

# Collective Memory and Democratic Mobilization: Insights from Chile's Constitutional Revolution (2019-2023)

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## Abstract

This article investigates the enduring impact of historical-political tragedies on current political behavior, focusing on Chile's "Estallido Social" protests (2019-2020) and the Constituent Plebiscite (2020-2023). Utilizing social media data to analyze political memory, the study suggests that protests serve as a strategic engagement tool in municipalities with vivid recollections of past violence, such as Chile's era of institutional violence under Pinochet dictatorship. Least squares analyses indicate that Chilean municipalities with pre-1970 military bases experienced heightened protest activity but showed reduced involvement in constitutional voting, without a clear lean towards any political coalition. The 2SLS estimations link this phenomenon to the long-term effects of political victimization during Pinochet's regime and the social media remembrance on the 1973 coup violence. The evidence suggests that while collective memories on political violence may encourage active protest participation, it can also weaken the relationship between voters and political elites, influencing voting behavior.

*Keywords:* Constitutional Change, Protests, Institutional Violence, Collective Memory

*JEL:* D74, D72

Statement: The author has no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

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## 1. Introduction

Ay policía que vida elegiste vos /  
verdugear a la gente es tu  
vocación / matar a la gente pobre  
es tu profesión / y así brindarle a  
los ricos la protección / ya vas a  
ver / las balas que vos tiraste van  
a volver.

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*Chilean Protest song*

*Unknown composer, inspired by  
Dany Lescano y su Flor de Piedra*

Chile is a country that has extreme political events in its history. The country endured a violent military regime from 1973 to 1989, which resulted in nearly 40,000 victims estimated by the national truth commissions - among whom were  
5 detained, tortured, executed, disappeared. Despite transitioning to democracy in 1988-89, Chile retained some institutional legacies of the dictatorship, such as the police organization and core elements of the 1980 Constitution, written in the peak of the regime. Thirty years after the redemocratization, the country has experienced one the largest social protests in the history of Global South  
10 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021), named *Estallido Social*, which gathered over 3,700,000 people. The protests pressured the incumbent right-wing government to initiate a new constituent process, whose turnout was all time high in Chilean democracy - but end up with rejecting all the constitutional text proposals.

15 Does collective memory of past political events in democracies influence whether people make demands in the streets or through the voting booth nowadays? In which ways can we assess how intensely a population maintains such a memory?

The influence of collective memory on contemporary political behavior is a  
20 research area still open for new insights. Drawing on empirical mechanisms sim-

ilar to the theoretical contributions of Ticchi et al. (2013) and Acemoglu and Jackson (2015), the study focuses on how popular remembrance of historical events shapes present political actions. Specifically, it uses data on social media remembrance on the Pinochet’s coup to measure the impact of collective memories of historical state violence in Chile. Chile’s history of extreme political repression and recent social unrest makes it an ideal case for this analysis.

This paper proposes a contribution to the literature by investigating memory as a factor that can drive a trade-off between protesting and voting for democratic claiming, since the Constituent initiative was a direct response to the protests. To do so, this analysis introduces a methodology to estimate a “consumer-side” indicator of collective memory on social media to quantitatively evaluate its persistent impact on political behavior. This indicator assesses whether the public continues to remember historical political events and comprehends the underlying reasons for perpetuating certain values.

The strategy of this paper relies on both quantitative and qualitative approaches. First, the case study describes the background of institutional violence under Pinochet’s regime between 1973 and 1989, as well as the violence and social unrest of the *Estallido Social* 30 years later that led to the constituent initiative<sup>1</sup>. The case study enriches the theoretical investigation and leads to hypotheses about whether the collective memory of Pinochet’s violence impacts how people protested or voted in the plebiscites.

The quantitative analysis is based on the exogeneity of the military presence in Chilean municipalities before the overthrow of Salvador Allende’s government, backed by the related literature and empirical tests. By comparing 290 Chilean comunas with and without old military bases using least squares estimates, this study found significant differentials in contemporary political behavior during the *Estallido Social* (the intensity of protests) and the new constitution plebiscite (voter turnout). Mechanism analyses using 2SLS estimates suggest that the relative number of Pinochet’s victims in a given comuna, the number

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<sup>1</sup>Appendix B present the comprehensive description of Estallido Social

50 of memorial sites and social media users remembering the 1973 military coup  
in 2019 were significant drivers of such divergence in political behavior.

The study's qualitative discussion provides complementary evidence, tracing how institutional violence influences Chilean contemporary behavior. The findings appoint the importance of further research on state reforms to curb  
55 institutional abuses and entrenchment that can persist during democratization phases.

This investigation builds on a substantial body of literature on the historical persistence of political and economic phenomena (see Cirone and Pepinsky (2022) for a comprehensive review). Despite challenges in directly measuring  
60 collective memory, recent studies in the political economy have increasingly recognized its significance in explaining political engagement (Ticchi et al., 2013; Nikolova et al., 2022; Ochsner and Roesel, 2017; Belmonte and Rochlitz, 2020). This research intersects theories of political emotions and institutional persistence, viewing collective memory as a social institution that can influence po-  
65 litical behavior over generations.

The concept of collective memory, introduced by Maurice Halbwachs (2020), refers to the shared information and values about events remembered by a social group. Unlike personal memory, which fades with the individuals who experienced it, collective memory persists through documents, oral traditions, and  
70 ceremonies. It functions as a social institution, shaping rules of conduct and public opinion (for instance, pay respects for the victims, react in such manner if something similar happens or is mentioned, see Danieli (1998)), thus influencing political behavior in related circumstances. Collective memory is agent-sensitive, meaning political equilibria can shift based on how agents interpret  
75 historical events (Hodgson, 2006).

Behavioral sciences provide micro-level explanations for these phenomena. According to Bordalo et al. (2023), agents accumulate past information through personal experiences and communication with peers or media, retrieving it through memory. The likelihood of retrieving a specific memory is related to  
80 its similarity to current circumstances requiring a decision, thereby influencing

choices. Memory is often context-based: the attributes of an experience change slowly over time, and the agent can retrieve memories by similarity but change the interpretation based on recency(Kahana, 2012).

The interaction between collective memories and political behavior shapes  
85 public sentiments and actions toward politics. Feelings of unfair treatment by governments (Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017) and frustration from unmet social goals (Gurr, 2015) often lead to social unrest. Historical events, like racial violence, reduce contemporary electoral engagement (Williams, 2021) and increase social mistrust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Past authoritarian regimes’  
90 surveillance and repression have long-lasting impacts on political behavior, including the maintenance of political dynasties and persistent opposition voting (Nikolova et al., 2022; Lichter et al., 2021; Boucher, 2023).

Voting and protesting are key aspects of political behavior, providing mechanisms for influencing policy and holding politicians accountable. Universal  
95 suffrage incentivizes politicians to redistribute income to the poor (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), while enhanced voting accessibility can lead to greater public investment in healthcare (Fujiwara, 2015). Civil liberties, such as freedom of association and speech, allow citizens to expose irregularities (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; O’Donnell, 1998). Protests play a strategic role in democracies,  
100 when moderate activists and clear social demands are key to their effectiveness (Lohmann, 1993; Arruda et al., 2021). Elections and protests offer complementary forms of accountability, with elections providing vertical accountability and civic engagement enabling diagonal accountability (Lührmann et al., 2020). Part of literature often describes the two mechanisms as complementary since  
105 people can protest when they are dissatisfied with the electoral options(Kim and Jung, 2020; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Verba and Nie, 1987).

Legacies of exclusionary policies persist, fostering dissatisfaction and ambiguous attitudes toward democracy, manipulated by elites or fueling demands against them (Ochsner and Roesel, 2017; Belmonte and Rochlitz, 2020; Ticchi  
110 et al., 2013). Protests can contribute to institutional robustness through social experimentation (Çıdam, 2021), while lack of experimentation can lead to polit-

ical entrenchment, as seen in Chile (Luna and Altman, 2011; Funk and Velasco, 2020).

Although there have been efforts to explore the persistence of memory within  
115 victims' families (Nikolova et al., 2022; Bautista, 2016, 2013), as well as the  
'supply-side' sources of memories, such as public monuments (Ochsner and Roel-  
sel, 2017), the literature on the persistence of political behavior can benefit from  
the addition of a collective, 'consumer-side' indicator. This indicator would mea-  
120 sure the extent to which the general populace indeed continues to remember a  
historical political event. Such an indicator could provide quantitative evidence  
on whether the public still comprehends the underlying reasons behind the val-  
ues they perpetuate.

The paper starts with the institutional background of Pinochet's regime and  
the development of the Estallido Social. It then formulates hypotheses to guide  
125 the study and describes a detailed quantitative strategy for analysis, present-  
ing the quantitative results. The analysis explores underlying mechanisms and  
rejects alternative explanations. A qualitative discussion on Chile's culture of  
political violence follows, concluding with a summary of the main findings and  
their implications for the politics of collective memory.

