

U.S. Public Opinion and Government Regulation of Foreign Social Media Apps: A “Hidden Consensus” About What to Ban?

Ka Zeng*
University of Massachusetts – Amherst
Email: kzeng@umass.edu

Damian Raess
Université Laval
Email: Damian.raess.1@ulaval.ca

Paul Musgrave
Georgetown University in Qatar
Email: rpm47@georgetown.edu

January 2025

Abstract: How do concerns about foreign social media app’s geopolitical and economic threats and impact on the domestic political economy influence individual support for government decisions to ban such apps? We address this question through a conjoint analysis conducted in November 2024 (N =1,494). Our findings indicate that geopolitical concerns dominate the respondents’ calculations. Apps that pose low risks to U.S. military/intelligence or corporate interests, provide strong data privacy protection, or are privately owned are less likely to be targeted for bans. Political economy concerns about reciprocal access or employment opportunities are also important determinants. App-specific features mattered, but to a lesser extent. Sub-group analysis reveals a remarkable lack of heterogeneity. Our results point to a surprisingly strong “hidden consensus” about what to ban—with TikTok-like features arousing opposition among the American public—suggesting that the trajectories of the liberal international economic order and the digital world order mirror each other.

Keywords: government regulation; digital societies; technology; social media; national security; U.S.-China relations

*The authors contributed to this project equally.

Introduction

Social media applications (“apps”) constitute a building block of contemporary societies. Over one billion people use Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, and WeChat each month, for instance.¹ These apps present a mix of opportunities and risks. They facilitate the sharing of content (information, ideas, photos, videos) at low cost and provide valuable tools for social interactions, freedom of expression, and commerce. On the other hand, critics allege that they raise many potential risks related to topics such as national security, industrial espionage, disinformation, data privacy, and public health.

Governments have recently begun to scrutinize and even crack down on foreign-owned social media apps. India banned the Chinese-owned app TikTok over geopolitical tensions in 2020 (*Forbes* 2023). Relatedly, motivated by national security concerns, governments introduced bans on the use of TikTok by public sector employees in Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Taiwan, the United States (U.S.), and the European Union (E.U.) (*New York Times* 2024a). The crackdown on foreign-owned social media apps reached its climax in the summer of 2024. Expressing concern that TikTok may expose sensitive user data, the Biden administration signed into law legislation forcing the popular Chinese social media app to be sold to a U.S. entity or banned (*New York Times* 2024a). A Brazilian Supreme Court justice blocked the social network X (formerly Twitter), owned by U.S.-based entrepreneur Elon Musk, as part of an effort to fight fake news and uphold democracy (*New York Times* 2024c). Finally, France arrested Pavel Durov, the Russian-born founder of the messaging service Telegram, on charges the network had enabled the trafficking of children and narcotics, a move that intensified the debate over the role of governments (and tech giants) in online speech, privacy, and security (*New York Times* 2024b).

These developments have taken place in the context of a general souring on economic integration. In recent decades, advanced economies have experienced the rise of economic nationalism and protectionism (Broz et al. 2021), epitomized by Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016. This backlash against economic globalization increasingly also manifests itself as a backlash against China-led globalization, including in public opinion (Feng et al. 2021; Schweinberger and Sattler 2023). Rising opposition to Chinese investment acquisitions has been linked to the expansion of governments’ investment screening policies (Bauerle Danzman and Meunier 2023; Chan and Meunier 2022; Raess 2021). The U.S.’s unilateral and bipartisan turn toward trade protectionism (e.g., the U.S.-China trade war) and new rhetoric of “friend-shoring” to increase supply-chain resiliency represents another manifestation of this trend. Little is known, however, about how the public views the regulation of foreign social media.

In this paper, we explore the demand-side for policy restrictions on foreign social media apps in the United States. In particular, we ask if a backlash has emerged against globalization, especially one “with Chinese characteristics,” in the digital realm. We further explore what factors may explain the variation in individual attitudes toward foreign social media bans. A review of the literature and policy debates suggests the possible factors involve security risks; reciprocal access to other countries’ social media markets; economic risks and opportunities; the

¹ <https://datareportal.com/social-media-users> (accessed January 12, 2025).

nature of the app's home country regime; ties between the app's ownership and its home country's government; its target audience; and its moderation policy and privacy protections.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted an online survey experiment in late November 2024 with 1,494 respondents. Because there are many possible contributors to the public's decision-making that co-occur or could co-occur in reality, we employ a conjoint experimental design. The results demonstrate that the public is more likely to support banning foreign apps that entail high risks to U.S. military and intelligence agencies or to U.S. corporate interests; that are dependent on their home-country government; and that lack strong privacy protection. Foreign social media apps that do not offer substantial job creation potential or originate from countries that do not provide reciprocal access to U.S. firms are also more likely to receive the endorsement for banning. Other factors, such as the regime type of the app's home country or the app's moderation policies or target audience, also mattered, but to a smaller degree than these geopolitical or political economy considerations. Heterogeneity analyses show that the results are generally robust to the respondents' demographic characteristics and political orientation such as age and partisanship.

These results contribute to discussions over the politics of globalization and social media apps by pointing to a surprisingly strong "hidden consensus" about what to ban. Our study shows that there is a broad, cross-party, societal support for banning TikTok-type foreign social media apps in the United States. TikTok possesses virtually all the features that arouse opposition among the American public. Indeed, our results suggest it would have been difficult to design an app to which the U.S. public would be less sympathetic to than TikTok, at least as the platform has been depicted to in the U.S. public (and elsewhere).

