The Role of Partisanship, Identity and Incentives in Mobilizing Zambian Citizens

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Abstract

Citizens' political engagement is widely regarded as vital for democracy. From fundraising and campaigning to participatory budgeting and attending community meetings, non-electoral political participation is believed to increase the inclusion of citizens and accountability of politicians, encourage civic skills and virtues, improve policy, and increase the legitimacy of both the process and outcomes. In Africa, however, the assumption has often been that citizens do not engage robustly in many of these vital activities, with political participation primarily limited to voting. Thus, little research explores the drivers of these other activities. In this paper, we aim to fill the gap, using an original survey experiment to explore the drivers of citizen participation in Zambia around the 2021 national elections. Contrary to widely held views in the literature, we find that partisanship is a critical driver of this non-electoral activity, with social incentives and ethnicity also playing important but less significant roles. Finally, we seek to understand the mechanisms underpinning these results, finding that citizens anticipate sanctions if they fail to support a co-partisan but not a co-ethnic candidate. These findings have important implications for understanding political engagement and democratic development throughout the region.

Introduction

Many consider an engaged citizenry during political campaigns to be one of the key pillars of a healthy democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Norris, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2013). From voting and campaigning for candidates, to attending rallies and meeting with elected representatives, citizen participation around elections is believed to increase the inclusion of citizens and accountability of politicians, encourage civic skills and virtues, improve policy development, and increase the legitimacy of both the electoral process and outcomes (Michels and De Graaf 2010; Dalton 2008).

Despite the acknowledged importance of political engagement during campaigns, however, studies have long suggested that citizens in Africa "often fail to participate much beyond voting," with a common assumption being that they lack the opportunity, interest, and/or resources to engage more robustly (Krawczyk and Sweet-Cushman, 2017, p.137). As a result, relatively little research has been done to explore the drivers of non-voting campaign-related behavior in Africa, leaving us with a limited understanding of why individuals choose to participate in these vital activities.[1] The evidence suggests, however, that citizens across the continent *do* engage in numerous forms of non-voting campaign-related activity, and indeed, as Paget (2019) has shown, rates of face-to-face campaign attendance and mobilization are higher in Africa than in many other world regions. A better understanding of these activities is therefore needed.

In this paper, we use an original survey experiment in Zambia to explore citizen participation in non-voting electoral activities. We focus specifically on two forms of activity in this regard - campaigning and attending a meeting to raise an issue. We focus on these two activities for a number of reasons. First, as already discussed, the literature on voting is reasonably well developed, while the drivers of these sorts of non-voting campaign activities are far less well understood in the African context. There is therefore an important gap to fill here. Additionally, although campaigning and attending a meeting to raise an issue are not the only forms of non-voting campaign activity, Afrobarometer data suggests that they are relatively common across the continent, making them particularly important to understand. And finally, although rallies are also an important and common form of campaign participation, rallies in the African

[1] See Portos et al (2020) for a similar argument about the relative lack of attention paid to non-voting forms of electoral activity more broadly.

context are often occasions where things are given out in return for participation (for example, food parcels, T-shirts, and party merchandise). We want to be able to randomize expectations of material reward in our empirical analysis, and this is easier to do for activities like campaigning and attending meetings, where the provision of incentives is a less common occurrence.

Drawing on the wider literature on voting and participation, we test the effect of two key sets of explanations on the propensity of citizens to report being willing to engage in these activities. These explanations are: 1) the existence of shared identities between candidates and citizens (including co-ethnicity, co-locality, co-partisanship and co-gender); and 2) the availability and use of monetary and social incentives. These explanations are all common in the wider literature, but have not been tested against one another in relation to non-voting campaign-related participation in the African context. This is therefore, to the best of our knowledge, the first time that these explanations have been rigorously tested and weighed against one another like this.

We find that, contrary to the dominant views of participation in Africa, partisanship is a critical driver of this campaign activity, with co-ethnicity and social incentives playing important, but less significant, roles. Moreover, sanctioning and enjoyment of the activity (i.e., social benefits) are strongly associated with co-partisan candidates, and more so than with regard to co-ethnicity and social incentives.

The paper makes three key contributions to our understanding of citizen participation in Africa. First, we show that partisanship plays a more important role in political participation in Africa than previously thought. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the role and activities of political parties across the continent, and the need to set co-ethnicity and regionalism in perspective. Second, and relatedly, the paper demonstrates the need to distinguish between partisanship, ethnicity and regionalism/localism. Even where these three factors are seen to be closely related, they may have distinct effects on individuals' actions. Third, the paper extends our understanding of electoral participation – studying individuals' willingness to campaign on behalf of a candidate or attend a community meeting, expressing concerns to the candidate.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on the drivers of citizen participation. Following this, we specify our hypotheses, before moving on to introduce the Zambian context in which our experiment takes place. We then detail the experiment and data, before moving on to present the results and discussion. The final section concludes.

Drivers of Citizen Participation

As already noted, the literature on political participation in Africa has tended to focus on voting, rather than on other forms of political activity, and to assume relatively little participation beyond that (Krawczyk & Sweet-Cushman, 2017; Krönke et al., 2022). Where works have focused on non-voting political participation, however, the dominant explanation has tended to be that the decision to participate depends largely on the individual resources, views and motivations of citizens at the micro-level (Isaksson, 2014; Mattes, 2008; Resnick & Casale, 2011). These sort of explanations, which draw on the works of Verba and his co-authors, particularly emphasize socio-economic and attitudinal factors, including the differential access of citizens to critical resources such as money, education, and civil skills (Almond & Verba, 1963; Verba et al., 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972). While undoubtedly important, however, this approach cannot fully explain the campaign-related participation patterns observed in the data. Importantly, many of these individual-level resources, values and motivations are likely to be relatively stable, making it hard to explain why people choose to participate for certain candidates and not others.

In this paper, therefore, while we accept that the socio-economic, resource and attitudinal models are at least part of the answer, we move beyond them. Specifically, we focus on the characteristics of candidates and their campaigns, and the ways in which these might affect the decisions of citizens to participate at a specific moment and for a specific campaign.

The broader literature suggests two possible sets of explanations in this regard. First, a significant body of literature on voting suggests that shared characteristics between candidates and citizens are a key factor in explaining voter turnout, and there are good reasons to believe that they can help to explain non-voting turnout as well. Crucially, these shared identities are likely to vary by candidate and election, and therefore they have the potential to help explain why the same individuals might choose to participate at one moment and not another. Second,

the literature on both voting and social movements suggests that the availability and provision of incentives – positive and negative, material and social – by candidates, campaigns and the wider community is also likely to have an important mobilizing effect. Given that the availability and use of these incentives is likely to vary by context, moreover, these explanations can also help to explain why citizens may choose to participate under some circumstances and not others.

Shared Characteristics

Beginning with shared characteristics, a growing body of literature finds that shared characteristics between candidates and citizens, such as co-ethnicity or co-gender, can be an important mobilizing factor for voting in communities around the world (Barreto, 2007; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Just, 2022). In the US and South Africa, for example, sharing a racial identity with a candidate has been shown to significantly increase the likelihood of voting (see, for example, Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Dawson, 1994; Ferree, 2011), while shared ethnicity has been found to increase electoral participation in settings ranging from Africa (Carlson, 2015) to the Middle East (Shockley & Gengler, 2020) and North America (Barreto, 2010). Co-gender (Badas & Stauffer, 2019; Campbell & Heath, 2017) , co-locality (Ichino & Nathan, 2013), and co-partisanship (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2010), similarly, are also often highlighted as factors affecting turnout, and while most of this research has focused on voting specifically, there are good reasons to believe that similar factors may affect political participation more broadly (e.g., Harding & Michelitch, 2021; Mattes & Krönke, 2020).

Whatever the specific characteristic, the fundamental argument is that voters have some sort of baseline preference for candidates that resemble them (Campbell & Heath, 2017). As Johnston et al (1992) argue, "the more an agent resembles oneself, the more he or she might be expected reflexively to understand and act on one's own interests." This belief in shared interests and goals, increases the level of psychological engagement among citizens, providing a powerful motivation to support such candidates, and act in ways to try and advance their campaigns - whether that be through voting, campaigning, or attending meetings (Dahl, 1961; Parenti, 1967; Tate, 2003). Additionally, the shared networks and communities that often accompany these shared identities, also facilitate and encourage mobilization, through social ties and networks and the ability of groups to utilize social incentives such as esteem and shame (Gerber et al., 2010; Klandermans, 2004; McClendon, 2014).

In the African context, four characteristics in particular may be important in motivating participation. These are: 1) co-ethnicity; 2) co-locality; 3) co-partisanship; and 4) co-gender.

