Authority and Participation

The Role of Leader Type, Shared Identity, and Community Influence on Campaign Participation in Zambia

Prisca Jöst and Ellen Lust[†]

Abstract

A diverse literature demonstrates that people comply with local leaders' calls to pay taxes, vote, or provide public goods. Yet, scholars are still in the initial stages of understanding the conditions under which different leaders are effective. In this paper, we address this question, asking which leaders can mobilize people, for what activities, and why. To do so, we draw on survey data from two original data sets and a survey experiment conducted in the run-up to the 2021 Zambian elections. The experiment varies the type of authority (e.g., a local religious leader, local chief or local councilor) and the type of activity (e.g., attending a meeting with or campaigning for a candidate), as well as whether participation is monitored. The surveys also gathered information on the respondents' shared identity traits (co-ethnicity and co-gender) with the leader and their perceptions of the leader's social influence over (1) the scope of the individual's life, and (2) the members of the community. This allows us to explore the extent to which it is the type of leader or the *nature* of the relationships between leaders and the individuals that drive compliance. We find support for the latter. Specifically, leader social influence over the scope of the individual's life, and over other members of the community is significantly associated with reported willingness to participate, and leader sanctioning and legitimacy are likely underlying mechanisms. Leader type has no significant influence on the respondents' stated willingness to participate. These findings draw away our attention from the role of the types of leaders and towards the social relationships between leaders and local citizens and the communities in which they are embedded.

[†] Prisca Jöst is a postdoctoral fellow at the Cluster of Excellence, "The Politics of Inequality" at the University of Konstanz. Ellen Lust is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg and Director of the Governance and Local Development Institute (GLD). Please send comments to prisca.joest-brenneis@uni-konstanz.de and ellen.lust@gu.se. We would like to thank Kate Baldwin, Ian Madison and the participants of the GLD Annual Conference 2022, the African Politics Working Group at Yale University and the Political Science Early Career Researcher Workshop at the University of Konstanz for helpful comments and suggestions.

Introduction

Who has the power to mobilize citizen participation? A diverse literature demonstrates that local leaders are effective in mobilizing people to pay taxes, vote, or provide public goods (e.g., Baldwin 2016, 2019; Koter 2013, 2016; Olken and Singhal 2011; Silverman et al. 2014), but less is known about what makes these leaders more effective. Recently, scholars have begun to explore these questions (Baldwin et al. 2021; Baldwin 2019; Minaeva and Panov 2021; Wilfahrt 2018). Some argue that people follow those leaders whom they perceive as legitimate (Blair 2018; French and Raven 1959) or who have sanctioning power (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011). Most of these studies, however, focus on the relationship between state and non-state actors (Baldwin 2013; Logan 2009; van der Windt et al. 2019; Murtazashvili 2016) or local versus more distant leaders (Jöst and Lust 2022). These studies provide important insights into the reasons people comply with different leaders, but they do not fully explain whether it is the type of leader, or the *nature* of their relationships with individuals and communities, that best explains who can mobilize support.

In this paper, we examine the extent to which it is the type of leader or the *nature* of the relationship between leaders and communities that best predicts when and why some local leaders are better able to mobilize citizens than others. We employ a survey experiment embedded in the Zambian Election Panel Study (ZEPS) 2021, as well as observational data from the ZEPS 2021 survey and the Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI), conducted in 2019. In the survey experiment, we focus on differences in local leaders' ability to mobilize citizens over two activities that have been largely overlooked: attending community meetings in which they raise local concerns to the MP and campaigning for a political candidate. We vary the type of local leader, differentiating between religious leaders, village chiefs/neighborhood leaders, and local councilors, and we investigate three types of relations between leaders and individuals: 1) shared ethnic and gender identities between leaders and individuals; 2) leader's social influence over the scope of the individual's life, and (3) the leader's social influence over the local community.[1] The observational data from the ZEPS

[1] We had initially also registered an expectation that whether the leader holds domain ownership over the activity should increase respondents` willingness to comply, following work by Baldwin, Kao and Lust (2022). We do not find domain congruence increases compliance with local leaders and report findings including domain congruence. (See Table C3 and D4 in the Appendix.) We decided to take the discussion of domain congruence out from the main text as the concept is not essential for our theoretical argument about the role of the leader influence in mobilizing individuals.

2021 and LGPI 2019 surveys allow us to implement robustness checks on leader-community ties and to explore external validity.

Our analysis reveals that the leader's relationship with individuals and communities, and not the type of leader, best predicts individuals´ reported willingness to participate. Moreover, we show that leader sanctioning and legitimacy are likely the underlying mechanisms. Highly influential local leaders are seen as legitimate in asking for compliance, and they are seen as more likely to sanction non-compliance compared to those who are less influential.

This study extends previous work in four important ways. First, unlike previous studies which have compared the mobilizing efforts by subnational and national actors or state and traditional leaders (e.g., Baldwin et al. 2022; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Jöst and Lust 2022), this paper focuses on the relative influence of different *local* actors. Second, we explore the impact of different local leaders in mobilizing citizens' engagement in electoral campaigns and community meetings. In doing so, we move beyond the tendency to focus on voting, and the prevalence of vote-buying in campaigns. Third, we move beyond previous studies by testing three potential mechanisms through which different leaders may mobilize citizens: leader sanctioning, community sanctioning and legitimacy. And finally, in doing so we show that it is not the type of leader (e.g., religious leader, local councilor or local village chief) but the nature of the leader's relationship with the individual and social influence over their community that explain leaders' mobilizing power.

We proceed as follows. First, we discuss previous work that considers the social influence of authorities and leaders, and their ability to mobilize political engagement. We present our theoretical framework that considers the nature of these leaders by focusing on shared identity, influence over the scope of the individual's life, and the leader's social influence over the members of the local community. Second, we introduce the case of Zambia, describing how various local leaders seek to mobilize participation in election campaigns. Third, we present the data and the analysis and discuss our results. Finally, we conclude by considering the study's theoretical and policy implications.

Authorities, Social Influence and Compliance

We draw on two sets of literature on the role of authorities and local leaders in the Global South to explore which leaders effectively mobilize individuals. One set of literature focuses on governance and public goods provision by different authorities, while a second literature focuses on social ties. These two sets of literature are based on very different understandings of authority – one focuses on the type of leader, and the second on the nature of ties between the authority and the individuals or communities they seek to sway.

Scholars often take leader types as the starting point. They point to how customary authorities (Baldwin 2015; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Magaloni et al. 2019; Murtazashvili 2016), religious leaders (Kingsley 2014; McClendon and Riedl 2019) or armed groups (Ajorna 2016; Ajorna et al. 2015; Magaloni et al. 2020) engage in governance, both given their de jure mandates and de facto powers. Where these leaders are juxtaposed with other leaders, it is to compare different *types* of leaders -- local versus more socially distant leaders (Jöst and Lust 2022) or state versus non-state actors and institutions (Baldwin 2019; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Logan 2009; Magaloni et al. 2019; Murtazashvili 2016). This raises questions over whether these different authorities act as substitutes or complements (Post et al. 2020), or how local leaders such as chiefs and religious dignitaries become important intermediaries between elected politicians and the local community (Baldwin 2015; Koter 2013, 2016). But the fundamental question over how much leader *type* shapes influence is largely overlooked. Thus, we seek first to test the *extent to which leader type affects the ability of authorities to gain compliance.*

Yet, there are reasons to believe that leader type is not the only, or even the most important, dimension determining leaders' influence. Studies on social similarity, or identity and politics, suggest that community members are more likely to comply with leaders who are like them. People often prefer candidates from the same ethnic group (e.g., Adida 2015; Carlson 2015; Nathan 2016), or seek assistance from those of the same gender (Benstead 2016). This expectation derives, in part, from findings in social psychology indicating that people tend to comply with others who they like, and that people tend to like and socially interact with others who share their social characteristics (Cialdini and Trost 1998; McPherson et al., 2001). It is also underpinned by work on group norms, which suggests that individuals expect those in their 'in-group' are more obligated to assist them, and relatedly, given information advantages, that they may be more likely to be sanctioned if they fail to do so (Habyarimana et al 2007;

Chandra 2007). Drawing on these findings, we focus on ethnicity and gender, and w*e expect leaders should be better at mobilizing people who share their social characteristics (i.e., gender and ethnicity).*

Leaders may also differ in the range of activities over which they have influence. A religious leader, for instance, may not only affect their congregationalists' spiritual paths, but also influence whether or not they can access charity or enjoy good social standing in the community. A village head may determine which villagers have access to land, and also whether they are first on a list to receive external aid. Leaders differ in the range of activities and outcomes they influence – for instance, some may only determine an individual's ability to resolve disputes, while others may determine access to land, services, and social standing in a community. The broader the range of activities over which the leader influences, the more the individual has at stake in maintaining the leader's approval. Thus, as suggested in Lust (2022), we expect *individuals are more likely to comply with authorities who have influence over a larger number of domains in their lives.*

Finally, leaders who are well connected in the community should gain greater compliance from community members. Local leaders are better able to coordinate collective action in communities in which formal and social institutions overlap, and where local leaders are typically embedded in the local communities over which they exert social influence (Tsai 2007; Wilfahrt 2018). Others suggest that leaders´ relative position in the social hierarchy explain their ability to coordinate and mobilize individuals to contribute to public goods (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Wilfahrt 2018), and that those leaders who hold central positions within the community – often measure through family networks – are most effective community mobilizers (Cruz 2019; Cruz et al. 2017; van Leeuwen et al. 2019). A recent field experiment conducted in ethnically homogeneous villages in Ghana finds no evidence that community members donate more when they are more closely connected to the local leader (Atwell and Nathan 2021). These findings suggest that the key to influence is the position of the leader within the community, not in individuals' lives. Thus, in this article, we distinguish *the range of activities* over individuals' lives (discussed above) from *the range of individuals* over which leaders hold influence. *We expect that individuals are more likely to comply when they believe more others in the village or neighborhood recognize the authority figure as a leader.*

Mechanisms underpinning Compliance

Distinguishing leader type, identity, and their influence over activities and communities still leaves open the question of why these leaders are effective in mobilizing individuals. We propose three mechanisms that can potentially explain why some local leaders should be better able to mobilize individuals in their community than others. We focus on leader sanctioning, community sanctioning, and leader legitimacy.

