Citizenship in comparative perspective:

populism in Rio de Janeiro and in Quebec

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Abstract
Populists (re)orient social identities by creating a dichotomous perspective in which certain groups are selected to be a menace. How is this phenomenon possible in so different contexts? A cultural and an identity turn seems to be a necessary condition for the success of populism. This phenomenon is better seen at how candidates consider racial groups as ideal citizens and other as subcitizens. Critical Discourse Analysis helped to elucidate social-hierarchies and power relations towards racialized groups in Quebec and in Rio de Janeiro during 2018 elections. This framework deepens our comprehension on the complex causality of populism by focusing on citizenship.

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Introduction

Liberal democracy has been in danger since the Second World War. The West has taken it for granted that the expected destiny of all societies is this type of democracy, yet uncertainty is skyrocketing, and the danger presents itself differently. Attacks on political pluralism, democratic institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law have clearly manifested themselves openly.

The end of History did not materialize as predicted by Francis Fukuyama (1992). Not only do we have various examples of authoritarian states, such as Saudi Arabia or the countries of Central Asia, which have remained almost immovable to foreign constraints and have effectively suppressed internal ones. Moreover, States considered to be democratic have experienced authoritarian repercussions and this has been the case of Venezuela, the United States, Turkey, Brazil and the Philippines. In this second box of countries and despite these contexts that differ, we will see populism as a common phenomenon that has been successful at the federal level. However, it is important to emphasize that populism was not encapsulated in countries that had elected populists to the presidency; this international event has affected other countries, such as Canada, but they are perceived at the provincial level.

Populism is here extended as a discursive and, possibly, practical ideology, whose actors consider that there is a dichotomous separation between the pure people and the corrupt elite, and that politics must ultimately be the expression of the general will of the people (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Despite the extensive literature on populism and democracy (Mudde, 2007; Andrade, 2020; Mazot-Oudin, 2017; Rosanvallon, 2020), there are two gaps that are not sufficiently addressed: the movement of the populist as soon as it is on public administration – the enforcement of ideology – and the sub-national regard of the populist in action. With the aim of exploring these scenarios, we choose the comparison of two very distant cases, but which are similar in the phenomena at the local level; we could, therefore, examine the different contexts in which these elements interact, and deals with possible new independent variables to this very phenomenon.
Certain aspects lead us to the fact that Quebec and Rio de Janeiro can be well compared if the variables to be controlled are taken into consideration (Sartori, 1994). In the North, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) and its candidate, François Legault, developed a discursive and practical approach to the exclusion of citizenship across the state, when the party and Legault had argued for the importance of the division between real Quebecers in relation to the socio-cultural threat of foreigners and Anglophones. In the South, the Social-Christian Party (PSC) and candidate Wilson Witzel also supported the exclusion of citizenship and the promotion of a pure citizen (Cidadão de bem) versus the rest, including communists and the disadvantaged in general – especially those who live in the favelas. In both cases, elected officials implemented their agendas using different spheres of public administration: in Quebec, the administration changed the ministry that is responsible for immigration, while in Rio de Janeiro the change took place at the secretariat responsible for public security.

Those scenarios lead us to a few questions that we will try to answer. First, is the economic anxiety or relative deprivation really could be a cause to populist success? Quebec is well known for its redistribution social policies (Arsenault, 2018), but Rio de Janeiro has a long history of inequality and poverty of rights (Fischer, 2008). Is it the long path of distrust in democratic institutions that causes populists uprisings? Is it because immigrants are endangering our culture and they must be controlled in order to stop hyper ethnic changes (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Is it because people are not so well-informed, and they let Manicheans populists deceived them to vote for exclusives agendas? Why now?

While those questions seem to provoke fruitful debates, which engage in several perspectives in social sciences, we decided to look for how citizenship was built in subnational units, and how would they be turned into public policies during at least one term. For the propose of this paper, we could only have dealt with the very first part, but the timeframe of one term seems also important. In this sense, we chose to follow a Most Different System Design approach in order to access similarities in discourse of successful populists in subnational elections. The article is divided in 5 parts: (1) methodological debates that are linked to this approach; (2) contexts; (3) theoretical framework; (4) preliminary results; and (5) conclusion.
Why this comparison matters?

