

# In Search of Consensus: Examining the Global South Perspectives on Climate Security in UNSC Debates

-Varun Mohan<sup>1</sup>

---

## Abstract

Climate change as a security issue is an intensely debated discourse. However, scholars, policymakers and the media are arriving at a consensus regarding its significance. This growing consensus have triggered calls for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to address climate change while in the background, debates continue regarding the UNSC's role and the impact on its mandate and membership. The Global North-South Divide has taken up the top spot as a critical theme in these discussions as it has been identified a major challenge to global climate action. This paper dives deep into these debates, giving emphasis to the diverse perspectives within the Global South over the involvement of UNSC in climate security.

By comprehensively analyzing the discourse of UNSC open debates from 2007 to 2023, the study delves into the complexities of arriving at a unified Global South front on climate security. Two key questions are addressed here: to what extent do states acknowledge climate change as a security concern and how willing are states to support the UNSC's mandate regarding the same. The article is arranged into five sections: first, a literature review on the Global North-South dichotomy; second, a conceptualization of the term 'Global South'; third, a description of the methodology using Maarten Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis and a new and broader definition to the idea of the 'Global South', fourth, primary findings with regard to the evolving stance of Global South nations, and fifth, a conclusion summarizing the implications for global climate governance. The findings have revealed a tendency towards a greater acceptance among the Global South states for UNSC's involvement, suggesting a potential paradigm shift in international climate discourse.

---

<sup>1</sup> Varun Mohan (He/Him) is a PhD Scholar at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, India and a Visiting Researcher at the University of Queensland, Australia. He is also associated with the University of Trans-Disciplinary Health Sciences and Technology, India.

## Introduction

The discourse surrounding the implications of climate change on security remains a subject of contention<sup>1</sup>. Nevertheless, there is an increasingly consolidated viewpoint among scholars, policymakers, and media commentators, asserting its status as a significant security concern<sup>2</sup>. This recognition underscores the need for engagement by the foremost international security institution, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)<sup>3</sup>. However, considerable debate persists regarding the Council's role in addressing climate change as a security issue<sup>4</sup>. These discussions are marked by contentious deliberations surrounding the Council's 'mandate creep'<sup>5</sup>, calls for membership reform, and the optimal allocation of responsibilities within the broader United Nations (UN) framework. Within this landscape, one salient critical theme that emerges is the enduring Global North-South Divide within UN institutions<sup>6</sup>, often identified as a major roadblock for global climate action. This paper seeks to delve deeper into these debates, to find out the disparities between the Global North and South, to examine the diverse perspectives of states within the Global South regarding the UNSC's role in matters pertaining to climate security.

The anticipation of a unified stance from all Global South states underscores the intricacies inherent in navigating international responses to climate change within the framework of the UN institutions. This article, employing a comprehensive discourse analysis of UNSC open debates spanning from 2007 to 2023, endeavors to explore the delicate dynamics surrounding the addressing of climate security concerns within the Global South. Specifically, the focus lies on elucidating the complexities of presenting a unified stance at the UN Security Council. To assess the extent to which a coherent 'Global South' voice emerges within the UNSC debates on climate change, this study frames two central inquiries. Firstly, it examines the extent to which states acknowledge the characterization of climate change as a salient security concern. Secondly, it evaluates the level of willingness among states to endorse the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in addressing matters pertaining to climate security.

The article is organized into five distinct sections. Firstly, the literature pertaining to the Global South-North dichotomy is examined in order to contextualize the division within the global climate change discourses. Secondly, significant attention is devoted to defining the ambiguous and elusive term 'Global

South' to establish a clear conceptual framework. The third section delineates the methodology employed, with a specific focus on Maarten Hajer's<sup>7</sup> argumentative discourse analysis, on the Global South nations' voices within the UN Security Council, utilizing UNSC open debates. This section also elaborates on the data parameters and the pertinent questions addressed in the analysis.

Moving forward, the fourth section presents the key findings derived from the analysis, highlighting discernible shifts in the positions of Global South nations regarding climate security. Notably, there is evidence of a recent trend towards greater acceptance of the role of the UNSC among Global South states. Finally, the conclusion section reflects on the implications of these findings and questions the continued relevance and utility of the "Global South" label within the broader context of global climate governance architecture. This section signals a potential paradigm shift within the Global South and underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of its evolving role in shaping international climate discourse.

## **Climate Change & the Great Divide**

In both academic and policy circles, the Global South-Global North divide serves as a crucial framework to underscore significant disparities<sup>8</sup> and to elucidate the 'intellectualization of politically significant disputes'<sup>9</sup> across various dimensions, encompassing human development, industrialization levels, health, infrastructure, digital access, knowledge sharing, among others<sup>10</sup>. Recently, this divide has taken center stage in climate change discussions<sup>11</sup>, tracing its origins back to early environmental cooperation debates at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm and extending through the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 to the present day. This framework now forms a pivotal axis for articulating and navigating the diverse array of national, regional, and global interests inherent in the climate change discourse<sup>12</sup>, particularly concerning climate security.

Müller<sup>13</sup> identifies a distinct North-South divide in equity debates within climate negotiations, labeling it as the 'great divide'. Others have criticized the global environmental agenda for privileging the concerns of affluent nations<sup>14</sup> and marginalizing viewpoints from the Global South. Similarly, Pillai & Dubash<sup>15</sup> observe that the formulation of climate policy in nations such as India is notably framed within the North-South paradigm, imbuing any negotiations within the UN system, especially in the UN Security

Council, with political implications<sup>16</sup>. For these scholars, the 'North-South cleavage'<sup>17</sup> serves to underscore the historical marginalization of Global South voices in the international climate regime<sup>18</sup>.

This diversity of perspectives is further complicated by historical and structural inequalities between the two regions, as emphasized by Roberts & Parks<sup>19</sup>. Historically, the Global North, predominantly comprising industrialized nations, has exhibited pronounced per capita emissions, a legacy of industrialization and economic growth predicated upon fossil fuel consumption. Conversely, the Global South, encompassing a spectrum of developing and least developed nations, often bears a disproportionate burden of climate change impacts despite historically contributing minimally to global emissions. This rationale led to the integration of the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDR-RC) into global climate negotiations. Despite its incorporation into the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, CBDR-RC remains a contentious issue in climate talks<sup>20</sup>, with the Global North often opposing differentiated obligations based on historical emissions and economic capacity<sup>21</sup>. Simultaneously, concerns have been voiced by developed nations regarding perceived preferential treatment afforded to countries like China and India, particularly given their substantial carbon emissions<sup>22</sup>, which surpass those of numerous developed counterparts<sup>23</sup>.