In concrete terms, our findings suggest the re-election of Donald Trump, the unlikely champion of the platform, to the U.S. presidency may prove to be the best outcome TikTok could have hoped for (*New York Times* 2024f) as this may run against the inclinations of his base. Republicans in our sample generally share preferences with Democrats and Independents, although they are less eager to regulate disinformation. Republicans are, however, no less concerned than other partisans about national security risks and slightly more worried about reciprocal openness to foreign markets.

Theoretical Background

When it comes to government regulation of cross-national flows of goods, capital, and information, a large body of literature (e.g., Bulman 2024; Chilton et al. 2020; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Jensen and Lindstädt 2013; Li and Zeng 2017; Linsi 2022; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Menon and Osgood 2024; Pandya 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Raess 2021, 2023, 2024; Rho and Tomz 2017; Zeng and Li 2019) has examined individual attitudes toward trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). However, relatively little attention has been directed to the factors that influence public attitudes toward digital media/social media.

A smaller body of research analyzes public opinion toward government surveillance of social media (Blackmore et al. 2023) and awareness and concern around the regulation of digital technologies (Biddle et al. 2018; Public Attitudes to Digital Regulation 2023). However, most of

these studies focus on public perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with social media instead of the relative role that consideration about (foreign) social media's influence on national security, economic well-being, or domestic society may have on their attitudes. Where studies do analyze how perceptions of global competition, including perceptions of technology's role in the competition, may influence individual technology attitudes, the focus tends to be on attitudes toward technology in general instead of digital technology in particular (Wu 2023). We need to understand whether the public views the regulation of foreign social media applications similarly to other forms of international trade and investment, or whether the novel characteristics of these applications leads to different evaluations.

Hypotheses

Building on various strands of international relations and international political economy theory, we develop expectations about the influence of political, economic, and social influences on citizens' attitudes toward foreign social media app restrictions or bans. There are strong reasons to expect that factors that shape public attitudes toward trade and, especially FDI, will also influence attitudes toward the use of digital technology such as foreign social media apps as it involves foreign-controlled delivery of media content. Yet the nature of social media apps themselves—the fact that apps are not the same as, say, factories—means that we also investigate the traits of those apps, such as their protection of personal data and their regulation of misinformation.

A. National Security and Economic Threats

Realist theories of international relations posit that some commercial exchanges may leave a country worse off than its trade or investment partner (Gowa 1994; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Bronson 1997). To the extent that social media can generate revenue and income for the foreign country, it may enhance its ability to translate such commercial gains into political influence and generate security externalities at the expense of the home country. Furthermore, foreign social media apps can negatively affect the home country's security interests if they provide direct access to strategic information, such as classified intelligence, or enable political or economic espionage. In particular, the ability of foreign social media apps to gain access to the host country's sensitive technologies, such as semiconductors, or critical technology fields such as space and defense, has a direct bearing on that country's national security. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense has prohibited the use of TikTok on government phones on the grounds that it presents a potential cybersecurity risk (Vergun 2023). Further, social media also offers ways of directly influencing a target's media environment for strategic purposes (Singer and Brooking 2018). In short, exposure to foreign social media may unleash national security concerns resulting from both direct political threats and the potential for the foreign country to leverage its economic gains for political influence.

As far as economic threats are concerned, foreign social media may undermine the home country's economic leadership and competitiveness by providing access to state-of-the-art technology and know-how. Policymakers discussing cybersecurity frequently raise the prospect of threats to corporate data security (Vergun 2023). Previous research has found conflicting evidence about how respondents in the public evaluate those threats. Cyberattacks against military targets are rated as somewhat more severe than attacks against corporate targets, which

might point toward risks of corporate disclosure leading to less support for a ban than national security concerns (Leal and Musgrave 2023). At the same time, cyberattacks against military and corporate targets do not elicit different levels of support for escalatory responses, which points in the opposite direction (Leal and Musgrave 2023).

In addition, national security and strategic concerns play a significant role in the recent wave of regulatory restrictions on and public attitudes toward FDI. The overarching rationale for the tightening of investment screening regimes in advanced economies over the 2007-2021 period has been national security and public order (Bauerle Danzman and Meunier 2023). Moreover, European countries with a higher level of technological development were more supportive of the EU-wide investment screening mechanism due to concerns with technological transfer (Chan and Meunier 2022). Similarly, Chinese acquisitions of U.S. firms in security-sensitive industries are more likely to trigger political opposition (Tingley et al. 2015). Experimental tests find greater support for restrictions on investments from countries described or perceived as security threats (Chilton et al 2020) and increased support for targeted restrictions results when fear of security competitors is primed (Bulman 2024). Furthermore, Swiss public opinion data shows that industry-level exposure to Chinese acquisitions reduces support for FDI from China among senior managers employed in high R&D industries, suggesting that the fear of technology transfer is an important driver of opposition by a key segment of the private sector elite to Chinese FDI (Raess 2021). We expect that geopolitical and economic concerns that underly opposition to incoming FDI in advanced industrialized countries may similarly influence public attitudes toward government regulation of foreign social media apps.

Hypothesis 1a (threat to national security): Respondents are more likely to support government bans on foreign social media apps that pose higher risks to U.S. military and intelligence agencies.

Hypothesis 1b (threat to corporate interests): Respondents are more likely to support government bans on foreign social media apps that pose higher risks to U.S. corporate and business interests.

B. Political concerns

There are reasons to expect that the regime type of the app's home country and the app's ownership may influence respondents' evaluations. Previous research has found that U.S. public attitudes toward democratic countries are more favorable in the context of trade (Chen et al. 2023), although evidence is mixed regarding whether preferences over the use of force vary with the target's regime type (Kiratli 2024; Tomz and Weeks 2013).