There is a systematical force that is leading democracies to populism in an international level, and most of the recent literature is concerned on prime-ministers or presidents. Populism on subnational level (Drápalová & Wegrich, 2021) it is usually overlooked, although it is an effective way to rethink national-subnational units in federalists States. In Brazil, the Bolsonarismo\(^1\) can be understood as nationalization of a subnational logic of Rio de Janeiro – evangelical uprising, militarization, patrimonialism. In Quebec, the struggles between anglophones and francophones explains supports for anti-immigration actions whether in or out the province.

Comparative politics it is at the same time a sous-discipline in the realm of political science, and a whole discipline (Badie and Hermet, 2001; Gazibo and Jenson, 2015). Despite the divergences in terms of causality, what it is essential here is how they converge. Giovanni Sartori (1994) says that methods are necessary for any research to be considered as comparative. In this sense, I will briefly justify why and how the cases for this research matters for not only comparative politics, but also for populism and citizenship studies.

Carsten Anckar (2008) explains efficiently the distinction between the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). As the name suggests, in the MSSD we take systems/contexts that are extremely similar but differ in their phenomenon. In this sense, there is a goal to maintain the independent variables as constant as possible – sometimes assuming a *ceteris paribus* perspective – so the focus is on understanding why dependent variables are distinct although their contexts are similar. On the contrary, the MDSD is an alternative championed by Przeworski and Teune (1970) in which the “basic logic is that differences cannot explain similarities” (Anckar, 2008, p.390). In addition, the MDSD can also focus on subsystem level variables, so a multi-level modelling is possible but not necessarily needed.

Because of this multi-level and the search for similarities in highly diverse contexts are endorsed in this methodological choice, we believe that comparing subnational units

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\(^{1}\) For a useful overview of the foundations and its relation to evangelicals, please see McKenna (2020).
with the same phenomenon is a useful path for a research agenda that works with populism, citizenship, and comparative politics. The way the discourse is built between us and them is similar in both regions – also the praxis – however the context and how this discourse interacts itself with their actors differs. The interaction between the context and how the phenomenon presents give us the opportunity to research in depth complex variations in populism (Falleti and Lynch, 2009; Mills, 1988 [1871]).

Contexts

In Québec, the debate about citizenship has been promoted ultimately by the Parti Québécois (PQ) and, by contrast, the Parti Libéral Québécois (PLQ). Briefly, the PQ dominated the debate, associating a ‘citoyenneté québécoise’ with nationalists’ agendas, which went from seeking a formal citizenship recognized by the federal government in the late 1990s to a secular identity during the last decades. In opposition, PLQ has always worked towards a conciliation between federal and provincial spheres in terms of immigration. Hence, the struggles on citizenship were usually boosted by the PQ and were avoided or interrupted by the PLQ.

Apparently, citizenship is correlated to immigration in Québec, so it seems that debates are bounded by matters of formal integration with special attention to status rather than identity. However, Catherine Xhardez (2020) points that the PQ’s discourse developed an interesting in values and language, which she calls an identity turn², and the merely fact to have a passport was not sufficient to be considered québécoise. Xhardez (2020, p.817) concludes her article asserting that “citizenship is undoubtedly a powerful rhetorical tool for promoting a political or symbolic purpose, underling the importance of understanding how political actors use citizenship discourse”. Although it is not on Xhardez’s article, there is a strong similitude on how citizenship and populism is related on discourse analysis, and how the success of a so-called outsider took advantage on this turmoil debate.

