Conflict and nation: The colonial origins of ethnic exclusion and discrimination in Latin America

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Abstract

Why do some ethnic groups gain rights through mobilization against the state, while others become targeted for doing so? We argue that whether mobilization leads to inclusion or further exclusion of peripheral ethnic groups depends on the long-term trajectory of conflict. When peripheral groups have a history of conflict with the state, they often develop an oppositional identity that core groups can frame as a threat, thereby justifying intensified targeting and exclusion. We test this argument in the context of nineteenth-century South America, where core Creole elites established new nations on a fluid sociopolitical landscape, shaping ethnic boundaries that were still malleable while facing multiple and frequent conflicts with these groups. Our findings suggest that patterns of colonial-era conflict between white and non-white groups determined whether later inter-ethnic conflicts during state and nation-building led to ethnic exclusion and targeting.

1 Introduction

The relationship between ethnic mobilization and ethnic inequalities has long been a central concern in the study of ethnic conflict. While some ethnic groups successfully secure rights and inclusion through violent and non-violent collective action, others face repression and are specifically discriminated by the state. Although the understanding of these dynamics is essential to the promotion of ethnic rights and the development of more inclusive societies, the factors driving these divergent outcomes are not fully understood. Moreover, they are often contradictory, raising crucial questions about the role of historical context, identity formation, and conflict in shaping state responses. Why do some peripheral groups gain rights when they mobilize, while others become targets for further marginalization? This paper addresses this puzzle by examining how the historical trajectory

of conflict between ethnic groups and the state influences whether mobilization leads to inclusion or exclusion.

We argue that previous literature has been looking too closely the short-term consequences of conflict and missed the importance of the long term. Past conflict—sometimes centuries-old—plays a crucial role in determining the outcomes of ethnic mobilization. Peripheral groups with a history of conflict against the state often develop a collective identity defined in opposition to the core ethnic group. This oppositional identity enables state elites to frame these groups as threats to national stability, which, in turn, justifies their specific targeting further repression and exclusion. Conversely, when peripheral groups lack such a conflictual history, their mobilization is more likely to be perceived as legitimate demands for inclusion, leading to negotiations or concessions from the state.

To explore these dynamics, we focus on nineteenth-century South America, where newly independent Creole elites constructed national identities and states amid a fluid and contested sociopolitical landscape. The transition from colonial rule to independent nation-states involved ongoing struggles over ethnic boundaries, particularly between white Creole elites and non-white peripheral groups. By analyzing the patterns of inter-ethnic conflict from the colonial period and their impact on state responses to later mobilization, we demonstrate how historical conflict shaped ethnic exclusion during the era of nation-building.

We test this argument using a series of novel datasets. First, we compile an original list of indigenous and Afro-descendant revolts from 1550 to independence to capture earlier instances of group mobilization. Second, we measure ethnic mobilization in the nineteenth century using the Latin American Revolts Database (LARD) (Madrid and Schenoni, 2024), which documents instances of violence or threats of violence from independence until 1930. Third, we extend the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt, 2016) beyond 1945 by coding the status of ethnic groups in all Hispanic South American countries from independence through the early twentieth century.

Our results show that while ethnic mobilization in the nineteenth century alone did not have a systematic effect either increasing or decreasing the marginalization of mobilized groups, colonial-era conflicts were decisive in defining their impact. When rebel groups in the nineteenth century could be associated to a colonial revolt, their chances of being targeted for discrimination by the state increased. Conversely, groups that revolted but did not share this past were successful in reclaiming rights and became more emancipated. A significant difference between these two groups highlights the lasting impact of historical trajectories on ethnic relations and state development.

This paper brings three clear contributions to current debates about the role of conflict in explaining and addressing ethnic inequalities. Firstly, our study represents the inaugural examination of this issue within the historical context of Latin America, a region characterized by its substantial ethnic diversity and a notable history of rebellions. This investigation is particularly significant as it introduces a wealth of new data, providing fresh insights into the dynamics of ethnic groups and state responses in this unique setting and showing, among other

things, novel dynamics of violent mobilization in highly stratified societies.

Secondly, our study offers a conceptual innovation by concentrating on the notion of ethnic targeting—defined as the deliberate identification of specific ethnic groups for explicit legal discrimination—as an extreme manifestation of ethnic exclusion. Our focus on such practices results in a expansion of our ethnic groups considered in comparison to other datasets and allows us to focus on the most serious cases of ethnic discrimination.

Thirdly, by highlighting the significance of mobilization patterns across centuries, our study has the potential to challenge a field predominantly focused on short-term dynamics and fundamentally based on post-1945 data on these groups. This opens new avenues for research into the long-term effects of ethnic mobilization over extended historical periods, an approach that makes more sense given the developments of ethnic identities is a *longue durée* process.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview on the literature on ethnic exclusion, conflict and nationalism more generally, but looking also at the research on ethnic mobilization for Latin America more specifically. After presenting the argument and the corresponding hypotheses, we introduce relevant information regarding our region of study, justifying also our case election. Next, we describe the novel datasets and the research design used to test these arguments. Lastly, we discuss the main findings and end the paper with a few concluding remarks.

2 Literature review

Curiously, while lots of research has concentrated in how ethnic exclusion can lead to violence (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Lieberman and Singh, 2012; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2016; Lindemann and Wimmer, 2018), few scholars have dealt with the issue of how trends in violence between ethnic groups affect levels of ethnic discrimination.

The gap in this area is particularly significant, as these findings could greatly influence the policy recommendations provided to groups seeking recognition of their rights by the state. Moreover, the limited existing literature presents conflicting results, with outcomes ranging from negative to positive effects.

