Nationalism and Conflict:

How do Variations of Nationalism affect Variations in Domestic and International Conflict?

(A Theory of the Causal Links between Nationalism and Conflict)

Prepared for Presentation at APSA Annual Meeting, September 2022

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ABSTRACT

This paper advances a novel theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of international and domestic conflicts, especially in the 21st century. I argue that nationalism plays a major role in the rise of these conflicts. Yet, nationalism is not monolithic. I distinguish among five types of nationalism (liberal; stateless; consolidating; irredentist; populist). The variations in the type of nationalism explain variations in peace and conflict in different parts of the world. The explanation of the variations of types of nationalism, in turn, is based on the combined effect of variations in state capacity (the functioning of state institutions) and national congruence (the congruence between national identities and state borders). Thus, national congruence and high capacity produce liberal nationalism and a peaceful state. In contrast, national incongruence and low capacity lead to stateless nationalism and thus to civil wars in failed states. High capacity and national incongruence, especially external incongruence, produce irredentist nationalism of revisionist states, leading to war-prone inter-state conflicts. High capacity and declining congruence generate nationalist-populism and societal polarization. Thus, the theory developed here explains the recent rise of nationalist-populism (and the related domestic polarization) in quite a few democracies in comparison with other types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate.

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<u>(A Theory of the Causal Links between Nationalism and Conflict)</u>

This paper aims to provide a novel theoretical framework for explaining the effects of nationalism on conflict. Yet, nationalism is not monolithic or even dichotomous. I go beyond that to distinguish among five types of nationalism (liberal; stateless; consolidating; irredentist; and populist). The variations in the type of nationalism explain variations in peace and conflict in different parts of the world. The variations of types of nationalism, in turn, reflect the combined effect of variations in two independent variables: state capacity and national congruence. National congruence refers to the correspondence between national identities and borders. The general theoretical argument advanced in the paper provides an explanation for the recent rise of nationalist-populism (and the related domestic polarization) in the West and in other democracies in a comparative perspective with other types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate. There are also trans-border linkages between variations in national identity. Thus, the absence of a common national identity in weak states produces failed states, which, in turn, affect the reinforcement of populism in the West by exporting (not necessarily by design) migration and terrorism. Thus, paradoxically, some of the weakest states in the international system affect a major transformation in some of the highest-capacity states in the world by reinforcing the rise of populism. Such a rise of populism—as well as of revisionism and failed states—poses severe challenges to the liberal international order.

The Rising Nationalist Challenge to Liberalism

With the end of the Cold War and the rise of the American liberal hegemony under unipolarity, the US –occasionally in some collaboration with Europe— aimed to spread the liberal order much beyond the West, notably to include—in different ways—China, Russia and the Muslim/Arab world. Indeed, numerous observers predicted that liberalism will spread

globally.[1] They expected widespread democratization, and rising international trade and foreign direct investments and, as a result, growing economic interdependence among many states under globalization. Many liberals also foresaw the growing power of international institutions and of multilateral arrangements and global norms to cope with numerous global problems. All these developments were widely expected to lead to more international cooperation and to a peaceful world.[2]

These liberal expectations, however, have not been met. In contrast to liberal expectations, nationalism emerged as a major force in the 21st century in various parts of the world, including in large parts of the liberal West and in non-Western democracies. The failure of these expectations, in turn, has important effects on the emergence of various international, regional and domestic conflicts in different parts of the world. The research question to be explored here is how best to account for this variation in conflicts? Answering this question would allow me to account for the major types of international and domestic conflicts.

With the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and the rising tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan between the US and China, we have witnessed in the recent few years the re-

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References

[1] An extreme manifestation of liberal optimism was the famous article by Francis Fukuyama, "The *End of History?" The National Interest 16 (1989):*3-18 and later his book-- Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History* and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). On the optimist liberal expectations, see also Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); Diamond Larry, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World* (New York: Holt/Times Books, 2008); and Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined* (New York: Viking, 2011). On unipolarity, see John, G., Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, esds., *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). On the resilience of the international liberal order, see John, G. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); John, G. Ikenberry., "The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 3 (May-June 2014): 80-90.

[2] On liberal theory expectations that the spread of these three key liberal mechanisms (trade; democracy and international institutions) will bring peace, see Bruce Russett and John R. O'neal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

emergence of great-power competition between the West and Russia, and between the US and China.[3] Many liberals expected that such issues of territorial conflicts will become obsolete in a globalized and increasingly liberal world. Liberals expected that China and Russia will be gradually integrated to the liberal international order and will not challenge it. In both cases it seems that nationalist revisionism is an important motivation behind the more assertive/expansionist behaviour of both Russia and China in their respective regions. At the same time, large-scale civil wars and trans-border violence broke out in a number of failed states, especially in the Greater Middle East, at least partly because of the weakness of both state institutions and of a common national identity in many states in that region. Such an increasing disorder raised the fears in the West of growing levels of illegal migration. Violent non-state actors, including various affiliates of the Islamic State, took advantage of the failed states in the Middle East—and beyond— to initiate major violent acts in their respective regions, but also terrorist actions in the West.

The fears of massive illegal migration to the West and of rising terrorism there increased the appeal of nationalist/populist leaders and ideas in the US and Europe. These fears thus generated a backlash against the liberal order—both internally and internationally—also in the heartland of the West itself, most dramatically with the BREXIT vote in the UK and the election of Donald J. Trump in the US. The rise of the nationalist-populist leaders in the West reflected – and further enhanced -- domestic polarization and conflict in many Western countries around the issues of migration, national identity, globalization, free trade and

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[3] On Russia, Ukraine and Crimea, see Razan Menon and Eugene Rumer, *Conflict in Ukraine* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2015); John Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2014). On China and the South China Sea, see; Bill Hayton, *The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Howard W. French, *Everything under the Heavens (*New York: Knopf, 2017), p. 265; Andrew S. Ericson and Ryan D. Martinson, *China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations* (US Naval Institute, 2019).

international institutions. It also reflected—and further increased-- the cleavages in a number of EU member-states with regard to the future of European integration.

Such great diversity in conflict situations across the world is yet to be fully understood and explained, and so the key objective of this study is to put forward a powerful theory which accounts for such variations. This study proposes that the rise of nationalism plays a key role in the emergence of various types of international and domestic conflicts. In contrast to current approaches, I argue that nationalism is not monolithic, and that by identifying different types of nationalism, we can account for the conditions that lead to conflicts or peace.

My theory aims to show how a combined effect of two distinctive causal factors – **stateness** (the level of state capacity—how well state institutions are functioning) and **national congruence** (the level of compatibility between national identity and the state boundaries)—is expressed in the emergence of distinctive types of nationalism. These types of nationalism, in turn, have distinctive effects on the type of domestic and international conflict. The **level of democratization** is an intervening variable between the type of nationalism and the type of conflict—either aggravating it or moderating it. These causal relations—as they appear in recent years in various parts of the world-- have major effects on the emergence of the challenges to the international liberal order. Without exploring these causal relations and their origins, we won't be able to explain the rise of such challenges.

Nationalism and beyond

The key objective of nationalism is to create congruence between *the state* (the administrative unit which controls a certain territory) and *the nation* or the people. For this purpose, nationalism aims to reach independence of the nation from "foreign" rule, ideally forming a state of its own. This state would control the territory which nationalists believe should belong to them, as they constitute the demographic majority or have strong historical connections to it or both. Even when independence is reached, nationalists tend to argue that "foreigners" are

responsible for the nation's problems—whether real or imagined.[4] In relation to the international system, nationalism aims at maximizing state sovereignty and minimizing the authorities of international institutions and multilateral arrangements which constrain national sovereignty. But nationalism has also major domestic implications. In this respect, one has to distinguish between two ideal-types of nationalism: *civic/inclusive nationalism* and *ethnic/exclusionary nationalism*. While the criterion for membership in a civic nation is based on the citizenship within the state, ethnic nationalism is based on membership in a certain primal group, most notably an ethnic group, but it can also be based on religious affiliation, race, language, sect or a tribe.[5] While civic nationalism accepts, at least in principle, all citizens of the state as equal members of the nation irrespective of their origin, ethnic nationalism is much more exclusionary. It focuses on the members of the primal group as the only "true" members of the nation, while other groups are seen as outsiders and do not fully belong to the "authentic" nation.[6] In deeply divided societies, the attitude toward the other groups might be the same as to the "suspicious foreigners" and in extreme cases might lead to ethnic cleansing or even genocide.[7]

Nationalism has a considerable power of attraction as a source of belonging and identification. It provides a powerful emotional attachment with various extents of "us" vs. "them" or "we"

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[4] The logic for this argument in drawn at least partly on the basis of psychological research that humans are hard-wired to prefer members of their own tribe and to regard outsiders with suspicion. For a recent work, see, for example, Amy Chua, *Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of Nation* (New York: Penguin, 2018).