Co-Ethnicity

Co-ethnicity has long been seen as one of the key mobilizing factors in African politics (Bates, 1983; Carlson, 2015; Ferree, 2011).[2] Central to such arguments is typically an instrumentalist theory of ethnic mobilization, which argues that voters support co-ethnic candidates because they expect to be favored by them and they see the success of such candidates as their best chance for getting access to resources, public goods, and desired policy changes (Carlson, 2015). Indeed there is significant empirical evidence that African voters expect to be favored by co-ethnic politicians (Okalany, 1996; Silah & Markakis, 1998; Young, 1976), and that they participate in ways that are hard to explain in the absence of these sorts of instrumental explanations (Ferree, 2006; Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Posner, 2005). Carlson (2015) goes so far as to call this instrumentalist argument of co-ethnic mobilization "a foundational assumption of much of the current literature on African political behavior" (p.355).

Of course, favoritism of this sort is not unique to ethnic groups, but ethnicity has a number of particular advantages as a cleavage. First, the deep social networks associated with ethnicity provide a useful way to mitigate the credibility problem facing many candidates (Carlson, 2015; Fearon & Laitin, 1996), making any promises of post-election provisions more credible and giving citizens increased confidence in their ability to hold co-ethnic politicians accountable once in office (Dunning & Harrison, 2010; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008). Additionally, ethnicity is a useful heuristic in the sort of low-information political environments common across the continent. As elsewhere, they help citizens make inferences about the preferences of candidates (Chandra, 2004; Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Corstange, 2008), increasing the likelihood that candidates will know what goods and policies their co-ethnics want, and making it more likely that they will share those interests (Barreto, 2010). The repeated interactions that take place within ethnic communities also provide multiple opportunities for reputations to develop, making it easier for voters to identify "good types" (Fearon, 1999; Fearon & Laitin, 1996).

As well as the dominant instrumentalist view, however, another set of literature, drawn from social identity theory (see Huddy, 2001 for a review), suggests that co-ethnic support during

[2] See Barreto (2010), Chandra (2004) and Lust (2009) for literature outside of the African context.

and around elections may also stem from positive or negative biases based on ascriptive identities, regardless of whether there is anything at stake economically (Shockley & Gengler, 2020). That is, political participation around elections may reflect a social-psychological affinity for co-ethnics, and a desire to support and engage with their campaigns as a result. Much of the strongest evidence for the impact of these social biases comes out of the United States, where a large body of literature has found a strong relationship between ascriptive identity and voting behavior (Campbell & Cowley, 2014; McDermott, 1998). In the African context, however, this literature is much more nascent (see, for example, Adida, 2015; Carlson, 2015; Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Shockley & Gengler, 2020), with the instrumentalist view continuing to dominate.

Co-Locality

While ethnicity remains the dominant identity discussed in the African context, a newer body of scholarship has pushed back on its central position, arguing that shared location, rather than shared ethnicity, may well be the key determining factor of electoral behavior (Ichino & Nathan, 2013; Posner, 2004b). Arguments here are typically positioned as an extension of the instrumental view that people participate in ways they believe will benefit them materially, but for these authors co-locality rather than co-ethnicity is key. Ichino and Nathan (2013), for example, argue that, in the Ghanaian case, individuals living in a rural area dominated by members of a non-co-ethnic group, have a strong incentive to support and vote for candidates who are members of this non-co-ethnic group, in order that the area might be favored with development goods from which they cannot be excluded.

Of course, across Africa, ethnicity and region often overlap significantly (Bates, 1974), making it hard in many cases to disentangle the mobilizing power of co-locality versus co-ethnicity (Adida, 2015). Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that co-locality with a candidate (whether that be current co-residence, or the fact that a candidate originally came from the area) may activate many of the same factors as co-ethnicity, such as a belief in the increased likelihood of receiving public, private or club goods, a sense of improved credibility and accountability, shared social networks that help to facilitate mobilization, and a belief that the candidate is more likely to have shared interests if they have a tie to the local area.

Recent work by Boone et al. (2022) suggests that this also exists at the meso-level. In line with the argument put forward by Lipset & Rokkan, the authors identify geographically defined

electoral blocks. These blocks "exhibit strong and persistent lines of regional competition and cleavage between economically-leading, predominantly agricultural regions, or between dynamic export-producing regions and poorer peripheries" (Boone et al. 2022). Although Boone et al. demonstrate the existence of these blocks using vote shares from presidential elections, it is plausible that these dynamics are relevant in our case, too. For example, citizens might be less inclined to participate in politics on behalf of an MP that comes from the other side of such an electoral cleavage due to perceived differences in the understanding of local economic realities.

Co-Partisanship

While ethnicity and (more recently) locality have tended to dominate the literature on participation in Africa, political parties have long been seen as the dominant mobilizing force in the Global North, with a substantial literature identifying the critical role they play in organizing and mobilizing supporters, encouraging people to vote, and involving individuals in campaign work more broadly (Kitschelt, 1994; Norris, 2004; Ware, 1996). Parties do this in many ways, including by developing civic skills that help facilitate political activity, offering social and material incentives, reducing the costs of participation (by, for example, supplying information or provide transportation to events), sanctioning non-participants, and directly asking citizens to participate (Bochel & Denver, 1971; Gerber & Green, 2000; Karp & Banducci, 2007).

Despite its dominance in the literature on the Global North, however, partisanship has traditionally been seen as a less important driver in Africa, where parties are typically seen as weak, with low levels of support, and a limited capacity to engage with or mobilize citizens (Krönke et al., 2022; Rakner & Van de Walle, 2009; Storm, 2013). A nascent literature, however, argues that scholars have underestimated how quickly citizens attach to parties in new democracies (Brader & Tucker, 2001; Harding & Michelitch, 2021), partisanship in Africa is actually higher than in many other regions, and parties across the continent have a greater mobilizational capacity than previously assumed (Harding & Michelitch, 2021; Krönke et al., 2022). All of this provides good reasons to think that co-partisanship might play a more important role than previously assumed, making it important to test alongside the more dominant arguments.

Co-Gender

And finally, although relatively little research has been done on this in the African context, scholars focused elsewhere have found that the gender of candidates also affects the propensity of individuals to support and mobilize for them. Authors such as Cook (1994) and Mansbridge (1986), for example, have found that women tend to be more interested in campaigns (and therefore more engaged with them) when female candidates are present, and we consider co-gender as variable as a result. The evidence is somewhat mixed in this regard, however, with many arguing that the influence of gender is extremely context specific, with candidate gender influencing behavior in some elections but not others (Campbell & Heath, 2017; Dolan, 2004; Dolan & Lynch, 2014). And additionally, there is also a related literature arguing that individuals have a baseline affinity for male or female candidates based on beliefs and stereotypes about competence and policy stands, regardless of their own gender (King & Matland, 2000; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Sapiro, 1983). While we consider co-gender alongside our other characteristics, therefore, it should be noted that the research remains relatively inconclusive as to the likely direction and mechanisms of this impact, and this is discussed further in the findings (Sanbonmatsu, 2002).

Incentives

In addition to the potential impact of shared identities, the literature on voting and social movements also suggests that the availability and provision of material and social incentives, both positive and negative, has an important mobilizing effect (Klandermans, 2004; Lockwood, 2022; Olson, 1965). Incentives can include the provision of material goods (Olson, 1965), social incentives such as participating alongside friends (Klandermans, 2004), and the use of negative incentives such as monitoring and sanctioning (Olson, 1965; White et al., 2014). Crucially, as with candidate characteristics, these incentives are likely to vary by campaign and context, helping to explain not only who participates, but also why people might choose to participate for some campaigns and not others.

Of course, as the discussion on shared characteristics above has shown, many of these incentives are believed to underlie and interact with the impact of shared identities. For example, expectations around the provision and targeting of material goods (material incentives), the availability of social ties and social incentives such as participating alongside friends (social incentives), and the ability of ethnic groups to monitor and sanction behavior

(negative incentives), are all suggested as key reasons why people support and mobilize for co-ethnic candidates (Carlson, 2015; Fearon & Laitin, 1996). And similar arguments have been made about political parties, locality, and gender.

In this paper, therefore, while we explore the impacts of incentives alongside those of shared characteristics, we recognize that, in reality, the provision and use of incentives are often intertwined with these characteristics in important ways. They do not have to be, however, and as we will discuss shortly, one of the advantages of our experiment is that we are able to tease apart these different factors to some extent, allowing us to understand the differential impacts they may have.

Hypotheses

Drawing on the above literature, we advance the following hypotheses, which were pre-registered prior to the survey [registered with EGAP on September 29, 2021, registration ID: 20210929AA]:

H1: *Identity or shared characteristics between the respondent and the MP candidate should increase the willingness of respondents to participate*. That is, we expect that respondents will be more likely to report being willing to participate in non-voting campaign-related activities when they:

- H1.1: Share an ethnicity with the MP candidate (co-ethnicity)
- H1.2: Are members of the same party (co-partisan)
- H1.3: Come from the same place (co-origin/co-locality)
- H1.4: Live in the same place (co-residence/co-locality)
- H1.5: Share the same gender (co-gender).