Those who emphasize the negative effect of mobilization on ethnic inclusion highlight the possibility of negative loops leading from mobilization to state repression and further escalation, which can end up leading to a process of balkanization (Koktsidis, 2014). This perspective is substantiated in both case studies and formally (Mele and Siegel, 2017), and it has been found to be particularly important in non-democratic contexts. For example, Janina Beiser-McGrath (2019) suggests that authocratic regimes employ pre-emptive and selective repression against ethnic groups that have resisted the state in uprisings, in order to deter future ethnic revolts, a dynamic that non necessarily replicates in democracies.

These findings stand in contrast to those who argue that ethnic mobilization and collective action, even of a violent kind, could have beneficial effects on ethnic incorporation (Olzak, 1983). Sometimes this argument takes the form of strategic

decision by a state under threat. Philip Roessler (2016), for example, argues that ethnic groups are most likely to be incorporated into the ruling coalition when they presents an immediate threat to the government, such that the ruling ethnic group will prefer the long-term danger of a coup d'état over the short-term risk of a civil war (see also Beiser-McGrath and Metternich, 2021, 2).

A key characteristic of the literature on violent ethnic mobilization and its effect on ethnic inequalities is its tendency to focus on Africa, where violent ethnic mobilization has been more common in recent times. Studies that fully incorporate alternative regional perspectives are sorely lacking.

Another limitation of the literature is in its temporal focus. By focusing on very recent patterns of conflict, studies tend to overlooks the fact that the ethnic groups they study have been interacting with the state—be it colonial o post-colonial—for centuries, and that both the patters of discrimination and mobilization typically have deep historical roots that need to be accounted for.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the most disappointing feature of the debate is that the impact of ethnic mobilization on a group's political status remains uncertain. While mobilization can signal to governments that a particular group holds political significance and poses a potential threat to those in power, it does not necessarily determine whether the state will respond by accommodating the group's demands or by confronting them.

Of course, there is a debate on ethnic mobilization and incorporation in other regions, but these tend focus on nonviolent mobilization and positive inclusion. For example, ethnic mobilization in Latin America received renewed attention since the rise of ethnic movements in the last decades of the twentieth century. While the first wave of research focused on the institutional factors which allowed for the rise of these movements and their corresponding political parties (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005; Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina, 2006), a second wave has been concerned with their consequences for ethnic groups' status. These authors point to important conditioning factors for groups' ability to achieve political status, including the factionalism within the movements and the responsiveness of the system (Vogt, 2016), their ability to appeal beyond their ethnic base (Madrid, 2012) and mobilize at the national level (vom Hau and Wilde, 2010).

These studies provide helpful insights concerning recent ethnic movements and the shift to multi-culturalism, but arguably focus on non-violent mobilization. We know much less about the political implications of past mobilization attempts, oftentimes violent, and why they were not successful. These are relevant antecedents as instances of previous mobilization likely influence the ability of groups to mobilize and gain rights today (see Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina, 2006).

This lack of attention to previous mobilization attempts of a violent nature is a function of both data availability and the (incorrect) assumption that groups did not mobilize prior to recent decades (see Yashar, 2005; Rice, 2012; Vogt, 2019). As we shall see, we do observe a variety of instances of mobilization in the colonial and post-independence period, if somewhat more sporadic and less organized than current ethnic movements. While ethnic groups like the indigenous and Afro-descendant population often mobilized within larger class-based movements (Rice,

2012; Butler and Helg, 2011), there were also several moments in which these groups rebelled in defense of their own rights. For instance, we observe slave revolts both before and after independence, rebellions in defense of indigenous land rights, against indigenous head tax, as well as against encroachment by the colonial and post-independence state (Coatsworth, 1988; Larson, 2004; Mallon, 1995; Safford and Palacios, 2002; Gonzales, 1987).

A few qualitative studies have examined the consequences of such instances of rebellion for the political status of ethnic groups. For instance Mallon (1995) showed that indigenous mobilization during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) led to these groups' discrimination after the war had ended. In contrast, subaltern mobilization in the French-Mexican War allowed these groups to be included in the government following the Mexican Revolution.[1] Sabau (2022) shows that ethnic conflict, in the case of Mexico, was seen in a more negative light than other types of conflict, given fears of a "race war" (or a conflict in which non-white ethnic groups would rise up and exterminate the white population). This qualitative work indicates that past attempts of mobilization did not necessarily improve the political status of groups, in fact often resulting in a reversal of rights. In contrast, research on the recent multi-cultural turn assumes that mobilization will lead to political inclusion, conditional on a series of factors. Given the potential reversal of rights as a product of mobilization, it is important to go beyond the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy and examine variation within the excluded category, particularly when looking at less responsive political systems like those in the nineteenth century (vom Hau, 2008, 2009).

3 Theory

This paper aims to explain why mobilization of subaltern or peripheral ethnic groups sometimes results in the end of the discriminatory policies enacted against them, while some groups are targeted by the state as a result.

Our main independent variable of interest is mobilization of a violent kind, this is, armed rebellion by an organization representing an ethnic group against the colonial or national state. We look at episodes of violent mobilization because these are less likely to fall under our historical radar but also because these are the most contested in the literature with regards to their effects on ethnic incorporation. While nonviolent mobilization seems to render some positive effects (Vogt, 2016; Madrid, 2012), we are here interested in the effect of violent mobilization, which to our knowledge have not been studied in Latin America.

Our primary dependent variable of interest is a specific type of ethnic exclusion which we denominate ethnic targeting. The process by which we determine the existence of an ethnic group and the existence of targeting requires some elaboration.

[1] It must be noted, however, that those instances of mobilization were "ethnic" in the sense that they recruited heavily from specific ethnic groups, but not in defense of these group's collective rights.

We depart from the notion that all nation-states have a "core" group, which forms the primary political community. This core can be defined in various ways, ranging from adherence to specific civic values to attachment to a particular territory (Mylonas and Tudor, 2023). In this study, we focus specifically on ethnic distinctions that demarcate the boundaries of the nation, characterized by shared ancestry, history, culture, and/or phenotypical traits.

