

From Gender Gap to Gender Gaps: Bringing Nonbinary People into Political Behavior Research*

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Abstract

The “gender gap” in voting is one of the most well-documented findings in political behavior across democracies. However, gender gap research has traditionally assumed that everyone is either a man or a woman, which does not account for the growing number of people who identify as nonbinary. How do nonbinary people differ from men and women in their party identification and voting behavior? We answer this question using data from the 2021 Canadian Election Study online panel, which has a large enough subsample of nonbinary respondents to identify gaps in party identification and voting behavior. Nonbinary people are much less likely to identify with and vote Liberal or Conservative and much more likely to identify with and vote for the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP) than both men and women. Many of these gaps persist even when restricting the analysis to LGBTQ respondents, adjusting for demographic variables that predict nonbinary identity, and adjusting for issue attitudes. Nonbinary people’s distinctiveness from men and women suggests that researchers need to add nonbinary response options to gender questions and, wherever possible, incorporate nonbinary people into analyses of political behavior.

One of the most well-established findings in political behavior is the “gender gap” in party support (Abendschön and Steinmetz, 2014; Bergh, 2007; Conover, 1988; Erickson and O’Neill, 2002; Gidengil et al., 2005; Giger, 2009; Immerzeel, Coffé, and Van der Lippe, 2015; Norrander, 1999; Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes, 1998). The modern gender gap, in particular, suggests that women are more likely to support parties of the left than men are. However, scholarship on the gender gap traditionally relies on the implicit assumption that everyone is either a man or a woman. As individuals increasingly identify as neither men nor women, this assumption has become untenable. How do nonbinary people – that is, people who are neither men nor women – compare to men and women in their political behavior?¹

Conventional surveys make it difficult to study the voting behavior of nonbinary individuals. Relatively few surveys – even surveys that include questions about transgender respondents – ask gender questions that allow nonbinary individuals the opportunity to self-identify as such. Fewer still have large enough nonbinary subsamples to allow for the study of nonbinary individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors. We overcome these challenges by relying on a large-scale online survey, the 2021 Canadian Election Study (CES) online panel ($N = 20,968$) (Stephenson et al., 2022). Large-scale online surveys are particularly well-suited for studying small populations (Stephenson et al., 2021). The 2021 CES uses a two-step approach to measuring gender, including a gender identity question with an explicit nonbinary response option and an open-ended response option, along with a transgender identity question. We identify 99 nonbinary respondents in the sample. This subsample is large enough to illustrate that nonbinary people are distinct from men and women if the gaps between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people are relatively large.

We analyze the nonbinary people’s party identification, voting behavior, and issue attitudes in comparison with men and women. We find nonbinary people are to the left of both men and women in their party identification and voting behavior. In bivariate analyses, we find that nonbinary people are less likely to identify with the center-left Liberals than men (by 20 percentage points) and women (by 23 percentage points), less likely to identify with the Conservatives than men (by 27 percentage points) and women (by 18 percentage points), and more likely to identify with the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP) than men (by 49 percentage points) and women (by 40 percentage points). We also find nonbinary people are less likely to vote for the Liberals than men and women (both by 18 percentage points), less likely to vote for the Conservatives than men (by 32 percentage points) and women (by 23 percentage points), and more likely to vote for the

¹Some people who identify as neither men nor women do not use the term nonbinary to describe themselves. For example, some of them may use terms such as genderqueer, bigender, or agender. However, in the 2021 Canadian Census, about two-thirds of the individuals who do not identify as men or women identify as nonbinary (Canada, 2022). For the sake of brevity and clarity, we refer to anyone who does not identify as a man or a woman as nonbinary.

NDP than men (by 59 percentage points) or women (by 45 percentage points). These gaps are large compared to the gaps between men and women. We similarly find that nonbinary people are more substantially more left-leaning than both men and women on most issue attitudes. Indeed, when we construct an overall left-right scale from 13 issue attitudes, we estimate that nonbinary people are 20 percentage points more left-leaning than men and 16 percentage points more left-leaning than women.

Our analyses likewise show that the gender gaps in party identification and voting persist when we run analyses that aim to explain these gaps in terms of demographics or issue attitudes. First, we show that these gender gaps persist even when we compare nonbinary people with LGBTQ men and women, which demonstrates that the predictive power of being nonbinary is not just due to nonbinary people being part of LGBTQ political coalition. Second, we demonstrate that “compositional effects” play a substantial role in explaining these gaps by running models that adjust for demographics on which nonbinary people tend to differ from men and women. Third, we find that issue attitudes have less predictive power than demographics in explaining these gaps. However, we find that the gaps between men and nonbinary people in Liberal, Conservative, and NDP party identification and the gaps between women and nonbinary people in Liberal party identification and voting persist even when adjusting for both demographics and issue attitudes.

In this article, we make three main contributions. First, we contribute to research on gender gaps in political attitudes and behaviors by demonstrating the existence of gaps between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people using a general population survey. Second, we put these nonbinary gender gaps through many of the early tests used by scholars of the man-woman gender gap to figure out potential explanations for the modern gender gap in party support. Our results point to a need for theories of how gender identities shape political attitudes and behavior that go beyond demographics and issue attitudes to explain nonbinary people’s distinctiveness. Third, we contribute to a growing body of research that disaggregates LGBTQ people to examine differences in political attitudes and behavior across gender and sexual identity subgroups (Jones, 2021; Strolovitch, Wong, and Proctor, 2017). For scholars of LGBTQ political behavior, we show that nonbinary people are distinctly left-leaning, even in comparison with other LGBTQ people. This result stands in stark contrast with past work that has concluded that transgender people—using measures that may include nonbinary people—are not as left-leaning as other LGBTQ subgroups (Jones, 2021; Strolovitch, Wong, and Proctor, 2017).