² The PQ proposed in 2007 to the National Assembly of Québec the creation of a formal québécoise citizenship (Bill 195), and a separated Constitution (Bill 191) that would validates Québec’s full power on citizenship. Both were not adopted by the Assembly though.
The polls of the 2018 Quebec election did not forecast an evident victory of the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) over the PLQ. According to Claire Durand and André Blais (2020, p.146) this election was unique in matters of polling miss, and this was due to not only a discrepancy between the polls and vote, but also a “systematic bias from all the pollsters”. The very same debate happened in the United States only two years before so was the case elsewhere a populist party won elections (

By reformulating the citizenship debate, the CAQ was created in 2011 and is led by François Legault a former PQ minister. In 2016, the CAQ adopted an own permanent constitution that either redirects or creates a clear path for the party, by turning explicit towards a nationalist project. From now on, its primary objective was to ensure the prosperity of “the Quebec nation within Canada, all while defending with pride its autonomy, language, values, and culture”. (Coalition Avenir Québec, 2018, p.4). Thus, a renewed PQ with pretentions of expanding nationalism succeeded by using a concept of ideal citizen, which is later discussed in the discourse analysis section.

Contrary to the Quebec’s case, in Brazil and in Rio de Janeiro neither languages nor regional societies come into question of distinction vis-à-vis the state. Despite the apparent stability in nationalism terms, the political elites dispute over the definition of citizenship in the public sphere. The phenomenon manifests itself usually towards the marginalized populations who live in favelas. Notwithstanding, almost all the people who live in favelas are Brazilians with status, with their rights supposedly guaranteed, the elites symbolize them as second-class citizens or as non-citizens. Subnormal agglomeration, which is the technical name for favelas, corresponds to 22% of the population of the capital of Rio de Janeiro (Data Rio, 2017) and is difficult to measure quantitatively. Although the presence of favelas is more evident in capital, it exists in all cities of Rio, with similar intervention actions in terms of form.

The construction of the discourse in which favelas are dangerous places can be divided in two moments, according to Márcia Pereira Leite (2012, my translations). Between the 1990s and the 2000s, the level of “state problem” rose to a war against the drug and arms dealers based in favelas. During this period, much was heard of “stray bullets”, which were associated with the death causes of residents of favelas after bloody shooting promoted by police officers. In 2008, the state turned its discourse to implement “pacification” by
Peacekeeping Police Units - UPP in regions dominated by drug dealers. According to Leite (2012), the intention is to “civilize” the inhabitants and integrate them into society through the police force. Regarding the territorial occupation of the favelados, Leite (2012, p. 376) argues that “the representations of favelas and favelados are understood as categories of nomination”, which are “practices and technologies of identification” by which the identity of others is delimited.

The victory of Bolsonaro in 2018\(^3\) was “the most impressive event of the Brazilian electoral history” according to Jairo Nicolau (2020, p.11). Clearly, many variables and recent changes in institutions in Brazil help to explain why and how Bolsonaro, and his allies were elected. The Bolsonarismo is a populist and nationalist wave that helped many outsiders or forgotten public figures to succeed in radical campaigns. In Rio de Janeiro, the former federal judge Wilson Witzel has never been candidate or appointed to an executive or legislative position until the day he became the governor. Although Witzel tried to create an ethos of someone emotionally more balanced than Bolsonaro, the way the latter promoted his campaign was nothing but similar to a distinction between *us* and *them*.

According to the Fluminense discourse, there is an obvious differentiation between types of citizens. The production and reproduction of the concept of “good citizen” and its other adjectives - correct and ethical citizen - is a contemporary reformulation of “sub-citizenship”, which is a socio-economic hierarchy within the Brazilian society where the poorest and the blacks were defined by the limited conception of the elites in relation to them (Souza 2003). Following Souza (2003) and evidenced by the proud identity creation of the Bolsonaro’s wave, there is not only a use of the hierarchization of Brazilian society and Rio de Janeiro, but also a fortification or an adoration of the social stratification in which inequality is famous. To use the words of Costa (2021, p. 8, *my translation*) about the concept of “good citizen”, “it is not a concrete subject, but a figure of speech, a discursive representation which aims to legitimize certain social practices and, therefore, with which different subjects can identify”.