The U.S., China, and the E.U. are engaged in a battle for the dominance of the global digital order (Bradford 2023). While the U.S. market-driven and the E.U. rights-driven models differ on the role of government intervention in fostering technological innovation and in protecting free speech, they are premised on the internet as a key tool to promote individual liberty and freedom in society. By contrast, under China's state-driven regulatory model, the government utilizes the internet for social control, including via internet censorship and mass surveillance, often at the expense of individuals' civil liberties. Accordingly, the most

consequential battle for the digital economy and society is arguably “the one being fought over the very future of liberal democracy itself” (Bradford 2023: 23). In short, social media apps originating from autocratic countries should elicit stronger opposition from the American public.

The above effect may, however, vary depending on the ownership type of the app. This is because digital surveillance by governments relies on tech firms and their digital tools to advance their national security and political goals. While authoritarian regimes may be able to coerce the private tech sector into sharing personal data and implementing censorship, direct ownership of the tech firms enhances their surveillance capacity. Indeed, many U.S. state bans have targeted TikTok because of alleged ties to the Chinese government (NPR 2023).

The FDI literature also suggests that the ownership type of the entity making the investment matters (Frye and Pinto 2009; Li et al. 2019; Zeng and Li 2019). Investment by a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or a firm closely connected to the government is likely to increase the salience of security considerations. Even though these studies find that respondents do not penalize investments from Chinese SOEs, others find that mergers & acquisitions by Chinese SOEs targeting U.S. firms are more likely to generate political protest, especially when the target firm is sensitive with regards to national security (Tingley et al. 2015). We test the conventional wisdom applied to digital technology that social media apps owned by the government are more likely to be met with stronger resistance in host countries than privately-owned social media apps.

Hypothesis 2a (type of government in the app’s home country): Respondents are more likely to support the U.S. government banning foreign social media apps that originate in non-democratic instead of partially or fully democratic countries.

Hypothesis 2b (ownership of the app): Respondents are more likely to support the U.S. government banning foreign social media apps if they are owned by the app’s home country government rather than privately owned (either connected to the app’s home country government or fully independent).

C. Political economy considerations

Individuals are more likely to have favorable views of investment projects if they are explicitly framed in terms of their potential benefits for the domestic economy, especially with respect to job creation (Jensen and Lindstädt 2013; Li and Zeng 2017). To the extent that investment projects may be able to promote labor market stability, they should be more likely to gain the good will of the host public (Pandya 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Extending this logic in the context of our study, it is possible that foreign social media may be perceived more positively if they contribute to job creation in the host country. By providing a larger number of social channels which may allow businesses to reach a wider audience, social media may boost brand recognition, facilitate interactions with potential customers, and provide more targeted advertising opportunities, therefore creating more business opportunities that increase the demand for labor in the host economy. It is possible, therefore, that foreign social media apps that contribute to more job creation may be less likely to be met with opposition by the public in the home country.

Reciprocal cooperation also matters for behavior and attitudes (Axelrod 1984; Chilton et al. 2020; Schweinberger and Sattler 2023). For instance, negative political reactions to Chinese acquisitions in the U.S. are more likely in sectors in which American firms face obstacles to entering China's acquisition market (Tingley et al. 2015). Similarly, reciprocity is a major determinant of public opinion toward inward FDI. Survey experiments in the U.S. and China have shown that Chinese and American respondents reacted to the reciprocity treatment in a similar way (Chilton et al. 2020). Accordingly, we test whether reciprocity influences attitudes.

Hypothesis 3a (employment opportunities): Respondents are more likely to support the U.S. government banning foreign social media apps that create fewer job opportunities.

Hypothesis 3b (reciprocal policies): Respondents are more likely to support the U.S. government banning foreign social media apps when the app home country's government bans all U.S. apps compared to when it allows U.S. apps (with or without restrictions).

D. App-specific concerns

Finally, we consider the role of app features such as moderation policies toward false or misleading content, data privacy protections, and audience differences.

The rise of foreign social media has generated growing concerns about their potential to spread misinformation that may erode trust in democratic institutions and the credibility of information, with potentially pernicious effects on public debate and the smooth functioning of democracy. For example, TikTok is increasingly subject to scrutiny about its role in allowing and even facilitating the proliferation of misinformation. As TikTok users who are exposed to misinformation are likely to be shown similar content in future interactions, this fuels the rapid spread of misinformation such as false health claims or conspiracy theory about political groups that may magnify national or cybersecurity risks (TikTok and the War on Misinformation 2023). TikTok additionally faces questions about misrepresenting remarks by British politicians and feeding voters, in particular young voters, in key election battlegrounds fake AI-generated videos in a way that may shape narratives about the ongoing election (BBC News 2024a). Similarly, Facebook and Twitter have been accused of bias in their role in the run-up to the Brexit referendum (Bradford 2023: 18). In view of the allegedly growing role of foreign social media in spreading fake news, disinformation, and propaganda and enhancing the ability of foreign influence operations to penetrate the domestic society, it is possible that such concerns may play an important role in shaping public attitudes toward foreign social media apps.

Public opinion research suggests that individuals object to the collection and use of sensitive personal information on the Internet (Kozyreva and Wayne 2021). Despite these concerns, most users tend not to protect this data actively and often share it voluntarily (Gerber et al. 2018). However, there is experimental evidence suggesting that privacy priming (provision of permissions warnings) combined with privacy risk priming (provision of risk communicating icons/cues) help individuals make low privacy risk app choices (Rajivan and Camp 2016). Therefore, the app's security features may influence individuals' attitudes towards allowing or restricting foreign social media apps.

