Large and Honest COVID-19 Relief
A Subnational Qualitative Comparative Approach with Evidence from Colombia

Juan Diego Prieto[1]

Oden Postdoctoral Fellow
Department of Political Science
Carleton College
jprieto@carleton.edu

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ABSTRACT

Subnational governments around the world played a significant role in response to the socioeconomic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic. Still, we know little about why some subnational governments adopted generous relief measures while others did not, and why some social assistance programs were more insulated from clientelism and partisan bias than others. Focusing on 23 Colombian cities, this article characterizes local governments' social assistance measures based on in-depth, original case studies and employs fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explain variation in breadth and programmatic character. I find that no single explanatory condition is either necessary or sufficient to produce broad or programmatic relief. Instead, various combinations of structural factors (either high state capacity or strong economic performance) and incentives for local incumbents' political action (high electoral competitiveness, political rivalries between mayors and the national government, and civil society mobilization) are conducive to both outcomes. It was especially common for electoral competitiveness and mobilization to prompt mayors to put material and bureaucratic resources toward providing aid, but many mayors in the opposition to the national government also delivered significant relief even while facing structural limitations. Structural factors appear to be especially important for relief to be programmatic, though one city stands out as an exception to this pattern. The findings thus call for a less static understanding of state capacity in the study of the politics of social policy as well as distributive politics.

1. INTRODUCTION

Most of the world's governments enacted several new—or expanded existing—social assistance measures seeking to mitigate the socioeconomic toll of COVID-19 and its attendant lockdowns (Béland et al. 2021; Cook and Ulriksen 2021; Dorlach 2022; Gentilini et al. 2022; Greer et al. 2021). As significant as these responses were, even the most generous among them did not manage to reach everyone in need or fully mitigate the income losses caused by the pandemic (Blofield, Giambruno, and Filgueira 2020; Gentilini 2022). Many households were either not covered by these policies or still could not make ends meet despite gaining coverage. This protection gap prompted many different backstop relief measures. These included community-level mutual aid initiatives, international humanitarian efforts, and privately funded charity efforts, but the crucial role of local and intermediate governments has been largely underrecognized and untheorized. Many works have paid attention to subnational authorities' physical distancing and other containment measures (Adeel et al. 2020; Bennouna et al. 2021; Chattopadhyay et al. 2022; Steytler 2022; Velasco-Guachalla et al. 2022). However, few have focused on their responses aimed specifically at addressing the pandemic's socioeconomic impact (see, e.g., Behrend and Karamaneff 2021; Cejudo et al. 2020; Segatto et al. 2022).

A focus on subnational governments in this context is warranted for both substantive and methodological reasons. At a time of crisis in which top-down, national-level interventions fell short of meeting the population's needs, local and intermediate governments are, at least according to decentralization theory, situated much closer to the people impacted by the pandemic and its attendant lockdowns, and therefore more attentive to their needs (Diamond 1999). Furthermore, if theories of "laboratory federalism" are correct, subnational units are likely to be important sites of policy innovation (Elazar 1987), especially in the realm of social policy (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). Methodologically, a subnational comparative design with a focus on local governments in a formally unitary but highly decentralized country like Colombia, whose social assistance interventions were

almost entirely autonomous from the central government, makes it possible to observe and explain cross-case variation in program design. Furthermore, a more localized analysis allows for capturing more fine-grained details about the politics of implementation and benefit distribution on the ground—phenomena that would fly under the radar of a national-level focus (Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder 2019).

In Colombia, national government relief measures reached only about 20% of the informal employed population—a conservative estimate if one considers the extent of additional job losses due to the pandemic—and many beneficiary households likely remained in need, given the modest size of the transfers (which amounted to about 18% of the monthly minimum wage) (Blofield, Giambruno, and Filgueira 2020, 26-28, 33). Anticipating the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19-related lockdowns and, in some cases, facing protests by residents demanding assistance, subnational governments began to launch their own additional assistance measures in late March and early April 2020. They did so with little to no direction or involvement by the national government. As a result, subnational social assistance measures varied widely, both in terms of the types and amounts of aid delivered as well as in the ways these measures targeted and distributed. While some were limited to sporadic food deliveries distributed almost at random or based on partisan discretion, others consisted of various combinations of unconditional cash transfers, food parcels, and utility subsidies, using sophisticated targeting techniques and transparent eligibility criteria.

Focusing on 23 Colombian cities, this article characterizes local (municipal and district[2]) governments' emergency assistance measures for their poor and vulnerable residents and explains why different subnational governments adopted different types of measures in response to the socioeconomic fallout of COVID-19. It focuses on two specific characteristics of these measures. First, it examines their

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[2] Subnationally, Colombia is divided into departments (intermediate government), municipalities (local government) and districts (a special type of local government).

breadth, measured in terms of city government spending. Second, it assesses whether or not they were programmatic in character, that is, whether the distribution of relief was shaped by clientelism, partisan conditionalities, or particularistic connections, or whether it was effectively governed by "formalized and public" eligibility criteria (Stokes et al. 2013, 7). Why were social assistance measures more generous and more programmatic in some cities than in others?

I address this question using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), based on in-depth, original analyses of each case. Drawing on the existing literature about the determinants of social policy expansion and of programmatic social transfer distribution, I focus on the effects of (and interactions among) state capacity, local economic performance, alignment (or lack thereof) between national and subnational executives (which I term intergovernmental competition for brevity), local-level electoral competition, and civil society mobilization.

I find that no explanatory condition is a silver bullet to guarantee broad or programmatic social assistance. Instead, causal factors operate jointly. In particular, various combinations of structural factors (either high state capacity or strong economic performance) and incentives for political action (either high levels of local electoral competitiveness or a mobilized civil society) go a long way in explaining both generous and programmatic outcomes. Yet the determinants of each of these outcomes vary in meaningful ways. While having high levels of state capacity (or, in its absence, high per-capita income) are necessary for relief to be programmatic (with only one exception), many poor and institutionally under-resourced city governments still managed to overcome these structural obstacles and provide sizeable relief. The findings thus call for a less static understanding of state capacity in the study of the politics of social policy as well as distributive politics.

This article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the social protection responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and describes how they varied across different cities. Section 3 contextualizes the research within the existing literature and uses it to develop a theoretical framework

for understanding the determinants of broad and programmatic social assistance measures. Section 4 presents the study's methodology and research design; it discusses the sources of data that were employed to characterize each city case and how they were used to set up the qualitative comparative analysis. Section 5 presents the QCA results, and Section 6 discusses their implications and concludes. The full QCA set calibration procedures and full truth tables are presented in two appendices.

2. Subnational Social Assistance during COVID-19 in Colombia

In Colombia, subnational policy responses to mitigate COVID-19's socioeconomic impact varied considerably. Despite its unitary structure, Colombia is also highly decentralized. Municipal and district governments have significant responsibility for social service provision and enjoy considerable spending autonomy.[3] During the pandemic, subnational governments were not subject to any programming requirements or directives from the national government in terms of the social assistance programs they should adopt. The national government provided logistical support to some subnational governments (for instance, by granting subnational governments access to its social registries to help them target local relief) and it relaxed spending rules to allow subnational governments to redirect earmarked funds toward pandemic-related measures, adopt special incentives to increase short-term tax collection, and borrow with fewer restrictions. However, it did not stipulate what types of measures local governments should deploy or who should or should not be eligible for them.[4] They thus enjoyed near-total autonomy for developing programs on top of national-level measures, similar to federal

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[3] Subnationally, Colombia is divided into departments (intermediate government), municipalities (local government) and districts (a special type of local government).

[4] The only (partially) subnational program that was subject to specific national rules was the public-school feeding program (*Programa de Alimentación Escolar*, PAE), run jointly by municipal governments and the national government. This was not a new program created during the pandemic, though it was adapted to continue operating when schools were closed. The PAE is not studied here.

countries like Argentina or Mexico (Behrend and Karamaneff 2021; Cejudo et al. 2020).[5] This section offers background on the national and subnational social policy responses to the pandemic in Colombia.

The national government's social assistance response to the pandemic was highly centralized and consisted of three main components. First, the government approved additional payments to beneficiaries of existing conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs (*Familias en Acción* and *Jóvenes en Acción*) and the small social pension program Colombia Mayor.[6] Second, the national government created a new unconditional cash transfer program, *Ingreso Solidario* (Solidary Income, IS) for poor and vulnerable households not covered by existing CCTs. Third, various national agencies provided food packages to vulnerable populations such as migrants, the elderly, ethnic minorities, and million families with children under the age of six (Pabón 2021).

While many local governments targeted their assistance to households that were not covered by national programs (and some local officials believed that failing to do so would expose them to anticorruption investigations[7]), this was not formally required. Although the national government delivered some of its in-kind aid packages through local governments, it did not provide additional funding to cover the cost of local government measures. National action to help subnational governments finance their local assistance measures consisted of changes to subnational spending rules, allowing subnational governments to redirect earmarked funds toward pandemic-related measures, loosening some borrowing rules, and creating special incentives to increase short-term tax collection.[8]

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[5] In other countries, subnational governments were given clear mandates by national governments. Some countries also approved extraordinary intergovernmental transfers to fund subnational responses.

[6] *Familias en Acción* ("Families in Action," aimed at families with children and conditioned on health and education requirements) and *Jóvenes en Acción* ("Youth in Action," designed for poor and vulnerable youth provided they remain enrolled in higher education programs) are the Colombian government's CCTs, created in 2001. Colombia Mayor ("Elder Colombia") is a non-contributory pension created in 2003. Due to the pandemic, the national government also expedited implementation of a program to refund value-added taxes to poor households.

