Blame Attribution, Partisanship, and Federalism: Evidence from a Panel Study

When disaster strikes in federal systems, who do citizens blame and why? While several literatures posit that partisanship shapes patterns of blame attribution, the mechanism driving this relationship remains disputed. Specifically, whereas partisan blame attribution (PBA) suggests that partisans hold distinct preferences regarding which level of government should devise policies in times of crisis—and subsequently hold said level accountable when failure is observed—partisan federalism (PF) suggests that citizens opportunistically assign blame to the level of government controlled by their disfavored party. In this study, we examine the extent to which each theory explains patterns of blame attribution related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Leveraging panel survey-data collected before the 2020 election and after the 2021 transition, we find that Democrats follow PF expectations, whereas Republicans follow PBA expectations. Our findings indicate that scholars should revisit blame attribution and more carefully consider the role of federalism in determining citizen preferences.

In times of crisis, people direct their fear and anger towards those they deem responsible for upheaval and suffering. In liberal democracies, where government is expected to effectively manage threats, politicians are often the target of popular ire, criticized for incompetence, indifference, or opportunism. Yet in a federal system such as the United States, with its layers of national, state, and local authority, it's unclear *which*, *why*, and *when* politicians will be blamed. This is evident during the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic in the US: a long-term and ongoing crisis of immense scope with substantial consequences for economic, social, and political life. While some Americans blame policy failures on the Trump administration, or later, the Biden administration, others point to governors or mayors. When an unprecedented pandemic is met with a cacophony of largely suboptimal and incongruent policy responses emanating from multiple levels of government, who do people blame and why?

To date, several federalism-based research streams conceive of political partisanship as a powerful lens for shaping interpretation of new information, values, and (potentially) the way individuals assign political blame (Maholtra 2008; Carsey and Layman 2006; Miller 1991). While such literatures posit that partisanship is an important indicator of blame perception, the manner in which this relationship unfolds is largely disputed.

According to theories of partisan blame attribution (PBA), partisanship serves as a stable group identifier beholden to distinct, polarized, and rigid belief systems (Maestas et al. 2008). Partisans have core and fixed preferences regarding the responsibilities of each level of government: Democrats (on average) prefer that policies emanate from the national government, whereas Republicans prefer that policies emerge from lower levels (Schneider, Jacoby, and Lewis 2011). Ultimately, when a failure in governance is observed or a crisis strikes, partisans assign blame to the level of government they believe is (or should-be) charged with responding

(Arceneaux and Stein 2006). *Thus, PBA purports that Democrats will—because of their predilection for federal solutions—direct blame toward the national government, while Republicans—due to their preference for decentralization—will find lower levels of government responsible. Such preferences are expected to hold irrespective of party control across levels.*

Alternatively, the theory of partisan federalism (PF) contends that competition exists between levels of government operating under opposing party control (Bullman-Posen 2013). Here, political elites perceive (and subsequently portray) decisions arising from competing levels of government as illegitimate and attempt to co-opt power in their favor (Olsen, Callaghen, and Karch 2017; Miras and Rouse 2021). These beliefs—which have been shown to extend to everyday citizens (Dinan and Heckelman 2020; Wolak 2016)—can shape the way individuals assign blame. *In this context, PF implies that during times of crisis, individuals will assign blame to the level of government controlled by the opposing party.*

Empirical studies examining the link between partisanship and blame attribution in federal systems—largely relying on cross sectional survey data collected in the aftermath of a single, relatively ephemeral crises[1]—shed little light on which (if either) mechanism is driving observed effects. For example, the most prominent research on the subject utilizes data collected in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (e.g., Boin and Hart 2010; Maestas et al. 2008). This work consistently finds that Democrats disproportionately blamed the national government (controlled by Republicans) whereas Republicans blamed state and local governments (controlled by Democrats), reinforcing the logic of both theories.

In this paper, we leverage survey data collected from a single sample of US adults across two waves—once before and once after the 2021 partisan shift in the national government—to

[1] Several exceptions use experimental data (e.g., Healy, Kuo and Malhorta 2014 and Malhorta and Kuo 2008).

explore the dynamics of blame attribution during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consistent with PF expectations, the rate by which Democrats assigned blame to subnational governments dramatically increased after the federal government transition. Consistent with PBA expectations, however, the rate by which Republicans assigned blame to state and local governments remained relatively high and did not vary across waves. Such findings suggest that both theories offer partial explanations of blame attribution, with each theory better explaining the behavior of individuals sitting on one end of the political spectrum.

Empirical Strategy

We examine how partisanship impacts the level of government citizens blame for US pandemic response shortcomings using online survey data collected from a large sample of US adult residents (18+) across two time periods.[2] The first wave of data collection took place several months before the 2020 election (6/7-9/7/2020) and involved 12,037 respondents. A quota-based sampling method—with quotas for race, gender, age, and census statistical division (based on 2018 US Census estimates)—was used to ensure a demographically representative sample. All respondents were resampled after the Biden inauguration (between 3/1-3/22/2021), with 3,353 responding (response rate=27.86%).

In each wave, individuals were asked questions regarding the US response to the ongoing pandemic—including what level of government they see as primarily responsible for any perceived shortcomings—and their partisanship, thus allowing us to examine i) how partisanship shapes blame attribution, and ii) how this effect varies across time and federal shifts in power.

[2] The survey research firm, Qualtrics, was charged with participant recruitment and distribution. See McLaughlin, Mewhirter and Sanders (2021) and Mewhirter, Sagir and Sanders (2022) for details regarding data collection.

