Collective memory and means of claims in democracies: Evidence from Chile (2019-2023)

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Abstract

The persistence of political behavior after historical-political tragedies is a debated topic, despite it is unclear whether people retain the motivations behind their transmitted values. This article argues that protests are crucial for politically engaging countries with a strong memory of past violence. It examines Chile's "Estallido Social" protests triggered by police violence from October 2019 to March 2020, followed by the Constituent Plebiscite between 2020 and 2023. Chile has a history of institutional violence, especially during Pinochet's authoritarian rule. LS analysis shows that municipalities with military bases before 1970 had increased participation in the "Estallido Social" protests. However, these same municipalities had lower participation in the Constitutional voting process, without endorsing any specific party coalition. 2SLS estimation reveals that political victimization during the Pinochet era and contemporary remembrance of the 1973 coup on social media significantly explain this effect. In conclusion, political violence can stimulate participation beyond voting but may weaken the connection between voters and political elites.

Keywords: Constitutional Change, Protests, Institutional Violence, Collective Memory

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1. Introduction

> Ay policía que vida elegiste vos / verduguear a la gente es tu vocación / matar a la gente pobre es tu profesión / y así brindarle a los ricos la protección / ya vas a ver / las balas que vos tiraste van a volver.
>
> *Chilean Protest song*
> *Unknown composer, inspired by*
> *Dany Lescano y su Flor de Piedra*

Does collective memory in democracies influence whether people make demands in the streets or through the voting booth?

Universal suffrage mechanisms are a key feature of democratic societies. Elections are a means for politicians to be held accountable to the people. Since the seminal work of Meltzer and Richard (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), literature on the economics of democracy has emphasized the incentives that elections give politicians to redistribute income to the poor. For example, making voting technologies more accessible can make politicians more likely to invest in public healthcare (Fujiwara, 2015). However, freedom of association, speech, and other individual rights are also important for accountability, as they allow people to denounce irregularities and hold public officials accountable to social demands (O'Donnell, 1998).

Protest can also be a powerful way to assert civil, political, and economic rights. Traditional literature on the economics and politics of social unrest suggests that the fear of revolutions motivates elites to grant these rights to the people (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). However, the incentives for political leaders are stronger when a significant proportion of moderate activists join the protests (Lohmann, 1993). The emotions expressed in protests can have electoral repercussions, but politicians' responses also depend on the noisiness

of social demands (Arruda et al., 2021).

To summarize, elections are a way for politicians to be held accountable to the people. However, the recognition of civil, political, and economic rights can also be influenced by an engaged society outside of elections. The use of freedom of association and speech can allow collective social organizations to form, leading to diagonal accountability. Therefore, we have two types of accountability with different languages from the people to the government (Lührmann et al., 2020).

Collective memory can be a significant variable in explaining political engagement, combining political emotions and institutional persistence theories. A general sentiment of unfair treatment by governments (Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017) and the relative deprivation of not achieving expected social goals (Gurr, 2015) can lead to social unrest. However, these emotions can be sparked by current policies and can interact with the persistence of past institutional features. Past historical events can have an impact on present social practices. For example, previous instances of racial violence can diminish contemporary electoral engagement (Williams, 2021) and foster increased social mistrust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Similar findings have been observed regarding the level of surveillance and repression during past authoritarian regimes(Nikolova et al., 2022; Lichter et al., 2021). Other effects of past political repression is persistent higher levels of voting on the opposition left (Boucher, 2023). However, the literature on the persistence of political behavior often lacks clear evidence regarding whether the people as a whole remember the underlying reasons behind the values they pass on [1]. Collective memory is a sociological concept introduced by Maurice Halbwachs. It refers to the body of information and values shared by a social group about events that are remembered by their members. Unlike personal memory that fades away when the individuals who experienced it die, in historical-collective memory, these past events are remembered directly by

[1] Nikolova et al. (2022) and Bautista (2016, 2013) found suggestive mechanism of personal memory within the victim's family.

those who lived through them or indirectly through documents, oral traditions, and ceremonies. In this case, collective memory becomes a social institution that is passed down through generations (Halbwachs, 2020)

Even if institutional reforms take place to have regime change, some institutions can remain embedded in exclusionary culture or policy (Robinson, 2000), leading to social dissatisfaction. Focused political collective memories can also create ambiguous attitudes towards democracy. On the one hand, elites can manipulate them (in a supply-side approach) to maintain their power (Ochsner and Roesel, 2017; Belmonte and Rochlitz, 2020); on the other hand, memories can also fuel demands against elites outside of democracy (Ticchi et al., 2013). In democratic contexts, Çidam (2021) argues that protests can lead to social experimentation within the democratic process, contributing to institutional robustness.

In this paper, we examine the impact of historical state violence on present-day political engagement. Chile is a suitable case to test these impacts (as discussed in Section 2), as it has experienced extreme political repression in the past and recent social unrest: between 1973 and 1989, the country was ruled by a violent military regime that victimized over 40,000 people; it underwent a process of democratization in 1988, but retained some institutional features from the dictatorship, such as the police organization and the core of the 1980 Constitution; and its people have participated in one of the largest waves of protests in the Global South according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021), which pressured the right-wing president Sebastian Piñera and the Chilean national congress to initiate a new constituent process.

After a thorough process of theory-building and causal tracing analysis (Beach and Pedersen, 2016), we formulated hypotheses about how presence of repression centers of Pinochet's regime could influence different forms of political engagement: protests or voting. We tested these hypotheses using cross-section regressions from 328 municipalities ("comunas"), with the number of demonstrations, participation, and voting in the Constituent Plebiscite as dependent

variables, and the presence of military bases before 1970 as the primary independent variable. The regressions were estimated using least squares , both weighted by population. To address the issue of historical repression and political engagement being influenced by the same older electoral safe-seats, we followed Bautista et al. (2021) in using the placement of military bases before 1970 as an exogenous variable of political repression during the Pinochet Era (see the discussion in Section 3). To assess the persistence of memory into contemporary political behavior, we propose a mechanism analysis based on data on social media of users remembering the violence of 1973 coup.

The estimates show that areas with repression centers had more protests but lower participation in the Constituent Plebiscite thirty years after. No results were found for how the population voted. 2SLS estimates suggest that the rate of political victimization and contemporary remembrance in social media are relevant mechanisms behind this effect. Based on the hypotheses developed in the case study, the results suggest that the memory of past institutional violence leads to political mobilization through protests, especially in response to present repression. However, little can be said about engagement in the voting system. To provide complementary evidence on autobiographical memory, surveys of survivors could be used (see Bautista (2016))

In the next section, we present the Chilean case study that underlies our analysis.

