

# Collective Memory and Democratic Mobilization: Insights from Chile's Constitutional Revolution (2019-2023)

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## Abstract

This article investigates the lasting impact of historical-political tragedies on current political behavior, focusing on Chile's Estallido Social protests (2019-2020) and the Constituent Plebiscite (2020-2023). Using social media data to analyze political memory, the study suggests that protests serve as a strategic engagement tool in municipalities with vivid recollections of past violence from the Pinochet dictatorship. Least squares analyses show that municipalities with pre-1970 military bases had heightened protest activity but reduced constitutional voting involvement, without a clear political coalition bias. The 2SLS estimations link this to the long-term effects of political victimization during Pinochet's regime and social media remembrance of the 1973 coup violence. The evidence suggests that while collective memories of political violence may encourage active protest participation, they can also weaken the relationship between voters and political elites, influencing voting behavior.

*Keywords:* Constitutional Change, Protests, Institutional Violence, Collective Memory

*JEL:* D74, D72

Statement: The author has no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

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## 1. Introduction

Chile is a country that has extreme political events in its history. The country endured a violent military regime from 1973 to 1989, which resulted in nearly

40,000 victims estimated by the national truth commissions - among whom were  
5 detained, tortured, executed, disappeared. Despite transitioning to democracy  
in 1988-89, Chile retained some institutional legacies of the dictatorship, such  
as the police organization and core elements of the 1980 Constitution, written  
in the apex of the regime. Thirty years after the redemocratization, the country  
has experienced one the largest social protests in the history of Global South  
10 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2021), named Estallido Social,  
which gathered over 3,700,000 people and pressured the incumbent right-wing  
government to initiate a new constituent process, whose turnout was all time  
high in Chilean democracy - but end up with rejecting all the constitutional  
text proposals.

15 Does collective memory of past political events in democracies influence  
whether people make demands in the streets or through the voting booth now-  
days? In which ways can we assess how intensely a population maintains such  
a memory?

The influence of collective memory in democracies on contemporary political  
20 behavior is a research area still open for new insights. Drawing on empirical  
mechanisms similar to the theoretical contributions of Ticchi et al. (2013) and  
Acemoglu & Jackson (2015), the study focuses on how popular remembrance  
of historical events shapes present political actions. Specifically, it uses data  
on social media remembrance on the Pinochet's coup to measure the impact  
25 of collective memories of historical state violence in Chile. Chile's history of  
extreme political repression and recent social unrest makes it an ideal case for  
this analysis.

This paper proposes a contribution to the literature by investigating mem-  
ory as a factor that can drive a trade-off between protesting and voting for  
30 democratic claiming, since the Constituent initiative was a direct response to  
the protests. To do so, this analysis introduces a methodology to estimate a  
“consumer-side” indicator of collective memory on social media to quantita-  
tively evaluate its persistent impact on political behavior. This indicator as-  
sesses whether the public continues to remember historical political events and

35 comprehends the underlying reasons for perpetuating certain values.

The strategy of this paper relies on both quantitative and qualitative approaches. First, the case study describes the background of institutional violence under Pinochet's regime between 1973 and 1989, as well as the violence and social unrest of the *Estallido Social* 30 years later that led to the constituent  
40 initiative. The case study enriches the theoretical investigation and leads to hypotheses about whether the collective memory of Pinochet's violence impacts how people protested or voted in the plebiscites.

The quantitative analysis is based on the exogeneity of the military presence in Chilean municipalities before the overthrow of Salvador Allende's government,  
45 backed by the related literature and empirical tests. By comparing 290 Chilean comunas with and without old military bases using least squares estimates, this study found significant differentials in contemporary political behavior during the *Estallido Social* (the intensity of protests) and the new constitution plebiscite (voter turnout). Mechanism analyses using 2SLS estimates suggest  
50 that the relative number of Pinochet's victims in a given comuna and social media users remembering the 1973 military coup in 2019 were significant drivers of such divergence in political behavior.

The study's qualitative discussion provides complementary evidence, tracing how institutional violence influences Chilean contemporary behavior. The  
55 findings appoint the importance of further research on state reforms to curb institutional abuses and entrenchment that can persist during democratization phases.

This investigation builds on a substantial body of literature on the historical persistence of political and economic phenomena (see Cirone & Pepinsky (2022)  
60 for a comprehensive review). Despite challenges in directly measuring collective memory, recent studies in the political economy have increasingly recognized its significance in explaining political engagement (Ticchi et al. 2013, Nikolova et al. 2022, Ochsner & Roesel 2017). This research intersects theories of political emotions and institutional persistence, viewing collective memory as a social  
65 institution that can influence political behavior over generations.

The concept of collective memory, introduced by Maurice Halbwachs (2020), refers to the shared information and values about events remembered by a social group. Unlike personal memory, which fades with the individuals who experienced it, collective memory persists through documents, oral traditions, and ceremonies. It functions as a social institution, shaping rules of conduct and public opinion (for instance, pay respects for the victims, react in such manner if something similar happens or is mentioned, see Danieli (1998)), thus influencing political behavior in related circumstances.

Behavioral sciences provide micro-level explanations for these phenomena. According to Bordalo et al. (2023), agents accumulate past information through personal experiences and communication with peers or media, retrieving it through memory. The likelihood of retrieving a specific memory is related to its similarity to current circumstances requiring a decision, thereby influencing choices. Memory is often context-based: the attributes of an experience change slowly over time, and the agent can retrieve memories by similarity but change the interpretation based on recency. (Kahana 2012).

The interaction between collective memories and political behavior shapes public sentiments and actions toward politics. Historical events, like racial violence, reduce contemporary electoral engagement (Williams 2021) and increase social mistrust (Nunn & Wantchekon 2011). Past authoritarian regimes' surveillance and repression have long-lasting impacts on political behavior, including the maintenance of political dynasties and persistent opposition voting (Nikolova et al. 2022, Lichter et al. 2021).

Voting and protesting are key aspects of political behavior, providing mechanisms for influencing policy and holding politicians accountable. Universal suffrage incentivizes politicians to redistribute income to the poor (Meltzer & Richard 1981). Civil liberties, such as freedom of association and speech, allow citizens to expose irregularities (Acemoglu & Robinson 2000, O'Donnell 1998) while lack of responsiveness can lead to political entrenchment, as seen in Chile (Luna & Altman 2011, Funk & Velasco 2020). Elections and protests offer complementary forms of accountability, with elections providing vertical ac-

countability and civic engagement enabling diagonal accountability (Lührmann et al. 2020). Part of literature often describes the two mechanisms as complementary since people can protest when they are dissatisfied with the electoral options (Kim & Jung 2020, Bernhagen & Marsh 2007, Verba & Nie 1987).

Although there have been efforts to explore the persistence of memory within victims' families (Nikolova et al. 2022, Bautista 2016), as well as the 'supply-side' sources of memories, such as public monuments (Ochsner & Roesel 2017), the literature on the persistence of political behavior can benefit from the addition of a collective, 'consumer-side' indicator. This indicator would measure the extent to which the general population indeed continues to remember a historical political event. Such an indicator could provide quantitative evidence on whether the public still comprehends the underlying reasons behind the values they perpetuate.

The paper starts with the institutional background of Pinochet's regime and the development of the Estallido Social. It then formulates hypotheses to guide the study and describes a detailed quantitative strategy for analysis, presenting the quantitative results. The analysis explores underlying mechanisms and rejects alternative explanations. A qualitative discussion on Chile's culture of political violence follows, concluding with a summary of the main findings and their implications for the politics of collective memory.

## 2. Institutional Background

### 2.1. The Pinochet regime repression

In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the civil government of Salvador Allende, whose coalition (Unidad Popular) aimed to implement Marxian socialism. This led to severe economic instability and political polarization (Dornbusch & Edwards 1990). Once in power, Pinochet's military *junta* engaged in an anti-communist witch hunt targeting former politicians, trade unions, and the opposition. The repression, initially carried out by the armed forces and *Carabineros*, used old military bases as repression centers (Bautista et al. 2021).