We do not have a strong prior regarding which of these characteristics will have the strongest effect, but the broader literature on Africa suggests that ethnicity is likely to be the dominant identity characteristic, with co-identities such as co-locality and co-partisan registering a weaker or even negligible effect.

H2: *Incentives should also increase the respondents' willingness to participate.* These may be material, or social (positive or negative).

- H2.1: Respondents are more likely to participate when they are told they will be compensated financially
- H2.2: Respondents are more likely to participate when they are told that they will participate alongside their friends.

Finally, we explore potential mechanisms explaining why respondents should be more likely to participate when they are asked to support a candidate who shares their social identity or when they receive material and social incentives. Specifically, we consider whether citizens expect sanctions from others in the community or their local leader and whether they believe that they will be more likely to enjoy the activity. We believe that these mechanisms could apply independent of the drivers of participation that we find to be most important.

H3. Respondents will be more likely to report being willing to participate when they share the social identity (co-ethnic, co-partisan, co-origin, co-resident, co-gender) of the MP candidate or when they receive material or social benefits because

- H3.1. they think that others will sanction them if they do not participate.
- H3.2. they think that their local leader will sanction them if they do not participate.
- H3.3. they believe that they will enjoy the activity.

Case Selection and Study Context

We examine the drivers of electoral participation in Zambia. Zambia is one of several countries to have experienced multiple democratic transfers of power in Africa, following the return to multiparty democracy in 1991. It is a case in which identity factors and incentives are expected to be salient, and one with a history of vibrant political participation that goes beyond voting on election day.[3] Thus, it is a useful case to test the competing explanations for campaign-related participation. Moreover, Zambia is not unique in these respects. Cross-national studies

[3] For example, in 1993, in one of the first surveys of the multiparty era, 38% said they had personally contacted a political representative, and 25% said they had promoted a political candidate in the five years prior to the survey (Bratton, 1999).

show Zambia to be very similar to other African countries with regards to our key dependent and independent variables, which lends confidence in the generalizability of our findings.

Starting with our dependent variable, we observe that Zambians' political participation is significant, but not unusual for the continent. In 2020, about half of Zambians said that they attended a community meeting (55%), while many also frequently engage with key political actors such as MPs and local party officials.[4] (Afrobarometer, 2022). Similarly, when asked about different forms of political participation during the 2016 election period, 15% claimed that they worked for a party or candidate, 37% said that they attended a campaign rally, and 65% claimed to vote on election day.[5] These levels of participation are very similar to that of citizens in other African countries (Figure 1).[6]

Figure 1: Worked for party/candidate in last election | 34 countries



Source: Afrobarometer Round 8 (2020); Respondents were asked: Did you work for a candidate or party in the last election? % of respondents who said "yes".

[4] According to Round 8 of Afrobarometer, 13% of respondents said they contacted a Member of Parliament at least once in the preceding 12 months, while 14% reported that they had approached an ordinary party official during the same time period.

[5] Afrobarometer data from 2003 to 2020 suggests that the level of participation has remained relatively stable over the past two decades (Appendix A, Figure A1).

[6] According to data from 34 countries between 2019 and 2021, Zambia scores close to the country-level mean on campaign related forms of participation (Appendix A, Table A1).

Participation remained significant in the campaign period for the 12 August 2021 general elections, the context of our study. The campaigns, which officially started on 15 May 2021, took place in a more repressive political environment than Zambia's previous elections. A decade of democratic backsliding under President Lungu had seen government efforts to dismantle the opposition (UPND), independent media outlets, and civil society organizations (Resnick, 2022b), and the playing field remained uneven in the final months prior to the election. Police often used excessive force with impunity when engaging with opposition supporters (Amnesty International, 2021), and COVID-19 related campaign restrictions being applied selectively to limit opposition rallies (Ahmed, 2021; du Plessis, 2021). Ordinary citizens feared and experienced serious violence and intimidation in public spaces such as markets or bus stations - especially from PF party cadres in urban areas (Beardsworth et al., 2021; Beardsworth & Krönke, 2022). Yet, despite this challenging campaign environment, many Zambians still participated in campaign related activities (42%)[7], and turned out in large numbers on election day (71%).[8]

Turning to the different explanations, the existing literature suggests that ethnicity is an important and politically relevant fault line in Zambian politics (Posner, 2004b, 2004a). The latest wave of the Afrobarometer survey finds that only 11% of Zambians identify primarily in ethnic, rather than national, terms (Afrobarometer 2022), but 43% of citizens identify equally as Zambian and as a member of their ethnic group. Scholars have long argued that politicians employ ethnicity, particularly as centered around the four major linguistic groups, as a tool to mobilize electoral support - seeing its success at least partly in instrumental terms (Posner 2008, Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010; Sishuwa, 2021). And some complained that ethnicity was particularly salient in the 2021 elections - the context of our study here, pointing to heightened ethnic rhetoric and the potential for conflict (Mwenza 2021).

[7] In ZEPS (2021), respondents were asked: "Have you ever attended a meeting to express community concerns to an MP or campaigned for an MP candidate? (Yes/No/Don´t know/Refuse to Answer)".

[8] We discuss the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the robustness checks in the Appendix.

Figure 2: Zambia in comparative perspective | Panel A: Feels close to political party (33 countries) | Panel B: feels close to ethnic group, equally close to ethnic group and national identity (32 countries)



Source: Afrobarometer Round 8 (2020); Respondents were asked: Do you feel close to any particular political party? % of respondents who said "yes" [Panel A]; Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a (national identity) and being a (respondent's ethnic group) [Panel B].

Localism, and in particular regionalism, also matters to Zambians in ways that are relevant to this study. At the meso-level, Zambia's distinct regional voting blocs are related to economic

cleavages such as Copperbelt and Northern Province versus Southern Province in Zambia (Boone et al., 2022). Thus, a candidate hailing from the same geographic area might be perceived to have more shared interests if they belong to the same economic region.

However, co-location also matters at a lower level of aggregation - neighborhoods. Not only does a considerable share of Zambians live in communities with dense social ties that have the potential to facilitate political mobilization (Jöst & Lust 2022), co-locality also has more diffuse yet tangible effects on Zambians' daily lives. For example, Zambians feel more obliged to help someone from their own community compared to someone else (43% in the border regions and 35% in the Lusaka area)[9], and a majority of Zambians also believe that co-locality matters when trying to access government services (40% in the border region and 31% in Lusaka area)[10], or applying for a job (40% in the border regions and 31% in the Lusaka area)[11]. Thus, we test for the possible effects of co-locality at both levels.

Partisanship is also salient in Zambia, although closely tied to regionalism. The first 15 years of multiparty democracy saw a great deal of party system instability, but the constellation of the major parties is now relatively stable (Arriola et al., 2022).[12] Following the victory of the Patriotic Front (PF) in 2011, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) effectively disintegrated by 2016, leaving Zambia with a two-party system (PF and United Party for National Development (UPND)). Zambia's parties are often characterized by clear regional strongholds, but the consolidation of the party system also coincided with an expansion of the PF and UPND local presence across most parts of the country (Beardsworth, 2020; Krönke et al., 2022; Resnick, 2022a). It has also resulted in greater party identification. Public opinion data finds that 43% of Zambians identify with a party and most know representatives who live

[9] In the Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI), a large household survey conducted in 2019 by the Governance and Local Development Institute (Lust et al. 2019), respondents were asked: "Are people from {name of respondent's village} more obligated to help each other, less obligated to help each other or neither more or less obligated to help each other than they are to help people from outside {name of respondent's village}? (Less obligated, equally obligated, more obligated, don´ know/refuse to answer)."

[10] In the LGPI, respondents were asked: "If you needed help from a government worker getting access to a service such as public healthcare or enrollment of your child into public school, do you think you get better assistance, worse assistance, or the same assistance if the person is from {name of respondent's village}?"

[11] In the LGPI, respondents were asked: "Imagine you are applying for a job, do you think that you have a better or worse chance of being hired if the person making the hiring decisions is from {name of respondent's village}?"

[12] The effective number of legislative parties remained stable between 2001 and 2011 (2001=3.3; 2006=3.1; 2011=3.4), before dropping to 2.6 in 2016 (Arriola et al., 2022).

in their communities from at least one, and often both major parties.[13] Co-partisanship is thus a plausible explanation for campaign related mobilization.

As outlined above, we expect that respondents will be more likely to report being willing to participate in non-voting campaign-related activities when they share the gender of the MP. Given the mixed results in the broader literature and the absence of prior studies on this issue in the Zambian context, we sketch out two broader dynamics as they relate to the gendered nature of the MP-citizen relationship in Zambia. Over the years the success rate of women candidates, as well as the number of female MPs has increased in Zambia. Yet, women still make up a clear minority in parliament (Wang & Muriaas 2019). What is more, women face several gender specific hurdles during parties' selection procedure and with regards to candidates' financial resources, even though they largely use the same strategies as men to succeed in politics. An upshot of these dynamics is that women candidates are significantly less likely than men to give public speeches or participate in rallies during campaigning (Arriola, Phillips & Rakner, 2021; Wang & Muriaas 2019).