While divergences between the Global South and the Global North have been extensively discussed in scholarly literature<sup>24</sup>, internal divergences within the Global South are less explored and debated upon. Boas<sup>25</sup> and Abdenur<sup>26</sup>, both highlight the divergent views and interests within the Global South, challenging the notion of a unified stance. According to Jayaram<sup>27</sup>, there is a notable divergence within the Global South regarding both the ethical considerations and the feasibility of addressing climate security within the framework of the United Nations Security Council.

Despite this, a significant research gap exists concerning the varied voices within the unified identity of the 'Global South'. While notable exceptions such as Rasheed<sup>28</sup>, Freeman<sup>29</sup>, and Najam<sup>30</sup> exist, comprehensive analyses of the concept of the 'Global South' within global environmental cooperation efforts, particularly within the UN Security Council, remain lacking. Since 2007, member states have been debating the role of the UNSC in matters related to climate security<sup>31</sup>, with the majority of opposition emanating from Global South countries. However, prior to delving into the analysis, it is essential to define the term "Global South" to comprehend the diversity of states encapsulated within this designation.

## Locating the ‘Global South’

Who is the Global South? There is no one direct or simple answer to this question. It is ‘not a directional designation or a point due south from a fixed north’<sup>32</sup>. Nevertheless, its usage has steadily increased since the 1990s<sup>33</sup>. The term "Global South" literally refers to countries situated below the equator or the 32 countries from the Southern hemisphere, but metaphorically it includes states from both the hemispheres. Despite its geographic semantics, in International Relations, it now encompasses a coalition of nations, often including those historically marginalized or disadvantaged countries in the global arena, majorly from Asia, Africa and South America<sup>34</sup>. The term is considered as another descriptive term in the long list of overarching concepts to identify and represent lesser developed and poorer parts of the world.

The complexity in understanding the term ‘global south’ has made the term ambiguous and vague in contemporary public discourse, especially within the academic circle. Scholars like Vijay Prashad<sup>35</sup> and Kloß<sup>36</sup> have alarmed the academic circle by generalizing the Global South as one ‘homogenous entity’ with a ‘homogenous history’. Mahler<sup>37</sup> considers it as a “deterritorialized” and “transnational” concept. The term is also criticized as a ‘Northern concept’ and as nothing but another ‘Euro-American’ contextualization of the world<sup>38</sup>. At the same time, it is popularly used by media professionals<sup>39</sup>, international NGO’s and politicians, to highlight the differences in the two halves of the world and to provide a non-western analysis of issues around it<sup>40</sup>. In recent times, the term ‘global south’ has evolved to emphasize and represent the contemporary geopolitical relations of power<sup>41</sup> in the world too. The recent reactions of the Global South countries to Western sanctions amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict underscore the geopolitical significance of the concept of the Global South<sup>42</sup>. This response reflects the complex interplay of geopolitical interests and alliances, highlighting the evolving dynamics within international relations.

In spite of that, scholars like Joseph Nye call the term “Global South” a “misleading term”<sup>43</sup> and point out that its main value is “diplomatic”. This complicates the process of defining it. There is neither completely ‘global’ nor is there completely ‘south’ in the idea of the ‘global south’. At best, the term signifies the story of two worlds and dichotomies in the present world order. Hence contesting and deconstructing the identity of the ‘global south’ is essential to unfold any debates and discussions around the term. The multitude of definitions and contexts are summarized below. Firstly, from a geographic perspective it is not completely south, but the identity includes nations from Africa, Asia, Latin America,

Oceania with some notable exceptions like Australia and New Zealand, among others. At the same time, as Mahler concisely asserted, "there are Norths in the geographic South and Souths in the geographic North"<sup>44</sup>, thus expanding the idea of the 'global south' as a reflexive term.

Secondly, from a political standpoint, the division between the Global North and South is discernible in voting patterns within the United Nations, a position aptly highlighted by Hansen<sup>45</sup> as a "politically motivated self-categorization" by a group of countries aimed at advancing common interests. This division is evident in the calls made by the Group of 77 (G77) and Non-Alignment Movement for the establishment of an alternative global order<sup>46</sup>, and in their efforts to challenge and protest structural inequalities within the international system<sup>47</sup> along the 'Brandt Line'. Najam<sup>48</sup> further posits that forums like the G77, serve as an influential and authentic representation of the Global South in matters pertaining to international affairs.

Thirdly, categorization of states based on the level of development, as promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is used to represent the divide between the Global North-South. The UNDP has played a key role in the popularization of the term Global South<sup>49</sup>, especially in the late 1990s through its Human Development Reports and in the early 2000s through its call for South-South cooperation for development<sup>50</sup>. The UNDP follows the designation<sup>51</sup> of "more developed" and "less developed", or "developed" and "developing", where the former in each set is considered as the Global North and the latter as the Global South. Lastly, considering the structural origins of liberalism and its unequal impact on the people around the globe, the term aligns with the division of states by various financial institutions like the World Bank<sup>52</sup>, and global groupings like OECD and G7 among others<sup>53</sup> based on their level of economic development.

In the light of multifaceted identities encompassed within the international community, this article adopts a comprehensive approach to define the concept of the Global South. Here, the Global South is conceptualized as a cohesive entity, representing a coalition of states—albeit not a static list—that have collectively endured the adverse legacies of colonialism, developmental disparities, globalization, and asymmetrical power dynamics on a global scale. However, it is essential to highlight that these experiences manifest uniquely in each member state, across varied socio-political, economic, and temporal dimensions. These disparities are particularly pronounced in contemporary climate change-related debates and

discussions across major international institutions and groupings. Recognized as a significant impediment to promoting and advancing climate action, these disparities warrant scrupulous study and evaluation. Therefore, the overarching objective of this paper is to meticulously delineate the inconsistencies and discernible trends evident in the voices of Global South nations during open debates within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Furthermore, it seeks to ascertain whether there is a compelling need to collectively identify countries as part of the Global South within the realm of global climate change negotiations.