Key Variables

Our dependent variable, *Blame Attribution,* concerns the level of government citizens believe is responsible for pandemic response shortcomings. To capture this variable, respondents were first asked to identify whether they "believe that there are currently shortcomings in the US response to the coronavirus pandemic": respondents could select "yes", "no", or "not sure". Respondents who selected "yes" were then asked to identify whether the "National government", "State governments", or "Local governments" are "MOST responsible for the **current** shortcomings". Our dependent variable, *Blame Level*, captures whether an individual assigns blame to state *or* local governments government (=1) as opposed to the national government (=0).[3] Note that respondents were asked about this broadly, and not in reference to the shortcomings in their locale. Individuals could assign blame to the national government (controlled by a Republican administration in wave 1 and a Democratic administration in wave 2) or subnational levels that observe considerable variation in party control.[4]

Figure 1 plots i) the rate by which respondents perceived shortcomings, and ii) the rates by which respondents who perceived shortcoming assigned blame to varying levels of government. Black bars correspond to wave 1 responses; blue bars correspond to wave 2 responses. As shown, response choice varies across waves (X^2=244.80; p<.001), with a substantively greater proportion of respondents indicating "not sure" in wave 2. The majority of respondents across waves attributed blame to the national government, though again, variation exists across waves (X^2=209.43; p<.001). A larger proportion of respondents attributed blame to

[3] Note that this measure excludes respondents that do not perceive limitations or are unsure. In the robustness check section (below), we adjust for potential response bias stemming from this operationalization.
[4] Wolak (2016) illustrates that the partisanship of the presidency is a key factor in citizens' evaluations of federalism preferences while state-level partisan control (for example, the governor's party affiliation) is not.

state governments in wave 2; across waves, very few respondents placed blame on local governments (4.35-6.04%)

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

We expect that partisanship drives blame attribution, and that this effect is conditioned by time. To generate our partisanship measure, respondents were first asked: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, a Libertarian, an independent, or something else". Individuals who identified as a Democrat or Republican were then asked to identify their affiliation as "strong" or "not very strong". Those who selected "independent", "Libertarian" or "other" were asked to identify whether they considered themselves closer to the Republican Party, Democratic Party, or neither. Our final measure, *Partisanship*, is a categorical variable, comprised of seven categories: Strong Democrat; Weak Democrat; Strong Republican; Weak Republican; Other—Democratic Leaning; Other—Republican Leaning; Other—No Lean".

Model and Results

We estimate a logistic regression that models *Blame Attribution* as a function of *Partisanship* with standard errors clustered at the respondent and county levels. A dummy variable indicating the survey wave (*Wave)* is included as an interaction term between *Partisanship* and *Wave*, allowing us to identify how the effect of *Partisanship* varies across time. We include an array of variables that have been shown to impact blame attribution and which *could potentially* impact partisanship (Malhotra and Kuo 2008; REMOVED 2021; Maestas et al. 2008). We include variables capturing race; education; gender; income; political sophistication; natural science literacy; trust in science; hardships imposed by the ongoing pandemic; health issues; the prevalence of COVID-19 cases in one's county; and political control in respondents'

states. In the Appendix, we detail all variable measurements (Table P1-a), provide summary statistics across waves (Table P1-b), and present full regression results (Table P2-c).

Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of *Wave* on *Blame Level* across levels of *Partisanship.* Consistent with PF expectations, moving from wave 1 to wave 2 impacts the likelihood that strong Democrats (B=.296; z=9.48) and weak Democrats (B=.227; z=5.79) assign blame to state and local governments.[5] The predicted probability graph (Figure 3) illustrates the magnitude of this shift: the likelihood that strong Democrats assigned blame to lower levels increased from .129 to .538 between rounds; these numbers shift from .165 to .445 for weak Democrats. Consistent with PBA expectations, however, *Wave* did not have a discernable impact on *Blame Level* among strong (B=-.101; z=-1.82) or weak Republicans (B=.075; z=1.30). As demonstrated in Figure 3, both strong and weak Republicans maintained relatively high levels of blame for state and local governments across waves 1 (.510; .351) and 2 (.408; .427).

[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE]

Robustness Checks

In the Appendix, we estimate a series of alternate models to assess the robustness of our results. Specifically, we consider several models that i) address clustering in alternate ways (pages Table P2-a-P2-e), and ii) adjust for response bias (potentially) emanating from a) non-random attrition between rounds, and b) individuals disagreeing that (or being not sure whether) there have been shortcomings in the US pandemic response (Table P3-a-P3-e). All results are entirely consistent with those presented in the main text.

Discussion

[5] Note that while we use .01 p-value as our threshold for statistical significance throughout this manuscript (and Appendix), our results do not hinge on this choice. The results presented and discussed in this manuscript hold if the more traditional .05 threshold is assigned; the results also hold if the level of .005 level—proposed by Benjamin et al. (2018)—is used.

Our findings suggest that both theories of blame attribution are supported, such that citizens can respond in theoretically anticipated directions, yet incomplete, in that neither PF nor PBA alone perfectly illustrates how citizens assign blame.[6] Future scholarship should seek to disentangle the mechanisms by which one theory may usurp or partially conflate the other theory. For example, while it is possible that Democrats may always assign blame using a PF frame and/or Republicans a PBA frame, there may be some institutional arrangement within government under which this relationship flips. We currently do not know enough about the influence of federalism on blame attribution to provide a more definitive resolution.