Similarly, citizen survey data reveals that men are more likely to participate in politics. According to Afrobarometer data (Round 8), men were more likely to contact an MP (16 vs. 10%), attend a campaign rally (43% vs. 30%), or work for a candidate/party (18% vs. 13%) in the preceding election compared to women (Afrobarometer Round 8).

Material and social incentives are also commonplace in Zambia. The Round 8 (2019/2021) Afrobarometer survey (2022) revealed that one fifth (19%) of Zambians were offered food, a gift, or money for their vote, a frequency in line with the 33-country average. Zambians are also frequently exposed to social incentives that are related to various forms of political participation. Living in communities with relatively dense social ties, unelected local elites can have an important influence on citizens' decision to participate in politics and community activities, whether by acting as development brokers (Baldwin, 2013), or through community sanctioning and bandwagoning (Jöst & Lust, 2022).

[13] Between 1999 and 2009, the share of Zambians who felt close to a party increased from 36% to 60%, before decreasing again steadily to 43% in 2020. Despite the recent decline in partisan identification, Zambia still reflects the country mean in a 33-country sample (Afrobarometer Round 8).

Data & Measurement

The data used here is drawn from the second wave of a three-wave Zambian Election Panel Survey (ZEPS). The survey was implemented by phone just prior to the 12 August 2021 election (15 July - 10 August).[14] Respondents were primarily located either in the urban and peri-urban areas of Lusaka or small towns and rural areas in the Eastern and Muchinga provinces, along the border with Malawi (Figure 3). Thus, the survey sample is not nationally representative, but it includes approximately 32% urban, 29% peri-urban, and 39% rural respondents.

Figure 3: Respondents of ZEPS Round 2 Survey | by location



Note: The map was created by Erica Metheney (statistician at GLD).

[14] More details on the survey sample and implementation are found in Appendix F.

Survey Experiment

The second wave of the Zambian Election Panel Study (ZEPS) included a survey experiment that was designed to explore the drivers of campaign related participation. The vignette experiment asks respondents to imagine a hypothetical situation in which their local leader asks them either to attend a community meeting or to campaign for a parliamentary candidate. The experiment starts with the following prompt:

> We realize that campaigns are in session, but for right now, I'd like you to consider a hypothetical situation.

The interviewer next reads a short vignette. The vignette contains a set of experimental treatments that are designed to test hypotheses regarding how and why identity, incentives, and the nature of authority affect participation.[15] All experimental attributes were randomized with equal probability (see Table 1 for a list of these attributes). In the vignette here, we denote experimental attributes with square brackets, and place items that were assigned based on the randomly chosen attributes in curly braces.

> I'd like you to imagine that [your neighbor /your local chief or neighborhood leader /your local councilor] is urging you to [help campaign for a candidate for Member of Parliament/ attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate].
>
> The candidate is a [Co-ethnic (respondent's ethnicity piped-in)/Not co-ethnic (randomly chosen, non-coethnic with respondent piped-in)] [man/woman] running for parliament as the [co-party (respondent's preferred party piped-in)/randomly chosen other party, non-co-party] candidate. {He/she} was [born here/born in a different region] {and/but} [currently lives in a village or neighborhood nearby/currently lives in a village/neighborhood on the other side of the district].
>
> Your [local religious leader / local chief Jor neighborhood leader / local councilor] is keen on you {helping campaign for a parliamentary candidate/ attending a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate}, [but is not keeping track of whether or not you do/ and will be keeping track of whether or not you do.] [No one else in the community is/Many others in the community are] keeping track of whether or not you {campaign for the candidate/attend the meeting}.

[15] Jöst and Lust further explore the nature of authority in a second paper on "Authority and Participation: The Role of Leader Influence and Shared Identity on Campaign Participation in Zambia".

[Many/None] of your friends have already agreed to {join in the campaign/attend the meeting} and [you will be compensated for your efforts/you will not be compensated for your efforts].

Table 1: Summary of Attributes in the Survey Experiment

Candidate Attribute	Levels
A. Activity	1. help campaign for a parliamentary candidate (**Baseline**) 2. attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate
B. Authority	1. local religious leader (**Baseline**) 2. local chief/neighborhood leader 3. local councilor
C. Ethnicity of Candidate	1. Co-ethnic (respondent's ethnic group piped-in) 2. Not co-ethnic (randomly chosen non-co-ethnic group piped in) (**Baseline**)
D. Partisanship of Candidate	1. party the respondent feels close to (piped-in) 2. party the respondent does not feel close to (randomly chosen and piped-in) (**Baseline**)
E. Sanctioning - Leader	1. but is not keeping track (**Baseline**) 2. and will be keeping track
F. Sanctioning - Community	1. No one else in the community is keeping track (**Baseline**) 2. Many others in the community will keep track
G. Social benefit/bandwagon	1. Many of your friends have agreed to join in 2. None of your friends have agreed to join in (**Baseline**)
H. Payment	1. you will be compensated for your efforts. 2. you will not be compensated for your efforts. (**Baseline**)
I. Origin of Candidate	1. born here 2. born in a different region (**Baseline**)

J. Residence of Candidate	1. currently lives in a village or neighborhood nearby 2. currently lives in a village or neighborhood on the other side of the district (**Baseline**)
K. Gender of Candidate	1. man (**Baseline**) 2. woman

The randomized attributes map on to the potential drivers of non-electoral participation that we consider in this paper. We rely on randomly assigned experimental attributes for ethnicity (co-/non-co-ethnic), localism (co-/non-co-resident and co-/non-co-origin, and partisanship (co-partisan/non-co-partisan). We also randomly assigned the gender of the candidate, which we later recoded to capture whether the candidate is a co-/non-co-gender. Finally, to consider both monetary and social incentives as steering participation in non-electoral political participation, we randomly assign whether the respondent will be paid to participate and whether she can expect many of her friends to join. We differentiate between two activities that we consider as non-voting electoral political participation: 1) attending a community meeting to raise concerns to the MP, 2) campaigning for a political candidate.

We administer a series of follow-up questions that measure the respondents´ willingness to participate, and perceptions about leader sanctioning and community sanctioning in case of non-compliance. We further explore the drivers of engagement by using follow-up questions on participation, and community and leader sanctioning as well as whether the respondents believe that they would enjoy the activity as our dependent variables in the analysis (see Table 2). Answers to the first three questions were 4-point Likert scales from ‘very likely’ to ‘not at all likely’, and the answers to the final question was a 4-point Likert scale from ‘very much’ to ‘not much at all’. All questions included a don’t know/refuse to answer option that was not read out loud.

Table 2: Follow-up Questions to the Experiment (Dependent Variables)

Number	Question Text	Purpose of Question
1	How likely are you to spend a day help campaign for a parliamentary candidate/ attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	Assess participation in the activity
2	How likely is it that your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	Measure of expected leader sanctioning
3	How likely do you think it is that other members of your village or neighbor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	Measure of expected community sanctioning
4	How much do you think you would enjoy to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	Measure of Enjoyment

Note: See a full list of follow-up questions to the experiment in the Appendix.

Analysis & Results

We follow the procedure to analyze rating-based conjoint experiments put forward by Hainmueller et al. (2014) in order to estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCE) for each experimental attribute. We first rescale our dependent variables, initially measured on a four-point scale, to values between 0 and 1. We run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression

to estimate the AMCEs of each attribute. We also run robustness checks using ordered logistic regression with all dependent variables on the initial four-point scale and report the results in Table B3 in the Appendix.

We explore the AMCEs of each attribute value in the experiment. In the model specification below y_{ik} represents our dependent variable (for a list of the outcome questions, see Table 2). In a first step, we explore the average marginal component effects of the different attributes on the likelihood that respondents will participate. Specifically, we test whether shared identity – including co-ethnicity, co-partisanship, co-gender, co-origin and co-residency – of candidate and respondent or material and social incentives are stronger predictors of respondent´s willingness to participate. The model is specified as follows:

M1 Average Marginal Component Effects Model

$$y_{ik} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Activity + \beta_2 * [Authority = Local\ Chief] + \beta_3 * [Authority = Local\ Councilor] + \beta_4 * CoEthnicity + \beta_5 * CoPartisan + \beta_6 * LeaderMonitor + \beta_7 * ComMonitor + \beta_8 * SocialBenefit + \beta_9 * Payment + \beta_{10} * Origin + \beta_{11} * Residence + \beta_{12} * Gender + e$$

where i denotes the individual (respondent) and k denotes which dependent variable is used. β_0 represents the intercept, and β_1 to β_{12} include the coefficients of the single experimental attributes. Lastly, e denotes the residual.

We calculate the AMCE for each attribute on the respondents´ willingness to participate in a political meeting or campaign for a political candidate. AMCEs report the change in stated likelihood to participate while comparing the attribute to its baseline. As we have previously rescaled all our dependent variables from a four-point scale to a 0 to 1 scale, we can interpret the coefficients as the expected change in the likelihood to participate when a given characteristic is compared to its baseline. The attributes and baselines are presented in Table 1.