In 1974, repression was centralized under the *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (DINA), which was later replaced by the *Central Nacional de Informaciones* (CNI) in 1977 due to external pressure over human rights violations (Policzer 2009). Official records report 3,216 people killed or forcibly disappeared, and  
130 38,254 imprisoned for political reasons, with 94% of these prisoners tortured (Comisión Valtech 2004, Comisión Rettig 1996).

Pinochet established a new constitution in 1980, extending his mandate, privatizing the public pension system, minimizing government intervention, and biasing electoral counts towards right-wing strongholds (Bautista et al. 2021).  
135 The repression led to civil resistance and, along with economic crises in the 1980s, social organizations called for democratization, supported by international pressure. In 1988, a plebiscite on Pinochet's continuation resulted in a 'No' vote winning with 55%, leading to subsequent elections dominated by the '*Concertación*' coalition until 2005 (Bautista et al. 2021).

140 Chile's democratization was seen as incomplete, with Pinochet remaining head of the armed forces until 1998 and holding a lifetime seat in Congress until 2002, when he resigned amid corruption and human rights charges (Bautista et al. 2021). Stern (2010) argues that post-redemocratization Chile faced tensions between victims' memories and Pinochetistas' efforts to forget. Despite  
145 constitutional reforms like the Ley 20840 in 2015 to make the electoral system more proportional, the 1980 Constitution's core remained, leading to debates about its technocratic and undemocratic nature (?) and a general lack of trust in political representatives Funk & Velasco (2020).

## 2.2. *Estallido Social and the Chilean Constituent*

150 The social unrest in Chile from 2019 to 2020 was triggered by an increase in transport fares in Santiago. Protests began on October 7 with high school students jumping turnstiles in metro stations the day after the Public Transport Expert Panel enforced the bus fare raise by 10 pesos and the peak-time metro fare by 30 pesos (Emol 2019). Tensions escalated with a call for a massive protest on October 18 (Rivera & Ruyt 2019). On October 16, heightened  
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online interest followed clashes with Carabineros at Santa Ana station, leading to arrests (Google 2019, 24Horas.cl 2019). The situation worsened with Metro service suspensions and vandalism at Plaza de Armas station, resulting in 133 student arrests on October 17 (Al Jazeera 2019).

160 On October 18, large-scale protests, known as the "Santiagazo," erupted, with significant clashes and a massive "cacerolazo" (pot-banging protest) in support of the demonstrations (Rollano 2019). In response, Minister of Public Security Andrés Chadwick invoked the National Security Act (CNN Chile 2019), and President Sebastián Piñera declared a state of emergency in Santiago and  
165 nearby cities, with curfews imposed (Dulci & Sadivia 2021). Despite these measures, protests spread to other regions (Stuardo 2019), leading Piñera to extend the state of emergency and propose suspending the fare increases (Prensa Presidencia 2019a). On October 20, Piñera met with leaders to discuss solutions, resulting in the proposal of new constitution and suspension of the Metro fare  
170 increase (Senado 2019). Protests intensified, with peaceful demonstrators and violent incidents, including arson and looting. Social movement leaders called for a new constitution, and large-scale marches continued, as *La Marcha Más Grande de todas* (El Desconcierto 2019). Under pressure, Piñera ended the state of emergency and replaced several ministers (Deutsche Welle 2019). Protests  
175 persisted, with trade unions calling for a general strike on November 4 (Europa Press 2019).

On November 12th, President Piñera announced three National Agreements in response to the protests: for peace, justice, and a new constitution (Prensa Presidencia 2019b). By November 15th, the government and opposition agreed  
180 to a constitutional plebiscite, which was passed by the national congress and promulgated on December 24th (Ministerio Secretaría General De La Presidencia 2019). The plebiscite was initially scheduled for March 24th, 2020, but postponed to October 25th, 2020 due to COVID-19. More than 7.5 million people participated, with 78.2% approving the constituent process and 79.1% favoring  
185 a fully elected convention. In early 2020, protests continued sporadically until the COVID-19 state of emergency on March 18, except for the *Estallido* an-

niversary on October 18. This period saw over 3.7 million protesters, 34 deaths, 12,500 hospitalizations, and 5,558 reports of institutional violence (Amnesty International 2020). On May 15-16, 2021, nearly 6.2 million people voted for  
190 the constitutional convention's composition. The new constitution was written and voted on by the convention in 2022, followed by a plebiscite to confirm its replacement of the old constitution.

### 2.3. Hypotheses formulation

Considering the “Estallido social,” hypotheses can be formulated to guide  
195 our analysis of the persistence of memory Pinochet's violence in Chilean political engagement. Funk & Velasco (2020) argue that the *Estallido Social* happened due to a meltdown of institutional trust and hopelessness. However, even the authors acknowledge that initial conditions matter in this situational crisis. Here, it is possible to hypothesize that collective memory can play a special role  
200 in these conditions. Consider again the mechanism described in (Bordalo et al. 2023): citizens embedded in the memory of past political violence can retrieve this memory in the wake of present political violence and choose to react against it.

Our first hypothesis concerns protests. Related literature shows that the im-  
205 mediate effects of repression on protests under dictatorship are uncertain. On one hand, repression may intensify protests in heavily affected areas (Hess & Martin 2006); on the other hand, fear of repression can demobilize resistance (Young 2019). However, in Chile, strikes and protests during Pinochet's government indeed pressured democratization and less electoral fraud (Bautista et al.  
210 2021). Ticchi et al. (2013) argue that collective memory drives resistance against long-standing authoritarianism. It is possible to argue that, in the case of Chile, the memory of repression can persist post-democratization, fueling protests like the *Estallido Social*. People may recall Pinochet's repression, view the state as a perpetrator of violence, and protest against it. In this way, Chile's experience  
215 can illustrate the hypothesis of the persistence of social memory driving the courage to protest.



**Hypothesis 1:** Memories on Pinochet regime's violence led to more political claims through protests.

A second hypothesis concerns the demand for electoral accountability. It is possible to argue that people can retrieve the memory of Pinochet's repression to relate the contemporary incumbent politicians as similar to Pinochet overall politics and demand to hold them accountable in elections. The related literature suggests a rejection of the governor's political identity following past repression. (Balcells 2012, Rozenas et al. 2017).

Even at the end of Pinochet's regime, the democratic governments remained based on the 1980 constitution, with only minor revisions since then. This has sparked criticism of its undemocratic nature. People who were affected by authoritarian repression may be more vocal in this criticism. The demand for a new constitution emerged in large protests, such as *La Marcha más grande de todas*. The vandalism of the Jaime Guzmán memorial can be seen as a protest against the constitution he contributed to. The creation of a new constitution became the main concession the Piñera government offered in response to the 2019-2020 protests.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Memories on Pinochet regime's violence led to more voting participation.

It is also possible to argue that the memory of victims can lead to demands for accountability from incumbent politicians. Related literature suggests the reverse happens: attempts to constrain the memory of the perpetrator can create a backlash (Rozenas & Vlasenko 2022, Villamil & Balcells 2021).

In Chile, Velasco (2021) argues that the rejection of neoliberal policies is unlikely to explain the *Estallido Social*: leaders of anti-liberal movements, such as the Communist Party, the Teacher's Union, and 'No + AFP' (anti-privatized pension movement) failed to get a seat in the convention. A notable characteristic of Chilean democracy is that the hybrid constitutional features inherited from Pinochet lead to dissatisfaction with political parties. Specifically, there

is general social complaint that parties are increasingly disconnected from civil society (Luna & Altman 2011, Funk & Velasco 2020). Sensitivity to flawed participation may also be higher where participation was more violently suppressed in the past. Velasco argues that the root of the Chilean constitutional revolution was the demand for more participatory democracy. This demand is something that the formation of *cabildos populares* for public discussion during the protests might be seen as evidence of.

**Hypothesis 2b:** Memories on Pinochet regime’s violence led to more claims to more voting accountability of politicians.

### 3. Quantitative Data and Methodology

This section describes the specification, data, and methodology of the estimations used to test the hypotheses discussed in subsection 2.3.