## 130 **2. Institutional Background**

### *2.1. The Pinochet regime repression*

In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the civil government of Sal-  
vador Allende, whose left-wing coalition (Unidad Popular) aimed to implement  
Marxian socialism. This led to severe economic instability and political polariza-  
135 tion (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990). Once in power, Pinochet's military *junta*  
engaged in media censorship (González and Prem, 2018) and an anti-communist  
witch hunt targeting former politicians, trade unions, and the opposition. The  
repression, initially carried out by the armed forces and *Carabineros*, used old  
military bases as repression centers (Bautista et al., 2021). In 1974, repression  
140 was centralized under the *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (DINA), which

was later replaced by the *Central Nacional de Informaciones* (CNI) in 1977 due to external pressure over human rights violations (Policzer, 2009). Official records report 3,216 people killed or forcibly disappeared, and 38,254 imprisoned for political reasons, with 94% of these prisoners tortured (Comisión Valtech, 145 2004; Comisión Rettig, 1996).

Pinochet established a new constitution in 1980, extending his mandate, privatizing the public pension system, minimizing government intervention, and biasing electoral counts towards right-wing strongholds (Bautista et al., 2021). The repression led to civil resistance and, along with economic crises in the 150 1980s, social organizations called for democratization, supported by international pressure. In 1988, a plebiscite on Pinochet's continuation resulted in a 'No' vote winning with 55%, leading to subsequent elections dominated by the '*Concertación*' coalition until 2005 (Bautista et al., 2021; González and Prem, 2018).

Chile's democratization was seen as incomplete, with Pinochet remaining 155 head of the armed forces until 1998 and holding a lifetime seat in Congress until 2002, when he resigned amid corruption and human rights charges (Bautista et al., 2021). Stern (2010) argues that post-redemocratization Chile faced tensions between victims' memories and Pinochetistas' efforts to forget. Despite 160 constitutional reforms like the Ley 20840 in 2015 to make the electoral system more proportional, the 1980 Constitution's core remained, leading to debates about its technocratic and undemocratic nature (Tsebelis, 2018) and a general lack of trust in political representatives Funk and Velasco (2020).

## 2.2. *Estallido Social and the Chilean Constituent*

165 The social unrest in Chile from 2019 to 2020 was triggered by an increase in transport fares in Santiago. On October 1, 2019, the Public Transport Expert Panel raised the bus fare by 10 pesos and the peak-time metro fare by 30 pesos, effective October 6 (Panel de Expertos Del Transporte Público Ley N° 20.378 2019). Protests began on October 7 with high school students jumping turnstiles 170 in metro stations (Emol, 2019). Tensions escalated with a call for a massive

protest on October 18 (Rivera and Ruyt, 2019). On October 16, heightened online interest followed clashes with Carabineros at Santa Ana station, leading to arrests (Google, 2019; 24Horas.cl, 2019). The situation worsened with Metro service suspensions and vandalism at Plaza de Armas station, resulting in 133  
175 student arrests on October 17 (CNN Chile, 2019b; Al Jazeera, 2019a).

On October 18, large-scale protests, known as the “Santiagazo,” erupted, with significant clashes and a massive “cacerolazo” (pot-banging protest) in support of the demonstrations (Rollano, 2019). In response, Minister of Public Security Andrés Chadwick invoked the National Security Act (CNN Chile,  
180 2019a), and President Sebastián Piñera declared a state of emergency in Santiago and nearby cities, with curfews imposed (Dulci and Sadivia, 2021). Despite these measures, protests spread to other regions (Stuardo, 2019), leading Piñera to extend the state of emergency and propose suspending the fare increases (Prensa Presidencia, 2019a). On October 20, Piñera met with leaders to discuss  
185 solutions, resulting in the proposal of new constitution and suspension of the Metro fare increase (Senado, 2019). Protests intensified, with peaceful demonstrators and violent incidents, including arson and looting. Social movement leaders called for a new constitution, and large-scale marches continued, as *La Marcha Más Grande de Chile* (Villaruel and Flores, 2019). Under pressure,  
190 Piñera ended the state of emergency and replaced several ministers (Deutsche Welle, 2019). Protests persisted in reduced amount, with trade unions calling for a general strike on November 4 (Europa Press, 2019). Moreover, the headquarters of the right-wing party Unión Democática Independiente and the memorial of Jaime Guzmán, the architect of Pinochet’s 1980 constitution, were vandalized  
195 (Ahumada and Vera, 2019). The Ministry of Public Security announced police reforms following allegations of human rights violations (infobae, 2019), but the initiative never took place.

#### 2.2.1. The beginning of the Constituent initiative

On November 7th, the Chilean Municipality Association approved a call for  
200 a citizen consultation on a new constitution (Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades, 2019). On November 12th, President Piñera announced three National



Agreements in response to the protests: for peace, justice, and a new constitution (Prensa Presidencia, 2019c). By November 15th, the government and opposition agreed to a constitutional plebiscite, which was passed by the national congress and promulgated on December 24th (Ministerio Secretaría General De La Presidencia, 2019). The plebiscite was initially scheduled for March 24th, 2020, but postponed to October 25th, 2020 due to COVID-19. More than 7.5 million people participated, with 78.2% approving the constituent process and 79.1% favoring a fully elected convention. In early 2020, protests continued sporadically until the COVID-19 state of emergency on March 18, except for the *Estallido* anniversary on October 18. This period saw over 3.7 million protesters, 34 deaths, 12,500 hospitalizations, and 5,558 reports of institutional violence (Amnesty International, 2020). On May 15-16, 2021, nearly 6.2 million people voted for the constitutional convention's composition. The new constitution was written and voted on by the convention in 2022, followed by a plebiscite to confirm its replacement of the old constitution.

### 2.3. Hypotheses formulation

Considering the “Estallido social,” hypotheses can be formulated to guide our analysis of the persistence of memory Pinochet’s violence in Chilean political engagement. Funk and Velasco (2020) argue that the *Estallido Social* happened due to a meltdown of institutional trust and hopelessness. However, even the authors acknowledge that initial conditions matter in this situational crisis. Here, it is possible to hypothesize that collective memory can play a special role in these conditions. Consider again the mechanism described in (Bordalo et al., 2023): citizens embedded in the memory of past political violence can retrieve this memory in the wake of present political violence and choose to react against it.

Our first hypothesis concerns protests. Related literature shows that the immediate effects of repression on protests under dictatorship are uncertain. On one hand, repression may intensify protests in heavily affected areas (Hess and Martin, 2006); on the other hand, fear of repression can demobilize resis-

tance (Young, 2019). However, in Chile, strikes and protests during Pinochet's government indeed pressured democratization and less electoral fraud (Bautista et al., 2021). Ticchi et al. (2013) argue that collective memory drives resistance against long-standing authoritarianism. It is possible to argue that, in the case of Chile, the memory of repression can persist post-democratization, fueling protests like the *Estallido Social*. People may recall Pinochet's repression, view the state as a perpetrator of violence, and protest against it. In this way, Chile's experience can illustrate the hypothesis of the persistence of social memory driving the courage to protest.

**Hypothesis 1:** Memories on Pinochet regime's violence led to more political claims through protests.

A second hypothesis concerns the demand for electoral accountability. It is possible to argue that people can retrieve the memory of Pinochet's repression to relate the contemporary incumbent politicians as similar to Pinochet overall politics and demand to hold them accountable in elections. The related literature suggests a rejection of the governor's political identity following past repression. (Balcells, 2012; Rozenas et al., 2017).

Even at the end of Pinochet's regime, the democratic governments remained based on the 1980 constitution, with only revisions since then. This has sparked criticism of its undemocratic nature. People who were affected by authoritarian repression may be more vocal in this criticism. The demand for a new constitution emerged in large protests, such as *La Marcha más grande de todas*. The vandalism of the Jaime Guzmán memorial can be seen as a protest against the constitution he contributed to. The creation of a new constitution became the main concession the Piñera government offered in response to the 2019-2020 protests.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Memories on Pinochet regime's violence led to more voting participation.

260 It is also possible to argue that the memory of victims can lead to demands for accountability from incumbent politicians. Related literature suggests the reverse happens: attempts to constrain the memory of the perpetrator can create a backlash (Rozenas and Vlasenko, 2022; Villamil and Balcells, 2021).

In Chile, Velasco (2021) argues that the mere rejection of neoliberal policies is 265 unlikely to explain the *Estallido Social*: leaders of anti-liberal movements, such as the Communist Party, the Teacher’s Union, and ‘No + AFP’ (anti-privatized pension movement) failed to get a seat in the convention. A notable characteristic of Chilean democracy is that the hybrid constitutional features inherited from Pinochet lead to dissatisfaction with political parties. Specifically, there 270 is general social complaint that parties are increasingly disconnected from civil society (Luna and Altman, 2011; Funk and Velasco, 2020). Sensitivity to flawed participation may also be higher where participation was more violently suppressed in the past. Velasco argues that the root of the Chilean constitutional revolution was the demand for more participatory democracy. This demand is 275 something that the formation of *cabildos populares* for public discussion during the protests might be seen as evidence of.