Ethnic groups that are "peripheral" (i.e., distinct from the core group) often face some form of exclusion, though they are commonly simply ignored by the state, excluded from power but tolerated in their existence. Such tolerance can stem from their perceived political loyalty (Mamdani, 2020) or from an appearance of assimilation, but this form of exclusion does not necessarily entail active discrimination.

Here, however, we are concerned with explicit discrimination—the deliberate targeting of a specific group by the state—representing the extreme end of the inclusion-exclusion spectrum. While the exclusion of certain ethnic groups from the national definition has been a central puzzle in studies of nationalism (Gellner, 1983; Deutsch, 1969; Anderson, 1991; Wimmer, 2002), and all ethnic groups and nations are typically defined in opposition to others, we argue that targeting represents a more specific and deliberate policy that cannot be fully explained by these broader processes of differentiation and identity formation, and should be more easy to redress.

Tolerated groups retain basic rights, including state protection, suffrage, and citizenship. While questions about the actual implementation of these rights and their experience of economic or social discrimination remain, these issues fall outside the scope of our study. In contrast, "targeted" groups face active rights deprivation and harassment, with the state pursuing forced assimilation or elimination to remove their distinct ethnic identity from the territory. The specificity of this targeting is central: we focus on groups explicitly identified by the state for discriminatory policies or rights deprivations, often justified by narratives of "racial backwardness" or depictions as "uncivilized" (Rodriguez, 2003; Larson, 2004; Safford, 2013).

An illustrative case is the Mapuche, an indigenous group in the Araucanía region of southern Chile. During Chile's independence process, elites extended citizenship to indigenous peoples in the north, abolishing forced labor systems imposed on them (Rodriguez, 2003). However, the Mapuche in the south, who had long resisted both Spanish and post-independence rule, were deemed unfit for citizenship (Rodriguez, 2003). Although mid-19th century citizenship and voting laws technically allowed the Mapuche to exercise these rights as landowners, they were effectively barred from doing so (Herr, 2019). The state simultaneously devised strategies to conquer their territory and implement assimilationist policies (Vergara and Mellado, 2018). In general, Afro-descendant populations are considered targeted when subjected to slavery, and indigenous groups face targeting when the state relocates them or threatens their cultural existence.

In sum, by looking at armed rebellion and targeted discrimination, we refine the literature's question to ask: how does violent mobilization influence the targeting

of specific ethnic groups by the state? This strategy enables us to focus on the most marginalized groups within a country's ethnic landscape and policies that, unlike implicit discrimination, should me more easy to identify and redress. It also allows us to focus on violent mobilization, which is unlikely to escape historical attention while also being the most contested in the literature regarding their effects on ethnic incorporation.

What determines whether a group is targeted or simply ignored? According to Scott Straus (2015, 11), military capabilities and the balance of power between given ethnic groups and the state is going to affect how ethnic threat is perceived. In such contexts, "armed challenges to the state are equivalent to armed challenges to that people [the primary community represented by the state]" (Straus, 2015, 11), justifying their treatment as a foreign enemy of the nation and the most extreme forms of exclusion. In other words, founding narratives lead elites to view conflicts with those outside the primary community in a different light than conflicts with those belonging to the primary community, and react in the form of ethnic targeting.

Qualitative evidence suggests this was the case in post-independence Latin America. As argued by Mamdani (2020), in the colonial and post-colonial process of conquest, only those deemed civilized had the right to be tolerated, and groups earned such right by being politically loyal to the state, or avoiding threatening the political survival of those in power (Mamdani, 2020). In such contexts rebellions by indigenous or Afro-descendants were immediately perceived as inciting or aiming for a "race war", i.e., a struggle in which the masses rise to exterminate the white population (Lasso, 2007; Sabau, 2022).

Again, this meant that mobilization by other actors, like peasants or the working class, that fit within the bounds of the primary were not attributed the same level of alarm than these subaltern rebellions. Additionally, previous conflict is often perceived by elites as indicative of future conflict (see Kreiman, 2022; Roessler, 2011). Because these groups rebelled in the past, they are able to do so again in the future, such that they need to be deal with in the present. Based on this arguments, we could argue that ethnic mobilization should be conducive to targeting by the state, leading to the first hypothesis:

H1a: *Groups that mobilize after independence century are more likely to be targeted than those who do not mobilize*

Nevertheless, ethnic mobilization could also have had an opposite effect. By mobilizing, ethnic groups can signal the government that they are politically significant, and that their interests should be represented in government (Vogt, 2016). Moreover, the threat could be significant enough that, considering the potential costs of an armed confrontation, state elites might be compelled to negotiate and make concessions to the group, thereby addressing previous policies and preventing the group from being targeted further (Roessler, 2016).

In fact, most of the research shows that *recent* ethnic movements account for the inclusion of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples in Latin American governments, or at least for their recognition in constitutional frameworks (Van Cott,

2005; Vogt, 2016; Hooker, 2005). Ultimately, the success of these movements depends on the responsiveness of the system (Vogt, 2016). Although this account seems to work in democratic contexts and when mobilization is nonviolent, many of its implications allow us to generate a second alternative hypothesis regarding the effect of mobilization after independence:

H1b: *Groups that mobilize after independence are more likely to be tolerated than those who did not mobilize*

Because the effect of ethnic mobilization seems to be ambiguous, we suggest that we need to consider past conflict as well as present conflict to understand whether groups are going to be targeted after mobilizing.

As discussed by Straus (2015), foundational narratives tend to equate the political community to a specific social group are prone to view those outside the community as enemies, and in contexts where the nation is already defined in exclusionary terms, armed challenges to the state are likely viewed as challenges to the community itself if perpetrated by those enemies.

One way of interpreting this account is as proposing an interaction of past enmity and current enmity. It has been studies that when new conflict triggers memories of past conflict and brings those narratives forwards, this can lead to extreme cases of targeting such as genocide (Harff, 2003; Nyseth Brehm, 2016; Roscigno et al., 2015).