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\(^3\) According to Lucio Rennó (2020, p.5), “[t]he Brazilian 2018 election has many unique traits that set it apart from previous elections in the country and elsewhere”. 
In both regions, three essential aspects were of paramount importance to this article. An identity or cultural turn were in vague moments before the regional elections, independently of their causes. A racial profile was used as a discursive tool, thus immigrants and favelados were attacked to not only gain votes, but also for real political projects, such as the Bill 21⁴ and military interventions in favelas. Populism is not only used as a demagogic discursive framework, but the focus on citizenship and public administration is evident. Hence the color barrière from what is considered to be white, and non-white condenses the racial aspect in these regions (Balibar and Wallerstein, 2007). Contexts well diversified, but with similar foreign bodies.

Theoretical framework

Being understood as a threat to liberal democracies, populist discourse and praxis have been discussed by several scholars (Cas Mudde, 2007; Rosanvallon; Levitsky and Ziblat, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Mounk, 2018; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). Cas Mudde’s definition of a revolt of the pure people against the elite and a thin ideology provide us a first step. Although useful, it is hardly the case to fit a thin ideology whereas the populism is served by thick ideological components. In Quebec, many professors, jurists, and scholars champion the CAQ and/or its exclusionary bills, such as the Bill 21, by creating arguments based on historical or cultural roots (Turcotte, Gagnon, Marois, Brun, & Chevrier, 2021). In Rio de Janeiro, it is an arduous task to find professors that would express support to the Bolsonarismo, but its roots are on antipetismo⁵ that was openly supported by the mainstream media, jurists, and even center-left and left-wing parties.

In general, there are two frameworks to explain it: the thick description and those who have chosen the minimalist definition. A thick description, as it is the case for Eatwell and Goodwin (2018), Mounk (2018), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2016), and Rosanvallon (2020),

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⁴ The Act to respect the laicity the state, known as Bill 21, was adopted by the National Assembly in 2019. Briefly, it prohibits public employees in position of power to wear religious symbols, such as turbans, hijabs, kippah, patka etc. It was paradoxically supported by many researchers and professors that seen as a sign of progress, but others understood as an act of racism against racial and religious minorities (Leydet, 2020).

⁵ Literally means to be against the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker’s Party) that was repeatedly associated with a communism fear by a neoliberal agenda.
is about demonstrating the roots of populism by making a link between the profound transformation of modern state and society, aggregating these variables and concluding as a possible end for liberal democracies. Hence, populism is here to stay in Western democracies, and they seek to explain the momentum and to propose alternatives. Pipa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2017, p.446) sustain that an intergerational phenomenon has been the cause for people supporting authoritarian parties, and it is “motivated by a backlash against the cultural changes linked with the rise of Postmaterialist and Self-expression values, far more than by economic factors”. By correlating the variables of cultural anxiety and an influx of foreigners, Norris and Inglehart (2017) do not go beyond the fact of second-generation immigrants, also other racial minorities that could fit this cultural anxiety. It would be hardly true to use post-materialism view in the Global South, although many populist leaders and parties had gained support there.

State-society: populism and citizenship

Complementarity is essential to explain social relations, considering the current complexity. The complex relationship between state and society occurs on a continuum of constant modification and reshaping between them, i.e., they are on relationship and not two different actors (Migdal, 2001; 2006). In this sense, citizenship is and has been in mutation vis-à-vis the public administration as it is possible to be contested by any sort of social movement. Understanding populism as a possible global or transnational trend and the way it shapes citizenship, in distinct localities, seems to be an exciting research agenda for social sciences.

Peter Evans (1995, p.59) develops a concept called “embedded autonomy”, which is a concrete set of connections that bind the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with which the State shares a common transformation project. According to Evans (1995), autonomy and embeddedness provide institutionalized channels for the constant renegotiation of common goals and policies between state and society. There has been a move from the modus operandi of “embeddedness” towards “encasement” by some groups who intend to encase the state in practices likely to guarantee the development of neoliberalism and practices which aim to exclude other groups through normative
institutions in the economic-legal field (Slobodian, 2018; Streeck, 2017; Crouch, 2016; Boschi and Pinho, 2019).