Moving forward, we implore scholars to revisit contemporary theories of blame attribution in various institutional and substantive contexts. Federalism clearly plays an important and hereto underdefined role in how citizens' assign blame during times of crisis within liberal democracies. Until researchers can better articulate how this institution influences blame assignment, we risk providing inexact—or potentially incorrect—guidance to politicians, practitioners, and the public.

[6] Note that the finding that Republicans tend to be less wavering in the manner in which they assign blame largely comports with recent work on decentralization preferences. Specifically, Dinan and Heckleman's (2020) finding that conservatives prefer decentralized policymaking—irrespective of party control—is consistent with our findings.

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Figures

Figure 1: Blame Attribution across Waves



Figure 2: Marginal Effect of *Wave* on the Probability of Blaming State/Local Government with 99% Confidence Intervals



Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Blaming State/Local Government with 99% Confidence Intervals



ONLINE APPENDIX

This file is split into three parts. In part 1, we provide further details regarding variable inclusion, and provide summary statistics disaggregated by wave. In part 2, we provide full regression results for the primary model described in the manuscript, and present results for a number of alternate models which vary how clustering is modeled. In part 3, we provide evidence on non-random attrition emanating from multiple sources, and estimate a number of weighted models that take such non-random attrition into account. **Results presented in parts 2 and 3 are entirely consistent with the primary model.**

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PART 1

Below, we include two tables. Table P1-a provides details regarding the variables included in our analyses. In Table P2-a, we provide summary statistics for all variables used in our analyses. As detailed in Part **3**, we find evidence of non-random attrition between rounds. Weighted regression results taking such attrition into account are consistent with primary regression results.

Table P1-a: Variable Operationalization

Concept	Label	Operationalization
Blame Attribution	*Blame Level*	• See main text for operationalization
Partisanship	*Partisanship*	• See main text for operationalization
Wave	*Wave*	• See main text for operationalization
Race	*Race*	• 0=White; 1=Black; 2=Hispanic; 3=Other
Education	*College*	• 1=College Graduate; 0= Not College Graduate
Gender	*Male*	• 1=Male; 0=Female • Note: A binary measure was used in order to match 2018 census estimates
Income	*Household Income*	• Total HH income before taxes • <$10,000 (=1); $10,000-$19,999 (=2); $20,000-$29,999 (=3); $30,000-$39,999 (=4); $40,000-$49,999 (=5); $50,000-$59,999 (=6); $60,000-$69,999 (=7); $70,000-$79,999 (=8); $80,000-$89,999 (=9); $90,000-$99,999 (=10); $100,000-$149,999 (=11); >$150,000 (=12)
Political Sophistication	*PS Index*	• Respondents were asked six political trivia questions in wave 1. • The measure indicates the proportion of correct answers (0-1). Values from wave 1 carry to wave 2. • Which position does Mike Pence currently hold? (Attorney General; Vice President*; Not Sure); Which party currently has the most members in the US House of Representatives in Washington DC? (Democrats*; Republicans; Not Sure); The system of government where power is divided between a national and regional governments is called what? (Federal system*; Mixed system; Not sure); On which of the following does the US federal government currently spend the least? (Foreign Aid*; Social Security; Not sure); Which levels of government are primarily charged with funding public schools? (National and State governments; State and local governments*; Not sure); Which level of government is primarily responsible for setting zoning policies and building codes? (National government; Local governments*)
Science Literacy	*NS Index*	• Respondents were asked six natural science questions in wave 1. • The measure indicates the proportion of correct answers (0-1). Values from wave 1 carry to wave 2. • "all radioactivity is man-made" (F); "the sun revolves around the earth" (F); "the continents on which we live have been moving their locations for millions of years and will continue to move in the future" (T); "the center of the earth is very hot" (T); "antibiotics kill bacteria and viruses" (F); "vaccines help develop immunity to disease (T)".
Trust in Science	*TS Apolitical*	• "A lot of research conducted by scientists is driven by their political motives" • 0-10: 0=complete disagreement; 10=complete agreement
Trust in Science	*TS Betterment*	• "Most scientists want to work on things that will make life better for the average person." • 0-10: 0=complete disagreement; 10=complete agreement
Trust in Science	*TS Community*	• "I have a great deal of confidence in the people running the scientific community" • 0-10: 0=complete disagreement; 10=complete agreement
COVID-19 Hardships	*HS Personal-Finance*	• "Indicate how the coronavirus pandemic and government response has impacted the following people's financial health" • Response for "yourself" • 0-10: 0=major negative impact; 10=major positive impact
	HS Personal-Mental	• "Indicate how the coronavirus pandemic and government response has impacted the following people's mental health" • Response for "yourself" • 0-10: 0=major negative impact; 10=major positive impact
	HS Network-Finance	• "Indicate how the coronavirus pandemic and government response has impacted the following people's financial health"