[5] For a recent overview of the "New Nationalism" by a number of leading authors, see *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2019. For a few of the recent works on nationalism, see Yoram Hazoni, *The Virtues of Nationalism;* Jerry Z. Muller, "'Us and them'," *Foreign Affairs*, 87, no. 2 (March-April 2008): 18-35; Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State-formation and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. For some of the classical works on nationalism see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, l983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (*London: Verso 2nd ed., l991); Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000). On the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, see Smith, *The Nation in History* (pp. 15-20); and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: five roads to modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (2000).

[6] On exclusionary policies in the Balkans, see Mylonas (2013).
[7] For a systematic study of ethnic cleansing, see the work of Bulutgil (2015, 2016).

vs. the "other". For example, Arab vs. Kurd in Syria and Iraq; Indo nationalists in India against Muslims, including those who are Indian citizens; Jews vs. Arabs; Serbs vs. Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims; and populists in Europe against migration from the Middle East and Africa and in the US against Hispanic and Muslim migrants. This is especially true in periods of major and rapid economic, political, demographic, technological and cultural changes. In the 21st century such changes include rising economic globalization and migration, the emergence of smart phones and social media as key means of communication and value changes (such as legalization of LGBT marriage; feminism; secularization and cosmopolitanism). The power of nationalism is frequently manipulated by political entrepreneurs, especially in periods of transformation which seem to pose a major demographic (migration and/or different levels of birth rate)) and physical (by another state or terrorism) threat to the primal group. Nationalist/populist politicians tend to underline the supposed connection between migration and terrorism on top of the cultural threat of changing demographics and "traditional values." It is frequently threatened majorities, who are attracted to nationalism as they fear of losing their traditional dominance (politically and culturally).[8]

The academic literature has not only overlooked, at least partly, the great appeal of nationalism in different areas, but also the fact that there could be great variations in how nationalism is represented.[9] These variations can account for the sources of conflicts in the

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[8] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019), esp., pp. 44-49; Diana C. Mutz, "Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote," *PNAS* April 23, 2018. 201718155; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115 (accessed August 9, 2018); John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2018).

[9] On the absence of systematic theorizing about nationalism in foreign policy analysis, see, for example, Harris Mylonas and Kuo Kenddrick, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy," *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics*, September 2017. Indeed, for example, in a recently major-- and very comprehensive-- volume on all IR approaches, which focuses on security and conflicts, nationalism is hardly mentioned and does not have a specific section even though all the major approaches in the field are addressed in chapters of their own. See Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford, Oxford UP, 2019).

West and outside of it: the rise of nationalist populism in the West; the emergence of nationalist revisionism in Russia, China and Iran; and the phenomenon of the failed states in countries with low capacity and a weak common national identity. Thus, variations in nationalism explain the de-stabilizing implications of these phenomena: Nationalist-populism weakens international cooperation and aggravates domestic polarization; revisionism produces international conflicts and leads to great-power competition; failed states generate civil wars and regional instability and also mass migration and transnational terrorism, which, in turn, affect the emergence of nationalist-populism in the West.

Explanatory Competitors to Nationalism

Realist factors, notably changes in the global distribution of capabilities (mainly the emergence of new great powers which challenge US dominance) play an important role in the rise of some of these challenges to the international liberal order.[10] Yet, they are unable to account for the rise of the polarizing populism in the West and the de-stabilizing effects of failed states on the West, and also for some of the substantive content of the nationalist revisionism in China, Russia and Iran. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" supposedly explains the failure to liberalize non-Western countries, however, some successes in democratization in non-Western countries—while many conflicts take place inside the supposedly "same civilization," (like Sunni-Shiite inside Islam, China-Taiwan inside the Confucius civilization and the recent rise of illiberalism in the West)—show the limitations to Huntington's influential theory.[11]

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[10] On the importance of the distribution of capabilities in Realist theory, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979); and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2014). On the realist focus on the recent changing distribution of capabilities, notably the decline of unipolarity, see, for example, Christopher Layne, "The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of Pax Americana," *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018): 89-111.

[11] HUNTINGTON, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon& Schuster, 1996).

Rather than accounting for only one aspect of these challenges—as most studies do—my research provides a novel theoretical explanation—based on the variations of nationalism—to be applied to various types of domestic and international conflicts.. None of the key theories/schools of thought in International Relations (IR) focuses on the sources of nationalism and its effects on different levels of conflict. Realism focuses on issues related to power, security and threat; liberalism highlights the effects of democracy, economic interdependence and international institutions; constructivism deals with ideas and norms; and the various levels of analysis in IR address the effects of leaders, domestic politics and the international system on foreign policy and international outcomes.[12] Moreover, in contrast to all mainstream approaches in IR theory, I argue that "state" and "nation" are not interchangeable, that is, these are different concepts which do not have a shared meaning. *The state* is a set of institutions which administer certain territory; while *the nation* is a group of people who in their subjective view shares common traits (whether it is ethnicity, language, history, culture or religion or a host of other factors) that entitle them to self-rule. Thus, they should fight for their independence from what they consider a "foreign rule," by establishing a state on the territory that they believe to have historical or demographic rights, or both. Realists are supposedly able to integrate nationalism into a realist analysis as "kissing cousins."[13] Yet, there are some major differences between the two approaches, especially related to the state-to-nation balance (s-n balance). For realists the state and the nation are

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[12] On realism, see the works of Waltz and Mearsheimer cited above. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edition (New York: Knopf) Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); on liberalism in IR, see the refences cited above in the first two fts. above and see also Michael W. Doyle, W., *Ways of War and Peace* (New York, W.W. Norton, 1997); on constructivism, see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); on the levels of analysis in International Relations, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[13] Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion* and "Bound to Fail."

basically the same, fusing into the nation-state. But this is only partly the case for various nationalist leaders, groups and orientations as the discussion in this paper shows.

Realists, particularly some leading neo-realists recognize the powerful force of nationalism and its relations with war.[14] Yet, for realists, nationalism is an instrument by the state to advance its interests in the competitive international system, for example, to motivate people to go to wars against the state's rivals (for defensive or offensive purposes). Yet, under a state-to-nation imbalance, nationalism is a force, which might be independent of the state and even challenges it, such as secessionist movements and other ethno–national forces which do not identify with the state or are oppressed by it on national grounds. Under a state-to-nation imbalance, moreover, nationalism may induce state leaders to endorse aggressive behaviour which could harm the state's power and its key security and economic interests. This may happen either when nationalism is used by the state leadership to further their own domestic standing even if it comes at the expense of key state interests, for example the expansionist wars conducted by Saddam Hussein of Iraq in the 1980s and early 1990s and Slovodan Milosevic of Serbia during the 1990s. Or nationalism may constrain state leadership to endorse bellicose polices which might contradict the logic of realpolitik and go against the logic of the balance of power, for example, the behavior of Israelis and Arabs in different phases of their conflict.

Finally, nationalist-populists—in continuation of the tradition of "blood and soil" nationalists— challenge the realist notion of the state as a unitary actor which is confronting threats and opportunities in the international system. Based on variations of the ethno-national identity, populists differentiate between the "authentic people"—the real core of the nation-- in contrast to those groups who are not part of the "real nation"-- notably minorities

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[14] Barry R Posen, **"**Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,"
International Security, 18 (2): 80-124; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy*, p. 365.

and migrants. The latter groups are supposedly allied with the "cosmopolitan" liberal elites and this "coalition" is supposedly working against the interests of the "authentic" nation and its traditional values.

Contributions to the Literature: By focusing on the effects of different types of nationalism on conflict and the international order, I aim to produce new insights on nationalism and populism, domestic and international conflict, war and peace, and the global system in a number of ways: First, this paper fills the gap created in the literature by an insufficient analysis of the effects of populism and nationalism on domestic and international conflict. Second, to the extent that nationalism is addressed in the academic literature, it is frequently treated as homogenous or dichotomous, while I argue that there is in fact a considerable differentiation among various types of nationalism and their distinctive effects on conflict. This could lead to a shift in how the concept of nationalism is understood.

Third, the novel theory developed here aims to explain the recent rise of populism in the liberal West under a unified theoretical framework, along with other types of nationalism in different parts of the world. Thus, we aim at developing a broader framework to better understand the sources and effects of populism in a comparative perspective through exploring the different types of nationalism and their effects on conflicts.

Fourth, the paper studies the variations in the effects of democratization on conflicts under the various types of nationalism, which offers a newl perspective on the democratisation process in different types of countries.