H2: *Groups that mobilize after independence, if they resisted the colonial state in the past, are more likely to be targeted, than those that did not have such preceding history.*

There are certainly many other factors that played a role in elites' understandings of ethnic threats. These include demographic factors like the size of the groups (see also Beiser-McGrath and Metternich, 2021) and their geographical proximity. For instance, in countries like Bolivia, indigenous peoples made up important majorities, and the most important cities were located in Aymara/Quechua territory (Larson, 2004). This made targeted policies much more challenging, thus these indigenous groups were tolerated for most of the nineteenth century. The spread of political ideologies like liberalism, "social Darwinism", communism, etc. also affected elites' understandings of the nation. While ideologies like communism and socialism led to the recognition of "mestizo" identity as representative of the nation (Siekmeier, 2017; vom Hau, 2008, 2009), "social Darwinism" led to discourses of the "racial inferiority" of both indigenous and Afro-descendant groups (Larson, 2004; Walsh, 2015). Nevertheless, we argue that material factors like ethnic groups' ability to mobilize can restrict elites' ability to implement these ideologies to their fullest extent.

4 Case selection and historical background

To test our argument, we look at the nine countries of Hispanic South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and

Venezuela. Most of these countries were once all part of the same Vice-royalty of Peru, and pioneered modern nationalism in the nineteenth century (Anderson, 1991) when tasked to come up with new definition of their nations in the rather arbitrarily defined sections of the Spanish Empire where they claimed sovereignty.

During colonial times, ethnic groups in Hispanic America were organized along a caste system with White Europeans (born in Europe) at the top ("peninsulares"), followed by their descendants born in the Americas ("criollo" or Creole). At the bottom stood indigenous peoples and African slaves. With independence in the early nineteenth century, the Creole sought to emancipate themselves from the peninsulares, and forged alliances with other groups to this effect. Because of this conflict the ethnic contours of the new South American nations became rather malleable.

In all countries the categories of white, indigenous, and black were used, but were also confused by racial mixing and political dynamics. Whites, for example, could falling in or out of the definition of the nation depending on their attitudes towards Spain. Mestizos were treated in some countries as an ethnicity of their own, even one that defined the nation (vom Hau, 2008, 2009). Mulattoes were usually lumped together with Black individuals in the category of Afro-descendants, but could achieve emancipation and even citizenship depending on their contribution to the national cause (Sobrevilla Perea, 2023). Institutions like the indigenous head tax (tribute) and slavery (Klaren, 2000) generally persisted until the 1850s in most countries, but the general tendency was toward their banishment.

However, at the same time, the Creole continued to fear a wide-spread rebellion of the indigenous and Afro-descendant masses, especially after events like the 1780 Revolution of Tupac Amaru II in Peru, the Haitian Revolution of 1791 or the 1810 Revolution of Hidalgo and Morelos in Mexico, to mention a few (Sabau, 2022; Klaren, 2000; Sabau, 2022). Because of this, elites tried to balance the creation of post-independence regimes based on republican ideals and universal rights, while restricting those rights to those "deserving" of citizenship (Sabato, 2001).

This provides an ideal setting to see how mobilization patterns affected ethnic groups' status. Those who came to power after independence, namely American-born whites or Creole, focused on maintaining their position above the ethnic hierarchy, which meant excluding both indigenous and Afro-descendant groups from power (Simon, 2017). However, from the start and all throughout the nineteenth century, these elites treated these non-white groups differently: while they provided citizenship rights to some, they identified others as key threats to the political order, targeting them with coercive and assimilationist policies. For instance, in Chile, Creole elites after independence recognized indigenous groups in the North as citizens, while claiming that the Mapuche in the South were not ready for such rights (Rodriguez, 2003). In Colombia, indigenous peoples were protected by the state while slavery of Afro-descendants persisted well after independence, as slaveowners were scared of a destructive uprising (Safford, 1991; Safford and Palacios, 2002). Those past dynamics likely shape national states today. The Mapuche in Chile continue to be perceived as a threat by the state, with the state formulating a so-called "anti-terrorism law" that specifically targets

their activities (Laborde, 2022). Paraguay, on the other extreme, is an example of national integration, in particular of the Guarani population, that started in the nineteenth century.

We examine these differences between groups' status, in particular whether they were *targeted* through specific discriminatory state policies before 1945. We argue that while ethnic mobilization in the *nineteenth century* could have led to some groups' emancipation, elites' pre-conceptions against particular groups based on their efforts to mobilize in the *colonial* period led to their targeting by the state. In such cases, mobilization fueled elites' fears of a "race war" (Sabau, 2022; Lasso, 2007). While the consequences of ethnic mobilization in Latin America have been extensively analyzed for recent decades,[2] we know much less about how they impacted ethnic groups' status in the century following independence.

While Straus (2015) originally formulated his concept of exclusionary foundational narratives to explain genocide in a few African countries, the ethnic connotations described above show how Latin America fits a similar pattern. In both cases, the primary political community is equated to an specific social (ethnic) group in a country. Further similarities can be found between Latin America and Africa, as well as other post-colonial contexts. For instance, both regions are characterized by high inequality between ethnic groups (Baldwin and Huber, 2010). However, as Vogt (2018, 2019) argues, the structure of inequality varies across these two sets of post-colonial countries. Most countries in Africa are segmented societies in which ethnic groups live in separate sub-societies and whereby new elites replaced the colonizers after decolonization (Vogt, 2018). In contrast, Latin American countries, like other colonial settler societies, are dominated by the descendants of the colonizers and are characterized by hierarchies between interdependent groups (Vogt, 2018). A similar structure of ethnic hierarchies can be found in Anglo-Saxon countries like the US, Canada, and Australia. Latin America is also often compared to Europe in terms of their nationalist ideologies: while Europe defines the nation often in opposition to an external "other" (e.g., Germans because not French), Latin American countries define it against an internal enemy (e.g. Chilean because not indigenous) (Centeno, 2002; Safford, 2013). Whether this is the case of Europe is open to debate, but this comparison nevertheless shows the relevance of looking at internal enemies as a method to define the nation.