Respondents may differ in the priority they assign to banning foreign apps based on who

uses them. There are reasons to suppose that gender and age of users might influence these outcomes. Many authors assert that female-dominated professions and fields are viewed as less serious or important than those dominated by men (Ross et al. 2022; Hannak et al. 2023). Given that many social media sites differ in their appeal to users of different gender (50 percent of American women use Pinterest, whereas only 19% of men do, for instance; Pew Research Center, 2024), respondents may be less likely to support banning apps targeting women, as these will be seen as less important than apps targeting men. Similarly, apps' appeal to different generations will vary. For instance, although 59% of U.S. adults aged 65 or over use Facebook, only 4% of the same cohort use Snapchat.² It could be that respondents will favor banning foreign apps indiscriminately targeting all users, as such restrictions could have a larger effect. On the other hand, one of the most prominent arguments against TikTok and other social media platforms has been their detrimental effect on the safety and mental health of younger audiences (*New York Times* 2024e, BBC News 2024b). It is possible, therefore, that respondents might prioritize banning apps targeting the (relatively) young.

Hypothesis 4a (moderation policies): Respondents are more likely to support government bans on foreign social media apps when they allow false and misleading posts compared to when they don't (whether via restrictions or bans).

Hypothesis 4b (privacy protection): Respondents are more likely to support government bans on foreign social media apps when the app provides weak instead of strong privacy protections.

Hypothesis 4c (target audience – gender): Respondents are more likely to support government bans on foreign social media apps when the app's target audience are men instead of women.

Hypothesis 4d (target audience – age): Respondents are more likely to support government bans on foreign social media apps when the app mainly targets the younger generation instead of adults.

Survey Design

To assess our theoretical propositions, we implemented a conjoint survey experiment. As a popular method developed for analyzing preferences for multidimensional choices in marketing research and psychology, conjoint analysis has received more extensive application in political science recently (Carlson 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Naoi 2020). In a conjoint experiment, respondents are typically presented with multiple profiles such as candidates or trading partners with randomly assigned attributes and then asked to choose between them (a "task"). The randomization of profile characteristics provides a valuable tool for researchers to assess the causal influence of each attribute on the outcome of interest. This methodology has been used to understand the U.S. public's attitude toward foreign aid (Doherty et al 2020), democracy promotion (Escribà-Folch et al 2021), and military commitments (Musgrave and Ward 2023).

² <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/?tabItem=5b319c90-7363-4881-8e6f-f98925683a2f> (accessed January 13, 2025).

We administered a conjoint experiment regarding preferences over the regulation of foreign social media applications to 1,494 U.S. adults via the CloudResearch Connect platform between November 22 and 26, 2024. Research demonstrates that the platform, which vets users before allowing them to complete surveys and other tasks, offers high quality data through a stringent process (O’Grady 2024, Hauser 2022). We restricted respondents to U.S. citizens aged 18 and over. We further used targets for the respondent’s age group, race and ethnicity, gender, and party identification (ID) based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau reflecting the distribution for U.S. population age 18 and over and Gallup polling data on party identification.³ This method yielded a sample that is broadly representative of the distribution of the adult members of the U.S. population. Table 1 presents sample characteristics as well as information about respondents’ use of selected social media applications.

Table 1: Sample characteristics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Summary</i>
Race	
White only	955 (63.9%)
Black	212 (14.2%)
Hispanic	216 (14.5%)
Asian	92 (6.2%)
Gender	
Female	748 (50.1%)
Male	741 (49.6%)
Non-binary / third gender	1 (0.1%)
Prefer not to say	4 (0.3%)
Party ID (3-value)	
Democrat	537 (35.9%)
Independent	485 (32.5%)
Republican	472 (31.6%)
Education	
No College Degree	668 (44.7%)
Has College Degree	826 (55.3%)
Household Income	
Less than \$25k	173 (11.8%)
\$25k to \$50k	338 (23.0%)
\$50k to \$100k	536 (36.5%)
More than \$100k	423 (28.8%)
US Regions	
Midwest	311 (20.9%)
Northeast	254 (17.1%)
South	570 (38.4%)
West	351 (23.6%)
Age	
18 to 24	112 (7.5%)
25 to 44	594 (39.8%)
45 to 64	553 (37.0%)
65 and over	235 (15.7%)

³ See Appendix 1 for the quotas used for target recruitment and Appendix 2 for the respondents’ use of foreign social media networks

Facebook Use	1,213 (81.2%)
Pinterest Use	642 (43%)
Instagram Use	1,017 (68.1%)
TikTok Use	716 (47.9%)
N	1,494

Experimental Design

Respondents were first presented with a brief explanatory note regarding background information on social media applications and the debate over their presence in the United States as well as instructions on how to complete the task-choices. They were then shown two hypothetical foreign social media apps with randomly assigned attributes and were asked to choose the one for which they would most support the government banning. The main variable of app choice is thus a binary variable indicating whether an app is the respondent's preferred choice between the two. Each respondent was presented with six pairs of hypothetical foreign social media apps, yielding 12 (2×6) hypothetical app choices per respondent. This procedure yielded 17,928 profiles (8,964 tasks) for 1,494 respondents, within our pre-registered range of 1,400 to 1,600 respondents. A power analysis using the online conjoint power calculator for conjoint experiment developed by Alberto Stefanelli and Martin Lukac shows that with 1,494 respondents, a maximum of four variable levels, and six tasks per design, our analysis has a predicted statistical power of 84%.