Fifth, the theory advanced here addresses the key issue in contemporary international politics by suggesting the implications of the theory advanced here for the rising challenges to the liberal international order. Sixth, to generate a unified explanation of both domestic and inter-state conflicts. Seventh, to produce a theory which is able to account for a great

variation in conflict and non-conflict situations. <u>Eighth</u>, the theory also suggests under what conditions democracy—esp. liberal democracy—is most likely to emerge and when it is most likely to confront major challenges or to be less feasible.

A Novel Theory: The *causal links between types of nationalism and conflict variations*

I argue that different types of nationalism, each developed due to a unique set of characteristics, can lead to different outcomes and predict potential domestic or international conflicts.

The Dependent Variable: Classification of Conflicts

1. Civil wars --- large-scale violence which takes place inside the sovereign territory of the state among different groups of its citizens.

2. Border and territorial conflicts take place when there are disagreements or unclarity with regard to the territorial division among different states and semi-independent entities in the region. In such cases borders are not agreed-upon by the different parties or at the minimum are unclear and ambiguous.

3. War-prone inter-state conflicts, namely either the conflict leads to actual violence (hot war) or there is a considerable likelihood of an escalation to violence ("cold war") indicated notably by the use of military means for signalling to the opponents for deterrence or compellence purposes. These conflicts are characterized by arms races, competing alliances, shows of force and frequent crisis.

4. Domestic polarization in deeply divided societies: there are fundamental and sharp cultural, value-based and political differences among the rival camps, including on factual evidence, notably election outcomes, scientific data and what really happened in major events.

5. Peaceful status-quo states which are unlikely to engage in domestic or international conflict.

The Explanation

For explaining conflict, some in the literature focus on the state and its capacity;[15] others on the nation and its culture and particularly its ethnic composition.[16] I argue that for a more comprehensive understanding of variations of war and peace and for more falsifiable predictions of such variations, we need to integrate the effects of both variables as both of them make important contributions.

Variations in the combined effect of two independent variables-- *stateness* and *national congruence*—are expressed in variations in nationalism. These variations, in turn, explain variations in domestic and international conflict as described in the causal chain in Figure 1:

<u>Figure 1; The Causal Chain</u>

Variations in State capacity + national congruence (the independent variables) =

Variations in certain types of nationalism > >

Leading to variations in conflict (the dependent variable)

The theory proposed here challenges leading theories in the field. The goal is to develop a theory which aims to be parsimonious, while explaining a number of key phenomena. My aim is to highlight a minimal number of explanatory variables (notably the types of nationalism), which account for major and important phenomenon: most of the key conflicts—both domestic and international -- in different parts of the world, including different types of states: authoritarian, strong and weak states, failed states, illiberal regimes and liberal democracies. Moreover, the theory specifies the conditions for the emergence of the key contemporary conflicts, which affect the international order: the rising great-power competition; failed states

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[15] Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D., 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil Wars', *American Political Science Review* 97: 1 (2003): 75-90; and the references below on state-building.

[16] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994); Smith, *The Nation in History*; On the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, see Anthony D Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations (*Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, l986).

and their effects on the spread of terrorism and mass migration to the West; and domestic/populist challenges to liberal democracy and its foreign policy behaviour. The theory engages scholarly fields that are usually studied separately, namely comparative politics (of quite a few and different countries), political behaviour, domestic regimes, terrorism, migration, peace and conflict, and international relations.

Table 1 below presents the types of nationalism, based on two independent variables: the degree of **stateness** or **state capacity**, namely the level of effectiveness of state institutions; and the **national congruence**, which has two dimensions – the spatial dimension, namely, the extent of compatibility between the state borders and the national identities of the key groups in that state; and a temporal dimension, namely, the extent of the gulf between the nation's current status versus its perceived past glory. A key manifestation of such a great gulf is the presence and scope of "lost territories".

Variations in the combination of these two key factors are reflected in **five main types of nationalism**, and as a result to various types of domestic and international conflict (see Table 1 below). Each type of nationalism has a distinctive effect on the type of conflict, migration, radicalism, democracy, great-power competition and the international order that could emerge. Moreover, I propose that this can explain variations in the outcomes of external attempts at liberalization—such as those led by the US after WWII, and especially after the Cold War.

Especially challenging would be to explain the rise of the "new" nationalist populism in Western democratic countries in recent years. Among other issues, I will explore how demographic changes in the West affect the level of national congruence, and thus the challenge it poses both to their liberal democratic nature and the level of internal cleavages. I argue that these changes, which lead to declining congruence, have major effects on the rise of nationalist populism. More broadly with regard to democracy, I aim to establish causal

relations between types of nationalism and the effects of *democratization* on domestic and international conflict.

The Explanatory Framework: State-to-Nation Imbalance – an Underlying Cause of Conflict

S*tate* and *nation* are dominant concepts for understanding peace and conflict situations due to the centrality of *'the state'* as the key actor in the international system, and of *'the nation'* as a key political locus of identification (at least since the late 18th century).[17] Moreover, **national self-determination** has become an accepted norm, legitimizing sovereignty in the international system, by giving a legal basis to nationalist aspirations, and acts as a powerful motivation for people to fight for their freedom.[18]

An earlier work on regional conflicts alerted me to the importance and need of conceptualising the notions of state and nation in the context of regionalism.[19] This led me to develop the notion of having various types of nationalism, and explore its theoretical and empirical effects on conflicts. This paper proposes a leap forward by developing a novel theory to address under-explored dimensions of scholarship: the causes of nationalism and populism and their effects on a great variety of domestic and international conflicts. This new theory will advance novel causal linkages between these dimensions under a unified analytical framework. The two key causal factors are the following:

I. The degree of state capacity (stateness or the success of state-building)

This causal factor refers to the institutions and resources available to states for governing the polity.[20] Thus, this factor affects the ability of the state to maintain domestic law and order,

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[17] See the sources cited above on nationalism.

[18] James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[19] "Author."

[20] On state-building, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968; Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State-Making', and

and thus the probability of domestic violence and civil war. This variable also affects the ability of the state to resort to external war and to initiate large-scale violence and violent interventions in the affairs of other states, including neighbouring states.

I distinguish between strong or capable states and weak or mal-functioning ones. In contrast to weak states, strong states possess well-functioning institutions and sufficient resources to carry out their policies and major functions. Especially important is their effective law and order system and monopoly over the means of violence in the state territory. Thus they are able to supply security in their sovereign territory. Such a sense of security facilitates business and commerce in the state. In contrast, weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies and to fulfil key functions. Most notably, they lack an effective control over the means of violence in their sovereign territory and an effective law-enforcement system is absent. State strength or capacity can be measured, among other things, by its capacity to provide services to the whole population, the extent to which infrastructure and communication networks cover the state territory, the extent of its control over the state sovereign territory; GDP per capita, GDP growth, and trade indicators since states with higher economic development enjoy larger pools of resources from which to extract taxes from their societies. Thus, in economically developed states taxes constitute a major portion of the annual income; the ratio of military expenditure to the GDP is also relevant since it indicates to what extent a given state is capable of mobilizing manpower for military service.

II. The degree of congruence (or extent of success of nation-building)

'Western State-Making', in C. Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993); Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

The extent of correspondence between state citizenship and the national aspirations and affiliations of the people in the state, namely the extent to which the current political boundaries in a certain state reflect the national identities and loyalties of the main groups in that state. High congruence means that there is compatibility between the state (as an entity administering certain territory) and the national sentiments of its citizens (that is, their aspiration to live together as a national community in their own state, at least the preference of the overwhelming majority of them). In other words, there is a strong acceptance and identification of the people in the state with the existing state and its territorial boundaries. The state citizens also see each other as fellow members of the same nation. Congruent states are either ethnically homogenous or have strong civic nationalism (notably, Western European states or the immigrant societies in the New World). There are two primary senses in which a state's geopolitical and national boundaries may be *incongruent* in relation to the ethno-national criterion of one state per one nation:

- A single geopolitical entity may contain numerous ethno-national groups: This is the internal dimension of incongruence, which has major implications for the possibilities of civil wars, especially in weak states as some groups might aspire to have their own independence or at least autonomy or have stronger attachment with trans-border groups than with some of their fellow citizens.

- A single ethno-national group may reside in more than one geopolitical entity: This is the external dimension of incongruence, which has major implications for revisionist or irredentist policies, especially if the *majority* ethnic group in the state lives in substantial numbers also in neighbouring and other regional states, either as a majority or a minority. The level of revisionism is heavily influenced by the extent of the trans-border territories populated by the dominant ethno-national group in the state.