		• Response for "people you consider close" • 0-10: 0=major negative impact; 10=major positive impact
	HS Network-Mental	• "Indicate how the coronavirus pandemic and government response has impacted the following people's mental health" • Response for "people you consider close" • 0-10: 0=major negative impact; 10=major positive impact
	Infected-Personal	• 1= respondents believe *they* have contracted COVID-19; 0=Otherwise
	Infected-Network	• 1= respondents believe someone they "consider closes" has contracted COVID-19; 0=Otherwise
COVID-19 Risks	*Risk Index*	• The proportion of the following conditions respondents report having: pregnancy; asthma; lung disease; diabetes; immune disorder; obesity; heart problems; liver or kidney problems
	Age	• Self-reported age
COVID-19 Prevalence	*County Density*	• Number of people per square mile • Source: 2018 Census ACS estimates
	County Cases Cap	• Proportion of individuals in respondents' county that have confirmed cases of COVID • Source: New York Times coronavirus case database (https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data)
	State Cases Cap	• Proportion of individuals in respondents' state that have confirmed cases of COVID • Source: New York Times coronavirus case database (https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data)
State Political Control	*Dem Governor*	• 1=State has a Democratic governor; 0=Otherwise
	Dem Legislature	• 1=State has a Democrat controlled legislature; 0=Otherwise

Table P1-b: Summary Statistics across Waves

Label	N	Mean (SD)	N	Mean (SD)
Blame Level	8,956	.276	2,046	.411
Partisanship				
Strong Dem	12,024	.231	3,352	.226
Weak Dem	12,024	.141	3,352	.130
Other-Dem Lean	12,024	.083	3,352	.084
Other-No Lean	12,024	.071	3,352	.078
Other-Rep Lean	12,024	.187	3,352	.173
Weak Rep	12,024	.106	3,352	.129
Strong Rep	12,024	.181	3,352	.180
Wave	12,037	0	3,353	1
Race				
White	12,037	.602	3,353	.728
Black	12,037	.122	3,353	.052
Hispanic	12,037	.176	3,353	.118
Other	12,037	.990	3,353	.102
College	12,030	.479	3,352	.591
Male	12,037	.486	3,353	.546
Household Income	12,010	6.126 (3.614)	3,348	6.349 (3.683)
PS Index	12,037	.400 (.197)	3,353	.425 (.166)
NS Index	12,032	.679 (.264)	3,352	.763 (.233)
TS Apolitical	11,987	4.982 (2.795)	3,344	5.460 (2.851)
TS Betterment	11,995	6.945 (2.233)	3,344	7.203 (2.099)
TS Community	11,989	6.245 (2.470)	3,346	6.495 (2.542)
HS Personal-Finance	11,990	5.036 (2.531)	3,339	4.892 (2.021)
HS Personal-Mental	11,971	4.815 (2.507)	3,343	4.652 (2.013)
HS Network-Finance	11,963	4.981 (2.496)	3,339	4.912 (1.973)
HS Network-Mental	11,958	4.790 (2.399)	3,332	4.680 (1.972)
Infected-Personal	11,714	.033 (.179)	3,311	.051 (.219)
Infected-Network	12,020	.197 (.398)	3,352	.401 (.490)
Risk Index	11,516	.065 (.104)	3,252	.059 (.099)
Age	12,026	46.999 (17.873)	3,351	58.213 (13.995)
County Density	11,972	1249.66 (3942.32)	3,336	885.21 (2644.44)
County Cases Cap	11,972	.017 (.009)	3,336	.086 (.024)
State Cases Cap	11,972	.017 (.006)	3,336	.087 (.016)
Dem Governor	12,037	.514	3,353	.547
Dem Legislature	12,037	.427	3,353	.439

NOTE: SDs are only provided for continuous variables

PART 2

In Table P2-c, we present the results of the logistic regression described in the manuscript. As noted in the manuscript, we utilize multiway clustered standard errors at the respondent and county levels. To make sure that our results are not dependent on our approach, we replicate our analysis, but alter the manner in which we correct for clustering in the data. In Table P2-d, we present the results of three alternative regressions: one does not adjust for clustering (robust errors only); in the others, we cluster errors at a single level. We also consider a series of random effects models. In Table P2-e, we present the results of three models: the first considers nested effects at the county and respondent level, and the remaining consider only one level. After estimating each model, we plot estimate i) the marginal effect of *Wave* and ii) the predicted probabilities of selecting state or local government.

In Table P2-a, we summarize the marginal effect of *Wave* across models. In Table P2-b, we summarize the predicted probabilities that *Blame Level* = State or Local. As shown, the results are entirely consistent across models.

Table P2-a: Marginal Effect of *Wave* across Models

	Clustered SE Approach			Random Effects Approach			Robust SE
	Both Levels	Respondent Level	County Level	Both Levels	Respondent Level	County Level	No Level
Strong Dem	.30 (.03)*	.30 (.03)*	.30 (.03)*	.31 (.03)*	.31 (.03)*	.30 (.03)*	.30 (.03)*
Weak Dem	.23 (.04)*	.23 (.04)*	.23 (.04)*	.24 (.04)*	.24 (.04)*	.23 (.04)*	.23 (.04)*
Other-DL	.34 (.03)*	.34 (.03)*	.34 (.03)*	.36 (.03)*	.36 (.03)*	.34 (.03)*	.34 (.03)*
Other-NL	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)
Other-RL	.14 (.04)*	.14 (.05)*	.14 (.04)*	.16 (.05)*	.15 (.04)*	.15 (.05)*	.14 (.05)*
Weak Rep	.07 (.06)	.07 (.05)	.07 (.06)	.08 (.05)	.08 (.05)	.08 (.05)	.08 (.05)
Strong Rep	-.10 (.06)	-.10 .(05)	-.10 (.06)	-.10 (.05)	-.10 (.05)	-.10 .05)	-.10 (.05)

