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Is the Liberal Soft Power Use a Myth? Comparing Democracies and Non-democracies' Soft Power Use

Abstract

Soft power literature has suggested that it is the liberal democracies that end up relying on soft power tools and not the non-democracies. The underlying theory advocates that soft power is an American concept that was created to support the spread of liberal ideology. This paper compares two groups of countries to test if the democracies and non-democracies actually use the same amount of soft power. The time-frame is 1995-2010. Using recoded events data, the findings indicate that non-democracies use a surprising amount of soft power. China uses 87% of soft power compared to the USA's 83% and Russia's 81%. Therefore, the results show that all countries use soft power, not just the liberal democracies.

Introduction

“The ability to get others to want what you want” in foreign policy has been defined as soft power (Nye 2011 p. 243). The key concept in Nye's (2011) definition is attraction. Countries can only wield more soft power if they are able to generate attraction. Attraction refers to creating a positive magnetic affect (Nye 2011 p. 92). Soft power builds on this positive attraction that sways others to behave in a preferable way.

In foreign policy this is an important tool as using soft power can lead to international cooperation. For example, after the Cold War, reestablishing diplomatic relationships, strengthening trade and military alliances were all among the top foreign policy goals of nations, both democracies and non-democracies. Soft power scholarship initially focused on American soft power use, later moved on to suggest that soft power as a concept has a liberal connotation, finally started to focus on non-democracies' soft power use. The underlying assumption of these

schools are that democracies use soft power to a higher level than non-democracies. This paper compares democracies' and non-democracies' soft power uses.

Soft Power Associated with Liberalism

For this paper, the author relies on Fukuyama's (2022) definition of democracies, which is rule by the people with free and fair multiparty elections under universal suffrage. Fukuyama further describes liberal democracies as democratic regimes where the rule of law and institutions restricting the executive power (Fukuyama 2022). One school of thought argues that as soft power is originally an American concept developed by American political scientist Joseph Nye, soft power is fundamentally a liberal concept (Lock 2010, Atkins 2010, Cox 2013). Continuing this argument, scholars also believe that as such, the use of soft power is also associated with the spread of liberal ideas and ultimately democracy (Lock 2010, Atkins 2010, Cox 2013).

While describing the resources of soft power, in 2011 Nye states that it includes intangible factors such as institutions, ideas, culture and the perceived legitimacy of policies. While Nye does not specifically connect these principles to liberal democracies, after the Cold War time-period it became a natural assumption (Vuving 2009). Further developing the connection between soft power and liberalism, Gallarotti (2010) suggests that soft power occurs when liberal principles such as fair play, cooperation and respect dictate the use of power and hard power is used when illiberal values control the same.

An opposing school pointed out that the use of soft power does not always seem to be associated with liberal democracies, for example, some authoritarian BRICS countries use it (Gallarotti 2016) as well as other non-democracies such as Saudi Arabia (Gallarotti and Filali

2012). Following this theory, Walker (2010) concludes that soft power can be hijacked by non-democracies and used to promote non-liberal ideas.

Scholars also point out China's, Russia's and Saudi Arabia's high soft power use when discussing non-democratic countries' reliance on soft power tools. In recent literature an increasing level of soft power use is connected with Russia and China as both emerging countries want to showcase their attractiveness by using a high-level of soft power (Grix and Lee 2013, Grix, Brannagan and Houlihan 2015, Trunkos 2021). According to some scholars, they sometimes surpass the U.S. (Diamond 2019, Van Herpen 2015, Kurlantzick 2007, Layne 2018).

Nye responds directly to the association of liberal ideology with the concept of soft power in his current work (2021) stating that liberalism is not built into the concept of soft power,¹ however, the two opposite approaches have not been evaluated against each other. Therefore, this research evaluates if liberal democracies use more soft power than non-democracies. The author uses statistical analysis of 81 countries to compare democracies and non-democracies' level of soft power use. The conceptual and operation assumption of this research is that democracy status is always associated with some level of liberal ideology (Rhoden 2015).