Drivers of Participation

In this paper, we focus on the potential drivers of non-electoral political engagement, weighing different explanations for why citizens participate against each other. We explore how sharing the social identity of the candidate and whether the respondent can expect social and monetary benefits or social sanctions by the community and the leader affects her willingness to participate in a campaign or community meeting. We show our findings in Figure 4 below and present the regression tables in Table B1 in the Appendix.

We find that both co-partisanship and co-ethnicity of the candidate appear to increase the likelihood that the respondent´s willingness to participate, but being of the same gender, co-resident or originally from the same village does not result in a statistically significant increase in the willingness to participate in the activity. The effect is strongest for co-partisanship which increases participation by 0.1 (SE=0.02, $p<0.001$) on the 0 to 1 scale. Ethnicity has a much smaller impact on the reported willingness to participate and is significant on the 90 percent level only (0.04, SE=0.02, $p<0.10$,).

With regard to material and social incentives that may be driving participation, we find that respondents are more likely to participate when they can expect their friends to do the same. The citizens´ stated willingness to participate increases by 5 percentage points when they expect their friends to join them (SE=0.02, $p<0.05$). However, whether the respondents will get compensated for the activity does not seem to significantly increase the willingness to join.

Figure 4: Average Marginal Effects Model with Participation as DV



Note: The dependent variable shows the expected likelihood to participate and was rescaled on a 0 to 1 scale. We included all experimental attributes in the model (see regression table in the Appendix). The figure is drawn from the regression results presented in Table 2. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Thus, we find that co-partisanship is the strongest predictor of participation in our models. This finding is surprising considering a large literature that has highlighted the importance of shared ethnicity between candidates and respondents when it comes to voting (e.g., Carlson, 2015; Ferree, 2011). Therefore, in a next step, we aim to investigate, more specifically, what explains increased willingness to participate when the respondents feel close to the same political party, shares the same ethnicity or when the respondents can expect many of their friends to join.

Mechanisms

We introduce three potential mechanisms that we believe should hold independent of which types of shared identity or incentives are driving participation. We explore whether community sanctioning, leader sanctioning and the respondents' beliefs that they would enjoy the activity

explain our results. To do so, we include these potential mechanisms as dependent variables in our average marginal effects model.

In Figure 5, we report the effect of co-partisanship, co-ethnicity and whether the respondents can expect their friends to join on their expectations of community sanctioning, leader sanctioning and enjoyment. We also include the effect of these attributes on willingness to participate, for easy reference to our earlier findings. We report the effects of all potential drivers of participation (i.e., co-identity measures and the social and material benefits) in Table B1 in the appendix.

We find strongest support that expectations over sanctioning and social benefits underpins the relationship between co-partisanship and willingness to participate. Respondents are roughly 5 percentage points more likely to believe that a leader will sanction non-compliance when the MP candidate is a co-partisan. They are also 4 percentage points more likely to believe that the community would sanction non-compliance with a co-partisan candidate. Co-partisanship with the candidate also has a highly significant ($p<0.001$) impact on whether the respondent believes that he or she would enjoy the activity, increasing this expectation by about 7 percentage points.

Regarding co-ethnicity, we find weaker evidence that sanctioning or social benefits underlies the relationship between co-ethnicity and willingness to participate. As we described previously, co-ethnicity is a less strong but still significant predictor of the willingness to participate. However, it is not associated with an expectation that the leader or community would sanction non-participation. Moreover, while individuals presented with a co-ethnic candidate are about 4 percentage points more likely to believe that they will enjoy the activity ($p<0.05$), the effect is less substantively and statistically significant than that associated with co-partisanship.

We find even less evidence that sanctions or social benefits explain the relationship between having one's friends participate in the activity and expected sanctioning or social benefits. This is somewhat surprising as respondents who got our social incentives treatment (i.e., that they

expect many of their friends to join) believed to enjoy the activity to a higher degree than their counterparts in the control condition. It is perhaps less surprising that they do not believe sanctioning by the community or leader is associated with their friends' participation.

Figure 5: The Effects of Partisanship, Ethnicity and Social Benefits on different DVs



Note: The dependent variable shows the expected likelihood to participate, being sanctioned by the leader and the community, and enjoy the activity on the y-axis. DVs were rescaled on a 0 to 1 scale. We display the effect of partisanship, ethnicity, and social benefit on the different DVs. The figure is drawn from the regression results presented in Table B1 in the appendix. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks

Before concluding that partisanship was the major factor driving willingness to participate in campaign activities, at least among our respondents, we consider three alternative explanations. First, we consider whether individual-level resources, such as time, money, and civic skills highlighted in the classic literature on political participation, drive our outcomes. Second, we explore whether results reflect the power of the incumbent party, particularly in the highly repressive context of Zambia's 2021 elections. Finally, we consider the extent to which they may reflect opinions of those for whom this was not a realistic scenario, exploring the plausibility of the experiment.

To rule out that these results are driven by individual-level resources, we run our main models with individual-level controls for gender, education, age, poverty and ethnicity. We also report balance test results for the distribution of the different treatment conditions of the experimental attributes by gender, education, age, poverty and ethnicity in the appendix (see Tables D2-D6). We create a dichotomized variable for education with 1 “At least some Primary education” and 0 “No formal education”. We create age brackets for 1 "18-34 years", 2 "35-54 years", 3 "55-74 years", and 4 "75-92 years". We measure poverty based on a survey question that asks respondents whether they can cover their needs or not. Answer options are recoded with 1 “cannot cover their needs without difficulties or great difficulties” and 0 otherwise.[16] Finally, we code the most frequent ethnic identities to measure individual ethnic belonging with 1 “Bemba”, 2 “Chewa”, 3 “Tumbuka” and 4 “Other ethnic identity”.

Figure 6 shows findings after including additional individual-level controls in our model. We find that whether the MP candidate is a co-partisan still significantly increases respondents´ willingness to participate. The effect is highly significant (p=0.000) and the coefficient size stays robust with 0.094 on a 0 to 1 scale (SE=0.021). Respondents who fall into the “55-74” age bracket are somewhat less likely to participate; however, the effect is only significant on the alpha=0.1 level (0.065, SE=0.035). Gender, ethnicity, education and poverty do not predict respondents´ willingness to participate in our model.

[16] We only find a low positive correlation between the two dichotomized variables for education and poverty. Spearman's rho=-0.02.

Figure 6: Average Marginal Effects Model with Participation as DV and Individual-Level Controls



Note: The dependent variable shows the expected likelihood to participate and was rescaled on a 0 to 1 scale. We included all experimental attributes in the model (see regression table in the Appendix). The figure is drawn from the regression results presented in Table 2. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Baselines: Ethnicity ("Bemba"), Education ("No formal education") and Age ("18-34").

We also test whether we find differences between incumbent MP candidates and those who are from one of the oppositional parties. We code the party the respondent feels close to as 1 for the incumbent party (Patriotic Front) and 0 for another political party using responses to the survey question: "If the parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?" We exclude those respondents who reported that they do not vote or do not feel close to any political party, and we also drop the don't know's from the analysis. In the experiment, the respondent was provided with information whether the MP candidate is from a political party that the respondent feels close to or not. We then run our model including an interaction between our binary measure of incumbent support and the experimental attribute on co-partisanship to test for the heterogeneous treatment effect.

We find that whether the respondent supports the incumbent party moderates the effect of co-partisanship on the willingness to participate. The interaction coefficient for incumbent party support when the MP candidate is a co-partisan is highly significant on the alpha=0.001 level. From this finding it appears that the effect of sharing the party affiliation with the MP candidate is particularly strong when the MP candidate is from the incumbent party.

Finally, we also address concerns that being asked to campaign for the given MP candidate or join a community meeting may not be considered to present a realistic scenario. We show the frequencies for the answers to the following follow-up question: "Do you think your {Authority} would support an MP candidate such as the one described here?" (See Table C1 in the Appendix). We also rerun the analysis for our main model shown in Figure 4 and in Table C3 in the appendix with only those respondents who responded in the affirmative.

Figure 7 shows findings after excluding those respondents who reported that they do not think that their local leader would support the MP candidate that was given in the experiment. We find the effect of co-partisanship to be robust (0.09, SE=0.24, p=0.000). The effects of both co-ethnicity and whether the respondents can expect their friends to join becomes insignificant in the model.

Figure 7: Average Marginal Effects Model with only Respondents who reported this to be a realistic scenario and participation as DV



Note: We dropped those respondents who reported that they do not think that their local leader would support the MP candidate that was shown in the experiment. We also drop respondents who reported that they do not know or refuse to answer whether their leader would support the candidate.

