

Polarization and Campaign Dynamics

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
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APSA 2022

- Volatility has shrunk in US elections, both within and between campaigns – polarization the key
- Similar in Canada? Incumbent shares:



- Has affective polarization increased?
- Does affective polarization decrease campaign volatility?
- Complications:
 - Multi-party system
 - Some dyads have polarized, others have depolarized
 - Shifting menu of parties
 - coordination imperatives between adjacent parties
 - Electorate is segmented: Quebec v rest of Canada (ROC)
 - Different menu of parties
 - QC: additional dimension -- “National Question”

Hypotheses:

1. As polarization increases, movement *within* ideological blocks *decreases*

Flattening the dimensionality confines movement to adjacent parties In the single dominant dimension – hinders performance judgments

2. As polarization increases, movement *within* ideological blocks *increases*

Performance judgments confined within blocks

3. As polarization increases, electoral *coordination* within blocks *increases*


FPP – strategic imperative to consolidate the vote

- Polarization indicator should include
 - All (non-minuscule) parties
 - Non-partisans as well as partisans
- Volatility indicators should separate movement *between* 'blocks' from movement *within* 'blocks'.
- Consolidation indicator should reflect number and relative size of parties within a block

Polarization indicator

- Feeling thermometer scores for *parties*
- Indexed by *spread* (Wagner 2021) – sum of squared deviations from average rating
 - Average and deviations *weighted* for vote shares in the current election
 - Premium on feelings toward larger parties

Polarization



Volatility indicators

- Based on Volatility index (Pedersen 1979):
- Volatility for the system = *Total Volatility* = TV
(Bartolini and Mair 1990 [2007])
- *Block Volatility* = BV .
- $WBV = TV - BV$

Consolidation

- Effective number of parties (Laakso & Taagepera 1979)

$$1/(1 - \text{HH index})$$


- Yields fractional number of “parties”
- Smaller value = more coordination
- Calculations within each block

Identifying the end points


True RCS (Johnston & Brady 2002)

1. Remove earliest days
 - Clearance of sample
2. Smoothing of vote intentions
 - Remove sampling error
 - Method: Generalized additive model (GAM) with cubic splines
 - Estimation by cross-validation
3. Volatility and consolidation: difference between smoothed share of vote intentions at the end of the campaign and at the beginning


Volatility




Consolidation




Spread and Block Volatility



Spread and Within-Block Volatility



Spread and Left Consolidation




Discussion

- Dimensionality
 - ROC: may have shrunk but still not unidimensional
 - QC: may actually have increased – Bloc v Liberals + expansion of L-R
- Liberals still occupy the centre – scope for opportunism (e.g. 90s)
- Party splits and fusion – PID not a constant, esp on the right
- Compensation voting?
- Strategic manoeuvre more between than within campaigns
 - context dependency
 - cf 1993 & 2011

Extras


- In the US, polarization has made elections less variable, including in campaigns:




Volatility indicators

- Volatility index (Pedersen 1973, 1983):
 - Where Volatility for *party_i* (V_i) = $P_{it} - P_{it(0)}$, where P_{it} is the i^{th} party's share at t .
 - Volatility for the system = $\frac{\sum_i |V_i|}{2}$. Call this *Total Volatility* = TV (Bartolini and Mair 1990 [2007])
- Where parties grouped in blocks:
 - *Block Volatility* = $\frac{|V_a+V_b+V_c|+|V_d+V_e|}{2}$, by way of illustration, where V_a, V_b, V_c are one block and V_d and V_e , the other block in a system with two blocks.
- Call *Within-Bloc* Volatility WBV.
 - $TV = BV + WBV$


Quebec



ROC



Quebec



ROC