#### 3.1. Old military bases as repression centers

Inspired by Bautista et al. (2021), this study explores the role of military base placements before the Allende government in Chilean politics.

The authors argue that these placements, prior to 1970, were driven by national security concerns rather than political leanings. They found no significant correlation between the establishment of military bases and the political orientation of city inhabitants, voter turnout, electoral outcomes from 1970-73, or education levels before the coup. There was also no significant correlation with investment in public goods, unemployment, or migration during the dictatorship.

Pinochet’s regime repurposed these bases for detaining and torturing dissidents, linking them strongly to political victimization. Bautista et al. (2021) argue that proximity to military bases facilitated logistics like patrols and raids, increasing repression intensity for local residents post-coup. By examining counties with and without old military bases, variations in repression levels can be observed without strategic targeting bias.

The authors also claim that awareness of nearby abuses had a strong psycho-  
275 logical effect, contributing to inter-generational trauma and collective memory  
(see Hersh (2013), Danieli (1998)).

While old military bases influenced political repression and memory, their  
impact on other contemporary political or socio-economic factors is unlikely.  
Literature on post-Pinochet politics indicates no significant differences in elec-  
280 toral engagement or voting for the Concertación or Pro-Pinochet politicians  
(Bautista et al. 2021, González et al. 2021).

Economic hardship and lack of public goods were major complaints during  
the *Estallido Social* protests (El Desconcierto 2019, teleSUR 2019). However,  
the existence of military bases does not seem to result in divergent policy imple-  
285 mentation or varying public goods investment across municipalities. Analysis  
in Table C.17 shows no significant differences in economic development, public  
good investment, or unemployment among municipalities.

[TABLE C.17 HERE]

### 3.2. *Social media remembrance as a measure of collective memory*

290 How is it possible to explore the relationship between past repression centers  
and current political engagement through the lens of contemporary social mem-  
ory? Measuring the role of social memory, defined as the collective recollection  
of past events, can be challenging. Here, I proposed a methodology based on  
gathering data from social media remembrance <sup>1</sup>.

295 Consider that one way that collective memory can be a institution is to set so-  
cial rules concerning memorial services during anniversaries (see Danieli (1998)  
and our introduction). Recent studies suggest that social media platforms, such  
as Twitter, can provide valuable resources for analyzing social memory as places  
to make public memorial services, as exposed by Sumikawa et al. (2018). It is  
300 possible to argue that there might be a potential bias towards younger users

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<sup>1</sup>As robustness test, Appendix B presents also the number of monuments as a supply  
source of collective memory, as suggested by Ochsner & Roesel (2017).

on the platform. For memory studies, it is worth considering the *persistence* of social memory through new generations <sup>2</sup>. Twitter was the fourth most used social media in Chile in 2019, according to the agency StatCounter (2019).

An approach to studying the connection between past political victimiza-  
305 tion and social memory involves identifying trending topics related to historical events and collecting tweets about them. For example, on the anniversary of the military coup on September 11th, 2019, prior to the *Estallido*, trending topics in Chile associated with the event were identified. Among these topics, the top five related to the remembrance of violence were selected <sup>3</sup>. The more vocal  
310 terms included “*Golpe de Estado*”, “*Allende Vive*”, and “*#NiPerdonNiOlvido*”. These terms were aggregated as Twitter I. Additionally, two moderated terms “Allende” and “*#11Septiembre1973*,” were added, which were aggregated as Twitter II. Considering all the terms, a sample was gathered using the web  
scraping tool exportdata.io of all the 26,238 tweets from 16,223 accounts that  
315 Twitter returned in its search on these hashtags.

To measure social memory, it was determined where the users who tweeted the selected terms were located by their reported location on personal profile, focusing on the least ambiguous reference to a single Chilean comuna. This resulted in a total sample of 2,623 users. The number of users remembering  
320 the coup per 10,000 inhabitants in each municipality was calculated, creating a measure of social memory. This measure was employed to examine the relationship between past political victimization, social memory, and current political engagement.

### 3.3. Specification

325 The econometric specification is inspired by Bautista et al. (2021) on the effects of Pinochet repression on the 1988 plebiscite that voted to end the Chilean

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<sup>2</sup>Moreover, Bautista et al. (2021) found no significant difference in political ideology among generations responding to the Latinobarometro survey from 1997 to 2017.

<sup>3</sup>The topic “Pinochet”, for instance, was largely used by Pinochetistas, so the results might be more ambiguous.

Military regime. The general equation is as follows:

$$poli = Repre + Controls + FE \quad (1)$$

where *poli* is the political mobilization variable for protests and constituent plebiscite, *repre* is the variable for political repression from the Pinochet era, and *Controls* relate to contemporary demography, geography, and pre-Pinochet politics.

Our initial hypothesis is that localities more affected by the Military regime's repression protested more in the *Estallido Social* and engaged more in voting for a new Constitution.

To test these hypotheses, I constructed a database of 290 municipalities (*comunas*)<sup>4</sup>. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data and its sources. Least squares are useful for evaluating the conditional mean between the results of the protests or plebiscite and the presence of repression centers, following Bautista et al. (2021).

The main variables related to repression and memory are: 1) a dummy variable indicating 1 if the comuna had military presence before 1970, 0 otherwise; 2) the number of victims per 10,000 inhabitants; 3) the collective memory measure described in Subsection 3.2.

Contemporary Chilean political behavior is assessed using data on protests and electoral outcomes. Protests during the *Estallido Social* are measured with data from The Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010), covering protests from October 18, 2019, to March 15, 2020. Since 2018, ACLED compiles reports in Latin America from newspapers, press agencies, NGOs, and new media, including protests of three or more people. Protests are classified as violent riots if there is personal or property damage. The intensity of protests is measured as the number of protests per 10,000 inhabi-

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<sup>4</sup>Chile has 346 comunas, but the sample was restricted by historical data. This city-level approach reduces interference from other memory diffusion centers within the same municipality, such as schools.

tants (based on the 2017 Chilean Census). Data on electoral outcomes, such as turnout and voting in the constitutional plebiscites and presidential elections, were obtained from the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL).

355 This study examines the influence of pre-1970 military bases as a primary independent variable on political repression, subsequently affecting contemporary memories and behaviors. Control variables account for the geographical strategy for national security and pre-Pinochet political orientation, providing a net effect of past repression centers on contemporary political attitudes. The de-  
360 mographic variables are fixed at contemporary levels to minimize post-Pinochet social divergences. FE is the province-level dummy<sup>5</sup>. This specification follows Bautista et al. (2021), weighting estimates for population to focus on individual behavior irrespective of municipality size.

To further investigate the mechanisms behind the effects of repression centers  
365 and contemporary democratic demands, I analyzed indicators of political victimization during Pinochet's regime, such as the number of victims per 10,000 inhabitants, as enumerated by the Chilean Truth Commission and computed by Bautista et al. (2021). Additionally, a novel measure of contemporary social memory using social media users remembering the '73 coup is assessed.  
370 Using 2SLS, I estimated victimization rates and the intensity of contemporary remembrance as independent variables, with the presence of pre-1970 military bases as the instrumental variable. This tests if higher casualties' recollection significantly explains the effects.

The mechanism analyses consist of 2SLS estimation, using political repres-  
375 sion as an instrumental variable for collective memory on contemporary behavior. The two stages are as follows:

$$\overline{memory} = Repre + Controls + FE \quad (2)$$

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<sup>5</sup>The results are also robust to region fixed effects.

$$Poli = \overline{memory} + Controls + FE \quad (3)$$

where  $\overline{memory}$  is the conditional expected value of the memory indicators.

#### 4. Political behavior differentials

This section presents the comuna-level differentials on the contemporary political mobilization influenced by the infrastructure of repression in the Pinochet era.

##### 4.1. *Estallido Social* Protests

Our first results deal with the intensity of protests during the “*Estallido Social*”. Table C.5 indicates that localities with pre-1970 military bases had higher levels of protest. The decomposition in Table C.5 shows that the effects were significant for both peaceful protests and violent riots. The results are in line with the expectation that the memory of Pinochet’s violence made residents more aware of state repression and led to more protests.