2. Case Study

2.1. Antecedents: the Pinochet regime repression

In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the civil government of Salvador Allende. The Allende government, a coalition of left-wing parties (Unidad Popular), won the elections in 1969 and had a plan to implement Marxian socialism. The implementation of strong price Controls and redistributive policies led to economic instability and political polarization (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990). Once Pinochet took power, the military junta engaged in an

anti-communist witch hunt against former politicians in the Allende government, trade unions, and the opposition in general. In the first months, the majority of repression was carried out by the armed forces and police officers (Carabineros) and, along other places, the old military bases created in democratic era for national security were used as repression centers (Bautista et al., 2021). In 1974, repression was centralized under a single agency (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional - DINA). Under external pressure due to human rights violations, DINA was replaced by another agency, supposedly "more supervised," in 1977 (Central Nacional de Informaciones - CNI) (Policzer, 2009). According to official records, 3,216 people were killed or forcibly disappeared and 38,254 people were imprisoned for political reasons during the dictatorship period, and 94% of these prisoners were tortured (Bautista et al., 2021).

Pinochet and the military concentrated political power, establishing a new constitution in 1980. This constitution extended Pinochet's mandate and privatized the public pension system in Chile, minimized government intervention in the economy, and biased the electoral system towards right-wing parties (Bautista et al., 2021). The repression also led to civil resistance, which was a concern for the junta (Esberg, 2021). Along with economic crises in the 1980s, social organizations organized strikes and protests calling for democratization, which was also supported by international pressure. In 1988, a plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet's government took place. The "No" vote won with 55% of the votes, and the "Concertación" coalition for the "No" won the elections in the following mandate and the subsequent elections until 2005 (Bautista et al., 2021).

The Chilean democratization process was seen as incomplete. Pinochet remained the head of the armed forces until 1998 and had a lifetime seat in Congress until 2002, the year he resigned due to corruption and human rights charges (Bautista et al., 2021). Stern (2010) argue that after the redemocratization, Chilean society faced tensions of memories of the victims by organized social groups which collided with initiatives of forgetting by Pinochetistas. Despite several constitutional reforms to improve the electoral system, the core

of the 1980 constitution remained, leading to debates about its undemocratic nature (Garretón, 1999).

2.2. Estallido Social and the Chilean Constituent

The trigger for the social unrest in Chile from 2019 to 2020 was the adjustment of transport fares in Santiago. On October 1, 2019, the Public Transport Expert Panel increased the bus fare by 10 pesos and the peak and off-peak metro fare by 30 pesos. The new fares were to be enforced on October 6 (Panel de Expertos del Transporte Público Ley N° 20.378, 2019).

The first organized protests took place on October 7. High school students in downtown Santiago jumped the turnstiles in metro stations en masse for several days (Emol, 2019). A week later, the first "violent" act occurred when a student was arrested after breaking a glass door at Pedro de Valdivia Station (Vega, 2019).

A large protest at several Metro stations had been organized on social media for October 18 (Rivera and Ruyt, 2019). However, October 16 was a turning point in terms of participation. According to Google Trends, searches for the term "18 de Octubre" reached their peak in Chile following the first clash with the Carabineros (Google, 2019). This clash occurred at the Santa Ana station and resulted in the arrest of four more students (24Horas.cl, 2019). The Metro suspended services at several stations on Line 5. In the afternoon, another group of students broke down the gate at Plaza de Armas station (Arias, 2019). On October 17, tensions further escalated with the looting of San Joaquin station (CNN Chile, 2019b) and the arrest of 133 students (Al Jazeera, 2019)

On October 18th, #ChileDespertó (Chile woke up). The protests gained even larger scale, and protesters fully occupied downtown Santiago - this event was also known as the "Santiagazo." The electricity company Enel's headquarters was damaged by fire - the electricity fare was also a complaint, but the accusation of arson was not yet solved (Lara, 2019). Large-scale clashes with the Carabineros also occurred: protesters were subjected to water jets and tear gas in many parts of the city. At night, residents of Santiago organized a massive

"cacerolazo" (pot-banging protest) in their homes in support of the demonstrations in the streets (Rollano, 2019). In response to the protests, the Minister of Defense Andrés Chadwick declared in a press conference that they would use the National Security Act against the "violentists." Furthermore, the Metro company president announced that the Metro would remain closed for one week, with no mention of reversing the fare adjustments (CNN Chile, 2019a). At the end of the night, the President of Chile Sebastián Piñera was seen at a luxury restaurant, which sparked criticism in public opinion (MercoPress, 2019).

In the first minutes after midnight, President Piñera declared a state of emergency in Santiago and nearby cities, and authorized the armed forces to maintain order. The armed forces chief imposed curfews in the designated state of emergency area. Despite these efforts, the protests persisted in Santiago and quickly spread to other regions of the country - for example, protesters set up barricades in the streets, and the police barracks were attacked in Concepción (Stuardo, 2019). Piñera extended the state of emergency to almost all regional capitals in Chile. The declaration of a state of emergency and the use of curfews outside of natural disasters were the first of their kind since the end of Pinochet's regime (France 24, 2019). Sebastián Piñera stated that the country was "at war with a powerful and implacable enemy," which fueled further revolt (Prensa Presidencia, 2019d). However, he also proposed suspending the readjustment and convening a meeting with leaders of different powers to discuss solutions to the high cost of living and the "safety of the family" (Prensa Presidencia, 2019b).

On October 20th, President Piñera held a meeting with the President of the Deputies Chamber Iván Flores, the President of the Supreme Court Haroldo Brito, and the President of the Senate Jaime Quintana. At this meeting, Quintana proposed resuming the process of writing a new constitution (Leal, 2019). On the same day, an extraordinary session of parliament suspended the Metro fare readjustment (Senado, 2019). Meanwhile, protests intensified, with peaceful protesters supporting students - they claimed "it was not for the 30 pesos (of the readjustment) but 30 years (of democracy)" (Maciel, 2019). However,

there were also instances of arson, looting, and violent clashes, with police using shots, tear gas, and water jets, and the first deaths were recorded. During this period, the formation of "cabildos abiertos," or open and decentralized assemblies self-composed to discuss social issues and solutions, was also observed. Examples of themes discussed in these assemblies included the new constitution, drug legalization, and local networks for service provision (Observatorio de Metodos Deliberativos, 2019). Finally, on October 21st, social leaders organized themselves to formally advocate for a new constitution (Flores, 2019).