Table 2 shows the attributes, levels, and the associated hypothesis in our conjoint analysis. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the app's target audience, level of protection of data privacy, restrictions on misinformation, job creation potential, ownership, and the threat it poses to the interests of U.S. national security agencies and the corporate sector; whether the government of the app's home country provides reciprocal treatment to U.S. apps; and the regime type of the app's home country. For certain traits, we chose our probability distributions to reflect either empirically or analytically guided distributions (De La Cuesta et al 2022). Thus, for instance, regime type reflects the Freedom House distribution of global regime types, while the Reciprocity condition was chosen to reflect the fact that total bans of U.S. services such as Facebook are uncommon but partial restrictions are more typical. Similarly, a "high" security threat is unlikely to be commonplace, so we relegated this to a distribution in which the average user would see it only once or twice per experiment. Finally, we restricted the distribution of ownership by app home country regime type, such that fully democratic countries could not own a social-media app (a seemingly implausible outcome to us).

Appendix 3 presents the summary of the conjoint levels, which shows the actual number of respondents per conjoint factor and level. As we can see from Appendix 3, we have largely hit our randomization target with our recruitment method.⁴ Demographic information comes from a

⁴ We preregistered treatments for the military/intelligence and corporate espionage threats that included a "Very Low" category and a larger share of respondents being exposed to low/very low threat treatments. The survey, as fielded, did not include the very low category, resulting in a larger percentage of responses assigned the level of "Moderate." However, this preserved the essential element of our design: testing the effect of the rare but serious "high" threat relative to lower levels.

combination of direct measurement and several features measured by CloudResearch Connect as part of its routine surveys of users.⁵

Table 2: Attributes and Levels in the Conjoint Analysis

Attribute	Levels	Associated Hypothesis
Security threat ⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● High (10%) ● Moderate (70%) ● Low (20%) 	H1a
Corporate espionage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● High (10%) ● Moderate (70%) ● Low (20%) 	H1b
Regime type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fully democratic (43%) ● Partially democratic (27%) ● Not democratic (30%) 	H2a
Ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Privately owned and fully independent ● Privately owned but connected to the ruling regime ● Owned by the government* 	H2b
Reciprocity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Bans all U.S. apps (20%) ● U.S. apps allowed with restrictions (40%) ● Allows U.S. apps without any restrictions (40%) 	H3a
Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Create 5,000 new jobs ● No significant effect ● Destroy 5,000 existing jobs 	H3b
Moderation / misinformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No restrictions ● Restricts false and misleading posts ● Bans false and misleading content and users who 	H4a

⁵ The comparison of our age and partisanship measures to the Cloud Research Connect measures in Appendix 4 suggests that whatever deviation we may observe between the two can be explained by our participant recruitment method and should not affect the interpretation of our main findings.

⁶ We chose to operationalize security threats as risks posed by the app rather than by specifying home country relationship with the United States. After all, political spying among allies takes place. Cases in point include former intelligence U.S. analyst Jonathan Pollard, who allegedly carried out espionage activities against the United States on behalf of Israel, the U.S. National Security Agency spying on its European allies from 2012 to 2014, and, of course, Soviet penetration of the Manhattan Project. Similarly, explicitly asking respondents their attitudes toward apps from specific countries (such as China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia), risked conflating multiple factors that may influence public opinion (for example, China is both an autocracy and an adversary of the United States that poses considerable challenges to U.S. interests). Our design abstracts these concerns to allow us to focus on the treatments (Brutger et al. 2023) while also preserving information equivalence (Dafoe et al. 2018).


Attribute	Levels	Associated Hypothesis
	spread it	
Data privacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strong ● Weak 	H4b
App Audience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Adults aged 18 to 29 ● Men aged 18 to 29 ● Women aged 18 to 29 ● All adults 	H4c H4d

Note: There is a 33.33% chance that each of these scenarios will obtain if the regime type of the app’s home country is not “fully democratic”; and there is a 50 % chance that the first two scenarios will obtain if the regime is “fully democratic.”

Descriptive Patterns

We measured the respondents’ overall attitudes toward government bans of foreign social media with the following question: “In general, what do you think about the U.S. government banning foreign social media apps from being used in the United States?” Figure 1 shows baseline support for banning foreign social media networks for the overall sample (Figure 1A) and by party ID, gender, race (white vs. non-white), respectively (Figures 1B-1D). As Figure 1A shows, a slightly higher percentage of respondents opposed banning foreign social media apps, with 19.70% of the respondents “strongly oppose” and 25.20% “somewhat oppose” compared to


Figure 1: Baseline Support for Banning Foreign Social Media Networks



9.6% of the respondents who “strongly support” and 23.3% who “somewhat support” such measures. The remaining 20.2% of the respondents took a neutral stance (i.e., “neither support nor oppose”). Figure 1B further shows that a larger percentage of Republican respondents either “strongly support” or “somewhat support” banning foreign social media networks (15.3% and 29.9%), compared to 6.9% and 22.7% for Democrats, respectively. Republicans are likewise less likely to oppose government bans, 15.9% and 22.9% of the Republican respondents “strongly oppose” and “somewhat oppose” banning, compared to 22.0% and 27.2% for Democrats, respectively. Interestingly, we do not observe any strong differences in attitudes by gender (Figure 1C). In terms of attitudes by race, we see that white respondents are more likely to favor banning foreign social media networks than those who do not identify as white, with 11.1% and 29.7% of the white respondents either “strongly support” or “somewhat support” banning, compared to 6.9% and 17.4% for non-white respondents.

In Figure 2, we present the results of a multinomial logistic model analyzing the three outcomes (support, oppose, or no opinion) in line with the recommendations of Kleinberg and Fordham (2018). Figure 2A demonstrates that Republican party affiliation, age, and White and Hispanic identifications are associated with stronger support for banning foreign media apps. Only one trait examined strongly increases *opposition* to banning apps: the use of TikTok. As Figure 2B demonstrates, the substantive importance of TikTok use in this associational study is

Figure 2: Multinomial Logistic Model of Baseline Support for Banning Foreign Social Media Networks



large, with TikTok users 24 percentage points more likely to oppose banning foreign apps in general

Conjoint Experiment Results

Associational studies, however, may be subject to biases, not least because we do not know exactly what respondents are envisioning when they answer. Further, the question above can only tell us the baseline view, not what contributes to those assessments.