The LS estimates suggest that the presence of military bases in a municipality, on average, resulted in nearly one more protest per 10,000 inhabitants during the *Estallido Social*, about 30 years later. Additionally, areas with pre-1970 military bases had a similar proportion of increased violent riots and pacific protests.

[TABLE C.5 HERE]

##### 4.2. *Constituent approval*

However, the data in Table C.6 shows that in areas with pre-1970 military bases, voluntary voter participation in the constituent plebiscite was lower. The first column of Table C.6 presents this result, which shows that if a municipality had a military base built prior to 1970, it experienced, on average, a decrease of more than 5% in its rate of participation in the 2020 plebiscite.

It is also possible to examine the impact of repression centers on constituent approval. Table C.6 also presents the regression results for the percentage of

constituent approval (second column) and the percentage of full popular con-  
vention given the constituent approval (third column). The data shows that  
405 there is little evidence that areas near the repression centers of the Chilean  
military regime voted more for the constituent or a more “radical” assembly  
composition.

[TABLE C.6 HERE]

#### 4.3. Results of Elections on the Constitutional Convention composition

410 Now, the impact of the presence of Pinochet repression centers on the vol-  
untary elections of constituent assembly members. As shown in Table C.7,  
the presence of pre-1970 constructed military bases resulted in even lower voter  
turnout than in the case of constituent approval: municipalities with these bases  
had an average participation rate that was nearly 8% lower than in other mu-  
415 nicipalities.

Second, third and fourth columns of Table C.7 present the results of voting  
for the coalitions Vamos Por Chile (right and center-right parties), Lista del  
Apruebo (center-left), and Apruebo Dignidad (left). It can be concluded that  
there are little differences about the voting preference of municipalities that have  
420 been more affected by past authoritarian repression. In areas where there were  
old repression centers, there was no electoral punishment for the right-wing  
coalition aligned with the president, nor was there a preference for left-wing  
opposition coalitions.

[TABLE C.7 HERE]

#### 425 4.4. Almost a backlash? Results of 2021 Presidential Elections

By the end of 2021, the impact of the *Estallido Social* was evident in the  
Chilean presidential elections. Far-right candidate Jose Antonio Kast, who  
supported the Emergency State against the *Estallido Social* (Olivares 2019),  
claimed Pinochet’s legacy in his campaign. In the first round on November 21,  
430 Kast led with 27.9% of the votes, while left-wing Gabriel Boric had 25.8%, rais-  
ing concerns about a political backlash. In the second round, Boric adopted a



conciliatory tone with welfare state proposals (The Economist 2021) and won with 55.87% to 44.13%, in a record turnout for a voluntary run (8,363,910 votes).

A robustness check shows that memories of past repression continue to affect  
435 electoral participation, even with a Pinochet-aligned candidate. Table C.8 shows significant negative effects on turnout in municipalities with military bases and no increased effort to vote for Boric or against Kast.

[TABLE C.8 HERE]

#### 4.5. *The constitutional wave crashes: the rejection of the first constitutional* 440 *draft*

In the 2022 Chilean constitutional referendum, citizens voted on a new draft constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly. The draft aimed to address issues like economic inequality and indigenous representation, considered legacies of Pinochet's constitution (Bartlett 2022). On September 4, with  
445 mandatory voting, 61.89% of voters rejected the draft, as reported by SERVEL.

This was a major setback for President Gabriel Boric's government, which supported the draft, and a victory for the opposition and social movements against it. Contributing factors included the unpopularity of Assembly politicians (Titelman 2022, Larraín et al. 2023), fake news and Boric's campaign un-  
450 popularity (Gonzalez-Ocantos & Melendez 2023). Public opinion surveys suggested rejection could increase polarization but might also improve employment, inflation, migration policies, and economic growth (Criteria 2022).

The draft's failure has left Chile at a crossroads. Some politicians called for new negotiations, while others suggested amending the current constitution or  
455 drafting a completely new one (POLGA-HECIMOVICH 2022).

Table C.9 analyzes the impact of military bases on the plebiscite outcome. Municipalities with pre-1970 military bases did not show higher support for the draft, aligning with findings by Brieba & Bunker (2019) on persistent turnout bias in Chile, whether voting is voluntary or mandatory.

460 [TABLE C.9 HERE]

4.6. *Second constitutional initiative, the rise of far-right, and the second text rejection*

After the first rejection of the constitutional draft, the national congress proposed the "Agreement for Chile" in December 2022, initiating a second attempt  
465 to draft a new constitution in 2023. This new effort involved a council of 50 publicly elected members, working alongside a 24-member Expert Commission appointed by the National Congress. Their task was to draft a preliminary proposal for the council to discuss and approve. Additionally, a Technical Committee of Admissibility was established to arbitrate potential regulatory violations  
470 (Cámara de Diputados y Senado 2023).

On May 7, 2023, Chilean citizens elected their councilors using proportional representation, open lists, a female candidate quota, and an indigenous seat (Cámara de Diputados y Senado 2023).

The 2023 election results showed a shift to the right. The Partido Republicano, a far-right party influenced by Pinochet supporters, won 34.34% of the  
475 vote and 23 seats. Unidad por Chile, a left-wing coalition, secured 27.73% and 16 seats, while Chile Seguro, a right-wing coalition, gained 20.42% and 11 seats. Altman et al. (2023) suggest that compulsory voting brought in right-wing voters dissatisfied with the constitutional process who had abstained previously.

480 The conservative draft approved by the council proposed minimalistic social policies, stricter abortion and immigration regulations, and weaker gender quotas (Benavides 2023). In the December 17, 2023 referendum, 55.76% voted against the proposed constitution, according to the Chilean Electoral Service.

Did Pinochet's era of repression influence this process? Tables C.10 and  
485 C.11 show that areas with former military bases had lower voter turnout and a higher incidence of invalid votes (21.43%). There was no significant shift towards rejecting the conservative draft or increased support for the left, indicating a broader rejection of electoral choices in these regions.

[TABLE C.10 HERE]

490 [TABLE C.11 HERE]

## 5. Mechanism analysis

### 5.1. Victimization as a mechanism

But what makes the military bases constructed before 1970 relevant to the local divergence in political engagement? This section investigates how the memories of political violence may be one mechanism that explains contemporary political behavior. As previously stated, the construction of these military bases prior to the Allende regime was not connected to the political stance of the central government, but the Pinochet regime used them as repression centers.

Table C.12 presents the impact of pre-70 military bases on two measures of political victimization during the Chilean military dictatorship: the number of victims in a locality per 10,000 inhabitants, and the number of residents who were victims per 10,000 inhabitants. Both results suggest that the presence of military bases was indeed associated with higher victimization. Municipalities with military bases built before 1970 had 2.5 more victims and 1.8 more victimized residents per 10,000 inhabitants. These estimates form the first stage of the 2SLS regressions that follow, as the F-test rejects the hypothesis of weak instrument for the mechanism analysis.

[TABLE C.12 HERE]

In table C.13, I re-estimate the regressions concerning the protests in 2019-2020 and the electoral behavior during the constitutional reform initiative and presidential elections <sup>6</sup>. Now, these are 2SLS estimates in which the victimization rate is the independent variable and the presence of pre-70 bases is the instrumental variable. The estimates go in line with the found about military bases: the higher was the relative number of victims or victimized residents, the higher was the relative number of protests, but no more effort to punish the incumbent right and even lower electoral participation during the constituent process and even in the presidential run against a Pinochetista. The results suggest that memories of victimization during the Pinochet Regime is a relevant

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<sup>6</sup>The following complete estimates are available on request

mechanism behind the political behavior in Chilean municipalities with military  
520 bases.

[TABLE C.13 HERE]

### 5.2. *Contemporary memory, past victimization and present political engagement*

Finally, the measure of social media remembrance discussed in Subsection  
3.2 can be used to assess collective memory as a mechanism that connects past  
525 repression and contemporary political engagement.