**Hypothesis 2b:** Memories on Pinochet regime’s violence led to more claims to more voting accountability of politicians.

### 3. Quantitative Data and Methodology

280 This section describes the specification, data, and methodology of the estimations used to test the hypotheses discussed in subsection 2.3.

#### 3.1. Old military bases as repression centers

Inspired by Bautista et al. (2021), this study explores the role of military base placements before the Allende government in Chilean politics. The authors 285 argue that these placements, prior to 1970, were driven by national security concerns rather than political leanings. They found no significant correlation between the establishment of military bases and the political orientation of city

inhabitants, voter turnout, electoral outcomes from 1970-73, or education levels before the coup. There was also no significant correlation with investment in  
290 public goods, unemployment, or migration after the coup.

However, Pinochet's regime repurposed these bases for detaining and torturing dissidents, linking them strongly to political victimization. Bautista et al. (2021) argue that proximity to military bases facilitated logistics like patrols and raids, increasing repression intensity for local residents post-coup. By examining counties with and without old military bases, variations in repression  
295 levels can be observed without strategic targeting bias.

The authors also claim that awareness of nearby abuses had a strong psychological effect, contributing to inter-generational trauma and collective memory (see Hersh (2013); Danieli (1998)).

300 While old military bases influenced political repression and memory, their impact on other contemporary political or socio-economic factors is unlikely. Literature on post-Pinochet politics indicates no significant differences in electoral engagement or voting for the Concertación or Pro-Pinochet politicians (Bautista et al., 2021; González et al., 2021).

305 Economic hardship and lack of public goods were major complaints during the *Estallido Social* protests (El Desconcierto, 2019; teleSUR, 2019). However, the existence of military bases does not seem to result in divergent policy implementation or varying public goods investment across municipalities. Analysis in Table C.17 shows no significant differences in economic development, public  
310 good investment, or unemployment among municipalities.

[TABLE C.17 HERE]

### 3.2. *Social media remembrance as a measure of collective memory*

How is it possible to explore the relationship between past repression centers and current political engagement through the lens of contemporary social mem-  
315 ory? Measuring the role of social memory, defined as the collective recollection of past events, can be challenging. Here, I proposed a methodology based on gathering data from social media remembrance.

Consider that one way that collective memory can be a institution is to set social rules concerning memorial services during anniversaries (see Danieli (1998) and our introduction). Recent studies suggest that social media platforms, such as Twitter, can provide valuable resources for analyzing social memory as places to make public memorial services, as exposed by Sumikawa et al. (2018). Twitter was the fourth most used social media in Chile in 2019, according to the agency StatCounter (2019).

An approach to studying the connection between past political victimization and social memory involves identifying trending topics related to historical events and collecting tweets about them. For example, on the anniversary of the military coup on September 11th, 2019 <sup>2</sup>, prior to the *Estallido*, trending topics in Chile associated with the event were identified. Among these topics, the top five related to the remembrance of violence were selected <sup>3</sup>. The more vocal terms included “*Golpe de Estado*”, “*Allende Vive*”, and “#NiPerdonNiOlvido”. These terms were aggregated as Twitter I. Additionally, two moderated terms “Allende” and “#11Septiembre1973,” were added, which were aggregated as Twitter II. Considering all the terms, a sample was gathered using the web scraping tool expordata.io of all the 26,238 tweets from 16,223 accounts that Twitter returned in its search on these hashtags.

To measure social memory, the locations of users who tweeted the selected terms were determined based on their reported location in their personal profiles, focusing on the least ambiguous references to a single Chilean comuna. This resulted in a total sample of 2,623 users. It is possible to argue that it might be a potential bias towards younger users on the platform. To minimize this age bias, the number of users was divided by the number of people aged 15 to 44 in each comuna using the 2017 Chilean census<sup>4</sup>. The number of users remembering

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<sup>2</sup>2019 was the oldest year available at expordata.io the month before the API policy change by Twitter. The referenced day is *before* the beginning of the protests.

<sup>3</sup>The topic “Pinochet”, for instance, was largely used by Pinochetistas, so the results might be more ambiguous.

<sup>4</sup>For memory studies, it is worth considering the *persistence* of social memory through new

the coup per 10,000 inhabitants in each municipality was calculated, creating a  
345 measure of social memory.

This measure was used to examine the relationship between past political  
victimization, social memory, and current political engagement.

### 3.3. Specification

The econometric specification is inspired by Bautista et al. (2021) on the  
350 effects of Pinochet repression on the 1988 plebiscite that voted to end the Chilean  
Military regime. The general equation is as follows:

$$poli = Repre + Controls + FE \quad (1)$$

where *poli* is the political mobilization variable for protests and constituent  
plebiscite, *repre* is the variable for political repression from the Pinochet era,  
and *Controls* relate to contemporary demography, geography, and pre-Pinochet  
355 politics. FE is the province-level dummy<sup>5</sup>.

Our initial hypothesis is that localities more affected by the Military regime's  
repression protested more in the *Estallido Social* and engaged more in voting  
for a new Constitution.

To test these hypotheses, I constructed a database of 290 municipalities  
360 (*comunas*)<sup>6</sup>. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data and its  
sources. Least squares are useful for evaluating the conditional mean between  
the results of the protests or plebiscite and the presence of repression centers,  
following Bautista et al. (2021).

The main variables related to repression and memory are: 1) a dummy vari-  
365 able indicating 1 if the comuna had military presence before 1970, 0 otherwise;

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generations. The estimates are robust when the measure is calculated with the total comuna  
population.

<sup>5</sup>The results are also robust to region fixed effects.

<sup>6</sup>Chile has 346 comunas, but the sample was restricted by historical data. This city-  
level approach reduces interference from other memory diffusion centers within the same  
municipality, such as schools.

2) the number of victims per 10,000 inhabitants; 3) the collective memory measure described in Subsection 3.2.

Contemporary Chilean political behavior is assessed using data on protests and electoral outcomes. Protests during the *Estallido Social* are measured with data from The Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010), covering protests from October 18, 2019, to March 15, 2020. Since 2018, ACLED compiles reports in Latin America from newspapers, press agencies, NGOs, and new media, including protests of three or more people. Protests are classified as violent riots if there is personal or property damage. The intensity of protests is measured as the number of protests per 10,000 inhabitants (based on the 2017 Chilean Census). Data on electoral outcomes, such as turnout and voting in the constitutional plebiscites and presidential elections, were obtained from the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL).

Initially, to assess the political divergence between comunas with and without old repression centers, a dummy variable for pre-70 military presence is used as the primary independent variable, representing vivid political repression. This subsequently affects contemporary memories and behaviors. Control variables account for the geographical strategy for national security and pre-Pinochet political orientation, providing a net effect of past repression centers on contemporary political attitudes. The demographic variables are fixed at contemporary levels to minimize post-Pinochet social divergences. This specification follows Bautista et al. (2021), weighting estimates for population to focus on individual behavior irrespective of municipality size.

To further investigate the mechanisms behind the effects of repression centers and contemporary democratic demands, I analyzed indicators of political victimization during Pinochet's regime, such as the number of victims per 10,000 inhabitants, as enumerated by the Chilean Truth Commission and computed by Bautista et al. (2021). Additionally, a novel measure of contemporary social memory using social media users remembering the '73 coup is assessed, along with the number of memorial sites placed in each comuna. Using 2SLS, I estimated victimization rates, number of monuments and the intensity of contem-

porary remembrance as independent variables, with the presence pre-70 military presence as the instrumental variable. This tests if higher casualties' recollection significantly explains the effects.

400 The mechanism analyses consist of 2SLS estimation, using political repression as an instrumental variable for collective memory on contemporary behavior. The two stages are as follows:

$$memory = Repre + Controls + FE \quad (2)$$

$$Poli = memory + Controls + FE \quad (3)$$

where *memory* is the conditional expected value of the memory indicators.

#### 4. Political behavior differentials

405 This section presents the comuna-level differentials on the contemporary political mobilization influenced by the infrastructure of repression in the Pinochet era.

##### 4.1. *Estallido Social* Protests

The first results deal with the intensity of protests during the “*Estallido Social*”. Table C.1 indicates that localities with pre-1970 military bases had higher levels of protest. The decomposition in Table C.1 shows that the effects were significant for both peaceful protests and violent riots. The results are in line with the expectation that the memory of Pinochet’s violence made residents more aware of state repression and led to more protests.

415 The LS estimates suggest that the presence of military bases in a municipality, on average, resulted in nearly one more protest per 10,000 inhabitants during the *Estallido Social*, about 30 years later. Additionally, areas with pre-1970 military bases had a similar proportion of increased violent riots and pacific protests.

420 [TABLE C.1 HERE]



#### 4.2. *Constituent approval*

However, the data in Table C.2 shows that in areas with pre-1970 military bases, voluntary voter participation in the constituent plebiscite was lower. The first column of Table C.2 presents this result, which shows that if a municipality had a military base built prior to 1970, it experienced, on average, a decrease of more than 5 percentage points in its rate of participation in the 2020 plebiscite.

