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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to describe *how* the Mexican government has been perpetuating a continuous cultural, socio-economic, and political exclusion of the indigenous people since 1810 to the present. The study demonstrates that indeed socio-economic, cultural and political exclusion of the indigenous people has been a constant throughout the three phases that are analyzed in the study. These phases are the independence (1810-1821), the post-evolutionary epoch (1910-1990), and the modern time (1991-present). This exclusion has been due, to a large extent, to indigenous underrepresentation at national and state level. This underrepresentation, in turn, is due to lack of more permissive electoral mechanisms that directly facilitate indigenous representation. A reserved seats systems is proposed to solve this underrepresentation.

I. Introduction

With 17 million indigenous citizens, or about 15 percent of the country's total population (Martines-Veloz, 2018, pp. 22, Cuadro 2), Mexico is the American country with the largest indigenous population and the fourth most indigenous nation-state in the American Continent. Along with this number, Mexico's indigenous people are also the origin and portrayers of a great civilization (or great civilizations), as other indigenous people are in other regions of the world (Bastida-Muñoz, 1999, p. 37). Despite these facts, the Mexican government has not paralleled the indigenous people's contribution to Mexico's current life. We should bring to our memory that during "the 300 years of the Spanish subjugation, the indigenous people decreased dramatically due to the barbarian oppression they went through on the part of the conquerors" (Lopez-Gallo, 1965, p. 49). López Gallo continues, "for antonomasia, the indigenous people were the most ignorant, and for fatality, the most humiliated and abused" (p. 49). Then, in the struggle for Mexico's independence, the indigenous people contributed with a large quota of blood. However, "the new social group that took power and designed the new political organization completely ignored them" (López-Bárcenas, 2010, p. 23). The Plan de Iguala, for example, discarded the indigenous people by its principle of equality of all inhabitants of the 'New Spain' without any distinction among Europeans. Africans and indigenous people (López-Bárcenas, 2010). During the Porfiriato, our indigenous people and their descendants suffered the cruelest, merciless, and largest dispossession of their lands and other depravations (Lopez-Gallo, 1965, pp. 250-251). This indigenous status of exclusion, poverty, humiliation, cultural dispossession, manipulation, and alienation have not changed significantly since then. Even worse, some recent administrations, like Salinas the Gortari's and Ernesto Zedillo's, persecuted them and/or killed them. Salinas committed the 'without precedent crime:' dropping bombs against the

Zapatistas in 1994. Then, under Zedillo's administration, on December 22, 1997, sadly, painfully, and with despairing frustration, Mexicans received the horrible news: a paramilitary group had massacred 45 indigenous people. They were at a prayer meeting of Roman Catholic indigenous townspeople, including a number of children and pregnant women, who were members of the group called "Las Abejas" ("The Bees"), in the small village of Acteal in the municipality of Chenalhó, in Chiapas, Mexico. The "revolutionary" governments of the PRI's time (1930s-2000) created different sectors within its organization. Peasants and workers, for example, had their sectors, but the indigenous people did not have one. They were included, to some extent, in the peasants' sector. For this reason, some agrarian rights of the indigenous communities were recognized, but systematically all the PRI-governments excluded the indigenous culture. Occasionally, the PRI-governments took into account this culture just to include it in the national culture as folkloric pieces.

The purpose of this research work is to show *how* the government, despite some efforts in the form of pro-indigenous policies, has been failing to recognize and respect the indigenous people's rights. That the Mexican government has not been recognizing and respecting properly the indigenous people's rights is somewhat so obvious for many that for them, the present study would not contribute with anything to our understanding of the indigenous people's situation of exclusion. However, what is not properly understood is "how" most of the specific indigenous policies adopted by the government during the period have actually contributed to maintain the no recognition and no respect for the indigenous people's rights. Consequently, the indigenous people has been in perennial situation of exclusion, lacerate poverty, and socio-political subjugation. A second argument is that this tragedy is partially due to lack of proper indigenous people's representation in the national and state legislative bodies. This in turn, is due to lack of proper

electoral systems that would facilitate indigenous representation. For this reason, the author proposes a *reserved seats* system to facilitate accurate indigenous people's representation. The period of analysis, 1810-2018, is divided into three phases: the independence (1810-1821), the post-evolutionary epoch (1910-1990), and the modern time (1991-present).

II. Literature Review and Theory

The Indigenous Concept

The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines indigenous people as "those who keep totally or partially their language, institutions and traditional style of life, and that distinguish themselves from the dominant society, and who occupied a particular place before other groups arrived..." (Gamboa-Montejo & Sanchez, 2008, p. 4). In line with this concept, the Mexican Constitution, in its second article, defines the indigenous people as "those who come from populations that inhabited the country's current territory by the time that the colonization started, and that they keep their own socio-economic, cultural, and political institutions..." (Gamboa-Montejo & Sanchez, 2008, p. 5). Thus, at least theoretically, for the Mexican authorities and the Mexican society, the indigenous people are "a people." That both government and society treat the indigenous people as "a people" is something different. Treating them as "a people" implies that we recognize and respect the rights specific to these indigenous people.