This research suggests that political scientists need to collect data on nonbinary gender identities and include them in their analyses where possible. This is particularly true for large-sample surveys in countries where nonbinary gender identities are salient. When surveys have tens of thousands of respondents, they are likely to have large enough nonbinary subsamples to include in models of political attitudes and behaviors. Given the

increasing share of the population and percentage of youth that identify as nonbinary, it is possible that smaller surveys may also need to start collecting this information over time.²

Bringing Nonbinary People into Gender Gap Research

The modern gender gap in electoral politics rose to prominence during the 1980 American presidential election. Several studies and popular pieces noted that women were less likely to support Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan than men were (Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler, 1998; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Norrander, 1999). This research relied on the dominant paradigm for studying “sex” since the widespread adoption of random sample surveys in the 1930s. This paradigm treats “sex” as binary and assumes “sex” is an objective category that interviewers can ascribe onto interviewees. However, transgender and nonbinary people demonstrate that perceived “sex” is not necessarily the same as gender identity – an individual’s self-categorization of themselves as man, a woman, nonbinary, and/or some other gender term.

Recently, scholars of gender and political behavior have moved beyond simply comparing respondents across binary “sex” variables to examine variation in respondents’ self-conceptions as masculine and/or feminine to explain political outcomes.³ These studies have shown that gender role self-conceptions as masculine and/or feminine offer considerable explanatory power for a range of political outcomes (Bittner and Goodyear-Grant, 2017*a,b*; Cassino, 2020; Cassino and Besen-Cassino, 2021; Gidengil and Stolle, 2021). Even in these studies, however, traditional categorical measures of sex or gender are still important predictors of political attitudes and behaviors. More importantly, continuous masculinity and femininity scales do not necessarily capture nonbinary people, who may provide very different responses to masculinity and femininity scales from one another.⁴ In fact, past work on masculinity and femininity scales typically assumes that

²Indeed, data on nonbinary identities are important to collect even in more traditional survey contexts because these respondents are part of the broader LGBTQ community. Many studies of LGBTQ political behavior still use data on lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) respondents (Egan, 2012; Guntermann and Beauvais, 2022; Hertzog, 1996; Schaffner and Senic, 2006; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2022; Wurthmann, 2023) or members of same-sex couples (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020*a*; Turnbull-Dugarte and Townsley, 2020; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2021). However, if researchers aim to examine overall differences between non-LGBTQ and LGBTQ respondents, for example, or adjust for LGBTQ identities in regression analyses, they need to measure gender minority identities—such as transgender and nonbinary identities—as well as sexual minority identities.

³These studies often refer to what we call gender role self-conceptions as “gender identity.” We do not use “gender identity” to describe these terms because that phrase is commonly used in transgender and nonbinary communities to refer to an individual’s self-categorization in terms of gender categories.

⁴For example, someone who identifies as agender may respond at the low end of both the masculinity and femininity scales. Someone who identifies as bigender may respond at the high end of both the mas-

these variables measure “gender” while traditional binary variables measure “sex” (Bittner and Goodyear-Grant, 2017*a,b*). However, the rise of online surveys has led surveys to shift their measurement of gender from interviewer “sex” coding to direct gender questions. These “sex” questions are in practice already gender identity questions. Cisgender men and women, of course, respond to them that they are male or female, in line with their gender identities. However, transgender men and women also respond to traditional direct sex or gender questions according to their gender identities rather than their assigned sex at birth (Kronk et al., 2022).⁵

The continued use of a binary “sex” variable in gender gap scholarship produces substantive, theoretical, methodological, and ethical problems for gender gap scholarship. Theoretically, binary “sex” variables obfuscate the importance of gender identity, rather than “sex,” as critical to understanding gender gaps. If the “sex” or “gender” questions commonly used in online surveys already measure gender identity, then we should think about them explicitly as measuring gender identity and recognize that respondents may have gender identities other than “man” or “woman.” Substantively, we do not know much about how nonbinary people differ in their political attitudes and behavior. This gap is particularly important given the rising number of people who identify as nonbinary and the salience of nonbinary people in policy debates (for example, debates over adding additional categories beyond “M” or “F” to identity documents). Methodologically, the exclusion of non-binary people introduces errors in measuring gender and in estimating the relationships between gender and political outcomes. When survey researchers treat every respondent as either male or female, they either force nonbinary people to select binary categories that do not reflect their identities (miscategorization bias) or stop responding to the survey (nonresponse bias). Either alternative can introduce systematic error into the measurement of gender and its relationship to political outcomes. Finally, ethically, if political behavior scholars systematically exclude nonbinary people from their research, they effectively erase nonbinary people and their concerns from academic research (Namaste, 2000). They treat nonbinary people as simply irrelevant to politics. For all these reasons, survey researchers need to ask questions that allow nonbinary people to identify themselves and incorporate them into their analyses.

As we show below, we find substantial gaps between men and women (M-W), men and nonbinary people (M-NB), and women and nonbinary people (W-NB). Given this reality, this means we need to move from studying “the gender gap” to studying multiple “gender (identity) gaps.” We do so by re-examining explanations of the M-W gap using the case of nonbinary people.

culinity and femininity scales. Someone who identifies as androgynous may respond at the middle of both of these scales. The umbrella term “nonbinary” does not necessarily say anything about how someone will respond to these questions.

⁵When general population studies rely on interviewer coding of “sex,” they are likely capturing gender identity differences through a proxy variable.

Explanations of Gender Identity Gaps

Gender gap research has identified several possible explanations for the M-W gap. Some of these explanations, such as early childhood socialization into stereotypical gender roles (Gilligan, 1982), do not hold up very well when we consider transgender and nonbinary people, as these individuals do not conform to the gender expectations foisted upon them as children and reinforced by the dominant gender discourse in society. However, many of the existing explanations for the gaps between men and women can apply to the gaps between men and nonbinary people or between women and nonbinary people, as well. Here, we focus on three main explanations taken from the gender gap literature – movements' role in shaping identities, compositional effects, and issue attitudes – that we can examine using the available data.