It is also possible to examine the impact of repression centers on constituent approval. Table C.2 also presents the regression results for the percentage of constituent approval (second column) and the percentage of full popular convention given the constituent approval (third column). The data shows that there is little evidence that areas near the repression centers of the Chilean military regime voted more for the constituent or a more “radical” assembly composition.

[TABLE C.2 HERE]

#### 4.3. *Results of Elections on the Constitutional Convention composition*

Now, the impact of the presence of Pinochet repression centers on the voluntary elections of constituent assembly members. As shown in Table C.3, the presence of pre-1970 constructed military bases resulted in even lower voter turnout than in the case of constituent approval: municipalities with these bases had an average participation rate that was nearly 8 percentage points lower than in other municipalities.

Second, third and fourth columns of Table C.3 present the results of voting for the coalitions Vamos Por Chile (right and center-right parties), Lista del Apruebo (center-left), and Apruebo Dignidad (left). It can be concluded that there are little differences about the voting preference of municipalities that have been more affected by past authoritarian repression. In areas where there were old repression centers, there was no electoral punishment for the right-wing coalition aligned with the president, nor was there a preference for left-wing opposition coalitions.

[TABLE C.3 HERE]

#### 4.4. *Almost a backlash? Results of 2021 Presidential Elections*

By the end of 2021, the impact of the *Estallido Social* was evident in the Chilean presidential elections. Far-right candidate Jose Antonio Kast, who supported the Emergency State against the *Estallido Social* (Olivares, 2019),  
455 claimed Pinochet’s legacy in his campaign. He emphasized law and order, targeting social unrest and immigrants (Bell, 2021). In the first round on November 21, Kast led with 27.9% of the votes, while left-wing Gabriel Boric had 25.8%, raising concerns about a political backlash (Cisternas, 2021). In the second round, Boric adopted a conciliatory tone with welfare state proposals (The  
460 Economist, 2021) and won with 55.87% to 44.13%, in a record turnout for a voluntary run (8,363,910 votes).

A robustness check shows that memories of past repression continue to affect electoral participation, even with a Pinochet-aligned candidate. Table C.4 shows significant negative effects (5.7 percentage points) on turnout in municipalities  
465 with military bases and no increased effort to vote for Boric or against Kast.

[TABLE C.4 HERE]

#### 4.5. *The constitutional wave crashes: the rejection of the first constitutional draft*

In the 2022 Chilean constitutional referendum, citizens voted on a new draft  
470 constitution proposed by the Constitutional Assembly. The draft aimed to address issues like economic inequality and indigenous under-representation, considered legacies of Pinochet’s constitution (Bartlett, 2022). On September 4, with mandatory voting, 61.89% of voters rejected the draft, as reported by SERVEL.

475 This was a major setback for President Gabriel Boric’s government, which supported the draft, and a victory for the opposition and social movements against it. Contributing factors included the unpopularity of Assembly politicians, opposition to the Plurinational state, and doubts about the economic sustainability of proposed social programs (Titelman, 2022; Larraín et al., 2023;

480 Stuenkel, 2022; Sazo, 2023). External factors included Boric’s campaign unpopularity (Gonzalez-Ocantos and Melendez, 2023), fake news (Stuenkel, 2022), and disagreements over the 2019 Constitutional initiative (García-Huidobro, 2023). Public opinion surveys suggested rejection could increase polarization but might also improve employment, inflation, migration policies, and economic  
485 growth (Criteria, 2022).

The draft’s failure has left Chile at a crossroads. Some call for new negotiations, while others suggest amending the current constitution or drafting a completely new one (POLGA-HECIMOVICH, 2022).

Table C.5 analyzes the impact of military bases on the plebiscite outcome.  
490 Municipalities with pre-1970 military bases had less turnout (-3.2 percentage points) and did not show higher support for the draft, aligning with findings by Brieba and Bunker (2019) on persistent turnout bias in Chile, whether voting is voluntary or mandatory.

[TABLE C.5 HERE]

#### 495 *4.6. Second constitutional initiative, the rise of far-right, and the second text rejection*

After the first rejection of the constitutional draft, the national congress proposed the “Agreement for Chile” in December 2022, initiating a second attempt to draft a new constitution in 2023. This new effort involved a council of 50  
500 publicly elected members, working alongside a 24-member Expert Commission appointed by the National Congress. Their task was to draft a preliminary proposal for the council to discuss and approve. Additionally, a Technical Committee of Admissibility was established to arbitrate potential regulatory violations (Cámara de Diputados y Senado, 2023).

505 On May 7, 2023, Chilean citizens elected their councilors using proportional representation, open lists, a female candidate quota, and an indigenous seat (Cámara de Diputados y Senado, 2023).

The 2023 election results showed a shift to the right. The Partido Republicano, a far-right party influenced by Pinochet supporters, won 34.34% of the

510 vote and 23 seats. Unidad por Chile, a left-wing coalition, secured 27.73% and 16 seats, while Chile Seguro, a right-wing coalition, gained 20.42% and 11 seats. Altman et al. (2023) suggest that compulsory voting brought in right-wing voters dissatisfied with the constitutional process who had abstained previously.

The conservative draft approved by the council proposed minimalistic social policies, stricter abortion and immigration regulations, and weaker gender 515 quotas (Benavides, 2023). In the December 17, 2023 referendum, 55.76% voted against the proposed constitution, according to the Chilean Electoral Service.

Did Pinochet's era of repression influence this process? Tables C.6 and C.7 show that areas with former military bases had lower voter turnout (-3.6 percentage points) and did not favor any coalition. A remarkable feature of this 520 voting was the higher incidence of invalid votes (21.43%). In areas with old repression centers, there were 2.3 percentage points more invalid votes. In the second exit plebiscite, the pattern was similar to the first. There was no significant movement towards rejecting the conservative draft, indicating a broader rejection of electoral choices in these regions. 525

[TABLE C.6 HERE]

[TABLE C.7 HERE]

## 5. Mechanism analysis

### 5.1. *Victimization as a mechanism*

530 But what makes the military bases constructed before 1970 relevant to the local divergence in political engagement? This section investigates how the memories of political violence may be one mechanism that explains contemporary political behavior. As previously stated, the construction of these military bases prior to the Allende regime was not connected to the political stance of the central government, but the Pinochet regime used them as repression centers. 535

Table C.8 presents the impact of pre-70 military bases on two measures of political victimization during the Chilean military dictatorship: the number of victims in a locality per 10,000 inhabitants, and the number of residents who

were victims per 10,000 inhabitants. Both results suggest that the presence of  
540 military bases was indeed associated with higher victimization. Municipalities  
with military bases built before 1970 had 2.6 more victims and 1.7 more vic-  
timized residents per 10,000 inhabitants. These estimates form the first stage  
of the 2SLS regressions that follow, as the F-test rejects the hypothesis of weak  
instrument for the mechanism analysis.

545 [TABLE C.8 HERE]

In table C.9, I re-estimate the regressions concerning the protests in 2019-  
2020 and the electoral behavior during the constitutional reform initiative and  
presidential elections <sup>7</sup>. Now, these are 2SLS estimates in which the victim-  
ization rate is the independent variable and the presence of pre-70 bases is the  
550 instrumental variable. The estimates go in line with the found about military  
bases: the higher was the relative number of victims or victimized residents,  
the higher was the relative number of protests, but no more effort to punish the  
incumbent right and even lower electoral participation during the constituent  
process and even in the presidential run against a Pinochetista. The results sug-  
555 gest that memories of victimization during the Pinochet Regime is a relevant  
mechanism behind the political behavior in Chilean municipalities with military  
bases.

[TABLE C.9 HERE]

### 5.2. Mechanism Analysis: Monuments as memorial sites

560 Moreover, this section also offers a mechanism analysis of the number of  
monuments dedicated to Pinochet's victims as a "supply source" of collective  
memory, inspired by Ochsner and Roesel (2017). The measure is the number of  
unique monuments commemorating human rights violations during the Pinochet  
era, as declared and condensed by the National Council of Monuments of Chile  
565 <sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup>The following complete estimates are available on request

<sup>8</sup>Some of the monuments were officially declared as such after the protests, but did exist  
before the *Estallido*.

Table C.10 presents is a first-stage estimate in which we assess the effect of old military presence and the maintenance of memorial sites dedicated to human rights violations during the Pinochet era. As expected, municipalities with old military bases are more likely to have memorial sites - the military presence is related to 1.4 more monuments. The non-integer number can be attributed to comunas that might not have old military presence, but placed memorial sites. The F-test rejects the hypothesis that military presence is a weak instrument, so we can use this variable for our mechanism analysis. Table C.11 presents the effect of victimization and the maintenance of memorial sites dedicated to human rights violations during the Pinochet era, using military presence as an instrument. Consistent with other results, higher levels of violence are associated with more monument placements.