## Methodology

Drawing upon the scholarly contributions of Maarten Hajer, who posits that discourses are both shaped and perpetuated through distinct sets of practices<sup>54</sup>, this study will scrutinize the climate security debates unfolding within the UNSC. Hajer's notion of a discourse coalition is particularly pertinent, as it underscores the presence of diverse countries from both the Global North and the Global South employing disparate discourses and discussions within the Security Council to advance their respective national interests. In this paper, I adopt a social constructivist approach to understand climate security, by asking how security and security threats are 'socially constructed' by diverse actors, institutions, and discourses.

Table 1.1

	<b>UNSC Open Debate Year</b>	<b>Proposed by</b>	<b>Document No</b>
1	2007	UK/Northern Ireland	S/PV.5663 <sup>55</sup>
2	2011	Germany	S/PV.6587 <sup>56</sup>
3	2018	Sweden	S/PV.8307 <sup>57</sup>
4	2019	Dominican Republic	S/PV.8451 <sup>58</sup>
5	2021A	Niger	S/PV.8923 <sup>59</sup>
6	2021B	UK/Northern Ireland	S/PV.8864 <sup>60</sup>
7	2021C	Niger	S/PV.8926 <sup>61</sup>
8	2022	Gabon	S/PV.9150 <sup>62</sup>
9	2023A	Malta	S/PV.9260 <sup>63</sup>
10	2023B	UAE	S/PV.9345 <sup>64</sup>

The imperative for a discourse analysis of the Global South members within the UNSC stems from the necessity to formulate a cohesive and sustainable climate action policy across all the UN institutions.

Given the inherently power-asserting nature of discourses, it becomes crucial not only to identify prevailing discourses but also to assess their influence and dominance over alternative narratives. To unravel the details of incoherence within the UNSC pertaining to the Global South, this research will meticulously analyze UNSC debates on the theme of climate security, spanning from the inaugural debate in 2007 to the most recent one in 2023, as demarcated in the provided table (Table 1.1). This temporal scope ensures a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of discursive trends and facilitates the identification of patterns and shifts over time.

While acknowledging the potential limitations inherent in confining the study's scope solely to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its open debates, this research is guided by several compelling reasons for such a choice. Firstly, there exists a persistent discourse and call from both the policy and academic spheres to institutionalize climate change within the purview of the UN Security Council<sup>65</sup>. Secondly, in order to understand the level of unity/division among the Global South states, this study is set to scrutinize states' perceptions regarding the role of the UNSC in matters pertaining to climate change.

In accordance with Article 24 of the UN Charter, it is the responsibility of the UNSC to uphold international peace and security through prompt and effective action. Thus, the selection of the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the focal point of analysis is grounded in its unparalleled authority and mandate in addressing issues of international peace and security. Furthermore, the composition of the UNSC, comprising of both permanent and non-permanent members, encapsulates a diverse array of national interests and priorities. In addition to that, focusing specifically on the UNSC open debates offers several methodological advantages conducive to an in-depth analysis. Open debates within the UNSC provide a platform for member states to express their perspectives on pertinent issues, unfettered by procedural constraints. Unlike formal resolutions or closed-door deliberations, open debates offer a transparent forum wherein nations can assert their viewpoints, engage in dialogue, and shape discourse on critical matters such as climate security. By scrutinizing UNSC open debates, this research aims to capture the diversity of voices within the Global South, unraveling the complexities of their discursive strategies and policy preferences in a contextually rich and publicly accessible setting. Thus, the choice of UNSC open debates as the primary source of analysis aligns with the research objective of elucidating the discursive dynamics shaping climate security governance and policy formulation at the global level.



## Data Characteristics

For this research, the term "Global South" is regarded as a "booming meta category" that can be used to frame research in scholarly circles and across disciplines<sup>66</sup>, but the lack of one clear definition for 'global south' has always led to the questioning of the relevance and potency of categorization of countries as 'global south'<sup>67</sup>. Hence this research uses a broader parameter to classify countries as 'global south'. All the members that participated in the UNSC open debates from the time period of 2007-2023 are listed below based on five parameters- their geographical position<sup>68</sup>, developmental indicators (using UNDP HDI Index), political stand (membership to G77), economic classification (based on OECD membership) and finally their position in international climate regime through their classification as 'Annex 1' and 'Non-Annex 1' countries to the Kyoto Protocol<sup>69</sup> as used in various other studies. A country is identified as the 'Global South'<sup>70</sup> when it meets at least three or more parameters (Refer Table 1.2). Hence, it will provide a wider representation to the idea of the 'global south' (refer supporting document I for detailed country classification).

Table 1.2

S. No	Parameters	Variables
1	Geographical (Asia, Africa, South America considered ad Global South) *Excludes some countries)	Asia
		Africa
		Oceania
		Europe
		North America
		South America
2	Economy (non-OECD considered as Global South)	Non-OECD
		OECD
3	Human Development (As per UNDP, countries below Medium HDI is considered as developing)	<b>Developing countries based on HDI</b>
4	Political (Members united based on ideas for global negotiations inside the UN)	G77

5	Kyoto (Countries divided based on industrial development)	Annex 1
		Non-Annex 1

To comprehensively ascertain the stance of each country, particularly those from the Global South, an analysis is conducted through the lens of discourses articulated within open debates, as presented by the representatives of the respective countries. The speeches of 137 countries over the time period of 2007-2023 was analyzed. This analysis revolves around two pivotal inquiries:

1. *Acknowledgment of the characterization of climate change as a salient security concern impacting international peace and security.*
2. *Willingness to endorse the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in addressing matters pertaining to climate security.*

The responses to these inquiries are categorized into three distinct answers—YES, NO, and UNCERTAIN—based on the content of the speeches delivered by each representative. For the first question, a YES denotes acknowledgment of the nexus between climate change and international peace and security, while a NO indicates the consideration of climate change solely as a sustainable development issue. Responses categorized as UNCERTAIN signify ambiguity or absence of an explicit stance. Regarding the second question, a YES signifies endorsement of the UNSC's involvement in addressing climate security matters, whereas a NO indicates non-endorsement. Responses categorized as UNCERTAIN denote lack of explicit endorsement. (refer supporting document II for detailed data).


## Discussion

The major observations made by analyzing the open debates are stated below.