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

Table P2-b: Predicted Probability that "Blame= State or Local" across Models

	Clustered SE			Random Effects			Robust SE
	Both Levels	Respondent Level	County Level	Both Levels	Respondent Level	County Level	No Level
Strong Dem (1)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)
Strong Dem (2)	.54 (.05)	.54 (.04)	.54 (.05)	.56 (.04)	.55 (.04)	.54 (.04)	.54 (.04)
Weak Dem (1)	.17 (.01)	.17 (.01)	.17 (.01)	.16 (.01)	.16 (.01)	.17 (.01)	.17 (.01)
Weak Dem (2)	.45 (.05)	.45 (.05)	.45 (.05)	.46 (.05)	.46 (.05)	.45 (.05)	.44 (.05)
Other-DL (1)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)
Other-DL (2)	.61 (.05)	.61 (.05)	.61 (.05)	.63 (.05)	.63 (.05)	.62 (.05)	.61 (.05)
Other-NL (1)	.47 (.02)	.47 (.02)	.47 (.02)	.47 (.02)	.47 (.02)	.47 (.02)	.47 (.02)
Other-NL (2)	.44 (.05)	.44 (.05)	.44 (.05)	.44 (.05)	.44 (.05)	.45 (.05)	.44 (.05)
Other-RL (1)	.28 (.01)	.28 (.01)	.28 (.01)	.27 (.01)	.27 (.01)	.28 (.01)	.28 (.01)
Other-RL (2)	.43 (.04)	.43 (.05)	.43 (.04)	.44 (.04)	.44 (.04)	.43 (.04)	.43 (.05)
Weak Rep (1)	.35 (.02)	.35 (.02)	.35 (.02)	.35 (.02)	.35 (.02)	.35 (.02)	.35 (.02)
Weak Rep (2)	.43 (.05)	.43 (.05)	.43 (.05)	.44 (.05)	.43 (.05)	.43 (.05)	.43 (.05)
Strong Rep (1)	.51 (.02)	.51 (.02)	.51 (.02)	.51 (.02)	.51 (.02)	.51 (.02)	.51 (.02)
Strong Rep (2)	.41 (.04)	.41 (.05)	.41 (.04)	.41 (.04)	.41 (.04)	.41 (.05)	.41 (.05)

Note: SE's in Parentheses

Table P2-c: Primary Regression Results (Multiway Clustered SEs)

Variables	Blame Level (Multiway SE)
Partisanship (Ref=Strong Dem)	
Weak Dem	0.30***
	(0.11)
Other-Dem Lean	0.01
	(0.13)
Other-No Lean	1.87***
	(0.12)
Other-Rep Lean	0.98***
	(0.10)
Weak Rep	1.35***
	(0.11)
Strong Rep	2.05***
	(0.11)
Wave	2.17***
	(0.23)
Wave X Partisanship	
Wave X Weak Dem	-0.70***
	(0.20)
Wave X Other-Dem Lean	0.30
	(0.25)
Wave X Other-No Lean	-2.27***
	(0.23)
Wave X Other-Rep Lean	-1.46***
	(0.18)
Wave X Weak Rep	-1.83***
	(0.21)
Wave X Strong Rep	-2.61***
	(0.20)
Race (Ref=White)	
Black	0.25***
	(0.10)
Hispanic	0.15
	(0.07)
Other	-0.13
	(0.09)
College	-0.09
	(0.05)
Male	0.02
	(0.06)
Household Income	0.00
	(0.01)
PS Index	-0.08
	(0.14)
NS Index	-0.01

	(0.11)
TS Apolitical	-0.09***
	(0.01)
TS Betterment	-0.05***
	(0.01)
TS Community	-0.06***
	(0.01)
HS Personal-Finance	0.01
	(0.02)
HS Personal-Mental	0.04
	(0.02)
HS Network-Finance	-0.00
	(0.02)
HS Network-Mental	-0.01
	(0.02)
Infected-Personal	-0.29
	(0.14)
Infected-Network	0.06
	(0.06)
Risk Index	-0.74***
	(0.25)
Age	-0.01***
	(0.00)
County Density	-0.00***
	(0.00)
County Cases Cap	-1.35
	(2.07)
State Cases Cap	-1.15
	(3.62)
Dem Governor	-0.03
	(0.06)
Dem Legislature	0.03
	(0.06)
Constant	-0.42
	(0.19)
Observations	10,181

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

Table P2-d: Regression Results with Alternate Clustered SEs and Robust SEs

Variables	Robust SE No Clustering	Cluster Level= Respondent	Cluster Level= County
Partisanship (Ref=Strong Dem)			
Weak Dem	0.30***	0.30***	0.30***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Other-Dem Lean	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Other-No Lean	1.87***	1.87***	1.87***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Other-Rep Lean	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Weak Rep	1.35***	1.35***	1.35***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Strong Rep	2.05***	2.05***	2.05***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Wave	2.17***	2.17***	2.17***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Wave X Partisanship			
Wave X Weak Dem	-0.70***	-0.70***	-0.70***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Wave X Other-Dem Lean	0.30	0.30	0.30
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Wave X Other-No Lean	-2.27***	-2.27***	-2.27***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Wave X Other-Rep Lean	-1.46***	-1.46***	-1.46***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Wave X Weak Rep	-1.83***	-1.83***	-1.83***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Wave X Strong Rep	-2.61***	-2.61***	-2.61***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Race (Ref=White)			
Black	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Hispanic	0.15	0.15	0.15
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Other	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
College	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Household Income	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PS Index	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
NS Index	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01