External incongruence may also have a historical dimension where an ethno-national group has lost control over certain territories. The greater the gap between an imagined past glory of the nation and its recent and current status, the greater the likelihood of the adoption of a revisionist policy to revive the ancient glory. This gap can be measured by the size of the "lost territories." Specific territorial demands are based on these lost territories, which were under the nation control in its glorious days and then it lost them to foreign powers. These losses lead to a sense of national humiliation. Such a humiliation reinforces nationalism due to the eagerness to correct past injustices—including by restoring the national control over these territories -- so as to "make the nation great again."

Territory-- Operationalizing the state-to-nation balance by the Territory Factor:

The key link between the s-n balance and types of conflict

State capacity can be measured by the extent of the state ability to control its sovereign territories. Thus, a weak state is unable to exercise control over considerable swaths of its territory in contrast to a strong state which is able to exercise effective control on all of its territory—even if parts of its territory is populated by groups which would prefer to secede. Thus, state services are provided and taxes are collected—more or less to the same high extent- - - in all the territorial parts of the state.

National Congruence is present when no territorial part of the state is populated by groups of people who don't see themselves as part of the nation. Under an internal National Incongruence—there are substantial territories inside the state populated by groups who don't see themselves as part of the same nation as other groups in the state. External National Incongruence—the presence of groups of people outside of the state boundaries who see themselves as part of the nation of the state and esp. the nation in the state sees these groups— and they territories they settle-- as belonging to their nation.

Another dimension of external incongruence refers to the "lost territories"—discussed above.

These links between territory and the s-n balance can explain some types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate (civil wars, border disputes and inter-state wars-- hot and cold). The exception is nationalist populism which focuses more on what its adherents see as the changing national congruence inside the existing territory of the state, which may lead to polarized societies.

The Effects of Democratization

In my model, *democratization* acts as an intervening variable between the independent variables (the types of nationalism affected by levels of stateness and national congruence), and the dependent variable (expressions of domestic and international conflicts).[21] I argue that while democratization could have a stabilizing effect when there are high levels of both stateness and national congruence, it could also have an opposite de-stabilizing effect when any one of these conditions is missing. Since that in a democracy "the people" are meant to make decisions, it is essential to identify who "the people" are.[22] This requires a common national identity that defines who is included in this national-political community: is it based on a universal citizenship in the state's current boundaries (i.e., civic nationalism), or on an ethnic affiliation which might include only part of the population and might also transcend current boundaries? Functioning institutions, notably the provision of security and law and order, are also a prerequisite for the working of democracy. If either one of these two components– national congruence and state strength – are not present, democratization is likely to precipitate either internal war or external revisionist ventures. A common national identity is thus essential for a stable and functioning democracy, where a peaceful transfer of power is

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[21] For a recently new edition of a major and comprehensive volume on democratization, see Christian W. Haerpfer et al, *Democratization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 2ed.). While this useful volume addresses numerous aspects of democratization, it doesn't address the subject addressed here— a theory on the relations between democratization and peace and conflict.

[22] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy." *Comparative Politics* (1970) 2, no. 3: 337–363.

based on election outcomes. I argue that this process is more likely to be accomplished among people with a shared national identity—either civic or ethno-national— also for fulfilment of liberal principles like human rights of its citizens and social welfare for all of them. If a common identity is missing, there is a higher probability of domestic instability, which might lead in extreme cases—if the stateness is weak— to civil wars.

My thesis provides two preconditions—derived from the two independent variables-- for democracy as a stabilizing factor:[23]

1) For a democracy to be stabilizing, there has to exist both a well-functioning state and a high national congruence, namely a state which went through a successful process of state- and nation-building.[24] In non-democracies, there is no need for a prior agreement on the territorial identity of the state, as separatist or irredentist aspirations are usually suppressed by force (in such cases the level of violence depends on the central authority's strength). In contrast, if in a democratizing state a significant group does not accept the state's legitimacy and its territorial integrity, it could pose a severe threat to democratization and especially to democratic consolidation.[25]

2) Similarly, the lack of a clear definition of "the people" and "the citizens" in a democracy makes democratization more difficult than in a congruent state. I propose that in order for a democratic state with majority voting to function well, a powerful sense of national identity, which is congruent with the state, is required. When such an idea is missing, democratization

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[23] On democracy and stability, see Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: principles for a post-Cold War world (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (*New York: W.W.Norton, 2000); Edward D., Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Vipin Narang, and Rebecca M. Nelson. "Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War." *International Organization (*2009) 63: 357–379.

[24] Rustow "Transitions to Democracy," 337–363.

[25] See also Rustow, 351.

might lead to the break-up of a state, as happened in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. While this argument seems to apply especially to newly democratizing states, I argue that the absence of a common national identity might challenge even established democracies such as those in the West, since a peaceful transfer of power is more likely to take place when there is a powerful joint national identity. My proposition is that the less prevalent the sense of a common identity is, the more problematic a peaceful transfer of power will be.

The combined effect of variations in *stateness* and *national congruence* can also explain the variations in the outcomes of US attempts to liberalize the world.[26] Such attempts could succeed only when high stateness and high national congruence were present, such as in post-WWII West Germany and Japan. In many of the post-Cold War cases, however, either one or the two conditions were missing. This applies especially to the failed states but also to the revisionist states, and a bit less so to the partitioned states (all these categories are discussed below).

Methodology and Case Selection

The key proposition focuses on the effects of variations in *stateness and national congruence* (the independent variables) and *democratization* (the intervening variable) on the variations in the types of nationalism and their effects on variations in conflict (the dependent variables).[27] The selection of cases is based on variations in the independent variables— stateness (cases of

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[26] On these attempts, see Melissa Willard-Foster*, Toppling Foreign Governments: The Logic of Regime Change* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), Ch. 6; John J., Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); David C Hendrickson, *Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Tony Smith, *Why Wilson Matters: The Origins of American Liberal Internationalism and its Crisis Today* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 182-275; Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); James Mann, *The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism will not bring Democracy to China.* (London: Penguin, 2007).

[27] Alexander L George, and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (*Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

strong and weak states) and national congruence (cases of national congruence and incongruence—external and internal).[28] I identify a causal chain between the key independent variables, the intervening variable (democratization) and the outcomes to be explained: variations in peace and conflict. This causal chain depicts how the independent variables (stateness and national congruence) are manifested in the various types of nationalism, and how they affect the outcome of the level and type of conflict. I also propose the type of effects of the intervening variable – *democratization*— on modifying the effects of the independent variables on the outcomes of conflict by either aggravating the danger of conflict or moderating the level of conflict. Thus, we'll be able to identify the conditions under which democratization is going to have de-stabilizing or pacifying effects. Finally, this causal chain helps us to understand the sources of current and future challenges to the international liberal order.

For a full-blown empirical investigation, it will be useful to apply a research strategy of comparative case-studies, more specifically, George's method of "structured, focused comparison".[29] Considering the space limitations, however, I'm able to present here the key cases only briefly. Still, the variation (based on the variation in the independent variables) and the importance of these cases demonstrate the explanatory power of the theoretical model advanced here with regard to a wide-range of conflicts in the world. As we'll see briefly below, four of these types of cases also present the key challenges to the liberal international order.

The Causal Relations

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[28] On such a strategy of case selection, see Gary King, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 137.

[29] Alexander L. *George*, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon (ed.*), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, *1979*), pp. 43-68.

Following are the proposed causal linkages between the types of nationalism and conflict, under the conditions that affect the likelihood of domestic and international conflicts:

1. **National Congruence + High Statenes > Liberal Nationalism > Peaceful State**

States which are strong and nationally coherent are likely to produce *liberal nationalism*.[30] Such nationalism is based on a relatively homogenous society or on civic nationalism (box 1 in Table 1 below). These states have been going through successful state- and nation-building processes. This 'satisfied' nationalism accepts the territorial status-quo and engages in high-levels of international cooperation, and even regional integration. It is also inclusive internally and respects minority rights. Congruent states have less motivation to resort to violence and have fewer quarrels with their neighbours. They will tend to be status-quo states with no ambition of territorial expansion. Thus mutual fears and the security concerns with regard to neighbouring states are likely to decline among such states --even if they have the capacity to harm each other. As strong states they are not only able to negotiate peaceful agreements with regional states, but also maintain their commitments and guarantee stable peace. As strong states the likelihood of civil wars is very low, especially when there are also no major domestic national cleavages based on divergent identities because of the strength of the shared national identity.