[TABLE C.10 HERE]

[TABLE C.11 HERE]

Table C.12 shows the effect of memorial sites on contemporary political behavior. Similarly, the results indicate that more monuments in a comuna are associated with increased protests and lower voter turnout, with no political bias.

[TABLE C.12 HERE]

### 5.3. *Social media remembrance and present political engagement*

Finally, the measure of social media remembrance discussed in Subsection 3.2 can be used to assess collective memory as a mechanism that connects past repression and contemporary political engagement.

A first stage estimation were conducted to explore the connection between the presence of military bases and the number of Twitter users remembering the violence of the '73 coup. The results presented in Table C.13 indicated that municipalities with pre-1970 military bases had more remembrance of the coup on Twitter, with up to 7.4 more accounts per ten thousand inhabitants than municipalities without these bases. The F-test also rejects the hypothesis of weak instrument for this mechanism analysis.

[TABLE C.13 HERE]

Another analysis utilized a 2SLS regression to investigate the relationship between past victimhood and Twitter users remembering the '73 coup, using pre-1970 military bases as an instrument. The results, shown in Table C.14, indicate that the more political victims of Pinochet there were in a given municipality, the more remembrance of the violent coup there was on Twitter. Specifically, one victim per 10k inhabitants was related at least to 1.3 accounts remembering the '73 coup, and one victim resident per 10k inhabitants was related at least to 2 accounts remembering the '73 coup.

[TABLE C.14 HERE]

Additionally, Table C.15 shows the positive effect of monument placements on social media remembrance. If a municipality has one monument, at least 2.5 more Twitter users per 10,000 inhabitants remember the 1973 coup violence. This suggests that monuments are a significant source of contemporary collective memory among the local population.

[TABLE C.15 HERE]

Lastly, I utilized 2SLS regressions to analyze the relationship between Twitter users' remembrance of the coup and political engagement in the Constitutional revolution. The results in Table C.16 suggest that there is a positive effect between remembrance of the coup on Twitter and protests, less participation in the Constitutional process, and no increased effort to punish the incumbent right.

Let's make some inferences concerning the more conservative measure of remembrance, Twitter I. The coefficient of 3.337 shows that old military presence increases memorial mentions on social media by over 3 users per 10,000 inhabitants. With a coefficient of 0.334 between memory and protests, the impact of old repression centers is  $0.334 * 3.337 = 1.114$  protests per 10,000 inhabitants. This is similar to Los Angeles (1.186 protests per 10,000 inhabitants), the provincial capital of Bio-Bio, and an important spot in the Greatest March (Villarreal and Flores, 2019).

Considering turnout, the coefficient of -2.253 indicates that each user per

10,000 inhabitants remembering the 1973 coup on Twitter is associated with more than a one percentage point reduction in electoral turnout for the first constitutional convention. Given the impact of military presence on memory  
630 (3.337 users per 10,000 inhabitants), the effect on turnout is pretty significant: almost eight (7.851) percentage points less. Additionally, the coefficient of -0.554 indicates that each user per 10,000 inhabitants remembering the 1973 coup on Twitter is related with nearly a half percentage point reduction in electoral turnout for the second presidential vote. Thus, the effect on turnout is  
635  $-1.235 \times 3.337 = -4.121$  percentage points. This accounts for 63,51% of the voting difference between Boric and Kast, potentially exerting significant electoral pressure on the candidates.

[TABLE C.16 HERE]

## 6. Discussion

640 The evidences presented suggest that the memory of Pinochet's repression did not lead to increased electoral turnout or demand for accountability. In areas with higher levels of repression, there was no greater participation in constitutional changes or a tendency to vote for or against incumbent coalitions.

This finding aligns with Bautista et al. (2021), who argued that the impact  
645 of Pinochet's repression on votes for the Concertación decreased over time and remained insignificant. According to a survey by CERC (2013), the percentage of people rejecting the necessity of military coups increased significantly from 48% in 2003 to 68% in 2013. However, in 2013, only 2% blamed the right-wing for the 1973 coup, down from 4% in 2003. MORI and CERC (2023)  
650 indicated that this change in public opinion is due to short-term volatility and is concentrated among those who lived during the Pinochet era. MORI and CERC (2023) indicated that this change in public opinion was volatile and concentrated among those who lived during Pinochet's era. However, according to Bautista et al. (2021), this did not result in divergence in political leaning  
655 along the redemocratization until recent years.



Rather than political actors or social policy, the evidence suggests that the primary issue for memory-driven contemporary engagement was state violence. Despite some efforts to reform the armed forces and Carabineros, significant progress was stalled (Dreisbach, 2015; Torres, 2021; Agencia Aton, 2021). State violence during the *Estallido Social* escalated with the declaration of emergency states but declined when these decrees were revoked.

Stern (2010) noted that competing selective memories in Chile, especially among Pinochet's supporters, have impeded holding the dictatorship's political leaders accountable. This results in a societal oscillation between periods of caution and conflict. The selective memories of Pinochet's violence lead to a general resistance against violence but fail to connect contemporary violence to specific actors or institutions preserved from the dictatorship.

Political repression can lead to psychological effects such as fear of political persecution or polarization against out-groups (Boucher, 2023; Young, 2019; Nugent, 2020). However, the findings in Chile do not suggest a culture of fear regarding state violence or the right-wing, as evidenced by the courage to participate in street protests and the confidential voting process, which reduces fear of retaliation (Freedom House, 2022). This suggests a divergence from the autobiographical memory found in Bautista (2016).

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses indicate that memories of past repression contribute to polarization against political actors, viewing them as an "out-group." This finding aligns with the literature on the political uprooting of both right-wing and left-wing factions in Chile (Luna and Altman, 2011; Funk and Velasco, 2020). Fierro (2024) argues that the politically unengaged determined the outcomes of both constitutional draft rejections. The results suggest that the enduring memory of political violence is a significant factor driving this disengagement.

In Bordalo et al. (2023) terms, Chileans recalling Pinochet's repression could relate past political violence to contemporary state affairs and protested against it, but did not find significant differences between incumbent and opposition political options to motivate an electoral decision favoring one side during the

constitutional reform or presidential election.

To summarise, the *Estallido Social* was driven by a revolt against state violence, initiated by confrontations between students and police over subway fare adjustments in Santiago. Sensitivity to state violence motivated protests (hypothesis 1), but did not translate into increased electoral participation or demands for more accountable institutions (hypotheses 2a and 2b).

## 7. Conclusion

In this work, I investigated the persistence of collective memory of past institutional violence in present political engagement in democracies, using Chile as a case study. The legacy of Chile's military regime was often cited as a driver of street protests leading to a plebiscite for constitutional change.

The findings suggest that municipalities with more pre-1970 military bases saw higher protest levels during the Estallido Social but lower participation in the plebiscite and elections for constituent members. There was no punishment of the incumbent coalition or preference for the opposition. The analysis indicates that victimization during the Pinochet era could significantly shape political behavior.

Other factors, such as broken expectations and institutional mistrust, may also drive the demand for a new constitution, as theorized by Funk and Velasco (2020) and studied by Passarelli and Tabellini (2017) and Gurr (2015). However, our evidence suggests that, in particular, the legacy of Pinochet's violence leads people to protest rather than vote.

Overall, the management of armed forces is a particularly sensitive topic for collective memory and public opinion in democratic societies. The evidence suggests that not holding perpetrators of past political violence accountable can reduce the efficacy of electoral accountability. Studies in comparative memory law emphasize proper institutional reform and investigations of human rights violations are strategic for social peace in democratizing countries (Sadowski, 2024).

## Appendix A. List of Variables, Sources and Descriptive Statistics

To test quantitative hypotheses in this paper, a database on 290 municipalities (*Comunas*) was constructed with the following variables:

### 1. Dependent Variables

- 720 (a) Protests: number of pacific protests, interventions and riots<sup>9</sup> in Chile between October 18th, 2019 and March 15th 2020<sup>10</sup> per 10,000 inhabitants. The number of protests was obtained at ACLED database (Raleigh et al., 2010), and the number of inhabitants was obtained at the 2017 Chilean Census;
- 725 (b) Approval Turnout: rate of participation of the new constituent plebiscite, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (c) Apruebo: rate of approval of the constituent plebiscite, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (d) Popular convention: rate of voting for the full popular convention as  
730 the composition of the constituent (given Apruebo), obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (e) Constitutional Convention composition Turnout: rate of participation of elections of the Constitutional Convention members, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- 735 (f) Vamos por Chile: Percentage of voting for candidates of Piñera aligned right-Wing coalition Vamos por Chile, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>);
- (g) Lista del Apruebo: Percentage of voting for candidates of opposition center-left coalition Lista del Apruebo, obtained at the Servicio  
740 Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)

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<sup>9</sup>According to Raleigh et al. (2010), protests are demonstrations that aggregated three or more people and had media coverage; the demonstration is considered violent riot when three or more demonstrators perpetrated personal or property damage.