To examine the source of respondents' evaluations, we obtain the average marginal component effect (AMCE), or the average change in the probability that the respondent will favor the government banning a given app if one of the app features were to take on a different value, holding all other app attributes constant (Bansak et al. 2021; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The estimated coefficient thus represents the difference in the probability that an app will be selected given the value of the attribute relative to the omitted baseline. All regression models include standard errors clustered by respondent.


Figure 3 presents our estimates for all AMCEs, with the dots and the horizontal lines representing the coefficient estimates and the 95% confidence intervals, respectively, and the dots on the vertical zero line depicting the (omitted) baseline value for interpreting the effect of each attribute. The results lend substantial support to our conjectures about the importance of geopolitical and political-economy considerations for public opinion toward foreign social media bans. Notably, apps described as posing a high risk to U.S. national security interests increase support for a ban by almost 25%. The magnitude of these effects is much larger than that for corporate risks as apps that pose high risks to U.S. corporate interests are likely to see a 10.97% increase in support for banning. These results suggest that concerns for the apps' security and, to some extent, economic threat figure prominently in individual calculations about whether to support the government's decision to ban an app or not.

Such geopolitical concerns are further amplified when the app lacks strong privacy protection or is owned by the government. For example, privacy concerns matter to the respondents almost as much as risks to corporate interests. Respondents are more likely to support banning foreign social media networks with weak privacy protection (9.87%) compared to those which offer strong protection. In addition, compared to government-owned apps, privately owned apps that are either connected to the ruling regime or fully independent are associated with a 2.22% and 8.73% reduction in support for banning, respectively.

In addition to geopolitical concerns, political-economy considerations about the app's job creation potential or ability to provide reciprocal access to U.S. firms are also salient factors underlying the respondents' attitude formation. The coefficients for the "effect on employment" variable indicate that apps that promise substantial employment opportunities or have no significant employment effect reduce the support for a ban by 17.93% and 14.43%, respectively. The relatively large substantive effect for the variable suggests that individuals attach considerable importance to an app's potential impact on the local job market when formulating their opinion. The results additionally lend support to arguments about the importance of

reciprocity concerns as a major determinant of public attitudes toward global economic integration (Chilton et al. 2020). Support for banning will be reduced by 9.81% if the app’s home country allows U.S. apps with restrictions and by 12.07% if it allows US apps without any restrictions, pointing to reciprocity concerns as a major driver of public opinion toward social globalization.

Figure 3: Effect of Foreign Social Media App Features on Individual Preferences



Other factors, such as the regime type of the app’s home country (i.e., democracy or autocracy) or the app’s moderation policies or target audience, also mattered, but less than these geopolitical and political economy considerations. Given the anti-autocracy content of many anti-TikTok arguments, it is perhaps unsurprising that respondents were more likely to support banning social media apps that originate from partially democratic or non-democracies compared to those based in democratic countries. However, the magnitude of the effect is relatively small, with support for banning decreasing by 2.79% for apps originating from partially democratic and 5.43% for those from highly democratic countries relative to the reference category of non-democratic states.

App-specific features such as moderation policy and target audience influence preferences for banning as expected. However, once again, the effects were relatively small. Respondents were less likely to favor banning apps that either ban or place restrictions on false and misleading content (4.84% and 5.94%, respectively) compared to those without any restrictions. The app’s target audience exerts some influence on individual attitudes as well, as there is somewhat greater support for banning apps that target younger adults than the general public.

Overall, these results show that TikTok-style bans that target apps from authoritarian states that pose significant security (and, to some extent, economic) threats are likely to maximize support for banning. Respondents are additionally motivated by concerns about privacy, reciprocity, and the app's ownership and job creation potential in their preference formation. In other words, what we observe is an emerging "hidden consensus" about what to ban, with apps that pose significant geopolitical, political-economy, and privacy protection threats to the United States most likely to galvanize public support for restrictive government measures.


Heterogeneity Analyses

We carried out a set of additional analyses examining the potential heterogeneity in AMCE estimates by the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics and political orientation, and experience with social media such as TikTok and related phenomena such as cybercrime (this last suggested by Kostyuk and Wayne 2021). Overall, the results show a remarkable *lack* of heterogeneity. Specifically, our sub-group analyses show that the above results hold regardless of the respondent's gender, race, employment status, educational attainment (college degree-holders vs those without such degrees), and union membership. There is also little difference between those who believe that the federal government should play no or a minor role in economic policy and those who believe that the federal government has a major role to play as well as between those who believe that they have been helped by globalization and those who believe otherwise. Additionally, with the likely spurious exception of moderation policies, non-manipulated treatments such as whether a profile appeared on the left or right side of the screen did not have any effect on the respondent's app choice. The results and a discussion are presented in Appendix 5-13.

Nonetheless, a couple of interesting patterns emerge (Figure 4). When we break down the responses by the respondents' partisanship, we observe that there is a significant difference in the preferences between Republicans and Democrats regarding moderation policy, with Democrats demonstrating greater sensitivity to apps' moderation policies. Specifically, Democrats are more likely to see a significant reduction in their willingness to support banning apps that prohibit false and misleading posts (-0.12 points) compared to Republicans whose preferences are little changed when presented with such an app, a result that is not too surprising in view of the close connections between prominent entrepreneurs such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump in the recent election.