Theorizing No Connections Between Liberalism and Soft Power Use

The theory of this paper is that countries have been utilizing their soft powers regardless of their democracy status to enhance their influence internationally. As Vuving (2009) stated, in terms of states' behaviors there are three types of characteristics that lead to positive attraction, namely benignity, competence and beauty. Benignity is an aspect of how an agent relates to others. Benign act produces sympathy and credibility. Competence refers to how and agent does

¹ It is also important to note that Nye (2011, 2021) focus on producing soft power for each country but this research focuses on using soft power.

things and it produces respect and admiration. Beauty is defined as the perception of ideas, values and visions (Vuving, 2009)². The author theorizes that none of these behaviors are linked to liberal ideology and any country regardless of democracy status can utilize them to their benefit. In fact, in many ways, it is the non-democracies who need more political marketing to attract the West and everyone else.

In fact, during the post-Cold War time-period, non-democracies as well as democracies were trying to promote their foreign policies to the world. After 45 years of bipolar division the non-democracies such as Russia and China had to use their soft power tools to attract other countries and create new alliance and strengthen existing ones. Countries want to interact more with other states and they want to attract them with their own strengths, which does not always include the norms and values of a democracy.

The listed schools are divided about the role of liberal ideology in soft power, thus the author suggest that non-democracies use soft power just as well. Specifically, this author proposes the following hypothesis:

Ho: The mean value of democracies and non-democracies soft power use is the same

The author evaluates 51 democracies and 30 non-democracies to create a comprehensive study of these two types of countries soft power use. The author argues that contrary to some literature, soft power is not a foreign policy tool specifically used by liberal democracy. In fact, non-democracies such as China, Saudi Arabia and Russia rely on it just as well. Before the

² The success of soft power depends on both the agent having one the listed qualities, otherwise the given actions may produce indifference or dislike (Nye 2011).

author discusses the results, a deeper discussion of the conceptual development of soft power is revealed.

Concept of Soft Power and its Relationship with Hard Power

Despite that the initial soft power definition (Nye 1990) has been around for more than three decades, a fundamental conflict in soft power literature still exists regarding a clear measurable definition of soft power and its instruments (Parmar and Cox 2010, Naim 2013, Jain 2017, Doeser and Nisbett 2017, Gallarotti 2018). This issue leads to further problems with measuring and categorizing foreign policy tools. Soft power literature offers two conflicting conceptualizations; the earlier one is based on a conceptual dichotomy of power instruments in the form of soft power and hard power tools (Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Jain 2017) and the later one is based on a mixed-approach (Nye 2011, Gallarotti 2011) in which soft and hard power instruments mix and interact. For example, soldiers rebuilding schools in a war zone would add to the soldiers' country's soft power, according to the dichotomous approach via the benevolent action of the soldiers, however, the mixed-approach would evaluate the same scenarios as the rebuilding of the school counting for soft power, but the contradictions and harm caused by the soldiers and the war taking away from such soft power.

The dichotomous approach is more focused on identifying the instruments and actions and categorizing it as either hard or soft power. But the mixed-approach is more interested in a deeper evaluation of the interaction and perception of the used instruments. According to their framework, the foreign policy actions can weaken or strengthen each other. The next section will review the conceptual development of soft power from the early dichotomous approach to the later mixed-approach.

Dichotomous School: Dichotomous Conceptualization for Hard and Soft Power

Many soft power publications use the dichotomous conceptualization of instruments (Yan 2007, Sun 2008; Li 2009, Jain 2017, Cough 2017). The dichotomous school views power instruments as mutually exclusive. This means that all power tools can be categorized as either a soft power or a hard power tool (Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cough 2017, Jain 2017). According to this view, what matters is the ability to clearly place each tool into one or the other category. It is important to note here that the dichotomous school does not argue that there is no interaction between the soft and hard power tools, they merely create categories in which foreign policy tools can be placed.

At the time when Nye (1990) introduced the concept of soft power into the power literature, scholars were mostly concerned with the various aspects of power also known as the faces of power debate. As a reaction to this literature, it was Nye's (1990) work that created the first conceptual separation of soft and hard power. Some of the soft power scholars continued to work with the dichotomous understanding of power and power instruments (Yan 2007; Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cough 2017, Jain 2017). In this approach, the conceptual focus is on creating guidelines between soft and hard power categories in order to be able to recognize, separate and apply them in foreign policy.

Another example from a more recent dichotomous conceptual approach is Cough's (2017) work, who stresses the importance of using soft power to make hard power more effective. His examples are concerned with current asymmetric conflicts as he separates soft power instruments and hard power instruments (kinetic warfare). Cough (2017) specifically notes that a more effective and strategic use of soft power tools in the form of communication/narrative about the current U.S. conflicts in the Middle East would allow the U.S. to have more success in the region. This can only be achieved if soft power instruments are

recognized and strategically applied. His dichotomous conceptualization of soft power and hard power (kinetic warfare) serves as another example of scholars separating these power instruments, but it falls short on providing a systematic typology of instruments outside of the military.