Both the local community and leaders may monitor community members and sanction misbehavior. On the one hand, local leaders may themselves sanction non-compliance of the individuals. On the other hand, they may also make use of these channels of community monitoring. For instance, both Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) and Silverman et al. (2014) find that punishment by group leaders and authorities increases people´s willingness to contribute to public goods. Silverman et al. (2014) show that authorities' influence over people who are requested to contribute to public goods increases only when inducing a threat of being punished. We also know that, more generally, individuals' likelihood to turn out to vote increases when they can expect social pressure from peers and community members (Eubank et al. 2021; Gerber et al. 2008; Rosenzweig 2018; Sinclair 2018). Importantly, these findings indicate that both community members and leaders may monitor behavior and sanction non-compliance. Both activities discussed in this paper (i.e., participation in a community meeting and campaigning) expose the individual to a wider audience as they are highly visible acts. Thus, both monitoring and sanctioning by leaders and other community members present a likely scenario.

There is reason to believe that shared identity and social influence may both be associated with greater abilities to monitor participation. Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2014) compare traditionally governed communities with those that are state-led and governed by political parties in Oaxaca, Mexico. The authors find that traditional leaders perform better as they are more embedded in the community, better able to engage citizens and to exert sanctions in case of non-compliance. Others find that local leaders who hold central positions within communities and are embedded in the local networks can make better use of community monitoring (Cruz et al. 2017; Tsai 2007; Wilfahrt 2018). *Thus, monitoring and sanctioning (non)compliance may be an underlying mechanism increasing the power of leaders, regardless of whether the authority is characterized by social identity or social influence.*

Others have argued that the perceived legitimacy of the leader and her anticipated power explains people's willingness to comply (Blair 2018; French and Raven 1959). The concept of legitimacy describes the idea of leaders as being "appropriate and proper, with the consequence that they feel obligated to defer to the decisions made by leaders with legitimacy and the policies and rules they create" (Tyler 2006: 393). Or, as Beetham (2013) puts it, "[l]egitimacy concerns the normative dimension of power relations, and the ideas and practices that give those in power their moral authority and credibility".[2] This further implies that legitimate authorities have the right to ask people to comply, "[no matter if] they [political leaders and authorities] have acquired their positions through knowledge, talent, or fortune, their positions bespeak superior information and power" (Cialdini and Trost 1998: 170). Thus, independent of sanctioning power, people follow leaders who they perceive as legitimate because of an internalized duty or social norm to obey (French and Raven 1959; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Tyler 2006, 1990).[3] In line with this, Magaloni et al. (2019) find in the case of traditionally ruled municipalities in Mexico that disputes are solved by community members who are perceived as legitimate by the wider community. *Thus, we expect that people will be more likely to comply with local leaders who they see as more legitimate in asking people to participate in a community meeting or political rally.*

Hypotheses

In sum, we argue that it is the *nature* of local authorities' relations with individuals, communities that drives compliance, and not their *position or leader type* (e.g., local councilors, religious leaders) that does so. We also explore the extent to which sanctioning and

[2] Beetham (2013) makes an important distinction between two conceptions of legitimacy as those practices that are "acknowledged as rightful" and those that are rightful because they meet certain normative criteria on how power is exercised and obtained. We rely on the first conception that understands power as legitimate when it is acknowledged as rightful by those involved. Unlike Beetham, however, we do believe that asking people about their own beliefs will provide important insights into whether an action can be "*justified in terms of* their beliefs" (Beetham 2013, 11).

[3] We acknowledge that legitimacy can have both positive and negative consequences. Legitimacy is argued to be essential for functioning democracies and it reduces costs related to authority based on power (French and Raven 1959; for a discussion see Tyler 2006), yet it can also build the basis for oppression and immorality (see work by Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Milgram 1975). However, in this paper, we focus on the positive consequences of legitimacy as compliance with local leaders who try to mobilize people to engage in community meeting and political rallies.

legitimacy may be the mechanisms underpinning compliance. We test the following pre-registered[4] hypotheses:

H1. Leaders should be better at mobilizing people *from their own ethnic group and/or those who have the same gender.*[5]

H2. Individuals are more likely to comply with authorities who have a more encompassing social influence over them *(i.e., have influence over more aspects of their welfare.)*.

H3. Individuals are more likely to comply when they believe more others in the village or neighborhood recognize the authority figure as a leader.

H4. Individuals are more likely to comply with local leaders because they expect sanctions from the leader or the community in case of non-participation.

H5. People will be more likely to comply with local leaders who they see as more legitimate in asking people to participate in a community meeting or political rally.

Campaign Participation in Zambia

We turn to Zambia to explore our hypotheses. As a multiparty democracy, Zambia witnesses heavily contested election seasons with active campaigns. According to the 2020 (Round 8) Afrobarometer survey (Afrobarometer 2020), it is not unusual for Zambians to engage in political activities, including attending a community meeting, contacting an MP, campaigning for a candidate, or attending a campaign rally. In the survey, 55 percent of Zambians reported having attended a community meeting, 37 percent attended a campaign rally, 15 percent had worked for a party or candidate, and 13 percent had contacted an MP. Thus, the activities around which our experiment is designed – to participate in a meeting with an MP or campaign on behalf of a candidate – are realistic.

[4] The pre-analysis plan was pre-registered with EGAP (ID: 20210929AA).
[5] We had initially registered this hypothesis for co-ethnicity, co-origin and co-gender. We were not able to collect information on the origin of the local leader, so we will not be able to test this.

Local leaders frequently call upon Zambians to participate in such activities. The activities that we focus on in this study – attending a campaign meeting and campaigning on behalf of a candidate – are not under the clear or exclusive mandate of any of our leaders. Moreover, we find at least some respondents in our survey responded that the local leaders have asked them to participate in campaigns or community meetings in the past. Twenty-two percent responded that their local religious leader had asked them to participate, compared to 31 percent of the respondents who said their local chief had asked them and 37 percent who responded that their local councilor had asked them to participate in a campaign or community meeting. This evidence is in line with Kate Baldwin (2015)'s conclusion that local chiefs can act as 'development brokers,' providing important information and mobilization efforts to MPs, and in turn, signaling their support of particular candidates. But it also demonstrates that these are not the only actors who can have such influence.

Research Design

Data

To empirically test our theoretical expectations, we rely on data from two original surveys. The first survey is the Zambian Election Panel Study (ZEPS) 2021. This survey was administered by phone in the period around the Zambian 2021 elections, using telephone numbers that had been collected by the Governance and Local Development Institute (GLD) in the 2019 Local Governance Performance Index (LGP) survey. The second round of the three-panel survey, implemented in July 2021, includes a survey experiment that is the focus of this study (Lust et al. 2021).[6]

The second data set is the Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) implemented in Zambia in 2019. This survey was a face-to-face household survey with 9,864 Zambian respondents, drawn using Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) sampling in two regions: areas within a 50-km radius of the capital, Lusaka, and areas within a 100-km distance of the Malawi-Zambian border. The survey implementation was heavily clustered in square kilometer

[6] The study was reviewed, and IRB approval obtained from the Univ. Cape Town: 2021/02 (2021-07-05), Michigan State Univ.: STUDY00006161 (2021-05-13), Univ. Zambia: HSSREC-2021-MAY-021 (2021-09-29)

areas. This allows us to aggregate answers within survey areas to obtain community measures, and it was also paired with an elite survey that asked about community characteristics (see Appendix A for more information on the sampling).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level Measures

Attribute	**Percent**
Woman	46.03
Man	53.97
Education	
No Formal	2.41
At least some Primary	27.54
At least some Secondary	52.34
Post-Secondary or higher	16.99
Refused to Answer	0.72
Age	
18-34	50.07
35-54	38.35
55-74	11.07
75-92	0.52
Total Survey Respondents	1,536

Note: We present descriptive statistics for the merged LGPI-ZEPS sample for which the regression models are calculated.

Experimental Design

The survey experiment is a vignette in which the individual is asked to imagine that their local leader is asking them to engage in an activity, either to attend a community meeting to raise concerns to the MP or to campaign for a parliamentary candidate. The experiment is introduced with the following prompt:

> We realize that campaigns are in session, but for right now, I'd like you to consider a hypothetical situation.

Then, the interviewer read the following vignette. The attributes in square brackets were randomized with equal probability and are summarized in Table 2.[7] Items in curly brackets were assigned based on the randomly chosen attributes.

> I'd like you to imagine that [your neighbor /your local chief or neighborhood leader /your local councilor] is urging you to [help campaign for a candidate for Member of Parliament/ attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate].
>
> The candidate is a [Co-ethnic (respondent's ethnicity piped-in)/Not co-ethnic (randomly chosen, non-coethnic with respondent piped-in)] [man/woman] running for parliament as the [co-party (respondent's preferred party piped-in)/randomly chosen other party, non-co-party] candidate. {He/she} was [born here/born in a different region] {and/but} [currently lives in a village or neighborhood nearby/currently lives in a village/neighborhood on the other side of the district].
>
> Your [local religious leader / local chief or neighborhood leader / local councilor] is keen on you {helping campaign for a parliamentary candidate/ attending a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate}, [but is not keeping track of whether or not you do/ and will be keeping track of whether or not you do.] [No one else in the community is/Many others in the community are] keeping track of whether or not you {campaign for the candidate/attend the meeting}.
>
> [Many/None] of your friends have already agreed to {join in the campaign/attend the meeting} and [you will be compensated for your efforts/you will not be compensated for your efforts].

[7] Results from the balance tests do not give us reason to be concerned about the relatively equal distribution of attributes across gender, age, education, ethnicity and wealth groups in our sample (see Tables E1-5 in the Appendix).