<sup>10</sup>Period between the *Santiagoazo* and the declaration of emergency state for the COVID-19 pandemic.

- (h) Apruebo Dignidad: Percentage of voting for candidates of opposition left coalition Apruebo Dignidad, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>)
- 745 (i) Turnout 1st Round: Rate of participation on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>)
- (j) Boric 1st Round: Percentage of voting for Gabriel Boric on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 750 (k) Kast 1st Round: Percentage of voting for Jose Augusto Kast on first round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (l) Turnout 2nd Round: Rate of participation on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>)
- 755 (m) Boric 2nd Round: Percentage of voting for Gabriel Boric on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (n) Kast 2nd Round: Percentage of voting for Jose Augusto Kast on second round of 2021 presidential election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 760 (o) 1st Exit Plebiscite Turnout: Rate of participation on the First Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>)
- (p) 1st Exit Plebiscite Constitutional Text Approval: Percentage of voting for the First Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>)
- 765 (q) Constitutional Council composition Turnout: rate of participation of elections of the Constitutional Council members, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- (r) Unidad: Percentage of voting for candidates of left-Wing coalition Unidad por Chile, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servelec.cl>);
- 770

- (s) Seguro: Percentage of voting for candidates of establishment right-wing coalition Chile Seguro, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- 775 (t) Republicano: Percentage of voting for candidates of Populist/Pinochetista coalition Partido Republicano, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (u) Nulos: Percentage of non valid voting (nulls and blank) at the Constitutional Council composition election, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- 780 (v) 2nd Exit Plebiscite Turnout: Rate of participation on the Second Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- (w) 2nd Exit Plebiscite Constitutional Text Approval: Percentage of voting for the Second Constitutional Text Approval, obtained at the Servicio Electoral de Chile (<https://www.servel.cl>)
- 785 (x) EconDevIndex: Communal Index of Economic Development 2020, created by Hernández Bonivento et al. (2020) considering communal income, internet infrastructure, number of enterprises and dependency ratio
- 790 (y) Unemp/hab: Percentage of number of people filed as in search of an job relative to the population in 2017, obtained at the National System of Municipal Information (<http://datos.sinim.gov.cl>)
- (z) Inv Edu/alumno: Ratio of investment, in Chilean Pesos, on education by the number of students in Primary, Elementary and High School in 2017, obtained at the National System of Municipal Information (<http://datos.sinim.gov.cl>)
- 795 (aa) Inv Health/Inhab: Ratio of investment, in Chilean Pesos, on public health by the number of inhabitants in 2017, obtained at the National System of Municipal Information (<http://datos.sinim.gov.cl>)

800 2. Main Independent Variables

- (a) Military Presence: Dummy variable if the municipality had a military base placed before 1970 (the beginning of the Allende government), condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);
- 805 (b) Victims/10k Inhab: number (by 10,000 inhabitants) of victimizations placed by the Pinochet regime in a municipality, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);
- (c) Victims Residents/10k Inhab: number (by 10,000 inhabitants) of residents victimized by Pinochet Regime in a municipality, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);
- 810 (d) Monuments: number of monuments per comuna, as declared and condensed by the National Council of Monuments of Chile.
- (e) Twitter I: Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k inhabitants between 15-45 years old. Data scrapped at exportdata.io and calculated by the author using the 2017 Census.
- 815 (f) Twitter II: Number of Users that tweeted “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k inhabitants between 15-45 years old. Data scrapped at exportdata.io and calculated by the author using the 2017 Census.
- 820 3. Weight (Inverse standard deviation)
  - (a) Pop: population, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;
- 4. Controls
  - (a) Dist-RegCap: distance to regional capital, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);
  - 825 (b) Dist-Stgo: distance to Santiago, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021);
  - (c) Province FE: Fixed effects for the historical province division during the Pinochet era, Bautista et al. (2021);
  - (d) Pop: population, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;
  - (e) Rural: Rural share, obtained at the Chilean census 2017;
  - 830 (f) Share-Allende-1970: the share of votes for Salvador Allende (winner) in 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021)

(g) Share-Alessandri-1970 the share of votes for Jorge Alessandri (the second place) in 1970, condensed by Bautista et al. (2021)

## Appendix B. Estallido Social process tracing

835 The trigger for the social unrest in Chile from 2019 to 2020 was the adjustment of transport fares in Santiago. On October 1, 2019, the Public Transport Expert Panel increased the bus fare by 10 pesos and the peak-time metro fare by 30 pesos. The new fares were to be enforced on October 6 (Panel de Expertos del Transporte Público Ley N° 20.378, 2019).

840 The initial organized protests in Santiago started on October 7, with high school students jumping turnstiles in metro stations (Emol, 2019). The first significant incident occurred a week later with a student's arrest for vandalism at Pedro de Valdivia Station (Vega, 2019).

Tensions escalated with a call for a massive protest on October 18 (Rivera and Ruyt, 2019). A pivotal moment came on October 16, marked by heightened online interest following the clashes with Carabineros at Santa Ana station, leading to four arrests (Google, 2019; 24Horas.cl, 2019). The situation worsened with Metro service suspensions, vandalism at Plaza de Armas station (Arias, 2019), and looting at San Joaquin station on October 17, resulting in 133 student arrests (CNN Chile, 2019b; Al Jazeera, 2019b).

850 On October 18th, #ChileDespertó (Chile woke up). The protests gained even larger scale, and protesters fully occupied downtown Santiago - this event was also known as the "Santiagazo." The electricity company Enel's headquarters was damaged by fire - the electricity fare was also a complaint, but the accusation of arson was not yet solved (Lara, 2019). Large-scale clashes with the Carabineros also occurred: protesters were subjected to water jets and tear gas in many parts of the city. At night, residents of Santiago organized a massive "cacerolazo" (pot-banging protest) in their homes in support of the demonstrations in the streets (Rollano, 2019).

860 In response to the protests, Minister of Public Security Andrés Chadwick announced in a press conference that the National Security Act would be used (CNN Chile, 2019a). Just after midnight, President Sebastián Piñera declared a state of emergency in Santiago and nearby cities, authorizing the armed forces



to maintain order. The armed forces chief subsequently imposed curfews in the  
865 areas under the state of emergency. Despite these measures, protests continued  
in Santiago and rapidly spread to other regions - for instance, barricades were  
erected by protesters in the streets, and police barracks were attacked in Con-  
cepción (Stuardo, 2019). Piñera extended the state of emergency to nearly all  
regional capitals in Chile. This declaration of a state of emergency and the impo-  
870 sition of curfews were unprecedented since the end of Pinochet's regime (Dulci  
and Sadivia, 2021). However, he also proposed suspending the fare increases  
and convening a meeting with leaders from various sectors to discuss solutions  
to the high cost of living and the "safety of the family" (Prensa Presidencia,  
2019b).

875 On October 20th, President Piñera met with leaders of the Deputies Cham-  
ber, Supreme Court, and Senate, where Senate President Jaime Quintana pro-  
posed restarting the process to draft a new constitution (Leal, 2019). On the  
same day, an extraordinary session of parliament suspended the Metro fare  
readjustment (Senado, 2019). Meanwhile, protests intensified, with peaceful  
880 protesters supporting students - they claimed "it was not for the 30 pesos (of  
the readjustment) but 30 years (of democracy)" (Maciel, 2019). However, there  
were also instances of arson, looting, and violent clashes, with police using shots,  
tear gas, and water jets, and the first deaths were recorded. During this period,  
the formation of "cabildos abiertos," or open and decentralized assemblies self-  
885 composed to discuss social issues and solutions, was also observed. Examples  
of themes discussed in these assemblies included the new constitution, drug le-  
galization, and local networks for service provision (Observatorio de Metodos  
Deliberativos, 2019). Finally, on October 21st, social movement leaders orga-  
nized themselves to formally advocate for a new constitution (Flores, 2019).

890 Contrary to general claims, President Piñera proposed minor social policy  
reforms, termed the "New Social Agenda" (Prensa Presidencia, 2019a), which  
were perceived as overly modest, even among Piñera's allies (La Tercera, 2019).  
Three days later, "La Marcha Más Grande De Chile" (the greatest march of  
Chile) took place (Villarroel and Flores, 2019), with an estimated 1,200,000

895 people in Santiago, and repercussions seen in Copiapó, Viña del Mar, Curicó,  
Rancagua, Concepción, Los Ángeles, Temuco and Osorno. On October 27th,  
100,000 people peacefully marched between Viña Del Mar and Valparaíso, but  
faced police repression (teleSUR, 2019). Both protests also called for the im-  
peachment of President Piñera and against private pensions, high costs of living,  
900 and a lack of public services. Under pressure, Sebastián Piñera declared the end  
of the state of emergency and the presence of armed forces on the streets (Go-  
bierno de Chile, 2019). Piñera also invited his ministers to resign, which was  
accepted by eight ministers, including Minister Andrés Chadwick (Deutsche  
Welle, 2019).