5 Data and method

As mentioned earlier, one of the main contributions this paper seeks to make is to analyze the effect of ethnic mobilization in the pre-20th century context on political status, quantitatively. To achieve this aim, this paper uses three main original datasets: first, the Latin American Revolts Database covering from 1830 to 1930. Second, a novel list of indigenous and slave revolts during colonial times. And lastly, a measure of political status from independence until 1945, roughly based on but also expanding on a variable contained in the Ethnic Power Relations

[2](Yashar, 2005; Van Cott, 2005; Vogt, 2016; Madrid, 2012)

dataset (after 1945) (Vogt et al., 2015). In the following sections, we will describe the contents of each of these datasets in turn.

5.1 Ethnic mobilization: LARD and colonial revolts

First, the Latin American Revolts Database (LARD) (Madrid and Schenoni, 2024) includes all instances in which a politically defined group uses violence or threatens the use of violence against the state's authority. Each of these is referred to as a "revolt". We focus on violent, as opposed to non-violent, ethnic mobilization as they are "most likely" to generate fears among elites, and thus targeting. We recognize that, in that sense, we differ from previous studies that tend to focus on recent ethnic movements that tend to be non-violent, with a few exceptions (e.g. the Zapatistas in Mexico (Wimmer, 2002)).

The dataset distinguishes between different types of revolts according to the nature of their participants and leadership. In order to measure ethnic mobilization, the analysis focuses on the sub-type of revolts referred to as "popular uprisings", or revolts led by non-elites. In a next step, we identify among these revolts those with an "ethnic" dimension. This is based on a single criterion, namely whether the revolt participants or leaders mobilize in defense of a given ethnic group and make claims on its behalf. This coding strategy differs slightly from that of established datasets, like ACD2EPR, which also uses participation or recruitment as a criterion to identify ethnic conflicts (Vogt et al., 2015). In this particular context, leaving out recruitment as a sufficient criterion helps us distinguish ethnic from class-based revolts, which constituted the predominant form of mobilization in the region (Yashar, 2005; Rice, 2012). Class-based movements, such as peasant rebellions, often recruited heavily from the indigenous or Afro-descendant population, since they belonged to these lower social classes (Lucero, 2012; Butler and Helg, 2011). Yet, these movements acted on behalf of a given social class, not a particular ethnic group. For instance, the revolts making up the Caste War of Yucatan (Mexico) have a clear ethnic dimension, with Mayans aiming to improve their situation and create an independent state (Reed, 1964). In contrast, the revolts of the Mexican Revolution are driven by peasants' concerns, despite there being indigenous peoples in their ranks (Mallon, 1995).

Figure 1 shows the proportion of popular uprisings that are considered "ethnic" across countries.[3] Contrary to suggestions in the current literature (see e.g. Yashar, 2005; Rice, 2012), ethnic groups did mobilize prior to recent decades. In fact, in countries like Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, ethnic mobilization constitutes the modal type of mobilization among non-elites. Table 1 indicates which groups mobilized in each country. While in Argentina, Peru and Bolivia, ethnic mobilization is widespread across different indigenous and other groups, in countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, one particular group is rebelling.

[3]A careful observer will note that Uruguay is missing from the plot, this is because there are no documented popular uprisings in this country for the period studied. Paraguay also does not display any ethnic uprisings in this period. We use these countries as cases where no ethnic mobilization occurred, thus targeting might have been solely based on colonial legacies. These cases help us increase our number of observations yet bias our coefficients downward.



Figure 1: Revolts by type

Country	Ethnic revolts	Participants
Argentina	6 (60%)	Pampas/Patagonia (ind.) (5), Mapuche (4), Quechua-Diaguita (1)
Bolivia	13 (86.67%)	Aymara (1), Aymara; Quechua (10), Lowland peoples (2)
Chile	2 (25%)	Mapuche (2)
Colombia	1 (25%)	Afro-Colombians (1)
Ecuador	76 (83.52%)	Indigenous highland peoples (76)
Paraguay	0 (0%)	
Peru	13 (92.86%)	Afro-Peruvians (3), Asian (2), Amazon (ind.) (1), Andes (ind.) (7)

Table 1: Revolts by country, disaggregated per ethnic group

To measure mobilization in the colonial period we also created an original data on indigenous and Afro-descendant mobilization in the period between 1550 and 1830. The starting point of this list are a series of master lists, including a list of major indigenous rebellions created by Rosati (1996), Coatsworth's (1988) list of rural rebellions and the Organizacion Mundo Afro's (2006) record of slave uprisings. We then expanded these lists using country-specific sources. Similar to the previous dataset, we focus solely on revolts that implicated violence. Figure 2 shows the number of groups per country depending on whether they rebelled our not in the colonial period. We see that a few groups that did not mobilize in the post-independence period, like those situated in Paraguay and Uruguay as seen in Figure 1, did mobilize in the colonial period. Thus, we can see that mobilization in the post-independence period is not necessarily a continuation of colonial mobilization. In countries like Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru we also find that not all groups rebelled in this period.

5.2 Political status: targeting of ethnic groups

As already mentioned, in this paper we go beyond political status in terms of inclusion and exclusion from power, and look more closely to the state treatment of excluded groups. In particular, we focus on whether groups are *targeted* by the state with discriminatory policies. This conceptualization is largely inspired by the Ethnic Power Relation's (EPR) measure of ethnic discrimination, as a subcategory of ethnic exclusion (Vogt et al., 2015). They view discrimination as an active, intentional, targeted policies against a particular group (Vogt et al., 2015, 1331). We deviate from this definition slightly, particularly in the coding process. In our coding, we do not only care that such policies are in place, but that state elites explicitly identify a particular group as the subject. This identification does not necessarily occur at the level of official documents, but becomes apparent when looking at elites' discourse. In contrast, EPR's coding of discrimination often refers to generalized policies that might affect a particular group disproportionately. In this section we discuss a few examples to clarify the differences of our outcome variable with EPR's coding of discrimination.