As a result of the mentioned efforts, the categorization of power instruments became somewhat clear but all hard and soft power instruments were still not comprehensively and systematically separated. Instead, what we see in the soft power literature is conceptual focus on only a few soft power instruments such as culture, sports or education but no further development of a complex typology of all soft power tools.

The problem emerging from the dichotomous approach is the difficulty of categorizing instruments that can be placed into both power categories. President Trump's social media posts for example, can sometimes be categorized as soft power tools when he tweets about Easter at the Whitehouse, but it can also be categorized as a hard power tool when it is coercive. For instance, when President Trump insulted the North Korean leader by calling him "Rocket Man," that was clearly a hard power action. As this example shows, categorizing Tweeter as a foreign policy tool solely as a soft or hard power instrument makes the general mistake of oversimplifying the usage of the instrument.

Another example is the role of economic instruments. Their classification either as a hard or soft power wielding tool has been questioned from the beginning. Nye (1990) initially placed all economic tools into the hard power category, and later started noting that there are some economic tools such as humanitarian aid that wields soft power (2011). As these examples show, soft power conceptualization would greatly benefit from a more nuanced new typology in which soft power use is clearly separated from hard power use.

Mixed Conceptualization of Soft Power

Another school of soft power scholarship argue that there is a significant interplay between soft and hard power instruments as some tools can play both roles therefore, it is a mistake to separate them into either hard or soft power categories, but instead they need to be conceptualized together. Wilson (2008), Nye's later works (2011) and Gallarotti's (2011) article represent the mixed-conceptual approach. This school of thought also produced concepts such as Nye's (2011) smart power and Kounalakis and Simonyi (2011) and Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) spectral power concepts. These newer conceptualizations of power instruments argue that the academic focus should not be on the separation of power instruments, but instead the focus should be on the successful combination and application of them.

One of the initial mixed approaches was laid out by Wilson (2008, 111) who argued that the national interest was badly served by an imperfect dichotomous power debate. Gallarotti (2011) also suggests that soft power should not be separated from hard power as it may lead to mistakes when categorizing instruments. Instead, soft power and hard power should be evaluated together as they reinforce and weaken each other. After his initial dichotomous approach in 2011, Nye also proposed merging soft power with hard power, which he called smart power. Nye (2011 p. xiv) defines smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy. According to Nye's (2011) conceptualization, smart power was an intelligent integration of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of hard and soft power. This mixed concept recognizes that states use different forms of power at different times to achieve the most appropriate goals. Another mixed approach was the spectral power concept (Kounalakis and Simonyi 2011, Simonyi and Trunkos 2015) which offered a visual

and a conceptual model for the overlapping nature of power instruments similarly to the other mixed approaches mentioned above.

Kounalakis and Simonyi (2011) and later Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) proposed a conceptualization using light as a metaphor to explain how some instruments have both soft power and hard power qualities and instead of searching for the cut points to decide where soft power ends and hard power begins, we should study them as shades of light as colors can mix and create new colors. If a tool, for instance is hard power based on its appearance as well as based on its impact, the spectral power conceptualization would categorize it as hard-hard power and assign the red color to it, while soft-soft instruments would be blue color. Any tool that mixes these powers would end up creating new colors such as orange for hard-soft instruments or green for soft-hard tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015). Another scholar suggesting that a mixed approach is the most accurate for the concept of soft and hard power is Vuving (2019), who argues that on a spectrum of power-behaviors on the softer end are the volunteer actions and towards the harder end are the coercive acts.

The mixed-conceptualization reveals the importance of the interaction and mutual impact of such instruments in foreign policy, but it does not help with the clear recognition of soft or hard power tools, in fact, it further confuses them. The mixed-conceptualization also did not offer any operationalization methods by which any measurable values could be attached to soft and hard power tools. This means that Nye's (2011) and Gallarotti's (2011) points are important as they want to shed light on the interactions of soft and hard power tools, they do not offer any measurement methods to study such occurrence. While both scholars write about how hard power actions can diminish soft power tools, other than a few case studies as examples they do not provide any measurements that would allow scholars to test their

implications on a larger, international scale. Not only the current literature on soft power is not able to compare all countries' soft power use, but also, they do not focus on why some countries seem to rely more on soft power instruments than others.