905 Even after the end of the state of emergency, protests continued in smaller  
numbers, often led by organized social groups. On November 4th, trade unions  
called for a general strike for a new constitution - on this day, 20,000 people par-  
ticipated, and the protest was marked by some of the most violent incidents of  
the period (Europa Press, 2019). On the following days, the headquarters of the  
910 right-wing party Unión Democristiana Independiente and the memorial of Jaime  
Guzmán, mentor of Pinochet's 1980 constitution, were vandalized (Ahumada  
and Vera, 2019). Due to allegations of human rights violations, the Ministry of  
Public Security announced on November 9th that the government would reform  
the police (infobae, 2019).

915 On November 7th, the Chilean Municipality Association approved a call for  
a citizen consultation on a new constitution (Asociación Chilena de Municipal-  
idades, 2019). On November 12th, President Piñera announced three National  
Agreements in response to the protests: for peace, for justice, and for a new con-  
stitution (Prensa Presidencia, 2019c). On November 15th, the government and  
920 opposition agreed to a constitutional plebiscite. The constitutional amendment  
proposal was passed by the national congress and followed by its promulgation  
on December 24th (Ministerio Secretaría General De La Presidencia, 2019).  
The amendment outlined that the plebiscite would determine whether to initi-  
ate a constituent process and decide its nature: a mixed convention of newly  
925 elected constituents and current congress members, or a fully elected popular

convention. It also mandated gender parity and a set quota for indigenous representation in the convention.

The plebiscite was scheduled for March 24th, 2020, but was postponed to October 25th, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Chilean electoral service (<https://www.servel.cl>), more than 7.5 million people participated in the plebiscite on that day - an all time record. The option to “approve” the constituent process won with 78.2% of the votes, and the choice of a fully popular convention won with 79.1%

At the beginning of 2020, there were sporadic protests: student demonstrations on January 6-7 against the national university admission exam (Urrejola, 2020); rallies following the death of a football fan at the hands of the Police on January 28 (Cooperativa.cl, 2020); and objections to the Viña del Mar Music Festival in February (Carreras, 2020). After a COVID-19 state of emergency was declared on March 18, protests subsided, except for October 18, which marked the “estallido” anniversary with 30,000 protesters, clashes, 580 arrests, and two church burnings in Santiago (Ulloa, 2020). The “estallido” led to over 3,700,000 people participating in protests until November 10, 2019 (Cooperativa.cl, 2019), resulting in 34 confirmed deaths, 12,500 hospitalizations, and reports of 5,558 victims of institutional violence until October 2020 (Amnesty International, 2020).

According to the electoral service (<https://www.servel.cl>), almost 6.2 million people voted for the composition of the constitutional convention on May 15-16th 2021. The Vamos por Chile coalition (right-wing) gained 37 seats, the Lista del Apruebo (center-left) gained 25 seats, Apruebo Dignidad (left) gained 28 seats, and independents gained 48 seats. The new constitution was written and voted on by the convention in 2022, and then a new popular plebiscite took place to confirm the replacement of the old constitution.

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## Appendix C. Tables

Table C.1: LS Estimates: Protests/10k Habs - (Decomposition)

	Pacific	Riots	Total
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>0.580***</b> (0.201)	<b>0.563***</b> (0.200)	<b>1.143***</b> (0.396)
Avg. Dep. Variable	0.867	0.396	1.263
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.787	0.683	0.750
LS F-statistic	35.428	21.082	28.903
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.2: LS Estimates: (Approval of Constituent)

	<b>Turnout</b>	<b>Approval</b>	<b>Popular Convention</b>
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>-5.389***</b> (0.957)	<b>1.624</b> (2.375)	<b>1.314</b> (2.197)
Avg. Dep. Variable	43.791	76.270	76.676
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.838	0.725	0.667
LS F-statistic	49.133	25.568	19.636
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.



Table C.3: LS Estimates: (Composition of Convention)

	<b>Turnout</b>	<b>Vamos</b>	<b>Lista</b>	<b>Dignidad</b>
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>-7.980***</b>	<b>-1.195</b>	<b>1.433</b>	<b>-4.356</b>
	(1.153)	(2.141)	(1.216)	(3.885)
Avg. Dep. Variable	43.813	21.503	16.687	15.887
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.762	0.729	0.453	0.413
LS F-statistic	30.943	26.128	8.707	7.570
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.4: LS Estimates: Votes (2021 1<sup>o</sup> and 2<sup>o</sup> Presidential Voting)

	Turnout (1 <sup>o</sup> V)	Kast (1 <sup>o</sup> V)	Boric (1 <sup>o</sup> V)	Turnout (2 <sup>o</sup> V)	Kast (2 <sup>o</sup> V)
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>-5.743***</b> (1.144)	<b>-0.215</b> (1.689)	<b>-0.246</b> (1.605)	<b>-4.108**</b> (1.644)	<b>-0.812</b> (2.382)
Avg. Dep. Variable	44.310	30.405	20.884	52.399	48.429
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.711	0.789	0.826	0.626	0.771
LS F-statistic	23.957	35.781	45.385	16.606	32.305
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290	290	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.5: LS Estimates: 1st Exit Plebiscite

	<b>Turnout</b>	<b>Approval</b>
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>-3.266***</b> (0.878)	<b>-0.948</b> (1.955)
Avg. Dep. Variable	84.649	32.311
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.828	0.801
LS F-statistic	45.920	38.536
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.6: LS Estimates: (Composition of Consejo)

	<b>Turnout</b>	<b>Unidad</b>	<b>Seguro</b>	<b>Republicano</b>	<b>Nulos</b>
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>-3.628***</b> (0.863)	<b>-0.461</b> (1.669)	<b>-1.804</b> (1.152)	<b>1.734</b> (1.333)	<b>2.337***</b> (0.695)
Avg. Dep. Variable	80.059	23.114	22.246	37.532	23.055
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.862	0.802	0.736	0.723	0.815
LS F-statistic	59.169	38.664	26.964	25.321	42.161
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290	290	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.7: LS Estimates: (2nd Exit Plebiscite)

	<b>Turnout</b>	<b>Against</b>
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>-3.660***</b>	<b>0.649</b>
	(0.897)	(1.974)
Avg. Dep. Variable	83.931	52.344
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.880	0.728
LS F-statistic	69.288	25.920
p-value (LS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.8: LS Estimates : Effect of pre-70 Military Presence on Pinochet victimization

	Victims	Victim residents
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>2.662***</b> (0.470)	<b>1.728***</b> (0.378)
Avg. Dep. Variable	2.449	1.500
LS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.692	0.597
F-statistic	21.859	14.749
Prob (F-statistic)	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	289	289

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.9: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Victimization

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables				Avg. Dep. variable
	Victims/10k Inhab.		Victim Resid./10k Inhab		
Total Protests	<b>0.429***</b>	(0.156)	<b>0.661***</b>	(0.226)	1.263
Pacific Protests	<b>0.218***</b>	(0.080)	<b>0.336***</b>	(0.117)	0.867
Violent Riots	<b>0.211***</b>	(0.077)	<b>0.326***</b>	(0.112)	0.396
Turnout (Const. Initiative)	<b>-2.024***</b>	(0.336)	<b>-3.117***</b>	(0.718)	43.791
Approval (Const. Initiative)	<b>0.611</b>	(0.836)	<b>0.941</b>	(1.335)	76.270
Const. Convention	<b>0.494</b>	(0.780)	<b>0.761</b>	(1.235)	76.676
Turnout (Composition)	<b>-2.999***</b>	(0.464)	<b>-4.619***</b>	(1.011)	43.813
Vamos	<b>-0.449</b>	(0.761)	<b>-0.692</b>	(1.207)	21.503
Lista	<b>0.659</b>	(0.561)	<b>0.833</b>	(0.911)	16.687
Dignidad	<b>-1.636</b>	(1.477)	<b>-2.521</b>	(2.395)	15.887
Turnout (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-2.157***</b>	(0.351)	<b>-3.323***</b>	(0.787)	44.310
Boric (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-0.092</b>	(0.610)	<b>-0.142</b>	(0.935)	20.884
Kast (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-0.082</b>	(0.627)	<b>-0.126</b>	(0.973)	30.405
Turnout (2nd Pres. Round)	<b>-1.543**</b>	(0.637)	<b>-2.377**</b>	(1.074)	52.399
Kast (2nd Pres. Round)	<b>-0.306</b>	(0.871)	<b>-0.472</b>	(1.370)	48.429
Turnout (1st Exit Plebs.)	<b>-1.226***</b>	(0.404)	<b>-1.889***</b>	(0.588)	84.649
Approval (1st Exit Plebs.)	<b>-0.355</b>	(0.761)	<b>-0.547</b>	(1.152)	32.311
Turnout (Consejo)	<b>-1.363***</b>	(0.402)	<b>-2.099***</b>	(0.582)	80.059
Unidad	<b>-0.172</b>	(0.640)	<b>-0.266</b>	(0.976)	23.114
Seguro	<b>-0.678*</b>	(0.389)	<b>-1.045</b>	(0.650)	22.246
Republicano	<b>0.651</b>	(0.539)	<b>1.004</b>	(0.801)	37.532
Nulos	<b>0.878***</b>	(0.170)	<b>1.352***</b>	(0.364)	23.055
Turnout (2nd Exit Plebs.)	<b>-1.374***</b>	(0.443)	<b>-2.117***</b>	(0.635)	83.931
Against (2nd Exit Plebs.)	<b>0.245</b>	(0.722)	<b>0.377</b>	(1.133)	52.344

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.10: LS Estimates : Effect of pre-70 Military Presence on number of memorial sites

	<b>Num. Monuments</b>
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>1.358***</b> (0.379)
<i>Avg. Dep. Variable</i>	0.231
OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.778
OLS F-statistic	33.650
p-value (OLS F-statistic)	0,000
State Dummies	x
Controls	x
N. Obs.	290

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.