Sub-group analyses further indicate that TikTok users and non-users generally have the same opinions. The differences, however, concerned the app's ownership and threat to the U.S. military and intelligence community. Non-TikTok users are more likely to see significant reductions in their support for banning privately owned apps that are either connected to the ruling regime or fully independent. They also tend to be more favorably disposed toward banning apps that pose significant military (and economic) risks to the United States. TikTok users may be inclined to take such issues less seriously, or they may have been aware of the arguments around TikTok on this point and thus responded expressively to justify their own behavior.


Figure 4: Selected AMCEs by Subgroups



Still another notable difference relates to the attitudes of younger vs. older respondents toward apps with strong threats to U.S. security interests. Compared to those between 18 and 44 years of age, older respondents (those between 45 and 65) demonstrated a stronger willingness to support banning apps that pose high levels of threats to the U.S. military and intelligence community as the latter group has seen a more significant increase (29 points) in their willingness to ban such apps compared to the former (20 points). Taken together, these results indicate that certain segments of the U.S. population (e.g., Republicans, older adults, and TikTok users) may have a stronger tendency to favor banning foreign social media apps than others. While there exists considerable heterogeneity in the types of apps they favor banning, such latent support may not particularly bode well for Trump’s effort to rescue TikTok.

Finally, we examine results for respondents broken out by their baseline attitudes (Figure 5). Again, in general our results are substantively the same in categories that are not shown; we chose the most striking variations in these subgroups. For instance, respondents predisposed to neither support nor oppose bans were more sensitive to reciprocity concerns, but much less sensitive to ownership or threats to corporate interests. By contrast, those who were predisposed to support *or* oppose bans responded similarly to ownership treatments and in a directionally equivalent manner to threats to corporate interests.

Figure 5: AMCE by Baseline Attitude



Discussion

National interests matter in attitudes toward the regulation of social media. Respondents were likelier to favor government bans targeting social media apps that present significant threats

to U.S. military and, to some extent, economic interests. They are also more favorably disposed toward banning apps that lack strong privacy protection, are owned by the government, lack significant job creation potential, or do not offer reciprocal access to American apps.

Other factors, such as the app's moderation policies or target audience also mattered, but less than these geopolitical and political-economy considerations. Importantly, these results remain robust, with some differences in the details, when we take into consideration the heterogeneity in the respondents' demographic characteristics and political orientation.

Conclusion

As of this writing, the popular Chinese-owned app TikTok is in peril. The U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide whether the law banning the app unless it is sold is constitutional (Pequeño 2024). Whatever the result, the prominence of national security and privacy protection concerns in the recent debate over TikTok highlights the U.S. public's rising anxiety over foreign social media's potential to impair the country's geostrategic standing, economic well-being, and way of life.

The above findings indicate that the trajectories of the liberal international economic order and the digital world order mirror each other, with the next global era featuring a new and decisive divide between the "digital democracy" championed by the U.S. and its allies on the one hand, and China's approach of "digital autocracy" with sophisticated disinformation and censorship regimes on the other (Bradford 2023; Shen and Browder 2022). As authoritarian states like China promote the adoption of technologies such as the Great Firewall and pursues the state-led "China Standards 2035" project, these initiatives stand to significantly reshape the global digital order through the development of a set of technological norms and standards that present a profound challenge to the Western digital governance model built on core liberal democratic values.

As the rising influence of foreign social media apps in the United States has elevated foreign governments' ability to exploit network opportunities to "weaponize interdependence" and gain strategic advantage (Farrell and Newman 2019), our findings help to illuminate the potential for domestic pushback against the expansion of global information networks that may enhance the leverage and coercive capacity of foreign governments vis-à-vis the home government.

References

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2021. "Conjoint Survey Experiments." In *Advances in Experimental Political Science*, edited by James N. and Donald P. Green. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp.19-41.
- Bauerle Danzman, S. and Meunier, S. 2023. Mapping the Characteristics of Foreign Investment Screening Mechanisms: The New PRISM Dataset. *International Studies Quarterly* 67(2): squad026
- BBC News. 2024a. TikTok Users Being Fed Misleading Election News, BBC Finds (Marianna Spring), June 2.
- BBC News. 2024b. Albania Declares One-year TikTok Ban over Stabbing (Thomas Mackintosh), December 21.
- Biddle, Nicholas, Edwards Ben, Gray, Matthew and McEachern, Steven. 2018. Public Attitudes towards Data Governance in Australia. Australian National University Center for Social Research & Methods Working Paper No. 12.
- Blackmore, Holly, Logan, Sarah, Chan, Janet and Bennett Moses, Lyria. 2023. Public Attitudes Towards Government Surveillance of Social Media in Australia. *Surveillance & Society* 21(3): 317-333.
- Bradford, Anu. 2023. *Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology*. New York (NY): Oxford University Press.
- Broz, J. Lawrence., Frieden, Jeffry, and Weymouth, Stephen. 2021. Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash. *International Organization* 75(2): 464-494.
- Brutger, Ryan., Kertzer, Joshua D., Renshon, Jonathan, Tingley, Dustin and Weiss, Chagai M., 2023. Abstraction and Detail in Experimental Design. *American Journal of Political Science*, 67(4): 979-995.
- Bulman, David J., 2024. When Fear Matters: Varied Foreign Economic Cooperation Preferences in the Face of Conflict. *Review of International Political Economy*: 1-25.
- Carlson, Elizabeth. 2015. Voting and Accountability in Africa: A Choice Experiment in Uganda. *World Politics* 67 (2): 353-385.
- Chan, Zenobia B. and Sophie Meunier. 2022. Behind the Screen: Understanding National Support for a Foreign Investment Screening mechanism in the European Union. *The Review of International Organizations* 17(3): 513-541.
- Chen, Frederick R., Jon CW Pevehouse, and Ryan M. Powers 2023. Great Expectations: The Democratic Advantage in Trade Attitudes. *World Politics* 75(2): 316-352.
- Chilton, Adam S., Milner, Helen V., and Tingley, Dustin. 2020. Reciprocity and Public Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment. *British Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 129-153.
- Clayton Katherine, Yusaku Horiuchi, Aaron R. Kaufman, Gary King, and Mayya Komisarchik 2023. Correcting Measurement Error Bias in Conjoint Survey Experiments. Working paper. Available at: <https://gking.harvard.edu/conjointE> (accessed January 13, 2025).
- Dafoe, Allan, Zhang, Baobao, and Caughey, Devin. 2018. Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments. *Political Analysis* 26(4): 399-416.
- De la Cuesta, Brandon, Egami, Naoki and Kosuke Imai. 2022. Improving the External Validity of Conjoint Analysis: The Essential Role of Profile Distribution. *Political Analysis* 30(1): pp.19-45.