One possible explanation for gender identity gaps is the historical development of the LGBTQ political movement. This parallels arguments about the feminist movement and feminist identification as explanations of the M-W gap (Conover, 1988). As LGBTQ political organizations have expanded their focus to include transgender people, they also have included nonbinary people within their coalitional umbrellas. LGBTQ organizations typically have ties to the political left. However, to date, most studies of LGBTQ political behavior overwhelmingly rely on data from LGB people (Egan, 2012; Guntermann and Beauvais, 2022; Hertzog, 1996; Schaffner and Senic, 2006; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2022; Wurthmann, 2023) or same-sex couples (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020*a,b*, 2021). These studies overwhelmingly find that LGB people or individuals in same-sex couples tend to be more left-leaning (in party identification, voting and/or ideology) than comparable straight or heterosexual people. However, there is important variation by gender, sexual identity, and race among LGBs (Jones, 2021; Guntermann and Beauvais, 2022; Strolovitch, Wong, and Proctor, 2017). If nonbinary people are similar to (cisgender or non-transgender) LGBs, then we might expect them to be left-leaning simply because they are part of the LGBTQ umbrella. Alternatively, we may expect nonbinary people to be more like LGBs generally because community-driven surveys suggest that nonbinary people are very unlikely to identify as straight or heterosexual (Bauer, 2020*b*; James et al., 2016).

A related possibility is that we may expect nonbinary people to be more like transgender respondents. After all, the transgender umbrella category generally includes nonbinary people. We have relatively limited data on transgender political behavior, especially in comparison with other LGBTQ subgroups and from general population surveys.⁶ Some studies have used data from the Cooperative Election Survey to examine transgender respondents in comparison with other LGBTQ subgroups (Jones, 2021; Strolovitch, Wong,

⁶Hunklinger and Ferch (2020) provide an account of transgender political behavior in Germany, but they do not use a general population survey

and Proctor, 2017). These findings suggest that transgender people are less left-leaning than other LGBTQ subgroups. However, they rely on an unusual question for identifying transgender respondents that asks about whether they have started a gender transition rather than whether they identify as transgender or identifying transgender respondents by comparing their responses on questions about their assigned sex at birth and current gender identity.⁷ It is unclear how we should interpret this question in comparison with other more commonly-used approaches for identifying transgender respondents. In any case, these surveys do not disaggregate nonbinary people from other transgender people, which leaves open the possibility that transgender men and women, particularly straight transgender men and women, may drive the overall results for transgender people in these studies. If so, nonbinary people may be distinct from other groups within the transgender umbrella.

Early research on the gaps between men and women focused on “compositional effects” as a possible explanation of these gaps. Compositional effects refers to the idea that the gap between men and women may be a product of men and women having different distributions on other explanatory variables, such as education or income (Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes, 1998; Howell and Day, 2000). These compositional effects, often referred to as structural explanations, explain in part the size of the gaps between men and women (Gidengil et al., 2005). This concern applies to difference between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people, as well. Since nonbinary identity is not completely random within the population, it is possible that any gaps between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people are due to men, women, and nonbinary people having different distributions on other variables besides gender identity. Community-driven surveys from Canada suggest nonbinary people are more likely to be young, be low-income, identify as not straight/heterosexual and are less likely to have graduated high school, be native speakers of French, residents of Quebec, or born outside Canada (Bauer, 2020*b*). The 2021 Census of Canada confirms that nonbinary people are more likely to be young and less likely to reside in Quebec (Canada, 2022).

Research on man-woman gender gaps likewise point to issue attitudes (or values differences) as explanations of the gaps. For example, Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes (1998) examine whether several issues, including spending on poverty and defense, the death penalty, and abortion account for the man-woman gender gap in Australia, Britain, and the United States. Gender gap research has identified several values dimensions that explain portions of the man-woman gender gap, including views on state intervention in the economy, capitalism, law and order, traditional moral values (or feminism), and post-

⁷The exact question is, “[h]ave you ever undergone any part of a process (including any thought or action) to change your gender / perceived gender from the one you were assigned at birth? This may include steps such as changing the type of clothes you wear, name you are known by or undergoing surgery.”

materialism (Erickson and O'Neill, 2002; Gidengil et al., 2005). If nonbinary people differ from men and women in their political attitudes, then it is possible that any gaps between men and nonbinary people or between women and nonbinary people are attributable to these underlying attitude differences.

The Canadian Case

We focus our study on Canada, which is a useful starting point for examining nonbinary political behavior. Most importantly, Canada is one of the only countries where political scientists have access to a large-sample general population survey that includes a gender question designed to identify nonbinary respondents. However, Canada has also gone further (comparatively speaking) than most other countries in state recognition of nonbinary gender identities. The 2021 Census of Canada was the first Census worldwide to identify transgender and nonbinary people (Canada, 2022). The federal government has allowed nonbinary people to select an “X” gender marker on their passports since 2019. Several provincial and territorial governments have also allowed “X” gender markers on birth certificates, driver’s licenses, health cards and other government-issued identification, while others have removed gender markers entirely or started issuing identification without gender markers upon request. As nonbinary identities become more salient in other countries, they may start to look more like Canada.

The Canadian case usefully generalizes to other Western democracies because it has a multiparty system. Canada has five parties that regularly win seats in Parliament – the Liberals (center-left), the Conservatives (center-right), the NDP (social democratic), the Bloc québécois, and the Greens. The Liberals and the Conservatives are the only parties to have formed the government federally. These parties have historically had different relationships with LGBTQ people and movements. The NDP has traditionally had the strongest ties to the LGBTQ movement (DeGagne, 2019). NDP MPs, including Bill Siksay and Randall Garrison, have attempted to add gender identity protections to human rights legislation for about a decade before the Trudeau Liberal government passed similar legislation in 2016. By contrast, many Conservative MPs have opposed LGBTQ rights legislation over time, including same-sex marriage, human rights protections for transgender people, and bans on conversion therapy. Based on this history, we might expect nonbinary people to be more likely to support the NDP and less likely to support the Conservatives.

Data and Methodology

We draw on data from the 2021 CES online panel ($N = 20,968$), which draws on Léger Marketing's online panel (Stephenson et al., 2022). The data and documentation are available online through the Harvard Dataverse, and the documentation includes a full description of the questionnaire, informed consent, and compensation for respondents. The 2021 CES has quota targets stratified by region (Atlantic (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island), Quebec, Ontario, West (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia), and Territories (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Yukon) and balanced on gender and age within each region.⁸ Finally, targets were used for language (within Quebec, within Atlantic Canada, and overall).

The 2021 CES uses a two-step approach to identify transgender and nonbinary respondents. The first step is a gender identity question:

Are you...?