Democratization under liberal nationalism: *Liberal nationalism* is conducive to the pacifying effects of democratization. Liberal nationalism tends to make states pacific which resolve conflicts by non-violent means. Democratization within a congruent state can increase the citizens' identification with their state; it thus strengthens these states and makes them more coherent in the longer term and therefore raises the prospects for domestic peace.[31] The satisfied nature of liberal nationalism means that the democratic peace theory (of absence of

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[30] See Yuli Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton University Press, 1995).
[31] See Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996) 33–34; Stepan 1998, 50–52.

war among democracies) will be especially applicable among democracies which share this type of nationalism.[32] Similarly, the likelihood of a civil war during democratization is low, since the transfer of power doesn't pose a security threat as in an incongruent society. Well-functioning professional law-enforcement institutions can also help to guarantee a peaceful transfer. Thus, there is a greater likelihood for a peaceful transfer of power than in an incongruent state.

2. National Incongruence + Low Stateness > Stateless Nationalism > Civil Wars in a Failed State

State weakness and national incongruence are likely to lead to the emergence of 'failed states', with a likelihood of hosting hot civil wars. Such states are characterized by a weak common national identity. There is a low identification of the citizens with the state and with its territorial identity. Many citizens feel that the state doesn't reflect their national identity and aspirations. This mismatch between state and nation raises the potential for state collapse and violent conflicts within the state, as well as a potential foreign intervention due to shared trans-border identities. One possible manifestation of the mismatch refers to strong aspirations for secession and for the establishment of new states. This is due to the presence of stateless *nationalism*—groups which aspire to fulfil their national self-determination. However, the state citizenship is not the key criterion for membership in such stateless groups. Rather, the key criterion is frequently kinship and blood ties. There might be strong national attachment with only some of the citizens, but not with others, or even stronger affiliations with trans-border groups than with some other fellow citizens. The weakness of incoherent states is permissive for the violent actions of revisionist groups and encourages other groups trying to defend themselves. In this case, one should expect the eruption of civil/ethnic wars within these states, which might also create opportunities for neighbouring actors (states and non-states) to intervene in these conflicts (either because of security fears or a quest for profit or ethno-

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[32] For sources on the democratic peace theory, see reference no. 2 above.

national/sectarian affiliations). Thus, we should expect these states to be inflicted with civil wars, trans-border violence and foreign military interventions (see box 3 in Table 1 below). Asymmetric conflicts --such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare--are likely, as well as the presence of warlords and armed militias and the (voluntary or involuntary) hosting of terrorists in these failed states. As a result, such states might "export" both terrorist actions and mass migration of many of their desperate citizens.

Democratization in an incongruent and weak state: Under these conditions, in the absence of successful state- and nation-building, democratization by itself (manifested mainly by holding general elections) might increase the level of violence rather than promote peace. This is because it might bring extremists to power by playing the ethno-nationalist card. This will result in further polarizing an already incongruent society, without any restraints posed by non-partisan and professional law-enforcement agencies and other institutions.[33] In such a case attempts at democratization might generate various dire outcomes, emanating from the 'failed state syndrome'. One in particular is that the existing sectarian/ethno-national groups in the state will be reluctant to share power. Fear and mistrust between the warring parties will dominate politics and society and produce violence, while the outcome of elections will be hotly disputed and could lapse to violence and possibly civil war. Transfer of power, within a failed state, is likely to be violent as well. [34] This is because the ruling party will fear that the successful party may abuse its power either against the rival sectarian/ethnic groups or to secede from the state.[35] Therefore, consociational democracy, federalism and other power-

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[33] See Mansfield and Snyder, *Electing to Fight*.

[34] For general data on loss of power and ethnic exclusion as causes of rebellion, see Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis," World Politics (2010), 62 (1):87–119.

[35] See Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103-124.

sharing mechanisms are prone to failure within an imbalance between state and nation, at least for the short-run. Federalism is especially hazardous, as such system may reinforce separatist forces by guaranteeing them resources, they can employ for the secessionist cause, such as local police forces and government revenues.[36]

3. Low Stateness + National Congruence > Consolidating Nationalism > Border/Territorial Conflicts among Partitioned States

One way to address the problem of stateless nationalism in failed states and its production of civil wars is by a partition of these states along ethno-national lines (cell 4 in Table 1 below).[37] The hope is that the rising national congruence and the expected satisfaction of nationalist aspirations by the *consolidating nationalism* in the newly-formed state (or autonomous enclave) will resolve the violent conflicts. Yet, the division and separation among ethnic groups can be quite problematic and even escalates to ethnic cleansing. The partition might not be seen as legitimate by some groups and at the very least the new borders might not be agreed-upon by the various groups, while minorities might still be left in the territory of the rival entity. Under these conditions the borders might be unclear and ambiguous Thus, the newly-created states might face territorial conflicts, esp. in the border areas.

Democratizing partitioned states: we might expect continuous territorial conflicts among the newly-created states or entities, although a successful state-building process and the related national consolidation are likely to have stabilizing effects. In these latter circumstances,

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[36] See K. J. Holsti, *War, The State, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l996), 184–185; See also Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," *International Security* (2003) 28(1): 47-78, esp. 54-58. A realist critic would emphasize the de-stabilising effects of the security dilemma effect, see Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma." In Barbara Walter, and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (N.Y.: Columbia UP, 1999), 15-37; see also Daniel Byman, and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2007), 4.

[37] For the opposing views on partitions and its effects, see Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs*, 76:1, Jan-Feb, 1997 versus Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, 20:4, 1996, pp. 136-75.

democratization might have some limited stabilizing effects—but only if the state-building enterprise is successful and the national consolidation indeed takes place.

4. High Stateness + External National Incongruence > Irredentist Nationalism > War-Prone Inter-State Conflicts

States which are relatively strong but externally incongruent will tend to produce *revisionist/irredentist nationalism*, based on strong nationalist aspirations for national unification of the whole nation in all the parts of its homeland. These states tend to pursue revisionist policies based on the "too many states" logic (see Table 1below, cell no. 2A). There is a widespread national feeling, even if manipulated by leaders for their own domestic political agenda, that the nation is artificially and arbitrarily divided into a number of states. In this nationalist view, the nation should unify into a single state which would reflect the national aspirations and sentiments of the single unified nation. For this "holy" purpose of national unification, the strongest state of that nation could even consider the use of force. A related variant is the irredentist policy of the "Greater State," claiming territories beyond its boundaries based on national identity of the people or historical rights. In these revisionist states, there is a strong sense of victimhood—the nation was supposedly humiliated by foreign powers and at any rate doesn't get its appropriate place among nations. One concrete manifestation of this is the strongly-held beliefs about "lost territories"—territories which were taken from the nation by "evil" foreign powers and cause continuous humiliation. In different historical periods the policies of "Greater Germany," "Greater Serbia," or "Greater Russia" illustrate this type of state. There are strong relations between nationalist revisionism and rising great-power competition. Revisionist policies under the state-to-nation imbalance are likely to aggravate inter-state conflicts, leading to cold wars and balance of power policies such as arms races, competing alliances and frequent crises in the region and limited wars with some potential for escalation to large-scale violence.

Nationalism and the limits to democratization: 'Greater state' aspirations and nationalist sentiments will be a major domestic political force in a democratizing state, and thus generate a revisionist foreign approach, using the trans-border kin to justify and facilitate occupying new lands or at the very least to establish a sphere-of-influence for the revisionist state. Even if the current political leaders are pragmatists, nationalist or sectarian forces in the domestic society and pressure groups are likely to constrain the manoeuvring ability for moderate foreign policy.[38] Less pragmatist leaders will tend to manipulate the nationalist issue for their own power purposes, including for establishing or preserving an illiberal democracy or an authoritarian regime. Thus, the nationalist card might serve as a legitimizing mechanism which substitutes democracy. Putin in Russia, Erdogan in Turkey, the Ayatollahs in Iran and Xi in China might be good examples of such dynamics, using nationalism for legitimizing their rule instead of promoting democratization. The likelihood for this to happen is higher when the national identity is ethnically or sectarian-based.[39]

5. Declining Congruence + High Stateness > Nationalist Populism > Societal Polarization

The emergence of deep internal cleavages with regard to the national identity are likely to lead to severe domestic conflicts even in well-established democracies and potentially also to rising likelihood of international conflicts and severe constraints on international cooperation (Table 1 below, cell 2B). Such high-capacity states might face a nationalist challenge by populists who engage in political struggles which reflect—and further deepen--- the cleavages in the society, and potentially also create the conditions for external conflicts. The rise of such nationalist populism is most likely when a large section of the demographic majority group is

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[38] For the argument that nationalism is both necessary for democracy and can also push democracies toward belligerency, see Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era* (NY: Knopf 2002), 112–118.