A first stage estimation were conducted to explore the connection between  
the presence of military bases and the number of Twitter users remembering  
the '73 coup. The results presented in Table C.14 indicated that municipalities  
with pre-1970 military bases had more remembrance of the coup on Twitter,  
530 with up to 4.6 more accounts per ten thousand inhabitants than municipalities  
without these bases. The F-test also rejects the hypothesis of weak instrument  
for this mechanism analysis.

[TABLE C.14 HERE]

Another analysis utilized a 2SLS regression to investigate the relationship  
535 between past victimhood and Twitter users remembering the '73 coup, using  
pre-1970 military bases as an instrument. The results, shown in Table C.15,  
indicate that the more political victims of Pinochet there were in a given mu-  
nicipality, the more remembrance of the violent coup there was on Twitter.  
Specifically, one victim per 10k inhabitants was related up to 1.7 accounts re-  
540 membering the '73 coup, and one victim resident per 10k inhabitants was related  
to 2.6 accounts remembering the '73 coup.

[TABLE C.15 HERE]

Lastly, I utilized 2SLS regressions to analyze the relationship between Twit-  
ter users' remembrance of the coup and political engagement in the Constitu-  
545 tional revolution. The results in Table C.16 suggest that there is a positive effect  
between remembrance of the coup on Twitter and protests, less participation  
in the Constitutional process, and no increased effort to punish the incumbent  
right.

[TABLE C.16 HERE]

550 Overall, the findings of this study suggest that social memory plays a likely role in contemporary political engagement. Additionally, Twitter can be a useful tool for measuring social memory and providing valuable insights into the correlation between past political victimization and present-day political engagement.

## 555 6. Discussion

So far, the evidence suggests that the memory of Pinochet's repression did not lead to increased electoral turnout or demand for accountability. Areas with higher levels of repression showed no greater participation in constitutional changes or voting tendencies for or against incumbent coalitions.

560 This finding aligns with Bautista et al. (2021), who noted that the impact of Pinochet's repression on votes for the Concertación decreased over time. A survey by CERC (2013) showed that the rejection of military coups increased from 48% in 2003 to 68% in 2013, but only 2% blamed the right-wing for the 1973 coup. MORI and CERC (2023) indicated that this change in public opinion 565 was volatile and concentrated among those who lived during Pinochet's era. However, according to Bautista et al. (2021), this did not result in divergence in political leaning along the redemocratization until recent years.

Rather than political actors or social policy, state violence was the primary issue driving memory-driven contemporary engagement. Despite efforts to reform the armed forces and Carabineros, significant progress was stalled (Torres 570 2021). State violence during the *Estallido Social* escalated with emergency state declarations but declined when these decrees were revoked.

Stern (2010) noted that competing selective memories in Chile, especially among Pinochet's supporters, have impeded accountability for the dictatorship's leaders. This leads to societal oscillation between caution and conflict. 575 The selective memories of Pinochet's violence lead to general resistance against violence but fail to connect contemporary violence to specific actors or institu-

tions preserved from the dictatorship.

Political repression can lead to psychological effects such as fear of political persecution or polarization against out-groups (Young 2019, Nugent 2020).  
580 However, the findings in Chile do not suggest a culture of fear regarding state violence or the right-wing, as evidenced by the courage to participate in street protests and the confidential voting process, which reduces fear of retaliation (Freedom House 2022). This suggests a divergence from the autobiographical  
585 memory found in Bautista (2016).

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses indicate that memories of past repression contribute to polarization against political actors, viewing them as an "out-group." This finding aligns with the literature on the political uprooting of factions in Chile (Luna & Altman 2011, Funk & Velasco 2020). Fierro  
590 (2024) argues that the politically unengaged determined the outcomes of both constitutional draft rejections. The results suggest that the enduring memory of political violence is a significant factor driving this disengagement.

In Bordalo et al. (2023) terms, Chileans recalling Pinochet's repression could relate past political violence to contemporary state affairs and protested against  
595 it but did not find significant differences between incumbent and opposition political options to favor one side during the constitutional reform or presidential election.

In summary, the *Estallido Social* was driven by a revolt against state violence, initiated by confrontations between students and police over subway  
600 fare adjustments in Santiago. Sensitivity to state violence motivated protests (hypothesis 1), but did not translate into increased electoral participation or demands for more accountable institutions (hypotheses 2a and 2b).

## 7. Conclusion

In this work, I investigated the persistence of collective memory of past  
605 institutional violence in present political engagement in democracies, using Chile as a case study. The legacy of Chile's military regime was often cited as a driver

of street protests leading to a plebiscite for constitutional change.

The findings suggest that municipalities with more pre-1970 military bases saw higher protest levels during the Estallido Social but lower participation in the plebiscite and elections for constituent members. There was no punishment of the incumbent coalition or preference for the opposition. The analysis indicates that victimization during the Pinochet era could significantly shape political behavior. Other factors, such as broken expectations and institutional mistrust, may also drive the demand for a new constitution, as theorized by Funk & Velasco (2020). However, our evidence suggests that the legacy of Pinochet's violence leads people to protest rather than vote.

Overall, the management of armed forces is a particularly sensitive topic for collective memory and public opinion in democratic societies. The evidence suggests that not holding perpetrators of past political violence accountable can reduce the efficacy of electoral accountability. Studies in comparative memory law emphasize proper institutional reform and investigations of human rights violations are strategic for social peace in democratizing countries (Sadowski 2024).

## Appendix A. List of Variables and Sources

To test quantitative hypotheses in this paper, a database on 290 municipalities (*Comunas*) was constructed with the following variables:

### 1. Dependent Variables

- (a) Protests: number of pacific protests, interventions and riots<sup>7</sup> in Chile between October 18th, 2019 and March 15th 2020<sup>8</sup> per 10,000 inhabitants. The number of protests was obtained at ACLED database

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<sup>7</sup>According to Raleigh et al. (2010), protests are demonstrations that aggregated three or more people and had media coverage; the demonstration is considered violent riot when three or more demonstrators perpetrated personal or property damage.

<sup>8</sup>Period between the *Santiagoazo* and the declaration of emergency state for the COVID-19 pandemic.

(Raleigh et al. 2010), and the number of inhabitants was obtained at the 2017 Chilean Census;

- (b) Approval Turnout: rate of participation of the new constituent plebiscite, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 635 (c) Apruebo: rate of approval of the constituent plebiscite, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (d) Popular convention: rate of voting for the full popular convention as the composition of the constituent (given Apruebo), obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 640 (e) Constitutional Convention composition Turnout: rate of participation of elections of the Constitutional Convention members, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (f) Vamos por Chile: Percentage of voting for candidates of Piñera aligned right-Wing coalition Vamos por Chile, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 645 (g) Lista del Apruebo: Percentage of voting for candidates of opposition center-left coalition Lista del Apruebo, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (h) Apruebo Dignidad: Percentage of voting for candidates of opposition left coalition Apruebo Dignidad, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 650 (i) Turnout 1st Round: Rate of participation on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (j) Boric 1st Round: Percentage of voting for Gabriel Boric on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 655 (k) Kast 1st Round: Percentage of voting for Jose Augusto Kast on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 660 (l) Turnout 2nd Round: Rate of participation on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>)



- (m) Boric 2nd Round: Percentage of voting for Gabriel Boric on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- 665 (n) Kast 2nd Round: Percentage of voting for Jose Augusto Kast on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (o) 1st Exit Plebiscite Turnout: Rate of participation on the First Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile
- 670 (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (p) 1st Exit Plebiscite Constitutional Text Approval: Percentage of voting for the First Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (q) Constitutional Council composition Turnout: rate of participation of elections of the Constitutional Council members, obtained at the
- 675 Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (r) Unidad: Percentage of voting for candidates of left-Wing coalition Unidad por Chile, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (s) Seguro: Percentage of voting for candidates of establishment right-wing coalition Chile Seguro, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de
- 680 Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (t) Republicano: Percentage of voting for candidates of Populist/Pinochetista coalition Partido Republicano, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- 685 (u) Nulos: Percentage of non valid voting (nulls and blank) at the Constitutional Council composition election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (v) 2nd Exit Plebiscite Turnout: Rate of participation on the Second Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de
- 690 Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (w) 2nd Exit Plebiscite Constitutional Text Approval: Percentage of voting for the Second Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)