For example, while the mixed-approach presented by Gallarotti (2011) focuses on powers enhancing or diminishing the other and to illustrate that, using the example of a positive image bolstering national defense by gaining allies, he does not help to categories actions of national defense (such as sending troops). Even more importantly, as Gallarotti (2011) studies how soft power can enhance hard power instruments, he does not offer any ways to validate his claim. He does not develop his theory further to offer an operational mechanism which could measure how much certain soft power resources or actions can enhance hard power. Also, by recognizing that some instruments can wield both soft and hard power, the mixed-approach does not offer a way to identify these instruments. Instead, they argue that we should just focus on the effective use of such combination of tools.

This conceptual debate points to a void in literature in addressing a clear conceptualizations and typology of power instruments. The mixed-approach correctly points to the overlap of soft and hard power instruments, but it fails to take the next step to offer an operational solution separating them. On the other hand, the dichotomous approach recognizes the need for conceptual separation but does not provide clear guidelines to do so. A good approach must first clarify soft power instruments, then study how and why countries' use them. The author provides a solution by first offering a conceptualization based-on the dichotomous approach and using soft power actions to further narrow the research.

New Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Soft Power Actions

For the purpose of this study, the author limits Nye's (2011) definition of soft power to actions taken by states to make themselves more attractive (Trunkos 2021). Soft power actions provide states with more tools than traditional diplomacy. Since the literature does not have a clear consensus on what states do to make themselves attractive this article proposes a typology separating soft power actions from hard power actions. Examples of soft power actions are making a public statement, engaging in a symbolic act, engaging in negotiations or making a visit while hard power actions are threatening, accuse of a crime or use conventional military force. Table 1. provides a list of soft and hard power actions.

Soft Power Actions	Hard Power Actions
engage in symbolic act, grant asylum, return or release person; appeal for diplomatic cooperation, nation building, supporting women's rights and education, host a visit, make a visit, provide humanitarian aid, inducements, positive sanctions, provide economic aid, cooperate economically, cooperate militarily, deployment of peacekeepers	cooperate militarily, demand diplomatic cooperation; reject plan or agreement to settle dispute; threaten to reduce or break relations; demand settling a dispute, accuse of crime or corruption; reject request for rights; threaten to boycott, embargo or sanction; threaten to stop aid, use conventional military force, occupy territory, assassinate, use human shield, violate cease fire

Table 1. The examples of soft power and hard power actions

The creation and separation of soft and hard power actions provide scholars a clear analytical approach that makes it possible to assess a country's foreign policy strategies especially since many non-traditional diplomatic actions can be qualified as soft power actions. For example, making a public statement traditionally would only count as diplomacy, if the statement included diplomatic goals or functions such as engaging in a symbolic act. This article conceptualizes public statements as soft power if they were simply attractive in nature, in other words, did not

include any coercion or threat in the language of the announcement and used the list of “attractive” language listed in Appendix A.

To measure countries’ soft power use, data was collected from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset. The international events are based on news reports from a variety of international news sources and coded according to the CAMEO³ (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) ontology.

The dataset is machine coded and it is provided in a dyad format which the author used to focus on countries interaction with all other countries. TABARI, which is a text analysis program, creates codes for each interaction between countries. Since its creation in 2002 the CAMEO codebook has been evolving to include more detailed events (Gerner et al. 2002). The creators of the ICEWS dataset added their own adjustments to the original CAMEO codebook to clarify the events. These changes have been included in this study.

Recoding the ICEWS Event Dataset

The author recoded ICEWS’ event codes for the purpose of measuring countries’ soft power use. All events are now categorized as either hard power actions or soft power actions. To gauge democracies and non-democracies annual soft power use (percentage), the author added up all soft power actions for each year and divided it by all actions taken (both soft and hard power actions). The author chose the ICEWS dataset because it is one of the most current applications of text analysis program which codes global events, and it allows for the recode of specific government actions⁴. This dataset includes many types of actions between actors including

³ Developed by Gerner, D. J, Philip A. Schrodtt, Ömür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr.

⁴ Events datasets were specifically created to capture the interactions between actors and not the transactions between them (Edward J. Laurence. Events data and policy analysis. *Policy Sciences*, (1990) 23(2), 111-132.

making a public statement, making a visit, hosting a visit, express intent to cooperate. The ICEWS dataset contains more than 15 million events with global coverage from 1999 to 2020.