For instance, in EPR's coding, literacy requirements for voting qualify as grounds for discrimination of *all* indigenous groups in a country. Instead, we look at whether such requirements are introduced to restrict the right to vote of a particular group, or if there are other alternatives for these groups to gain vot-



Figure 2: Colonial mobilization per country

ing rights. In the case of Peru, literacy requirements were found in many of its constitutions (Del Aguila, 2010). Nevertheless, indigenous groups could still vote in their status as they paid the "personal contribution", which was introduced in 1860 purposefully to allow their ability to vote (Del Aguila, 2010). Hence, we do not code indigenous groups as targeted from that period onwards. In contrast, we cod Afro-peruvians as targeted in the 1850s, despite the abolition of slavery, because the government introduced voting restrictions for those who are in specific lower-rank professions associated to these groups (Arrelucea Barrantes and Cosamalon Aguilar, 2015). In EPR, both groups would be considered discriminated, yet we viewed the policy surrounding Afro-Peruvians to be targeting these groups, while indigenous peoples seemed to be accommodated by the state.

Similarly, in Bolivia, literacy restrictions were in place for most of the period under examination (Del Aguila, 2010). Nevertheless, the government kept in place colonial structures of tribute that were demanded by indigenous peoples themselves, since these allow them to preserve their rights over communal land (Larson, 2004). Both the indigenous in Peru and in Bolivia become truly targeted when, after the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), social Darwinism and positivism started to take hold among elites, who focused on policies to address these groups "racial backwardness" (Larson, 2004). Further examples of targeting include the Mapuche in Chile and the Indigenous peoples of the Pampa/Patagonia in Argentina, who were explicitly named by elites as "savages" and "uncivilized", and thus undeserving of citizenship unlike their other indigenous counterparts (Rodriguez, 2003; Gordillo and Hirsch, 2003).

Our group selection also differs from that of EPR. The latter focuses on "politically relevant" groups, as those that are either included in government, represented by a national-level organization, or discriminated by the government (Vogt et al., 2015). Instead, we also consider "politically irrelevant" groups, since they fit within our understanding of "peripheral" or "tolerated" groups. This type of coding entails also dis-aggregating composite groups like "Indigenous peoples" into various sub-groups, which the state often differentiated in its policies. For instance, we separate the Waynuu from the rest of the indigenous population in Venezuela, since the latter were subject to colonization policies in their territories (Paz Reverol, 2014). We also separate the various indigenous peoples of Argentina, which were distinguished by elites in the early decades after independence (Gordillo and Hirsch, 2003). Adding these groups is also important since we are focusing on a different period than EPR, when other identities were more relevant.

Figures 3 and 4 display the variation of our coding of political status (targeted vs. tolerated) over time and across groups for two countries in our sample, Peru and Bolivia. While the original dataset starts the coding in the year of independence, we restrict these variables to the period from 1830 onwards to match our mobilization data. As seen in Figure 3, groups like the indigenous peoples of the Andes and Amazon were targeted until 1860, when their right to vote was guaranteed through tributary policies. In contrast, Afro-Peruvians are targeted either by slavery until 1854 or by voting restrictions that were targeted at them



Figure 3: Status of groups over time (Peru)

in the mid-19th century. We also include the Asian immigrant community, who were subject to slavery-like labor regimes for much of the 19th century. Figure 4 show similar variation for ethnic groups in Bolivia, indicating the shift in the late 19th century to targeted policies aimed at Highland indigenous peoples (Quechua and Aymara), whose primary objective was to assimilate them through the expropriation of their land and the dismantling of previous colonial rights (Larson, 2004).

5.3 Method

The hypotheses are tested in a longitudinal framework with group-years as unit of analysis. The main independent variable corresponds to a cumulative measure of the number of a revolts since independence until the year before the outcome is measured. Using the cumulative measure should help capture slow changes in status in response to mobilization, as well as elites' growing sense of danger as groups repeatedly mobilize. Robustness checks are performed using alternative specifications of this variable, including a dummy variable indicating whether the group mobilized at all in the examined period. Given the often large disparities in terms of mobilization across groups within and across countries, this robustness check should alleviate concerns that one single case is driving the results. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the group is targeted



Figure 4: Status of groups over time (Bolivia)

in a given year. Given the binary nature of the outcome, we perform logistic regressions. These are also Markov transition models that adjust for the previous status of groups. This method is used to alleviate the possible reverse causality between mobilization and political status, as targeted groups are more likely to mobilize in an effort to combat discriminatory policies. The analysis is based on the following model:

$$Y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{ict-1} + \beta_2 Revolts_{ict} + \beta_3 Colonial_{ic} + \beta_4 Revolts * Colonial + \sigma \text{X'}_{ic} + \delta_c + \epsilon_{ict}$$

The index i, c, t correspond to groups in a country in a given year. Y_{ict} signifies the outcome, namely whether a group was targeted by the state in a given year. $\beta_1 Y_{ict-1}$ stands for a lagged version of the outcome, to avoid issues of reverse causation. The main coefficients of interest measure the impact of the number of revolts until a given year (β_2), of having rebelled in the colonial period (β_3), and an interaction between the two (β_4). $\sigma \text{X'}_{ic}$ corresponds to a matrix of time-varying and/or group-varying controls. These include a quadratic measure of the relative size of the group, measured in a single snapshot given data availability. To compute this measure, we relied on a combination of geo-referenced ethnic settlement maps (Alt, 1847), census data and EPR's measures of group sizes (Vogt et al., 2015).[4] Large groups have greater political leverage, but pose more of a threat to elites, thus indicating an inverse-U relationship with discrimination (Vogt, 2016). Additionally, larger groups have greater capacity to mobilize (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). The analysis also adjusts for diffusion effects from revolts by comparable groups (e.g., other indigenous or Afro-descendant groups), in other countries. Such revolts are also likely going to make elites fearful of the ethnic groups in their own countries, even if they have not mobilized yet. Lastly, the models incorporate country-fixed effects to compare groups within countries (δ_c).