International Indigenous Legislation

Precisely, the United Nations Organization (UNO) and ILO group the rights specific to the indigenous people in four categories, economic, cultural, social, and political. Regarding the economic rights, the aforementioned organizations include the indigenous rights to use their land and natural resources, as well as apply their own ways of production. In the cultural rights, the

organizations embrace the indigenous people's rights to use their own language, profess their own religion, and live as a distinct community. Social indigenous people's rights include the right to create, and organize themselves as "a people" and to enjoy their own recreational life. Finally, related to political affairs, UNO and ILO include the following: the right to use their own *usos y costumbres* to elect their own authorities and decide their own political life. The ratifying countries should create the corresponding institutional instruments to make this happen (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2012, pp. 6-7).

The chronology of the international recognition of Indigenous rights indicates that although the indigenous awareness may be old, the indigenous concern and compromise are relatively recent. This started with the Number 107 Covenant on Indigenous People and Tribes that ILO created in 1957. A few number (27) of States ratified the accord (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2012, p. 5). Then, the international Pact of Civil and Political Rights was published in 1966. The Article 27 of this document specifically details the cultural, religious and linguistic rights of the indigenous people (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2012, p. 6). In 1989, ILO revised its 1957 Covenant and issued the 169 Covenant on Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries. Although this document "failed to meet certain aspirations in terms of both process and content, still it [is considered to be] a relatively progressive instrument for its time" (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, p. 190). The relevance of this document is that it is a binding covenant of international law. For this reason, it is a very important document to indigenous advocacy, especially for the Indigenous Latin America, given that in this region, "fifteen of the twenty states to ratify the Convention are located" (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, p. 191). Fortunately, Mexico ratified this accord (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2012, p. 6), although in practice, it looks like if the government had not ratified it. In 1992, ONU

came up with its Declaration on the Rights of People belonging to Linguistic, Religious, and Ethnic National Minorities. The document encouraged the States to come up with institutional arrangements to protect the national indigenous people's linguistic, cultural, and religious identity (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2012, p. 6). Finally, in 2007, we welcomed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This was a triumph for justice and human dignity of the World's indigenous people, after more than two decades of negotiations between governments and indigenous peoples' representatives.¹ The relevance of this document is that it establishes a universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity, wellbeing and rights of the world's indigenous peoples (UN Office of the High Commissioner, 2007). The Declaration addresses many of the rights that had been already detailed in other documents. However, this time the Declaration embraces both 'individual and collective rights and promotes the indigenous people "full and effective participation in all matters that concern them...and the Declaration explicitly encourages harmonious and cooperative relations between States and indigenous peoples" (UN Office of the High Commissioner, 2007). Another amazing aspect of this Declaration is that it also stresses the indigenous people's right to "the spiritual attachment to traditional lands and focuses on community rights" (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, p. 192).

In sum, as UNO indicates, the World's Indigenous people count on a "universal framework of minimum standards for [their] survival, dignity, well-being, and individual and community rights" (UN Office of the High Commissioner, 2007). Since representatives of both national governments and the indigenous people negotiated the last and probably the most important document, the national governments are more encouraged (forced) to enact the components of the agreement.

¹ The negotiations and general work on the draft started in 1995 (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, p. 191)

This progressive international indigenous 'legislation' will be just a nice historical decoration, like a Christmas tree ornament, if domestically the ratifying nations do not do anything to come up with the corresponding laws and the resultant executing institutional mechanisms to carry out such laws. The first step in this direction could be the adoption of an electoral system that guarantees the indigenous people true, real representation in the national and state legislatures; otherwise, any indigenous legislation for good it might be would not serve the indigenous people because it would not have their input.

Indigenous Political Representation

Regarding political representation, most scholars in the electoral systems literature argue that the Parliaments or national legislatures, as representative decision-making bodies, should mirror the diversity of the society they supposedly represent. In this regard, John Adams suggested, "parliament should be an exact portrait, in miniature of the people at large, as it should look, feel, think, and act as [they do]" (Farrell, 2001, p. 11). This suggests that in diverse societies, each group should be represented more or less proportionally to its share of the general population (Cox, 1997). In this regard, the more permissive the electoral formula is, the better legislative representation for minorities and ethnic groups will be (Lijphart, 1994; Norris, 1997; Cox, 1997; Farrell, 2001). The core argument in the electoral systems literature is that in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, proportional representation (PR) systems based on party lists facilitate the entry of minority ethnic groups into parliament. However, "closer examination suggests that the causal mechanisms affecting representation levels of women and minority ethnic groups within PR systems are somewhat different, and that the benefits of PR for minority ethnic groups are often contingent on the presence of ethnic parties" (Bird, 2014, p. 14). For this reason,

Bird (2014) identifies three broad families of ethnic group representation. These families include those guaranteeing seats to ethnic parties, those incorporating designated groups within larger panethnic parties, and those creating special electoral districts for ethnic interests (Bird, 2014, pp. 15-24). In Mexico, there is no ethnic parties. For this reason, the third family of ethnic representation is more appropriate for Mexico. CNE (Electoral National Council) has already identified 28 indigenous districts. However, these districts do not cover even half of the indigenous population. A *reserved seats* system is the most appropriate electoral engineering to serve properly the indigenous people's political representation. In the "proposal section," the author will expand on this system.

III. Methodology

In the introductory section, we indicated that the purpose of the paper is twofold: first, to describe *how* indeed the Mexican government has failed to fully recognize and respect the rights of the indigenous people since the country's independence in 1810 to present, despite the fact that different administration have made some efforts to help the indigenous people. The second argument is that this governmental failure is partially due to lack of a proper electoral system allowing for true indigenous representation in the national and state legislatures. This indigenous representation would facilitate proper indigenous legislation to advance the indigenous cause.