The CAMEO coding system is based on extensive dictionaries which classifies actors and events and then links them with specific codes. Using TABARI, the events are coded 1 through 20 based on the type of action on a cooperation and conflict scale where 1 is making a public statement and 20 is committing mass violence (Leetaru and Scrodt 2013). The actions range from diplomacy to waging war with multiple sub-events totaling over 300 event categories. Events that the author re-classified as soft power actions were recoded as 1. Events that the author re-classified as hard power action received 2. A list of the newly coded events can be seen in Appendix A. Using a recoded events database ICEWS the author studies the percentage of soft power actions taken over all actions taken by each country for the time-period of 1995-2010.

Methodology

In order to compare democracies and non-democracies soft power use, this article turns to quantitative analysis. First, the author operationalizes and measures states soft power use using the explained recoded ICEWS events data. Second, the author compares the mean values and the summary statistics of the created two groups using a two-sided t-test with equal variance. The main goal is to compare the two regime types' general soft power use. Finally, the author compares the top 3 democracies and non-democracies' soft power use percentage to see if the top users of these two groups' reliance-percentage on soft power differs to a significant level (20%).

Democracies: contains 51 democracies (see Appendix B). The countries were selected by the Polit V scores. Countries that scored 6 or higher on the Polity V scale were categorized as democracies.

Non-Democracies: contains 30 countries that scored below 5 or below on the Polity V scale (see Appendix C). The number of democracies and non-democracies were not equalized to allow for a less restricted analysis of available data.

Results

Starting with the first and second steps of this analysis, after the author recoded events data for both democracies and non-democracies, the mean values of the two groups were compared. The question was whether both groups rely on soft power to an equal degree. Looking at Table 2 of the summary statistics of the two groups clearly shows that, based on the average soft power use of democracies and non-democracies, they use a similar amount. Democracies use 78% (average for 16 years) and non-democracies use 74% (average for 16 years). Therefore, democracies only use 4% more soft power than non-democracies.

Table 2. Democracies and Non-democracies' soft power use summary statistics (1995-2010)

	Mean	Min	Max	# Observations
Democracies	78%	50	94	51
Non-Democracies	74%	54	91	30

As Table 2. reveals, the democracy level of the regime does not seem to matter when it gets to countries soft power reliance. Even more importantly, looking closer to the non-democratic group, their minimum soft power use value is slightly higher at 50% than democracies at 54%. This means that for a smaller non-democratic country such as Vietnam, the government officials use around 2,941 number soft power actions per year. This 4% difference for Vietnam translates into around 117 actions annually such as making a trip abroad for the leaders or hosting or attending a diplomatic event. Looking at the maximum values for each respective group, democracies lead by 94% soft power use over non-democracies with 91%. Again, this 3 % difference is not a significant amount.

In order to examine the variance of the two sample groups, the author also completed Levine's test for robust equal variance, which showed that the two groups are equal in variance (See Appendix D). Further, for this non-directional hypothesis to be tested, the authored used a two-tailed t-test with two independent samples with equal variances to compare the mean values of the democracies and nondemocracies' soft power use percentage. The results indicate that the alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected as the two-sided P value is larger than 0.05 (See Appendix D). This result confirms that the two groups, namely democracies and non-democracies, do not use soft power to a different degree. Stated differently, the numbers show that non-democracies use soft power just as much as democracies.

Finally, using the recoded events data to rank the tops soft power user from each group and then compare their soft power use, the author concludes similarly to the other tests that non-democracies use soft power just as much as democracies. Looking at specifically the top performers of soft power from each regime type, Table 3 shows that Finland with 94% leads the democratic countries group but Vietnam (non-democracy) is not far behind with 91%. This means that these two nations' soft power use in foreign policy is very similar. Out of 100 interactions with other countries, they rely on 94 or 91 soft power actions respectively. Finland is known for it's high use of democracy as well as soft power use (Trunkos and Cox 2023) but Vietnam is not yet known to be such a high soft power user. Therefore, this is a new finding of this research.

Table 3. Top 3 Democracies and Non-Democracies Soft Power Use Percentage Comparison 1995-2010

Democracies	Soft Power % Average	Non-Democracies	Soft Power % Average
#1 Finland	94	#1 Vietnam	91
#2 Slovenia	94	#2 Burkina Faso	88
#3 Lithuania	93	#3 China	87

Further, the second and third ranked soft power users differ only slightly. For democracies, Slovenia stands at #2 place with 94% (only decimal place difference between Finland and Slovenia) while Burkina Faso is placed as second with #88% average soft power use for 16 years. The 5% difference does not constitute as significant. Burkina Faso, is also a surprise result of this analysis. The small West African landlocked country only takes about 168 actions per year (including both soft and hard power actions), but 88% of all that is soft power events.