Discussion & Conclusion

Evidence from our survey experiment, conducted during the campaigns leading up to Zambia's 2021 elections, provides important insights into electoral participation. The study sheds light on the drivers of previously overlooked forms of political participation in elections – attending community meetings and campaigning on behalf of a candidate, thus going beyond relatively well-studied voting and participation in election rallies. They also turn our attention to the role of partisanship, which has been overshadowed by studies of ethnicity and regionalism in studies of African elections. We find that partisanship is a stronger predictor of expressed willingness to participate in community meetings or campaign on behalf of a candidate than ethnicity, locality, gender or material and social incentives, and that the influence of partisanship is likely driven by both fear of sanctions and social benefits. Importantly, even in

Zambia - where ethnicity, regionalism and partisanship are intertwined and each is a salient political cleavage - partisanship is not only a stronger predictor of willingness to participate than ethnicity and locality, but it is independent of them as well.

The study raises a number of issues that require further study. First, it may raise the concern that our dependent variables of interest are willingness to comply, rather than actual participation. We recognize the important distinction between expressed and behavioral measures. Yet, we also argue that understanding stated willingness to comply with authorities is important in itself, and moreover, that stated willingness has been found to be highly correlated with actions. That said, however, we encourage further behavioral studies on the drivers of participation.

We also encourage studies that interrogate these dynamics beyond our sample in Zambia. One can question the extent to which results from Zambia's 2021 election – and indeed, our geographically limited sample of citizens during this electoral period - geographic generalize to other contexts. As described above, Zambia's 2021 election campaigns occurred in a highly repressive, polarized context. One might argue that partisanship played a particularly important role in these circumstances, although we note that exploring the effect of partisanship on our results casts some doubt on this explanation. Alternatively, it may be that partisanship is beginning to eclipse ethnicity and regionalism, as party systems are consolidated and more nationally present. In this case, we expect that partisanship plays a very similar role elsewhere on the continent - and beyond. Importantly, we do not interpret our results as suggesting that the outsized role of ethnicity and regionalism uncovered in earlier studies was wrong. Rather, we view this as evidence that the nature of politics shifts over time, in response to changes in technology, urbanization, and other social and political developments, and it does so in ways that raise the importance of some factors while diminishing others. Scholars and policymakers cannot afford to have a stagnant view of politics.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Survey Questions

Table A1: Outcome Questions to the Experiment

Question Order	Question Text	Answer Choices	Purpose of Question
1	How likely are you to spend a day help campaign for a parliamentary candidate/ attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?"	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Assess participation in the activity
2	How likely do you think others in your neighborhood would be to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate, if your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor asked them to do so?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure expected behavior of the respondent's community members.
3	How likely is it that your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of expected leader sanctioning
4	How likely do you think it is that other members of your village or neighbor would treat you better or worse in the future, depending on whether or not you help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of expected community sanctioning

5	How much do you think it is right and proper for your local religious leader / local chief/neighborhood leader / local councilor to urge you to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very likely somewhat likely not very likely not likely at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of perceived legitimacy of the leader
6	How much do you think you would enjoy to help campaign for a parliamentary candidate / attend a community meeting, expressing local concerns to the MP candidate?	very much somewhat not much not at all Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	Measure of Enjoyment

Table A2: Additional follow-up Questions to the Experiment

Do you think your {Authority} would support an MP candidate such as the one described here?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Has your {Authority} ever asked you to {Activity}?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Have you ever attended a meeting to express community concerns to an MP or campaigned for an MP candidate?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4. Refused to answer

Do you think people who attend community meetings to express concerns to the MP do so more to show support for candidate or to express local community concerns?
1. Support for the MP
2. Support for the community
3. Both
4. Neither
5. Don't Know
6. Refuse to Answer

Please think of your {Authority}. Is this a man or a woman?
1. man
2. woman
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

Is {he/she} {respondent's ethnic group}?
1. Yes
2. No

3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

How much do you think {Authority} cares about the same issues that you do?
1. very much
2. somewhat
3. not very much
4. not at all
5. Don’t Know
6. Refuse to Answer

Think about how many people in your village/neighborhood see your {Authority} as their leader. Would you say that it is almost everyone, some people, a few people, or hardly anyone see your {Authority} as their leader?
1. Almost everyone
2. Some people
3. A few people
4. Hardly anyone
5. Don’t Know
6. Refuse to Answer

Is it acceptable for [Village Chiefs] to try to influence others regarding parliamentary elections?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Is it acceptable for [Local Councilors] to try to influence others regarding parliamentary elections?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Is it acceptable for [Local Religious Leaders] to try to influence others regarding parliamentary elections?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Appendix B: Main Analysis and Robustness Checks

Table B1: OLS Regression Analysis using different DVs and Co-Gender

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Sanctioning	Model (3): Community Sanctioning	Model (4): Enjoy Activity
Attending community meeting	0.133***	-0.008	0.010	0.185***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.040	0.051*	0.018	-0.016
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Local councilor	-0.018	0.041+	0.019	0.017
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Co-Ethnic	0.040+	0.011	0.017	0.042*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Partisan	0.101***	0.046*	0.043*	0.072***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Leader Monitoring	0.010	-0.030	-0.024	-0.013
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Community Monitoring	0.005	0.030	0.053**	-0.009
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.005	0.027	0.025
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Payment	0.034+	-0.000	0.000	0.022
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Origin	0.006	0.017	0.019	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Co-Resident	0.019	-0.002	0.015	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Gender	-0.011	0.028	0.003	-0.019
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Constant	0.407***	0.398***	0.378***	0.447***
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Observations	1521	1472	1472	1516
R^2	0.052	0.013	0.014	0.069

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Note: In line with our theoretical expectation, we recoded the initial gender of the MP candidate attribute in the experiment to indicate whether the respondent and the candidate share the same gender. We report results with the initial gender attribute in the experiment below.

Table B2: OLS Regression Analysis with Gender

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Sanctioning	Model (3): Community Sanctioning	Model (4): Enjoy Activity
Attending community meeting	0.133***	-0.008	0.010	0.184***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Authority				
Local chief	-0.039	0.051*	0.018	-0.016
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Local councilor	-0.017	0.039+	0.019	0.018
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Co-Ethnic	0.041*	0.012	0.018	0.042*
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Partisan	0.101***	0.046*	0.043*	0.072***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Leader Monitoring	0.010	-0.029	-0.023	-0.013
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Community Monitoring	0.006	0.031	0.054**	-0.009
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Social Benefit	0.047*	0.006	0.027	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Payment	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.021
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Origin	0.006	0.017	0.019	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Co-Resident	0.019	-0.003	0.015	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Woman	0.013	0.013	0.018	0.008
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Constant	0.394***	0.404***	0.369***	0.434***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Observations	1521	1472	1472	1516
R^2	0.052	0.0122	0.014	0.068

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: We use the initial gender of the MP candidate attribute in the analysis.

Table B3: Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis

	Model (1): Participating	Model (2): Leader Monitoring	Model (3): Community Monitoring	Model (4): Enjoy Activity
Attending community meeting	1.806***	0.963	1.050	2.380***
	(0.172)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.229)
Authority				
Local chief	0.849	1.301*	1.101	0.948
	(0.099)	(0.150)	(0.127)	(0.110)
Local councilor	0.927	1.224+	1.102	1.089
	(0.107)		(0.127)	(0.127)
Co-Ethnic	1.189+	1.065	1.094	1.235*
	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.118)
Co-Partisan	1.575***	1.258*	1.236*	1.413***
	(0.150)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.135)
Leader Monitoring	1.058	0.855+	0.886	0.961
	(0.100)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.091)
Community Monitoring	1.018	1.166	1.305**	0.948
	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.090)
Social Benefit	1.217*	1.034	1.146	1.123
	(0.115)	(0.097)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Payment	1.161	1.004	1.006	1.111
	(0.110)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.106)
Co-Origin	1.030	1.094	1.103	1.027
	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.098)
Co-Resident	1.082	0.991	1.076	0.978
	(0.102)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.093)
Woman	1.074	1.077	1.090	1.050
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.100)
Cut1	-0.348	-0.788	-0.654	-0.492
	(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.175)
Cut2	0.517	0.618	0.764	0.340
	(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Cut3	1.216	1.627	1.816	1.185
	(0.174)	(0.181)	(0.179)	(0.176)
Observations	1521	1472	1472	1516
Pseudo-R^2	0.0194	0,0047	0,0053	0,0266

Note: Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Odds ratios are presented. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are measured on a 4-point scale from unlikely to very likely.