Table 2. Summary of Attributes in the Survey Experiment

Attribute	Levels
A. Activity	1. help campaign for a parliamentary candidate (**Baseline**) 2. attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate
B. Authority	1. local religious leader (**Baseline**) 2. local chief/neighborhood leader 3. local councilor
C. Ethnicity of Candidate	1. Co-ethnic (respondent's ethnic group piped-in) 2. Not co-ethnic (randomly chosen non-co-ethnic group piped in) (**Baseline**)
D. Partisanship of Candidate	1. party the respondent feels close to (piped-in) 2. party the respondent does not feel close to (randomly chosen and piped-in) (**Baseline**)
E. Sanctioning - Leader	1. but is not keeping track (**Baseline**) 2. and will be keeping track
F. Sanctioning - Community	1. No one else in the community is keeping track (**Baseline**) 2. Many others in the community will keep track
G. Social benefit/bandwagon	1. Many of your friends have agreed to join in 2. None of your friends have agreed to join in (**Baseline**)
H. Payment	1. you will be compensated for your efforts. 2. you will not be compensated for your efforts. (**Baseline**)
I. Origin of Candidate	1. born here 2. born in a different region (**Baseline**)
J. Residence of Candidate	1. currently lives in a village or neighborhood nearby 2. currently lives in a village or neighborhood on the other side of the district (**Baseline**)
K. Gender of Candidate	1. man (**Baseline**) 2. woman

Note: We investigate the role of different types of leaders and their ability to sanction individuals for non-compliance in this paper. The experimental attributes are accentuated in black in the table. We explore the effect of the candidate´s characteristics and social and monetary incentives on the willingness to participate in a separate paper (attributes in grey). Attributes are listed in the order that they appear in the vignette.

Measurement of Dependent Variables

After the vignette is read, a series of questions is asked to tap into compliance and the underlying mechanisms. These follow-up questions to the experiment, asked in a fixed order, are our dependent variables in the analysis. The answer sets are very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, not likely at all, and Don't Know/Refuse to Answer for each of the following questions:[8]

Stated participation: "How likely are you to spend a day help campaign for a parliamentary candidate/ attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?"

Expected leader sanctioning: "How likely is it that your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?"

Expected community sanctioning: "How likely do you think it is that other members of your village or neighbor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?"

Perceived legitimacy of the leader: "How much do you think it is right and proper for your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor to urge you to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?"

Measurement of Independent Variables

We draw upon the experimental arms as well as additional survey questions on social influence to measure the three different factors that we anticipate affect the leaders' authority: shared identity, social influence, and community embeddedness.

[8] See a full list of follow-up questions to the experiment in Appendix B.

We test our expectations regarding *shared social identity* by drawing on questions about the leaders' ethnicity and gender from the survey, recognizing that the leader's social characteristics are not randomly assigned in the experiment. Specifically, the two questions read after the vignette are: "Please think of your (piped in leader type). First, tell me: is this a man or a woman?" and "Is (he/she) (piped-in respondent ethnicity)?" We test the effect of leader identity by including both variables separately in the analysis. Respondents who share the ethnicity or gender are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. We recognize that local leaders are more likely to be male, and that therefore it may be difficult to disentangle the co-gender of leaders from the respondent's gender (i.e., that males are more likely than females to have co-gender leaders). We nevertheless believe it is important to explore these relationships.

To measure the leader's influence over the scope of the individual's life, we rely on follow up questions to the experiment which ask about the impact of each type of leader on the individual. The battery asks individuals to tell whether they think their local religious leader, local councilor or local chief has the greatest impact on their ability to a) make it through hard times, providing assistance with basic living expenses; b) obtain and secure land and property rights; c) find a job if they needed one; and to ensure d) the personal safety of them and their family; e) positive social relations with others in their community; and f) their spiritual well-being.[9]

We create a simple additive index to measure the leader's influence over the scope of the individual's life. We believe that having influence of more aspects of the respondents' lives represents a valid measure of leader influence, yet we also run robustness checks using alternative measures (see tables C5-6 in the Appendix). The response to each subquestion is encoded by three indicator variables, one for each leader. The indicator variable is equal to 1 if the leader that was given in the experiment was selected for the sector, and it takes the value of 0 otherwise or if "all leaders equally" was selected.

The leader's social influence over the members of the local community is measured using a survey question that aims to capture the range of individuals over which an authority has social influence as leaders:
"Think about how many people in your village/neighborhood see your {local religious leader / local chief or neighborhood leader / local councilor} as their leader. Would you say that it is

[9] For question wording, see the Appendix.

almost everyone, some people, a few people, or hardly anyone see your {local religious leader / local chief or neighborhood leader / local councilor} as their leader?"

We test two versions of this measure: one using a dichotomized version, with almost everyone and some people vs. few people and hardly anyone, and one using the four-point scale. In the following, we will report findings using the dichotomized variable (results for the four-point scale are found in the Appendix[10]).

We also run several robustness checks to rule out that our findings are driven by endogeneity problems that result from our survey measure of leader influence. We rely on additional survey data from the Local Governance Performance Index (Lust et al. 2019) to calculate an alternative community-level measure of social influence based on a survey question in which respondents were asked to name the most influential person in their village or neighborhood. The LGPI was fielded in 2019 in several same communities as the ZEPS survey. The clustered sampling design allows for the aggregation of survey data on the community level and to then merge the LGPI survey data with our ZEPS data set.

Analysis

To test our hypotheses associated with experimental arms of the conjoint, we estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCE) following Hainmueller et al. (2014). Our main model, however, includes non-randomized variables for leader identity and leader social influence.[11]

As suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2014) we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in the analysis, and we rescale our dependent variables that are measured on a four-points scale, so they take values between 0 and 1. We also run analyses with the dependent variables on the initial four-points scale using ordered logistic regression as robustness checks (see Table C4 in the Appendix).

[10] For the highest scale, "almost everyone", findings are significant on the 90 percent or 95 percent level depending on the model specification. See tables C5-6 in the Appendix.
[11] We also specify the basic experimental model to estimate the average marginal effects of each attribute on participation (see table C1 in the Appendix). However, in this paper we are primarily interested in leader characteristics that were measured observationally in the survey.

First, we explore the average marginal treatment effect of each attribute in the experiment. In the model specification below y_i represents our outcome questions (see the outcome questions described above). The attributes and baselines are presented in Table 2. Specifically, we are interested in exploring the effect of our leader monitoring and community monitoring attributes in the experiment on the likelihood that respondents will participate, think that the leader has legitimacy or believe that they would be sanctioned by the community or leader in case of non-participation. The model is specified as follows:

$\mathrm{M1}_j$ Main Effects Model

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Activity + \beta_2 * [Authority = local\ chief] + \beta_3 * [Authority = local\ councilor] + \beta_4 * CoEthnicityMP + \beta_5 * CoPartisanMP + \beta_6 * LeaderMonitor + \beta_7 * ComMonitor + \beta_8 * SocialBenefit + \beta_9 * Payment + \beta_{10} * OriginMP + \beta_{11} * ResidenceMP + \beta_{12} * GenderMP + \varepsilon$$

where i refers to the individual (respondent) and β_0 denotes the intercept. The experimental attributes are included as β_1 to β_{12} in the model specification. The residual is included as ε in the model. We are particularly interested to explore the effect of the leader type and leader and community monitoring on the likelihood to participate. The effects of the other experimental attributes (i.e., characteristics of MP candidate, social benefits and payments) are investigated in a separate paper.

We then explore the importance of the nature of leadership on participation (see M2) as compared to the role of the leader type. We include observational variables for leader social influence and shared identity in the model. These variables do not represent experimental conditions as they have not been randomized in the experiment. To test some of the potential mechanisms, we further explore whether leader social influence and leader identity increase the likelihood to be sanctioned by the leader and the community as reported by the respondent or to perceive the leader as having legitimacy. We run Model M2 with our alternative dependent variables for leader sanctioning, community sanctioning and legitimacy.

$M2_j$ Main Effects Model with Centrality, Leader Identity and Influence Measures

$$y_{ih} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Activity + \beta_2 * [Authority = local\ chief] + \beta_3 * [Authority = local\ councilor] + \beta_4 * CoEthnicityMP + \beta_5 * CoPartisanMP + \beta_6 * LeaderMonitor + \beta_7 * ComMonitor + \beta_8 * SocialBenefit + \beta_9 * Payment + \beta_{10} * OriginMP + \beta_{11} * ResidenceMP + \beta_{12} * GenderMP + \beta_{13} LeaderSharedIdentity_j + \beta_{14} Influence_k + \varepsilon$$

In the model specification above, h denotes the dependent variable that is used. Moreover, β_{13} is added to the model indicating whether the respondent shares the identity of the leader who is making the request. The variable is coded as dummy variables with 1 "shares the identity of the leader" (i.e., ethnicity and gender) and 0 otherwise. β_{14} indicates the nature of the relation between the leader and the respondents and the community. $_j$ and k denote the variables used to measure whether the respondent shares the social identity of the leader and the social influence of the leader (see the discussion in the measurement section).

Results

We examine the average marginal effects of each attribute of the experiment on the respondent´s likelihood to participate. The AMCEs show the change in reported willingness to participate when comparing the attribute to its baseline. Figure 1 shows that people are significantly more likely to participate in a community meeting to raise concerns to the MP than to campaign for a political candidate (0.13, SE=0.02, p=0.000).

Importantly, we find no evidence that the type of leader significantly affects whether respondents are more inclined to heed the leader's request to participate in the activity. As shown in Figure 1, neither local chiefs/neighborhood leaders nor local councilors are better able to mobilize support than local religious leaders (see table C1 in the Appendix for the regression table).[12] We also do not find a significant effect of leader and community monitoring on the likelihood to participate, or that it varies by type of leader (see table D1 in the Appendix).

[12] We run the same model using logistic regression and find our results to be robust. See table C4 in the Appendix.

Figure 1. Average Marginal Effects Model with Participation as Dependent Variable



Note: We have included all experimental conditions in the model from which this figure is drawn. See Table C1 in the Appendix for regression tables with all experimental conditions shown.

Next, we examine how the nature of the leader's relationship with individuals, communities and activities affect the respondent´s likelihood to participate. Since our leader characteristics have not been randomly assigned in the experiment, we can only report associations between these variables and the respondent´s likelihood to participate. We visualize findings from including observational variables form the survey on shared identity between the leader and the respondent and leader social influence in Figure 2 (see regression table C2 in the appendix).

Figure 2. Participation Model with Leader Identity and Leader Social Influence



Note: We have included all experimental conditions in the model from which this figure is drawn. See Table C2 in the Appendix for regression tables with all experimental conditions shown.