Finally, at third place for democracies is Lithuania (93%) and China for non-democracies with (87%). In order to equalize small and large countries' analysis, the author used the percentage of soft power actions taken over all actions taken, and with comparisons like Lithuania and China, this makes the result more valid. While much larger China takes 20,957 number of actions each year, of which 87% is soft power, small European Lithuanian only takes 1,321 actions annually of which 93% is soft power use.

The result has to be explained a little further. While China can afford to interact with the world using soft and hard power 20,957 times each year, Lithuania, interacts on a much lower scale with the world (1,321). For foreign policy analysis, it is useful and important to state what countries do with respect to their capabilities. Stated differently, Lithuania's 93% only translates

to 1,228 soft power actions annually worldwide (compared to China's (18,233 annual soft power actions), in terms of soft power reliance, Lithuanian is the higher soft power user.

Another surprise of this analysis is the United States is not among the top 3 democracies that use a high level of soft power. According to this analysis the USA stands at # 28 out of the included 51 democracies in its soft power use with 81% average (See Appendix B). This also means that using both hard and soft power tools, the USA uses only 81% soft power actions overall⁵. As a superpower, naturally the US reliance on the highest number of soft power actions each year (40,653) of all other countries.

Conclusion

Answering the question whether non-democracies use the same amount of soft power as liberal democracies, this analysis revealed that they do. While some scholars associate the concept of soft power with liberal ideology, this analysis clearly detached that concept from soft power. For foreign policy analysis this means that soft power is not biased by or attached to liberal ideologies, but rather used by any country that wants to improve its brand and its connections with other countries.

Some of the surprising result of this analysis also needs further evaluation. Vietnam's and Burkina Faso's high soft power use needs to be the focus of future research. Finally, future research needs to include all countries in the analysis using an extended time-frame.

Policy Implications

⁵ It is important to note here that if simply the number of soft power actions were compared across nations, the USA would lead over all others.

Soft power tools are cheaper than hard power tools and due to fast communication provided by fast internet, countries are able to promote their interests fast and cheap. This also means that misinformation and disinformation (many tools of sharp power) can also be utilized. Foreign policy decision-makers need to be aware of such attempts.

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Appendix A

SOFT AND HARD POWE RECODING

The re-coding of the CAMEO mediation dataset is based on the following:

Soft power actions=1

Hard power actions=2

I used MySQL to recode the ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power actions were recoded as 1. All events that were re-classify as hard power action received 2. In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create attractiveness or coerce, or the action was taken towards a third party, these were dropped from the dataset.

Events were dropped in three basic instances:

- 1) When it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create attractiveness or coerce, they were dropped from the analysis.
- 2) When the description of the event was more specific, but the giver or initiator state's intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness could not be determined. For instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244 appeal for military cooperation.
- 3) If the initiator state asked a third party to do something. This action did not provide information about the initiator's action.

Note: When governments only talk about doing something (express intent, demand, appeal for etc.) those actions are all coded as diplomatic actions.

Dropped events:

	dropped from soft power
11	decline comment
12	make a pessimistic comment

13	make an optimistic comment
16	reject or deny responsibility
24	appeal for political reform
26	appeals to others to meet or negotiate
28	appeal to others to engage in or accept mediation
34	express intent to institute political reform
52	defend verbally
53	rally support on behalf of
75	grant asylum
90	Investigate
241	appeal for leadership change
242	appeal for policy change
244	appeal for change in institutions or regime
251	appeal for easing administrative sanction
254	appeal to easing economic sanctions, boycott or embargo
341	express intent to change leadership
342	express intent to change policy
831	accede to demands for change in political leadership
832	accede to demand for policy change
834	accede to demands for institutional or regime change

	dropped from hard power
101	demand material cooperation
104	demand political reform
105	demand that target yield
113	rally opposition against
114	complain officially
120	Reject
123	reject request or demand for political reform
128	defy norms, law
141	demonstrate or rally
1014	demand intelligence cooperation
1041	demand leadership change
1042	demand policy change
1222	reject request for military aid
1224	reject request for military protection or peacekeeping
1231	reject request to change leadership
1232	reject request to change policy
1411	demonstrate or rally for leadership change
1412	demonstrate or rally for policy change

