (Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and the South/border states (Maryland, Louisiana, Missouri, Florida). The states with the largest gaps tend to have relatively large black populations, while those with the smallest average gaps tend to have larger white populations (Maine, New Hampshire, Utah, West Virginia). Out of the 45 states with large enough black populations to provide estimates, all but Wisconsin and Hawaii saw the disparity shrink, with New York seeing the largest decline (4.2 years) with the average decrease was 1.7 years.

Figure 1: Disparity between Black and White Life Expectancy at Birth in the Amercan States

Source: CDC Health Statistics and Harper et al (2014)

Educational Attainment

In addition to racial health disparities, we also estimate racial disparities in educational attainment across the states. We use the CDC's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). This over the phone survey is one of the most comprehensive public surveys with up

to 500,000 respondents per year across all 50 states. With the proper use of weights, data from the BRFSS are representative of state populations. We calculate the absolute value of the difference between the percentage of black individuals in a state with a high school degree and the percentage of white individuals with a high school degree. In our sample, 91% of the white population and 86% of the black population has at least a high school degree. The BRFSS data spans from 1993 to 2016 and is shown in Figure 2. As shown in Figure 2, the educational attainment gap between white and black populations appears to be shrinking somewhat. More notably, state level variation appears to be shrinking overtime as the gap becomes similar across all states in the sample. We again find that Wisconsin is one of the states with the largest racial disparities, followed by several Southern states (Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana). The disparity has been reduced on average by 3.8 percentage points, but 8 states have seen the gap grow since 1993.

Figure 2: Disparity between Black and White % of Population with at least High School Degree in the American States

CDC Behavioral Risk Surveillance System

Poverty

Finally, we use data from the American Community Survey 2009-2019 to measure racial inequalities in poverty across the states. Here, our outcome variable is the absolute difference in the poverty rate between black and white populations across the states. The average poverty rate is much higher for black populations (27%) compared to the white ones (10%). States with small black populations see the highest disparities (the Dakotas, Vermont, Idaho) while non-Southern, more diverse states tend to see the smallest average disparity (Delaware, Arizona, New York). From 2009 to 2019, the average difference has shrunk from over 18% to under 14%, and most states see a downward trend.

Figure 3: Disparity between Black and White Poverty Rate in the American States

Source: American Community Survey

Measuring Majoritarian Institutions

Our first task is to test the *Majoritarian Hypothesis*, which suggests that states with strong majoritarian institutions have larger disparities than states with weak majoritarian institutions. To test this hypothesis, we measure state majoritarian institutions using a latent scale developed by LaCombe (2021). As described by LaCombe (2021), the measure was calculated from a Bayesian factor analysis using institutional data from all 50 states from 1975 to 2016. LaCombe (2021) identifies one of the dimensions from this factor analysis as *accountability pressure*. States high in accountability pressure have an easy to use initiative process, relatively strict campaign finance laws, and high levels of legislative professionalism. Evidence suggests that many of these institutions—when studied separately—increase the association between public opinion and policy (Gerber 1996; Maestas 2000; Pacheco 2013; La Raja and Schaffner 2015). The composite scale also matters; states with higher levels of accountability pressure have higher rates of opinion- policy congruence across dozens of policies (LaCombe 2020; 2021). Pacheco and LaCombe (forthcoming) use these data to demonstrate that accountability pressure has population health implications, with states higher in accountability pressure having lower infant mortality rates

Participatory Bias

We argued above that there are two conditions under which majoritarian institutions will exacerbate inequalities: when there are systemic participatory biases in the political process and when the majority public opinion is prejudiced. To test the *Participatory Interaction Hypothesis*, we include a measure of income bias in voter turnout from 1996 to 2016. This measure captures the extent to which voter turnout is disproportionately represented by wealthy citizens compared

to the overall population. If the voting population is healthier than the overall population, then there is an incentive structure for political elites to craft policies that are favored by wealthy citizens, potentially leading to increased social disparities. We therefore interact this measure with the accountability variable. While the original dataset included estimates for even years from 1996-2012, we interpolated missing values for the time series cross sectional data using a linear trend.