On October 22nd, President Piñera presented a package of reforms called "New Social Agenda," which included: a 20% increase in pensions, the creation of public insurance for medication and serious illnesses, a mechanism to stabilize electricity fares, an increase in taxes for high incomes, a reduction in the wages of high-ranking public workers, and limits on re-elections and the number of congressmen (Prensa Presidencia, 2019a). However, these measures were seen as too modest, even among Piñera's allies (La Tercera, 2019).

Three days later, "La Marcha Más Grande De Todas" (the greatest march of all) took place (El Desconcierto, 2019), with an estimated 1,000,000-1,500,000 people in Santiago, 50,000 in Concepción, and a similar number in Valparaíso. On October 27th, 100,000 people peacefully marched between Viña Del Mar and Valparaíso, but faced police repression (teleSUR, 2019). Both protests also called for the impeachment of President Piñera and against private pensions, high costs of living, and a lack of public services. Under pressure, Sebastián Piñera declared the end of the state of emergency and the presence of armed forces on the streets (Gobierno de Chile, 2019). Piñera also invited his ministers to resign, which was accepted by eight ministers, including the minister of public security (Deutsche Welle, 2019)

Even after the end of the state of emergency, protests continued in smaller numbers, often led by organized social groups. On November 4th, trade unions called for a general strike for a new constitution - on this day, 20,000 people participated, and the protest was marked by some of the most violent incidents of the period (Europa Press, 2019). On the following day, the protests reached the

eastern part of Santiago, the country's financial center. The headquarters of the right-wing party Unión Democratica Independiente and the memorial of Jaime Guzmán, mentor of Pinochet's 1980 constitution, were vandalized (Ahumada and Vera, 2019). Due to allegations of human rights violations, the Ministry of Public Security announced on November 9th that the government would reform the police (infobae, 2019).

On November 7th, the Chilean Municipality Association approved a call for a citizen consultation on a new constitution (Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades, 2019). On November 12th, President Piñera announced three National Agreements in response to the protests: for peace, as he called on retired military personnel to reintegrate the security forces; for justice, as he reiterated the Social Agenda; and for a new constitution (Prensa Presidencia, 2019c).

On November 15th, an agreement was reached between the government and the opposition to hold a constitutional plebiscite. A project for a constitutional amendment was presented and approved on December 16th in the Deputies Chamber (Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 2019) and on December 19th in the Senate (Senado de Chile, 2019). The amendment was then promulgated on December 24th (Ministerio Secretaría General De La Presidencia, 2019). The amendment stipulated that the people must choose in the plebiscite whether or not to approve a constituent process, and if the constituent would be a mixed convention between newly elected constituents and current elected congress members, or a fully popular convention. In addition, the plebiscite must ensure gender equality and a minimum percentage of indigenous representation in the composition of the convention.

The plebiscite was scheduled for March 24th, 2020, but was postponed to October 25th, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Chilean electoral service (https://www.servel.cl), more than 7.5 million people participated in the plebiscite on that day - an all time record. The option to "approve" the constituent process won with 78.2% of the votes, and the choice of a fully popular convention won with 79.1%

Along with 2020, there were a few protests. Student protests took place on

January 6-7th against the national university admission exam (Urrejola, 2020); demonstrations against the death of a football fan who was run over by a police truck on January 28th (Cooperativa.cl, 2020); and protests against the International Festival of Music in Viña del Mar in February (Carreras, 2020). On March 18th, a state of emergency was declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Protests lost momentum, with the exception of October 18th, 2020, when the march on the first anniversary of the "estallido" was marked by around 30,000 people protesting in Santiago's main square, clashes with the police, 580 arrests, and two churches burned down (Ulloa, 2020). The "estallido" resulted in more than 3,700,000 people participating in protests until November 10th 2019 (Cooperativa.cl, 2019), 34 deaths confirmed, 12,500 people hospitalized, and reports of 5,558 victims of institutional violence until October 2020 (Amnesty International, 2020).

According to the electoral service (https://www.servel.cl), almost 6.2 million people voted for the composition of the constitutional convention on May 15-16th 2021. The Vamos por Chile coalition (right-wing) gained 37 seats, the Lista del Apruebo (center-left) gained 25 seats, Apruebo Dignidad (left) gained 28 seats, and independents gained 48 seats. The new constitution was written and voted on by the convention in 2022, and then a new popular plebiscite took place to confirm the replacement of the old constitution.

2.3. Hypotheses formulation

Considering the "Estallido social," hypotheses can be formulated to guide our analysis of the persistence of memory of the victims of the Pinochet regime in Chilean political engagement. Funk and Velasco (2020) argue that the *Estallido Social* happened due to a meltdown of institutional trust and hopelessness. However, even the authors acknowledge that initial conditions matter in this situational crisis. Here, we can hypothesize that collective memory can play a special role in these conditions.

Our first hypothesis is about protests. As mentioned in the background on Chilean democracy, people in the country used strikes and protests during

the Pinochet government to put pressure on democratization when the electoral process was tainted by fraud. The tendency to protest may be more pronounced in areas where the iron fist of repression was more heavily felt. As Ticchi et al. (2013) argue, collective memory can be a significant driver of resistance against authoritarianism. However, we can also argue that this memory of repression can persist even after democratization is achieved and drive protests, as seen in the *Estallido Social*.

Hypothesis 1: Memories on Pinochet regime's victims led to more political claims through protests.

A second hypothesis concerns the demand for electoral participation. Even at the end of Pinochet's regime, the democratic governments remained based on the 1980 constitution, with only minor revisions since then. This has sparked criticism of its undemocratic nature. People who were affected by authoritarian repression may be more vocal in this criticism. The demand for a new constitution emerged in large protests, such as *La Marcha más grande de todas*. The vandalism of the Jaime Guzmán memorial can be seen as a protest against the constitution he contributed to. The creation of a new constitution became the main concession the Piñera government offered in response to the 2019-2020 protests.

Hypothesis 2a: Memories on Pinochet regime's victims led to more voting participation.