1622	reduce or stop military assistance
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Soft Power Events Coded:

10⁶	make a public statement
14	consider policy option
15	acknowledge or claim responsibility
17	engage in symbolic act
18	make empathetic comment
19	express accord
20	make and appeal or request
21	appeal for material cooperation
22	appeal for diplomatic cooperation
23	appeal for material aid
27	appeal to others to settle dispute
30	express intent to cooperate
31	express intent to engage in material cooperation
32	express intent to cooperate diplomatically
33	express intent to provide material aid
35	express intent to yield
36	express intent to meet and negotiate

⁶ Bold indicates the most commonly used events.

37	express intent to settle dispute
38	express intent to accept mediation
39	express intent to mediate
40	Consult
41	discuss by telephone
42	make a visit
43	host a visit
44	meet at a third location
45	engage in mediation
46	engage in negotiation
50	engage in diplomatic cooperation
51	praise or endorse
54	grant diplomatic recognition
55	Apologize
56	Forgive
57	sign formal agreement
60	engage in material cooperation
61	cooperate economically
63	engage in judicial cooperation
64	share intelligence or information
70	provide aid

71	provide economic aid
73	provide humanitarian aid
74	provide military protection or peacekeeping
80	Yield
81	ease administrative sanctions
82	ease political dissent
83	accede to request for political reform
84	return or release
85	ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo
86	allow international involvement
87	de-escalate military engagement
91	investigate crime or corruption
92	investigate human rights abuse
93	investigate military action
94	investigate war crimes
212	appeal for military cooperation
213	appeal for judicial cooperation
214	appeal for intelligence cooperation
233	appeal for humanitarian aid
234	appeal for military protection or peacekeeping
243	appeal for rights

253	appeal for release of person or property
255	appeal to allow international involvement
311	express intent to cooperate economically
313	express intent to cooperate in judicial matters
314	express intent to cooperate on intelligence
331	express intent to provide economic aid
333	express intent to provide humanitarian aid
334	express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping
343	express intent to provide rights
351	express intent to ease administrative sanctions
352	express intent to ease popular dissent
353	express intent to release person or property
354	express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott on embargo
355	express intent to allow international involvement
356	express intent to de-escalate military involvement
811	ease restrictions on political freedoms
812	ease ban on political parties or politicians
813	ease curfew
814	ease state of emergency or martial law
833	accede to demands for rights

841	return or release persons
842	return or release property
861	receive deployment of peacekeepers
862	receive inspectors
863	allow for humanitarian access
871	declare truce, cease fire
872	ease military blockade
873	demobilize armed forces
874	retreat or surrender military

Hard Power Events Coded:

72	provide military aid
100	Demand
102	demand for diplomatic cooperation
103	demand material aid
106	demand meeting
107	demand settling of dispute
108	demand mediation
110	Disapprove
111	criticize or denounce
112	Accuse

115	bring lawsuit against
116	find guilty or liable
121	reject material cooperation
122	reject request or demand for material aid
124	refuse to yield
125	reject proposal to meet
126	reject mediation
127	reject plan, agreement to settle dispute
129	Veto
130	Threaten
131	threaten, non-force
132	threaten with administrative sanctions
133	threaten political dissent
134	threaten to halt negotiations
135	threaten to halt mediation
136	threaten to halt international involvement
137	threaten with repression
138	threaten with military force
139	give ultimatum
140	engage in political dissent
142	conduct hunger strike

143	conduct strike or boycott
144	obstruct passage or block
145	protest violently or riot
150	demonstrate military or police power
151	reduce relations
152	increase military alert status
153	mobilize or increase police power
154	mobilize or increase armed forces
160	reduce relations
161	reduce or break diplomatic relations
162	reduce or stop material aid
163	impose embargo, boycott or sanctions
164	halt negotiations
166	expel or withdraw
170	Coerce
171	seize or damage property
172	impose administrative sanctions
173	arrest, detain or charge with legal action
174	expel or deport individuals
175	use tactics of violent repression
180	use unconventional violence