- 695 (x) EconDevIndex: Communal Index of Economic Development 2020,  
created by Hernández Bonivento et al. (2020) considering communal  
income, internet infrastructure, number of enterprises and depen-  
dency ratio
- (y) Unemp/hab: Percentage of number of people filed as in search of  
an job relative to the population in 2017, obtained at the National  
700 System of Municipal Information (<http://datos.sinim.gov.cl>)
- (z) Inv Edu/alumno: Ratio of investment, in Chilean Pesos, on education  
by the number of students in Primary, Elementary and High School  
in 2017, obtained at the National System of Municipal Information  
(<http://datos.sinim.gov.cl>)
- 705 (aa) Inv Health/Inhab: Ratio of investment, in Chilean Pesos, on public  
health by the number of inhabitants in 2017, obtained at the National  
System of Municipal Information (<http://datos.sinim.gov.cl>)

## 2. Main Independent Variables

- (a) Military Presence: Dummy variable if the municipality had a military  
710 base placed before 1970 (the beginning of the Allende government),  
condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);
- (b) Victims/10k Inhab: number (by 10,000 inhabitants) of victimiza-  
tions placed by the Pinochet regime in a municipality, condensed by  
Bautista et al. (2021);
- 715 (c) Victims Residents/10k Inhab: number (by 10,000 inhabitants) of  
residents victimized by Pinochet Regime in a municipality, condensed  
by Bautista et al. (2021);
- (d) Monuments: number of monuments per comuna, as declared and  
condensed by the National Council of Monuments of Chile.
- 720 (e) Twitter I: Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 <sup>9</sup>  
“Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per

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<sup>9</sup>2019 was the oldest year available at [expordata.io](http://expordata.io) the month before the API policy change  
by Twitter. The referenced day is before the beginning of the protests.

10k inhabitants. Data scrapped at exportdata.io and calculated by the author.

725 (f) Twitter II: Number of Users that tweeted “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, ”NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k inhabitants. Data scrapped at exportdata.io and calculated by the author.

### 3. Weight (Inverse standard deviation)

(a) Pop: population, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;

### 730 4. Controls

(a) Dist-RegCap: distance to regional capital, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);

(b) Dist-Stgo: distance to Santiago, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);

735 (c) Province FE: Fixed effects for the historical province division during the Pinochet era, Bautista et al. (2021);

(d) Pop: population, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;

(e) Rural: Rural share, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;

(f) Share-Allende-1970: the share of votes for Salvador Allende (winner) in 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021)

740 (g) Share-Alessandri-1970 the share of votes for Jorge Alessandri (the second place) in 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021)

## Appendix B. Mechanism Analysis: Monuments as memorial sites

This section also offers a mechanism analysis of the number of monuments dedicated to Pinochet’s victims as a ”supply source” of collective memory, inspired by Ochsner & Roesel (2017). The measure is the number of unique  
745 monuments commemorating human rights violations during the Pinochet era, as declared and condensed by the National Council of Monuments of Chile.

Table B.1 presents is a first-stage estimate in which we assess the effect of old military presence and the maintenance of memorial sites dedicated to human  
750 rights violations during the Pinochet era. As expected, municipalities with old

755 military bases are more likely to have memorial sites - the military presence is related to 0.8 more monuments. The non-integer number can be attributed to comunas that might not have military presence, but placed memorial sites. The F-test rejects the hypothesis that military presence is a weak instrument, so we can use this variable for our mechanism analysis. Table B.2 presents the effect of victimization and the maintenance of memorial sites dedicated to human rights violations during the Pinochet era, using military presence as an instrument. Consistent with other results, higher levels of violence are associated with more monument placements.

Table B.1: LS Estimates : Effect of pre-70 Military Presence on number of memorial sites

|                             | <b>Monuments</b>           |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>    | <b>0.836***</b><br>(0.223) |
| <i>Avg. Dep. Variable</i>   |                            |
| OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.823                      |
| OLS F-statistic             | 44.352                     |
| p-value (OLS F-statistic)   | 0,000                      |
| State Dummies               | x                          |
| Controls                    | x                          |
| N. Obs.                     | 290                        |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.2: 2SLS Estimates: effect of political victimization on number of memorial sites (pre-70 Military presence as instrument)

|                    | Monuments                  | Monuments                  |
|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Victims            | <b>0.314***</b><br>(0.080) |                            |
| Victim residents   |                            | <b>0.484***</b><br>(0.136) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable | 2.449                      | 1.500                      |
| IV F-statistic     | 69.619                     | 35.586                     |
| State Dummies      | x                          | x                          |
| Controls           | x                          | x                          |
| N. Obs.            | 289                        | 289                        |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

760 Table B.3 shows the effect of memorial sites on contemporary political behavior. The results indicate that more monuments in a comuna are associated with increased protests and lower voter turnout, with no political bias. Additionally, Table B.4 shows the positive effect of monument placements on social media remembrance. If a municipality has one monument, up to 5.5 more Twitter users  
765 per 10,000 inhabitants remember the 1973 coup violence. This suggests that monuments are a significant source of contemporary collective memory among the local population.

Table B.3: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Memorial sites

| Dependent Variables          | Independent Variable |         | Avg Dep Variable |
|------------------------------|----------------------|---------|------------------|
|                              | Monuments            |         |                  |
| Total Protests               | <b>1.367**</b>       | (0.630) | 1.263            |
| Pacific Protests             | <b>0.694**</b>       | (0.311) | 0.867            |
| Violent Riots                | <b>0.673**</b>       | (0.322) | 0.396            |
| Turnout (Const. Initiative)  | <b>-6.447***</b>     | (1.753) | 43.791           |
| Approval (Const. Initiative) | <b>1.943</b>         | (3.023) | 76.270           |
| Const. Convention            | <b>1.572</b>         | (2.781) | 76.676           |
| Turnout (Composition)        | <b>-9.368***</b>     | (2.566) | 47.728           |
| Vamos                        | <b>-1.430</b>        | (2.664) | 21.503           |
| Lista                        | <b>1.725</b>         | (1.915) | 16.687           |
| Dignidad                     | <b>-5.212</b>        | (4.345) | 15.887           |
| Turnout (1st Pres. Round)    | <b>-6.871***</b>     | (2.102) | 44.310           |
| Boric (1st Pres. Round)      | <b>-0.294</b>        | (1.897) | 20.884           |
| Kast (1st Pres. Round)       | <b>-0.257</b>        | (2.035) | 30.405           |
| Turnout (2nd Pres. Round)    | <b>-4.915***</b>     | (1.774) | 52.399           |
| Kast (2nd Pres. Round)       | <b>-0.972</b>        | (2.936) | 48.429           |
| Turnout (1st Exit Plebs.)    | <b>-3.908***</b>     | (1.173) | 84.649           |
| Approval (1st Exit Plebs.)   | <b>-1.135</b>        | (2.257) | 32.311           |
| Turnout (Consejo)            | <b>-4.340***</b>     | (1.192) | 80.059           |
| Unidad                       | <b>-0.552</b>        | (1.956) | 23.114           |
| Seguro                       | <b>-2.158</b>        | (1.635) | 22.246           |
| Republicano                  | <b>2.075</b>         | (1.597) | 37.532           |
| Nulos                        | <b>2.796***</b>      | (1.044) | 23.055           |
| Turnout (2nd Exit Plebs.)    | <b>-4.378***</b>     | (1.286) | 83.931           |
| Against (2nd Exit Plebs.)    | <b>0.776</b>         | (2.433) | 52.344           |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.4: 2SLS Estimates: effect of monuments on memories in social media

|                             | Twitter I                  | Twitter II                 |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Monuments</i>            | <b>2.469***</b><br>(0.694) | <b>5.562***</b><br>(1.578) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable          | 0.173                      | 0.481                      |
| OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.813                      | 0.818                      |
| State Dummies               | x                          | x                          |
| Controls                    | x                          | x                          |
| N. Obs.                     | 290                        | 290                        |