1. A man
2. A woman
3. Non-binary
4. Another gender, please specify:

The second step is a transgender identity question:

Are you transgender?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know/Prefer not to say

The transgender identity question appears immediately after the gender identity question on the same page of the online survey. All respondents, including the nonbinary respondents, receive the transgender identity question. Although academic research and transgender movement organizations often treat nonbinary people as transgender by definition, many nonbinary people do not identify with the term. In the 2021 CES, 35 percent of nonbinary people responded "Yes," 46 percent responded "No," and 18 percent responded "Don't Know" to the transgender identity question. This question likely means something different to nonbinary people. It's unlikely that nonbinary people are unfamiliar with what "transgender" usually means in society. Instead, some nonbinary people may take the term transgender as referring primarily to transgender men and women or to people who medically transition and not see the term as applying to themselves, even if they recognize that nonbinary people are typically considered to be part of a broader transgender community.

⁸The gender quotas were based on man/woman quotas. All the people who identify as "non-binary" or "another gender" were accepted into the sample.

Table 1: Number of Respondents and Share of Sample, by Gender Identity, 2021 CES Online Panel

Category	<i>N</i>	Percentage (Unweighted)	Percentage (Weighted)
Men	9,480	45.73	48.43
Women	11,378	53.80	51.29
Nonbinary People	99	0.48	0.25
Missing	11	0.05	0.03

Table 1 displays the number, unweighted percentage, and weighted percentage of results from the 2021 CES. The 2021 CES includes raked weights to the 2016 Census on age, gender, education, and province. We use the 2016 Census because the 2021 Census has not yet released data suitable for constructing weights on these four variables based on the CES target population. Since the 2016 Census relies on binary sex categories, the nonbinary respondents are not weighted on gender. Instead, their weights are based on age, education, and province but not gender. The 2021 CES weights produce a sample that has a larger percentage of nonbinary people (0.25 percent) than the 2021 Census (0.14 percent) (Canada, 2022). However, it is possible that the 2021 Census may under-count nonbinary people because it uses a household questionnaire. Nonbinary people may be more willing to identify as such in an online survey than in a questionnaire that is visible to other members of the household.

The 2021 CES transgender and nonbinary subsamples vary considerably in data quality. The transgender men subsample ($N = 77$) differs substantially on demographic variables (such as province of residence) from past estimates on transgender and nonbinary people (Bauer, 2020a; Canada, 2022). The transgender women subsample ($N = 21$) is small enough that the uncertainty around the estimates is too wide for simple bivariate comparisons. Past research using community-driven samples also suggests that these data over-represent transgender men relative to transgender women (Bauer, 2020a; James et al., 2016). However, the 2021 CES nonbinary respondents look similar to other surveys of nonbinary respondents (Bauer, 2020b). As a result, we are confident in the data quality of the nonbinary subsample but not in the transgender men and women subsamples. For this reason, we do not compare nonbinary people with transgender men and women directly in this paper, even though we would encourage researchers to make such comparisons when able.

We focus on two main outcome variables – party identification and voting behaviour. In bivariate analyses, we use vote intention over vote choice because we rely primarily on the campaign period wave rather than the post-election wave. We do this to avoid problems of survey attrition. The small number of nonbinary respondents in the campaign wave would

mean any attrition would make it more difficult to identify the M-NB and W-NB gaps. What is more, nonbinary people have disproportionately high attrition between survey waves (50 percent of nonbinary people drop out versus 27 percent of men and 29 percent of women). However, we use vote choice in our examination of issue attitudes because many issue attitude questions, including an item on LGBTQ+ rights (a conversion therapy ban), are only available in the post-election wave. Where possible, we include the five largest parties, the Liberals, the Conservatives, the NDP, the Bloc québécois (BQ), and the Greens. However, when we run multivariate models, we restrict our analyses to the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP. We have relatively few BQ and Green voters in the overall sample, and very few nonbinary voters report identifying with or intending to vote for these parties.

We examine whether the gender gaps in party identification and voting persist among LGBTQ people by restricting our analyses to LGBTQ respondents. We include in this group (1) anyone who identifies as nonbinary, (2) anyone who identifies as transgender, (3) anyone who identifies as not straight/heterosexual, or (4) anyone who identifies as Two-Spirit (an Indigenous gender/sexual identity term).

We address concerns about compositional effects and issue attitudes by running models of the gender gaps in party identification and vote choice that adjust for nine demographic variables and 13 issue attitude questions. We provide the details of question wordings and variable codings for all variables in the Supplementary Materials. We run into two missing data challenges. First, we encounter some missing data due to non-response on demographic questions. Second, we run into some survey attrition because 11 of 13 issue items come from the post-election survey. We use multiple imputation with chained equations to handle missing data due to non-response or attrition. Given the small nonbinary subsample, it would be difficult to examine the compositional effects or issue attitudes explanations without multiple imputation. We include a detailed description of the multiple imputation model in the Supplementary Materials.

Bivariate Estimates of the Gender Identity Gaps

We examine bivariate estimates of the percentage identifying with and intending to vote for each party by gender identity. Since we present percentages for each variable, we use Wilson confidence intervals rather than the standard Wald confidence intervals. Wilson confidence intervals are not symmetric and allow more uncertainty on the side closer to 50 percent. Wilson confidence intervals perform better than Wald confidence intervals for percentages, particularly for values close to zero or 100 percent (Newcombe, 1998; Vollset, 1993; Wilson, 1927). We present weighted results in text and unweighted results in the Supplementary Materials. The unweighted results are generally similar, but the weighted results show somewhat larger gaps for the Conservatives and the NDP because

the weights are higher for young respondents and respondents without a high school diploma. These factors tend to predict support for these parties, which may explain the increased M-NB and W-NB gaps in the weighted results.

Figure 1 shows the weighted percent identifying with each party by gender identity. Figure 1 recovers the traditional M-W gap in Canada, in which women are more likely to identify with the NDP and less likely to identify with the Conservatives than men (Gidengil et al., 2005, 2013). However, these differences are small compared to the M-NB and W-NB gaps. Figure 1 shows that nonbinary people are less likely to identify as Liberals than men (by 20 percentage points) and women (by 23 percentage points), less likely to identify with the Conservatives than men (by 27 percentage points) and women (by 18 percentage points), and much more likely to identify with the NDP than both men (by 49 percentage points) and women (by 40 percentage points). These gaps are large enough to detect differences despite the small nonbinary subsample. However, the nonbinary subsample is not large enough to detect differences in BQ or Green party identification or identifying with no party.