We find that the relationship between the leader and community is more important than the social identity. Specifically, both the leader's influence over the scope of the individual's life (p=0.01) and the leader social influence over the members of the community (p=0.003) appear to increase the likelihood to join a community meeting or campaign for an endorsed candidate in the experiment. Respondents' willingness to participate increases by 2.2 percentage points (SE=0.09) with every one-point increase in the influence over the scope of the individual's life -- measured as the number of activities over which the leader has influence. Moreover, respondents are 8.3 percentage points (SE=0.03) more prone to comply with leaders who are perceived as having influence over most or many people in the community compared to those who do not have much influence over the community. In contrast, whether the leader and individual share the same ethnicity or gender does not significantly affect the leader's ability to mobilize participation.[13]

[13] We run the same models including leader identity, leader influence and domain congruence by rural, urban and peri-urban sample and find that local councilors are significantly more important than religious leaders only in urban communities (0.116, SE=0.060, p=0.056). While the social influence of the leader over the community appears to be significant only in rural communities (0.105, SE=0.046, p=0.022) and the influence over the scope

We test several alternative measures of leader influence. For instance, we include each aspect of the individual's life separately in the analysis. We find that only the leader's influence over the respondent's personal safety and over the social relations within the community (both $p<0.10$) are positively associated with a higher willingness to join the event (see table C5 in the appendix). Moreover, we find that leaders are not equally influential over different aspects of the individual´s life. We create a new variable based on the following survey question to define which area of influence is most important for our respondents: "Which of the following is most important to you? Material assistance, land security, employment, safety, community relations, your spiritual well-being." Our results do not hold when we use an alternative measure that relies on the activity that was named as most important aspect of the individuals' lives. (The results are presented in table C6 in the Appendix.)

Finally, we also run robustness checks using an alternative community-level measure of social influence based on a LGPI survey question in which respondents were asked to name the most influential person in your village or neighborhood. We find that this assessment of the influence of our different types of leaders does not predict different participation levels than our ZEPS measure. Running logistic regression, we further find that our LGPI measure significantly predicts respondents` assessment of the leader`s social influence measured based on survey responses in the ZEPS survey ($p=0.000$). (For the robustness checks using aggregated leader influence measure based on the LGPI data see Tables C7-12 in the Appendix.) We, therefore, believe that the leader influence measure based on the ZEPS data presents an accurate measure of leader influence even though it is taken from the same data set as the dependent variable measuring individuals´ intentions to participation.

of the individual´s life only in peri-urban communities (0.029, SE=0.015, p=0.059). However, our n drops significantly after splitting the samples to n=371 in the urban, n=331 in the peri-urban sample and n=544 in the rural sample. Thus, the experiment is underpowered to make any definite claims when splitting our sample by the type of community. See figures D3-5 in the Appendix.

Mechanisms

We now turn to the potential mechanisms that may explain why leaders with influence over more aspects of the respondent´s live and leaders who have influence over more people in the community are better able to mobilize them.

We run the same model that was presented in M2 with community sanctioning, leader sanctioning and legitimacy as dependent variables (see Figure 3-5 and Table C2 in the Appendix). We do not find evidence that shared identity, or social influence over the community is associated with a higher likelihood to be sanctioned by other community members. (See findings reported in Figure 3). Moreover, we find the effect of leader influence over the scope of the individual's life to be significant only on the 90 percent level (0.013, SE=0.008). Yet, as shown in Figure 4, leaders who have a higher influence over the scope of the individual's life appear to be significantly more likely to sanction non-compliance of the respondents (0.023, SE=0.008, p=0.003). Yet, the same does not appear to be true for more socially influential leaders within the community. Moreover, when being asked by co-ethnic leaders, the likelihood that this leader will sanction non-participation increases by 4.6 percentage points (SE=0.02). The finding is significant on the 95 percent level.

Figure 3. Community Sanctioning Model with Leader Identity, Leader Social Influence



Figure 4. Leader Sanctioning Model with Leader Identity, Leader Influence



Figure 5. Legitimacy Model with Leader Identity, Leader Influence



Note: We have included all experimental conditions in the models from which this figures 3-5 are drawn. See Table C2 in the Appendix for regression tables and figures with all experimental conditions shown.

Leaders who have a higher influence over the individual's life also appear to be seen as being more legitimate (0.026, SE=0.008, p=0.001). Results are shown in Figure 5. Moreover, neither leader influence over the community nor shared identity (i.e., being a co-ethnic or of the same gender) appear to increase the leader´s perceived legitimacy.

However, we do not find an independent effect of leader monitoring and community monitoring on participation. Yet, if sanctioning power of different leaders is explaining why individuals decide to participate when being asked by a highly influential leader, the interaction between either leader influence over the scope of the individual's life or the social influence over the members of the community and monitoring by the community or the leader should matter. We do not find evidence that leaders who are co-ethnic, co-gender, those who have a high influence over the individual and the community are significantly better in mobilizing individuals when they or the local community monitor behavior. We report the findings from the heterogeneous effects models in the Appendix (see Tables D2-3 in the Appendix).

Discussion and Conclusion

Our findings suggest that it is not the type of leader but the nature of the relations between the leader and the community – in particular, the more aspects of an individual's life over which the leader has influence, and the more central the position the leader holds in the community – that explains who has most power to mobilize individuals. Leaders who have influence over more aspects of the individuals´ lives and who hold central positions in the community are more likely associated with higher participation. Moreover, we do not find the effect of social influence to vary by the leader type – namely religious leader, local chief/ neighborhood leader or local councilor, or by the extent of social similarity – whether the respondent shares the leader's gender or ethnicity.

Our analyses of the underlying mechanisms suggest that citizens view some leaders as legitimate and expect some to sanction them. These do not neatly fit with the most influential leaders, however. For instance, respondents are more likely to view leaders who have influence over more aspects of their lives as more likely to sanction non-compliance. These leaders are also perceived as more legitimate in asking people to participate. However, respondents do not appear to see leaders who are more centrally located within the community network as more

prone to sanction misbehavior or as more legitimate in asking for compliance. This suggests that centrality may play a role simply because these leaders are focal points – when respondents view leaders as being known by more community members, they also assume that others would be likely to coordinate on the activity the leader proposes. Furthermore, while shared identity does not appear to drive participation, respondents appear to see co-ethnic leaders as more likely to sanction non-compliance. The results thus raise questions regarding the relationship between legitimacy and sanctioning, and citizens' willingness to participate.

We also do not find community monitoring to increase respondents´ willingness to participate. We have manipulated whether respondents can expect others in the community to monitor their behavior or not. However, community monitoring by neighbors may likely always happen when participation is visible to the community. Respondents who were told that no one else is keeping track of whether they attend may still expect their neighbors to know whether they have joined the activity. Therefore, we cannot rule out that our treatment of social monitoring by the community may not have worked as intended in the experiment.

The study also raises important avenues for future research. Overall, these findings provide some evidence that social influence of local leaders within community networks and their position within the social hierarchy as being more important than social similarity between the leaders and the citizens. Much more work remains to be done, however, to determine whether these findings hold when leaders are at a supra-local level, or when activities require the coordination of larger communities to be successful. So, too, the study raises questions about how the relationship of leaders to other actors affects their ability to mobilize community members. Does a leaders' relationship with the state, with external donors, or other actors and resource bases affect their ability to spur participation? And, finally, to what extent does the impact of social influence (i.e., leader's social influence over the scope of the individual's life, and the members of the community), and other characteristics of leaders depend on the wealth, education or other endowments of individual community members? Answering these and other questions both will extend our theories of leadership, mobilization and development.

REFERENCES

Adida, C.L. 2015. "Do African Voters Favor Coethnics? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Benin." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2(1): 1–11.

Ajorna, A. 2016. *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Ajorna, A., Kasfir, N. and Mampilly, Z. 2015. Rebel Governance in Civil War. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Afrobarometer. 2020. Afrobarometer Data, Round 8, 2020, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.

Atwell, P. and Nathan, N.L. 2021. "Channels for Influence or Maps of Behavior? A Field Experiment on Social Networks and Cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science*. (*Online first)*.

Baldassarri, D. and Grossman, G. 2011. "Centralized Sanctioning and Legitimate Authority Promote Cooperation in Humans." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108(27): 11023-11027.

Baldwin, K. 2015. *The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baldwin, K. 2019. "Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (12): 1925-1956.

Baldwin, K., Kao, K. and Lust, E. 2022. "How Does Authority Translate Across Spheres? Legitimacy, Domain Ownership and the Limits of Power in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia." *Unpublished manuscript*.

Baldwin, K. and Raffler, P. 2019. "Traditional Leaders, Service Delivery, and Electoral Accountability. In: *Decentralized Governance and Accountability*. Edited by Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 61-90.

Beetham, D. 2013. *The Legitimacy of Power*. 2nd Edition. New York, NY: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Benstead, Lindsay. 2016. "Why Quotas are Needed to Improve Women's Access to Services in Clientelistic Regimes." *Governance* 29 (2): 185-202.

Blair, R. 2018. “Legitimacy After Violence: Evidence from Two Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in Liberia.” *SSRN Scholarly Paper*, 23 January. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.

Carlson, E. 2015. “Ethnic Voting and Accountability in Africa: A Choice Experiment in Uganda." *World Politics* 67, 2 (2015): 353-85.

Chandra, K. 2007. *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Cialdini, R.B. and Trost, M.R. 1998. “Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance.” In: *The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vols. 1-2, 4th Ed*. New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill, pp. 151–192.

Cruz, C. 2019. “Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying.” *Comparative Political Studies* 52(3): 382-411.

Cruz, C., Labonne, J. and Querubín, P. 2017. “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines.” *American Economic Review* 107 (10): 3006-37.

Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B. and Ruiz-Euler, A. 2014. Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico. *World Development* 53. Decentralization and Governance: 80–93.

Eubank, N., Grossman, G., Platas, M.R. and Rodden, J. 2021. “Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 16(3): 265-284.

French Jr., J.R.P. and Raven, B. 1959. “The bases of social power.” In: *Studies in Social Power*. Oxford, England: Univer. Michigan, pp. 150–167.

Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J. and Yamamoto, T. 2014. “Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments.” *Political Analysis* 22 (1): 1-30.

Habyarimana, J. *et al.* (2007) 'Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?' *American Political Science Review,* 101(4), pp. 709–725.