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k inhabitants. Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

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## Appendix C. Tables

Table C.5: LS Estimates: Protests/10k Habs - (Decomposition)

|                            | Pacific                    | Riots                      | Total                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>0.580***</b><br>(0.201) | <b>0.563***</b><br>(0.200) | <b>1.143***</b><br>(0.396) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 0.867                      | 0.396                      | 1.263                      |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.787                      | 0.683                      | 0.750                      |
| LS F-statistic             | 35.428                     | 21.082                     | 28.903                     |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000                      | 0.000                      | 0.000                      |
| State Dummies              | x                          | x                          | x                          |
| Controls                   | x                          | x                          | x                          |
| N. Obs.                    | 290                        | 290                        | 290                        |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.6: LS Estimates: (Approval of Constituent)

|                            | <b>Turnout</b>              | <b>Approval</b>         | <b>Popular Convention</b> |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>-5.389***</b><br>(0.957) | <b>1.624</b><br>(2.375) | <b>1.314</b><br>(2.197)   |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 43.791                      | 76.270                  | 76.676                    |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.838                       | 0.725                   | 0.667                     |
| LS F-statistic             | 49.133                      | 25.568                  | 19.636                    |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000                       | 0.000                   | 0.000                     |
| State Dummies              | x                           | x                       | x                         |
| Controls                   | x                           | x                       | x                         |
| N. Obs.                    | 290                         | 290                     | 290                       |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.



Table C.7: LS Estimates: (Composition of Convention)

|                            | <b>Turnout</b>   | <b>Vamos</b>  | <b>Lista</b> | <b>Dignidad</b> |
|----------------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>-7.830***</b> | <b>-1.195</b> | <b>1.433</b> | <b>-4.356</b>   |
|                            | (1.135)          | (2.141)       | (1.216)      | (3.885)         |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 47.728           | 21.503        | 16.687       | 15.887          |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.747            | 0.729         | 0.453        | 0.413           |
| LS F-statistic             | 28.488           | 26.128        | 8.707        | 7.570           |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000            | 0.000         | 0.000        | 0.000           |
| State Dummies              | x                | x             | x            | x               |
| Controls                   | x                | x             | x            | x               |
| N. Obs.                    | 290              | 290           | 290          | 290             |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.8: LS Estimates: Votes (2021 1<sup>o</sup> and 2<sup>o</sup> Presidential Voting)

|                            | Turnout (1 <sup>o</sup> V)  | Kast (1 <sup>o</sup> V)  | Boric (1 <sup>o</sup> V) | Turnout (2 <sup>o</sup> V) | Kast (2 <sup>o</sup> V)  |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>-5.743***</b><br>(1.144) | <b>-0.215</b><br>(1.689) | <b>-0.246</b><br>(1.605) | <b>-4.108**</b><br>(1.644) | <b>-0.812</b><br>(2.382) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 44.310                      | 30.405                   | 20.884                   | 52.399                     | 48.429                   |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.711                       | 0.789                    | 0.826                    | 0.626                      | 0.771                    |
| LS F-statistic             | 23.957                      | 35.781                   | 45.385                   | 16.606                     | 32.305                   |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000                       | 0.000                    | 0.000                    | 0.000                      | 0.000                    |
| State Dummies              | x                           | x                        | x                        | x                          | x                        |
| Controls                   | x                           | x                        | x                        | x                          | x                        |
| N. Obs.                    | 290                         | 290                      | 290                      | 290                        | 290                      |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.9: LS Estimates: 1st Exit Plebiscite

|                            | <b>Turnout</b>              | <b>Approval</b>          |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>-3.266***</b><br>(0.878) | <b>-0.948</b><br>(1.955) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 84.649                      | 32.311                   |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.828                       | 0.801                    |
| LS F-statistic             | 45.920                      | 38.536                   |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000                       | 0.000                    |
| State Dummies              | x                           | x                        |
| Controls                   | x                           | x                        |
| N. Obs.                    | 290                         | 290                      |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.10: LS Estimates: (Composition of Consejo)

|                            | Turnout                     | Unidad                   | Seguro                   | Republicano             | Nulos                      |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>-3.628***</b><br>(0.863) | <b>-0.461</b><br>(1.669) | <b>-1.804</b><br>(1.152) | <b>1.734</b><br>(1.333) | <b>2.337***</b><br>(0.695) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 80.059                      | 23.114                   | 22.246                   | 37.532                  | 23.055                     |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.862                       | 0.802                    | 0.736                    | 0.723                   | 0.815                      |
| LS F-statistic             | 59.169                      | 38.664                   | 26.964                   | 25.321                  | 42.161                     |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000                       | 0.000                    | 0.000                    | 0.000                   | 0.000                      |
| State Dummies              | x                           | x                        | x                        | x                       | x                          |
| Controls                   | x                           | x                        | x                        | x                       | x                          |
| N. Obs.                    | 290                         | 290                      | 290                      | 290                     | 290                        |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.11: LS Estimates: (2nd Exit Plebiscite)

|                            | <b>Turnout</b>   | <b>Against</b> |
|----------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>-3.660***</b> | <b>0.649</b>   |
|                            | (0.897)          | (1.974)        |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 83.931           | 52.344         |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.880            | 0.728          |
| LS F-statistic             | 69.288           | 25.920         |
| p-value (LS F-statistic)   | 0.000            | 0.000          |
| State Dummies              | x                | x              |
| Controls                   | x                | x              |
| N. Obs.                    | 290              | 290            |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.12: LS Estimates : Effect of pre-70 Military Presence on Pinochet victimization

|                            | <b>Victims</b>             | <b>Victim residents</b>    |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>   | <b>2.662***</b><br>(0.470) | <b>1.728***</b><br>(0.378) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable         | 2.449                      | 1.500                      |
| LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.692                      | 0.597                      |
| F-statistic                | 21.859                     | 14.749                     |
| Prob (F-statistic)         | 0.000                      | 0.000                      |
| State Dummies              | x                          | x                          |
| Controls                   | x                          | x                          |
| N. Obs.                    | 289                        | 289                        |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.13: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Victimization