Table C.11: 2SLS Estimates: effect of political victimization on number of memorial sites (pre-70 Military presence as instrument)

	Num. Monuments	Num. Monuments
Victims	<b>0.510***</b> (0.142)	
Victim residents		<b>0.785***</b> (0.250)
Avg. Dep. Variable	0.231	0.231
IV F-statistic	69.619	35.586
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	289	289

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.12: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Memorial sites

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable		Avg Dep Variable
	Num. Monuments		
Total Protests	<b>0.841*</b>	(0.445)	1.263
Pacific Protests	<b>0.427*</b>	(0.226)	0.867
Violent Riots	<b>0.414*</b>	(0.221)	0.396
Turnout (Const. Initiative)	<b>-3.968***</b>	(0.881)	43.791
Approval (Const. Initiative)	<b>1.196</b>	(1.833)	76.270
Const. Convention	<b>0.967</b>	(1.682)	76.676
Turnout (Composition)	<b>-5.877***</b>	(1.281)	47.728
Vamos	<b>-0.880</b>	(1.576)	21.503
Lista	<b>1.062</b>	(1.028)	16.687
Dignidad	<b>-3.207</b>	(3.024)	15.887
Turnout (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-4.228***</b>	(1.049)	44.310
Boric (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-0.181</b>	(1.163)	20.884
Kast (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-0.158</b>	(1.257)	30.405
Turnout (2nd Pres. Round)	<b>-3.024***</b>	(0.806)	52.399
Kast (2nd Pres. Round)	<b>-0.598</b>	(1.787)	48.429
Turnout (1st Exit Plebs.)	<b>-2.405**</b>	(0.931)	84.649
Approval (1st Exit Plebs.)	<b>0.698</b>	(1.375)	32.311
Turnout (Consejo)	<b>-2.671***</b>	(0.905)	80.059
Unidad	<b>-0.340</b>	(1.205)	23.114
Seguro	<b>-1.328</b>	(0.888)	22.246
Republicano	<b>1.277</b>	(0.874)	37.532
Nulos	<b>1.720***</b>	(0.564)	23.055
Turnout (2nd Exit Plebs.)	<b>-2.694***</b>	(1.002)	83.931
Against (2nd Exit Plebs.)	<b>0.477</b>	(1.486)	52.344

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.13: LS Estimates: effect of repression centers on memories in social media

	Twitter I	Twitter II
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>3.337***</b> (0.876)	<b>7.421***</b> (1.996)
Avg. Dep. Variable	0.368	1.049
OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.848	0.848
OLS F-statistic	53.004	53.029
p-value (OLS F-statistic)	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k (15-45y)inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.14: 2SLS estimates (Pre-70 Military Presence as instrument)

	<i>Twitter I</i>	<i>Twitter I</i>	<i>Twitter II</i>	<i>Twitter II</i>
Victims	<b>1.249***</b> (0.329)		<b>2.787***</b> (0.746)	
Victim residents		<b>1.925***</b> (0.421)		<b>4.293***</b> (0.943)
Avg. Dep. Variable	0.368	0.368	1.049	1.049
IV F-statistic	69.619	35.586	69.619	35.586
State Dummies	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	289	289	289	289

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses. IV F-statistic is the Cragg-Donald weak instrument test.

Table C.15: 2SLS Estimates: effect of monuments on memories in social media

	Twitter I	Twitter II
<i>Monuments</i>	<b>2.450***</b> (1.002)	<b>5.464***</b> (2.230)
Avg. Dep. Variable	0.368	1.049
IV F-Statistic	90.752	90.752
State Dummies	x	x
Controls	x	x
N. Obs.	290	290

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users that tweeted in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.16: Mechanism Analysis: 2SLS estimates - Remembrance

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables				Avg Dep variable
	Twitter I		Twitter II		
Total Protests	<b>0.344***</b>	(0.102)	<b>0.154***</b>	(0.046)	1.263
Pacific Protests	<b>0.174***</b>	(0.051)	<b>0.078***</b>	(0.023)	0.867
Violent Riots	<b>0.169***</b>	(0.053)	<b>0.076***</b>	(0.024)	0.396
Turnout (Const. Initiative)	<b>-1.620***</b>	(0.517)	<b>-0.726***</b>	(0.233)	43.791
Approval (Const. Initiative)	<b>0.395</b>	(0.691)	<b>0.219</b>	(0.339)	76.270
Const. Convention	<b>0.488</b>	(0.753)	<b>0.177</b>	(0.311)	76.676
Turnout (Composition)	<b>-2.399***</b>	(0.730)	<b>-1.076***</b>	(0.329)	43.813
Vamos	<b>-0.359</b>	(0.664)	<b>-0.161</b>	(0.298)	21.503
Lista	<b>0.433</b>	(0.483)	<b>0.194</b>	(0.215)	16.687
Dignidad	<b>-1.309</b>	(1.229)	<b>-0.587</b>	(0.556)	15.887
Turnout (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-1.726***</b>	(0.591)	<b>-0.774***</b>	(0.266)	44.310
Boric (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-0.074</b>	(0.480)	<b>-0.033</b>	(0.215)	20.884
Kast (1st Pres. Round)	<b>-0.065</b>	(0.510)	<b>-0.029</b>	(0.229)	30.405
Turnout (2nd Pres. Round)	<b>-1.235**</b>	(0.603)	<b>-0.554**</b>	(0.269)	52.399
Kast (2nd Pres. Round)	<b>0.244</b>	(0.740)	<b>-0.109</b>	(0.332)	48.429
Turnout (1st Exit Plebs.)	<b>-0.982***</b>	(0.185)	<b>-0.440***</b>	(0.081)	84.649
Approval (1st Exit Plebs.)	<b>-0.285</b>	(0.579)	<b>-0.128</b>	(0.259)	32.311
Turnout (Consejo)	<b>-1.090***</b>	(0.210)	<b>-0.489***</b>	(0.092)	80.059
Unidad	<b>-0.139</b>	(0.497)	<b>-0.062</b>	(0.223)	23.114
Seguro	<b>-0.542</b>	(0.390)	<b>-0.243</b>	(0.175)	22.246
Republicano	<b>0.521</b>	(0.404)	<b>0.234</b>	(0.179)	37.532
Nulos	<b>0.702**</b>	(0.283)	<b>0.315**</b>	(0.127)	23.055
Turnout (2nd Exit Plebs.)	<b>-1.100***</b>	(0.200)	<b>-0.493***</b>	(0.088)	83.931
Against (2nd Exit Plebs.)	<b>0.195</b>	(0.609)	<b>0.087</b>	(0.273)	52.344

Notes: Twitter I = Number of Users tweeting in 11th september 2019 “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado” and/or “NiPerdónNiOlvido” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Twitter II = Number of Users twitting “Allende vive”, “Golpe de Estado”, “NiPerdónNiOlvido”, “Allende” and/or “11septiembre1973” per 10k (15-45y) inhabitants. Significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) 0.05, and (\*) 0.10. Controls: distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.17: Alternative Mechanism Analysis: LS estimates

	EconDevIndex	Unemp	Inv Edu/Alumno	Inv Health/Inhab
<i>Military Presence</i>	<b>0.0001</b> (0.029)	<b>-0.447</b> (0.855)	<b>-10.707</b> (8.674)	<b>-0.233</b> (0.185)
Avg. Dependent Var.	0.123	3.751	77.920	0.204
OLS Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.841	0.056	0.192	0.144
OLS F-statistic	50.340	1.534	3.194	2.311
p-value (OLS F-statistic)	0.000	0.041	0.000	0.000
State Dummies	x	x	x	x
Controls	x	x	x	x
N. Obs.	290	278	287	273

Notes: Marginal significance levels: (\*\*\*) denotes 0.01, (\*\*) denotes 0.05, and (\*) denotes 0.10. All regressions have control for distance to Santiago and regional capital, province fixed effects, 2017 population and rural share, and vote shares for Allende and Alessandri in 1970. Weights: 2017 population. Coefficient in bold, standard errors in parentheses.