We probably do not need a research study to show that the Mexican government has not been recognizing nor properly respecting the indigenous people's rights. What we do need, however, is to know *how specifically* the government has failed to do both. At times, the government has done nothing. Some other times, it has done something, but via this "something,' the government has worsened the indigenous people's tragedy. Finally, very often, the government

has acted directly against the indigenous population. To test these assumptions, the author examines different "indigenous" legislations adopted during the 1810-2018 period. To facilitate the narrative, the period is divided into three phases: the independence (1810-1821), the post-revolutionary epoch (1910-1990), and the modern time (1991-present). A second assumption is that absence of proper electoral system to facilitate true indigenous representation has contributed to drought of indigenous legislation. When we have had some indigenous legislations, the corresponding executing/operating institutional mechanisms have not accompanied such laws. For this reason, the author proposes the adoption of a *reserved seats* system that will facilitate appropriate indigenous representation, which in turn will produce real indigenous legislation with the corresponding institutional arrangements so that indeed such legislation reaches the indigenous population.

IV. Evidence and Analysis

The Independence (1810-1910)

Before Mexico's independence, "indigenous people were largely denied citizenship rights and were, during the 1800s, subjected to laws that distributed their lands, demolished their economies, usurped their traditional governance systems, criminalized their religions, and tried to assimilate them into mainstream society" (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, p. 185). The *encomienda* system and the *Spanish Requerimiento* of 1512 responded to this end. The *encomienda*, for example, "granted conquistadores, soldiers, and government officials dominion over Indian land and labor in the Americas and the Caribbean" (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, pp. 181-182). This practice became a tradition impossible to reverse.

Then during the struggle for Mexico's independence, the indigenous population contributed with a large quota of blood. However, the new social group that designed the new political 'order' completely ignored them (López-Bárcenas, 2010, p. 23). "Independence from colonial control, far from representing vindication of indigenous claims, exacerbated the Indians' misery" (Tresierra, 1994, p. 193). The best thing that the first Federal Constitution of Mexico (1824) did for the indigenous people was to put the National Congress in charge of regulating the commerce between them and the states (article 49, fraction XI) (López-Bárcenas, 2010, p. 24). However, as López-Becerra (2010) argues, the indigenous people's problem was a question far beyond commercial affairs. The 1835 reform to this constitution was even worse: it denied citizenship to the indigenous people because of their lack of education (López-Bárcenas, 2010, p. 24). In the discussions to approve the 1857 Constitution, the indigenous people's rights were debated but not included in the final draft (López-Bárcenas, 2010). Even the most liberal legislation of the time was conceived against them. For example, the Juárez Law of 1855 and the Lerdo Law of 1856 "expedited the expropriation of indigenous communal lands. Under the prevailing legal order these lands became the property of those who promulgated the law" (Carpenter & Riley, 2014, pp. 181-182). Then the other liberal reforms adopted between 1859 and 1863 did not mention the indigenous people, although probably their author, Benito Juárez, assumed that such legislations were going to directly benefit the indigenous people. It did not happen so.² Not even by default, this liberal group thought about the possibility of including a provision for indigenous representation in the national legislature in the 1857 Constitution.

² Juarez, as President, implemented the "other" following reforms: the July 12, 1859 nationalization of the Catholic Church assets law; the July 23, 1859 civil marriage law; the July 28, 1859 people's civil status law; the July 31, 1859 decree indicating that the catholic church intervention in cemeteries was abolished; The August 11, 1859 law on holidays and prohibition to attend any religious ceremony; the December 4, 1860 law on cults; decree extinguishing all religious communities of orders; and the September 25, 1873 decree through which all these preforms became constitutional.

Under the Porfiriato (1876-1911), every single legislation and regulation were to benefit foreigners and national friends of the dictator, Porfirio Díaz, at expenses of the indigenous people. A couple of examples will illustrate this point. In 1883, the Law on Plot Delimitation and Colonization gave nationals and foreigners a series of benefits (read it donations). In its article 21, the law reads, "as compensation for the expenses incurred by the survey companies in developing vacant lands, the *Executive may cede them as much as one-third of all the land they survey or the equivalent value...*" (Lopez-Gallo, 1965, p. 250). What is worse is that Díaz knew that the 'vacant lands' he refers to in the law were perfectly titled. For this, they could not be categorized as 'vacant.' They had legitimate owners, mostly indigenous people (Lopez-Gallo, 1965). The Congressional decree of December 18, 1893 authorized Díaz (the federal executive) to allow nationals and foreigners to denounce (read it usurp/appropriate) more than 2,500 hectares of vacant lands. Then the March 26, 1894 law just hammered home the decree of the year before (Lopez-Gallo, 1965, pp. 254-255).

By the end of his despotism, and as a result of his ambition, avarice, and eagerness to serve and please himself and his national and foreign friends, dictator Porfirio Díaz had distributed among them a significant portion of the national land (see table 1).

Table 1 about here

As we see in table 1, most of the 3,960,170 hectares or 15,290.30 square miles were in the southeast of Mexico, where most of national indigenous population lived. For these generous land grants, the "new owners" were to pay very little money. For example, Faustino Martinez paid for the 700,000 hectares only \$1.00 peso for each ton of wood he sold (Lopez-Gallo, 1965, p. 256). Even worse, by 1889, Porfirio Díaz had benefitted foreigners and his national friends with 38,249,377 hectares (equivalent to 147,681.67 square miles).