Jöst, P. and Lust, E. 2022. “Leadership, Community Ties and Participation of the Poor. Evidence from Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.” *GLD Working Paper* No. 55.

Kelman H.C. and Hamilton V.L. 1989. *Crimes of Obedience*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kingsley, J.J. (2014). “Redrawing Lines of Religious Authority in Lombok, Indonesia”. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 42(5), 657–677.

Koter, D. 2016. *Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge, MT: Cambridge University Press.

Koter, D. 2013. “King-makers: Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa”. *World Politics*, 65(2), 187-232.

Logan, C. 2009. “Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Perspectives on the Co-Existence of Democracy and Traditional Authority.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47(1): 101–128.

Lust, E. 2022. *Everyday Choices: The Role of Competing Authorities and Social Institutions in Politics and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lust, E., Beardsworth, N., Krönke, M., Seekings, J., and Wahman, M. Zambian Election Panel Survey Round 2. 2021. University of Cape Town; The Program on Governance and Local Development at University of Gothenburg. www.gld.gu.se.

Lust, E., Kao, K., Landry, P. F., Harris, A., Dulani, B., Metheney, E., Nickel, S., Carlitz, R., Gakii Gatua, J., J st, P., Mechkova, V., Mujenja, M. F., Tengatenga, J., Grimes, M., Ahsan Jansson, C., Alfonso, W., Nyasente, D., Ben Brahim, N., Jordan, J., ...Lueders, H. (2019). The local governance performance index (LGPI): Kenya, Malawi. Zambia: The Program on Governance and Local Development, University of Gothenburg. https://gld.gu.se.

Magaloni, B., Vivanco, E.F. and Melo, V. 2020. “Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro.” *American Political Science Review* 114(2): 552 – 572.

Magaloni, B., Díaz-Cayeros, A. and Ruiz Euler, A. 2019. “Public Good Provision and Traditional Governance in Indigenous Communities in Oaxaca, Mexico.” *Comparative Political Studies* 52(12): 1841–1880.

McClendon, G. H. and Riedl, B. B. 2019. *From Pews to Politics: Religious Sermons and Political Participation in Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McPherson M., Smith-Lovin L. and Cook, J.M. 2001. “Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 415-444.

Milgram S. 1975. *Obedience to Authority*. New York: Harper Colophon.

Minaeva, E. and Petr, P. 2021. “Dense Networks, Ethnic Minorities, and Electoral Mobilization in Contemporary Russia.” *Problems of Post-Communism (online first)*.

Murtazashvili, J. B. 2016. *Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nathan, N.L. 2016. "Local Ethnic Geography, Expectations of Favoritism, and Voting in Urban Ghana." *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(14), 1896–1929.

Olken, B.A. and Singhal, M. 2011. "Informal Taxation." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3(4): 1–28.

Post, A., Bronsoler, V. and Salman, L. 2017. "Hybrid Regimes for Local Public Goods Provision: A Framework for Analysis". *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(4), 952-966.

Silverman, D., Slemrod, J. and Uler, N. 2014. "Distinguishing the role of authority 'in' and authority 'to'." *Journal of Public Economics* 113: 32–42.

Tsai, L.L. 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *American Political Science Review* 101 (2): 355-372.

Tyler, T.R. 2006. "Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation." *Annual Review of Psychology* 57 (1): 375-400.

Tyler T.R. 1990. *Why People Obey the Law*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
van der Windt, P., Humphreys, M., Medina, L., Timmons, J. F. and Voors, M. 2019. "Citizen Attitudes Toward Traditional and State Authorities: Substitutes or Complements?" *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (12): 1810-1840.

van Leeuwen, B., Ramalingam, A., Rojo Arjona, D. and Schram, A. 2019. "Centrality and cooperation in networks." *Experimental Economics* 22(1): 178– 196.

Wilfahrt, M. 2018. "Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Public Goods Delivery: Evidence from Decentralized West Africa." *World Politics* 70 (2): 239-274.

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Sampling Information

The Zambian Election Panel Round 2 (ZEPR2) survey was the second round of the Zambian Election Panel Survey (ZEPS). The survey was administered by telephone from July 15 to August 11 in 2021.
The sampling frame for each round of ZEPS was compromised of a list of telephone numbers obtained from individuals who:

1. Took some combination of the Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) 2019, Zambia Covid Survey Round 1 (ZCSR1), Zambia Covid Survey Round 2 (ZCSR2) survey, or previous ZEPS rounds,
2. Gave consent for follow-up contact, and
3. Provided a telephone number

The LGPI 2019 sample, the original sample that formed the basis of all subsequent sampling frames, was obtained via a stratified multistage probability proportional to size sampling scheme. The strata included two regions: 1) a 50km radius of Lusaka, and 2) a 100km region from the Zambia-Malawi border. A detailed description of the sampling plan can be found here.
The ZCSR1 survey was a telephone survey administered to those individuals who took the LGPI 2019 survey, consented to follow up contact, and provided a phone number. During fielding, if the original LGPI respondent could not be reached, a substitute respondent was permitted. The ZCSR2 survey was also a telephone survey that used the same sampling frame as ZCSR1 plus the new respondents obtained in ZCSR1 that consented to follow up contact. This same system was used to obtain the ZCSR2 sampling frame and the subsequent ZEPS sampling frames.

Figure A1: Heat map of the number of respondents per district



Figure A2: The heatmap with an overlay of the locations of respondents who took the LGPI 2019 survey



Note: Maps created by Erica Metheney (statistician at GLD).

Appendix B: Survey Questions

Table B1: Outcome Questions to the Experiment

Question Order	Question Text	Answer Choices	Purpose of Question
1	How likely are you to spend a day help campaign for a parliamentary candidate/ attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?"	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Assess participation in the activity
2	How likely do you think others in your neighborhood would be to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate, if your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor asked them to do so?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure expected behavior of the respondent's community members.
3	How likely is it that your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of expected leader sanctioning
4	How likely do you think it is that other members of your village or neighbor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of expected community sanctioning
5	How much do you think it is right and proper for your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor to urge you to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of perceived legitimacy of the leader
6	How much do you think you would enjoy to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very much somewhat not much not at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of Enjoyment

Table B2: Additional follow-up Questions to the Experiment

Do you think your {Authority} would support an MP candidate such as the one described here?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Has your {Authority} ever asked you to {Activity}?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Have you ever attended a meeting to express community concerns to an MP or campaigned for an MP candidate?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4. Refused to answer

Do you think people who attend community meetings to express concerns to the MP do so more to show support for candidate or to express local community concerns?
1. Support for the MP
2. Support for the community
3. Both
4. Neither
5. Don't Know
6. Refuse to Answer

Please think of your {Authority}. Is this a man or a woman?
1. man
2. woman
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

Is {he/she} {respondent's ethnic group}?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4. Refused to answer

How much do you think {Authority} cares about the same issues that you do?
1. very much
2. somewhat
3. not very much
4. not at all
5. Don't Know
6. Refuse to Answer

Think about how many people in your village/neighborhood see your {Authority} as their leader. Would you say that it is almost everyone, some people, a few people, or hardly anyone see your {Authority} as their leader?
1. Almost everyone
2. Some people
3. A few people
4. Hardly anyone

5. Don’t Know
6. Refuse to Answer

Is it acceptable for [Village Chiefs] to try to influence others regarding parliamentary elections?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Is it acceptable for [Local Councilors] to try to influence others regarding parliamentary elections?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Is it acceptable for [Local Religious Leaders] to try to influence others regarding parliamentary elections?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Table B3: Survey Questions on the Social Influence of Different Local Leaders

Please tell me, when you think of your local religious leader, your local councilor or your local chief, which has the greatest impact on	
your ability to make it through hard times, providing assistance with basic living expenses	Your local religious leader Your local councilor Your village head/local chief All equally likely None will help Don't Know Refuse to Answer
your ability to obtain and secure land and property rights	Your local religious leader Your local councilor Your village head/local chief All equally likely None will help Don't Know Refuse to Answer

your ability to find a job if you needed one	Your local religious leader Your local councilor Your village head/local chief All equally likely None will help Don't Know Refuse to Answer
The personal safety of you and your family	Your local religious leader Your local councilor Your village head/local chief All equally likely None will help Don't Know Refuse to Answer
Positive social relations with others in your community	Your local religious leader Your local councilor Your village head/local chief All equally likely None will help Don't Know Refuse to Answer
Your spiritual well being	Your local religious leader Your local councilor Your village head/local chief All equally likely None will help Don't Know Refuse to Answer

Appendix C: Main Analysis and Robustness Checks

Table C1: Main Models showing OLS Regression Analysis with different Dependent Variables

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Sanctioning	Model (3): Community Sanctioning	Model (4): Legitimacy
Attending community meeting	0.133***	-0.008	0.010	0.166***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.039	0.051*	0.018	0.096***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Local councilor	-0.017	0.039+	0.019	0.138***
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Co-Ethnic	0.041*	0.012	0.018	0.033+
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Partisan	0.101***	0.046*	0.043*	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Leader Monitoring	0.010	-0.029	-0.023	-0.037+
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Community Monitoring	0.006	0.031	0.054**	-0.000
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.006	0.027	0.034+
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Payment	0.033	0.000	0.000	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Origin	0.006	0.017	0.019	0.004
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Resident	0.019	-0.003	0.015	-0.023
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Woman	0.013	0.013	0.018	-0.014
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Constant	0.394***	0.404***	0.369***	0.398***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Observations	1521	1472	1472	1516
R^2	0.052	0.0122	0.014	0.076

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C2: OLS Regression Analysis with Social Influence and Shared Identity

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Legitimacy
Leader Influence				
Over Individual	0.022*	0.023**	0.013+	0.026**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Over Community	0.083**	-0.008	-0.018	0.009
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Leader Co-Gender	0.015	0.000	0.024	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.028	0.046*	0.022	0.011
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Attending community meeting	0.138***	-0.004	0.022	0.169***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.029	0.080**	0.043+	0.096***
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Local councilor	0.030	0.072**	0.047+	0.171***
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Co-Ethnic	0.042+	0.015	0.008	0.023
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Partisan	0.105***	0.044*	0.049*	0.025
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Monitoring	0.022	-0.021	-0.028	-0.031
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Community Monitoring	-0.004	0.028	0.040+	-0.018
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.021	0.029	0.039+
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Payment	0.046*	-0.005	-0.001	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Origin	0.021	0.016	0.033	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Resident	0.005	-0.013	0.000	-0.038+
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Woman	-0.000	0.013	-0.002	-0.027
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Constant	0.259***	0.327***	0.339***	0.354***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Observations	1248	1229	1222	1246
R^2	0.0771	0.027	0.0224	0.092