6 Findings

The analysis largely corroborates our expectations that ethnic mobilization's effect on state's discriminatory targeting might be conditional on groups' colonial history of conflict. But first, let us inspect the association between ethnic mobilization and targeting. As stated in H1a and H1b, the effect of ethnic mobilization on state's treatment of ethnic groups is ambiguous: while it might generate fears of a "race war" and threat perceptions among elites, especially in this particular setting where foundational narratives are largely exclusionary (H1a), it can also

[4]Peru's groups' sizes are based on the 1876 census (Diaz, 1974), Argentina's on the 1869 census (Gobierno Argentino, 1872), and Colombia's on the 1912 census (Gobierno Colombiano, 1912). In Bolivia we use the 1900 census to get the share of Afro-Bolivians (Gobierno Boliviano, 1904). For the remaining groups of Bolivia, as well as for Venezuela, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile we rely on EPR group sizes. In all cases except Colombia and Uruguay, the shares are combined with the 1847 ethnic settlement map to get the relative sizes of indigenous sub-groups (e.g. Waynuu in Venezuela, Guarani in Paraguay, etc.)

signal the political significance of groups (H1b). The results in Table 2 speak in favor this ambiguous effect of ethnic mobilization on ethnic discrimination. The correlation itself is negative and marginally significant at the 10% level. We still take this as evidence that the effect is ambiguous, although could be tilting in the direction suggested in H1b. Models using a binary version of post-independence mobilization show also no significant association between having mobilized in the century after independence and being targeted by the state (see Table 4 in the Appendix). The main results in Table 2 also show that previous status is highly positively associated with current status, underscoring the "sticky-ness" of political status in this context (see also Vogt, 2019).

Table 2: Ethnic mobilization and targeting

	Dependent variable:			
	Targeting (binary)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-independence revolts (no.)	−0.003	−0.018	−0.013	−0.048^{+}
	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Targeted (t-1)		8.711**	8.682**	8.576**
		(0.335)	(0.341)	(0.355)
Relative size			−5.889	9.210
			(8.237)	(11.037)
Relative size^2			19.431	−26.694
			(26.714)	(35.432)
Revolts by comparable groups			0.143	0.169
			(0.219)	(0.219)
Constant	0.471**	−4.308**	−4.146**	−3.519**
	(0.039)	(0.261)	(0.322)	(0.485)
Country FE	no	no	no	yes
Observations	3,056	3,041	2,940	2,940
Log Likelihood	−2,038.063	−208.159	−201.863	−195.412
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,080.125	422.317	415.725	418.823
Note:				$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

If the effect of ethnic mobilization on the likelihood of being targeted by the state is unclear, we suggest that elites' pre-conceptions toward certain groups will tilt the balance in favor of either mechanism suggested in H1a and H2b. Hence, the next set of models adds a binary measure of previous mobilization during the colonial period, both as an additional covariate and as an interaction term with the extent of mobilization in the post-independence period. According to H2, we would expect that groups that mobilize in the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century are likely going to be targeted if they mobilized in the colonial period, given pre-existing negative perceptions associated to these groups. The results in Table 3 corroborate this expectations. The interaction terms displayed in Column 3 indicate that groups

that mobilize in both periods are more likely to be targeted by the state, whereas those that only mobilized after independence are still less likely to be targeted. For instance, in Colombia Afro-descendants mobilized both during the colonial and post-colonial period, same as the Mapuche in Chile, and both groups were targeted for most part of the 19th century. The correlation between previous mobilization and targeting is also positive, indicating strong legacies from the colonial period, in terms of elites negative biases toward particular groups. In fact, the association between previous and current status largely disappears after introducing this variable, which suggests that the previous status of groups, especially at independence, could have been determined by groups' colonial history. The control variables again have no significant associations with the outcome.

Table 3: Ethnic mobilization and targeting (conditional)

	Dependent variable:		
	Targeting (binary)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Post-independence revolts (no.)	−0.019	−0.046^{+}	−1.068*
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.480)
Colonial revolt (binary)	8.715**	8.534**	8.543**
	(0.336)	(0.356)	(0.359)
Targeted (t-1)	0.125	0.553	0.157
	(0.373)	(0.580)	(0.613)
Relative size		6.943	7.299
		(11.435)	(11.230)
Relative size^2		−20.980	−25.931
		(36.431)	(35.867)
Revolts by comparable groups		0.153	0.119
		(0.222)	(0.228)
Revolts (post) x Revolt (col)			1.025*
			(0.480)
Constant	−4.400**	−3.649**	−3.539**
	(0.381)	(0.523)	(0.514)
Country FE	no	yes	yes
Observations	3,041	2,940	2,940
Log Likelihood	−208.102	−194.953	−193.025
Akaike Inf. Crit.	424.205	419.906	418.050
Note:			$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Because we are using the number of revolts as an indicator for post-independence



Figure 5: Marginal effect of post-independence revolt (binary)

mobilization, the results could be driven by a few groups that mobilized extensively during this period. As seen in the previous section, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador, particularly those situated in the Highlands, mobilized to a record degree during the period examined. Hence, we run the analyses again but excluding Ecuador from the sample. The results, as shown in Table 5 in the Appendix, remain robust. We also generate models in which mobilization in the post-independence period is measured in binary terms, indicating whether a group mobilized at all in a given period. While the results are not as potent as with the cumulative measure, we still find a (marginally) significant interaction effect between having rebelled in the post-independence period and in the colonial period, in the expected direction (see Table 6 in the Appendix).