[39] It is important to note here that ethnic nationalism is predisposed to develop irredentist aspirations due to its features of exclusivity. On ethnic, cultural and civic nationalism see Rainer Lepsius, "The Nation and Nationalism in Germany." *Social Research (1985)* 52, no. 1: 43–64.

fearful that it might soon lose its ethnic/racial/religious majority and related dominance and status.[40] This declining majority is worried that accordingly there is going to be a major change in the national identity of the state and what they perceive as its associated traditional values and culture (e.g. the traditional family; nationalism; religion and the traditional marriage while opposing the legalization of LGBT marriage; and also rejecting feminism).[41]

Accordingly, the key targets of nationalist populism —for criticism, exclusion or both— are the following groups: First, the liberal elites who are viewed as having cosmopolitan commitments rather than caring for the "authentic" nation of their own state. The liberal elites also advance globalization despite its supposed economic and other costs to the "real people." The elites include the mainstream media, intellectuals, a great variety of experts, judges and the academy.[42]

Second, the so-called "deep state" (the permanent civil service and the courts) together with the elites are viewed by populists as unnecessarily constraining the ability of the elected Executive Branch to govern, thus supposedly interfering with the real aspirations of the "people," who elected them. Populists aim to weaken the 'checks and balances' of a liberal democracy by erasing the courts' independence; imposing limitations on the media; promoting political appointments in the Civil Service; erasing equality before the law, thus, challenging the rule of law; weakening civil society and non-governmental organizations; while legitimizing these steps by arguing that the only consideration which provides legitimacy is winning elections. At the same time, the leaders should have a "direct" communication with

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[40] On such fears of white majorities in Britain, Europe and the US, see Eric Kaufmann, *Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities* (UK: Allen Lane, 2018); Ashley Jardina, *White Identity Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[41] Norris and Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash*; John Sides, et. al, *Identity Crisis*; John B. Judis, *The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization* (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018).

[42] Left-wing populists share the anti-elite agenda, but they focus on the economic elites by calling for re-distribution of income in favour of the middle and lower-classes.

the "people" without the interference of biased/unelected "intermediaries," which the populists argue serve the elites rather than "the people."

Third, ethnic/racial <u>minorities</u> who have different identities from the supposedly "truly authentic" people, which in the West usually means white Christians. Thus, these minorities do not seem to fully belong to the "authentic" nation even though they are fellow citizens.

Fourth, <u>migrants</u> from different "civilizations," who ethnically/racially/religiously/culturally differ from the nativists/nationalists. For European populists, it means first of all Muslims. For American populists it refers to Hispanics in addition to Muslims. Populists fear that immigrants—supported by the liberal/globalist elites-- are taking away their national identity. An extreme version of that is the spreading far-right conspiracy theory about "The Great Replacement": that non-white and Muslim immigrants in Western countries are invaders, ushered in by scheming elites to replace ethnic-European populations.[43] Whether this "theory" is right or wrong, I argue that the changing demographics, and accordingly the declining congruence in the eyes of the ethno-nationalists, lead to the rise of nationalist populism and rising challenges to liberal democracy.

Fifth, <u>foreigners</u> who are allegedly taking advantage of the nation and are blamed for all the state's troubles.

What are the international effects of nationalist populism? For one thing, the attitude to immigration is related to a "Clash of Civilizations" perspective,[44] which underlines a supposedly enduring conflict between the West and non-Western civilizations, especially Islam. Another key populist concern is the focus on national sovereignty and the opposition to what they see as the subordination of the state to international institutions and multilateralism.

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[43] Lauretta Charlton, "What is the Great Replacement," *New York Times*, August 6, 2019; "No safe places: White nationalist terrorism," *The Economist*, March 23rd 2019., pp. 50-52.

[44] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*.

Instead, populists prefer unilateralism and the maximization of short-term material gains of the state at the expense of others in trade and security. Populists also oppose the promotion of universal values such as human rights. They rather focus on a search of "enemies" or "free-riders" which supposedly take advantage of the state. Such attitudes, in turn, constrain international cooperation and raise the prospects for international competition and conflict.

Nationalist populism increases also the likelihood of domestic conflicts and polarization because of its fight against various internal opponents—whether real, imagined or manipulated. In addition to the aggressive rhetoric against foreign "enemies," populists also use harsh rhetoric against domestic rivals which they might call "traitors," while only their supporters are the real "patriots." Populists believe that they can gain politically by polarizing society and portraying "us vs. them" both domestically and externally.

The effects of democracy: The high capacity of state institutions in the West reduces the likelihood of internal violence. The danger is, however, that populist leaders and their constituencies might erode democratic institutions and norms, relying on election outcomes as the key expression of the will of "the people," while weakening the checks and balances on the power of the populist strongmen. As a result, the state might stay democratic in the sense of multi-party elections, but might become also illiberal state in different degrees. In extreme cases, the lack of agreement on who are "the people" might even challenge one of the key foundations of a democracy—the peaceful transfer of power, especially if the winning party/leader are not viewed by a considerable part of the population as an "authentic" part of the "people."

Empirical Evidence: Key Case-Studies

The following case-studies illustrate the dynamics involved in the various causal relations:

Liberal Nationalism and the Peaceful State

West Germany and Japan are the *leading examples* of peaceful democratization and the rise of liberal nationalism following the end of WWII.[45] This is a bit puzzling in light of their authoritarian history and their belligerent past. The model presented here suggests that the combined effect of high stateness and national congruence played a key role in turning these countries into pacific democracies with liberal nationalism. Their high stateness and national congruence were *necessary* –even if not sufficient--conditions for the US-led democratization to pacify them since the 1950s. Relatively soon after their defeat in the war, their state institutions were well-functioning. At the same time in the decades after the war their societies were highly homogenous without major controversies and conflicts over the common national identity. German partition, even though creating an external incongruence, was taken as a realpolitik given under the Cold War setting. The post-2015 wave of migrants from the Middle East to Germany might have challenged these identity factors in Germany in recent years and we still have to see how will German society overcome these issues even though we already notice the rise of the nationalist far-right there.[46]

Stateless Nationalism and Civil Wars

There is a substantial empirical evidence of the ethno-nationalist sources of civil wars.[47] Among them, at least half of the civil wars are wars of nationalist-driven secession.[48] *Key recent cases*

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[45] On Germany and Japan, see Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan," In Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security (*New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)., pp. 317-356; Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

[46] For a recent article on the rise of the far-right—as a result of the post-2015 response to the wave of migrants, see, for example, JÖRN FLECKAND AND ALEX PIETER BAKER "Germany's Far-Right Is Creeping Ever Closer to Power: Extremists will triumph in this weekend's regional elections—and Angela Merkel's party is starting to see their appeal," *Foreign Policy*, AUGUST 28, 2019.

[47] Lars-Erik Cederman, Nationalism and Ethnicity in International Relations, *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 531-554.

[48] See the citations in Ryan D. Griffiths, *The Age of Secession* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 4. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014)'s research of precolonial conflict in Africa shows that low state strength and national incongruence produce higher levels of domestic conflict. The national incongruence is a result of powerful ethnic identities but fragile national identities.

of secession include the two cases of Bosnia and Kosovo which resulted from the 1991 breakdown of Yugoslavia: *Bosnia* 1992-95—the deep ethno-national division and conflict among Muslims, Croats and Serbs;[49] and *Kosovo* 1991-1999 – the ethno-national division and the rising conflict between Kosovars and Serbs—a key source of conflict in this case is the mismatch between the demographic and historical sources of nationalism. Thus, the Albanian-Muslim Kosovars had a considerable demographic majority in Kosovo when the process of disintegration started in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Although being a minority in the province, Serb nationalism is tightly related to Kosovo, where the Serbs supposedly fought a heroic battle in 1389 against the invading Ottoman armies and over the years constructed there many monasteries of the Orthodox Serbian Church, expressing the powerful religious-nationalist attachment to Kosovo.[50]

Another set of conflicts in failed states with an imbalance of state and nation due to the weakness of the common national identity in these states-- took place in the Arab world, notably the conflict among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in post-2003 *Iraq* following the 2003 US invasion of that country, and the civil war and foreign intervention in *Syria* 2011-2019 following the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011.[51] Post-2003 Iraq might particularly serve as

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[49] The ethno-national distribution: Bosniak (Muslims) 50.1%; Serb 30.8%; Croat 15.4%; other 2.7%; not declared/no answer 1% (according to the World factbook of the CIA 2013 est.—these figures are disputed by the Serbs).