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C3: OLS Regression Analysis with Social Influence, Shared Identity and Domain Ownership

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Legitimacy
Domain Ownership	-0.011	-0.002	0.005	0.070**
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Leader Influence				
Over Individual	0.022*	0.023**	0.013+	0.026**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Over Community	0.082**	-0.008	-0.018	0.014
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Leader Co-Gender	0.016	0.000	0.024	-0.007
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.028	0.046*	0.022	0.010
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Attending community meeting	0.139***	-0.004	0.022	0.167***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.024	0.081**	0.040	0.063*
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Local councilor	0.035	0.073*	0.045	0.138***
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Co-Ethnic	0.042+	0.015	0.008	0.021
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Partisan	0.104***	0.044*	0.050*	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Monitoring	0.022	-0.021	-0.028	-0.030
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Community Monitoring	-0.004	0.028	0.040+	-0.017
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.021	0.029	0.036+
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Payment	0.046*	-0.005	-0.001	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Origin	0.021	0.016	0.033	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Resident	0.005	-0.013	0.000	-0.038+
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Woman	0.000	0.013	-0.003	-0.029
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Constant	0.259***	0.327***	0.339***	0.355***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)

Observations	1248	1229	1222	1246
R^2	0.0772	0.027	0.0224	0.097

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Domain congruence is assigned ex ante, pairing experimental arms from the conjoint experiment on the type of leader and activity. We anticipate a priori that the local chief or neighborhood leader has domain ownership over calling of local community meetings, the local councilor has ownership over campaigning, and the religious leader does not enjoy ownership of either of these activities.

Table C4: Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis with Participation as DV

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Legitimacy
Attending community meeting	1.806***	0.963	1.050	2.231***
	(0.172)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.213)
Authority				
Local chief	0.849	1.301*	1.101	1.632***
	(0.099)	(0.150)	(0.127)	(0.189)
Local councilor	0.927	1.224+	1.102	1.917***
	(0.107)		(0.127)	(0.221)
Co-Ethnic	1.189+	1.065	1.094	1.171+
	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.110)
Co-Partisan	1.575***	1.258*	1.236*	1.130
	(0.150)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.107)
Leader Monitoring	1.058	0.855+	0.886	0.847+
	(0.100)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.080)
Community Monitoring	1.018	1.166	1.305**	0.977
	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.092)
Social Benefit	1.217*	1.034	1.146	1.149
	(0.115)	(0.097)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Payment	1.161	1.004	1.006	0.993
	(0.110)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Co-Origin	1.030	1.094	1.103	1.050
	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.099)
Co-Resident	1.082	0.991	1.076	0.878
	(0.102)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.083)
Woman	1.074	1.077	1.090	0.929
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.088)
Cut1	-0.348	-0.788	-0.654	-0.534
	(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Cut2	0.517	0.618	0.764	0.574
	(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.173)
Cut3	1.216	1.627	1.816	1.393
	(0.174)	(0.181)	(0.179)	(0.176)
Observations	1521	1472	1472	1516
Pseudo-R^2	0.0194	0,0047	0,0053	0,0292

Odds ratios are presented. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are measured on a 4-point scale from unlikely to very likely.

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C5: OLS Regression Analysis with Alternative Measures for Leader Influence and Centrality and different Dependent Variables

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Legitimacy
Domain Ownership	-0.015	-0.008	0.002	0.065*
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Leader Influence by Activity				
Assistance	0.013	0.019	0.046+	0.052*
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Property	-0.022	0.034	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Job	0.044	0.075**	0.065*	0.079**
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Safety	0.053+	0.054*	0.065*	0.038
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Relations	0.052+	-0.009	0.059*	0.020
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Wellbeing	-0.138**	-0.122**	-0.112*	-0.171***
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Leader Influence over Community				
Few	0.057	0.079	0.039	-0.080
	(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Some	0.111	0.027	-0.006	-0.102
	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Almost everyone	0.154+	0.094	0.036	-0.019
	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Leader Co-Gender	0.018	0.004	0.031	-0.002
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.023	0.039+	0.015	0.001
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Attending community meeting	0.143***	0.003	0.030	0.175***
	(0.022)	(0.0207)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.136*	-0.049	-0.043	-0.081
	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Local councilor	-0.091+	-0.068	-0.071	-0.036
	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Co-Ethnic	0.038+	0.011	0.007	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Co-Partisan	0.099***	0.037+	0.043*	0.019

	(0.023)	(0.021)	0.021)	(0.021)
Leader Monitoring	0.020	-0.025	-0.034+	-0.037+
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Community Monitoring	-0.007	0.023	0.035+	-0.020
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Social Benefit	0.045*	0.019	0.028	0.031
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Payment	0.045*	-0.005	-0.001	0.006
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Co-Origin	0.019	0.012	0.028	-0.000
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Co-Resident	0.005	-0.011	0.001	-0.035
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Woman	0.001	0.010	-0.007	-0.031
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Constant	0.341***	0.394***	0.413***	0.597***
	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.096)
Observations	1248	1229	1222	1246
R^2	0.092	0.048	0.045	0.124

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: In the analysis, we use a measure of centrality on a four-point scale to capture the range of people over which an authority has social influence. We include variables for each level of influence separately in the analysis to measure social influence of the authority. See list of survey questions on social influence in Table B3.

Table C6: OLS Regression Analysis with Alternative Measures for Leader Influence (Influence over most important aspect of live) and different Dependent Variables

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Legitimacy
Domain Ownership	-0.013	-0.007	0.002	0.067*
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Leader Influence				
Over Individual	0.007	0.027	0.022	0.020
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Over Community				
Few	0.067	0.097	0.054	-0.062
	(0.089)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Some	0.119	0.046	0.009	-0.088
	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Almost everyone	0.171*	0.117	0.054	0.004
	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Leader Co-Gender	0.013	-0.004	0.021	-0.012
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.026	0.043*	0.021	0.005
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Attending community meeting	0.141***	-0.001	0.024	0.172***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.037	0.070*	0.034	0.045
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Local councilor	0.0196	0.0619*	0.0401	0.120***
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Co-Ethnic	0.040+	0.011	0.006	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Partisan	0.102***	0.040+	0.047*	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Leader Monitoring	0.020	-0.025	-0.030	-0.02+
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.0206)	(0.0216)
Community Monitoring	-0.005	0.027	0.039+	-0.015
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.020	0.028	0.033
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Payment	0.043+	-0.010	-0.003	0.003
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Co-Origin	0.023	0.018	0.034+	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)

Co-Resident	0.007	-0.010	0.001	-0.03
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Woman	-0.0008	0.012	-0.004	-0.031
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Constant	0.247**	0.288***	0.316***	0.470***
	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.089)
Observations	1248	1229	1222	1246
R^2	0.076	0.029	0.024	0.101

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: In the analysis, we use a measure of influence over the community on a four-point scale to capture the range of people over which an authority has social influence. We use a measure of social influence that captures whether the leader that was chosen in the experiment has influence over the most important aspect of the respondent´s live.

Table C7: OLS Regression Analysis with Participation as Dependent Variable and Aggregated LGPI Measure for Leader Influence by Type of Leader

	Model (1): Participating
Leader Influence	
Over Individual	0.006
	(0.013)
LGPI Measure	
Neighborhood Leader Influence	0.159*
	(0.065)
Councilor Influence	0.060
	(0.46)
Religious Leader Influence	0.227
	(0.573)
Leader Co-Gender	-0.003
	(0.035)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.016
	(0.038)
Attending community meeting	0.155***
	(0.035)
Authority	
Local chief	-0.066
	(0.043)
Local councilor	-0.052
	(0.045)
Co-Ethnic	0.023
	(0.035)
Co-Partisan	0.103**
	(0.035)
Leader Monitoring	0.020
	(0.035)
Community Monitoring	0.082*
	(0.035)
Social Benefit	0.083*
	(0.035)
Payment	0.049
	(0.035)
Co-Origin	0.046
	(0.035)
Co-Resident	-0.037
	(0.035)
Woman	-0.031

	(0.036)
Constant	0.330***
	(0.071)
Observations	549
R^2	0.063

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: We calculated a measure of leader influence by type of leader based on a survey question on who people name as most influential person in the community. The survey question was aggregated on the sq km level based on survey data from the Local Governance Performance Index (Lust et al. 2019) and merged with the ZEPS data. It represents the share of people living in the community who named the leader as most influential person. Communities with less than 20 respondents were dropped.

Table C8: Multilevel Analysis with Participation as Dependent Variable and Aggregated LGPI Measure for Leader Influence by Type of Leader

	Model (1): Participating
Leader Influence	
Over Individual	0.004
	(0.013)
LGPI Measure	
Neighborhood Leader Influence	0.148*
	(0.070)
Councilor Influence	-0.022
	(0.501)
Religious Leader Influence	0.351
	(0.612)
Leader Co-Gender	-0.003
	(0.034)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.007
	(0.037)
Attending community meeting	0.160***
	(0.034)
Authority	
Local chief	-0.067
	(0.041)
Local councilor	-0.054
	(0.044)
Co-Ethnic	0.016
	(0.034)
Co-Partisan	0.104**
	(0.034)
Leader Monitoring	0.019
	(0.034)
Community Monitoring	0.086*
	(0.034)
Social Benefit	0.086*
	(0.034)
Payment	0.042
	(0.034)
Co-Origin	0.051
	(0.034)
Co-Resident	-0.036
	(0.034)
Woman	-0.026

	(0.035)
Constant	0.340***
	(0.071)
Variance (constant)	0.013
	(0.007)
Variance (residual)	0.143
	(0.010)
Observations	549
Communities	188

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Random Intercept Model. We calculated a measure of leader influence by type of leader based on a survey question on who people name as most influential person in the community. The survey question was aggregated on the sq km level based on survey data from the Local Governance Performance Index (Lust et al. 2019) and merged with the ZEPS data. It represents the share of people living in the community who named the leader as most influential person. Communities with less than 20 respondents were dropped.