### *i. Diverse range of perspectives within the Global South*

Starting from first UNSC open debate<sup>71</sup> in 2007 concerning matters pertaining to climate change and security, there are evident divergences among the Global South states (refer image 1). For instance, there is a notable inclination among the Global South nations to acknowledge the impact of climate change on security, with a predominant focus on human security. Among the participating Global South states, approximately 66% have recognized the potential linkage between climate change and its implications for international peace and security. However, a significant 59% of these nations have vehemently opposed any envisaged role for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and another 16% do not fully endorse or completely reject any role for the UNSC, advocating instead for the classification of climate change as an issue within the domain of sustainable development.

*Image 1*



For instance, Bolivia articulated the association between climate change and security threats, particularly highlighting its adverse effects on water security. Despite acknowledging these security implications, Bolivia adamantly rejected any prospective involvement of the UNSC, citing its departure from the Council's established mandate. On a similar note, Chinese representative Liu Zhenmin contended that, while climate change may entail certain security implications its fundamental “essence lies within the purview of sustainable development”<sup>72</sup> and should therefore be addressed within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Nirupam Sen, Indian Permanent

Representative to the UN at that time, reminded the members that “the Security Council does not have the expertise and may not have the mandate”<sup>73</sup> to address matters pertaining to climate security.

In contrast, Peru extended an invitation to the UNSC to deliberate on the impacts of climate change on international security, advocating for preemptive measures over reactionary responses from the Council. By the same token, representing Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Papua New Guinea expressed a welcoming stance towards the potential engagement of the UNSC in addressing the climate crisis. Papua New Guinea urged the UNSC to scrutinize specific issues related to sovereignty and international legal rights concerning the loss of land resources and displacement of populations. In short, the Global South showcased a diverse range of perspectives towards climate security which in effect reduced the bargaining power of the collective identity.


## *ii. Recognition of Interlinkages*

Another notable trend is the consistent acknowledgment of the growing interlinkages between climate change and international security among the Global South states. From 2007 to 2023, an average of approximately 81% of these countries have recognized the significance of climate security concerns, with a particular emphasis on the dimension of human security.

Moreover, there has been a noticeable trend towards increased acceptance of this linkage in recent years, evidenced by an average of 85% of the countries accepting the linkage between climate change and security in the last two debates, compared to 64% in the initial two debates. In support of this trend, Mariam Mohammed Saeed Al Mheiri, the UAE’s Minister of Climate Change and Environment, who sponsored the 2023 open debate, suggested that “the Council should approach conflicts through a climate-sensitive lens and avoid polarization in its consideration of the issue”<sup>74</sup>. For Gabon, the climate and security nexus must be “systematically incorporated into all geopolitical strategies for international peace and security”<sup>75</sup>.

### iii. Trend Towards Acceptance of UNSC Role

Image 2



Correspondingly, in the debates of 2007 and 2011, nearly 60% of the participating Global South nations, on average, expressed opposition to any role for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in climate security matters. However, this stance has gradually shifted, with opposition diminishing to less than 20% on average in the last two debates. Concurrently, there has been a noticeable inclination towards endorsing a greater role for the UNSC, with an average of 61% of nations in the last two debates expressing support for UNSC engagement in addressing the climate crisis. This trend indicates a growing acceptance among the Global South countries towards the UNSC's involvement in climate security issues (refer image 2).

For instance, in the 2023 debate, Dr. Kwaku Afriyie, the Minister for Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation of Ghana, opined that climate change poses an “existential threat to humankind and is driving and exacerbating threats to international peace and security in several regions of the world, especially the Sahel.” In such a situation, he recommended the Security Council to integrate climate change into its peace efforts by encouraging special political missions. Furthermore, Gabon, in the 2023 Malta debate, provided a list of actions expected from the UNSC in dealing with climate security, which included risk assessment, planning, and appropriate funding for resilience and capacity building in fragile States.


Simultaneously, nations such as India and Brazil have consistently voiced opposition to any involvement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to climate security.

Notably, both countries have registered objections to the UNSC's role in all ten debates. For instance, Ms. Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, representing Brazil in 2011, articulated that "conflict is usually a result of underdevelopment and lack of access to resources and technology for adaptation," emphasizing that it is not solely attributable to climate change but rather a multifaceted issue<sup>76</sup>. This sentiment was echoed again during the 2022 Gabon debate by Brazilian Ambassador Ronaldo Filho, who asserted that it was inappropriate to imply a direct causal link between climate change and conflicts. He reiterated the view that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum to address climate change concerns.


#### iv. *Inconsistencies within G77 Nations*

On examining the discourse among G77 nations, internal inconsistencies regarding the intersection of climate change and security within this group become apparent. During the 2007 debate, 66% of G77 member states emphasized the linkage between climate change and security, a figure that escalated to 75% by the 2023 debate. Concurrently, the disposition towards endorsing the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) role in climate security underwent a noteworthy transformation. In 2007, 59% of G77 nations expressed opposition to the involvement of the UNSC, a stance that significantly dwindled to 25% by the 2023 debate (refer image 3 and 4).

*Image 3*



*Image 4*



For instance, while analyzing the Chinese diplomatic discourse concerning the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its role in addressing climate change-related matters, a progression of viewpoints can be observed over the years. In 2011, Mr. Wang Min, Chinese diplomat, articulated a position discrediting the UNSC as a suitable forum for discussing climate change issues, primarily due to its perceived lack of universal representation. This perspective stressed China's initial skepticism regarding the efficacy of the UNSC in addressing climate-related challenges. In 2018, they continued their stand, marked by an endorsement of South-South Cooperation on climate change and a commitment to supporting other developing countries in responding to climate change challenges. However, in the 2020 open debates

sponsored by Niger, Chinese representation called for unity in the Council's actions related to climate security and advocated for further consultation among Council members on this matter. Further in the 2023 open debate, China took a more proactive stance by suggesting that the Council could consider authorizing its field missions to countries where climate change is contributing to instability and conflicts.

On a similar vein, during the 2023 debate, Costa Rica, another G77 member which endorsed the G77 statement in 2007, called upon the Security Council and the Peace building Commission to deliver an effective and joint response based on human security and sustainable peace. For Costa Rican representative, Chan Valverde, the threats that might arise due to sea level rise could “foment new conflicts over land and resources, leading to the creation of ever more dangerous migration patterns and exacerbating the exploitation of vulnerable groups”<sup>77</sup>.