Velasco (2021) argues that the rejection of neoliberal policies is unlikely to explain the *Estallido Social*: leaders of anti-liberal movements, such as the Communist Party, the Teacher's Union, and 'No + AFP' (anti-privatized pension movement) failed to get a seat in the convention. A notable characteristic of Chilean democracy is that the hybrid constitutional features inherited from Pinochet lead to dissatisfaction with political parties. Specifically, there is general social complaint that parties are increasingly disconnected from civil society

(Luna and Altman, 2011). Sensitivity to flawed participation may also be higher where participation was more violently suppressed in the past. Velasco argues that the root of the Chilean constitutional revolution was the demand for more participatory democracy. This demand is something that the formation of *cabildos populares* for public discussion during the protests might be seen as evidence of.

Hypothesis 2b: Memories on Pinochet regime's victims led to more claims to more voting accountability of politicians.

3. Quantitative Data and Methodology

This section describes the specification, data, and methodology of the estimations used to test the hypotheses discussed in subsection 2.3.

The econometric specification is inspired by Bautista et al. (2021) on the effects of Pinochet repression on the plebiscite of 1988 that voted for the end of the Chilean Military regime. Thus, the general equation is as follows:

$$poli = f(repre, Controls, FE), \tag{1}$$

, where poli is the political mobilization variable for protests and constituent plebiscite, repre is the variable for political repression from the Pinochet era, and the presence of Controls related to demography, geography, and politics pre-Pinochet. FE is the state (Región) level dummy.

Considering hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b, our general initial hypothesis is that of dictatorship memory and institutional persistence: localities that were more affected by the Military regime's repression protested more in the Estallido Social. In addition, they engaged more in voting for a new Constitution to replace the last one designed by the Pinochet government.

To test these quantitative hypotheses, we have constructed a database of 328 municipalities (*Comunas*)[2]. See Appendix B for a detailed description of

[2]This city-level approach has an advantaged over higher granularity data to assess the

the data and its sources. We use least squares to evaluate the conditional mean between the results of the protests or plebiscite and the presence of repression centers, as our methodology is inspired by Bautista et al. (2021). As seen by this work, the placement of military bases in Chile before 1970 was related to national security issues. The authors argue that the establishment of military bases was not correlated with the city inhabitants' right-wing or left-wing orientation - the government in both directions almost equally contributed to the construction of these bases. Besides, correlational analysis suggests that there is no clear association between the presence of military bases and turnout or electoral outcome in the '70-'73 elections, nor education. However, Pinochet used the military bases as centers of detention and torture of dissidents in his regime. Therefore, they are highly correlated with victimization. Bautista et al. (2021) also argue that, when controlled by the 1970 election results, the use of military presence fixes the influence of the political orientation of a locality prior to Pinochet and gives a net effect of existence of past repression centers on contemporary variables of political attitudes. However, the authors argue that weighting the estimates for the population is strategic for analyzing sociopolitical action because it gives more focus and equal treatment to individual behavior, irrespective of the size of the municipality.

To further investigate the mechanisms behind the effects of repression centers and contemporary democratic demands, we analyzed indicators of political victimization during Pinochet's regime, such as the number of victims or residents who were victims per 10,000 inhabitants. Besides, a measure of contemporary social memory using social media users remembering the '73 coup is also assessed. Using 2SLS, we estimated the victimization rates and the intensity of contemporary remembrance as independent variables and the presence of military bases prior to 1970 as the instrumental variable. This allowed us to test if the recollection of higher casualties plays a significant role in explaining the

effects of social memory as it reduces the interference of other centers of memory diffusion within the same municipality, such as schools.

effects.

4. Econometric results

In this section, we can assess the empirical effects on the social mobilization influenced by the local memory of political repression in the Pinochet era.

4.1. Protests and Constituent Plebiscite Turnout

Table 1 indicates that localities with pre-1970 military bases had higher levels of protest during the "*Estallido Social*". The decomposition in Table 1 shows that the effects were significant for both peaceful protests and violent riots, in similar proportions. The results are in line with the expectation that the memory of Pinochet's victims made residents more aware of state repression and led to more protests.

The LS estimates suggest that the presence of military bases in a municipality, on average, resulted in nearly 1 protest per 10,000 inhabitants during the *Estallido Social*, about 30 years later. Additionally, areas with pre-1970 military bases had slightly higher levels of violent riots compared to those without such bases.

Table 1: LS Estimates: Protests/10k Habs - Decomposition

	Pacific Protests	**Riots**	**Total**
Pre-70 Bases	**0.458*** **	**0.522*** **	**0.979*** **
	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.294)
	[2.968]	[3.472]	[3.331]
LS Adjusted R^2	0.730	0.600	0.680
LS F-statistic	41.221	20.605	32.539
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x
N. Obs.	328	328	328

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

4.2. Constituent approval

However, the data in Table 2 shows that in areas with pre-1970 military bases, voter participation in the constituent plebiscite was lower. The first column of Table 2 presents this result, which shows that if a municipality had a military base built prior to 1970, it experienced, on average, a decrease of more than 5% in its rate of participation in the 2020 plebiscite.

We can also examine the impact of repression centers on constituent approval. Table 2 also presents the regression results for the percentage of constituent approval (second column) and the percentage of full popular convention given the constituent approval (third column). The data shows that there is lit-

Table 2: LS Estimates: (Approval of Constituent)

	Turnout	**Approval**	**Popular Convention**
Pre-70 Bases	**-5.261*** **	**4.339**	**3.661**
	(1.254)	(2.910)	(2.689)
	[-4.194]	[1.491]	[1.362]
LS Adjusted R^2	0.731	0.681	0.630
LS F-statistic	41.298	32.764	26.290
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x
N. Obs.	328	328	328

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

tle evidence that areas near the repression centers of the Chilean military regime voted more for the constituent or a more "radical" assembly composition.

4.3. Results of Elections on the Constitutional Convention composition

Now, we can examine the impact of the presence of Pinochet repression centers on the elections of constituent assembly members. As shown in Table 3, the presence of pre-1970 constructed military bases resulted in even lower voter turnout than in the case of constituent approval: municipalities with these bases had an average participation rate that was nearly 8% lower than in other municipalities.