[50] On Bosnia and Kosovo, see Sabrina R. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Steven L. Burg, and Paul Shoup, *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning ugly: NATO's war to save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); David Charles-Philippe, "Alice in wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia." *Contemporary Security Policy* 22 (1) (2001): 1-30. For a general approach to this kind of conflicts, see Mary Kaldor, *New & old wars: organized violence in a global era* (3rd ed.) (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[51] In contrast to the Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis are not nations. However, the deep cleavage between them and their trans-border ties with their brethren show the failure of nation-building—and the related absence of a common national identity-- in Iraq and in a few other Arab states. On state, nation and regime change in Iraq, see Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: *Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2007); Gareth Stansfield, *Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Moon, E, Bruce, "Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq." *International Security* 33, no. 4

a useful test-case of the problems of the peaceful transfer of power in a deeply divided

society (roughly 55% Shia, 20% Sunni and 20% Kurds). Thus, following the US-led

democratization, many of the Sunnis were unwilling to respect the electoral victory of Shiite

parties and started an insurrection. The Sunni resistance was reinforced by their exclusion

from power by Shiite governments. The Kurds, for their part, strove for national self-

determination.

Additional cases of failed states include the Sudan and South Sudan (which seceded from

Sudan in 2011); Afghanistan; Somalia; and post-Arab Spring Libya and Yemen.

There is a major variation between the successful imposition of democracy by the US in

Germany and Japan and its failure in in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. In contrast to the high

stateness and national congruence of Germany and Japan, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq

are characterized by low stateness and national incongruence. These factors played a key role

in de-stabilizing them and in the US failure to democratize them, especially Iraq and

Afghanistan.[52] In addition, the collapse of the Iraqi and Syrian states brought about the de-

stabilizing rise of the terrorist Islamic State and the flow of refugees and migrants from these

countries to neighbouring states and Europe. [53]

(2009): 115–148. On Syria and the Arab Spring, see Charles Glass, *Syria Burning* (New York: Verso, 2016); H. Darwisheh , *Trajectories and Outcomes of the Arab Spring: Comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria* (Chiba-Shi: The Institute of developing Economics, 2014); James L. Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012); Emile Hokayem, *Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant* (Routledge, 2013); Marc Lynch, The *New Arab Wars (New York: Public Affairs, 2016) and his edited volume, The Arab uprisings Explained (New York: Columbia UP, 2014);* Christopher Phillips, *The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2016); Steven Cook, *False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[52] For a comparison between the consequences of the US democratization in post-WWII Japan and post-2003 Iraq, see John W. Dower, *Cultures of War: Embracing Defeat* (New York: Norton, 2010), esp. pp. 313-358. On Germany and Iraq, see James Dobbins, *et al., America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Institution, 2003). For a detailed analysis how the variations in the levels of stateness and national congruence played a key role in accounting for the variations in the democratization outcomes in Germany and Iraq, see "author."

[53] On the Islamic State and the Jihadists, see Charles Lister, *Profiling the Islamic State* (Washington, DC, Brookings, 2014); Shadi Hamid, *Islamic Exceptionalism* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2016), ch. 7: "ISIS: After the State Fails," pp. 200-237; Jessica Stern & J. M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*

Consolidating Nationalism and Border Conflicts

In some of the *cases* discussed in the preceding category, there are dynamics of consolidating nationalism following a partition -- whether the de-jure partitions such as between Serbia and Kosovo in 2008 (though still not recognized by Serbia; a de-facto partition started already in 1999 following NATO intervention), and between Sudan and South Sudan in 2011, or the de-facto partitions in the following cases: between the Serbs and the Muslims/Croats in *Bosnia* (following the 1995 Dayton agreements); between the Kurds and the Arab parts of *Iraq* with the consolidation of Kurdish autonomy in the post-2003 period; and between the Kurdish areas and the rest of (Arab-dominated) *Syria* following the post-2011 Arab Spring in Syria.[54] The record thus far shows that the effects of partition and democratization on stability in the cases of the Kurds and of Bosnia and Serbia-Kosovo can be potentially stabilizing only when the nation-building and state-building processes succeed, which are still far from being the case, particularly in the Kurdish cases.

Revisionist Nationalism and War-Prone Inter-State Conflicts

The most notable cases of irredentism are China and Russia:[55] Vladimir Putin—the Russian leader-- claims that Russia has been pushed around by the West since the end of the Cold War and lost territories which historically belonged to Russia that are partly populated by ethnic

(London: William Collins, 2015); Laurie Brand, "The Islamic State and the Politics of official narratives," in POMPES, "Rethinking Nation and Nationalism," (June 2, 2015), pp. 15-16; William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (Washington D.C., Brookings, 2015).

[54] On the Kurds, see Ofra Bengio, *The Kurds in a Volatile Middle East* (Ramat Gan: BESA, 2017); On Iraqi Kurds, see Sherko Kirmanj, *Identity and Nation in Iraq* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013). Aziz Mahair, *The Kurds of Iraq* (London: Tauris, 2011); On the Kurds in Syria, see Harriett Allsopp, *The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East* (I.B/Tauris: London, 2014).

[55] For a comprehensive survey of irredentism, see David S. Siroky and Christopher W. Hale, "Inside Irredentism: A Global Empirical Analysis*," American Journal of Political Science*, 2017.

Russians, Russian-speakers or both.[56] Russia under Putin also shows that a supposedly democratizing state (which at least holds multi-candidate elections even though it is very far from being a meaningful democracy) can adopt a revisionist policy under relatively high stateness and external incongruence.[57] The Chinese, for their part, are heavily influenced by what they see as their "one-hundred years of humiliation" since the Opium Wars in the mid-19th century and their loss of territories such as Taiwan and the East and South China Seas.[58] National unification of the people and whole its homeland seems to be a major objective of the Chinese grand strategy.[59] Additional cases of revisionist states include Iran and Turkey in the Middle East. Nationalist sentiments, such as humiliation and irredentist claims, are often manipulated by political leaders to enhance their own political power, while avoiding democracy. Such manipulations lead to the adoption of revisionist policies which, in turn, contribute to rising conflicts and to the emergence of great-power competition.

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[56] See a recent Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" (July 12, 2021), published by the office of the President of Russia in the Kremlin. On the persistence of the Russian belief that the Ukrainians (and Belorussian) are one nation with the Russians, see *Jeffrey Mankoff*, "Putin likes to talk about Russians and Ukrainians as 'one people.' Here's the deeper history." The *Monkey Cage, The Washington Post,* 11/2/2022. The author suggests that for centuries, Moscow has worried that foreign powers are scheming to separate Ukraine from Russia, while Ukraine is historically and demographically part of Russia. Thus, Russians often view Kyiv, now the Ukrainian capital and once the center of the medieval Kyivan Rus, as the birthplace of their nation. See also Michael Hirsh, "Putin's Thousand-Year War," *Foreign Policy*, March 12, 2022.

[57] On the recent rise of Russian nationalism, see Laruelle Marlene, *Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines and Political Battlefields* (London: Routledge, 2018); Richard Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: CRISIS IN THE BORDERLANDS* (London, I.B. TAURIS, 2015); H. Blakkisrud, & P. Kolsto (Eds.), *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–2017* (Edinburgh, U. K.: Edinburgh University Press).

[58] On Chinese revisionism, see Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, "The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 2018); Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); French, *Everything under the Heavens*; Suisheng Zhao, "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 22, issue 82 (2013), pp. 535-553; Hayton, *The South China Sea*; Nathan, Andrew J., "The Chinese World Order," *New York Review of Books* (October 12, 2017.

[59] See, for example, Weizhan Meng, "Unity, Democracy, and Anti-Americanism in China," The *Washington Quarterly* 42:3, pp. 121-135.

Nationalism in Russia and China is obviously not a new development. What turned it to an actual revisionist policy, threatening the liberal order, is the rising state capacity in the recent decade. In Russia it is manifested by military modernization made possible by rising oil prices until recently, while the huge economic growth of China has enabled it to spend more on defence.

Nationalist-Populism and the Polarized State

One of the most dramatic developments in the second decade of the 21st century is the rise of nationalist populism in democratic Western high-capacity states, notably Trump in the USA, Brexit in the UK and Orban in Hungary, and also nationalist-populist parties in countries such as Italy and Poland. This resulted in the deepening of sharp polarization in these societies between liberals and populists. A few of the key manifestations of such polarization in the US include the extremely deep divisions over the validity of the 2020 presidential election outcomes; the interpretation of the Jan. 6 assault on Capitol Hill; and the attitude toward COVID-19 and its behavioral implications (wearing masks? inoculated with the vaccines?). There are three major explanations of the rise of populism in the West: the identity explanation (the fear of declining national congruence), the economic (globalization) or the political (the preference for "strongmen").[60] A number of major recent studies show that the declining congruence,[61] especially due to rising non-European (or colored) migration (and the fear of its effects on a decline of the common national identity and the expected erosion of "traditional

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[60] On nationalist populism esp. in the age of Brexit and Trump, see Michael Bernhard and Daniel O'Neill, "Trump: Causes and Consequences," Special Sections of *Perspectives on Politics,* Vo. 17, No. 2 (June 2019), pp. 317-479; Rogers Brubaker, "Populism and Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 26:1, 2020; Barry Eichengreen, *The Populist Temptation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die?* (New York: Crown, 2018); Edward Luce, *The Retreat of Western Civilization* (New York: Atlantic, 2017); Yasscha Mounk, *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger & How to Save it*. (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 2018); Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Ashesh Mukherjee, *The Internet Trap: Five Costs of Living Online* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, **2018); and** Jan-Werner Muller, *What is Populism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).
[61] Census statistics project that America will become "minority white" in 2045.

values") plays a key role in the rise of nationalist-populism and the challenges it poses to liberal democracy.[62] In addition, with regard only to the US-- the failed post-Cold War US military interventions in failed states (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya) affected the rising domestic opposition in the US to intervene overseas. This is another way how low stateness and low congruence (by causing the interventions' failure in these states) adversely affected the liberal order.