#### v. *Consistent Advocacy from Small Island Developing States (SIDS)*

Similarly, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have consistently advocated for heightened attention to the security implications of climate change. In the 2007 debate, 89% of SIDS acknowledged the correlation between climate change and security, a percentage that surged to 100% by the 2023 debate convened in Malta. Furthermore, SIDS uniformly supported a greater role and responsibility for the UNSC. In the 2023 Malta debate, which included 10 SIDS representatives, none dissented against the UNSC's involvement in addressing climate security concerns (refer image 5 and 6).

For SIDS, issues like sea-level rise are not only environmental concerns but also matters of security and survival for their populations. For instance, Maldives, which supported the G77 position in 2007, considers climate change as their number-one security threat in 2023<sup>78</sup>. Similarly, Papua New Guinea urges the Security Council to effectively address non-traditional security issues such as climate security<sup>79</sup>. In 2021, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, a southern Caribbean Island nation, reminded the Security Council not to sidestep its responsibility to address the security implications of climate change<sup>80</sup>. At the same time, Nauru refers to it as a multidimensional crisis<sup>81</sup> and acknowledges the role of the UNFCCC and the General Assembly in dealing with climate security<sup>82</sup>.

Image 5





Image 6



These observations underscore the nuanced and evolving perspectives within the Global South, revealing both convergence and divergence in their approaches towards climate security discourse.

## Conclusion

Despite historical opposition, there is a discernible trend towards greater acceptance of the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) role in addressing climate security matters, indicating a shifting paradigm within the Global South. These findings have significant implications for policy and governance frameworks concerning climate security. Firstly, there is a pressing need for enhanced collaboration and coordination among Global South nations to articulate common positions and priorities within international forums. This entails fostering dialogue and consensus-building mechanisms to address internal variations and align diverse interests towards shared objectives. Moreover, the persistence of internal discord and inconsistency within the UN Security Council debates under the banner of the 'Global South' raises significant questions regarding the collective bargaining power and efficacy of this collective identity. The divergence and incoherence exhibited by member states during UNSC discussions may significantly influence their positions and bargaining leverage in other international platforms, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This stresses the need for a critical reassessment of the utility and effectiveness of the 'Global South' label in shaping collective bargaining strategies and advancing shared interests in global climate governance.

Secondly, the escalating urgency surrounding climate security concerns emphasizes the importance for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to assume a more proactive role in addressing this complex global challenge. Despite internal divisions within the Council, recent developments have positioned the UNSC as an increasingly relevant body for deliberating climate-related matters. Initiatives such as the establishment of the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security in July 2020 and the Group of Friends



on Climate and Security in 2018, alongside the adoption of Presidential Statements and resolutions (e.g. [A/RES/63/28](#), [S/RES/2349](#), [S/PRST/2018/3](#), [S/RES/2423](#), [S/RES/2429](#)) pertaining to climate security and the Secretary-General's efforts to "green the blue helmets"<sup>83</sup> signify a growing recognition of the intersecting issues of climate change and international peace and security. However, the evolving dynamics observed among Global South states in this study emphasizes the necessity for the UNSC to provide greater clarity and definition regarding its role in addressing climate security concerns.

Climate change is a multilateral problem that requires a multilateral solution. There is no reason to alter the centrality of the UNFCCC in addressing climate change matters, but at the same time when the impact of changing climate on security is hard to neglect<sup>84</sup>, the UN Charter mandates the UNSC to take responsibilities to ensure international peace and security. Rather than keeping it exclusive to one organ, the UN system demands unity of action. Samadou Ousman, Counselor and Deputy Political Coordinator of the Permanent Mission of the Niger at the UN in 2022, reminded that "our understanding of the principle of unity of action at the United Nations means that the fact that it has one organ with the principal mandate for an issue should not exclude another of its organs from dealing with an aspect of that issue relevant to its own mandate"<sup>85</sup>. On a similar note, the Kenyan representative in 2021, demanded the UNSC "to provide solutions that respond to the challenges we face in line with its mandate"<sup>86</sup> and Papua New Guinean representative, in 2023, urged Security Council members "to be proactive, based on evidence and science"<sup>87</sup> and address the realities while respecting their mandates based on the UN Charter.

The question of whether the UN Security Council should play a role is no longer relevant; rather, all UN members should collectively seek an answer to the Indonesian representative's question: "How should the Security Council respond to that threat?"<sup>88</sup>. Indecision can result in missed opportunities. As a way forward, Chile reminds the world that "the Security Council must bear in mind certain principles, such as equity, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the duty to cooperate, the polluter pays principle, the principle of territorial integrity, and legal stability with regard to the preservation of baselines and the outer limits of maritime zones, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and obligations concerning the non-refoulement of persons affected by sea level rise to third States"<sup>89</sup> when considering matters related to climate change.

Moreover, it is cardinal to strengthen support for vulnerable nations, especially Small Island Developing States, through tailored assistance and capacity-building programs. This encompasses bolstering resilience measures, facilitating the transfer of technology, and mobilizing financial resources to alleviate the detrimental effects of climate change on vulnerable communities. Advocating for the South-

South Cooperation can yield dual benefits for the global governance framework by concurrently advancing Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13 (Climate Action) and SDG Goal 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). This approach aligns with the principles of equity and solidarity, emphasizing the shared responsibility of all nations in addressing the challenges posed by climate change. Lastly, there is a need for continued research and dialogue to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics within the Global South and strengthen evidence-based policy formulation. This entails interdisciplinary collaboration, leveraging diverse perspectives and methodologies to address complex challenges and promote ecological security.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Florian Krampe, Dylan O'Driscoll, McKenzie Johnson, Dahlia Simangan, Farah Hegazi, Cedric de Coning, Climate change and peacebuilding: sub-themes of an emerging research agenda, *International Affairs*, Volume 100, Issue 3, May 2024, Pages 1111–1130, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iaae057>; Ide, T., Brzoska, M., Donges, J. F., & Schleußner, C. (2020). Multi-method evidence for when and how climate-related disasters contribute to armed conflict risk. *Global Environmental Change*, 62, 102063. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102063>; Hoffmann, R., Dimitrova, A., Muttarak, R., Cuaresma, J. C., & Peisker, J. (2020). A meta-analysis of country-level studies on environmental change and migration. *Nature Climate Change*, 10(10), 904–912. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0898-6>; Koubi, V. (2019). Climate change and conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 343–360. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070830>; Sakaguchi, K., Varughese, A., & Auld, G. (2017). Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links between Climate Change and Violent Conflict. *International Studies Review*, 19(4), 622–645. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix022>; Brzoska, M. (2012). Climate change as a driver of security policy. In *Hexagon series on human and environmental security and peace* (pp. 165–184). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_8)