Second, third and forth columns of Table 3 present the results of voting

Table 3: LS Estimates: (Composition of Convention)

	Turnout	**Vamos**	**Lista**	**Dignidad**
Pre-70 Bases	**-8.108*** **	**-4.050**	**1.608**	**-2.390**
	(1.208)	(2.743)	(1.145)	(3.353)
	[-6.712]	[-1.476]	[1.404]	[-0.713]
LS Adjusted R^2	0.669	0.630	0.339	0.396
LS F-statistic	31.077	26.285	8.624	10.762
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	328	328	328	328

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

for the coalitions Vamos Por Chile (right and center-right parties), Lista del Apruebo (center-left), and Apruebo Dignidad (left). It can be concluded that there is little differences about the voting preference of municipalities that have been more affected by past authoritarian repression. In areas where there were old repression centers, there was no electoral punishment for the right-wing coalition aligned with the president, nor was there a preference for left-wing opposition coalitions.

4.4. Almost a backlash? Results of 2021 Presidential Elections

By the end of 2021, the impact of the *Estallido Social* was noticeable in the Chilean presidential elections. One of the favorite candidates was the far-

right Jose Antonio Kast. As president of the Chilean Republican Party in 2019, he was one of the most vocal proponents of the Emergency State against the *Estallido Social* (Olivares, 2019). In 2021, Kast claimed the legacy of Pinochet in his electoral run. He was the son of a Nazi soldier and the brother of a former Pinochet minister (Bell, n.d.), and he argued that "If Pinochet were alive, he would vote for him" (Slattery, 2021). During the *Estallido Social*, he also claimed that it represented that "Violence was winning the peace". Law and order would be his main electoral platform (Montero, Felipe Díaz, 2021), not only against social unrest but also against immigrants (Bell, n.d.). In the first round on November 21, Kast was the front-runner, obtaining 27.9% of the votes, while in second place, the left-wing Gabriel Boric (former student activist and representing the Apruebo Dignidad coalition) gained 25.8%. This result was seen by political analysts as a risk of a political backlash from the *Estallido Social* (Cisternas, 2021). In the second round, Gabriel Boric pursued a conciliatory tone with welfare state proposals (The Economist, 2021). On December 19, Boric won against Kast with 55.87% to 44.13%, in a record of voting participation (8,363,910 votes - 55.64% turnout).

An important robustness check is to determine if the lack of electoral participation due to the memories of past repression centers remains even when faced with a Pinochet-aligned candidate. Table 4 presents the estimates for the first-round turnout and voting for the two leading candidates in columns 1 to 3. The fourth and fifth columns present the results for the second-round turnout and voting for José Kast. The results are consistent with previous findings: a significant and negative effect on electoral turnout in municipalities with military bases; and, no increased effort to vote for Boric or against Kast.

Table 4: LS Estimates: Votes (2021 1º and 2º Presidential Voting)

	Turnout (1ºV)	**Kast (1ºV)**	**Boric (1ºV)**	**Turnout (2ºV)**	**Kast (2ºV)**
Pre-70 Bases	**-6.573*** **	**-1.801**	**1.612**	**-3.616***	**-3.026**
	(1.211)	(1.982)	(2.090)	(1.884)	(2.751)
	[-5.428]	[-0.909]	[0.771]	[-1.919]	[-1.100]
LS Adjusted R^2	0.648	0.737	0.761	0.518	0.736
LS F-statistic	28.352	42.670	48.328	16.990	42.509
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	328	328	328	328	328

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

4.5. The constitutional wave crashes: the rejection of the new constitutional draft

In the 2022 Chilean constitutional referendum, citizens were asked if they approved of the new draft constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly elected in 2021. This new draft was the result of negotiations among various political and social groups and aimed to address issues such as economic inequality, lack of indigenous representation, and concentration of power - considered by the Assembly to be a social legacy of Pinochet's constitution (Bartlett, 2022).

The referendum took place on September 4th, 2022, with mandatory voting. The results of the vote were decisive, with 61.89% of voters rejecting the draft constitution and 38.11% supporting it, according to SERVEL.

This outcome was a major blow to President Gabriel Boric's government which had supported it. It was also a victory for the country's opposition coalition and social movements, who had campaigned against the draft. Factors that may have contributed to the rejection of the draft included fake news (Stuenkel, 2022), unpopularity of Assembly politicians, opposition to the Plurinational state design, and skepticism about the economic sustainability of social programmatic guidelines (Titelman, 2022). Public opinion surveys prior to the referendum suggested rejection of the draft would increase political polarization, but could also lead to increased employment, lower inflation, more organized migration policies, and economic growth (Criteria, 2022).

The failure of the draft constitution has left Chile at a crossroads, with some calling for new negotiations and discussions to find a way forward. A minority have suggested amending the current constitution, but social actors overall have called for a completely new constitution to be written from scratch (POLGA-HECIMOVICH, 2022).

The impact of the presence of military bases on the outcome of the exit plebiscite is analyzed in Table 5. As seen in previous tables, municipalities that had military bases prior to 1970 did not exhibit a higher voter turnout in favor of the proposed constitution. Despite the requirement of mandatory voting, the decreased voter turnout still had a significant effect.

Table 5: LS Estimates: Exit Plebiscite

	Turnout	**Approval**
Pre-70 Bases	**-2.651***	**1.226**
	(1.426)	(2.465)
	[-1.860]	[0.497]
LS Adjusted R^2	0.625	0.749
LS F-statistic	25.748	45.349
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	328	328

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

5. Mechanism analysis

5.1. Victimization as a mechanism

But what makes the military bases constructed before 1970 relevant to the local divergence in political engagement? In this section we investigate how the memories of political victims may be one mechanism that explains contemporary political behavior. As previously stated, the construction of these military bases prior to the Allende regime was not connected to the political stance of the central government, but the Pinochet regime used them as repression centers.

Table 6 presents the impact of pre-70 military bases on two measures of political victimization during the Chilean military dictatorship: the number of victims in a locality per 10,000 inhabitants, and the number of residents who were victims per 10,000 inhabitants. Both results suggest that the presence of military bases was indeed associated with higher victimization. Municipalities with military bases built before 1970 had 2.5 more victims and 1.8 more victimized residents per 10,000 inhabitants. [3]. These estimates form the first stage of the 2SLS regressions that follow.