Figure 5 shows the marginal effect using the binary measure of post-independence mobilization. As seen in the figure, there is little difference in terms of the likelihood of being targeted among groups who did not mobilize during the post-independence period. However, for those who mobilize in the post-independence period, the likelihood of being targeted is much higher if they mobilized in the colonial period. Again, this corroborates our expectations in H2, and confirms our intuition that we need to consider long-term patterns of conflict to understand elites' attitudes toward certain groups.

In sum, these results indicate that, while ethnic mobilization can be an important method for groups to attain further rights and overcome discrimination by the state, it is only effective if the state does not have negative pre-conceptions, given by a prior history of conflict.

7 Conclusion

This paper examined the impact of ethnic mobilization on state's discriminatory policies towards ethnic groups. We sought to make three contributions: first, we examined the political implications of violence ethnic mobilization in 19th century Latin America, which have remained under-studied as most research focuses on the consequences of recent ethnic social movements. Second, we expanded our understanding of political status to study "ethnic targeting", a specific type of discrimination that is more severe and identifies a particular group as the subject of state concerns. Lastly, we suggest that, in order to truly address mobilizations' political consequences, we need to consider conflict patterns over the long-term. We studied these aspects in a sample of South American countries during the key period of nation-building, where Creole elites where defining both the primary political community and dealt with threats to their rule. Our findings show that, while ethnic mobilization in the 19th century by itself does not seem to make a difference to groups' status, taking into consideration groups' colonial history of conflict elicits a much clearer picture. We find that those groups who rebelled in both periods tend to be targeted by the state, likely because of negative preconceptions by elites that helped frame such mobilizational attempts more easily as a threat. In contrast, those who only mobilized in the post-independence period have better chances of getting further rights and alleviating their exclusion.

These findings are relevant to understand current patterns of ethnic discrimination and inclusion in the region, and invite scholars to consider similar dynamics in other contexts, particularly post-colonial countries. Further research could improve on the analysis by relying on instrumental variable analysis, to circumvent issues of reverse causation. We also aim to expand the scope of the paper to include the full Latin American region. Another interesting avenue of research could look at particular windows of opportunity for groups' inclusion or emancipation, which arise as a product of other types of conflict. For instance, White elites who took over power after civil conflicts, like the Liberal and Conservative conflicts of the 19th century, rewarded those ethnic groups that had aided them in their victory (Sobrevilla Perea, 2023). Additionally, governments often expanded their definition of citizenship to facilitate conscription in large-scale inter-state conflicts (Shesko, 2020). Further research could examine whether, in such cases, the long-term legacies of conflict can be reversed.

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Appendix

Table 4: Ethnic mobilization (binary) and targeting

	Dependent variable:			
	Targeting (binary)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Revolt (binary)	1.230**	0.503	0.607	0.434
	(0.086)	(0.344)	(0.375)	(0.435)
Targeted (t-1)		8.604**	8.570**	8.471**
		(0.332)	(0.340)	(0.348)
Relative size			−11.854	−4.490
			(7.641)	(10.432)
Relative size^2			35.959	14.196
			(24.767)	(33.892)
Revolts by comparable groups			0.170	0.201
			(0.223)	(0.224)
Constant	0.062	−4.466**	−4.159**	−3.508**
	(0.045)	(0.279)	(0.321)	(0.483)
Country FE	no	no	no	yes
Observations	3,056	3,041	2,940	2,940
Log Likelihood	−1,925.131	−207.577	−200.738	−196.868
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,854.263	421.153	413.476	421.737
Note:				$^+$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table 5: Ethnic mobilization and targeting (conditional) (minus Ecuador)

	Dependent variable:		
	Targeting (binary)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Post-independence revolts (no.)	0.048	−0.061	−1.056*
	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.478)
Colonial revolt (binary)	−0.058	0.629	0.206
	(0.389)	(0.575)	(0.613)
Targeted (t-1)	8.645**	8.506**	8.468**
	(0.361)	(0.387)	(0.389)
Relative size		2.030	1.708
		(11.927)	(11.811)
Relative size2		−6.049	−9.549
		(37.691)	(37.295)
Revolts by comparable groups		0.152	0.124
		(0.224)	(0.231)
Revolts (post)x Revolt (col)			1.047*
			(0.493)
Constant	−4.369**	−3.619**	−3.504**
	(0.382)	(0.523)	(0.511)
Country FE	no	yes	yes
Observations	2,706	2,605	2,605
Log Likelihood	−186.809	−175.140	−173.195
Akaike Inf. Crit.	381.619	378.280	376.390
Note:			+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table 6: Ethnic mobilization (binary) and targeting (conditional)

	Dependent variable:		
	Targeting (binary)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Revolt (binary)	0.550	0.383	−2.034
	(0.362)	(0.449)	(1.312)
Colonial revolt (binary)	−0.146	0.566	0.121
	(0.376)	(0.561)	(0.609)
Targeted (t-1)	8.594**	8.439**	8.409**
	(0.332)	(0.348)	(0.349)
Relative size		−6.169	−7.344
		(10.690)	(10.691)
Relative size^2		17.935	16.300
		(34.478)	(34.374)
Revolts by comparable groups		0.179	0.152
		(0.228)	(0.237)
Revolt (post)x Revolt (col)			2.685+
			(1.384)
Constant	−4.373**	−3.625**	−3.525**
	(0.366)	(0.514)	(0.504)
Country FE	no	yes	yes
Observations	3,041	2,940	2,940
Log Likelihood	−207.502	−196.354	−194.579
Akaike Inf. Crit.	423.003	422.708	421.158
Note:			+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01