<sup>2</sup> McDonald, M. (2023). Immovable objects? Impediments to a UN Security Council resolution on climate change. *International Affairs*, 99(4), 1635–1651. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iad064>; McDonald, M. (2021). Protecting the vulnerable: towards an ecological approach to security. In *Springer eBooks* (pp. 191–208). [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53014-3\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53014-3_11); Arnall, A. (2023). Climate change and security research: Conflict, securitisation and human agency. *PLOS Climate*, 2(3), e0000072. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000072>; Buhaug, H., & Von Uexküll, N. (2021). Vicious circles: violence, vulnerability, and climate change. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 46(1), 545–568. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-014708>; Allan, R. P., Arias, P. A., Berger, S., Canadell, J. G., Cassou, C., Chen, D., Cherchi, A., Connors, S. L., Coppola, E., Cruz, F. A., Diongue-Niang, A., Doblas-Reyes, F. J., Douville, H., Driouech, F., Edwards, T. L., Engelbrecht, F., Eyring, V., Fischer, E., Flato, G. M., . . . IPCC. (2021). Summary for policymakers [Report]. In V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S. L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M. I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J. B. R. Matthews, T. K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, & B. Zhou (Eds.), *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis* (pp. 3–32). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896.001>

<sup>3</sup> Sindico, Francesco, Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue? *Carbon and Climate Law Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 26-31, 2007, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1013186>

<sup>4</sup> Shirley V. Scott, Implications of climate change for the UN Security Council: mapping the range of potential policy responses, *International Affairs*, Volume 91, Issue 6, November 2015, Pages 1317–1333, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12455>

<sup>5</sup> McDonald, Immovable objects?, p.1649.

<sup>6</sup> Arnulf Becker Lorca, Contesting global justice from the South: redistribution in the international order, *International Affairs*, Volume 99, Issue 1, January 2023, Pages 41–60, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iac315>

<sup>7</sup> Hajer, M. A. (1995). *The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Clarendon Press.

<sup>8</sup> Salverda, T., Tappe, O., & Hollington, A. (2015). Concepts of the Global South (Voices from Around the World). [https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/6399/1/voices012015\\_concepts\\_of\\_the\\_global\\_south.pdf](https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/6399/1/voices012015_concepts_of_the_global_south.pdf); Schneider, N. (2017). Between promise and skepticism: the global South and our role as engaged intellectuals. *The Global South*, 11(2), 18. <https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.02>

<sup>9</sup> Kleinschmidt, J. (2018). Differentiation Theory and the Global South as a Metageography of International Relations. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 43(2), 59–80. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26641446>

- <sup>10</sup> Eriksen, T. H. (2015). What's Wrong With The Global North And The Global South? In *Concepts of the Global South – Voices From Around the World*. Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany. [https://gssc.uni-koeln.de/sites/gssc/Medien/Voices/Issue\\_1/2015/2\\_WHAT\\_S\\_WRONG\\_WITH\\_THE\\_GLOBAL\\_NORTH\\_AND\\_THE\\_GLOBAL\\_SOUTH\\_voices012015\\_concepts\\_of\\_the\\_global\\_south\\_Kopi\\_e.pdf](https://gssc.uni-koeln.de/sites/gssc/Medien/Voices/Issue_1/2015/2_WHAT_S_WRONG_WITH_THE_GLOBAL_NORTH_AND_THE_GLOBAL_SOUTH_voices012015_concepts_of_the_global_south_Kopi_e.pdf)
- <sup>11</sup> Haug, S., Braveboy-Wagner, J. A., & Maihold, G. (2021). The 'Global South' in the study of world politics: examining a meta category. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), 1923–1944. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1948831>; Albuquerque, F. L. R. (2018). Developing powers in multilateral regimes: Brazil's foreign policy in the climate change and peace and security regimes. *International Negotiation*, 23(3), 423–445. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23031142>; Blicharska, M., Smithers, R., Kuchler, M., Agrawal, G. K., Gutiérrez, J. M., Hassanali, A., Huq, S., Koller, S. H., Marjit, S., Mshinda, H., Masjuki, H. H., Solomons, N. W., Van Staden, J., & Mikusiński, G. (2017). Steps to overcome the North–South divide in research relevant to climate change policy and practice. *Nature Climate Change*, 7(1), 21–27. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3163>; Hurrell, A., & Sengupta, S. (2012). Emerging powers, North-South relations and global climate politics. *International Affairs*, 88(3), 463–484. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01084.x>; Lunde, L. (1991). North/South and global warming - conflict or cooperation? *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 22(2), 199–210. <https://doi.org/10.1177/096701069102200206>
- <sup>12</sup> Dillarstone, H., Brown, L. J., & Flores, E. C. (2023). Climate change, mental health, and reproductive decision-making: A systematic review. *PLOS Climate*, 2(11), e0000236. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000236>
- <sup>13</sup> Müller, B. (2002). *Equity in climate change: the great divide*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/EV31-EquityinGlobalClimateChangeTheGreatDivide-BMuller-2002.pdf>
- <sup>14</sup> Atapattu, S., & González, C. G. (2015). The North–South divide in international Environmental Law: Framing the issues. In *Cambridge University Press eBooks* (pp. 1–20). <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107295414.002>
- <sup>15</sup> Pillai, A. V., & Dubash, N. K. (2021). The limits of opportunism: the uneven emergence of climate institutions in India. *Environmental Politics*, 30(sup1), 93–117. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2021.1933800>
- <sup>16</sup> Joshi, S. (2013). Understanding India's representation of North–South climate politics. *Global Environmental Politics*, 13(2), 128–147. [https://doi.org/10.1162/glep\\_a\\_00170](https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00170)
- <sup>17</sup> Rajão, R., & Duarte, T. R. (2018). Performing postcolonial identities at the United Nations' climate negotiations. *Postcolonial Studies*, 21(3), 364–378. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2018.1482597>
- <sup>18</sup> Sultana, F. (2023). Whose growth in whose planetary boundaries? Decolonising planetary justice in the Anthropocene. *Geo: Geography and Environment*, 10(2). <https://doi.org/10.1002/geo2.128>
- <sup>19</sup> Roberts, J. T., & Parks, B. (2006). *A climate of injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy*. National Geographic Books.
- <sup>20</sup> Cullet, P. (1999). Differential treatment in international law: towards a new paradigm of inter-state relations. *European Journal of International Law*, 10(3), 549–582. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/10.3.549>; Thakur, S. (2021). From Kyoto to Paris and Beyond: The Emerging Politics of Climate Change. *India Quarterly*, 77(3), 366–383. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284211027252>
- <sup>21</sup> Pauw, P., Bauer, S., Richerzhagen, C., Brandi, C., Schmöle, H., & Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. (2014). *Different Perspectives on Differentiated responsibilities: A State-of-the-Art review of the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities in international negotiations* [Discussion Paper]. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. [https://www.idos-research.de/uploads/media/DP\\_6.2014..pdf](https://www.idos-research.de/uploads/media/DP_6.2014..pdf)
- <sup>22</sup> Ertuğrul, H. M., Çetin, M., Şeker, F., & Doğan, E. (2016). The impact of trade openness on global carbon dioxide emissions: Evidence from the top ten emitters among developing countries. *Ecological Indicators*, 67, 543–555. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2016.03.027>
- <sup>23</sup> Din, A. U. (2023). Emerging powers and small island developing states: leadership or Co-Option? *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 79(2), 244–263. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284231165082>
- <sup>24</sup> McDonald, Immobile objects?; Tigre, M. A., & Wewerinke-Singh, M. (2023). Beyond the North–South divide: Litigation's role in resolving climate change loss and damage claims. *Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law*, 32(3), 439–452. <https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12517>; Weber, E., & Kopf, A. (2018). South–South approaches to international environmental negotiations. In *Routledge eBooks* (pp. 205–214). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315624495-15>; Rajão, R., & Duarte, T. R., Performing postcolonial identities at the United Nations' climate negotiations; Gonzalez, C. (2015). *Bridging the North-South Divide: International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene*. Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/772>;
- <sup>25</sup> Boas, I. (2014). Where is the South in security discourse on climate change? An analysis of India. *Critical Studies on Security*, 2(2), 148–161. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2014.905295>
- <sup>26</sup> Abdenur, A. E. (2021). Climate and security: UN agenda-setting and the 'Global South.' *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), 2074–2085. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1951609>