A similar argument is presented by Teresa Caldeira and James Holston (2008), although they focus on new technologies on modern urbanism in Brazil. They sustain that because of political franchise expansion through constitutional reforms – which expanded social citizenship rights towards previously excluded groups - neoliberalism has attempted to undermine these bases by privatizations of social services.

Another common correlation of the rise of populism is about socio-economical inequalities. Societies that are more unequal or with more exclusive encasement tend to support the rise of populism more easily, because as Pástor and Veronesi (2021) sustains, equality is a luxury good. Nevertheless, we have plenty of counterexamples, such as in Canada (Boily, 2020), Denmark (Siim and Meret, 2016), Sweden (Rydgren, 2006), and Switzerland (Albertazzi, 2008) populisms. It should be noted that between the most unequal and the most equal societies, what remains in common is the way in which populism acts in matters of citizenship. As a result, and with the intention of going beyond in terms of observing this phenomenon, the discourse and praxis on citizenship presents itself as fruitful.

Citizenship must be clearly defined so that it can be controlled as a variable. According to Jane Jenson (2007, p.25, *my translation*) “citizenship is the concrete expression of a fundamental principle of political modernity: equality between members of the body politic”. The construction of modern citizenship has been achieved in and through the framework of the nation-state. Citizenship regimes include the conceptualization necessary to frame within the relationship between state and society (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003; Marques-Pereira and Garibay, 2011). For this article, there are four elements: the formal recognition of rights; the rules of the democratic game; the territory of citizenship – both by the concrete or abstract border – and the fundamental values in relation to civic responsibilities.

The link with populism is now clearer. Populism can formally recognize certain rights, deny access to the state, increase responsibility and legitimize transit through territory, due to the passport, but deny belonging to the dominant identity. At the same time, flexibility can be reduced when the populist oversees public administration, because
there is another institutional logic with its own formal and informal constraints. As Max Weber (1971) aptly pointed out, authority is enforced in administration.

*Preliminary results*

In this article, we chose to compare the speeches of the successful populist candidates considering their political party orientations. Discourse is understood as an object of the temporal totality that surrounds it, in which each sign is related to another sign. The intention is to create a kind of “new language” focusing more on the global sense than necessarily in its content. It represents a particular view of reality that is normally subjective in the sociopolitical arena. It is worth mentioning that the political actors involved do not always have clear and objective definitions of what they mean by “us” and “them”, leading to vague and sometimes double-interpretation uses. (Biancalana & Mazzoleni, 2020; Mosemghvdlishvili & Jansz, 2020; Rocha & Deusdará, 2005; Maingeneau, 1997)

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is based, according to Gonçalves (2016, p. 286), on the focus on cultural forms of oppression and by offering instruments to overcome them. The author says that the relationship between concept and object - signifier and signified - is never stable or fixed, which leads to a certain difficulty in objectifying what actors comprehends about their discourse. Among the main goals of the CDA is to consider language to be part of a social structure of unequal power distributions, and to constantly ally ideology to discourse. Its roots come from the Frankfurt School, which became notorious for studies on authoritarianism.

Lela Mosemghvdlishvili and Jeroen Jansz (2020, p. 60-61) use the political discourse theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau to carry out a comparative discourse analysis. Although the focus of the article by these authors is different, it is worth mentioning the concepts of “nodal points”. They are key-signifiers or privileged signs, which redefine the meaning of another signifier by becoming the central point of the discourse. The fixing of these points leads to an articulation of the discourse, which is per se a political act, and the relationship between the signifiers is made by a logic of equivalence and difference. In this way, depending on the content of the speech, one can
approach one object or distance oneself from it. In this sense, by exploring the key-signifiers and their logic, the researcher can study the formation of different discourses, which is central to the article. We seek to understand how discourses about a marginalized population and its signifiers are articulated, and to what extent the process is different from one region to another.

The populist discourse must have some idea of people. Our priority is the set of minimal hypotheses about the world and its language used for/about the chosen populations: immigrants and *favelados*. The expressions aimed at these groups and conjectures about the national culture will be focused. For example, when dealing with the issue of the French language in the province of Québec and the share of responsibility for immigration or when dealing with public security and invasion of slums to combat dealers. All these discursive interventions are attempts to domesticate these people.