| Dependent Variables          | Independent Variables |         |                         |         | Avg. Dep. variable |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------|--------------------|
|                              | Victims/10k Inhab.    |         | Victim Resid./10k Inhab |         |                    |
| Total Protests               | <b>0.429***</b>       | (0.156) | <b>0.661***</b>         | (0.226) | 1.263              |
| Pacific Protests             | <b>0.218***</b>       | (0.080) | <b>0.336***</b>         | (0.117) | 0.867              |
| Violent Riots                | <b>0.211***</b>       | (0.077) | <b>0.326***</b>         | (0.112) | 0.396              |
| Turnout (Const. Initiative)  | <b>-2.024***</b>      | (0.336) | <b>-3.117***</b>        | (0.718) | 43.791             |
| Approval (Const. Initiative) | <b>0.611</b>          | (0.836) | <b>0.941</b>            | (1.335) | 76.270             |
| Const. Convention            | <b>0.494</b>          | (0.780) | <b>0.761</b>            | (1.235) | 76.676             |
| Turnout (Composition)        | <b>-2.940***</b>      | (0.476) | <b>-4.529***</b>        | (1.010) | 47.728             |
| Vamos                        | <b>-0.449</b>         | (0.761) | <b>-0.692</b>           | (1.207) | 21.503             |
| Lista                        | <b>0.659</b>          | (0.561) | <b>0.833</b>            | (0.911) | 16.687             |
| Dignidad                     | <b>-1.636</b>         | (1.477) | <b>-2.521</b>           | (2.395) | 15.887             |
| Turnout (1st Pres. Round)    | <b>-2.157***</b>      | (0.351) | <b>-3.323***</b>        | (0.787) | 44.310             |
| Boric (1st Pres. Round)      | <b>-0.092</b>         | (0.610) | <b>-0.142</b>           | (0.935) | 20.884             |
| Kast (1st Pres. Round)       | <b>-0.082</b>         | (0.627) | <b>-0.126</b>           | (0.973) | 30.405             |
| Turnout (2nd Pres. Round)    | <b>-1.543**</b>       | (0.637) | <b>-2.377**</b>         | (1.074) | 52.399             |
| Kast (2nd Pres. Round)       | <b>-0.306</b>         | (0.871) | <b>-0.472</b>           | (1.370) | 48.429             |
| Turnout (1st Exit Plebs.)    | <b>-1.226***</b>      | (0.404) | <b>-1.889***</b>        | (0.588) | 84.649             |
| Approval (1st Exit Plebs.)   | <b>-0.355</b>         | (0.761) | <b>-0.547</b>           | (1.152) | 32.311             |
| Turnout (Consejo)            | <b>-1.363***</b>      | (0.402) | <b>-2.099***</b>        | (0.582) | 80.059             |
| Unidad                       | <b>-0.172</b>         | (0.640) | <b>-0.266</b>           | (0.976) | 23.114             |
| Seguro                       | <b>-0.678*</b>        | (0.389) | <b>-1.045</b>           | (0.650) | 22.246             |
| Republicano                  | <b>0.651</b>          | (0.539) | <b>1.004</b>            | (0.801) | 37.532             |
| Nulos                        | <b>0.878***</b>       | (0.170) | <b>1.352***</b>         | (0.364) | 23.055             |
| Turnout (2nd Exit Plebs.)    | <b>-1.374***</b>      | (0.443) | <b>-2.117***</b>        | (0.635) | 83.931             |
| Against (2nd Exit Plebs.)    | <b>0.245</b>          | (0.722) | <b>0.377</b>            | (1.133) | 52.344             |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.14: LS Estimates: effect of repression centers on memories in social media

|                             | <b>Twitter I</b>           | <b>Twitter II</b>          |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>    | <b>2.063***</b><br>(0.546) | <b>4.649***</b><br>(1.249) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable          | 0.481                      | 0.173                      |
| OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.848                      | 0.848                      |
| OLS F-statistic             | 53.037                     | 53.020                     |
| p-value (OLS F-statistic)   | 0.000                      | 0.000                      |
| State Dummies               | x                          | x                          |
| Controls                    | x                          | x                          |
| N. Obs.                     | 290                        | 290                        |

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k inhabitants. Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.



Table C.15: 2SLS estimates (Pre-70 Military Presence as instrument)

|                    | <i>Twitter I</i>           | <i>Twitter I</i>           | <i>Twitter II</i>          | <i>Twitter II</i>          |
|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Victims            | <b>0.775***</b><br>(0.203) |                            | <b>1.746***</b><br>(0.463) |                            |
| Victim residents   |                            | <b>1.194***</b><br>(0.261) |                            | <b>2.689***</b><br>(0.589) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable | 0.481                      | 0.481                      | 0.173                      | 0.173                      |
| IV F-statistic     | 69.619                     | 35.586                     | 69.619                     | 35.586                     |
| State Dummies      | x                          | x                          | x                          | x                          |
| Controls           | x                          | x                          | x                          | x                          |
| N. Obs.            | 289                        | 289                        | 289                        | 289                        |

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k inhabitants. Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses. IV F-statistic is the Cragg-Donald weak instrument test.

Table C.16: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Remembrance

| Dependent Variables          | Independent Variables |         |                  |         | Avg Dep variable |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|------------------|---------|------------------|
|                              | Twitter I             |         | Twitter II       |         |                  |
| Total Protests               | <b>0.554***</b>       | (0.169) | <b>0.246***</b>  | (0.076) | 1.263            |
| Pacific Protests             | <b>0.281***</b>       | (0.084) | <b>0.125***</b>  | (0.038) | 0.867            |
| Violent Riots                | <b>0.273***</b>       | (0.087) | <b>0.121***</b>  | (0.039) | 0.396            |
| Turnout (Const. Initiative)  | <b>-2.612***</b>      | (0.825) | <b>-1.159***</b> | (0.367) | 43.791           |
| Approval (Const. Initiative) | <b>0.787</b>          | (1.215) | <b>0.349</b>     | (0.540) | 76.270           |
| Const. Convention            | <b>0.637</b>          | (1.115) | <b>0.283</b>     | (0.496) | 76.676           |
| Turnout (Composition)        | <b>-3.794***</b>      | (1.141) | <b>-1.684***</b> | (0.507) | 47.728           |
| Vamos                        | <b>-0.579</b>         | (1.072) | <b>-0.257</b>    | (0.476) | 21.503           |
| Lista                        | <b>0.699</b>          | (0.781) | <b>0.310</b>     | (0.345) | 16.687           |
| Dignidad                     | <b>-2.111</b>         | (1.970) | <b>-0.937</b>    | (0.880) | 15.887           |
| Turnout (1st Pres. Round)    | <b>-2.783***</b>      | (0.943) | <b>-1.235***</b> | (0.420) | 44.310           |
| Boric (1st Pres. Round)      | <b>-0.104</b>         | (0.823) | <b>-0.053</b>    | (0.343) | 20.884           |
| Kast (1st Pres. Round)       | <b>-0.119</b>         | (0.774) | <b>-0.046</b>    | (0.366) | 30.405           |
| Turnout (2nd Pres. Round)    | <b>-1.991**</b>       | (0.962) | <b>-0.884**</b>  | (0.425) | 52.399           |
| Kast (2nd Pres. Round)       | <b>-0.394</b>         | (1.193) | <b>-0.175</b>    | (0.530) | 48.429           |
| Turnout (1st Exit Plebs.)    | <b>-1.583***</b>      | (0.301) | <b>-0.703***</b> | (0.132) | 84.649           |
| Approval (1st Exit Plebs.)   | <b>0.460</b>          | (0.932) | <b>-0.204</b>    | (0.413) | 32.311           |
| Turnout (Consejo)            | <b>-1.758***</b>      | (0.342) | <b>-0.780***</b> | (0.150) | 80.059           |
| Unidad                       | <b>-0.224</b>         | (0.801) | <b>-0.099</b>    | (0.355) | 23.114           |
| Seguro                       | <b>-0.874</b>         | (0.632) | <b>-0.388</b>    | (0.280) | 22.246           |
| Republicano                  | <b>0.840</b>          | (0.648) | <b>0.373</b>     | (0.286) | 37.532           |
| Nulos                        | <b>1.132**</b>        | (0.452) | <b>0.503**</b>   | (0.201) | 23.055           |
| Turnout (2nd Exit Plebs.)    | <b>-1.774***</b>      | (0.324) | <b>-0.787***</b> | (0.142) | 83.931           |
| Against (2nd Exit Plebs.)    | <b>0.314</b>          | (0.982) | <b>0.140</b>     | (0.436) | 52.344           |

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users tweeting in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users twitting “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k inhabitants. Significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) 0.05, and (\*) 0.10. Controls: distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.17: Alternative Mechanism Analysis: LS estimates

|                             | <b>EconDevIndex</b>      | <b>Unemp</b>             | <b>Inv Edu/Alumno</b>     | <b>Inv Health/Inhab</b>  |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>Military Presence</i>    | <b>0.0001</b><br>(0.029) | <b>-0.447</b><br>(0.855) | <b>-10.707</b><br>(8.674) | <b>-0.233</b><br>(0.185) |
| Avg. Dep. Variable          | 0.123                    | 3.751                    | 77.920                    | 0.204                    |
| OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.841                    | 0.056                    | 0.192                     | 0.144                    |
| OLS F-statistic             | 50.340                   | 1.534                    | 3.194                     | 2.311                    |
| p-value (OLS F-statistic)   | 0.000                    | 0.041                    | 0.000                     | 0.000                    |
| State Dummies               | x                        | x                        | x                         | x                        |
| Controls                    | x                        | x                        | x                         | x                        |
| N. Obs.                     | 290                      | 278                      | 287                       | 273                      |

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.