Biased Public Opinion

We test the *Opinion Interaction Hypothesis* using two different approaches. First, we include a measure of state racial resentment (Smith et al 2020). Smith et al (2020) use small area estimation techniques on the ANES data to produce state level measures of racial attitudes, with higher values indicating stronger levels of racial resentment. We expect that in majoritarian systems designed to maximize the influence of public opinion, these attitudes may have an even stronger effect on increasing racial disparities in population outcomes. On the other hand, if public opinion had low levels of racial resentment, we would expect to see majoritarian institutions lead to smaller disparities between majority and minority groups as elites have fewer incentives to craft policies that cater to voting populations with high levels of racial resentment. We interact this measure with accountability pressure to evaluate if disparities that emerge from majoritarian institutions are larger when racial resentment is high. We again used interpolation using a linear trend to fill in missing values of the resentment score, which were estimated originally in four-year increments.[2]

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[2] Watts et al (2020) show the time series cross sectional estimates are very static. On a zero to one scale, all states are found to be between .5 and .76, while no state sees a change of more than

Because the state racial resentment measure is unavailable across the timespan, we also measure prejudiced public opinion using a simpler method. Specifically, we use Hero and Tolbert's (1996) categorization of states based on racial and ethnic diversity. They categorize states as homogenous, heterogeneous, and bifurcated. Homogenous states have low levels of both racial and ethnic diversity, while bifurcated states include those with large minority populations but small white ethnic populations, and heterogeneous states have high levels of both. Growing diversity may be perceived as a racial threat by white voters, which leads to higher levels of biased public opinion. Under this scenario, greater diversity leads to the white population to feel threatened by political, economic, and social competitions from non-white voters (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, 1989; Avery and Fine 2012). For example, Avery et al (2016) find that states with a larger Latino population pass more restrictive immigration laws, particularly when Latino voter engagement is low, and Tolbert and Grummel (2003) find that whites living in more diverse census tracts were more likely to support bans on affirmative action. In this scenario of racial threat, majoritarian institutions may empower white populations to enact policies stemming that either disproportionately benefit white populations, or harm non-white groups.[3] Similar to the other analyses, we include an interaction term to test for our hypothesis.

.09 across the original time series from 1988-2016. We chose a linear trend because changes we small and gradual over time.

[3] On the one hand, a larger minority population indicates an opportunity for elites to reach new voters by crafting policy solutions that are appealing to this voting bloc. Furthermore, larger minority constituencies could reach a critical size to elect representatives who share their

Empirical Strategy

There is complexity in estimating models that account for both unit heterogeneity and autocorrelation for cross-sectional time series data (see Beck and Katz 1995; 2011; De Boef and Keele 2008; Bell and Jones 2015). Proper identification of the modeling strategy requires an understanding about the source of variation in the dependent and independent variables as well as the limitations of the data. ANOVA analyses indicate the source of variation for the dependent variables differs with some variables (life expectancy and poverty) having a majority of variance between states and others having a majority of variance within states (educational attainment).

A major concern with time series cross sectional data is that systemic factors (e.g., national level policies) or unit specific forces (e.g., state economics) that are not included in the model lead to omitted variable bias. Methodologically, systemic factors can be controlled away with variables that capture time trends (e.g., cubic spline or year fixed effects) while unit fixed effects (e.g., state categorical variables) account for unit heterogeneity. These solutions are atheoretical and may lead to an over-parameterization of the model (e.g., Achen 2005). There is also concern that including unit fixed effects with a LDV creates biased estimates (e.g, Nickell 1981) although others suggest this bias is small when T is greater than 5 (Beck and Katz 2011). Still others advise against unit fixed effects when the researcher wishes to include unit-invariant covariates (e.g., region) or predictors that change gradually over time (Clark and Linzer 2015).

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preferences (Lublin 1997). Under this theory, greater levels of racial and ethnic diversity may lead to smaller disparities between white and black populations.

In these cases, a random effects estimator may be preferable, even in the presence of bias, to reduce variance (Clark and Linzer 2015). The larger point is that alternative model specifications often lead to drastically different conclusions (e.g., Wilson and Butler 2007) and, in the absence of perfect theory and data, it is difficult to decide which model specification is closest to the "truth."