The political situation was not better for the indigenous people: Porfirio Díaz imposed his candidates everywhere, as the following letter from Porfirio Diaz to the Governor of Puebla demonstrates:

"...in the archive of Rosendo Márquez at the University of Texas-Austin, there is a letter signed by Porfirio Diaz, President of Mexico, and sent to Rosendo Márquez, Governor of Puebla. In the letter, Porfirio Diaz includes the list of Puebla's candidates for federal deputies. Marquez indicates that he will proceed diligently according to Porfirio's instructions. Then, Marquez gave the list to each of his political chief subordinates. These chiefs sent the list to municipal presidents (majors). Then, Marquez would communicate the matter to Porfirio as 'mission accomplished.' Then the list of deputies would appear in *El Diario de Debates* of the National Congress" (Bravo-Regidor, 2010, pp. 258-259).

This evidence demonstrates two things. The first one is that Díaz' intervention in the selection of candidates was clear, as well as the channels that he used to impose his will. Second, under the plurality 'electoral system' in place, there was no room (neither space) for the indigenous people. Situation that made any possible indigenous legislation an impossible mission.

Some state legislatures were an oasis in the national indigenous legislative desert. For example, the state of Oaxaca adopted its first constitution in 1825. It recognized the plurality of people and parties that formed the province that preceded the state. This plurality included the indigenous people, who, in fact, kept the right to elect their mayors and councilors (Perez-Jiménez, 1959). Then, the second state constitution, adopted in 1857, recognized the rights of the indigenous people to administer their collective goods (Perez-Jiménez, 1959). However, by decree, the conservative governments of the late 1850s and early 1860s transformed the communal lands (indigenous lands) into private property (González-Navarro, 1990).

Meanwhile, in the states of Sonora and Sinaloa (the State of the Occident in 1825), the constitutional arrangements to recognize and respect the indigenous people's rights were a taunt. The first constitution (of 1825), for example, prohibited indigenous slavery, as well as trading indigenous people. However, this prohibition was just partial, because Indians could be sold, and the only beneficiaries of this sale were the former owners of the indigenous peoples (López-Bárcenas, 2010). Later, in 1827, the indigenous people's rights to remain in their lands and preserve their social systems were smashed by decree. Then, in 1828, the constitution also prohibited the use of the indigenous people's *usos* y *costumbres* to elect and conserve their own government (López-Bárcenas, 2010). The constitutions that came after these first constitutions did not include significant legislation that could benefit the indigenous people.

As the indigenous people were going through this exclusion, they were poorly represented or not represented at all in the national legislature. Graph 1 (partially based on table 2) shows the tremendous difference between the percentage of indigenous people in the national legislative body and the percentage of these people in the national legislation.

Graph 1 and Table 2 about here

The consequence of this underrepresentation was the absence of proper indigenous legislation. This poor representation was associated, at least partially, to the following systems: the *plurality-majoritarian*, *a semi-proportional* (Sui generis, 1964-1979), and the *mixed-member* proportional (see table 3, column "Electoral System").

Table 3 about here

These types of systems were implemented for the PRI-government to maintain hegemony, as we see in table 3 under the 'Party System' column. First, as we saw in the 'literature review'

section, the plurality-majoritarian system works against minorities (including ethnic minorities) and favors major parties. Second, intentionally, the systems were implemented for the party-government to maintain its hegemony. Under this circumstances, the indigenous people lacked legislative representation. In fact, the electoral systems, despite becoming more permissive step by step (see table 3), still they did not work properly for the indigenous people, since when the indigenous population was best represented $(3.6\% \approx 4.0\%)$ of the national Chamber of Deputies in 2006, according to figure 1), that representation did not mirror the percentage of the national population that the indigenous people represented (10%).

In sum, during the independence epoch, the indigenous people's rights were not respected, nor recognized, although at times, the national Congress just discussed them. Then under the Porfiriato, these rights were actually smashed, as the Porfirismo deprived the indigenous people of their lands, and condemned these people to live in misery and forced them to abandon their *usos* y *costumbres*.³ Humiliated, defenseless, and miserable, the indigenous people survived in the margins of 'las haciendas' (household chores) condemned to do the hard work for their abusers.

The Post-Revolutionary Epoch (1910-1990)

The Mexican Revolution consolidated the Mestizo ideology as the racial, ideological and linguistic basis of the post-revolutionary society (Hamel, 2008, p. 303). José Vasconcelos, as secretary of education, described properly this new assault on the indigenous people's culture and rights when he asserted that the mestizo (son/daughter of a Spanish white and an Amerindian) would be the "cosmic race" (Bartolomé, 2017, p. 42). With this, the indigenous person, as indigenous, not as a person, should disappear. In other words, s/he should get 'mestized.' In 1937,

³ This was the case of Chihuahua, Veracruz, Zacatecas, and Yucatán. For a detailed narrative of these cases, refer to López Becerra (2010, pp. 33-44).

Vasconcelos proclaimed that the Spanish conquerors built a system better than the indigenous people's culture, which the Spanish subjugators found when they arrived to the Aztec land. For this reason, Vasconcelos argued, "we should incorporate the Indian into civilization, that is, Christianism and the Spanish culture" (Bartolomé, 2017, p. 42). This was the philosophical foundation of all the indigenous legislations and political actions during this post-revolutionary period. The creation of several institutions responded to this end. These institutions included the Department of Education and Culture created in 1921, the Casa del Pueblo (House of the People) inaugurated in 1923, and El Internado Nacional de Indios (National House for Indians) established in 1932 (López-Bárcenas, 2010, pp. 44-48).