Among the fifteen major axes of the CAQ booklet it can be said that the political platform followed a neoliberal agenda *latu senso* (Bernartchez, 2018). There are mentions of cutting taxes, downsizing the State or making it more efficient; in the culture and identity axis, reducing the number of immigrants in the province, as well as making them pass a test of Québec values. The decrease was justified so there would be a “better integration” for the new immigrants.

While it alludes to a plurality of the ethnic past – native population, French and English – it values authenticity. According to Özkirimli (2003), there would be no problem in mirroring the past; however, developing approaches that can be used as apologetic discourses and that can justify or legitimize discrimination and oppression does not fit into “better integration”.


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6 They followed in this exact order: family, education, health, people of advanced age, identity and culture, integrity and justice, efficiency, economy, environment, solidarity, regions, agriculture, natural resources, transport and democracy.
was elected in the 2018 elections, was removed by the Superior Court of Justice after two years in office.

The public security agenda is a priority in Witzel’s government plan (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2018). In this plan (p. 10), it is said that the common citizen is cornered and “the police will have the support of their Governor to, within the limits of law, assert authority to restore social peace and order”. The war metaphor (Leite, 2012) is repeatedly used as a political discourse. Alongside with the presidential candidate, Bolsonaro, Witzel replicates several proposals that involve warlike thoughts: “shooting down criminals” who carry weapons, using snipers to shoot people, side by side with who broke a Marielle Franco’s sign and threatened arrest the other candidate, Eduardo Paes, if he ever insulted him (Neves, 2018; Globo News, 2018). Witzel stated that he would protect any police officer who went to court if he followed his orders to kill the “criminals”.

In this bellicose wave, Witzel and other candidates from the Brazilian Bolsonarist wave11 used terms to create an ideal citizen, the good citizen12 versus the rest. The “good citizen” would have no problem with this policy, according to Witzel, since the police would only be truculent with criminals. It is important to note that the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro was, at the time, responsible for a third of homicides in the state, according to a report by the Federal Public Defender's Office. As well summarizes the complex social relationship between state and favelas, anthropologist Carly Machado (2013, p. 31, *my translation*) argues that there is a “moral project of redemption lead by the State of Rio de Janeiro, in order to associate the political-state liberation of territories ruled by criminals, with Christian liberation from sin, evil and the enemy”. There is, therefore, an association between Christian morality versus sinful people in the favela region, which clearly shows the source of the definition between favelados and good citizens.

It is interesting to note the convergences and divergences between party orientations and the candidate's actions. Although Witzel was not so far from the PSC's

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7 She was a black Rio de Janeiro city council member who was killed in March of 2018. She was born in Complexo da Maré, one of the biggest favela complexes in Rio, and had a master’s degree in public administration – her thesis was about police intervention in favelas).

8 In the annex.

9 The full report is in the annex
values, which are economic freedom, lowering the age of criminal responsibility, against the legalization of abortion, against the legalization of drugs and in favor of optional voting, his actions were very contrary to the party's booklet to the 2018 elections. The first 13 pages inform only the changes promoted by the electoral justice, while the following 5 are about what should not be done. The first that stands out is “making false claims about your identity or qualifications” – Witzel added on the national curriculum platform, Lattes, that he had done a doctoral exchange at Harvard University, which was later denied by the university. Likewise, it was forbidden to promote hate speech, intolerance and discrimination. It is possible to say that he followed the missions and values of the party but went against its prohibitions in the 2018 campaign.

Comparison between Quebec and Rio de Janeiro

For the purposes of this article, the comparison is made at the level of political discourse in the regions of Quebec and Rio de Janeiro in the 2018 elections. The material analyzed is composed of party guidelines, press releases of the candidates and their government plans. Recapitulating a definition of CDA: discourse is a social practice through which there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and social contexts and/or social institutions and structures (Biancalana & Mazzoleni, 2020). There is a dialectic between actors and social contexts, in which they modulate, identify and relate to social groups. The central idea of critical discourse analysis is to demonstrate the relationship between discursive language and non-linguistic social structures.