181	abduct, hijack, or take hostage
182	physical assault
183	conduct suicide, car or other non-military bombing
184	use human shield
185	attempt to assassinate
186	Assassinate
190	use conventional military force
191	impose blockade, restrict movement
192	occupy territory
193	fight with small arms and light weapons
194	fight with artillery and tanks
195	employ aerial weapons
196	violate cease fire
201	engage in mass expulsion
1011	demand economic cooperation
1012	demand military cooperation
1013	demand judicial cooperation
1031	demand economic aid
1032	demand military aid
1033	demand humanitarian aid
1034	demand military protection or peacekeeping

1043	demand rights
1044	demand change in institutions and regime
1051	demand easing of administrative sanctions
1052	demand easing political dissent
1053	demand release of person or property
1054	demand easing economic boycott, embargo or sanctions
1055	demand to allow international involvement
1056	demand de-escalation of military engagement
1121	accuse of crime corruption
1122	accuse of human rights abuses
1123	accuse of aggression
1124	accuse of war crimes
1125	accuse of espionage
1211	reject economic cooperation
1213	reject judicial cooperation
1214	reject intelligence cooperation
1221	reject request for economic aid
1223	reject request for humanitarian aid
1233	reject request for rights
1234	reject request for change in institution or regime
1241	refuse to ease administrative sanctions

1242	refuse to popular dissent
1243	refuse to release person or property
1244	refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo
1245	refuse to allow international involvement
1246	refuse to de-escalate military engagement
1311	threaten to reduce or stop aid
1312	threaten to boycott, embargo or sanction
1313	threaten to reduce or break relations
1321	threaten with restrictions on political freedoms
1381	threaten with blockade
1382	threaten occupation
1383	threaten unconventional attack
1384	threaten conventional attack
1385	threaten unconventional mass violence

Appendix B-List of 51 Democracies and Soft Power Ranking

Name of country	Soft Power Use % Average 1995-2010
1. Finland	94
2. Slovenia	94
3. Lithuania	92
4. Bulgaria	91
5. Estonia	91
6. Norway	91
7. Romania	91
8. Latvia	90
9. Uruguay	90
10. Japan	89
11. Portugal	89
12. Slovakia	89
13. Cyprus	87
14. Poland	87
15. Ukraine	87
16. Austria	86
17. Czech Republic	86
18. Switzerland	86
19. Macedonia	86
20. Belgium	85
21. Hungary	85
22. South Korea	85
23. Croatia	84
24. Denmark	84
25. Germany	84
26. Sweden	84
27. France	82
28. United States	81
29. Chile	80
30. Italy	79
31. El Salvador	78
32. Greece	78
33. Turkey	75
34. Argentina	74
35. Canada	74
36. Spain	74
37. United Kingdom	74
38. Dominican Republic	72
39. Ireland	71
40. Brazil	69
41. New Zealand	68

42. Trinidad and Tobago	68
43. Peru	66
44. South Africa	66
45. Australia	65
46. Mexico	63
47. Indonesia	61
48. Israel	56
49. India	55
50. Philippines	52
51. Colombia	50

Appendix C-List of 30 Non-Democracies and Soft Power Ranking

Country	Soft Power % Average (1995-2010)
1. Vietnam	91.17
2. Burkina Faso	88.31
3. China	87.16
4. Armenia	86.47
5. Jordan	86.36
6. Azerbaijan	86.03
7. Mali	85.71
8. Kyrgyzstan	84.58
9. Saudi Arabia	82.87
10. Egypt	82.86
11. Russian Federation	80.81
12. Belarus	80.02
13. Iran	79.89
14. Georgia	79.48
15. Tanzania	77.64
16. Morocco	76.72
17. Albania	73.58
18. Bosnia and Herzegovina	73.3
19. Ethiopia	68.37
20. Rwanda	66.39
21. Algeria	65.94
22. Pakistan	65.88
23. Guatemala	65.58
24. Thailand	64.55
25. Zambia	63.5
26. Nigeria	63.2
27. Iraq	61.2
28. Uganda	60.99
29. Zimbabwe	59.78
30. Bangladesh	54.28

Appendix D

Two Sample t-test with equal variance

diff = mean(Dems) - mean(Nondems)	t =	1.8607
H0: diff = 0	Degrees of freedom =	79
Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9667	Pr(T > t) = 0.0665	Pr(T > t) = 0.0333

Nondems	Summary of SPpercentall		Freq.
	Mean	Std. dev.	
Dems	78.784314	11.581561	51
Nondems	73.933333	10.884767	30
Total	76.987654	11.503797	81

W10 = 0.03338772 df(1, 79) Pr > F = 0.85548343