[7] Zoom interview with an official from the Secretariat for Social Development and Inclusion of the city of Neiva, May 11, 2021.

[8] Zoom interview with a Ministry of Finance official in charge of subnational finances, March 8, 2021. See also Decree 461 (2020).

On average, the local governments under study spent 0.82% of their total 2020 expenditures (with a standard deviation of 0.56). The highest spender was the municipal government of Neiva, at 2.25%, and the lowest was Florencia, at 0.18. The main types of assistance measures implemented by Colombian city governments were in-kind transfers (food rations, hygiene supplies, and personal protective equipment), vouchers for basic necessities redeemable at local stores, public utility subsidies, and unconditional cash transfers (transferred to recipients' bank accounts or mobile banking apps or paid through money transfer retail services). Some governments offered some additional measures (most of them only in the first two months of the lockdowns). These included rent subsidies or temporary housing options, free water deliveries to neighborhoods lacking access to water systems, and free or subsidized transportation to Venezuelan migrants seeking to reach the international border. These measures are coded as "Other" below. While in-kind food transfers were present everywhere, cash transfer programs were only implemented in seven cities, including Bogotá and Medellín (the country's capital and second-largest city), as well as smaller cities like Villavicencio, Barrancabermeja, and Soacha (despite the last two not being department capitals).[9] By contrast, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena (third through fifth by population) did not adopt cash transfers. The duration of social assistance measures also varied; in some cities they lasted only two months, while in others they were maintained well into 2021. Table 1 presents each city's spending on social assistance in response to COVID-19, the specific measures adopted in each city, and their duration.

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[9] In Bogotá, payments have been made multiple times and are still ongoing as of 2022, and transfer amounts range from COP 160,000 (like Ingreso Solidario) to COP 240,000 pesos (between 18 and 27 percent of the monthly minimum wage). Medellín issued several rounds of payments of COP 100,000. Bucaramanga, Barrancabermeja, and Soacha each provided one-time payments of COP 225,000 pesos, COP 160,000, and COP 50,000, respectively. Barrancabermeja's *Aporte Solidario* was funded in full by Ecopetrol, the state-owned oil company which operates a large refinery in that city. In Riohacha and Villavicencio, the city governments provided a one-time cash payment to 400 individuals, with funds from a grant offered by the National Association of Industrialists' (ANDI) private foundation.

Table 1. Spending, Variety, and Duration of COVID-19 Social Assistance in Colombia

City	Spending (as % of 2020 total)	In-kind aid	Vouchers	Utility subsidies	Cash transfers	Other	Duration (in months)
Barrancabermeja	0.48%	Y	N	Y	Y	N	6 to 8
Barranquilla	0.63%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	6 to 8
Bogotá	1.82%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	> 8
Bucaramanga	1.34%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	> 8
Buenaventura	0.74%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	6 to 8
Cali	0.83%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	6 to 8
Cartagena	0.96%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	> 8
Cúcuta	0.59%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	4 to 6
Envigado	0.21%	Y	Y	Y	N	N	2 to 4
Florencia	0.18%	Y	N	N	N	N	6 to 8
Ibagué	0.79%	Y	Y	Y	N	N	> 8
Leticia	1.72%	Y	N	N	N	Y	2 to 4
Medellín	0.61%	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4 to 6
Neiva	2.25%	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	4 to 6
Pereira	1.24%	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6 to 8
Quibdó	0.53%	Y	Y	N	N	N	6 to 8
Riohacha	0.37%	Y	N	N	Y	Y	2 to 4
Santa Marta	1.48%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	4 to 6
Soacha	0.71%	Y	Y	N	Y	N	4 to 6
Tumaco	0.41%	Y	Y	N	N	Y	2 to 4
Tunja	0.29%	Y	N	N	N	N	2 to 4
Villavicencio	0.31%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4 to 6
Yopal	0.34%	Y	N	N	N	Y	4 to 6

Sources: Agencia Nacional de Contratación Pública (2022a, 2022b) for spending; in-depth case studies for other columns (see Section 4).

Beneficiary identification and selection and delivery processes by subnational governments involved a wide range of practices. Technical procedures using the national government's social registries, sometimes crosschecked with local databases, were used in some cities. In others, local government officials conducted door-to-door canvassing. Several governments created online and phone application systems. But others did not seem to follow any systematic criteria to target assistance. Protests sometimes seemed to influence it. Neighborhood-level organizations, NGOs, and international relief agencies played a role in some places. There were several reports of aid being channeled through local politicians and clientelistic networks.

Of the 23 city governments under study, only two (Bogotá and Santa Marta) established formal distribution criteria that were stipulated in publicly available official documents (as a strict

interpretation of Stokes and collaborators' [2013] definition of programmatic criteria would demand). Eleven established formal eligibility criteria and communicated them (in part or in full) on their websites or social media or through press releases, but the norms or directives that governed distribution were not made public in full.[10] These were scored as more programmatic than not. The rest, scored as mostly nonprogrammatic, also announced some eligibility criteria through various outlets (which varied in terms of their specificity, though most were very broad, like one government that explained relief was simply targeted to "the poor and vulnerable"), but they did not formally stipulate on any official documents. None of the city governments included in the study were found to have no set criteria whatsoever.

In terms of actual distribution practices, twelve of the city governments did not behave programmatically. There, formal criteria were frequently violated and there were multiple reports (as well as, in two cases, formal investigations) of clientelism, partisan conditionalities, and, especially, personal connections strongly influencing actual access to assistance. These were scored as mostly or fully nonprogrammatic. Among those that were scored as more programmatic than not, stated criteria (whether formalized or not) were mostly complied with; even when personal connections were found to play some role in shaping access (as was the case in four of these cities), they did not replace formal criteria. It remains striking that mostly (and, in three cases, fully) programmatic distribution practices were present in nearly half of the study cases even at a time of extreme urgency like the one produced by COVID-19. Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of city governments' distribution criteria and actual practices on the ground. The full QCA set membership scores for every city are shown on Table 5 in section 4, along with an explanation of how they were calibrated.

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[10] Some of these governments published their directives sometime later (variously in the context of anticorruption investigations, as part of public reports, or in response to media or public information requests like the ones submitted for this study).

Figure 1. Distribution of City Governments' Use of Programmatic Distribution Criteria

Sources: In-depth case studies (see Section 4).

Figure 2. Distribution of City Governments' Use of Programmatic Distribution Practices

Sources: In-depth case studies (see Section 4).

3. EXPLAINING VARIATION IN SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS' SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

The politics of welfare breadth or generosity and of the programmatic distribution of social transfers have been among the most widely studied issues in comparative political economy. While the normative ideal of large welfare programs is not uncontested, during the COVID-19 pandemic governments of many different stripes sought at least to ensure that their social protection measures were at least capable of mitigating its impact on incomes and overall well-being. Arguably, moreover, most scholars of social policy tend to view well-funded (which need not mean bloated) welfare policies as more preferable to overly frugal and therefore insufficient ones. Likewise, programmatic, rule-based modes of distribution are widely preferred over non-programmatic ones such as clientelism, pork-barrel spending, and the like. What do we know about the conditions under which policies are more likely to be broad and programmatic rather than narrow and non-programmatic? Addressing this question calls for taking up breadth and programmatic character one at a time, since—as is often the case—not all good things always go together. A policy can very well be simultaneously very generous and highly clientelistic, as well as highly programmatic and very small to the point of irrelevance. The following

subsections review the existing literature about the drivers of broad social policies and the determinants of programmatic ones, with a focus on whether it might make sense to view them as either necessary or sufficient for each of the outcomes of interest.

Explaining Social Policy Breadth

The question of why some governments adopt broader, more far-reaching social policies than others has been the focus of comparative analysis for several decades (Dorlach 2021; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012; Korpi 1983; Quadagno 1987). Factors such as state capacity, economic performance, regime type, government ideology, and the presence or absence of constitutional veto points are usually cited among the main determinants of social policy breadth across countries. Scaling down to the subnational level, these factors generally remain relevant (with the exception of constitutional veto points, which usually remain constant within the same country[11]). In addition, other determinants, like policy or partisan conflicts between different levels of government, also come to the fore. This subsection discusses these factors and develops some expectations about whether each of them, or different combinations of them, may be necessary, sufficient, or merely enabling for social assistance breadth. As discussed in section 4, these theoretical expectations will inform the article's empirical analysis.

State capacity

In order to enact and implement policies, governments need resources of various kinds. Basic material resources are paramount: is there enough fiscal capacity to procure the funds required to cover the cost of the policies of interest? (Blofield and Pribble 2021; Murshed et al. 2020; Sharp and Maynard-

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[11] The exception to this pattern are localities that are on the same government tier but asymmetric in terms of their institutional arrangements. There is such a thing in Colombia, with districts being on the same level as municipalities and enjoying greater authority in some policy areas, but not social policymaking; the veto points structure is essentially the same in municipalities and districts. See Sara Niedzwiecki and Juan Diego Prieto, "Colombia," *Regional Authority Index (RAI)*, v. 3.1 (2020), https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13018/2021/03/Colombia_combined.pdf.

Moody 1991). Capacity is also a function of administrative and bureaucratic resources: to what extent are relevant state agencies logistically able to carry out the specific tasks that the policies in question entail? (Baldwin 2021; Capano et al. 2020; Flora and Alber 1981; Skocpol 1980; see, more generally, Mann 1984). Several studies about government responses to COVID-19—focusing broadly on social distancing policies and public health measures but also in some cases on social protection responses— put the spotlight on state capacity as a necessary condition for effective interventions (Bello Gómez and Sanabria Pulido 2021; Bennouna et al. 2021; Capano et al. 2020; Chattopadhyay et al. 2022; Steytler 2022).