Then, because of a national indigenous congress, called 'Indigenist Congress of Pátzcuaro,' taking place in 1940, the 'National Indigenous Institute' was created in 1948. Not surprisingly, its main objective was "to integrate the indigenous people into [the Mexican] nationality" (Bartolomé, 2017, p. 43). To get this objective, indigenismo was planned and executed as a protectionist program. It was "welfare-oriented and even paternalistic toward the indigenous people" (Tresierra, 1994, p. 190). As Levi (2002) argues Indigenismo was a "for" not a "by" indigenous people policy. In this context, the indigenous education program was a tool for cultural assimilation, while the indigenous culture program became a touristic- commercial-oriented folkloric exhibition platform.

During his presidency, Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) did similar assault on the indigenous people's culture and rights, even though he is considered the most pro-indigenous President. In fact, he was nicknamed *Tata Lazaro* (equivalent to *dad* Lázaro) because of his closeness to the indigenous people. Under his design of the corporatist state, Cárdenas left the indigenous people out of the structure. Instead, he included them "in his own political project as just another force

favoring consolidation of the Mexican Nation" (Tresierra, 1994, p. 194). This is to say, his indigenous policies were designed to mexicanize the Indigenous people. The creation of the *Department of Indigenous Affairs*, in 1935, responded to this end. Cárdenas never thought that the indigenous people were culturally different. For him, "they simply should get out of misery, which they had been going through for centuries" (López-Hernández, 2013, p. 50).

After the Revolution, two sets of fundamental principles killed the aspiration of the indigenous people to have their rights recognized and respected. First, the 'revolutionary' elite converted the indigenous lands into national property. The nation (government) was the new owner of the indigenous lands. The nation (government) gave only administrative titles to the indigenous people. Overnight, the latter became estrangers at home. Second, the governing elite considered the indigenous people as unable to preserve their other rights because they were ignorant and poor. They had to be educated and cultured according to the 'new good' civilization that the conquerors brought, so that they (the indigenous people) could become Mexicans (like the white and mestizos). In a few words, the idea was to eliminate these 'indios' as "a people," so that Mexico were only one 'educated' society.

The electoral systems adopted during the post-revolutionary period contributed to the indigenous tragedy by failing to facilitate the indigenous representation. First, the system in place, the single-member plurality system (SMPS), is the worst at representation (see, e.g., Norris,1997; Lijphart, 1994; Cox, 1997). The electoral systems literature suggests that the proportional representation system is the one best suitable for minority representation and, by extension, for indigenous representation (see, e.g., Norris,1997; Lijphart, 1994; Cox, 1997). In this respect, Riedl (2014) argues that the electoral system used in Mexico during this period, might have determined the number of indigenous peoples who gain access to political representation, as he found that

proportional representation and mixed electoral systems facilitate this representation. "Eleven of the 20 countries that have adopted elements of proportional representation, 85 per cent have indigenous representatives in parliament" (Riedl, 2014, p. 7). By contrast, 58% of the countries that have adopted the single-member plurality-majoritarian system (SMPS) have indigenous representation in the national legislature (Riedl, 2014, p. 7). During the post-revolutionary period, SMPS was the only game in town. Precisely the system that, according to the theory, does not help the indigenous people get access to the national political representation. There were some light (make up) changes to the electoral system in place, but as we will see next, these changes did not serve the indigenous cause at all.

Molinar Horcasitas (1991) identifies four series of electoral reforms during the postrevolutionary period. No one of them facilitated indigenous participation. The first reform, called
the one-party system, took place between 1946 and 1963. For the election of the representatives
(Lower House or Cámara de Diputados), the law kept the plurality formula in single member
districts. As we discussed above, this system does not facilitate indigenous representation (Levy
& Szekely, 1987). The indigenous people could have participated as independent candidates;
however, to avoid this participation, the law indicated that only parties could run candidates. This
was the time when the elections were indispensable to legitimate the system, but not necessary to
elect representatives (Sesmo, 1987). The system forgot the Indigenous people.

The second reform happened between 1964 and 1976. This is what Molinar-Horcasitas (1991) calls the classic period. The main elements of the reform was the creation of the party deputies (in addition to the plurality deputies elected in single-member districts) and a threshold of 2.5 for the parties to participate in the party deputy distribution (Sirvent, 2002). Any party winning less than 20 percent of the vote nationwide was qualified to receive party deputies. Any

small party was allotted five deputies if it had at least 2.5 percent of the national vote and an additional seat for every 0.5 percentage points above the threshold, up to a maximum of twenty seats (Story, 1986). This was not a real proportional representation system, but it opened a little window for the opposition, especially the opposition from the left that had been very intensively involved in informal political activities in the 1940-1970s period. However, the new electoral system did not facilitate indigenous representation, because the indigenous people did not have a party. They were obliged to vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). They were affiliated to this party through the Central Nacional Campesina or CNC (National Peasant Organization). During this period of reforms, Mexico had a one-party system (see table X) with no room for any (ethnic) minority representation.