Appendix C: Additional Analysis

Table C1: Frequency table for responses on how realistic it is to be asked by your leader to support the MP candidate that was given

Answers	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	813	52.93
No	449	29.23
Don´t know	205	13.35
Refuse to Answer	69	4.49
TOTAL	69	100

Table C2: Frequency table for Party Support

Answers	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Patriotic Front	547	35.61
Other Party	485	68.41
No party	95	6.18
I do not vote	36	2.34
Don´t know	87	5.66
Refuse to Answer	286	18.62
TOTAL	1536	100

Table C3: OLS Regression Analysis with additional individual-level controls

	Model (1): Participating
Attending community meeting	0.137*** (0.021)

Authority	
Local chief	-0.037
	(0.025)
Local councilor	-0.017 (0.025)
Co-Ethnic	0.036+
	(0.021)
Co-Partisan	0.095***
	(0.021)
Leader Monitoring	-0.010 (0.021)
Community Monitoring	0.004 (0.021)
Social Benefit	0.048*
	(0.021)
Payment	0.037+
	(0.021)
Co-Origin	-0.000
	(0.021)
Co-Resident	0.017
	(0.021)
Co-Gender	-0.010
	(0.021)
Individual Controls	
Female	-0.028 (0.021)
Age (Baseline "18-34")	
Age ("35-54")	0.011 (0.022)
Age ("55-74")	-0.065+ (0.035)
Age ("75-92")	-0.086 (0.142)
Ethnicity (Baseline Bemba)	
Chewa	-0.035 (0.039)
Tumbuka	0.019
	(0.038)
Other	0.028 (0.031)

At least some primary education	0.052 (0.069)
Poor	-0.001 (0.028)
Constant	0.362***
	(0.086)
Observations	1494
R^2	0.048

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Note: We run our main model presented in Table B1 above and included individual-level controls for gender, age, ethnicity, education, and poverty of the respondent.

Table C4: OLS Regression Analysis with only respondents who believe that they leader would support the MP candidate

	Model (1): Participating
Attending community meeting	0.130*** (0.023)
Authority	
Local chief	-0.054+
	(0.029)
Local councilor	-0.056+ (0.029)
Co-Ethnic	0.033
	(0.023)
Co-Partisan	0.090***
	(0.024)
Leader Monitoring	0.005 (0.023)
Community Monitoring	-0.013 (0.023)
Social Benefit	0.018
	(0.023)
Payment	0.028
	(0.023)
Co-Origin	0.001
	(0.023)

Co-Resident	0.006
	(0.023)
Co-Gender	-0.028
	(0.023)
Constant	0.554***
	(0.043)
Observations	1075
R^2	0.049

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Note: We dropped those respondents who reported that they do not think that their local leader would support the MP candidate that was shown in the experiment. We also drop respondents who reported that they do not know or refuse to answer whether their leader would support the candidate.

Table C5: OLS Regression Analysis with interaction between incumbent support and co-partisanship

	Model (1): Participating
Interaction	
Incumbent support x Co-Partisan	0.085+ (0.050)
Incumbent support	-0.097* (0.038)
Attending community meeting	0.127*** (0.025)
Authority	
Local chief	-0.007
	(0.031)
Local councilor	-0.016 (0.030)
Co-Ethnic	0.034
	(0.025)
Co-Partisan	0.045
	(0.037)
Leader Monitoring	0.010 (0.025)
Community Monitoring	-0.003 (0.025)
Social Benefit	0.029

	(0.025)
Payment	0.038
	(0.025)
Co-Origin	0.023
	(0.025)
Co-Resident	0.045
	(0.025)
Co-Gender	-0.002
	(0.025)
Constant	0.466***
	(0.049)
Observations	1027
R^2	0.044

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Note: We code the party the respondent was closed to as 1 incumbent party (Patriotic Front) versus 0 another political party using responses to the survey question: "If the parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?" We exclude those respondents who reported that they do not vote or do not feel close to any political party, and we dropped the don´t known's from the analysis.

Table C6: Marginal Effects for the Interaction between Incumbent support and Co-Partisanship with the MP Candidate on Participation

	Marginal Effect	**Standard Error**	**p-Value**
Co-Partisan			
Incumbent	0.045	0.037	0.222
Other	0.130	0.035	0.000

Note: Both variables in the interaction are binary coded. Calculation based on Model 1, Table C5.

Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests

Figure D1: Distribution of Likelihood to Participate



Table D1: Non-electoral forms of political participation | 34 countries | 2019/2021

Country	Attend community meeting	Join others to raise an issue	Contact party official	Contact MP	Attend campaign rally	Worked for party/candidate	Contacted by party representative
Angola	50%	55%	21%	12%	27%	21%	16%
Benin	63%	62%	20%	9%	46%	33%	31%
Botswana	61%	34%	17%	15%	28%	15%	55%
Burkina Faso	68%	61%	11%	8%	32%	14%	13%
Cabo Verde	32%	39%	19%	11%	43%	8%	42%
Cameroon	46%	60%	26%	16%	25%	14%	20%
Côte d'Ivoire	61%	66%	18%	14%	28%	17%	21%

Eswatini	59%	57%		18%	22%	7%	
Ethiopia	72%	54%	10%	11%	25%	6%	7%
Gabon	44%	67%	22%	17%	56%	28%	34%
Gambia	67%	58%	19%	15%	30%	11%	13%
Ghana	49%	44%	21%	15%	32%	19%	24%
Guinea	68%	64%	15%	6%	41%	29%	27%
Kenya	63%	61%	12%	14%	47%	19%	25%
Lesotho	76%	68%	19%	10%	43%	16%	23%
Liberia	73%	72%	34%	32%	36%	21%	22%
Malawi	86%	80%	17%	15%	59%	19%	16%
Mali	66%	55%	24%	10%	35%	30%	38%
Mauritius	51%	38%	18%	13%	30%	8%	27%
Morocco	44%	59%	11%	6%	16%	7%	18%
Mozambique	63%	39%	24%	15%	34%	20%	20%
Namibia	53%	43%	18%	8%	21%	5%	4%
Niger	68%	54%	26%	13%	48%	25%	24%
Nigeria	60%	55%	27%	14%	25%	21%	24%
Senegal	65%	63%	25%	7%	41%	29%	36%
Sierra Leone	72%	62%	18%	23%	35%	20%	53%
South Africa	55%	50%	17%	6%	16%	8%	17%
Sudan	60%	54%	23%		23%	13%	19%
Tanzania	82%	52%	19%	10%	62%	26%	12%
Togo	58%	54%	17%	12%	49%	27%	25%
Tunisia	19%	31%	6%	5%	13%	6%	13%
Uganda	77%	63%	24%	15%	54%	28%	49%
Zambia	**55%**	**50%**	**14%**	**13%**	**37%**	**15%**	**21%**
Zimbabwe	53%	43%	17%	8%	28%	9%	16%

*34-country average**	*60%*	*55%*	*19%*	*13%*	*35%*	*17%*	*24%*

* Eswatini and Sudan have missing data because certain questions were not asked.

Figure D2: Non-electoral forms of political participation | Zambia | 2003-2020



Source: Afrobarometer Rounds 2-8 (2003-2020)

Table D2: Covariate Balance Test by Gender

	Female	Male	Pearson Chi2	p-Value
Activity				
Campaigning	49.43	51.69	0.7788	0.378
Community Meeting	50.57	48.31		
Authority				
Religious Leader	32.81	33.29	0.2313	0.891
Local Chief	34.09	32.93		
Local Councilor	33.10	33.78		
Co-Ethnicity				
Co-Ethnic	50.35	50.06	0.0131	0.909
Non-Co-Ethnic	49.65	49.94		
Co-Partisanship				
Co-Partisan	46.25	44.15	0.6810	0.409
Non-Co-Partisan	53.75	55.85		
Leader Monitoring				
Monitoring	49.72	49.64	0.0010	0.975
No Monitoring	50.28	50.36		
Community Monitoring				
Monitoring	50.85	49.03	0.5040	0.478
No Monitoring	49.15	50.97		

Social Benefit				
Benefit	49.57	49.88	0.0141	0.905
No Benefit	50.43	50.12		
Payment				
Payment	47.14	46.56	0.2376	0.626
No Payment	52.19	53.44		
Origin				
Co-Origin	55.59	49.34	5.9747	0.015
Non-Co-Origin	44.41	50.66		
Residence				
Co-Resident	49.50	50.42	0.1284	0.720
Non-Co-Resident	50.50	49.58		
Gender				
Male	54.46	48.01	6.3440	0.012
Female	45.54	51.99		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by covariate.