In table 7, we re-estimate the regressions concerning the protests in 2019-2020 and the electoral behavior during the constitutional reform initiative and presidential elections [4]. Now, these are 2SLS estimates in which the victimization rate is the independent variable and the presence of pre-70 bases is the instrumental variable. The estimates go in line with the found about military bases: the higher was the relative number of victims or victimized residents, the higher was the relative number of protests, but no more effort to punish the incumbent right and even lower electoral participation during the constituent process and even in the presidential run against a Pinochetista. The results suggests that memories of victimization during the Pinochet Regime is a relevant

[3] This result aligns with the findings of Bautista et al. (2021). The authors also discovered that the presence of military bases did not have an impact on unemployment, migration, or investment in public goods during the dictatorship.

[4] The complete estimates are available on request

mechanism behind the political behavior in Chilean municipalities with military bases.

Table 6: LS Estimates : Effect of Presence of pre-70 bases on Pinochet victimization

	Independent Variables	
	Victims/10k inhab.	**Victim residents/10k inhab.**
Pre-70 Bases	**2.541*** **	**1.803*** **
	(0.475)	(0.336)
	[5.354]	[5.362]
LS Adjusted R^2	0.689	0.599
OLS F-Statistic	29.960	20.582
p-value (OLS F-Statistic)	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	289	289

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

5.2. Contemporary memory, past victimization and present political engagement

505 To delve deeper, can we explore the correlation between past repression centers and current political engagement through the lens of contemporary social memory? Measuring the role of social memory, which is defined as the collective recollection of past events, can be challenging. Nevertheless, recent studies suggest that social media platforms, such as Twitter, can provide valuable re-

Table 7: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Victimization

	Independent Variables			
Dependent Variables	**Victims/10k Inhab.**		**Victim Resid./10k Inhab**	
Total Protests	**0.360****	(0.141)	**0.507*****	(0.186)
Pacific Protests	**0.174****	(0.073)	**0.245****	(0.096)
Violent Riots	**0.186*****	(0.070)	**0.262*****	(0.094)
Turnout (Const. Initative)	**-1.980*****	(0.387)	**-2.790*****	(0.671)
Approval (Const. Initiative)	**0.982**	(0.886)	**1.384**	(1.310)
Const. Convention	**0.787**	(0.821)	**1.109**	(1.207)
Turnout (Composition)	**-3.212*****	(0.490)	**-4.526*****	(0.856)
Vamos	**-0.653**	(0.834)	**-0.920**	(1.221)
Lista	**0.980**	(0.620)	**0.931**	(0.864)
Dignidad	**-1.519**	(1.357)	**-2.140**	(1.949)
Turnout (1º Pres. Round)	**-2.391*****	(0.361)	**-3.369*****	(0.689)
Boric (1º Pres. Round)	**0.072**	(0.662)	**0.100**	(0.936)
Kast (1º Pres. Round)	**-0.200**	(0.655)	**-0.282**	(0.934)
Turnout (2º Pres. Round)	**-1.535****	(0.667)	**-2.163****	(0.988)
Kast (2º Pres. Round)	**-0.588**	(0.919)	**-0.828**	(1.334)
Turnout (Exit Plebs.)	**-0.969****	(0.425)	**-1.365****	(0.570)
Approval (Exit Plebs.)	**-0.160**	(0.817)	**-0.226**	(1.145)

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold. Newey-West standard errors. The instrument is the presence of pre-70 military bases. The weakness of the instrument is tested by the Cragg-Donald test.

sources for analyzing social memory, as exposed by Sumikawa et al. (2018)[5]. Twitter was the forth most used social media in Chile in 2019, according to the agency StatCounter (StatCounter, 2019).

One approach to studying the connection between past political victimization and social memory is by identifying trending topics related to historical events and collecting tweets about them. For example, on the anniversary of the military coup on September 11th, 2019, prior to the Estallido, we identified the Chilean trending topics associated with the event. Among these topics, we selected the top five related to the remembrance of violence [6], namely "Golpe de Estado," "Allende," "Allende Vive," "#11Septiembre1973," and "#NiPerdonNiOlvido." We then gathered a sample of 26,238 tweets from 16,223 accounts that used one of these topics, utilizing the web scraping tool exportdata.io.

To measure social memory, we determined the municipalities where the users who tweeted the selected terms were located. We opted for the least ambiguous reference to a single Chilean comuna, resulting in a total sample of 2,623 users. Next, we calculated the number of users remembering the coup per 10,000 inhabitants in each municipality, creating a measure of social memory. We employed this measure to examine the relationship between past political victimization, social memory, and current political engagement.

We conducted several regression analyses to explore this relationship. In one analysis, a linear regression was estimated using the least squares method to examine the connection between the presence of military bases and the number of Twitter users remembering the '73 coup. The results presented in Table 8[7] in-

[5]However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this approach. Twitter users may not be representative of the broader population, so the findings should be interpreted with caution. For example, there might be a potential bias towards younger users on the platform. Despite this limitation, it is worth considering the *persistence* of social memory through new generations.

[6]The topic "Pinochet", for instance, were largely used by Pinochetistas, so the results might be more ambiguous.

[7]The complete estimates are also available on request

Table 8: LS Estimates: effect of repression centers on memories in social media

	Independent Variable
	TwitterAcc / 10k Inhab
Military Base	**4.222****
	(2.019)
	[2.091]
OLS Adjusted R^2	0.619
OLS F-statistic	25.124
p-value (OLS F-statistic)	0.000
State Dummies	x
Controls	x
N. Obs.	328

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

dicated that municipalities with pre-1970 military bases had more remembrance of the coup on Twitter, with 4.2 more accounts per ten thousand inhabitants than municipalities without these bases.

Another analysis utilized a 2SLS regression to investigate the correlation between past victimhood and Twitter users remembering the '73 coup, using pre-1970 military bases as an instrument. The results, shown in Table 9, indicate that the more political victims of Pinochet there were in a given municipality, the more remembrance of the coup there was on Twitter. Specifically, one victim per 10k inhabitants was related to 1.6 accounts remembering the '73 coup, and one victim resident per 10k inhabitants was related to 2.2 accounts remembering

Table 9: 2SLS estimates (Presence of pre-70 bases as instrument)

	Independent Variables	
	TwitterAcc/ 10k Inhab	**TwitterAcc/ 10k Inhab**
Victims/10k inhabs	**1.567*** **	
	(0.442)	
	[3.543]	
Victim residents/10k inhabs		**2.208*** **
		(0.558)
		[3.957]
IV F-statistic	65.147	40.451
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	289	289

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, and T-statistic in brackets.

the '73 coup.