State capacity not only varies across countries but also inside them. State power is usually territorially uneven, and this has consequences for policy adoption as well as for its implementation. Varying levels of state capacity within countries, and the specific ways in which national states broadcast their authority across territory, are likely to shape how and to what extent officials are able to deliver aid (Giraudy and Luna 2017; González 2014; Naseemullah and Staniland 2016). I therefore expect state capacity to be an important determinant of the breadth of subnational social assistance—indeed, it is likely to be a *necessary* condition for it. Yet it is unlikely that high levels of state capacity are *sufficient* for guaranteeing broad relief. Having large stocks of state capacity does not guarantee that those resources will be put to use by the political agents that control them (Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017), so I expect other political factors to be indispensable complements to it.

Economic performance

Differences in economic performance can also be important: richer jurisdictions can reasonably be expected to have ampler social policies because they have more resources to cover their cost. Higher availability of taxable resources is likely to have a positive effect on local fiscal capacity (Haggard and

Kaufman 2008).[12] In addition, a stronger local economy usually comes with a stronger, more organized, and better-resourced business sector that may contribute some of its own resources to fund the local government's relief efforts (Frisch 2017).[13] It thus makes sense to view stronger economic performance as an enabling condition for broad relief, and it may also be necessary. Still, like state capacity, a wealthier local context is unlikely to guarantee, at least on its own, more generous social assistance, as it is one thing for resources to be available and another for those resources to be deployed to fund emergency relief.

Regime type

Both democracies and nondemocracies have incentives to offer generous social transfers. In democracies, electoral competition gives politicians incentives to offer more generous benefits to the population as they compete for electoral support (especially among poor voters), all while people and interest groups have greater freedom to make social demands on the government (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Przeworski 1985). To what extent can this logic be scaled down to the subnational level? A rich literature has focused on the existence of authoritarian enclaves at the subnational level inside countries that are democratic at the national level (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015), mainly in federations, but also in unitary countries like Colombia (Eaton and Prieto 2017), so it makes sense to compare cities in terms of the quality of democracy.[14] Still, less democratic governments (especially ones where elections are still present, even if they are not free) also have strong incentives to

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[12] A "logic of industrialism" approach—according to which industrial growth "creates new needs for social protection, those needs get articulated and channeled into the political process, and they are met through the expansion of the welfare state" (Huber and Stephens 2001, 49)—is not very relevant in the contexts under study, insofar as differences in economic performance across Colombian districts and municipalities are not attributable to industrialization. Furthermore, the bulk of COVID-19 social assistance beneficiaries are informal-sector workers, not formal industrial employees whose employers may be inclined to support state support to protect their labor force.

[13] See also Faith Mitchell, "How Philanthropy Can Partner with Government to Meet Critical Needs during COVID-19," *Urban Institute*, May 11, 2020, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/how-philanthropy-can-partner-government-meet-critical-needs-during-covid-19.

[14] As Behrend and Whitehead (2016) have argued, it makes more sense to speak of illiberal practices than subnational authoritarian regimes.

provide generous social assistance (Eibl 2020; Fails 2020), especially if such spending is unconditional (as was the case with the forms of relief studied here) (Dodlova, Giolbas, and Lay 2017). What seems to matter most is not the overall quality of democracy (though this can enable stronger demand-making), but the levels of electoral competitiveness. Recent works have highlighted the importance of competition for the vote of specific population sectors—especially, for the case of Latin America, the informal sector—in driving the adoption of more generous social policies (Garay 2016).

In conclusion, as the welfare state literature has frequently emphasized, democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for welfare generosity (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012). A stronger case may be made for electoral competition, however limited, as a necessary condition (though not a sufficient one)—yet scholarship on welfare in the Middle East, including the most closed regimes, shows that electoral incentives are not the only mechanism that pushes autocrats to increase social transfers; more contentious pressure outside the realm of formal institutions can play that role (Eibl 2020; Jawad, Jones, and Messkoub 2019).

Ideology, intergovernmental political rivalry, and contentious politics

The welfare states literature, especially the power resources approach, indicates that ideology matters. Specifically, leftist and left-of-center governments are more prone to enacting generous social transfers (Esping-Andersen 1985; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012). Still, the correspondence between leftist governments and social policy expansion is not as straightforward, especially in Latin America, where center-right, purportedly neoliberal administrations also advanced broad social policies (De la O 2015; Otero Bahamón 2014). During COVID-19, Brazil's far-right government carried out a major expansion in cash transfers, while Mexico's government, sometimes associated with the left, did not enact any new assistance measures (Blofield, Lustig, and Trasberg 2021). Thus, I do not expect leftist government to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for broad relief.

Yet this does not mean that ideology does not matter at all. It just may matter the most in a relational way. As Niedzwiecki (2018) has shown, ideological and partisan competition between different levels of government can have a significant effect on social policy outcomes on the ground. Local government can be an important springboard for opposition parties and movements aspiring to higher office and a testing ground for progressive policies (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Eaton 2017), so local leaders who are in the opposition have strong incentives to adopt more expansive relief measures—though it is unlikely for vertically divided government to be either necessary or sufficient for this outcome. Likewise, as the power resources tradition teaches us, it is not just the presence of leftist governments, but the existence of strong alliances between them and strong movements beyond the formal political system, which contributes the most to social policy expansion (Huber and Stephens 2001). Focusing specifically on city-level politics, Pasotti (2020) has also shown that movement politics is most successful in achieving progressive goals in alliance with left-leaning and leftist administrations. In conclusion, while intergovernmental policy competition and social mobilization are unlikely to be either necessary or sufficient on their own, their simultaneous presence is likely to be a powerful force—and possibly even a sufficient condition—for broad social assistance.

Table 2 summarizes the "directional expectations" offered by the existing literature about the relationship between the breadth of social assistance, on the one hand, and state capacity, economic performance, local electoral competition, intergovernmental competition, and mobilization, on the other. While all of them can conceivably be viewed as enabling conditions for broad social assistance, none is sufficient by itself, and only state capacity and economic performance are likely to be necessary. Yet it is also apparent that these two structural conditions, when combined with strong political incentives for action—such as those provided by local or intergovernmental competition or by a mobilized civil society—are very likely to result in more generous relief measures. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.

Table 2. Theoretical Expectations about Individual Drivers of Broad Social Assistance

	Enabling	Necessary	Sufficient
State capacity	✓	✓	✗
Economic performance	✓	✓	✗
Local electoral competition	✓	✗	✗
Intergovernmental competition	✓	✗	✗
Mobilization	✓	✗	✗

Figure 3. Theoretical Expectations about Interactive Drivers of Broad Social Assistance

One or both:
- State capacity
- Economic performance

✖

One or more:
- Local competition
- Intergov. competition
- Mobilized civil society

➜

Broad social assistance

Explaining Programmatic Social Policy

The question of what makes social policies programmatic has also been tackled extensively, but by a different field of study, namely the literature on clientelism and distributive politics (Golden and Min 2013; Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). Programmatic distribution entails the existence of formalized and public eligibility criteria (Stokes et al. 2013, 7). Formalized and public rules are ones inscribed in official statutes (laws, decrees, resolutions, or operations manuals) that are subject to observation, scrutiny, and discussion; they may change, but not in secret. Programmatic criteria are set in terms of general, impersonal rules, paired with specific stipulations for implementation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Furthermore, it is not enough for rules to be written on paper; they must actually shape the distribution of benefits (Stokes et al. 2013). Meeting these conditions is easier said than done, however. Every step of the process, from policy design to implementation, is full of opportunities for various actors to extract private benefits in the form of material gain or electoral and other political returns. Many of the same conditions discussed for the breadth of social assistance go some way in explaining its programmatic distribution, though the mechanisms at play are different.

State capacity

Programmatic distribution demands significant state capacity. On the one hand, it requires up-to-date, fine-grained knowledge about the population and its socioeconomic situation, which in turn demands advanced information capacity, as well as strong reach across territory and within different sectors of society. On the other hand, it requires significant oversight and enforcement capacity to ensure state agents tasked with identifying and delivering aid do so according to formal criteria (Berwick and Christia 2018). Historically, replacing patronage-based transfers with more sophisticated public goods required considerable improvements in administrative capacity (Kuo 2018). More generally, studies have found strong relationships between low state capacity and the incidence of clientelism (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017). In contexts of weak administrative capacity, citizens are more likely to accept (and even demand) nonprogrammatic social transfers (Auyero 2000; Nichter and Peress 2017). At the same time, the most effective forms of nonprogrammatic distribution—the kinds that maximize returns for those exercising it—also require considerable capacity, especially in terms of information. High capacity on its own is unlikely to yield programmatic transfers for the same reasons that it does not guarantee their breadth: it is all contingent on political decisions about how to use said capacity. The takeaway is that state capacity is likely necessary for social assistance to be programmatic, but it is most likely not sufficient.

Economic performance and regime type

Nonprogrammatic distribution is, on average, more prevalent in poorer places and with restricted electoral competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). People with higher incomes tend to find nonprogrammatic benefits less appealing, forcing politicians to increase the nonprogrammatic benefits that they offer, to the point that it may prove more effective to turn to programmatic strategies to win voters' support. Although clientelism is present in both democratic and authoritarian contexts,

higher levels of competition are associated with more programmatic forms of distribution.[15] Against the predictions of modernization theory, however, the relationship between nonprogrammatic distribution, on the one hand, and income and democratic openness, on the other, and is far from monotonic. Nonprogrammatic practices remain present in many wealthy and democratic countries, and, as Kitschelt and Kselman (2012) show, clientelism often increases as countries move from low- to middle-income status and as they transition from authoritarianism to more democratic regimes.