Table D3: Covariate Balance Test by Education

	No Formal	**At least some Formal**	**Secondary**	**Post-secondary**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity						
Campaigning	51.35	50.12	50.88	51.74	0.1757	0.981
Community Meeting	48.65	49.88	49.12	48.26		

Authority						
Religious Leader	29.73	31.68	34.08	32.57	5.9752	0.426
Local Chief	48.65	34.52	31.72	34.87		
Local Councilor	21.62	33.81	34.20	32.57		
Co-Ethnicity						
Co-Ethnic	43.24	49.41	49.50	53.64	2.1969	0.533
Non-Co-Ethnic	56.76	50.59	50.50	46.36		
Co-Partisanship						
Co-Partisan	40.54	47.28	44.15	45.59	1.4353	0.697
Non-Co-Partisan	59.46	52.72	55.85	54.41		
Leader Monitoring						
Monitoring	48.65	51.06	49.62	47.10	1.0211	0.796
No Monitoring	51.35	48.94	50.38	52.90		
Community Monitoring						
Monitoring	48.65	47.28	49.50	55.21	4.1559	0.245
No Monitoring	51.35	52.72	50.50	44.79		
Social Benefit						
Benefit	48.65	55.08	47.38	48.65	6.7603	0.080
No Benefit	51.35	44.92	52.62	51.35		
Payment						
Payment	67.57	47.52	46.64	45.59	6.5464	0.088
No Payment	32.43	52.48	53.36	54.41		

Origin						
Co-Origin	43.24	52.25	51.00	56.32	3.4231	0.331
Non-Co-Origin	56.76	47.75	49.00	43.68		
Residence						
Co-Resident	51.35	49.17	51.24	46.74	1.7418	0.628
Non-Co-Resident	48.65	50.83	48.76	53.26		
Gender						
Male	54.05	51.54	51.37	48.66	0.8027	0.849
Female	45.95	48.46	48.63	51.34		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by covariate.

Table D4: Covariate Balance Test by Poverty

	Non-Poor	**Poor**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity				
Campaigning	49.62	50.80	0.1211	0.728
Community Meeting	50.38	49.20		
Authority				
Religious Leader	33.33	33.12	1.4294	0.489
Local Chief	36.02	32.80		
Local Councilor	30.65	34.08		
Co-Ethnicity				
Co-Ethnic	47.89	50.52	0.5958	0.440
Non-Co-Ethnic	52.11	49.48		
Co-Partisanship				

Co-Partisan	47.51	44.61	0.7320	0.392
Non-Co-Partisan	52.49	55.39		
Leader Monitoring				
Monitoring	47.69	50.00	0.4584	0.498
No Monitoring	52.31	50.00		
Community Monitoring				
Monitoring	52.69	49.28	1.0029	0.317
No Monitoring	47.31	50.72		
Social Benefit				
Benefit	46.92	50.40	1.0409	0.308
No Benefit	53.08	49.60		
Payment				
Payment	50.57	46.53	1.4191	0.234
No Payment	49.43	53.47		
Origin				
Co-Origin	54.79	51.56	0.9047	0.342
Non-Co-Origin	45.21	48.44		
Residence				
Co-Resident	50.57	49.72	0.0630	0.802
Non-Co-Resident	49.43	50.28		
Gender				
Male	48.66	51.32	0.6105	0.435

Female	51.34	48.68		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by covariate.

Table D5: Covariate Balance Test by Age

	18-34	**35-54**	**55-74**	**75-92**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity						
Campaigning	52.73	48.03	50.30	50.00	2.9461	0.400
Community Meeting	47.27	51.97	49.70	50.00		
Authority						
Religious Leader	32.90	33.79	31.18	37.50	2.1853	0.902
Local Chief	32.25	34.47	35.29	37.50		
Local Councilor	34.85	31.75	33.53	25.00		
Co-Ethnicity						
Co-Ethnic	50.59	49.41	50.59	62.50	0.6886	0.876
Non-Co-Ethnic	49.41	50.59	49.41	37.50		
Co-Partisanship						
Co-Partisan	44.60	42.95	54.71	50.00	7.5843	0.055
Non-Co-Partisan	55.40	57.05	45.29	50.00		
Leader Monitoring						
Monitoring	49.35	48.38	55.62	50.00	2.8182	0.421
No Monitoring	50.65	51.62	44.38	50.00		
Community Monitoring						
Monitoring	51.69	47.35	51.48	25.00	4.6604	0.198

No Monitoring	48.31	52.65	48.52	75.00		
Social Benefit						
Benefit	50.26	48.89	50.30	50.00	0.2738	0.965
No Benefit	49.74	51.11	49.70	50.00		
Payment						
Payment	47.59	47.54	44.12	37.50	1.0227	0.796
No Payment	52.41	52.46	55.88	62.50		
Origin						
Co-Origin	53.84	49.24	55.88	37.50	4.5156	0.211
Non-Co-Origin	46.16	50.76	44.12	62.50		
Residence						
Co-Resident	51.89	45.67	55.88	62.50	8.3625	0.039
Non-Co-Resident	48.11	54.33	44.12	37.50		
Gender						
Male	52.41	50.76	44.12	75.00	5.6869	0.128
Female	47.59	49.24	55.88	25.00		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by covariate.

Table D6: Covariate Balance Test by Ethnicity

	Bemba	**Chewa**	**Tumbuka**	**Other**	**Pearson Chi2**	**p-Value**
Activity						
Campaigning	53.88	48.13	52.59	49.82	2.0911	0.554
Community Meeting	46.12	51.87	47.41	50.18		

Authority						
Religious Leader	33.33	33.18	34.05	32.75	3.1519	0.790
Local Chief	35.02	29.91	31.03	34.62		
Local Councilor	31.65	36.92	34.91	32.63		
Co-Ethnicity						
Co-Ethnic	48.95	56.07	51.72	48.71	4.0765	0.253
Non-Co-Ethnic	51.05	43.93	48.28	51.29		
Co-Partisanship						
Co-Partisan	45.57	48.60	39.22	45.66	4.4208	0.219
Non-Co-Partisan	54.43	51.40	60.78	54.34		
Leader Monitoring						
Monitoring	50.43	49.07	51.29	49.12	0.4325	0.933
No Monitoring	49.57	50.93	48.71	50.88		
Community Monitoring						
Monitoring	51.29	49.07	49.14	49.94	0.2942	0.961
No Monitoring	48.71	50.93	50.86	50.06		
Social Benefit						
Benefit	56.03	47.20	52.59	47.94	6.0805	0.108
No Benefit	43.97	52.80	47.41	52.06		
Payment						
Payment	43.88	45.79	48.71	47.89	1.5839	0.663
No Payment	56.12	54.21	51.29	52.11		

Origin						
Co-Origin	56.12	51.87	52.16	51.29	1.7486	0.626
Non-Co-Origin	43.88	48.13	47.84	48.71		
Residence						
Co-Resident	49.79	48.60	48.28	50.94	0.7481	0.862
Non-Co-Resident	50.21	51.40	51.72	49.06		
Gender						
Male	51.48	49.53	52.16	50.82	0.3388	0.953
Female	48.52	50.47	47.84	49.18		

Note: We report percentages for the experimental attributes by covariate.

Appendix E: COVID-19 and survey fieldwork

While the country's electoral commission introduced several COVID-19 related restrictions, the impact of the pandemic on citizen's political participation in Zambia is likely to have been modest. On the one hand, only very few citizens reported to have been ill with the coronavirus.[17] On the other hand, a clear majority of Zambians was satisfied with how the government kept the public informed about COVID-19, and managed the pandemic overall (Afrobarometer 2022).[18] Similarly, in June 2021 only a minority of survey respondents said that COVID-19 is the most important problem that the government should address (Seekings et al., 2021), even though the country was in the middle of the third wave of infections at the time of fieldwork. In short, in addition to the careful phrasing of the survey experiment, we are confident that the broader context in which the experiment was asked had a limited effect on the outcome.

[17] According to Round 8 of Afrobarometer, less than 2% reported that they got ill with Covid-19.

[18] This is in stark contrast to how Zambians evaluated their government's efforts to manage the economy, provide health care and other basic services. For example, 86% of respondents were fairly/very satisfied with how government kept the public informed about COVID-19, while only 23% were equally satisfied with how government managed the economy.

Appendix F: Sampling Information

The Zambian Election Panel Round 2 (ZEPR2) survey was the second round of the Zambian Election Panel Survey (ZEPS). The survey was administered by telephone from July 15 to August 11 in 2021.
The sampling frame for each round of ZEPS was compromised of a list of telephone numbers obtained from individuals who:

1. Took some combination of the Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) 2019, Zambia Covid Survey Round 1 (ZCSR1), Zambia Covid Survey Round 2 (ZCSR2) survey, or previous ZEPS rounds,
2. Gave consent for follow-up contact, and
3. Provided a telephone number

The LGPI 2019 sample, the original sample that formed the basis of all subsequent sampling frames, was obtained via a stratified multistage probability proportional to size sampling scheme. The strata included two regions: 1) a 50km radius of Lusaka, and 2) a 100km region from the Zambia-Malawi border. A detailed description of the sampling plan can be found here.
The ZCSR1 survey was a telephone survey administered to those individuals who took the LGPI 2019 survey, consented to follow up contact, and provided a phone number. During fielding, if the original LGPI respondent could not be reached, a substitute respondent was permitted. The ZCSR2 survey was also a telephone survey that used the same sampling frame as ZCSR1 plus the new respondents obtained in ZCSR1 that consented to follow up contact. This same system was used to obtain the ZCSR2 sampling frame and the subsequent ZEPS sampling frames.

Figure A1: Heat map of the number of respondents per district



Figure A2: The heatmap with an overlay of the locations of respondents who took the LGPI 2019 survey



Note: Maps created by Erica Metheney (statistician at GLD).