How do Variations in Nationalism affect the Rising Challenges to the International Order

Nationalism—and related issues of national identity—play a key role in the three major challenges to the liberal international order as they emerged particularly in the 2nd decade of the 21st century (see Table 2 below):

1. **Rising great-power Competition:** This has to do with the strengthening in recent years of nationalist-revisionist policies of rising powers characterized by the combination of high stateness and external incongruence, notably China and Russia (Table 2 cell 1). This revisionism led to rising Russian-Western rivalry and US-Chinese competition.[63] Because of the power of revisionist nationalism under these conditions, US/Western attempts to make them more liberal didn't succeed. The only partial success was some economic liberalization in China. Yet, that didn't prevent China from pursuing an aggressive nationalist trade policy, which affected rising unemployment/wage stagnation in the West, thus contributing to the rise of populist/anti-globalization sentiments there. One might add, however, that the US-led attempts "to make the world in its own image" and to liberalize

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[62] For such studies on the US in context of the 2016 election of Trump, see Norris and Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash, esp. pp. 44-48*; Sides, et al., *Identity Crisis*, overviewed in p. 4; Judis, *The Nationalist Revival*; Fukuyama, *Identity*; Klein, *Why We're Polarized (New York: Simon& Schuster, 2020)*; and Mutz, "Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote." Thus, for example, Sides et al, found that "The social science of group identity points directly to why these identities mattered in 2016… the context of the election was conducive. The demographics of the United States were changing. The dominant majority of the twentieth century—white Christians— was shrinking. The country was becoming more ethnically diverse and less religious…" On the fear of changing values at least partly as a result of the demographic changes, see esp. Norris and Inglehart.

China and Russia—in different ways—were seen by their respective leaderships as posing threats to them of "regime change" and thus their revisionism can be partly seen also as defensive moves.[64] Yet, the rise of nationalism in Russia and China—on top of their growing power-- has at any rate independent effects on their more aggressive polices in recent years and specifically on their substantive demands regarding the "lost territories." Domestic politics and the mobilization of public support have played a major role in this rising nationalism because of the ability of nationalism in these states to mobilize domestic support and to legitimate rulers, including authoritarian.[65] Moreover, nationalism can at least partly explain the US failure to liberalize them. A key element of nationalism is the outright rejection of external attempts to bring about domestic change in the state's political system.

2. **Failed States:** weak states – states that lack a common national identity and where groups fight for self-determination under ethnic/sectarian conflicts -- help produce large waves of illegal migration to the West (Table 2 cell 3;). These states also host terrorist organizations which initiate attacks in Europe and the US. The leading terrorist organizations—such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State—rely on external incongruence (Table 2 cell 4). This means that people that share their identity—such as religion—and who might live far away, follow the instructions of these organizations or are inspired by them to commit terrorist actions, including in the West. Rising terrorism and growing migration from different races and religions, in turn, contributed immensely to the rise of nationalist-populism in the West.

The phenomenon of *failed states* -- particularly, post-2001 Afghanistan, post-2003 Iraq, post-2011 Libya and post-1992 Somalia—is closely related to the challenges to the international order and the rise of populism particularly in the US also in another sense. In all of the failed states mentioned here, the US intervened militarily. The unintended outcome

of these interventions was either to make them more of a failed state than before (Iraq, Libya) or, at least not to prevent their further deterioration as failed states (Afghanistan and Somalia). For the American public such failures signalled the failure of US overseas interventions and thus also reduced the support for the leading US role in preserving the liberal international order. A widespread sentiment grew that the US pays disproportionately for maintaining the order, while getting limited benefits. The spread of such disenchantment from international commitments also to the domains of the US-led alliances, international institutions and free trade contributed immensely to the rise of the nationalist-populism of America First led by Trump. The failed military interventions played a key role in this process because of the salience of casualties in human life (in addition to huge financial costs) and also the rise of terrorism and migration following the failed interventions.

By affecting the rise of populism in the West, the least-capable states in the international system affected both the domestic politics of the most-capable states and the nature of the international order.

3. **The Rise of Nationalist-Populism in the West** (and in key non-Western democracies such as Brazil and India) which opposes and weakens some of the key dimensions of the liberal international order (Table 2 cell 2): migration, multilateralism, international institutions (including the US-led security alliances), globalization and free trade, and universal commitments to global issues such as human rights and climate change. This populism also tries to weaken a key pillar of the liberal order: the EU, which serves as a model for regional integration also beyond Europe.

Conclusions

In sum, the theory presented here challenges the focus of the current leading theories on power and security (realism), types of regimes, international institutions and economic interdependence (liberalism), norms and ideas (constructivism) or culture (clash of

civilizations). Moreover, the novel approach, while focused on nationalism, departs from the conventional wisdom which views nationalism as monolithic and homogenous. The new approach underlines the divergent effects of different types of nationalism on conflicts with potential implications for the challenges to the international order, thus establishing causal relations between domestic politics and political sociology and the global system; in this way departing from rigid disciplinary boundaries.

The paper presents a parsimonious theory—with a minimal number of explanatory variables—which is able to account for civil wars, domestic conflicts, inter-state wars, great-power competition, failed states, migration, trans-national terrorism and the rise of populism in democracies. In particular, the theory has major implications for the rising challenges to the liberal international order: Great power competition, engaging the US in an intense rivalry with the revisionist Russia and China; Failed states and their de-stabilizing effects in various regions and on discrediting US global leadership; and the rise of populism in the West and its de-stabilizing domestic and international effects. The study also advances a pioneering attempt to place nationalist-populism in a larger conceptual and comparative framework.

Although the theory presented here, certainly, has its own limitations, it presents the "big picture|" of conflicts world-wide in a comparative perspective, while providing a parsimonious explanation of some of the major conflicts in the contemporary world.

Table 1: Types of Nationalism-- Sources and Effects

	National Congruence	National Incongruence	
		External	**Internal**
High Stateness	**(1) Liberal Nationalism** The peaceful state Stable liberal democracies **Examples:** Post-WWII Western Europe; Post-WWII Germany and Japan	**(2A) Irredentism** The revisionist state Inter-state conflict/wars **Examples:**	**(2B) Populism / Divisive Nationalism** The polarized state Declining Congruence Conflictual society **Examples:**

		China; Russia; Iran	US (Trump); UK (Brexit); Hungary; Poland; Italy
Low Stateness	**(3) Consolidating Nationalism** The partitioned state Border conflicts Following partition **Examples:** Post-1995 Bosnian Serbs and Muslims/Croats; Post-1999 Kosovo; Post-2011 South Sudan; Post-2003 Kurds in Iraq; Post-2011 Kurds in Syria	**(4) Stateless Nationalism** The failed state States' breakdown /Civil wars Fight of stateless nations for national self-determination **Examples:** Serbs, Muslims, Croats in Bosnia 1992-95; Pre-1999 Kosovo; Pre-2011 Sudan; Pre-2003 Kurds in Iraq

Table 2: How Do Variations of Nationalism Challenge the Liberal International Order?

	External Incongruence	Internal Incongruence
High Stateness	**(1)** Revisionist Powers produce **Great-Power competition:** China; Russia	**(2)** Nationalist Populism (fear of declining congruence) > Illiberal Democracy; **Constraints on International cooperation:** Trump; Brexit; the recent Italian government; Hungary's Orban; Poland; India's Modi
Low Stateness	**(4) Transnational Terrorist Organizations** (Headquartered in failed states + transborder identities) > terrorism in the West and beyond: The Islamic State; Al Qaeda	**(3)** Failed States > Mass **Migration** to the West (and failure of US interventions in some of them) Libya; Syria; Iraq; Afghanistan; Somalia; South Sudan; Sudan