Figure 2 shows a similar pattern for vote intention. Nonbinary people are less likely to vote for the Liberals than men (by 18 percentage points) and women (by 18 percentage points). They are less likely to vote for the Conservatives than men (by 32 percentage points) and women (by 23 percentage points). They are more likely to vote for the NDP than men (by 59 percentage points) and women (by 45 percentage points).


We find substantial M-NB and W-NB gaps in both party identification and vote intention. Nonbinary people are much less likely to support the Liberals and the Conservatives and much more likely to support the NDP. The M-NB and W-NB gaps are consistently larger than the M-W gaps. Based on these results, we find that there is not just one “gender gap” in party support but three gender gaps. Nonbinary people are different from men and women in their party identification and voting behavior.

Comparing Nonbinary People with LGBTQ Men and Women

One possible explanation of these gaps is that nonbinary people are part of the broader LGBTQ coalition. After all, LGBTQ people as a whole tend to be more likely to identify with and vote for left parties than straight cisgender people. We address this possibility by re-running the analysis on a subsample of LGBTQ respondents. We code respondents as LGBTQ if they identify their sexual identity as something other than straight or heterosexual, identify as transgender, or identify as nonbinary. We do not include weights because we do not have reliable estimates of most demographic variables for the population of LGBTQ adult citizens.


Figure 3 shows the gender identity gap in party identification among LGBTQ respondents. Figure 3 recovers the man-woman gap among LGBTQ people identified in previous

Figure 1: Weighted Estimated Percentage of Men, Women, and Nonbinary People Identifying with Each Political Party, with 95 Percent Wilson Confidence Intervals




Note: The light gray horizontal lines represent the percentage in the entire sample.

Figure 2: Weighted Estimated Percentage of Men, Women, and Nonbinary People Intending to Vote for Each Political Party, with 95 Percent Wilson Confidence Intervals



Note: The light gray horizontal lines represent the percentage in the entire sample.

Figure 3: Unweighted Estimated Percentage of Men, Women, and Nonbinary People Identifying with Each Political Party, with 95 Percent Wilson Confidence Intervals, LGBTQ Respondents Only



Note: The light gray horizontal lines represent the percentage among all LGBTQ respondents.

work (Perrella, Brown, and Kay, 2012, 2019), in which LGBTQ men are more likely to support the Liberals, while LGBTQ women are more likely to support the NDP. However, it also shows the distinctiveness of nonbinary people. Nonbinary people are less likely to identify as Liberals than LGBTQ men (by 28 percentage points) and LGBTQ women (by 16 percentage points). Nonbinary people are less likely to identify as Conservatives than LGBTQ men (by 10 percentage points) and LGBTQ women (by 3 percentage points), though the gap between nonbinary people and LGBTQ women is nonsignificant. Nonbinary people are more likely to identify with the NDP than LGBTQ men (by 38 percentage points) and LGBTQ women (by 17 percentage points).

Figure 4 shows a similar gender identity pattern for vote intention among LGBTQ respondents, though the gaps are generally larger for vote intention than party identification. Nonbinary people are less likely to vote Liberal than LGBTQ men (by 24 percentage points) and LGBTQ women (by 10 percentage points). They are also less likely to vote Conservative than LGBTQ men (by 15 percentage points) and LGBTQ women (by 7 percentage points), although again the gap between LGBTQ women and nonbinary people is nonsignificant. They are much more likely to vote NDP than LGBTQ men (by 47 percentage points) and LGBTQ women (by 19 percentage points).


Restricting the analysis to LGBTQ respondents accounts for some of the gaps in party identification and vote intention. LGBTQ women come close to nonbinary people in being very unlikely to vote Conservative. However, nonbinary people's opposition to the Liberals and support for the NDP is distinct even among LGBTQ respondents. As a result, the gaps between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary are not attributable to nonbinary people being more left-wing because they are LGBTQ.

“Compositional Effects,” Issue Attitudes and the Gender Identity Gaps

So far, we have shown that the gaps between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary found in the bivariate analysis persist even when restricting the sample to LGBTQ people. We turn to the two remaining explanations of the M-W gap that we can test with our data. The first is “compositional effects”—men, women, and nonbinary people have different values on other variables, such as age, education, income, sexual identity, and so forth, and these other variables actually explain the observed gender identity gaps. Put differently, if men, women, and nonbinary people were demographically the same, the gender identity gaps would not exist. The second explanation is issue attitudes. If nonbinary people are simply more left-wing in their attitudes, either on LGBTQ rights issues or overall, this may explain why they vote for more left-wing parties.

For demographics, we examine age, education, income, sexual identity, country of

Figure 4: Unweighted Estimated Percentage of Men, Women, and Nonbinary People Intending to Vote for Each Political Party, with 95 Percent Wilson Confidence Intervals, LGBTQ Respondents Only



Note: The light gray horizontal lines represent the percentage among all LGBTQ respondents.

birth, Indigenous identity, racialized (non-white and non-Indigenous) identity, mother tongue, and province or territory of residence. These demographic variables include ones known to distinguish nonbinary people from past work (Bauer, 2020*b*; Canada, 2022). For issue attitudes, we draw on 13 items from the campaign period and the post-election waves, including items on banning conversion practices—commonly known as “conversion therapy”—(one item), abortion (one item), equal rights (one item), family values (one item), bilingualism (one item), the environment (one item), government intervention in the economy (one time), economic inequality (two items), and immigration (four items). We take attitudes toward banning conversion practices as an LGBTQ rights measure, which may be especially important for explaining nonbinary people’s party identification or voting behavior. The other items include several issues or scales traditionally used to explain gaps between men and women (Gidengil et al., 2005; Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes, 1998). We construct three scales based on these items—immigration (four items, $\alpha = 0.86$), economic inequality (two items, $\alpha = 0.82$), and a general left-right scale (all 13 items, $\alpha = 0.84$). The exact question wording and variable coding for all variables are available in the Supplementary Materials. Given that we rely on some demographic variables with missing data and issue items from the post-election wave, all the results we present here use multiple imputation address missing data (such as non-response or attrition).