This does not necessarily mean that income and regime type do not matter for programmatic distribution, but merely that they are not sufficient on their own. According to Weitz-Shapiro (2014), however, their combination may be so. Based on subnational comparisons in Argentina, she finds that, where the population is wealthier, and especially where there is a sizeable middle class, the electoral benefits that politicians may reap from nonprogrammatic transfers to the poor may be outweighed by the loss of support these practices may cause among other constituencies. Yet changing class structures are not enough to change distributive practices in the absence of sufficient political competition to allow voters to punish leaders who continue to rely on clientelism. In summary, neither higher incomes nor increased political competitions are likely to suffice alone, but they may do so together. Each of them is likely to be an enabling condition for aid measures to be programmatic, and both may also be necessary.

Intergovernmental competition

A crucial determinant of whether social spending is programmatic or not has to do with the extent to which politicians seek to use it to their political advantage. It is well known that national politicians direct more (or fewer) resources, or do so in different ways, to subnational units governed by their allies (or rivals) (Golden and Min 2013; Stokes et al. 2013). But subnational politicians at odds

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[15] For more detailed discussions of each of the two factors, see Hicken (2011).

with the national government can also play at that game. They can, and often do, use public office to build up their parties or movements through nonprogrammatic distributive practices (Dargent and Muñoz 2016). However, this strategy can backfire, as it exposes them to being targeted by anticorruption investigations and disciplinary or even criminal prosecution (Freeman and Prieto 2020), especially in local contexts where they face strong electoral competition from pro-government forces. Mayors who are allied with the national government may also be exposed to such investigations, but their national alliances may also provide some cover, and they can at least count on not being targeted by "lawfare" or politicized prosecutions. It may prove safer, and overall more advantageous, for opposition mayors to strengthen their appeal by distributing benefits programmatically, based on the same logic as discussed for the breadth of social transfers: a leader who develops and implements transparent social policies locally can then use them as a springboard for higher office, while also preventing reputational damage caused by accusations of clientelism, patronage, or partisan bias. Intergovernmental competition can thus be viewed as generally propitious but not necessary for programmatic aid distribution. It is also unlikely to be sufficient by itself, but it is more likely to be sufficient in conjunction with strong local-level political competition.

Contentious civil society

The relationship between programmatic policy and social mobilization is a complicated and ambiguous one. When facing protests, governments can use public spending to try to defuse it (Calvo and Murillo 2019). Discretionary and nonprogrammatic benefits are especially attractive when politicians need quick solutions to unrest (Del Tredici, González, and Zarazaga 2022). Where nonprogrammatic politics is prevalent, movements learn to work with it and develop recursive relationships with it, using patronage to fuel prolonged contention, which can in turn serve to keep clientelistic benefits flowing (Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Poma 2009). Yet mobilization is far from incompatible with programmatic policies; an active and independent civil society can in fact be

instrumental for replacing patronage-based social safety nets with citizenship-, rights-based, programmatic policies (Anria and Niedzwiecki 2016; Fox 1996, 2015). The effects of mobilization on the (non)programmatic character of social transfers are therefore not deterministic—neither necessary nor sufficient, nor even necessarily enabling—but conditional on other institutional, social, and economic factors (Giraudy 2007).

Table 3. Theoretical Expectations about Individual Drivers of Programmatic Social Assistance

	Enabling	Necessary	Sufficient
State capacity	✓	✓	✗
Economic performance	✓	✓	✗
Local electoral competition	✓	✓	✗
Intergovernmental competition	✓	✗	✗
Contentious civil society	✗	✗	✗

Table 3 summarizes the theoretical expectations drawn from the literature about the relationship between programmatic social assistance, on the one hand, and state capacity, economic performance, local electoral competition, intergovernmental competition, and a contentious civil society, on the other. I expect all of these conditions to be conducive to programmatic relief distribution, with the exception of societal mobilization, whose effects are ambiguous. I also anticipate state capacity, strong economic performance, and electoral competition to be necessary, but no single condition should be sufficient. As illustrated in Figure 4, however, I expect the confluence of strong economic performance and electoral competitiveness—together with state capacity, which I have deemed necessary—to suffice for programmatic social assistance.[16] The next sections of this article put these expectations to the test.

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[16] I do not include intergovernmental competition in the formula because it should only be sufficient in conjunction with local competition, which I expect will be sufficient regardless of intergovernmental competition.

Figure 4. Theoretical Expectations about Interactive Drivers of Programmatic Social Assistance

State capacity ✖ Economic performance ✖ Local competition ➡ **Programmatic social assistance**

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

To identify the determinants of broad and programmatic social assistance in Colombian cities, I employ qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Thanks to its ability to capture cross-case patterns without flattening the causal complexity that plays out in particular cases, QCA is the most appropriate method for this analysis (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). It is capable of identifying both equifinality and conjunctural causation: it can identify how different paths—each of which may feature a particular combination of causal factors—may lead to the same outcome of interest. QCA is also well-suited for addressing "causes-of-effects" questions, where theoretical interest lies not in identifying the average causal effect of a set of independent variables but in explaining why particular cases turned out the way they did and whether the causal configurations that led to that outcome are necessary or sufficient for it (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). It is also known as a powerful tool for analyzing medium-sized samples, which are too large for individual in-depth case studies but too small for reliable statistical analysis. I use fuzzy-set QCA (or fsQCA)—as opposed to crisp-set, or csQCA—because it allows for analyzing not just whether or not a case belongs to a given category or set of cases but also the degree of belonging. Thus, for instance, it enables us to analyze not only whether or not a city government's social assistance measures were broad or programmatic, but also *the extent to which* they were broad and programmatic.

This study's use of in-depth case study research based on public information requests to local governments, interviews, and a large collection of government reports, press releases, websites, and social media pages, nongovernmental and international organization reports, regional, national, and

international news stories, audio and video clips, and publicly accessible social media exchanges as the basis for QCA is itself an important methodological contribution. While QCA allows for integrating all types of data, the use of in-depth, original, micro-level qualitative data as the main input for case analysis remains less prevalent, especially in political science, than the use of secondary sources and existing datasets (for an exemplary exception, see Pasotti 2020; see also Basurto and Speer 2012). This work speaks to the feasibility, as well as the clear advantages of building QCA on a foundation of in-depth qualitative fieldwork. The next subsections discuss case selection procedures, the data sources employed, and the set calibration process.

Case Selection and Data Sources

The analyses presented here are based on a study of the social assistance responses to the COVID-19 pandemic by the local governments of 23 cities in Colombia: Barrancabermeja, Barranquilla, Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Buenaventura, Cali, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Envigado, Florencia, Ibagué, Leticia, Medellín, Neiva, Pereira, Quibdó, Riohacha, Santa Marta, Soacha, Tumaco, Tunja, Villavicencio, and Yopal. These cities were selected to maximize regional diversity within Colombia: aside from Bogotá, five cities are in the Central region, five are in the Eastern region, four are in the Caribbean region, and four are in the Pacific region, while the less-populated Amazonia and Orinoquía regions have two each.[17] All but one have populations over 100,000, and all but five are department capitals.[18] This sample is purposely focused on intermediate cities (those with populations between 100,000 and 1 million, which despite being home to more than one-third of the country's population, have been consistently understudied. The time period for analysis is between March 20 (when the first lockdowns began in Colombia) and December 31, 2020.

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[17] The categorization followed the regional classification used by the national statistical agency, DANE: Bogotá, Central, Eastern, Caribbean, Pacific, Amazonia, and Orinoquía.

[18] The sample covers 17 out of 31 of the country's department capitals and 5 out of 12 non-capital cities with population over 100,000. The only exception to the 100,000 population threshold in the sample is Leticia, capital of Amazonas department, with a population of 42,844 (2018), included to achieve greater representation of the Amazon region.

Data originate from three main sources: public information requests (*derechos de petición*) to city governments, 45 interviews with local officials and representatives of civil society and community-based organizations,[19] and an original repository totaling 1633 online documents, news articles, audio files, video clips, and other publications collected from print and online media outlets, government websites and social media (mainly Facebook and Twitter) pages, and non-governmental reports, all of which were reviewed with the help of six research assistants. Out of the public information requests that were submitted to each of the 23 city governments under study, full formal responses were received from fifteen of them, three did not issue written responses but agreed to make an official available for an interview, and five never responded, despite two follow-ups.

QCA Design and Set Calibration

In order to use fsQCA, cases need to be assigned set membership scores for every condition of interest. Membership scores range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that the case is fully out of the set, 1 indicates that it is fully in, and 0.5 is the "point of indifference," which represents the qualitative threshold between membership and non-membership. Intermediate scores denote that the case is either more out than in (or more in than out) of the set. Calibration is based on empirical knowledge and openly stated theoretical expectations and assumptions rather than on attributes of the data. It requires clear and consistent coding rules which must also be based on criteria that are external to the data (thus, the meaning of a "high" membership score should not be determined on the basis of high scores on the raw data but on a theory-informed determination of the meaning of "high" and "low."

For this analysis, I employ two different calibration procedures: the manual approach and the direct method. The manual approach consists of hand-scoring each case based on predefined criteria, usually using a three- or five-point scoring scale (0, 0.33, 0.67, and 1, or 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1).

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[19] Most interviews were done remotely, via phone, videocalls on Zoom and Google Meet, and WhatsApp messages and voice recordings.

The direct calibration method consists of specifying "three relevant set membership anchors: the threshold for full set membership (1), the threshold for full non-membership in the set (0), and, crucially, the point of indifference or crossover point (0.5)" (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 42). The point of indifference establishes "the qualitative difference in kind above which cases are more in than out of the set, and below which cases are more out than in the set." Case membership scores are then calculated using a logistic function available on the QCA package for R (Duşa 2019).