The third reform, between 1979 and 1987, is what experts identify as the phase of democratization. This time, the PRI-government was more serious about reforming the system of representation. It was a conscious effort to avoid political violence (Becerra, Salazar, & Woldenberg, 2000). Silvia Gomez-Tagle indicates that the effort was to "respond to multiple pressures which [could] be traced to the social movements of the 1970s" (Gomez-Tagle, 1993, p. 65). Jesus Reyes Heroles (then Minister of the Interior) pointed out these pressures in his famous speech on April 1, 1977 in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. "... that means that the Mexican government, he declared, will introduce political reforms to encourage the democratic unity of the nation and cover the ample variety of ideas and interests that constitute such a democratic unity" (Aziz-Nassif, 1984, p. 173). This reform, as Gomez-Tagle (1993) argues, was dedicated to the Left, not to the indigenous people; as a result, once again, they remained unrepresented or not represented at all.

Finally, on June 19, 1986, President Miguel De La Madrid convoked all "the national political parties, national political associations, social organizations, academic institutions, and

citizen in general, but not specifically the indigenous people, to participate in public meeting to discuss the political electoral renovation and the citizen participation in the government of the Federal District" (Becerra, Salazar and Woldenberg 2000: 166). It was also the time for a national electoral reform. For its planning and adoption, the indigenous people were not invited. For the 1988-1991 period, and because of the reform, there was increasing electoral support for the opposition, especially the left. A new way of doing business was inaugurated in the Chamber of Deputies given that the PRI could not do constitutional changes all by itself; it needed the cooperation (vote) from the opposition. Still, as we see in graph 1, the indigenous people were not properly represented, not even when they were best represented in the 2006-2009 legislature, with 18 seats or 3.6 percent of the Lower House. In 2006-2009, the indigenous people represented between 10 and 16 percent of the general population.

In sum, during *The Post-Revolutionary Epoch* (1910-1990), the indigenous people were as they had always been: miserable, dispossessed of their rights to enjoy or use their lands, to practice their own religions, to govern themselves with their *usos* and *costumbres*, and to be properly represented in the national and state legislative bodies.

The Modern Period, 1991-2018

In 1990, Mexico ratified the *OIL's 169 Covenant on Indigenous People and Tribes in Independent Countries*. This ratification implied that the country should apply the indigenous rights included in such document. To do this, the lawmakers had to amend the constitution. At the end of 1991, the National Congress approved a change to Article 4 of the constitution. In its new version, this article declared that Mexico was a multicultural and pluri-ethnic nation, "based originally upon its indigenous peoples" (De-la-Peña, 2011, pp. 307-308). At the same time, this

article promoted and protected the development of indigenous languages, cultures, usages and traditions. For the first time in Mexican history, indigenous peoples were explicitly mentioned in the constitution. However, "the article did not mention the human rights of the indigenous people" (Stavenhagen, 2010, p. 35). Despite its positive components, the article was ignored until its derogation.

Then, in 1996, a federal government commission and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (MZLN or Zapatistas) signed the San Andrés Accords in the village of San Andrés Larrainzar (Chiapas). Explicitly, the document "recognized the indigenous peoples' rights to their culture, communal lands, economic viability, and political autonomy" (De-la-Peña, 2011, p. 308). Nevertheless, the Zedillo administration sent its own indigenous legislative initiative to the national congress in 1998. This initiative did not include the agreements contained within the San Andrés Accords. For this reason, the Zapatistas and the rest of indigenous groups rejected the legislation. Then, after five years of demands from indigenous groups, political parties, and civilsociety organizations, many aspects of the San Andrés Agreements were finally included in the Mexican Constitution in 2001. The legislation included a constitutional mandate devoted to the states for them to recognize the indigenous rights. In practice, this meant that the main function of the states was 'to regulate the application of the federal legislation in their jurisdictions (López-Bárcenas, 2010). By the end of the 1990-2007 period, only 17 states had amended their constitutions to include the indigenous rights as mandated by the national Constitution (Valdivia-Dounce, 2009). Only 12 of those states recognized the national pluri-culturism, and only 10 of them passed an indigenous regulatory law (Valdivia-Dounce, 2009). In addition, the national Congress passed the General Law of Linguistic Rights of the Indigenous People in 2003. By decree, then, the Executive created the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous

Peoples and the National Institute of Indigenous Languages (De-la-Peña, 2011, p. 309). A few years later in 2010, the constitutional articles 21 and 23 were reformulated. As a result, bilingual education in indigenous regions was fostered. Finally, in 2013, the Special Program for Indigenous Peoples was adopted. Among other things, the program recognized that the right to prior consultation had not been fully implemented in Mexico and called for its active implementation.

However, all these important legislative changes, dedicated to recognize Mexico as a pluralistic, multi-cultural society, have not transformed the conflicting nature of the relationships between the indigenous peoples and other segments of the Mexican society (De-la-Peña, 2011, p. 309). Horbath and García (2012) maintain that "the practice of discrimination and social exclusion toward natives in Mexico have been generating levels of isolation and growing poverty in the *various communities*" (p. 175). Burks (2015) argues that this poverty is due to the fact that indigenous underrepresentation "has contributed to the indigenous people marginalization. For this underrepresentation, indigenous people are less likely to advance economically and are more likely to remain in a persistent state of poverty" (Burks, 2015, p. 1). Fuentes (2014), provides evidence of Burks' argument as the former scholar found that seventy seven percent of the indigenous people lived in poverty by 2014. Data in table 4 support Burks' argument and confirm Fuentes' findings as the typical percentage of the years between 1992 and 2017 was 74.15.