	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
TS Apolitical	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
TS Betterment	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
TS Community	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
HS Personal-Finance	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Personal-Mental	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Network-Finance	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Network-Mental	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Infected-Personal	-0.29	-0.29	-0.29
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Infected-Network	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Risk Index	-0.74***	-0.74***	-0.74***
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Density	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Cases Cap	-1.35	-1.35	-1.35
	(2.41)	(2.43)	(2.07)
State Cases Cap	-1.15	-1.15	-1.15
	(3.56)	(3.59)	(3.62)
Dem Governor	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Dem Legislature	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.42	-0.42	-0.42
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Observations	10,181	10,181	10,181

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

Table P2-e: Random Effect Model Results

Variables	RE Level= Both	RE Level= Respondent	RE Level= County
Partisanship (Ref=Strong Dem)			
Weak Dem	0.34*	0.35*	0.30*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Other-Dem Lean	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Other-No Lean	2.22*	2.22*	1.87*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Other-Rep Lean	1.14*	1.14*	0.98*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Weak Rep	1.61*	1.61*	1.35*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Strong Rep	2.42*	2.43*	2.05*
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Wave	2.67*	2.66*	2.20*
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.23)
Wave X Partisanship			
	-0.83*	-0.83*	-0.70*
Wave X Weak Dem	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)
	0.39	0.39	0.31
Wave X Other-Dem Lean	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.23)
	-2.81*	-2.80*	-2.29*
Wave X Other-No Lean	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.22)
	-1.73*	-1.74*	-1.46*
Wave X Other-Rep Lean	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.18)
	-2.22*	-2.22*	-1.84*
Wave X Weak Rep	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.19)
	-3.17*	-3.17*	-2.62*
Wave X Strong Rep	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Race (Ref=White)			
Black	0.29*	0.29*	0.25*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Hispanic	0.18	0.19	0.15
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Other	-0.15	-0.15	-0.13
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
College	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Male	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Household Income	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PS Index	-0.12	-0.12	-0.09
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)
NS Index	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01

	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)
TS Apolitical	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
TS Betterment	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
TS Community	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
HS Personal-Finance	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
HS Personal-Mental	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Network-Finance	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
HS Network-Mental	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Infected-Personal	-0.31	-0.31	-0.29
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Infected-Network	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Risk Index	-0.88*	-0.88*	-0.75*
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.24)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Density	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Cases Cap	-1.23	-1.59	-0.98
	(2.85)	(2.77)	(2.41)
State Cases Cap	-2.40	-1.91	-1.71
	(4.28)	(4.20)	(3.59)
Dem Governor	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Dem Legislature	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.40	-0.42	-0.41
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.19)
SD Respondent	1.02*	1.04*	
	(.24)	(.24)	
SD County	.02		.02
	(.02)		(.01)
Observations	10,181	10,181	10,181
Clusters (Respondent)	8,627	8,627	
Clusters (County)	1,027		1,027
LR Test (χ^2)	35.36*	33.71*	3.10

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

PART 3

In this section we test for the presence of, and correct for, non-response bias arising from multiple sources.

First, we consider actor dropout between waves (i.e., attrition). To test for the presence of non-random attrition, we estimate a logistic regression that estimates the likelihood of an individual responding to the wave 2 survey (=1) or not (=0), using wave 1 data. All discussed covariates are included as potential predictors: standard errors are clustered at the county level (respondent level is not considered as only wave 1 data is used). The results—presented in column 1 of Table P3-c, demonstrate that a number of variables predict the likelihood of wave 2 response. To correct for this, we utilize an inverse probability weighting approach (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Olmos and Govindasamy (2015)): the goal of the approach is to estimate a model that approaches what would have been observed had attrition occurred randomly (based on observed covariates). Here, the results of the aforementioned logistic regression are used to estimate a probability score for each respondent. Then the inverse probability score is calculated for respondents (=1/probability score). The inverse probability score is then assigned to round 2 responses. Wave 1 responses all receive a weight of 1. We then replicate the primary model presented in the paper, with observations weighted by the inverse probability score. Two models are considered: one that includes all observations (full sample), and one that only includes observations from those that participated in both rounds (trimmed sample). The full regression results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table P3-c. In Table P3-a (columns 2 and 3), we summarize the marginal effect of *Wave* across these models. In Table P3-b (columns 2 and 3), we summarize the predicted probabilities that *Blame Level* = State or Local. <u>The results are entirely consistent with the primary model (summarized in column 1 of Tables P3-b and P3-c).</u>

Second, we consider non-response bias that occurs when individuals responded “no” or “not sure” when asked whether they “believe that there are currently shortcomings in the US response to the coronavirus pandemic.” As noted in the manuscript, only individuals who perceived shortcomings were asked to assign blame to a given level. If partisanship impacts the likelihood that one perceives shortcomings to begin with, this could—given that they drop out of the dataset when not asked to assign blame—bias our estimates. To test for this, we estimate two logistic regressions: the first estimates the likelihood that an individual saw “no” shortcomings in wave 1, and the second estimates the same regression in wave 2. Standard errors are clustered at the county level (respondent level is not considered as different regressions are estimated for each wave). The results are then used to estimate a probability score for each respondent-wave. Next, we estimate the inverse probability weight (1/probability score) for each respondent-wave. Finally, we then replicate the primary model presented in the paper, with observations weighted by the inverse probability score. This process was repeated again, where response bias emanating from a tendency to select “no” OR “not sure” was considered.