My scoring of cases is based principally on the in-depth qualitative research conducted for each case, as discussed above. Where appropriate, I also employ quantitative data (for instance, when calibrating governments' level of spending on assistance measures, cities' state capacity, economic performance, and local electoral competition). The subsections that follow explain how each condition was calibrated, and Appendix I provides the full details of the process.

Outcome Conditions

The Breadth of Social Assistance Measures

City governments' membership in the "broad" set was based on city governments' spending on COVID-19 social assistance as a percentage of their total expenditures for 2020. The amount of government spending on COVID-19 social assistance was calculated using contract data from the publicly available SECOP I and II databases (Agencia Nacional de Contratación Pública 2022a, b). Data were obtained for all the municipal or district governments under study. These datasets were filtered in two steps using R, running keyword searches for contracts that were justified as pandemic-related and, secondly, for contracts that could involve social assistance (as opposed to health infrastructure or enforcement of social distancing measures).[20] Results were then examined by hand to determine whether they fit the study's definition of social assistance measures adopted during the

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[20] The keywords used for the first search were "*covid*," "*corona*," "*emergencia*," "*pandemia*," "*sanitaria*," and "*solidari*." Truncated words were used deliberately to include various word endings. The terms for the second search were "*mercado*," "*bono*," "*ayud*," "*humanit*," "*aliment*," "*transfer*," "*solidar*," "*agua*," "*kit*," "*nutrici*," "*viver*," "*vulnerab*," "*asist*," "*solidari*."

COVID-19 pandemic. Amounts calculated from SECOP I and II were contrasted with each city's self-reported spending on COVID-19 social assistance (whenever available). Some data points were adjusted accordingly using additional sources. For instance, contract spending does not reflect some cities' spending on their own cash transfer programs; this was the case for Bogotá and Bucaramanga.[21] Set membership scores were assigned through direct calibration using the QCA package for R (Duşa 2019), using calibration anchors reported in Appendix I. Table 4 shows the membership score of every city under study for the BROAD set.

Table 4. Variation in the Breadth of COVID-19 Social Assistance

City	Total spending, 2020 (million COP)	% of 2020 spending	Breadth
Barrancabermeja	2,530.68	0.48%	0.46
Barranquilla	18,652.23	0.63%	0.60
Bogotá	338,501.38	1.82%	0.98
Bucaramanga	10,784.72	1.34%	0.92
Buenaventura	4,174.63	0.74%	0.67
Cali	27,704.97	0.83%	0.72
Cartagena	16,677.30	0.96%	0.80
Cúcuta	6,745.27	0.59%	0.57
Envigado	929.18	0.21%	0.11
Florencia	495.13	0.18%	0.09
Ibagué	6,077.67	0.79%	0.70
Leticia	900.01	1.72%	0.97
Medellín	34,458.99	0.61%	0.58
Neiva	13,570.54	2.25%	0.99
Pereira	9,978.91	1.24%	0.90
Quibdó	1,552.45	0.53%	0.52
Riohacha	1,550.03	0.37%	0.28
Santa Marta	12,623.28	1.48%	0.95
Soacha	3,494.00	0.71%	0.65
Tumaco	1,303.61	0.41%	0.35
Tunja	744.20	0.29%	0.17
Villavicencio	2,049.16	0.31%	0.20
Yopal	996.02	0.34%	0.23

Sources: Agencia Nacional de Contratación Pública (2022a, 2022b)

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[21] The full datasets and R code will be made available as supporting materials when this article is submitted for publication.

Programmatic character

City governments' membership in the "programmatic" set depends on whether governments stipulated and enforced formalized and public eligibility criteria for beneficiary selection and aid delivery (Stokes et al. 2013).

Eligibility criteria — Membership in this set was based on whether formal eligibility criteria were stipulated in publicly available official documents and publicized through official press releases, public notices, social media, or other means. To be considered fully out of this set, a city government would have needed to set no formal eligibility criteria whatsoever, which did not occur in any of the cases under study. This condition only considered the "parchment" side of things. Actual procedures for identifying and selecting beneficiaries and delivering assistance to them were evaluated separately.

Identification and delivery practices — This set was hand-calibrated based on local governments' actual behavior as documented on its official responses to my information requests, posts and subsequent community comments on local governments' social media profile pages, media reports, formal investigations by other government entities, and community interviews. A full membership score of 1 required formal eligibility criteria to be closely followed and no evidence of clientelism, partisan conditionalities, or personal connections influencing access to social assistance.

The formula for calculating membership scores for programmatic character was as follows:

$$\text{PROGTIC} = \text{CRITERIA } AND \text{ PRACTICE}$$

For a social assistance measure to be considered programmatic, formal and public criteria must be accompanied by effective enforcement and compliance in relation to identification and delivery practices (Stokes et al. 2013). The absence of one cancels out the other's presence. Thus, set membership scores here are calculated using the logical AND: each case takes the lowest of its scores on

eligibility criteria and identification and delivery practices. Table 5 shows the membership scores of every city under study for this set.

Table 5. Membership Scores for Programmatic Social Assistance

City	Eligibility criteria	Identification and delivery practices	Programmatic character
Barrancabermeja	0.8	0.8	**0.8**
Barranquilla	0.8	0.4	**0.4**
Bogotá	1	1	**1**
Bucaramanga	0.8	1	**0.8**
Buenaventura	0.6	0.6	**0.6**
Cali	0.8	0.8	**0.8**
Cartagena	0.8	0.8	**0.8**
Cúcuta	0.8	0.8	**0.8**
Envigado	0.4	0.6	**0.4**
Florencia	0.2	0.6	**0.2**
Ibagué	0.8	0	**0**
Leticia	0.4	0.4	**0.4**
Medellín	0.8	1	**0.8**
Neiva	0.6	0.6	**0.6**
Pereira	0.4	0.4	**0.4**
Quibdó	0.2	0.4	**0.2**
Riohacha	0.2	0.4	**0.2**
Santa Marta	1	0.4	**0.4**
Soacha	0.2	0	**0**
Tumaco	0.2	0.2	**0.2**
Tunja	0.2	0.4	**0.2**
Villavicencio	0.6	0.4	**0.4**
Yopal	0.4	0.2	**0.2**

Sources: Specific sources for each data point have been saved in full on local PDF copies and on the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine (http://web.archive.org) and will be made available alongside detailed notes on their interpretation using annotations on the manuscript with AnnoREP (https://anno-rep.org).

Explanatory Conditions

The conditions assessed were state capacity, economic performance, intergovernmental competition, local-level electoral competition, and the presence of an active civil society. Every city's set membership scores for these conditions are shown in Table 9 in Appendix I.

State capacity

City governments' membership in this set was calculated using the "administration" (*gestión*) component of the National Planning Department's 2020 municipal performance scores (*medición de desempeño municipal*, MDM) for the cities under study (DNP 2022). MDM scores are based on two sets of indicators: "administration" (which measures local governments' performance at own-source revenue mobilization, financial resource management and execution, open government and transparency, and exercise of land-use regulatory authority) and "results" (which assesses education, health, public service, and security outcomes) (DNP 2020). The "administration" component, by focusing on fiscal capacity and some relevant elements of the bureaucracy's behavior, approximates the concept of state capacity understood as a stock of organizational and bureaucratic resources (Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar 2017). Importantly, it does not fall prey to the error of inferring capacity from outcomes. Set membership scores were assigned through direct calibration using the QCA R package as detailed in Appendix I.

Economic performance

Membership in this set was assigned through direct calibration based on each municipality or district's 2019 per-capita gross value added (DNP 2022), as explained in Appendix I.

Vertically divided government — Membership in this set was hand-calculated based on the mayor's party affiliation and electoral coalition for the 2019 mayoral election and those parties' official status as opposition, independent, or pro-government relative to the national government. Colombia's 2018 Opposition Statute requires every political party to declare its stance toward the national government (Botero et al. 2022).

Electoral competitiveness

Membership in this set was calculated using two indicators: the mayor's share of the vote in the 2019 subnational election, aimed at capturing Pino Uribe's (2020) "winner's strength" indicator, and the

margin of victory. Because of Colombia's fragmented party system, most elections are split among several candidates, but not all of them are, so neither of these two indicators by itself adequately captures the extent of electoral competition. Set membership scores were thus calculated and calibrated in two steps. First, raw competitiveness scores were obtained by dividing the margin of victory by the winner's share of the vote. Direct calibration was then used to assign set membership scores as detailed in the appendix.

Contentious civil society

Membership in this set was assigned using direct calibration based on the total number of "protests" or "riots" in the 2015-2019 period using data from the publicly available Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010).[22]

The QCA Process

Once every set is calibrated, the data are ready for qualitative comparative analysis, using the QCA and SetMethods R packages (Duşa 2019; Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021). First comes an analysis of necessity, which identifies causal conditions (or combinations thereof) that are always present along with the outcome of interest. This is followed by an analysis of sufficiency, intended to reveal conditions (or combinations thereof) that may not be present every time the outcome of interest is observed, but when they are present, so is the outcome. The point of departure for this analysis involves the construction of a "truth table" listing all the logically possible combinations of the causal conditions under analysis to identify connections between combinations of conditions and outcomes (Ragin 2008). The truth table can then be logically simplified (using the QCA R package) to reveal a "solution," or a

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[22] See https://acleddata.com. The data were not adjusted for population as this would have overstated mobilization in small cities and, most problematically, understated it in large cities (suggesting, for example, that civil society is much weaker in Bogotá or Medellín—where in fact it is the most robust—than in most intermediate cities).

summary of the combinations of conditions that yield the outcome of interest.[23] Truth table solutions often show that there are many different paths—also referred to as "causal recipes"—to the same outcome.