Following Wodak et al. (2009), I share the following four definitions. Nations are discursive constructions and “imagined communities” in the sense of Benedict Anderson (2006). National identities are produced, reproduced and limited through discourse. There is an attempt to demonstrate an intranational population unity while discriminating against other social groups. Finally, the attempt to seek an ideal social group is not uniform across all actors and is often malleable.

The analysis takes place looking for the ways in which the discourse (re)constructs positive self-representations, and negative ones for the representations of others, in this case immigrants and favelados. Discursive strategies are also important. In the following
subsection, one can see the positive construction of the ideal Quebecois citizen and the construction of the Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro “good citizen”.

Quebecer (in-group or us & positive self-representations)

The first proposition of the CAQ booklet is family, which is a malleable concept to define according to Irene Levin and Jan Trost (1992). The strategy follows, which is not a cynical calculation of utilitarian maximization (Bourdieu, 1993), but has its back line of meanings. In the following propositions, there is mention of “family” with health and education of children and the elderly, which shows an evident concern for the well-being of this family. It is understood that there is a strategy of using the part for the whole (pars pro toto), regarding the concept of the family nucleus and what would be the central concern for CAQ, even though Legault said that it would be education during an interview for Patrice Roy in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation channel.

In addition to the clear conception of the family, there is neoliberal political ideology in the discourse. In Legault’s booklets and statements, the idea of the entrepreneurial State is surrounded by the “efficiency”, which proposes “the fight against waste”, an end to the “immutability of high officials”, “the end of the computer disarray” and “tax simplification”. The tab with the fewest propositions is the one for democracy, which perhaps suggests a lack of concern or a conservative attitude towards the status quo. It could corroborate the literature that supports the inability of coexistence between neoliberal capitalism and democracy, because they generate excluding interests (Polanyi, 2001; Piketty, 2014)

Good Citizen (in-group or us & positive self-representations)

In Wilson Witzel's government plan, there is 21 mentions for “citizens”, and most of them with a sense of patronage in relation to their needs – not to imply that other politicians would do the same. The citizen of Rio de Janeiro is the “good citizen”, as this is the approach made by the candidate himself in some episodes of right-wing demonstrations, such as when he held up a broken sign by Marielle Franco and on the
streets of Copacabana\textsuperscript{10}. In these manifestations, commonly were forms of exaltation of a homeland, anti-partisanship or against “everything that is there”, as it became famous in press appearances (Andrade, 2015). For Rita Santos (2012, p. 155), the “good citizen are ‘good fathers, bosses and husbands’, for whom it is important to protect their families and properties from ‘criminals’”.

The production and reproduction of a “good citizen” and its other adjectives – rightful, correct and ethical citizen – it is another façade of ideal citizen and “sub-citizen” Jessé Souza (2003). Following Souza (2003) and clearly demonstrated by a nationalist identity creation during the Bolsonarismo wave, there is not only a use of the hierarchization of Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro’s societies, but also a fortification or adoration of this social stratification in which inequality is celebrated. In the words of Costa (2021, p. 8, \textit{my translation}), the “good citizen it is not a concrete subject, but a figure of speech, a discursive representation that aims to give legitimacy to certain social practices and by which different subjects can identify”.

In the following subsection, one can see the negative construction of immigrants and \textit{favelados} through discourse.

\textit{Immigrants (out-group or they)}

In an interview for Radio-Canada, the interviewer, Patrice Roy, asks Legault about immigration\textsuperscript{11}. François Legault answers highlighting that his predilection is for not only the most qualified but also for those that excel the Quebec’s values test\textsuperscript{12} in three years. If they fail, the immigrants are illegal in the country and will be deported by the federal government, since it is their responsibility. Legault approaches the immigrant who fails to

\textsuperscript{10}The neighborhood transformed itself as a safe space for far-right demonstrations since 2016. Usually, social movements prefer to be at downtown for logistics (people from distinct parts of the city can also manifests); however, Copacabana it is situated at the South Zone (the richer part).