In Table P3-d, we present the results of the logistic regressions that examine the determinants of an individual answering “no”, or alternatively, “not sure”, when asked about shortcomings. As demonstrated, a wide array of variables—including *Partisanship*—have a significant impact. The weighted regression results are presented in Table P3-e. In Table P3-a (columns 4 and 5), we summarize the marginal effect of *Wave* across these models. In Table P3-b (columns 4 and 5),

we summarize the predicted probabilities that *Blame Level* = State or Local. The results are entirely consistent with the primary model (summarized in column 1 of Tables P3-b and P3-c).

Table P3-a: Marginal Effect of Wave across Models

	Primary Model	IPAW Weight Wave-Attrition Full Sample	IPAW Weight Wave-Attrition Trimmed Sample	IPAW Weight "No" Shortcoming Attrition	IPAW Weight "No" or "NS" Shortcoming Attrition
Strong Dem	.30 (.03)*	.35 (.04)*	.53 (.06)*	.23 (.03)*	.23 (.03)*
Weak Dem	.23 (.04)*	.35 (.06)*	.49 (.07)*	.18 (.04)*	.18 (.03)*
Other-DL	.34 (.03)*	.41 (.05)*	.69 (.08)*	.28 (.03)*	.27 (.03)*
Other-NL	-.02 (.06)	.06 (.07)	.08 (.08)	.01 (.07)	.00 (.07)
Other-RL	.14 (.04)*	.20 (.05)*	.25 (.06)*	.13 (.05)*	.13 (.05)*
Weak Rep	.07 (.06)	.12 (.07)	.17 (.07)	.06 (.06)	.06 (.06)
Strong Rep	-.10 (.06)	-.05 (.07)	-.12 (.07	-.03 (.06)	-.03 (.07)

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

Table P3-b: Predicted Probability that "Blame= State or Local" across Models

	Primary Model	IPAW Weight Wave-Attrition Full Sample	IPAW Weight Wave-Attrition Trimmed Sample	IPAW Weight "No" Shortcoming Attrition	IPAW Weight "No" | "NS" Shortcoming Attrition
Strong Dem (1)	.13 (.01)	.11 (.01)	.04 (.01)	.10 (.01)	.09 (.01)
Strong Dem (2)	.54 (.05)	.49 (.04)	.44 (.03)	.51 (.06)	.51 (.06)
Weak Dem (1)	.17 (.01)	.15 (.01)	.08 (.02)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)
Weak Dem (2)	.45 (.05)	.52 (.05)	.49 (.05)	.39 (.06)	.39 (.06)
Other-DL (1)	.13 (.01)	.11 (.01)	.03 (.01)	.12 (.01)	.11 (.01)
Other-DL (2)	.61 (.05)	.57 (.05)	.52 (.05)	.59 (.06)	.58 (.06)
Other-NL (1)	.47 (.02)	.45 (.03)	.41 (.06)	.40 (.03)	.40 (.03)
Other-NL (2)	.44 (.05)	.51 (.05)	.49 (.05)	.41 (.06)	.41 (.06)
Other-RL (1)	.28 (.01)	.26 (.02)	.21 (.03)	.23 (.01)	.23 (.01)
Other-RL (2)	.43 (.04)	.46 (.04)	.44 (.03)	.38 (.05)	.38 (.06)
Weak Rep (1)	.35 (.02)	.33 (.03)	.26 (.04)	.31 (.02)	.31 (.02)
Weak Rep (2)	.43 (.05)	.45 (.05)	.42 (.04)	.37 (.06)	.37 (.06)
Strong Rep (1)	.51 (.02)	.49 (.03)	.55 (.06)	.39 (.02)	.39 (.02)
Strong Rep (2)	.41 (.04)	.44 (.04)	.42 (.04)	.36 (.05)	.36 (.06)

Note: SE's in Parentheses

Table P3-c: Testing and Adjusting for Non Random Attrition between Rounds

Variables	Non-Attrition	Blame Level Full Sample	Blame Level Trimmed Sample
Partisanship (Ref=Strong Dem)			
Weak Dem	-0.03	0.34***	0.69***
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.24)
Other-Dem Lean	-0.08	0.02	-0.55
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.38)
Other-No Lean	0.01	1.95***	2.81***
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.25)
Other-Rep Lean	0.05	1.06***	1.78***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.19)
Weak Rep	0.22	1.41***	2.10***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.22)
Strong Rep	-0.05	2.12***	3.37***
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.23)
Wave		2.11***	2.92***
		(0.27)	(0.31)
Wave X Partisanship		0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Wave X Weak Dem		-0.21	-0.47
		(0.25)	(0.34)
Wave X Other-Dem Lean		0.33	0.88
		(0.27)	(0.47)
Wave X Other-No Lean		-1.86***	-2.59***
		(0.25)	(0.31)
Wave X Other-Rep Lean		-1.18***	-1.78***
		(0.20)	(0.26)
Wave X Weak Rep		-1.58***	-2.17***
		(0.23)	(0.30)
Wave X Strong Rep		-2.32***	-3.45***
		(0.21)	(0.29)
Race (Ref=White)			
Black	-0.30***	0.09	-0.08
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.25)
Hispanic	-0.13	0.23	0.29
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Other	0.13	-0.15	-0.14
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.18)
College	0.36***	-0.05	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Male	0.26***	-0.05	-0.13
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Household Income	0.01	0.02	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PS Index	0.65***	0.10	0.26
	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.34)