We begin to examine the issue attitudes explanation by presenting the bivariate estimates of the M-NB and W-NB gaps on issue attitudes. Table 2 displays the estimated percentage point gaps on issue attitudes and scales for women vs. men, nonbinary people vs. men, and nonbinary people vs. women. All the items and scales are coded from 0-100, where 0 is right and 100 is left in the Canadian case. An asterisk indicates that the results are significant to $p < 0.05$. We estimate these gaps using weighted ordinary least squares. As Table 2 shows, women are more left-wing than men on most issue items. The exceptions are both immigration items. However, nonbinary people are more left-wing than men on every issue item, and these gaps are significant for every issue other than government intervention in the economy, which falls just short of statistical significance. Non-binary people are more left-wing than women on every issue item, though the W-NB gaps on income inequality, the wealth gap, abortion, government intervention in the economy, and the economic redistribution scale are nonsignificant. Notably, the W-NB gap is larger than the M-W gap on nearly every issue item or scale. The exceptions are income inequality, government intervention in the economy, and the economic redistribution scale, where these gaps approximately the same size. Table 2 makes it clear that issue attitudes are a plausible explanation for the M-NB and W-NB gaps.

We estimate how demographics and issue attitudes (separately and together) condition the gender gaps using a series of eight weighted logistic regressions separately for each party. Model 1 includes only gender identity as a predictor. This bivariate model serves as a baseline for comparison for the other seven models. Model 2 includes gender

Table 2: Weighted Bivariate Estimates of Percentage Point Differences in Average Position on Issue Attitude Items and Scales, Women vs. Men, Nonbinary People vs. Men, and Nonbinary People vs. Women

Item or Scale	M-W (Women-Men)	M-NB (Nonbinary-Men)	W-NB (Nonbinary-Women)
Conversion Therapy	3*	16*	12*
Immigration Levels	-4	19*	23*
Refugee Migration Levels	0	25*	25*
Immigrant Integration	5*	28*	23*
Immigrants Take Jobs	-3	15*	18*
Income Inequality	8*	16*	8
Wealth Gap	5*	12*	7
Family Values	7*	30*	23*
Equal Rights	9*	24*	15*
Jobs vs. Environment	4*	27*	24*
Bilingualism	4*	18*	14*
Abortion	4*	12*	8
Government Intervention	6*	13	6
Immigration Scale	0	22*	22*
Economic Inequality Scale	7*	14*	7
Left-Right Scale	4*	20*	16*

identity and all nine demographic controls. Model 3 includes gender identity and attitudes toward banning conversion practices. We interpret Model 1 as adjusting for LGBTQ-specific issue attitudes, which have the closest links to nonbinary identity. Model 4 includes gender identity and attitudes toward conversion practices, abortion, equal rights, family values, the environment, government intervention in the economy, immigration (four-item scale), and economic redistribution (two-item scale). We use the scales rather than the raw items for immigration and economic redistribution to avoid multicollinearity. Model 5 includes gender identity and a single left-right scale constructed by averaging all 13 issue items. Models 6-8 replicate Models 3-5 (respectively) but add in the demographic variables. We note generally that Models 4 and 7 generally tend to produce wider confidence intervals than the other models. This uncertainty is not surprising given that issue attitudes tend to correlate with one another. The regression tables for all the models we show are available in the Supplementary Materials.


Figure 5 displays estimates of the M-W, M-NB, and W-NB gaps in party identification from each of these models. We replicate the expected M-W gaps in Conservative and NDP party identification. Women are more likely to identify with the NDP and less likely to identify with the Conservatives than men. We also find that women are more likely to identify as Liberal than men, though this gap becomes small (less than one percentage point) and nonsignificant in Models 4 and 5.⁹

Figure 5 suggests that issue attitudes, either alone or with demographics, cannot account for all the M-NB and W-NB gaps in party identification. We find that nonbinary people are significantly ($p < 0.05$) less likely to identify as Liberals than both men and women across all eight models. The point estimates of the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Liberal party identification are large across all eight models (13-23 and 18-24 percentage points, respectively). Model 2 shows that adjusting for demographics reduces the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Liberal party identification. Models 3-5 show that adjusting for issue attitudes do not decrease the M-NB and W-NB gaps. In fact, the M-NB and W-NB gaps actually increase in Models 4 and 5. Models 6-8, which include both demographics and issue attitudes, generally show similar results to Model 2. Overall, these results suggest that (1) demographics can account for some of the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Liberal party identification, (2) issue attitudes do not account for these gaps, and (3) something else must explain these gaps.

We find that demographics and issue attitudes explain the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Conservative party identification better than they do Liberal party identification. In Figure 5, we find that nonbinary people are significantly less likely to identify as Conservatives than men in six of eight models and than women in four of eight models. In Model 1,

⁹We report significance to both $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.10$. We report significance to the $p < 0.10$ threshold because we have a relatively limited nonbinary subsample, which limits the power of our tests. Under these circumstances, results significant to $p < 0.10$ are notable.

Figure 5: Predicted Percent Identifying with the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP, by Gender Identity with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals (Demographic and Issue Attitude Models)



Note: Model 1 is a simple bivariate model using only gender identity as a predictor. Model 2 adds in nine demographic variables. Model 3 adds attitudes toward banning conversion therapy. Model 4 adds a series of nine issue attitude variables. Model 5 adds a single left-right scale. Models 6-8 replicate Models 3-5 but add demographics.