Table 4 about here

The Proposal

If according to Burks' (2015), the indigenous underrepresentation contributes largely to the indigenous economic stagnation and to the state of persistent poverty among the indigenous population, we need then proper indigenous representation in the national and state legislatures. For this to happen, we need an electoral system more permissive than the current mixed-member

in place. Under the latter, on February 11, 2004, the Federal Electoral Institute (now National Electoral Institute or INE) approved a redistricting (positive gerrymandering) for the legislative elections of 2006 and 2009 (González-Galván, 2017). This political engineering was to identify indigenous districts. For a region to become an indigenous district, the indigenous people should represent 40% or more of the district population; second, there should be a geographic continuity; and third, the district region should have both communication access and public services. Based on this, INE identified 28 districts. The idea was to elect the same number of indigenous people to the national Lower House. Results were not as expected. After the redistricting of 2004, the number of indigenous people went up from 7 in 2003 to 18 in 2006 and then down to 17 in 2009 (table 5).

Table 5 about here

This upward trend from 2006 to 2009 was due to the indigenous quotas that some parties (specially the PRI and the PRD) adopted more than to the redistricting itself (Sonnleitner, 2013). In any case, as has been pointed out in this study, not even the maximum percent (3.6) of deputies is close to the percentage that the indigenous people represent in the national population. The quality of representation was not (and is not) that good either. In the 2015-2018 legislature, for example, the indigenous representation submitted 23 bills related to indigenous issues. Only two of them passed and five were rejected (Global-Americans, 2017).

Despite permissiveness of the electoral systems, the indigenous people still do not have proper access to the national representation body. This is the reason: first, assuming that in those 28 districts all winning candidates were indigenous, they would be representing only 47 percent of the indigenous people of the country (González-Galván, 2017). Second, the 40% threshold is far away from the 65% necessary to generate real advantages for the indigenous people, according the theory (Sonnleitner, 2013, p. 41). Third, one of the criteria to identify an indigenous district

was that the area should have both proper communication networks and public services. Most areas where the indigenous people live lack both proper communication networks and public services. Just based on this latter criterion, more than 50 percent of the indigenous people cannot be represented. This is to say, they cannot be represented because they are poor (González-Galván, 2017). Having no water, no electricity, and no communication networks is not community responsibility; it rather is a policy problem, that is, a trouble that cannot be solved without governmental intervention.

In sum, we need an institutional engineering more permissive than the positive gerrymandering just described above. A *reserved seats* system will produce the real-proper indigenous representation that the positive gerrymandering did not originate. First, as graph 1 presents, the 2006-2009 and 2009-2012 legislatures were the legislative periods during which the indigenous people were better represented holding 3.6% and 3.4% respectively. These percentages were far away from the percentages (10 and 16 respectively) that the indigenous people represented in the whole population. The typical percent of indigenous representatives was 1.4 for the period between 1988 and 2015,⁴ while the corresponding typical percent of the indigenous people in the national population was about 13 during the same period (see table 5). This is a significant representation gap for the period.

The system proposed here will fill in this gap and consists of reserving a percentage of the national legislative seats for the indigenous people in proportion to their share in the national population. For example, if the indigenous people represent 15 percent of the national population, about 15 percent of the seats in the national Cámara de Diputados (Lower House) should be reserved for the indigenous people. The selection or election of these indigenous representatives

⁴ Mexico held national legislative elections in July 2018. It will take some time for us to know the number of indigenous representatives in that body.

would be up to the indigenous people so that they their *usos* and *costumbres* to elect their authorities. The absolute number corresponding to the 15 percent will be distributed among the indigenous districts and/or communities in a proportional way. For example, fifteen percent of the national legislative seats is 75 (or .15*500). Let us assume that the indigenous region or community (or district) "X" contains 40 percent of the indigenous population, then the number of legislative seats for that region "X" should be 30 (or .40*75).⁵

Second, this national institutional arrangement should repeat at state level. This is to say, if the state indigenous population represents about 30 percent of the population of the state of Tamaulipas, then about 30 percent of the state legislative seats should be reserved for the indigenous people. The specific number of indigenous seats per district, or community within the state should be based on that district's share of the state indigenous population. If the state "Y" district contain 20 percent of the total indigenous population of the state, then about 20 percent of the indigenous reserved seats (in the state legislature) would be for that "Y" district. This is just the point of departure for a more detailed plan.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to describe *how* the Mexican government has been perpetuating a continuous cultural, socio-economic, and political exclusion of the indigenous people since 1810 to the present. The study demonstrates that socio-economic and political exclusion has been the rule for the indigenous people throughout each of the three phases analyzed in the study. However, during the modern period (1991-present), we saw some improvement, as Mexico ratified the *OIL's 169 Covenant on Indigenous People and Tribes in Independent*

⁵ We know that by 2014, according to the Atlas of the Indigenous People of Mexico (Atlas de los Pueblos Indígenas de México), there were in Mexico 34,263 localities, where the indigenous people represented at least 40% of the total population.

Countries. This and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (appearing publically in 1994) provoked some important indigenous legislation that ended up with a positive gerrymandering to serve the indigenous people's representation in the national legislative body. Nevertheless, the resultant representation was not as good as expected. The argument here is that the indigenous underrepresentation in every single period analyzed here contributed to the current socioeconomic, cultural and political exclusion of the indigenous people. For this reason, the present study proposes a reserved seats system consisting of reserving a percentage of seats in both national and state legislatures for the indigenous people. This is to say, the percentage of indigenous seats in both national and state legislatures should reflect the percent that the indigenous people represent in nation and in each state respectively.