Table C9: OLS Regression Analysis with Participation as Dependent Variable and Aggregated LGPI Measure for Neighborhood Leader only

	Model (1): Participating
Leader Influence	
Over Individual	0.026
	(0.024)
LGPI Measure	
Neighborhood Leader Influence	0.109
	(0.123)
Leader Co-Gender	0.023
	(0.066)
Leader Co-Ethnic	-0.110
	(0.068)
Attending community meeting	0.138*
	(0.064)
Co-Ethnic	0.030
	(0.065)
Co-Partisan	0.130*
	(0.065)
Leader Monitoring	0.016
	(0.067)
Community Monitoring	0.096
	(0.064)
Social Benefit	0.032
	(0.065)
Payment	0.075
	(0.064)
Co-Origin	0.119+
	(0.064)
Co-Resident	-0.006
	(0.063)
Woman	-0.025
	(0.065)
Constant	0.228+
	(0.117)
Observations	185
Pseudo-R^2	0.030

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: We dropped those who saw the religious leader and the local councilor in the experiment from our sample. We believe that the experiment is underpowered to make any meaningful interpretation with an n=185.

Table C10: OLS Regression Analysis with Participation as Dependent Variable and Interaction between Aggregated LGPI Measure for Leader Influence and Dummy for whether LGPI Measure existed

	Model (1): Participating
Interaction	
LGPI_dummy x Combined_Influence	-0.018
	(0.024)
Leader Influence	
LGPI_dummy	0.021
	(0.024)
Combined_Influence	0.029+
	(0.017)
Influence over Individual	0.020*
	(0.009)
Leader Co-Gender	0.006
	(0.024)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.047+
	(0.024)
Attending community meeting	0.149***
	(0.024)
Authority	
Local chief	-0.049
	(0.031)
Local councilor	0.008
	(0.030)
Co-Ethnic	0.032
	(0.024)
Co-Partisan	0.094***
	(0.024)
Leader Monitoring	0.012
	(0.024)
Community Monitoring	0.010
	(0.024)
Social Benefit	0.046+
	(0.024)
Payment	0.050*
	(0.024)
Co-Origin	0.014
	(0.024)
Co-Resident	0.007

	(0.024)
Woman	0.007
	(0.024)
Constant	0.323***
	(0.051)
Observations	1,102
R^2	0.062

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: For the interaction. we create a combined measure using LGPI and ZEPS data capturing the influence of the leaders in the community. We first rescaled the initially 4-point scale variable for how many people see the leader as their leader on a 0-1 scale. We then standardize the rescaled variable. We also rescaled the continuous variable from the LGPI to then create a combined measure. We also create a dummy variable to indicate whether LGPI data on leader influence is available or not for the respondent.

Table C11: Number of Respondents in ZEPS with alternative LGPI Measure of Influence available

Measure	Frequency	Percent
ZEPS Measure only	624	49.52
LGPI and ZEPS Measures	636	50.48
Total	1,260	100

Table C12: Logistic Regression with ZEPS measure as DV and LGPI Measure as Predictor

	Model (1): Leader Influence ZEPS
Leader Influence	
LGPI	5.448***
	(2.20)
Constant	0.524***
	(0.049)
Observations	610
Pseudo-R^2	0.023

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: For the ZEPS measure, we create a dichotomized measure of leader influence with almost everyone vs some, few and hardly anyone based on the following survey question: "Think about how many people in your village/neighborhood see your {local religious leader / local chief or neighborhood leader / local councilor} as their leader. Would you say that it is almost everyone, some people, a few people, or hardly anyone see your {local religious leader / local chief or neighborhood leader / local councilor} as their leader?". For the LGPI measure, we rely on a survey question that asks about the most influential leader in the community. It reports the share of people who have reported that the leader that was given in the experiment is the most influential person. The answers were aggregated on the community (sq km level). We excluded communities with less than 20 respondents.

Appendix D: Additional Analysis

Table D1: Heterogeneous Effects Models with Leader and Community Monitoring on Participation by Leader

	Model (1): Leader Monitoring x Authority	Model (2): Community Monitoring x Authority
Interaction		
Monitoring x Local chief	-0.035	0.049
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Monitoring x Local councilor	-0.087+	0.050
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Attending community meeting	0.133***	0.133***
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Authority		
Local chief	-0.021	-0.065+
	(0.035)	(0.036)
Local councilor	0.027	-0.042
	(0.036)	(0.035)
Co-Ethnic	0.040*	0.040*
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Co-Partisan	0.101***	0.101***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Leader Monitoring	0.051	0.009
	(0.036)	(0.021)
Community Monitoring	0.008	-0.028
	(0.021)	(0.036)
Social Benefit	0.048*	0.047*
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Payment	0.033	0.033
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Co-Origin	0.008	0.006
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Co-Resident	0.019	0.018
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Woman	0.014	0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Constant	0.371***	0.413***
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Observations	1521	1521
R^2	0.054	0.054

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D2: Heterogeneous Effects Models with Leader Monitoring and different Measures of the Nature of the Leaders on Participating

	Model (1): Leader Monitoring x Domain Ownership	Model (2): Leader Monitoring x Embeddedness	Model (3): Leader Monitoring x Centrality	Model (4): Leader Monitoring x Co-Gender	Model (5): Leader Monitoring x Co-Ethnic
Interaction	-0.061	0.036*	-0.056	0.031	0.115*
	(0.045)	(0.015)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.0451)
Domain Ownership	0.012				
	(0.0335)				
Leader Influence					
Over Individual		0.010			
		(0.011)			
Over Community			0.111**		
			(0.035)		
Co-Gender Leader				-0.004	
				(0.030)	
Co-Ethnic Leader					-0.018
					(0.032)
Leader Monitoring	0.030	-0.052	0.057	-0.003	-0.026
	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Community Monitoring	0.013	0.014	0.005	0.007	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.0208)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Attending community meeting	0.139***	0.137***	0.137***	0.137***	0.143***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Authority					
Local chief	-0.034	-0.027	-0.047+	-0.040	-0.040
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.0256	(0.026)	(0.027)
Local councilor	-0.000	0.020	0.003	0.003	-0.000
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.0260)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Co-Ethnic	0.041+	0.038+	0.040+	0.0415+	0.041+
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Co-Partisan	0.106***	0.106***	0.105***	0.109***	0.105***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.046*	0.052*	0.045*	0.0495*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Payment	0.036+	0.037+	0.038+	0.039+	0.046*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Co-Origin	0.014	0.011	0.025	0.020	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Co-Resident	0.014	0.011	0.015	0.0122	0.0054
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.0215)	(0.022)
Woman	0.013	0.012	0.002	0.005	0.006
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)

Constant	0.377***	0.359***	0.359***	0.392***	0.391***
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Observations	1445	1445	1388	1368	1278
R^2	0.060	0.071	0.069	0.0599	0.0693

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure D1. Marginal Effects for Leader Monitoring and Embeddedness (Model in Table C2, Model 2)



Table D3: Heterogeneous Effects Models with Community Monitoring and different Measures of the Nature of the Leaders on Participating

	Model (1): Community Monitoring x Domain Ownership	Model (2): Community Monitoring x Embeddedness	Model (3): Community Monitoring x Centrality	Model (4): Community Monitoring x Co-Gender	Model (5): Community Monitoring x Co-Ethnic
Interaction	-0.017	-0.038*	-0.098+	-0.029	-0.045
	(0.045)	(0.0148)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Domain Ownership	-0.009				
	(0.034)				
Leader Influence					
Over Individual		0.047***			
		(0.0107)			
Over Community			0.135***		
			(0.036)		
Co-Gender Leader				0.026	
				(0.030)	
Co-Ethnic Leader					0.042+
					(0.022)
Leader Monitoring	0.011	0.009	0.012	0.0134	0.021
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Community Monitoring	0.018	0.079*	0.082+	0.021	0.021
	(0.025)	(0.0330	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Attending community meeting	0.139***	0.136***	0.135***	0.138***	0.142***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Authority					
Local chief	-0.035	-0.028	-0.047+	-0.040	-0.0339
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.0257)	(0.026)	(0.0267)
Local councilor	-0.001	0.020	0.00316	0.003	0.00318
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.0260)	(0.026)	(0.0273)
Co-Ethnic	0.041+	0.039+	0.040+	0.042+	0.042+
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Co-Partisan	0.106***	0.107***	0.105***	0.109***	0.106***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Social Benefit	0.048*	0.046*	0.052*	0.046*	0.0492*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Payment	0.038+	0.038+	0.039+	0.039+	0.045*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Co-Origin	0.014	0.010	0.025	0.020	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Co-Resident	0.015	0.011	0.015	0.012	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Woman	0.013	0.012	0.002	0.004	0.005

	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	0.389***	0.298***	0.287***	0.377***	0.360***
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Observations	1445	1445	1388	1368	1278
R^2	0.060	0.071	0.071	0.060	0.065

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure D2. Marginal Effects for Community Monitoring and Embeddedness (Model in Table C3, Model 2)



Table D4. OLS Regression Analysis with Alternative Measures for Domain Congruence

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Legitimacy
Domain Ownership	-0.011	-0.050	-0.036	-0.027
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Leader Influence				
Over Individual	0.026**	0.021*	0.012	0.024**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Over Community	0.073*	-0.003	-0.018	0.022
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Leader Co-Gender	0.016	-0.019	-0.004	-0.018
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Leader Co-Ethnic	0.046+	0.052*	0.033	0.035
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Attending community meeting	0.137***	0.028	0.040	0.136***
	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.011	0.152*	0.089	0.067
	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.073)
Local councilor	0.050	0.094*	0.065+	0.184***
	(0.087)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Co-Ethnic	0.040	-0.001	-0.002	0.005
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Co-Partisan	0.117***	0.036	0.037	0.027
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Leader Monitoring	0.040+	-0.018	-0.039+	-0.020
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Community Monitoring	-0.000	0.027	0.054*	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Social Benefit	0.034	0.022	0.027	0.039+
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Payment	0.040+	0.006	0.014	0.012
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Co-Origin	0.010	0.013	0.014	0.019
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Co-Resident	0.014	-0.010	0.003	-0.033
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Woman	0.008	0.004	0.004	-0.038
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Constant	0.239***	0.332***	0.352***	0.357***
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Observations	1050	1034	1030	1050
R^2	0.89	0.026	0.022	0.086

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. We rely on a measure that considers both the sphere of influence and the geographic reach. The religious leader is coded as 0 for community meetings and 0 for campaigns, the Local Councilor is coded as 1 for community meetings and 2 for campaigns, the local chief/neighborhood leader is coded as 1 for community meeting and 0 for campaign.