we find large M-NB and W-NB gaps in Conservative party identification (27 and 18 percentage points, respectively). Model 2 reduces the M-NB by about 30 percent (to 19 percentage points) and the W-NB gap by about 40 percent (to 11 percentage points). It also makes the W-NB gap only significant to $p < 0.10$. Model 3's adjustment for attitudes toward banning conversion therapy does not change the M-NB or W-NB gaps. However, when we adjust for a broader range of issue attitudes in Models 4 and 5, we find smaller but still significant ($p < 0.05$) M-NB and W-NB gaps (17-18 and 13-15 percentage points, respectively). Models 6-8 show that demographics and issue attitudes together make the W-NB gap nonsignificant but not the M-NB gap. In Model 6, the M-NB gap shrinks by one-third to 18 percentage points but is still significant to $p < 0.05$. In Model 7, the M-NB gap falls to 13 percentage points and becomes nonsignificant ($p = 0.10$), though we note that multicollinearity may explain why this estimate is nonsignificant. In Model 8, the M-NB gap is also 13 percentage points and is only significant to $p < 0.10$. By contrast, in Models 6-8, the W-NB gap in Conservative party identification is always nonsignificant. However, if the W-NB gaps we estimate in our sample in Models 6-8 are anything like the population estimate, they would be substantively large (8-11 percentage points, respectively). The differences between Model 1 and Models 6-8 suggest that demographics and issue attitudes only reduce the point estimate of the W-NB gap by about half. Ultimately, we would need larger nonbinary subsamples to know for sure whether demographics and issue attitudes can fully account for the W-NB gap in Conservative party identification.

Finally, we find that demographics and, to a lesser extent, issue attitudes, can explain a large portion of the M-NB and W-NB gaps in NDP party identification. Both gaps are very large in Model 1 (50 and 41 percentage points, respectively). Model 2 reduces the M-NB gap by 70 percent (to 15 percentage points) and the W-NB gap by over 75 percent (to ten percentage points). The W-NB gap also becomes nonsignificant ($p = 0.10$). The regression tables in the Supplementary Materials, along with our bivariate analyses among LGBTQ respondents, strongly suggest that sexual identity accounts for much of the reduction in the gaps in Model 2. Model 3 demonstrates that LGBTQ-specific attitudes, measured by views on banning conversion therapy, can only account for about four percent of the M-NB gap and about five percent of the W-NB gap in NDP party identification. However, Models 4 and 5 show that issue attitudes can explain a relatively large share of the gaps in NDP party identification. In Model 4, the M-NB and W-NB gaps are about 40 percent smaller than in the bivariate analysis (31 and 25 percentage points, respectively). The reductions are only slightly smaller in Model 5 (34 and 26 percentage points). The combination of demographics and issue attitudes in Models 6-8 only slightly reduce the M-NB and W-NB gaps relative to Model 2. In Models 6-8, the M-NB gap in NDP party identification is about 70-75 percent smaller than the bivariate estimate (12-15 percentage points) but remains significant (to $p < 0.05$ in Model 6 and to $p < 0.10$ in Models 7-8). By contrast, the W-NB gap is 75-80 percent smaller (8-10 percentage points) but becomes nonsignificant in Models 6-8. Again, we note that the point estimates are still

relatively far from zero, even when we adjust for demographics and issue attitudes. If this were the population estimate, it would still mean a substantial gap remains even when accounting for demographics and issue attitudes. However, we cannot say for certain whether a portion of the M-NB and W-NB gaps remain with this sample.


We conduct a similar analysis for voting behavior. As we discuss above, we use present estimates for vote choice rather than vote intention because we use issue attitudes from the post-election wave. The estimates for vote choice are noisier than for party identification because multiple imputation adds additional uncertainty around the estimates.

Figure 6 displays the estimated M-W, M-NB, and W-NB gaps in Liberal, Conservative, and NDP vote choice from Models 1-8. Figure 6 shows very similar patterns to Figure 5. Model 1 shows large M-NB and W-NB gaps in Liberal party identification (18 and 20 percentage points, respectively). Model 2 reduces the M-NB gap by almost 40 percent (to 11 percentage points) and the W-NB gap by about 25 percent (to 15 percentage points). The M-NB gap becomes nonsignificant, while the W-NB gap remains significant to $p < 0.10$. Models 3-5 actually increase the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Liberal vote choice, which suggests that issue attitudes cannot account for these gaps. Models 6-8 render the M-NB gap in Liberal vote choice nonsignificant, though the point estimates are still substantively large (11-13 percentage points). By contrast, the W-NB gap in Liberal vote choice remains large (15-16 percentage points) and significant (to $p < 0.10$ in Models 6-7 and $p < 0.05$ in Model 8) even when adjusting for both demographics and issue attitudes.

Demographics and, to a lesser extent, issue attitudes, can account for substantial portions of the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Conservative vote choice. Model 1 shows bivariate M-NB and W-NB gaps of 26 and 19 percentage points, respectively. When we add in demographics (Model 2), the M-NB gap shrinks by about 40 percent (to 16 percentage points), and the W-NB gap shrinks by over 50 percent (to eight percentage points). The W-NB gap also becomes nonsignificant. Adjusting for attitudes toward banning conversion therapy (Model 3) does not substantively change the M-NB or W-NB gaps in Conservative voting. Adjusting for nine issue items (Model 4) reduces the M-NB gap by almost one-half (to 14 percentage points) and the W-NB gap by about one-third (to 13 percentage points). Model 4 also makes both the M-NB and W-NB gaps nonsignificant. Adjusting for a 13-item left-right scale (Model 5) reduces the M-NB gap by about 40 percent (to 16 percentage points) and the W-NB gap by about 35 percent (to 12 percentage points). In Model 5, the M-NB gap remains significant ($p < 0.05$), but the W-NB gap becomes nonsignificant. Finally, adjusting for both demographics and issue attitudes (Models 6-8) make the M-NB and W-NB gaps nonsignificant, though they are still substantively large (9-15 and 6-8 percentage points, respectively).

Demographics play a similarly large role in explaining the M-NB and W-NB gaps in NDP voting. The bivariate M-NB and W-NB gaps are very large (51 and 40 percentage points, respectively). However, adjusting for demographics (Model 2) reduces the M-NB

Figure 6: Predicted Percent Voting Liberal, Conservative, and NDP, by Gender Identity with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals (Demographic and Issue Attitude Models)



Note: Model 1 is a simple bivariate model using only gender identity as a predictor. Model 2 adds in nine demographic variables. Model 3 adds attitudes toward banning conversion therapy. Model 4 adds a series of nine issue attitude variables. Model 5 adds a single left-right scale. Models 6-8 replicate Models 3-5 but add demographics.

gap by almost three-quarters (to 14 percentage points) and the W-NB gap by about 80 percent (to 8 percentage points). Both these gaps become nonsignificant when adjusting for demographics. Attitudes toward banning conversion therapy (Model 3) do little to explain the gaps. When we adjust for nine issue items (Model 4) or a single left-right scale (Model 5), we find the M-NB and W-NB gaps shrink by about 30-40 percent, though they remain significant. Finally, when we adjust for both demographics and issue attitudes (Models 6-8), we find the M-NB and W-NB gaps in NDP voting become nonsignificant. Generally, Models 6-8 produce very similar estimates to Model 2.