I rely on "intermediate" solutions.[24] There are three types of solution: conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate. The logical simplification process in the conservative solution is based only on the truth table rows for which cases are available. In practice, by not using the rows for which cases are *not* available in the empirical data for the purposes of logical minimization, the conservative solution ends up assuming that they are all *insufficient* for the outcome of interest (Ragin 2008, 173). The parsimonious solution does the opposite: it assumes that they are all sufficient. By contrast, the intermediate solution relies on researcher input to make this adjudication. Herein lies the importance of the directional expectations drawn earlier from the literature. These are used as guidance for which remainder rows should and which ones should not be used for logical simplification.

Some of the resulting recipes may be able to explain more cases than others, so the analysis also yields several parameters of fit that quantify the explanatory power of each. The measure of consistency indicates the extent to which cases that have a given combination of causal conditions also display the outcome of interest. The proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) parameter measures whether a given condition or set of conditions is found to be sufficient for the outcome of interest to be present but also for it to be absent.[25] Finally, the measures of coverage reveal the empirical relevance of causal

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[23] Here I follow the "enhanced standard analysis" approach recommended by Schneider and Wagemann (2012) and Oana, Schneider, and Thomann (2021).

[24] It usually yields complex causal results that are difficult to interpret theoretically. By contrast, the parsimonious solution uses all the truth table rows that were not observed in the case material (referred to as the "remainders") to take logical simplification a step further; this results in the simplest, most easily interpretable results, but it rests on strong assumptions about the causal effect of recipes for which case evidence is not available (either that they are irrelevant or that, if they existed, they would be sufficient for explaining the outcome). The exact logic and procedure for calculating a parsimonious solution are explained in detail in (Ragin 2008, 155-157). The intermediate solution, for its part, relies on researcher input (directional expectations based on substantive knowledge) as guidance for which remainder rows should and which ones should not be used for logical simplification.

[25] This can happen when using fsQCA because a case that is partially a member of a given set is also a member of that set's negation. The closer a row's PRI is to 0.5, "the less one should be inclined to consider the given set as sufficient for a given outcome" (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 96).

recipes. The raw coverage measure tells us the degree to which a causal recipe can account for observed instances of the outcome, while the unique coverage measure indicates how many cases are explained by that causal recipe alone. The results of these analyses are presented and discussed in the next section.

5. RESULTS

In this section I report findings from QCA, first for the breadth and then for the programmatic character of social assistance measures. For each of these, I begin by reporting the results of the analyses of necessity. This step is required not just because of our theoretical interest in identifying the conditions that must be present for each of our outcomes of interests to be so as well, but also to inform our analysis of sufficiency (specifically, to ensure that the process of logical simplification does not overlook conditions that might be found later to be necessary). Then I report the results of the analysis of sufficiency, focusing only on intermediate solutions informed by the directional expectations drawn from the existing literature.

Explaining Broad Social Assistance

Necessity Analysis

The first finding from the analysis of necessity for broad social assistance is already a surprising one. No single condition or configuration of conditions is necessary for explaining the enactment of broad social assistance measures. Not even state capacity or economic performance are shown to be a prerequisite. Indeed, some poor cities with limited-capacity state infrastructures invested significant resources to fund pandemic relief (see Table 4 in the previous section). Such was the case, for instance, of the Amazonian city of Leticia, the city with the lowest state capacity score of the sample, ranked third in terms of pandemic relief spending (1.72% of its total 2020 expenditures). This figure amounts to nearly three times as much as the percentage spent by Medellín, the country's second-largest city,

which is ranked third in terms of state capacity within the study sample, and more than 3.5 times as much as Barrancabermeja, the sample's richest city as measured by per-capita income.

Sufficiency Analysis

To obtain an intermediate solution for the analysis of sufficiency, the empirical evidence is organized in a truth table (presented as Table 10 in Appendix II).[26] I then run logical minimization on it with a set of directional expectations that express the relationships specified earlier (see Figure 3): the combination of state capacity with local-level electoral competition, intergovernmental competition, and a contentious civil society, and of strong economic performance with each of these conditions.[27]

As shown in Table 6, four different causal recipes are each found to be sufficient for the adoption of broad social assistance (see the full truth table in), all of them with consistency and coverage scores very close to 1, meaning that there is a good fit between the set-theoretic relationship implied by all the recipes and the available empirical evidence (Mello 2021). The recipe with the highest consistency is the combination of strong state capacity and economic performance with a mobilized civil society, as exemplified by five different cities. The recipe is also entirely consistent with the general expectation that the coincidence of either one, or both, of the two structural conditions (high state capacity and income) with any of the factors that incentivize leaders to put institutional and material resources to good use should produce more generous assistance.

In the second recipe, state capacity and a contentious civil society come together again, but this time they do so together with the *absence* of intergovernmental competition, to produce generous relief, as was the case in Barranquilla, Cali, Ibagué, and Pereira. Although the positive effect of intergovernmental alignment rather than division is unexpected, the solution overall remains consistent

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[26] Considering the detailed qualitative case studies that inform this study's QCA design, I use a demanding consistency cutoff of 0.9.

[27] This procedure does not predetermine the result, which still needs to be wholly coherent with the empirical evidence (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Mello 2021; Ragin 2008).

with theoretical expectations: the presence of a contentious civil society pushes governments to spend more on assistance, high state capacity means that the resources that such increased spending demands are available, and the literature provides no reason to expect that intergovernmental alignment should work against greater spending (if anything, the mayor might be able to ask the national government to contribute to its increased provision of assistance.

The third causal recipe follows the same pattern: both electoral competition and a mobilized civil society offer incentives to act, while state capacity provides the means to do so. In contrast to the first three, the fourth recipe, associated only with Santa Marta, challenges theoretical expectations more strongly. The absence of high state capacity and of high electoral competition, together with intergovernmental rivalry appear to explain that city's generous relief measures; neither of the two structural conditions had to be present, while vertically divided government seems to have been the main driving force. [28] This causal recipe seems to confirm the result from the analysis of necessity for this same outcome: state capacity (along with strong economic performance) may be an enabling condition—and a strong one at that—for generous social policy, but governments that do not have a lot of it may still find workarounds. Bringing all four causal recipes together, the raw coverage (covS) score of the entire solution is 0.64, meaning that it covers about 64% of the total membership in the outcome—not a bad result, though it certainly calls for further investigation of other, unidentified as of yet, causes.

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[28] It is worth noting that the results of the 2019 mayoral election, used here to calibrate the political competition set across cases, significantly understate the competitiveness of Santa Marta's electoral landscape. Despite the incumbent's landslide win (with 63% of the vote), her left-leaning movement Fuerza Ciudadana and her coalition in the district council are comfortably outnumbered by the opposition. The 2019 election results do not reflect the strength of the region's traditional political class and the extent of Fuerza Ciudadana's competition against it.

Table 6. Analysis of Sufficiency for BROAD (Intermediate Solution)

	Cons.	PRI	covS	covU	Cases
STATECAP * ECONPERF * CIVSOC	0.993	0.987	0.413	0.024	Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Bogotá, Cartagena, Medellín
STATECAP * ~VERTDIVGOV * CIVSOC	0.98	0.957	0.283	0.021	Barranquilla, Cali, Ibagué, Pereira
STATECAP * ELECTCOMP * CIVSOC	0.976	0.955	0.384	0.05	Bogotá, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Ibagué, Medellín, Pereira
~STATECAP * VERTDIVGOV * ~ELECTCOMP	0.97	0.931	0.202	0.121	Santa Marta
Solution	0.968	0.946	0.64		

Abbreviations

Cons.: Consistency; *PRI:* Proportional reduction in inconsistency; *covS:* Raw coverage; *covU:* Unique coverage.
A tilde (~) denotes the absence of a condition.

Formula

~STATECAP * VERTDIVGOV * ~ELECTCOMP **+** STATECAP * ECONPERF * CIVSOC
+ STATECAP * ~VERTDIVGOV * CIVSOC **+** STATECAP * ELECTCOMP * CIVSOC → BROAD

Explaining Programmatic Social Assistance

Analysis of Necessity

Turning to the drivers of programmatic social assistance, no single condition by itself is found to be necessary, but the analysis does find that programmatic social assistance measures require the presence of either state capacity or strong economic performance: an institutionally weak administration can still provide programmatic relief but only if the local economy is strong, while a poor city can still enjoy programmatic assistance but only if its local government is institutionally strong.[29] Table 7 displays the results of the analysis of necessity. The consistency score, 0.901, is not perfect (the commonly used threshold is 0.9), meaning that there are cases that do not fit the pattern. Indeed, as Figure 5 shows, there are seven cities with high state capacity or strong economic performance that were not programmatic in targeting and distributing aid (which does not really contradict a claim of necessity), but also one city—the Pacific port city of Buenaventura—that was mostly programmatic despite being poor and having limited state capacity. Very strictly speaking, then,

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[29] In more technical terms, state capacity and economic performance are SUIN conditions, or ones that are a "sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome" (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009, 126).

these structural conditions are not truly necessary (though QCA practitioners usually do not treat a single deviant case as completely invalidating of necessity relations). Another important caveat raised by the results comes from the low relevance and coverage scores (both of which are close to 0.6, the threshold suggested by Oana et al. [2021]), which indicates that this necessary condition may be somewhat trivial. Since 15 of the 23 cases under analysis meet this condition, the combination of high state capacity and income is almost a constant within the sample.[30]