We decide to report results using multiple model specifications. First, we model the dependent variables as the 1-year *difference* and include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to correct for autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 1995). More specifically, we estimate an Error Correction Model (ECM) with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 2011). Modeling our dependent variables as first differences has two benefits. First, these types of models essentially purge the regression of any unobserved state-specific fixed effects. ANOVA analyses on the differenced dependent variables confirm that virtually all the variation is within states. Second, we are able to allow for the possibility that the treatment effect of majoritarian institutions on disparities requires some extended period of time. An ECM allows for the estimation of both short and long-term effects of independent variables and tells us how quickly the system returns to equilibrium or the overall mean after being disrupted. Since our measure of political accountability is time varying, we include differenced and lagged versions.[4] We also

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[4] The coefficient on the differenced independent variable gives the short-term effect on the dependent variable, while the coefficient on the lagged independent variable gives the long-term effect on the dependent variable. To get the estimated short-term effect of a unit change in X, we simply multiply this effect with the coefficient on the differenced independent variable. To get

include fixed effects of year to capture common trends. For these dynamic models, we decide against state fixed effects because the differenced outcomes are already purged of the between state variation and because our main independent variables, while dynamic, are slow to change (see Clark and Linzer 2015).

Not including state fixed effects, however, may result in biased coefficients due to an omitted variable. It is possible that some unobserved factor, for instance state culture, impacts both democratic institutions and population health outcomes. As a result, we present a second set of models that attempt to describe the between state association of majoritarian institutions and racial disparities. For these models, the estimate of the effect of political accountability is contemporaneous and non-time varying. Similar to the dynamic models, however, we still control for common time trends by including fixed year effects.

All dependent variables are the absolute value of the difference between two groups (white and black populations at the state level).[5] For each outcome, we estimate the model without control variables first and then estimate a parallel model that includes a lagged and difference measure for unified Democratic control and the percentage of the percentage of the population that is black. We expect for states that are dominated by Democrats to have lower disparities (e.g., Kousser and Gamm 2022) and for states with large black populations to have higher disparities.

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the estimated long-term effect of a unit change in X, we divide the coefficient by the error correction rate and then multiple it by a unit change in X (see De Boef and Keele 2008).

[5] Given the small sample size of estimates for black populations in some states, we constricted analysis to only include state-year observations with at least 3% of the sample being black.

For the interaction models, we move to two-way fixed effects models primarily because our expectations about the interactive effects are non-time dependent. We use these models to interact accountability pressure with the interactions mentioned earlier on income bias in turnout and our two measures of prejudiced opinion including racial resentment and the Hero and Tolbert racial/ethnic diversity classification.

Results: Dynamic Models

Table 1 shows the results for racial disparities in life expectancy across the states. Recall that the dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between white and black populations. Therefore, negative coefficients values indicate an association with smaller disparities while a positive coefficient indicates an association with larger disparities. We find support for our majoritarian hypothesis that higher levels of accountability pressure in the previous year are associated with greater disparities in life expectancy between black and white populations in the current year. We do not find a significant relationship between differenced accountability pressure and life expectancy gaps. The only significant control variables in the model are the indicators for bifurcated and heterogeneous states, which on average see smaller racial disparities in life expectancy compared to homogenous states.

We next move to racial disparities in the proportion of the population with at least a high school degree. As can be seen in Table 2, the lagged dependent variable strong predicts disparities in educational outcomes. It is the only significant variable in model 1 without controls. Once controls are included in the model, we find that higher levels of accountability pressure are associated with greater educational disparities, providing further support for our majoritarian hypothesis. We also find that the disparity is larger in states with larger black populations.

Table 3 shows the results of the disparity between black and white poverty rates (percentage). In both models, we find that accountability pressure is associated with greater differences in poverty, supporting our majoritarian hypothesis. Democratic control is associated with smaller gaps in poverty rates, while bifurcated states see smaller gaps than homogenous ones. We next turn to our two-way fixed effect models to evaluate our interactive hypotheses.

Results: Two Way Fixed Effects Models

Across 5 of the 6 models in Table 4 we do not find a significant association between accountability pressure and disparities. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that racial resentment or biases in turnout moderate this relationship. However, we do find support for our hypothesis that racial context moderates the effect of majoritarian institutions on social disparities. According to the model, in homogenous states, more majoritarian institutions are associated with lower disparities in life expectancy, while in bifurcated and heterogeneous states we find a positive interactive effect. This suggests a racial threat dynamic where majoritarian institutions lead to inequality when white groups feel threatened by a sizable minority population.