\textsuperscript{11}Starts at 13’09” and ends at 16’20”. Accessed August 13, 2022. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1mbrrUVuB50>

\textsuperscript{12}The test is divided into 5 parts: Québec is a French-speaking society; Québec is a democratic society; Equality between men and women; The rights and responsibilities of Quebecers; Québec is a secular society. It is a test of Québec's nationalist values in other words. It is available on the website of the Ministry of Integration, Franchising and Immigration <https://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/publications/fr/valeurs/GUI_Pratique_Valeurs_FR.pdf>.
pass the tests as a tourist who has not left Canadian territory in the maximum time. Patrice Roy even tries to humanize the speech, suggesting that Legault could say that “the government would do everything to keep these immigrants in Québec”, but Legault responds that it would not be realistic or serious to support this speech.

The talk about the financial burden of immigrants, when it is said that they spend too much and/or wrongly, is anti-immigrant. According to Teun Van Dijk (2005), the argument against immigrants is based on causal and evident correlations, as when it is proposed to reduce the number of immigrants in order to better apply the budget. The use of categorization related to immigrants who come and fail to pass the tests vis-à-vis a tourist who has stayed longer than necessary is also an anti-immigration speech. Finally, the ease with which it is said that there is a consensus among Quebecers that immigrants do not speak French and that this is a danger is also anti-immigration.

*Favelados (out-group or them)*

The favelas and favelados are the “margins of the State” (Leite, 2015). In Witzel's government plan (2018, p. 4), it is said that the “worst problem of Rio de Janeiro” is the “public safety” and that “Rio de Janeiro citizens live in constant fear”. The war metaphor (Leite, 2012) is corroborated to demonstrate that there are sides within the Rio de Janeiro space, in which one must choose between the public order of middle and upper classes or the enemies. The intention, according to his agenda, is to extinguish the Public Security Secretariat and create a “direct channel” between the Executive and the police force, as this would be the fastest way and would not suffer political pressure. Further on, on page 10, it is said that “the topography of the communities makes operations in steep places hard”. It is reinforced, therefore, that the citizen is cornered, and the sub-citizen lives in an area of difficult access to the police and that constitutes a disruptive locus.

In this sense, this perception of the other as a threat leaves room for racists actions. Because neither political nor institutional channels work for this so-called problem, conflict is the chosen path. According to Leite (2012, p. 379 *my translation*) “representing social conflict in large cities as a war implies triggering a symbolic repertoire in which
sides/groups in confrontation are enemies”. A possible extermination it is one strategy for dealing the question.

This reinforcement of fear replicates and reproduces the exceptional measures in terms of security, including popular support from the middle and upper classes of Rio. hovered on the internet, during the 2018 elections, that if residents of Copacabana and other wealthier neighborhoods wanted military intervention, they should live in the favelas. Remembering that there was federal military intervention in the state between February 2018 and January 2019.

Final remarks

In both cases, populism and citizenship are clearly related on the discourse sphere. The approaches were similar in terms of in- and out-groups. Although the contexts are still distinct, an identity and cultural turn occurred a few years before the success of populists by targeting foreign bodies inside the region, namely immigrants and favelados, as it is condensed in figure 01. It is worth noting that those foreign bodies were already there, hence a reconceptualization of their role in the region was necessary in order to create an imminent and recent comprehension. Those racialized groups were handled as a problem to be fixed by populists in power. My next step on this research agenda is to map how did they attempt to do so when in power. We are also interest in comprehend how distinct is to maintain social hierarchies and promoting exclusion based on concepts of citizenship.
References


Annex

Public Defender’s Office:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Qy6yleYpugnSF3MrBpKhIpu0QmiyYV9/view

Pictures:

Wilson Witzel (on the far-right side) and the sign
CAQ orientation towards identity and culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-group</th>
<th>Out-group</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Immigrants</td>
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<td>Favelados</td>
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Figure 01