Lastly, we utilized 2SLS regressions to analyze the relationship between Twitter users' remembrance of the coup and political engagement in the Constitutional revolution. The results in Table 10 suggest that there is a positive correlation between remembrance of the coup on Twitter and protests, less participation in the Constitutional process, and no increased effort to punish the right.

But is collective memory truly the determining factor driving political behavior in the presence of past repression centers? One could argue that the

Table 10: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Remembrance

	Independent Variable	
Dependent Variables	**Twitter Acc/10k Inhab.**	
Total Protests	**0.232****	(0.091)
Pacific Protests	**0.108*****	(0.040)
Violent Riots	**0.124****	(0.053)
Turnout (Const. Initative)	**-1.246****	(0.520)
Approval (Const. Initiative)	**1.028**	(0.920)
Const. Convention	**0.867**	(0.807)
Turnout (Composition)	**-1.920****	(0.853)
Vamos	**-0.959**	(0.860)
Lista	**0.280**	(0.332)
Dignidad	**-0.566**	(0.858)
Turnout (1º Pres. Round)	**-1.558****	(0.701)
Boric (1º Pres. Round)	**0.382**	(0.525)
Kast (1º Pres. Round)	**-0.427**	(0.555)
Turnout (2º Pres. Round)	**-0.856**	(0.586)
Kast (2º Pres. Round)	**-0.717**	(0.815)
Turnout (Exit Plebs.)	**-0.628*****	(0.160)
Approval (Exit Plebs.)	**0.290**	(0.621)

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold. Newey-West standard errors. The instrument is the presence of pre-70 military bases. The weakness of the instrument is tested by the Cragg-Donald test.

Table 11: Alternative Mechanism Analysis: LS estimates

	Independent Variables		
	Unemp/Inhab	**Inv Edu/Student**	**Inv Health/Inhab**
Military Base	**-0.001**	**-9.048**	**-0.203**
	(0.007)	(7.385)	(0.175)
	[-0.154]	[-1.225]	[-1.160]
OLS Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.111	0.144
OLS F-statistic	1.823	2.840	3.436
p-value (OLS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x
N. Obs.	314	324	305

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, Newey-West standard errors and T-statistic in brackets.

existence of military bases can result in divergent policy implementation and varying levels of investment in public goods across different municipalities. This becomes particularly relevant when political repression gives rise to a dynasty of local politicians who support dictatorship (González et al., 2021) or when descendants of the repressed individuals are involved (Boucher, 2023). Following Bautista et al. (2021), we also explored alternative mechanisms that could influence political behavior. The results, presented in Table 11, indicate that there is no significant divergence among municipalities in terms of public good investment (such as healthcare or education) or unemployment.

Overall, the findings of this study suggest that social memory plays a likely role in contemporary political engagement. Additionally, Twitter can be a use-

ful tool for measuring social memory and providing valuable insights into the correlation between past political victimization and present-day political engagement.

6. Discussion

The overall evidence suggests that the memory of Pinochet's repression did not generalize into increased electoral turnout or pressure for more electoral accountability. In areas where there was more repression, there was no greater participation in constitutional change or increased tendency to vote for or against incumbent coalitions.

This result aligns with the findings of two pieces of literature. First, Bautista et al. (2021) argues that the effects of past Pinochet repression on votes for the Concertación decreased with each electoral run, so it can be inferred that it had little influence on voting for the right-wing coalition of parties that were not historically affiliated with the Concertación. Second, according to a public opinion survey conducted by CERC (2013) 40 years after the military coup of 1973, there was a significant increase in the percentage of people who rejected the necessity of military coups, from 48% in 2003 to 68% in 2013. However, 41% of the people interviewed in 2013 attributed the responsibility for the 1973 coup to Pinochet himself, 6% to the military, and only 2% to the right (compared to 34%, 7%, and 4%, respectively, in 2003). These results indicate an increasing detachment of most actors and institutions from the military regime by the public opinion.

Since municipalities with more victims saw more protests, what influenced people affected by Pinochet's repression to take to the streets, other than increased political participation, more public services, or punishment for the incumbent party? The literature on protests discusses the backfire of police repression of unarmed protests and emphasizes the role of communication infrastructure in the scalability of protests (see Sutton et al. (2014)). Here, we can infer that past memories of institutional violence may be a driving factor.

There was a late, small but existent effort to convict former army chiefs and reform the armed forces to eliminate the remnants of Pinochet's organization (Dreisbach, 2015), but little was done to the police. Despite pressure on the incumbent government to reform the Carabineros due to human rights violations during the 2019 protests, the initiatives remained paralyzed (Torres, 2021) by them; only the Constitutional Convention in 2021 pushed forward the reform initiative to end the militarization of the police system (Agencia Aton, 2021).

State violence was present in almost all the *Estallido Social* incidents; the mobilization increased when the first clashes between students and Carabineros occurred, and it spread throughout the country following the imposition of the emergency state. It began to scale down when the president revoked this decree.

According to Stern (2010), the process of political memory in Chile involves competing selective memories. This is likely due to the fact that supporters of Pinochet remain influential, making it difficult to hold the political leaders of the dictatorship accountable for their victims. As a result, Chilean society experiences oscillation between periods of caution and periods of conflict. Our empirical findings suggest that the selective memories of Pinochet's victims may lead Chilean society to resist violence in general, but are unable to connect this contemporary violence to specific actors or institutions that were preserved from the dictatorship.

Following the discussion in Boucher (2023), political repression can have psychological implications such as the fear of political persecution (Young, 2019) or polarization towards out-groups (Nugent, 2020). In our case, the findings do not suggest that Pinochet's repression led to a culture of fear regarding state violence or the right-wing, for two reasons: Firstly, people demonstrated the courage to participate in street protests. Secondly, the Chilean voting process is confidential and claimed to be fair (Freedom House, 2022), which makes it unlikely that voters from the opposition would face retaliation[8]. On the other

[8]This lack of fear suggests that Chilean collective memory diverges from the autobiographical memory found in Bautista (2016)

hand, both quantitative and qualitative analyses indicate that memories of past repression may contribute to polarization against political actors, perceiving them as an "out-group class." This finding aligns with the literature on the uprooting of both right-wing and left-wing political factions in Chile (Luna and Altman, 2011).