Moving to educational outcomes, Table 5 shows the two-way fixed effects results for education disparities. We do not find any significant relationship between accountability pressure and racial gaps in education rates and we also do not find any significant interactive effects. Lastly, in table 6, we also do not find support for any of our hypotheses, with accountability pressure being unrelated to racial gaps in poverty. We also do not find any significant interactive effects.

Synthesizing results

In sum, in our panel corrected standard error models, we find strong support for our first hypothesis, with almost every model indicating accountability pressure is associated with higher levels of racial disparities between white and black citizens along health, education, and economic outcomes. However, our two-way fixed effect models show a very different story, with accountability pressure largely unrelated to racial disparities in population outcomes, with the except of a significant interactive effect for racial context.

Discussion

In this paper we have shown some evidence that majoritarian institutions are associated with disparities in health, education, and economic outcomes. When levels of accountability pressure are high, we observe greater differences between white and black life expectancy, high school graduation rates, and poverty rates.

One clear pattern is that decision on how to incorporate temporal and geographic dependency influence the conclusions we draw. While the panel models demonstrate consistently that accountability pressure is associated with greater racial disparities across all outcomes (5 of the 6 models), we find much more limited support for our majoritarian hypothesis in the two-way fixed effects models. At the same time, In the 21 models included across 6 tables, every model either shows accountability pressure being associated with larger racial gaps in population outcomes or being unrelated. So, while more work is clearly needed to better understand the role of institutions on population disparities, there is no evidence that majoritarian institutions are capable of reducing racial disparities.

We see several critical paths forward for continuing this research. First, due to challenges in data collection, the temporal coverage of each outcome variables from nearly 30 years to under 10. Expanding the time series to incorporate racial disparities over more years will not

only allow for more comparable modeling strategies across outcomes, but also provide an opportunity to further explore how best to incorporate both time and geographic as relevant factors.

Taken in conjunction with earlier findings that accountability pressure is associated with lower rates of infant mortality in the overall state population (Pacheco and LaCombe forthcoming), these results have important implications for how we think about the role of democratic governance in population educational, health, and economic outcomes. Higher levels of democratic governance may result in better population outcomes, but we find evidence that these benefits are not equally distributed.

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Table 1: Error Correction Model Predicting Difference in Life Expectancy by Race

	(1)	(2)
Lagged DV	-.01	-.00
	(.01)	(.01)
D.Accountability	-.01	-.02
	(.05)	(.05)
L.Accountability	.01***	.02***
	(.00)	(.00)
D.Democratic Control		-.00
		(.02)
L.Democratic Control		-.01
		(.01)
D.Percentage Black		-.02
		(.04)
L.Percentage Black		-.00
		(.00)
Bifurcated		-.02*
		(.01)
Heterogeneous		-.07***
		(.02)
Constant	.07**	.10***
	(.03)	(.03)
Observations	698	679
R^2	.246	.281

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

Table 2: Error Correction Model Predicting Disparities Education Attainment

	(1)	(2)
Lagged DV	-.464***	-.544***
	(.035)	(.064)
D.Accountability	-.004	-.014
	(.011)	(.015)
L.Accountability	.002	.004***
	(.002)	(.002)
D.Democratic Control		.000
		(.003)
L.Democratic Control		-.002
		(.002)
D.Percentage Black		-.003
		(.007)
L.Percentage Black		.001***
		(.000)
Bifurcated		-.004
		(.003)
Heterogeneous		.002
		(.003)
Constant	.036***	.031***
	(.005)	(.004)
Observations	873	752
R^2	.261	.298

Panel corrected Standard errors in parentheses * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 3: Error Correction Model Predicting Black-White Gap in Poverty

	(1)	(2)
L.Lagged DV	-.25***	-.22**
	(.09)	(.10)
D.Accountability	-.39	.85
	(1.99)	(1.88)
L.Accountability	.27***	.37*
	(.10)	(.22)
D.Democratic Control		-1.83***
		(.60)
L.Democratic Control		-.26
		(.27)
D.Percentage Black		2.23
		(1.57)
L.Percentage Black		.02*
		(.01)
Bifurcated		-1.36**
		(.68)
Heterogeneous		-1.37
		(.89)
Constant	4.23***	5.13***
	(1.50)	(1.79)
Observations	312	210
R^2	.186	.213