Figure D3. Average Marginal Effects Model with Participation as Dependent Variable for the Rural Sample



Figure D4. Average Marginal Effects Model with Participation as Dependent Variable for the Urban Sample



Figure D5. Average Marginal Effects Model with Participation as Dependent Variable for the Peri-Urban Sample



Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics and Observational Analysis

Figure E1: Distribution of Likelihood to Participate



Figure E2: Responses whether leader has ever asked the respondents to participate by activity and leader type



Note: The Figure shows the percent of respondents who reported that they have been asked to participate in campaigning or community meetings by the different leaders. Respondents were only asked about the activity and leader that was given to them in the experiment. The question wording was “Has your {leader} ever asked you to{activity}? (Yes, No, Don´t know, Refuse to Answer)”. Don´t know and refuse to answer were dropped from the analysis as less than 1 percent of the respondents fell into these categories

Figure E3: Co-Ethnic Leader by Type of Leader



Figure E4: Co-Gender Leader by Type of Leader



Figure E5: Socially Central Leader by Type of Leader



Figure E6: Social Embeddedness by Type of Leader



Figure E7: Domain Ownership by Type of Leader



Table E1: Co-Variate Balance Test by Gender

	Female	Male	Pearson Chi2	p-Value
Activity				
Campaigning	49.43	51.69	0.7788	0.378
Community Meeting	50.57	48.31		
Authority				
Religious Leader	32.81	33.29	0.2313	0.891
Local Chief	34.09	32.93		
Local Councilor	33.10	33.78		
Co-Ethnicity				
Co-Ethnic	50.35	50.06	0.0131	0.909
Non-Co-Ethnic	49.65	49.94		
Co-Partisanship				
Co-Partisan	46.25	44.15	0.6810	0.409
Non-Co-Partisan	53.75	55.85		
Leader Monitoring				
Monitoring	49.72	49.64	0.0010	0.975
No Monitoring	50.28	50.36		
Community Monitoring				
Monitoring	50.85	49.03	0.5040	0.478
No Monitoring	49.15	50.97		
Social Benefit				
Benefit	49.57	49.88	0.0141	0.905
No Benefit	50.43	50.12		
Payment				
Payment	47.14	46.56	0.2376	0.626
No Payment	52.19	53.44		

Origin				
Co-Origin	55.59	49.34	5.9747	0.015
Non-Co-Origin	44.41	50.66		
Residence				
Co-Resident	49.50	50.42	0.1284	0.720
Non-Co-Resident	50.50	49.58		
Gender				
Male	54.46	48.01	6.3440	0.012
Female	45.54	51.99		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by co-variate.

Table E2: Co-Variate Balance Test by Education

	No Formal	**At least some Formal**	**Secondary**	**Post-secondary**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity						
Campaigning	51.35	50.12	50.88	51.74	0.1757	0.981
Community Meeting	48.65	49.88	49.12	48.26		
Authority						
Religious Leader	29.73	31.68	34.08	32.57	5.9752	0.426
Local Chief	48.65	34.52	31.72	34.87		
Local Councilor	21.62	33.81	34.20	32.57		
Co-Ethnicity						
Co-Ethnic	43.24	49.41	49.50	53.64	2.1969	0.533
Non-Co-Ethnic	56.76	50.59	50.50	46.36		
Co-Partisanship						
Co-Partisan	40.54	47.28	44.15	45.59	1.4353	0.697
Non-Co-Partisan	59.46	52.72	55.85	54.41		
Leader Monitoring						
Monitoring	48.65	51.06	49.62	47.10	1.0211	0.796
No Monitoring	51.35	48.94	50.38	52.90		
Community Monitoring						
Monitoring	48.65	47.28	49.50	55.21	4.1559	0.245
No Monitoring	51.35	52.72	50.50	44.79		
Social Benefit						
Benefit	48.65	55.08	47.38	48.65	6.7603	0.080
No Benefit	51.35	44.92	52.62	51.35		
Payment						
Payment	67.57	47.52	46.64	45.59	6.5464	0.088
No Payment	32.43	52.48	53.36	54.41		
Origin						
Co-Origin	43.24	52.25	51.00	56.32	3.4231	0.331
Non-Co-Origin	56.76	47.75	49.00	43.68		
Residence						
Co-Resident	51.35	49.17	51.24	46.74	1.7418	0.628
Non-Co-Resident	48.65	50.83	48.76	53.26		
Gender						
Male	54.05	51.54	51.37	48.66	0.8027	0.849
Female	45.95	48.46	48.63	51.34		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by co-variate.

Table E3: Co-Variate Balance Test by Poverty

	Non-Poor	**Poor**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity				
Campaigning	49.62	50.80	0.1211	0.728
Community Meeting	50.38	49.20		
Authority				

Religious Leader	33.33	33.12	1.4294	0.489
Local Chief	36.02	32.80		
Local Councilor	30.65	34.08		
Co-Ethnicity				
Co-Ethnic	47.89	50.52	0.5958	0.440
Non-Co-Ethnic	52.11	49.48		
Co-Partisanship				
Co-Partisan	47.51	44.61	0.7320	0.392
Non-Co-Partisan	52.49	55.39		
Leader Monitoring				
Monitoring	47.69	50.00	0.4584	0.498
No Monitoring	52.31	50.00		
Community Monitoring				
Monitoring	52.69	49.28	1.0029	0.317
No Monitoring	47.31	50.72		
Social Benefit				
Benefit	46.92	50.40	1.0409	0.308
No Benefit	53.08	49.60		
Payment				
Payment	50.57	46.53	1.4191	0.234
No Payment	49.43	53.47		
Origin				
Co-Origin	54.79	51.56	0.9047	0.342
Non-Co-Origin	45.21	48.44		
Residence				
Co-Resident	50.57	49.72	0.0630	0.802
Non-Co-Resident	49.43	50.28		
Gender				
Male	48.66	51.32	0.6105	0.435
Female	51.34	48.68		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by co-variate.

Table E4: Co-Variate Balance Test by Age

	18-34	**35-54**	**55-74**	**75-92**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity						
Campaigning	52.73	48.03	50.30	50.00	2.9461	0.400
Community Meeting	47.27	51.97	49.70	50.00		
Authority						
Religious Leader	32.90	33.79	31.18	37.50	2.1853	0.902
Local Chief	32.25	34.47	35.29	37.50		
Local Councilor	34.85	31.75	33.53	25.00		
Co-Ethnicity						
Co-Ethnic	50.59	49.41	50.59	62.50	0.6886	0.876
Non-Co-Ethnic	49.41	50.59	49.41	37.50		
Co-Partisanship						
Co-Partisan	44.60	42.95	54.71	50.00	7.5843	0.055
Non-Co-Partisan	55.40	57.05	45.29	50.00		
Leader Monitoring						
Monitoring	49.35	48.38	55.62	50.00	2.8182	0.421
No Monitoring	50.65	51.62	44.38	50.00		
Community Monitoring						
Monitoring	51.69	47.35	51.48	25.00	4.6604	0.198
No Monitoring	48.31	52.65	48.52	75.00		
Social Benefit						
Benefit	50.26	48.89	50.30	50.00	0.2738	0.965
No Benefit	49.74	51.11	49.70	50.00		
Payment						
Payment	47.59	47.54	44.12	37.50	1.0227	0.796

No Payment	52.41	52.46	55.88	62.50		
Origin						
Co-Origin	53.84	49.24	55.88	37.50	4.5156	0.211
Non-Co-Origin	46.16	50.76	44.12	62.50		
Residence						
Co-Resident	51.89	45.67	55.88	62.50	8.3625	0.039
Non-Co-Resident	48.11	54.33	44.12	37.50		
Gender						
Male	52.41	50.76	44.12	75.00	5.6869	0.128
Female	47.59	49.24	55.88	25.00		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by co-variate.

Table E5: Co-Variate Balance Test by Ethnicity

	Bemba	**Chewa**	**Tumbuka**	**Other**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity						
Campaigning	53.88	48.13	52.59	49.82	2.0911	0.554
Community Meeting	46.12	51.87	47.41	50.18		
Authority						
Religious Leader	33.33	33.18	34.05	32.75	3.1519	0.790
Local Chief	35.02	29.91	31.03	34.62		
Local Councilor	31.65	36.92	34.91	32.63		
Co-Ethnicity						
Co-Ethnic	48.95	56.07	51.72	48.71	4.0765	0.253
Non-Co-Ethnic	51.05	43.93	48.28	51.29		
Co-Partisanship						
Co-Partisan	45.57	48.60	39.22	45.66	4.4208	0.219
Non-Co-Partisan	54.43	51.40	60.78	54.34		
Leader Monitoring						
Monitoring	50.43	49.07	51.29	49.12	0.4325	0.933
No Monitoring	49.57	50.93	48.71	50.88		
Community Monitoring						
Monitoring	51.29	49.07	49.14	49.94	0.2942	0.961
No Monitoring	48.71	50.93	50.86	50.06		
Social Benefit						
Benefit	56.03	47.20	52.59	47.94	6.0805	0.108
No Benefit	43.97	52.80	47.41	52.06		
Payment						
Payment	43.88	45.79	48.71	47.89	1.5839	0.663
No Payment	56.12	54.21	51.29	52.11		
Origin						
Co-Origin	56.12	51.87	52.16	51.29	1.7486	0.626
Non-Co-Origin	43.88	48.13	47.84	48.71		
Residence						
Co-Resident	49.79	48.60	48.28	50.94	0.7481	0.862
Non-Co-Resident	50.21	51.40	51.72	49.06		
Gender						
Male	51.48	49.53	52.16	50.82	0.3388	0.953
Female	48.52	50.47	47.84	49.18		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by co-variate.