- <sup>27</sup> Jayaram, D. (2023). A global south perspective on ‘ecological security.’ *New Perspectives*, 31(1), 31–38. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825x221143624>; Jayaram, D. (2022). ‘Climatizing’ military strategy? A case study of the Indian armed forces. *International Politics*, 58(4), 619–639.
- <sup>28</sup> Rasheed, A. A. (2023). Small Island Developing States and climate securitisation in international politics: Towards a comprehensive conception. *Island Studies Journal*, 18(1), 161–185. <https://doi.org/10.24043/isj.391>
- <sup>29</sup> Freeman, D. (2017). The Global South at the UN: Using International Politics to Re-Vision the Global. *The Global South*, 11(2), 71. <https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.05>
- <sup>30</sup> Najam, Adil. 2003. “The Collective South in Multinational Environmental Politics.” In *Policy-making and Prosperity: A Multinational Anthology*, edited by Stuart Nagel, 197–240. Lanham: Lexington. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781071873038>
- <sup>31</sup> Conca, K. (2015). *An unfinished foundation: The United Nations and Global Environmental Governance*. Oxford University Press.
- <sup>32</sup> Grovogu. (2011). A revolution nonetheless: the Global South in international relations. *The Global South*, 5(1), p.176. <https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.5.1.175>
- <sup>33</sup> Dados, N., & Connell, R. (2012). The Global South. *Contexts*, 11(1), 12–13. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504212436479>; Hansen- Prys Miriam (2023). The Global South: a problematic term. *Internationale Politik Quarterly*. <https://ip-quarterly.com/en/global-south-problematic-term>
- <sup>34</sup> Heine, J. (2023). *The Global South is on the rise – but what exactly is the Global South?* The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959>; Taylor, A., Methner, N., Barkai, K. R., McClure, A., Jack, C., New, M., & Ziervogel, G. (2023). Operationalising climate-resilient development pathways in the Global South. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 64, 101328. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2023.101328>
- <sup>35</sup> Prashad, V. (2008). *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World*. The New Press; Prashad, V. (2014). *The poorer nations: A Possible History of the Global South*. Verso Books.
- <sup>36</sup> Kloß, S. T. (2017). The Global South as Subversive Practice: Challenges and potentials of a heuristic concept. *The Global South*, 11(2), 1. <https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.01>
- <sup>37</sup> Mahler, A. G. (2018). *From the tricontinental to the global South: race, radicalism, and transnational solidarity*. <https://www.dukeupress.edu/from-the-tricontinental-to-the-global-south>
- <sup>38</sup> Figueira, Dorothy M. (2007). “‘The Global South’: Yet Another Attempt to Engage the Other.” *The Global South* 1, no. 1–2: 144–52; Kloß, The Global South as Subversive Practice.
- <sup>39</sup> Ejaz, W., & Najam, A. (2023). The Global South and climate coverage: from news taker to news maker. *Social Media + Society*, 9(2), 205630512311779. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231177904>
- <sup>40</sup> Oduro-Marfo, S. (2018, August 8). *Global South: what does it mean and why use the term?* | *Global South Political Commentaries*. <https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/globalsouthpolitics/2018/08/08/global-south-what-does-it-mean-and-why-use-the-term/>
- <sup>41</sup> Dados & Connell, The Global South.
- <sup>42</sup> Alden, C. (2023). The Global South and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. *LSE Public Policy Review*, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.88>
- <sup>43</sup> Nye, J. S., Jr. (2023, November 3). *What is the Global South?* Project Syndicate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-south-is-a-misleading-term-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-11>
- <sup>44</sup> Refer Mahler, *From the tricontinental to the global South*, p.32.
- <sup>45</sup> Refer Hansen- Prys Miriam. The Global South.
- <sup>46</sup> Refer Freeman, The Global South at the UN.
- <sup>47</sup> Refer Adil Najam, “The Collective South in Multinational Environmental Politics.
- <sup>48</sup> Refer Adil Najam, “The Collective South in Multinational Environmental Politics.
- <sup>49</sup> Dirlik, A. (2007). Global South: predicament and promise. *The Global South*, 1(1), 12–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339225>
- <sup>50</sup> UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. “Forging a Global South: United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation.” <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH-PR-Publications-UNDAY-for-South-South-Cooperation.pdf>.
- <sup>51</sup> Source: UNDP. More developed regions comprise Europe, Northern America, Australia/New Zealand and Japan. Less developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Asia (except Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. The group of least developed countries (LDCs) includes 46 countries, located in sub-Saharan Africa (32), Northern Africa and Western Asia (2), Central and Southern Asia (4), Eastern and South-Eastern Asia (4), Latin America and the Caribbean (1), and Oceania (3). Accessed on January 31<sup>st</sup> 2024. <https://population.un.org/wpp/DefinitionOfRegions/#:~:text=More%20developed%20regions%20comprise%20Europe,plus%20Melanesia%2C%20Micronesia%20and%20Polynesia.>