To summarize, the cultural aspect that persisted in the *Estallido Social* was the revolt against state violence itself, following the police confrontation against early protesters who were against the adjustment of subway fares in Santiago. Sensitivity to state violence motivated people affected by past victims' memories to protest (hypothesis 1). However, it did not motivate people to go to the voting booth to demand more accountability through more participatory institutions or punish unresponsive incumbent parties (hypotheses 2a and 2b).

7. Conclusion

In this work, we investigate the persistence of collective memory of past institutional violence in present political engagement in democracies. The case of Chile provides an extreme example of a situation where the legacy of a military regime was often cited as a latent driver of street protests that led to a plebiscite for constitutional change.

The findings suggest that municipalities with more pre-1970 military bases saw higher levels of protests during the Estallido Social, but also had lower participation in the plebiscite and in electing constituent members. There was also no punishment of the incumbent coalition or preference for the opposition. The mechanism analysis also suggests that victimization during the Pinochet era could be a significant factor in shaping political behavior.

In the case of Chile, other factors could drive the specific demand for a new constitution, such as general emotions of broken expectations and institutional mistrust, as theorized by Funk and Velasco (2020) and as studied by Passarelli and Tabellini (2017) and (Gurr, 2015). However, for the scope of the collective memory of victims of Pinochet, our evidence suggests that this Chilean cultural

legacy leads affected people to make their claims through protests in the streets rather than voting in the booth.

This evidence suggests that the violent management of armed forces is a particularly sensitive topic for collective memory and public opinion in democratic societies. A significant implication is that proper institutional reform combined with investigations of human rights violations by authoritarian regimes are essential for social peace in democratizing countries (Jelin, 2007).

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Appendix A. List of Variables and Sources

To test quantitative hypotheses in this paper, a database on 289 municipalities (*Comunas*) was constructed with the following variables:

1. Dependent Variables

(a) Protests: number of pacific protests, interventions and riots in Chile between October 18th, 2019 and March 15th 2020[9] per 10,000 inhabitants. The number of protests was obtained at ACLED database (Raleigh et al., 2010), and the number of inhabitants was obtained at the 2017 Chilean Census;

(b) Approval Turnout: rate of participation of the new constituent plebiscite, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(c) Apruebo: rate of approval of the constituent plebiscite, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(d) Popular convention: rate of voting for the full popular convention as the composition of the constituent (given Apruebo), obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(e) Constituent composition Turnout: rate of participation of elections of the constituent members, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(f) Vamos por Chile: Percentage of voting for candidates of Piñera aligned right-Wing coalition Vamos por Chile, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(g) Lista del Apruebo: Percentage of voting for candidates of opposition center-left coalition Lista del Apruebo, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl)

(h) Apruebo Dignidad: Percentage of voting for candidates of opposition left coalition Apruebo Dignidad, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl)

(i) Turnout 1st Round: Rate of participation on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl)

(j) Boric 1st Round: Percentage of voting for Gabriel Boric on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

[9] Period between the *Santiagazo* and the declaration of emergency state for the COVID-19 pandemic.

(k) Kast 1st Round: Percentage of voting for Jose Augusto Kast on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(l) Turnout 2nd Round: Rate of participation on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl)

(m) Boric 2nd Round: Percentage of voting for Gabriel Boric on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(n) Kast 2nd Round: Percentage of voting for Jose Augusto Kast on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl);

(o) Constitutional Text Turnout: Rate of participation on Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl)

(p) Constitutional Text Approval: Percentage of voting for Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (https://www.servel.cl)

2. Main Independent Variables

(a) Victims/10k Inhabs: number (by 10,000 inhabitants) of victimizations placed by the Pinochet regime in a municipality, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);

(b) Victims Residents/10k Inhabs: number (by 10,000 inhabitants) of residents victimized by Pinochet Regime in a municipality, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);

3. Controls

(a) Dist-RegCap: distance to regional capital, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);

(b) Dist-Stgo: distance to Santiago, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);

(c) Pop: population, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;

(d) Rural: Rural share, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;

(e) Share-Allende-1970: the share of votes for Salvador Allende (winner) in 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021)

(f) Share-Alessandri-1970 the share of votes for Jorge Alessandri (the second place) in 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021)

4. Instrumental Variables

(a) DMilitaryPresence: dummy of military presence before 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021).

5. Weight (Inverse standard deviation)

(a) Pop: population, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics

Table A2

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	S.D.	Max.	Min.
Dependent Variables				
All protests	1.263	6.815	124.611	0.000
Pacific Protests	0.867	6.748	124.611	0.000
Violent Riots	0.396	0.732	5.198	0.000
Turnout (Constituent initiative)	43.791	67.980	11.340	10.556
Approval (Constituent initiative)	76.270	9.871	91.770	25.940
Approval (Popular Convention)	76.676	7.291	88.600	37.200
Turnout (Assembly composition)	47.728	9.024	73.730	1.650
Vote Share for Vamos por Chile	21.503	9.209	63.820	5.790
Vote Share for Lista del Apruebo	16.687	7.956	54.200	15.035
Vote Share for Apruebo Dignidad	15.887	8.551	50.820	1.600
Turnout (2021 Presidential 1º Votation)	44.310	6.693	69.270	19.070
Votes Share for Kast (2021 1º Voting)	30.405	9.900	72.340	11.570
Vote Share for Boric (2021 1º Voting)	20.884	7.146	45.430	1.880
Turnout (2021 Presidential 2º Votation)	52.399	8.634	72.850	14.070
Vote Share for Kast (2021 2º Voting)	48.429	12.477	94.690	24.570
Turnout (Constitutional Text)	84.649	9.365	94.550	32.750
Vote Share for Text Approval	32.311	9.461	58.230	5.300
Independent Variables				
Pre-70 Bases	0.113	0.317	1.000	0.000
Victims/10k Habs	2.449	8.534	132.721	0.000
Victim Residents/10k Habs	1.500	3.127	30.041	0.000
Twitter Accounts/10k Habs	0.763	4.301	72.463	0.000
Distance to Santiago	5.355	1.706	8.235	0.000
Distance to Regional Capital	3.755	1.442	8.256	0.000
2017 Population	50791.920	78691.930	568106.000	138.000
Rural Share	36.314	28.988	100.000	0.000
Vote Share for Allende (1970)	35.153	13.279	76.778	4.167
Vote Share for Alessandri (1970)	34.718	9.726	68.421	7.798