Table 7. Necessity Analysis for Programmatic Character

	Consistency	Relevance	Coverage
STATECAP + ECONPERF	0.905	0.625	0.656

Figure 5. XY Plot of High State Capacity or Strong Economic Performance as Necessary for Programmatic Social Assistance

Sufficiency Analysis

The analysis of sufficiency for programmatic relief is likely to shed more light on the role of state capacity and economic performance in conjunction with the other conditions under analysis. I once again obtain an intermediate solution based on the truth table presented as Table 11 in Appendix II, and using the directional expectation presented in Figure 4, in Section 3: the conjunction of high state

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[30] For a starker illustration of a trivial necessary condition, consider the claim that the presence of human beings in a given city is necessary for programmatic social assistance. The consistency score would be perfect, the relevance and coverage scores would most likely be quite low, as it would be a very trivial finding.

capacity, strong economic performance, and local-level electoral competition. Table 8 displays the results. There are two pathways to programmatic social assistance. The first one involves the simultaneous presence of high state capacity, strong economic performance, intergovernmental competition, and a mobilized civil society, as exemplified by Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cartagena, and Medellín. Contrary to my expectation that intergovernmental competition should only be relevant in combination with local-level competition (as it appears to be in the second causal recipe, discussed below), here it is revealed to be a necessary component of a causal recipe that is sufficient for programmatic relief.[31] The same is true for civil society mobilization, which the literature suggests can be either good or bad for programmatic outcomes depending on the context. The finding here is that in a context of high state capacity, strong economic performance, and intergovernmental competition, it not only helps but is also necessary for programmatic relief.

Table 8. Analysis of Sufficiency for the Programmatic Character of Social Assistance Measures (Intermediate Solution)

	Cons.	PRI	covS	covU	Cases
STATECAP * ECONPERF * VERTDIVGOV * CIVSOC	1	1	0.432	0.113	Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Medellín
STATECAP * VERTDIVGOV * ELECTCOMP * CIVSOC	1	1	0.393	0.074	Bogotá, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Medellín
Solution	1	1	0.506		

Abbreviations
Cons.: Consistency; *PRI:* Proportional reduction in inconsistency; *covS:* Raw coverage; *covU:* Unique coverage.
A tilde (~) denotes the absence of a condition.

Formula
STATECAP * ECONPERF * VERTDIVGOV * CIVSOC + STATECAP * VERTDIVGOV * ELECTCOMP * CIVSOC → PROGTIC

A contentious civil society is shown to play the same role in combination with high state capacity and income and with local electoral competition, according to the second causal recipe. This solution is associated with the same cities as the first one, but substituting Cúcuta (a highly competitive electoral

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[31] This is better known as an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition (INUS) condition (Mackie 1965, cited in Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009).

district) for Bucaramanga (whose mayor was elected in a landslide). Bringing these two causal recipes together, the raw coverage (covS) score of the entire solution is 0.506, meaning that it accounts only for about half of the total membership in the outcome. This result points to the need to analyze what explains the presence of programmatic assistance in the cities that are not accounted for in this solution (namely Barrancabermeja, Buenaventura, Cali, and Neiva).

6. CONCLUSION

Subnational governments around the world played a significant though understudied and largely untheorized role in response to the devastating socioeconomic impact of COVID-19. They worked to address serious protection gaps, especially among hard-to-reach populations such as informal-sector workers, migrants, and ethnic minorities—as they often do in the context of natural disasters and other crises. This study addressed this subject by mapping out the varied social protection responses of city governments in Colombia and narrowing in on two crucial questions. First, why did some adopt broader, more generous relief measures than others? Second, why were some cities' social assistance programs more insulated from clientelism and other nonprogrammatic distribution practices than others?

I employed qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to compare COVID-19 social assistance measures in 23 cities. Each city's measures were characterized through in-depth case studies based chiefly on original qualitative data collection, thus ensuring that the set calibrations required for QCA are grounded on high-quality data that accurately captures the micro-level processes under study. By demonstrating the feasibility (and superior reliability) of complementing the advantages of QCA for cross-case inquiry with rich within-case evidence, the study contributes to the growth of this promising approach to multi-method research (see, e.g., Pasotti 2020).

The analysis took full advantage of QCA's ability to recognize equifinality and conjunctural causation. It demonstrated that no single explanatory condition was either necessary or sufficient to bring about either broad or programmatic social assistance among the Colombian cities under study. What is more, no causal configuration was found to be a prerequisite for generous relief. This result should not merely be read as a null finding but as a reflection, on the one hand, of causal complexity and of some local governments' ability to overcome structural obstacles to deliver large and honest relief in a time of crisis.

Next, the analysis identified the causal configurations that *do* explain the observed variation. There are four pathways, or causal recipes, that lead to broad social assistance. The main conclusion, based on three of these recipes, is that different combinations of structural factors (either high state capacity or strong economic performance) and incentives for political action (either high levels of local electoral competitiveness or a mobilized civil society) explain generous outcomes. At the same time, some cities that scored low on the structural factors still delivered large aid packages, and intergovernmental competition stood out as a strong element in this alternative pathway.

Configurational causation also proved important for understanding the drivers of programmatic relief. Either high state capacity or high per-capita income is identified as a necessary condition, though the finding is not as robust as the others, and one city, Buenaventura (one of the country's poorest cities, with a historically weak institutional infrastructure), directly contradicts this relation of necessity. In terms of sufficiency, there is a similar pattern as the one identified for breadth: the presence of at least one structural factor (mainly state capacity) together with enough political incentives leads governments to adopt formal, transparent eligibility criteria and ensure that they are respected. In richer cities where state capacity is high, intergovernmental competition and societal mobilization are sufficient. In poorer cities, state capacity has to be accompanied by pressure from all

sides: local governments have to face simultaneous pressure from intergovernmental rivalries, from local-level electoral competition, and from a contentious civil society.

These findings provide important lessons for the field of comparative welfare states and for the distributive politics literature. It reinforces the broad consensus around the importance of a configurational understanding of causation for explaining social policy developments—perhaps some adaptation for a subnational level of analysis of Huber and Stephens' (2001, 2012) idea of "power constellations." It confirms the importance of aligning structural conditions and incentives for political action (Niedzwiecki 2018). At the same time, it also calls overly structuralist and static conceptions of state strength and weakness into question; sometimes politicians and bureaucrats develop the ability to overcome state capacity limitations as they act quickly to respond to social challenges, a reality that the vibrant contemporary literature on state capacity tends to overlook (Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2015; but see Kyle and Resnick 2019). The article also reflects much of what we know about the economic and political conditions that explain the evolution of (or, more precisely, the back-and-forth between) programmatic and nonprogrammatic distributive strategies (Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Yet it also calls for further investigation of the role that civil society and contentious politics has to play in relation to it—not just of the recursive relationships between mobilization and clientelism (Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Poma 2009), but also of the conditions under which a mobilized civil society can contribute to breaking these cycles (Fox 1996, 2015; Prieto 2022).

This article's findings call for further field-intensive investigation of how the different causal pathways play out in specific cities through qualitative process tracing, as well as what explains the outcomes that were not accounted for through the cross-case QCA approach. Just as in-depth qualitative case studies provided rich material for comparative analysis, a return to them is now necessary in order to answer some of the questions it raised, especially around what allows the

governments of poor cities with weak state capacity (like Buenaventura) to provide critical and perhaps even life-saving support to their populations.

7. APPENDICES

Appendix I. Calibration procedures

Outcome conditions

Breadth

The following anchors were used to calibrate the breadth set based on each government's COVID-19 social assistance contracts (Agencia Nacional de Contratación Pública 2022a, b) and direct spending.

- *Fully in (1):* 1.5% or more of 2020 government expenditures were spent on COVID-19 social assistance.
- *Point of indifference (0.5):* 0.5% of 2020 government expenditures were spent on COVID-19 social assistance.
- *Fully out (0):* Less than 0.1% of 2020 government expenditures were spent on COVID-19 social assistance.

Programmatic character

Eligibility criteria — This set was hand-calibrated based on the existence of formal and public criteria for eligibility, stipulated in binding official documents (such as council ordinances [*acuerdos*], decrees, resolutions, internal directives, or operations manuals).

- *Fully in (1):* The city government established formal eligibility criteria which were stipulated in publicly available official documents and well publicized through official press releases, public notices, or face-to-face interactions.
- *Nearly in (0.8):* The city government established formal eligibility criteria, and they were specific but were not made fully or widely public (for instance, the full text of the norms was not made available).
- *More in than out (0.6):* The city government established some formal but broad eligibility criteria, and they were only made partially public (for instance, some requirements were mentioned in press releases or in government representatives' announcements, but the public did not have access to the full text of the norms).
- *More out than in (0.4):* The city government publicized some specific eligibility criteria (for example, in officials' or representatives' comments to the media, social media publications, or in comments to the research team), but these were not formalized.
- *Nearly out (0.2):* The city government mentioned some broad eligibility criteria (for example, in officials' or representatives' comments to the media, social media publications, or in comments to the research team), but these were not formalized.
- *Fully out (0):* No eligibility criteria were found to have been set.

Identification and delivery practices — This set was hand-calibrated as follows:

- *Fully in (1):* Formal criteria were closely followed and there was no evidence of clientelism, partisan conditionalities, or personal connections influencing access to social assistance.
- *Nearly in (0.8):* There were some reports that personal connections may have influenced access to social assistance, but formal criteria were largely followed and there was no evidence of clientelism or partisan conditionalities.
- *More in than out (0.6):* There is strong evidence that personal connections influenced access to social assistance, but formal criteria were mostly respected, and there is no definitive evidence of clientelism or partisan conditionalities.
- *More out than in (0.4):* There was strong evidence of personal connections (not necessarily clientelism or partisan conditionalities) influencing access to social assistance, and formal criteria were frequently violated.
- *Nearly out (0.2):* There were multiple reports of clientelism and partisan conditionalities (not just personal connections) influencing access to social assistance and that formal criteria were frequently violated.
- *Fully out (0):* There was strong evidence, including judicial or disciplinary investigations, indicating that clientelism, partisan conditionalities, and personal connections strongly influenced access to social assistance, and formal criteria were frequently violated.