- <sup>52</sup> Haug, S., Braveboy-Wagner, J. A., & Maihold, G. (2021). The ‘Global South’ in the study of world politics: examining a meta category. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), 1923–1944. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1948831>
- <sup>53</sup> Singh, S. (2020). From global North-South divide to sustainability: Shifting policy frameworks for international development and education. *RIMCIS : International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences*, 9(1), 76. <https://doi.org/10.17583/rimcis.2020.4923> ; Custer, S., Horigoshi, A., & Marshall, K. (2023). *18 Responding to Global South views on development priorities, progress and partner performance*. Document - Gale Academic. <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A767861401/AONE?u=anon-5a5cdd04&sid=sitemap&xid=4ea54834>
- <sup>54</sup> Hajer, M. A. *The politics of environmental discourse*, p.44; Hajer M. A. (2006) *Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meaning*. In: van den Brink M, Metz T (eds) *Words matter in policy and planning: discourse theory and method in the social sciences*. KNAG, Utrecht, The Netherlands, pp 65–74
- <sup>55</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.5663. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_5663.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf)
- <sup>56</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.6587 <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20SPV%206587%20RES1.pdf>
- <sup>57</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8307. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_8307.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8307.pdf)
- <sup>58</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8451. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_8451.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8451.pdf)
- <sup>59</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8923. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n21/384/54/pdf/n2138454.pdf?token=Y8cmv9Qx053b0MFRUi&fe=true>
- <sup>60</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8864. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_8864.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8864.pdf)
- <sup>61</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8926. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n21/392/34/pdf/n2139234.pdf?token=eef2i3QCH6t7OOZks&fe=true>
- <sup>62</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9150. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S\\_PV\\_9150.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_PV_9150.pdf)
- <sup>63</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)
- <sup>64</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9345. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9345.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9345.pdf)
- <sup>65</sup> McDonald, M. (2023). Immovable objects?; Scott, S. V., & Nguyễn, N. T. (2022). 17 The UN Security Council and Climate Security: Responding to a multifaceted threat. In *Edinburgh University Press eBooks* (pp. 374–394). <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781399505451-020>; Scartozzi, C. M. (2022). Climate change in the UN Security Council: An analysis of discourses and organizational trends. *International Studies Perspectives*, 23(3), 290–312. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ckac003>; Hardt, J. N. (2021). The United Nations Security Council at the forefront of (Climate) change? Confusion, stalemate, ignorance. *Politics and Governance*, 9(4), 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4573>; Maertens, L. (2021). Climatizing the UN Security Council. *International Politics*, 58(4), 640–660. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00281-9>; Conca, Is there a role for the UN Security Council on climate change?; Scott, S. V., & Ku, C. (2018). The UN Security Council and global action on climate change. In *Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks*. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785364648.00008>; Cousins, S. (2013). UN Security Council: playing a role in the international climate change regime? *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 25(2), 191–210. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2013.787058>
- <sup>66</sup> Haug, S., Braveboy-Wagner, J. A., & Maihold, The ‘Global South’ in the study of world.
- <sup>67</sup> Khan, N. (2023). Conclusion: The Gift of the Global South. In *In Quest of a Shared Planet: Negotiating Climate from the Global South* (1st ed., pp. 173–180). Fordham University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.1380390>; Rajão & Duarte, Performing postcolonial identities at the United Nations’.
- <sup>68</sup> Heine, J. (2023). *The Global South is on the rise – but what exactly is the Global South?* The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959>
- <sup>69</sup> [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=en)
- <sup>70</sup> The author developed such a criterion to provide a wider and inclusive definition to the term ‘Global South’.
- <sup>71</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.5663. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_5663.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf)
- <sup>72</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.5663. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_5663.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf)
- <sup>73</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.5663. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_5663.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf)
- <sup>74</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9345. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9345.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9345.pdf)

- 
- <sup>75</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9345. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9345.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9345.pdf)
- <sup>76</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.6587 <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20SPV%206587%20RES1.pdf>
- <sup>77</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)
- <sup>78</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)
- <sup>79</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)
- <sup>80</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8864. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv.8864.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv.8864.pdf)
- <sup>81</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)
- <sup>82</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.6587 <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20SPV%206587%20RES1.pdf>
- <sup>83</sup> [https://operationalsupport.un.org/sites/default/files/unep\\_greening\\_blue\\_helmets\\_0.pdf](https://operationalsupport.un.org/sites/default/files/unep_greening_blue_helmets_0.pdf)
- <sup>84</sup> Conca, K. (2015). *An unfinished foundation: The United Nations and Global Environmental Governance*. Oxford University Press.
- <sup>85</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9150. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S\\_PV\\_9150.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_PV_9150.pdf)
- <sup>86</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8923. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n21/384/54/pdf/n2138454.pdf?token=Y8cmv9Qx053b0MFRUi&fe=true>
- <sup>87</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)
- <sup>88</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.8451. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_8451.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8451.pdf)
- <sup>89</sup> Refer UN Security Council Open Debate S/PV.9260. [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_9260.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9260.pdf)