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Individual	Company Represented	Hectares Distributed	The Mexican State
	by the Individual		Affected
Sánchez Mármol	Garduza	74,000	Chiapas
Arturo E. Stilwell		99,000	Chihuahua
Faustino Martínez		700,000	Quintana Roo
Joaquín de Casasús	Molina and Company	328,000	Quintana Roo
Alberto Terrazas		144,000	Quintana Roo
Joaquín de Casasús	Jacinto Marín Carrillo	444,227	Quintana Roo and
			Yucatán
Policarpo Valenzuela		247,777	Tabasco
Benjamín Barrios		631,000	Quintana Roo
Rómulo Fernández		314,448	Campeche
Mr. Hewett	The Stanford Mng.	192,000	Quintana Roo
	Company		
Herbert Monroe		230,000	Chihuahua and
Mundy			Sonora
Max Müller		25,000	Sonora
Alberto L. Palacios		68,000	Chihuahua
Emilio Rabasa		35,000	Veracruz
Bulnes		62,000	Veracruz
Bulnes		62,000	Chiapas
Pedro V. Rubio		60,000	Chiapas
Félix Díaz		28,000	San Luis Potosí
Angel López N., Hiram		215,718	Chiapas
C. Smith, Eduardo Hart			
Total		3,960,170 hectares or	
		15,290.3 square miles	

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from López-Gallo (1965, pp., 250, 254-256)

Table 2: Percent of Indigenous People in Mexico			
Year	Percentage	Source	
1980	9.04%	INEGI, X Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1980.	
		http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/ccpv/1980/	
1982	9.04%	From 1980	
1985	9.04%	From 1980	
1988	10.5%	From 1990	
1990 ²	10.5%	(Zolla & Zolla-Márquez, 2004)	
1991	10.5%	From 1990	
1994	10.06%	From 1995	
1995 ³	10.06%	(Zolla & Zolla-Márquez, 2004, p. 74)	
1997	10.06%	From 1995	
2000 ⁴	13.04	(Zolla & Zolla-Márquez, 2004)	

2003	13.04	From 2000	
2005 ⁵	9.54%	(Navarrete-Linares, Los Pueblos Indigenas de Mexico, 2008, p. 9) (Consejo	
		Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social, 2014)	
2006	9.54%	From 2005	
2009	16.0%	FROM 2010	
2010 ⁶	16.0	(Navarrete-Linares, Los Pueblos Indigenas de Mexico, 2008, pp. 22, Table 2)	
2012	12.78%	FROM 2010 (MY CALCULATION)	
2015	21.5	(CONAPO, 2015, p. 3)	
2018	15.1%	From 2016	

Note: In absence of data, for some years (or legislations), I used the percentages corresponding to the closest year. For example, the percentage of 1988 corresponds to (or is) the percentage of 1990. We assume that these proxies are not different from the real percentages.

Table 3: Electoral and Party Systems in Mexico's Chamber of Deputies, 1917- 2018			
Party	Electoral System	Party System	Length
1 1917-1929		Without system	Six three-term legislatures
2 1929-1946		Hegemonic System in process	Three three-year term, and 4 three-year term legislatures
3 1946-1964	Simple Majority	Hegemonic System with simple majority	6 legislatures
4 1964-1979	Party Deputy System	Hegemonic System	5 legislatures. Hegemonic with party deputies)
5 1979-1988	Mixed System: 300 plurality deputies and 100 proportional representation deputies	Hegemonic System	Three legislatures
6 1988-1997	Mixed System: 300 plurality deputies and 200 proportional representation deputies	Transition (1988-1997)	3 three-year term legislatures
7 1997-2018	Mixed System: 300 plurality deputies and 200 proportional representation deputies	Multi-party System	7 legislatures

Source: Reynoso (2017, p. 209)

Table 4: Poverty of The indigenous People, Modern Era 1992-2017		
Year	Poverty	
1992	70.8	
1994	69.2	
1996	83.7	
1998	65.1	
2000	85.4	
2002	68.5	
2004	85%	
2006	79%	
2008	81%	
2010	79.5%³	
2012*	72%	
2014	73%	
2015	80.6%	
2016	70%	
2017	72%	
Average	74.15	


Sources:

1992-2002: Mena-Vázquez (Mena-Vazquez, 2011); 2004, 2006, and 2008: (Garcia-Moreno & Patrinos, 2011); 2010: (Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social, 2014, p. 140); 2012: (Sanchez, 2013); 2014: (Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social, 2016, p. 63); 2015: (Heath, 2016); 2016: (El-Sur, 2016); 2017: (Sin embargo Periodismo Digital con Rigor, 2017)

Table 5: Indigenous Legislators, National Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2015			
year	Total Indigenous Deputies	%Indigenous Deputies	%Indigenous
			Representation*
1988	4	0.8%	10.5%
1991	1	0.2	10.5
1994	4	0.8	10.1
1997	5	1.0	10.1
2000	4	0.8	13.04
2003	7	1.4	13.04
2006	18	3.6	9.54
2009	17	3.4	16.0
2012	7	1.4	12.78
2015	6	1.2	21.5
2018			
Mean	7.3	1.46	13.0

Source: Sonnleitner (2013), except for 2012 and 2015 data that were obtained from Acosta Díaz (2016).

^{*}Data come from Table 1: Percent of Indigenous People in Mexico



Source:

- Indigenous Legislative Representation: Author's elaboration based on data from: Sonnleitner (2013), except for 2012 and 2015 data that were obtained from Acosta Díaz (2016).
- 2. Indigenous National representation: See Table 5: Percent of Indigenous People in Mexico.