Explanatory conditions

State capacity

City governments' state capacity set membership scores were assigned using direct calibration using the "administration" (*gestión*) component of the National Planning Department's 2020 municipal performance scores (*medición de desempeño municipal*, MDM) for the cities under study (DNP 2022). Local governments' administration scores range from 0 to 100; governments with scores under 45 are classified as low-performance, those between 45 and 55 are classified as medium-performance, and those over 55 are classified as high-performance. Since municipal performance scores among cities in general (and within this study's sample in particular) are higher than the national average, the anchor points for calibration were higher than those used for DNP's classification (otherwise even the weakest city governments would be classified as medium- or even high-performing).

- *Fully in (1):* The score for the "administration" component of the local government's MDM score is 76 or higher. Following Schneider and Wagemann's (2012, 35) suggestion, a prominent gap in raw values is used to define full membership (this way two similarly high scores are not arbitrarily deemed qualitatively different).
- *Point of indifference (0.5):* The score for the "administration" component of the local government's MDM score is 60. The lower bound established by DNP for high-performing governments (55) would have been an ideal point of indifference, but a large number of cases are clustered around this number, leading to arbitrary determinations of membership.
- *Fully out (0):* The score for the "administration" component of the local government's MDM score is 45 or lower. This is the upper bound for being classified as having a low level of municipal capacity by DNP.

Economic performance

Membership in this set was calibrated using each municipality or district's 2019 per-capita gross value added for (DNP 2022). Set membership scores were assigned through direct calibration, using the following anchors:

- *Fully in (1):* $41,123,185.92 Colombian pesos (COP) per capita (the World Bank's upper bound for middle-income countries, converted to COP at $3280.69 COP per USD, the 2019 average exchange rate).
- *Point of indifference (0.5):* $21.078.232.71 COP per capita (Colombia's country-level GDP per capita).
- *Fully out (0):* $3.395.492.42 COP per capita (the World Bank's upper bound for lower-income countries, converted to COP at $3280.669 COP per USD.

Vertically divided government

City governments' membership in this set was hand-calibrated based on the mayor's party affiliation and electoral coalition for the 2019 mayoral election and that party's official status as opposition, independent, or pro-government relative to the national government. Parties' official stances are published on the National Electoral Council's website (CNE 2022).

- *Fully in (1):* The mayor was affiliated to an opposition party and did not receive support from any independent or pro-government party.
- *More in than out (0.67):* The mayor was affiliated to an opposition or independent party and was supported by independent parties, but not by any pro-government party.
- *More out than in (0.33):* The mayor was not affiliated to a pro-government party) but was supported by pro-government parties.
- *Fully out (0):* The mayor was affiliated with a pro-government party.

Electoral competitiveness

Once raw competitiveness scores were calculated by factoring the winner's margin of victory and share of the vote, direct calibration was run on them using the following anchors:

- *Fully in (1):* 0.1 (based on a scenario in which the winner obtains only 30 percent of the vote and wins by a narrow margin of only 3 percentage points).
- *Point of indifference (0.5):* 0.25 (based on a scenario in which the winner obtains 40 percent of the vote and wins by 10 percentage points).
- *Fully out (0):* 0.5 (based on a scenario in which the winner obtains 60 percent of the vote and wins in a landslide by 30 percentage points).

Contentious civil society

The anchors for direct calibration were the following:

- *Fully in (1):* There were 50 or more protest or riot events between 2015-2019.
- *Point of indifference (0.5):* There were 27 riot events between 2015-2019.
- *Fully out (0):* There were 5 or fewer protest or riot events between 2015-2019.

Full Explanatory Condition Calibration

Table 9. City Data and Set Membership Scores

City	State capacity		Economic performance		Intergov. competition	Local electoral competition			Contentious civil society	
	MDM admin. score	SMS	Per-capita income (million COP)	SMS	SMS	Margin of victory	Winner's vote share	SMS	Protests and riots	SMS
Barrancabermeja	47.37	**0.08**	$76.0	**1.00**	**0.33**	18.79	47.46	**0.15**	10	**0.09**
Barranquilla	78.65	**0.97**	$22.3	**0.55**	**0.33**	49.05	62.43	**0.00**	88	**1.00**
Bogotá	81.33	**0.98**	$32.2	**0.84**	**1**	2.73	35.21	**0.97**	168	**1.00**
Bucaramanga	74.56	**0.94**	$25.8	**0.67**	**0.66**	34.51	48.36	**0.00**	46	**0.92**
Buenaventura	53.13	**0.21**	$13.3	**0.21**	**1**	2.75	24.13	**0.94**	10	**0.09**
Cali	84.15	**0.99**	$19.6	**0.44**	**0.33**	12.5	37.93	**0.28**	64	**0.99**
Cartagena	65.26	**0.72**	$22.5	**0.55**	**1**	2.77	28.87	**0.95**	88	**1.00**
Cúcuta	63.32	**0.65**	$12.0	**0.18**	**1**	6.07	33.77	**0.80**	35	**0.74**
Envigado	77.05	**0.96**	$39.0	**0.93**	**0.33**	17.17	41.14	**0.12**	2	**0.03**
Florencia	48.31	**0.09**	$12.0	**0.18**	**0.66**	4.24	34.71	**0.92**	18	**0.23**
Ibagué	68.52	**0.83**	$16.6	**0.32**	**0**	3.72	21.83	**0.83**	30	**0.59**
Leticia	34.73	**0.01**	$12.0	**0.18**	**0.33**	6.7	24.03	**0.42**	0	**0.03**
Medellín	80.51	**0.98**	$24.1	**0.61**	**0.66**	8.68	38.56	**0.62**	91	**1.00**
Neiva	65.08	**0.72**	$17.4	**0.35**	**0.33**	14.26	39.26	**0.21**	7	**0.06**
Pereira	78.79	**0.97**	$19.8	**0.45**	**0.33**	2.47	28.82	**0.96**	31	**0.63**
Quibdó	53.83	**0.23**	$11.7	**0.17**	**0**	5.09	29.9	**0.83**	6	**0.06**
Riohacha	52.47	**0.19**	$11.6	**0.17**	**0.33**	14.85	38.54	**0.17**	11	**0.11**
Santa Marta	57.8	**0.39**	$11.6	**0.17**	**1**	47.2	63.43	**0.00**	20	**0.28**
Soacha	52.98	**0.20**	$8.2	**0.11**	**0**	8.57	43.47	**0.74**	3	**0.04**
Tumaco	44.03	**0.04**	$6.6	**0.08**	**0**	2.11	26.76	**0.97**	1	**0.03**
Tunja	71.6	**0.89**	$21.6	**0.52**	**0**	9.91	34.96	**0.40**	11	**0.11**
Villavicencio	61.53	**0.57**	$15.7	**0.29**	**1**	1.9	21.3	**0.96**	9	**0.08**
Yopal	65.38	**0.73**	$30.0	**0.79**	**0.33**	9.27	29.81	**0.33**	0	**0.03**

Abbreviations: MDM = Municipal performance score (*Medición del desempeño municipal*); SMS = Set membership score.

Sources: DNP (2022) for state capacity and economic performance; CNE (2022) for intergovernmental competition, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (2019) for local electoral competition; ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) for civil society mobilization.

Appendix II. Truth Tables

Table 10. Truth table for breadth of social assistance measures (BROAD)

Model: Breadth of social assistance measures (BROAD)
= f (local state capacity [STATECAP], economic performance [ECONPERF], intergovernmental competition [VERTDIVGOV], electoral competition [ELECTCOMP], contentious civil society [CIVSOC])

	STATECAP	ECONPERF	VERTDIVGOV	ELECTCOMP	CIVSOC	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Cali
26	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Barranquilla
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Bucaramanga
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	0.997	0.993	Ibagué, Pereira
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.989	0.977	Bogotá, Cartagena, Medellín
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.98	0.961	Santa Marta
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.969	0.906	Cúcuta
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.898	0.639	Barrancabermeja
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.871	0.678	Neiva
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.858	0.683	Leticia, Riohacha
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.825	0.535	Villavicencio
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.72	0.447	Quibdó, Soacha, Tumaco
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.707	0.477	Buenaventura, Florencia
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.573	0.205	Envigado, Tunja, Yopal

Table 11. Truth table for the programmatic character of social assistance measures (PROGTIC)

Model: Programmatic character of social assistance measures (PROGTIC)
= f (local state capacity [STATECAP], economic performance [ECONPERF], intergovernmental competition [VERTDIVGOV],
electoral competition [ELECTCOMP], contentious civil society [CIVSOC])

	STATECAP	ECONPERF	VERTDIVGOV	ELECTCOMP	CIVSOC	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	Bogotá, Cartagena, Medellín
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Cúcuta
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Bucaramanga
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.915	0.26	Villavicencio
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.891	0.706	Cali
26	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.856	0.591	Barranquilla
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.854	0.574	Barrancabermeja
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.848	0.003	Santa Marta
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.782	0.277	Buenaventura, Florencia
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.699	0.218	Neiva
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.663	0.219	Ibagué, Pereira
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.595	0	Leticia, Riohacha
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.576	0	Envigado, Tunja, Yopal
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.428	0	Quibdó, Soacha, Tumaco

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