NS Index	0.63***	-0.02	0.22
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.24)
TS Apolitical	0.03***	-0.06***	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
TS Betterment	0.00	-0.06***	-0.07
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
TS Community	-0.02	0.01	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
HS Personal-Finance	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
HS Personal-Mental	0.02	0.07***	0.10
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
HS Network-Finance	-0.00	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
HS Network-Mental	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Infected-Personal	-0.70***	0.14	0.50
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.28)
Infected-Network	-0.11	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Risk Index	-1.17***	-0.50	-0.24
	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.55)
Age	0.05***	-0.01***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Density	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Cases Cap	-4.70	-1.10	-0.96
	(3.45)	(2.35)	(2.72)
State Cases Cap	10.64	-5.40	-6.62
	(5.62)	(4.10)	(4.54)
Dem Governor	0.18***	-0.04	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Dem Legislature	-0.03	0.02	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Constant	-4.46***	-0.96***	-2.74***
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.42)
Observations	10,980	10,156	4,331

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

Table P3-d: Testing for Non-Random Attrition due to Answering "No" or "Not Sure"

Variables	No Wave 1	No Wave 2	No | NS Wave 1	No | NS Wave 2
Partisanship (Ref=Strong Dem)				
Weak Dem	0.25	-0.43	0.48***	-0.12
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Other-Dem Lean	-0.41	-0.52	0.05	-0.27
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Other-No Lean	1.27***	-0.04	1.50***	-0.21
	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Other-Rep Lean	0.49***	-0.39	0.95***	-0.21
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Weak Rep	0.97***	-0.27	1.24***	-0.24
	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Strong Rep	1.87***	-0.02	1.92***	-0.06
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Race (Ref=White)				
Black	0.24	0.48	0.16	0.22
	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.19)
Hispanic	0.12	0.51***	0.15	0.36***
	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Other	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.26
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.13)
College	-0.17	-0.09	-0.28***	-0.26***
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Male	0.32***	-0.15	0.07	-0.18
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Household Income	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PS Index	0.42	-0.12	1.15***	0.65***
	(0.17)	(0.35)	(0.13)	(0.24)
NS Index	-0.84***	-0.15	-1.38***	-0.84***
	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.10)	(0.18)
TS Apolitical	-0.08***	0.06	-0.06***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
TS Betterment	-0.07***	0.04	-0.07***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
TS Community	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
HS Personal-Finance	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Personal-Mental	0.05	0.05	0.05***	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
HS Network-Finance	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
HS Network-Mental	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Infected-Personal	-0.84***	0.14	-0.73***	0.07

	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Infected-Network	-0.45***	-0.23	-0.38***	-0.16
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Risk Index	-0.43	-0.73	-0.78***	-0.95
	(0.29)	(0.51)	(0.23)	(0.39)
Age	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Density	0.00***	-0.00	0.00***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Cases Cap	-1.51	1.51	1.08	2.66
	(4.41)	(3.18)	(3.35)	(2.13)
State Cases Cap	2.91	6.82	2.43	2.79
	(6.88)	(4.60)	(5.24)	(3.43)
Dem Governor	-0.10	0.07	-0.06	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Dem Legislature	0.09	-0.08	0.04	-0.03
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Constant	-1.74***	-2.43***	-0.98***	-0.92
	(0.25)	(0.55)	(0.21)	(0.40)
Observations	9,605	2,468	10,980	3,154

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level

Table P3-e: Adjusting for Non-Random Attrition due to Answering "No" or "Not Sure"

Variables	Blame Level "No" Weight	Blame Level "No" | "NS" Weight
Partisanship (Ref=Strong Dem)		
Weak Dem	0.40***	0.41***
	(0.12)	(0.13)
Other-Dem Lean	0.25	0.27
	(0.14)	(0.15)
Other-No Lean	2.06***	2.14***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Other-Rep Lean	1.15***	1.22***
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Weak Rep	1.62***	1.65***
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Strong Rep	2.00***	2.06***
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Wave	2.54***	2.64***
	(0.28)	(0.28)
Wave X Partisanship		
Wave X Weak Dem	-0.93***	-0.96***
	(0.22)	(0.23)
Wave X Other-Dem Lean	0.14	0.05
	(0.28)	(0.28)
Wave X Other-No Lean	-2.48***	-2.62***
	(0.27)	(0.27)
Wave X Other-Rep Lean	-1.75***	-1.83***
	(0.21)	(0.20)
Wave X Weak Rep	-2.23***	-2.30***
	(0.24)	(0.24)
Wave X Strong Rep	-2.68***	-2.77***
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Race (Ref=White)		
Black	0.29	0.27
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Hispanic	0.22	0.23
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Other	-0.12	-0.09
	(0.12)	(0.11)
College	-0.15	-0.16
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Male	0.01	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Household Income	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
PS Index	-0.67***	-0.59***
	(0.19)	(0.19)
NS Index	-0.47***	-0.41***

	(0.16)	(0.16)
TS Apolitical	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
TS Betterment	-0.05***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
TS Community	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Personal-Finance	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Personal-Mental	0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)
HS Network-Finance	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
HS Network-Mental	-0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Infected-Personal	0.04	0.05
	(0.20)	(0.21)
Infected-Network	-0.01	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Risk Index	-0.43	-0.68
	(0.34)	(0.33)
Age	-0.02***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Density	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
County Cases Cap	-3.21	-3.63
	(3.12)	(3.06)
State Cases Cap	1.43	1.29
	(5.08)	(5.07)
Dem Governor	-0.11	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Dem Legislature	0.08	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	0.39	0.25
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Observations	10,181	10,181

Note: SE's in Parentheses—* denotes significance at the .01 level