We draw three main conclusions from our analyses of the gaps in party identification and voting. First, even when we adjust for both demographics and issue attitudes, we still find some M-NB and W-NB gaps that are substantively large and may be likely to exist outside our sample. We find that demographics and issue attitudes are unlikely to fully account for the M-NB gaps in Liberal, Conservative, and NDP party identification and the W-NB gaps in Liberal party identification and voting. Second, demographics appear to account for a larger share of the M-NB and W-NB gaps in Liberal, Conservative, and NDP party identification than issue attitudes. Among the demographic variables we include, we note that sexual identity is particularly important for explaining these gaps. About 60 percent of nonbinary respondents identify as another sexual identity besides straight/heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual (often using labels more common among younger generations, such as queer, pansexual, or asexual), and respondents who identify with these other sexual identities are particularly likely to identify with the NDP. Third, when issue attitudes explain the M-NB and W-NB gaps in party identification and vote choice, it is not LGBTQ-specific policy attitudes that make the difference. Adding attitudes toward a conversion therapy ban generally does relatively little to explain the M-NB and W-NB gaps. Instead, it is nonbinary people's tendency to be more left-leaning than both men and women on a wide range of issues that reduces the estimated M-NB and W-NB gaps. We leave the origins of these more left-wing attitudes to future work. It could be through processes of socialization into nonbinary communities and/or selection into identifying as nonbinary among individuals from more left-leaning families, as Egan (2012) suggests for lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals. We leave these possibilities for future research.

Discussion

In our analyses, we have shown that nonbinary people are politically distinct from men and women in their party identification, voting behavior, and issue attitudes using data from the 2021 Canadian federal election. Nonbinary people are to the left of both men and women. They are less likely to support the Liberals and Conservatives and much more likely to support the social democratic NDP. Our bivariate results suggest that a majority

of nonbinary people identify with and vote for the NDP, which makes nonbinary identity a strong predictor of NDP support. We also find nonbinary people are generally to the left of both men and women in their issue attitudes. The gaps in party identification, voting, and issue attitudes between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people are generally larger than the ones between men and women. These results contribute to research on gender gaps in political behavior by showing that nonbinary people are politically distinct from both men and women.

We examine three main explanations of the gaps in party identification and voting. First, we consider whether these gaps are simply attributable to nonbinary people being part of the broader LGBTQ community. They are not. These gender identity gaps exist even when examining only LGBTQ respondents. Our analysis contributes to a growing body of research that disaggregates LGBTQ political behavior (Jones, 2021; Guntermann and Beauvais, 2022; Strolovitch, Wong, and Proctor, 2017) by showing that researchers may need to disaggregate even further by examining nonbinary people as a distinct LGBTQ subgroup.

Second, we consider whether these gaps are a product of compositional effects. We run models to adjust for demographic differences between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people. Demographics explain a substantial portion of these gaps, but they do not fully explain them. In particular, given that nonbinary people are overwhelmingly not straight/heterosexual, the “sexuality gap” accounts for much of the bivariate differences between men and nonbinary people and, especially, between women and nonbinary people. However, the M-NB gaps in Liberal, Conservative, and NDP party identification remain large and significant in our demographic models. The same is true for the W-NB gaps between women and nonbinary people in Liberal party identification and vote intention. Although demographic variables appear to shrink the M-NB and W-NB gaps in NDP party identification and voting substantially, none of our demographic models reduce the gaps between men and nonbinary people and between women and nonbinary people in party identification and vote intention to zero. Ultimately, demographics only account for some of the distinctiveness of nonbinary people.

Third, we consider whether nonbinary people’s more left-wing issue attitudes explain the gaps in party identification and voting. Issue attitudes on their own generally do not account for the M-NB and W-NB gaps, except in Conservative vote choice. When we adjust for (1) attitudes on LGBTQ rights (a legislative conversion therapy ban), (2) a series of issue attitude items or scales, or (3) a left-right scale constructed from 13 issue items, the M-NB and W-NB gaps generally remain significant. Demographics explain more of the M-NB and W-NB gaps than issue attitudes. However, demographics and issue attitudes together are enough to render the M-NB gaps in Conservative and NDP voting and the W-NB gaps in Conservative and NDP party identification and voting nonsignificant. However, the point estimates are large enough that they would be substantively significant if they reflected the true population estimates. Even after we adjust for both demographics

and issue attitudes, however, we still find large and significant M-NB gaps in Liberal, Conservative, and NDP party identification and and W-NB gaps in Liberal party identification and voting. Given that the point estimates for the M-NB and W-NB gaps in party identification and voting remain substantively large even when they are nonsignificant, even our nonsignificant results raise questions about whether issue attitudes and demographics together would be sufficient to explain the M-NB and W-NB gaps in an even larger sample.

Ultimately, we need additional data to explain these gaps further. Surveys with larger nonbinary subsamples would help generate more precise estimates of the gender gaps in party identification and voting behavior. In addition, political surveys with high-quality transgender men and women subsamples would help us know the extent to which these gender gaps show up even among groups of transgender and nonbinary respondents. We do not simply need more data, however. We also need surveys designed to test other theories that could explain these gender gaps. We may also need more exploratory research, such as focus groups with nonbinary voters, to develop new theories of gender gaps that can explain differences between men and nonbinary or between women and nonbinary people.

Based on our results, we recommend that political surveys adjust their gender questions to allow respondents to identify as nonbinary. Nonbinary people are politically distinct from men and women. When sample sizes permit, researchers should include nonbinary identity in their models of gender and political behavior wherever possible. This issue will only become more pressing as the percentage of nonbinary people in many countries is likely to increase over time through generational replacement and new people coming out as nonbinary.

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