Panel corrected Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4: Two Way Fixed Effects Model of White vs Black Life Expectancy Disparity

	(1) W/B LE	(2) W/B LE	(3) W/B LE	(4) W/B LE	(5) W/B LE
Accountability	.03	-.60*	-.08	-.05	-1.43
	(.11)	(.32)	(.25)	(.26)	(1.19)
Democratic Control	-.01	-.01	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Percentage Black	-.17***	-.17***	-.16***	-.16***	-.16***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Bifurcated	1.68**	1.43*	.74	.71	.80
	(.72)	(.74)	(.85)	(.85)	(.85)
Heterogeneous	-3.24***	-3.57***	-3.48***	-3.48***	-3.44***
	(.15)	(.24)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Bifurcated # Account		.70**			
		(.35)			
Heterogeneous #Account		.71**			
		(.36)			
Accountability # Income				-.10	
				(.16)	
Accountability #Resent					2.00
					(1.72)
Income Bias			-.24*	-.19	-.23*
			(.13)	(.15)	(.13)
Racial Resentment			4.16**	4.09**	3.74**
			(1.64)	(1.65)	(1.68)
Constant	8.41***	8.67***	5.84***	5.86***	6.13***
	(.21)	(.25)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.14)
Observations	714	714	504	504	504
R^2	.944	.945	.970	.970	.970

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 5: Disparity in the Percentage of the Population with at Least a High School Degree

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Accountability	-.003	-.048	-.014	-.017	-.009
	(.013)	(.041)	(.022)	(.022)	(.107)
Democratic Control	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Percentage Black	-.001	-.000	.001	.001	.001
	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Bifurcated	-.031	-.058	-.095	-.092	-.095
	(.081)	(.085)	(.111)	(.111)	(.111)
Heterogeneous	-.077***	-.104***	-.111***	-.110***	-.111***
	(.014)	(.034)	(.020)	(.020)	(.020)
Bifurcated # Account		.057			
		(.045)			
Heterogeneous # Account		.039			
		(.045)			
Income Bias			.027*	.021	.027*
			(.015)	(.017)	(.015)
Racial Resentment			-.394**	-.387**	-.390**
			(.165)	(.166)	(.181)
Accountability # Income				.011	
				(.018)	
Accountability #Resent					-.008
					(.150)
Constant	.130***	.160***	.399***	.396***	.396***
	(.013)	(.029)	(.112)	(.112)	(.123)
Observations	1074	1074	832	832	832
R^2	.357	.358	.347	.347	.347

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{*} p < .1,$ $^{**} p < .05,$ $^{***} p < .01$

Table 6: Two Way Fixed Effects Black-White Gap in Poverty

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Accountability	2.21	4.65	3.40	3.92	-10.56
	(1.68)	(6.12)	(2.77)	(2.82)	(30.78)
Democratic Control	-.81**	-.82**	-.63	-.62	-.65
	(.36)	(.36)	(.49)	(.49)	(.50)
Percentage Black	1.05	1.06	2.00*	1.92*	1.90*
	(.92)	(.92)	(1.08)	(1.08)	(1.10)
Bifurcated	-26.47	-26.48	-43.92**	-42.06*	-41.86*
	(18.34)	(18.50)	(21.80)	(21.88)	(22.33)
Heterogeneous	-9.93***	-9.73**	-8.64*	-9.55*	-7.93
	(2.84)	(4.55)	(4.80)	(4.89)	(5.06)
Bifurcated # Account		-3.35			
		(6.47)			
Heterogeneous # Account		-1.28			
		(6.73)			
Income Bias			3.38	4.43	3.60
			(2.53)	(2.74)	(2.58)
Racial Resentment			-13.53	-29.92	-5.86
			(93.61)	(95.05)	(95.39)
Accountability # Income				-2.05	
				(2.06)	
Accountability #Resent					20.18
					(44.32)
Constant	18.43***	17.27***	21.06	32.57	16.39
	(5.94)	(6.60)	(63.83)	(64.88)	(64.84)
Observations	245	245	175	175	175
R^2	.846	.847	.861	.862	.861

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$