- Doherty, David, Bryan, Amanda Clare, Hanania, Dina and Pajor, Matthew. 2020. The Public's Foreign Aid Priorities: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment. *American Politics Research* 48(5): 635-648.
- Escribà-Folch, Abel, Muradova, Lala H. and Rodon, Toni. 2021. The Effects of Autocratic Characteristics on Public Opinion toward Democracy Promotion Policies: A Conjoint Analysis. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17(1): p.oraa016.
- Farrell, Henry and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. *International Security* 44 (1): 42–79.
- Feng, Yilang, Kerner, Andrew, and Summer, Jane, L. 2021. Quitting Globalization: Trade-Related Job Losses, Nationalism and Resistance to FDI in the United States. *Political Science Research and Methods* 9(2): 292-311.
- Forbes 2023. India banned TikTok in 2020. TikTok Still Has Access to Years of Indians' Data (21 March). Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrlevine/2023/03/21/tiktok-india-ban-bytedance-data-access/?sh=2583eb402eca> (accessed January 13, 2025).
- Frith, Michael J., 2021. Analysing Conjoint Experiments in Stata: The conjoint Command. London Stata Conference 2021 14, Stata Users Group.
- Frye, Timothy and Pinto, Pablo M. 2009. The Politics of Chinese Investment in the US. In K. P. Sauvant (Ed.), *Investing in the United States: Is the US Ready for FDI from China?* (pp. 85–121). Edward Elgar.
- Gerber, Nina, Gerber, Paul and Volkamer, Melanie. 2018. Explaining the Privacy Paradox: A Systematic Review of Literature Investigating Privacy Attitude and Behavior. *Computers & Security* 77: 226-261.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1994. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gowa, Joanne and Mansfield, Edward D. 1993. Power Politics and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 408–420.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Hiscox, Michael J. 2006. Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade. *International Organization* 60(2): 469-498.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 225-249.
- Hartman, Rachel, Aaron J. Moss, Shalom N. Jaffe, Cheskie Rosenzweig, Jonathan Robinson, and Leib Litman. 2023. Introducing Connect by CloudResearch: Advancing Online Participant Recruitment in the Digital Age. Available at <https://www.cloudresearch.com/introducing-connect-by-cloudresearch/> (accessed November 29, 2024).
- Hannak, Aniko, Joseph, Kenneth, Larremore, Daniel B. and Cimpian, Andrei. 2023. Field-specific Ability Beliefs as an Explanation for Gender Differences in Academics' Career Trajectories: Evidence from Public Profiles on ORCID.Org. 125(4): 681–698. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000348>.
- Hauser, David J., Aaron J. Moss, Cheskie Rosenzweig, Shalom N. Jaffe, Jonathan Robinson, and Leib Litman. 2023. Evaluating CloudResearch's Approved Group as a Solution for Problematic Data Quality on Mturk. 55: 3953-3964.
- Jensen, Nathan M. and Lindstädt, René. 2013. Globalization with Whom: Context-Dependent Foreign Direct Investment Preferences. Working Paper. Available at

- https://www.natemjensen.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Globalization_with_Whom_-_Working-Paper.pdf. (accessed January 13, 2025).
- Kiratli, Osman Sabri 2024. Policy Objective of Military Intervention and Public Attitudes: A Conjoint Experiment from US and Turkey. *Political Behavior* 46(2): 1257-1279
- Kleinberg, Katja B. and Fordham, Benjamin O., 2018. Don't Know Much about Foreign Policy: Assessing the Impact of "Don't Know" and "No Opinion" Responses on Inferences about Foreign Policy Attitudes. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14(3): 429-448.
- Kostyuk, Nadiya, and Carly Wayne 2021. The Microfoundations of State Cybersecurity: Cyber Risk Perceptions and the Mass Public. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6(2): ogz077.
- Leal, Marcelo M., and Musgrave, Paul. 2023. Hitting Back or Holding Back in Cyberspace: Experimental Evidence Regarding Americans' Responses to Cyberattacks. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 40(1): 42-64.
- Li, Xiaojun, Kuang, Yingqiu, and Linting Zhang. 2019. Misperceptions of Chinese Investments in Canada and Their Correction: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 285-302.
- Li Xiaojun and Zeng, Ka. 2017. Individual Preferences for FDI in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from China. *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 4: 195–205.
- Linsi, Lukas. 2022. Economic Narratives and the Legitimacy of Foreign Direct Investments. *Politics and Governance* 10(3): 98-109.
- Lukac, Martin and Alberto Stefanelli. 2020. Conjoint Experiments: Power Analysis Tool. Retrieved from <https://mblukac.shinyapps.io/conjoints-power-shiny/>.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Bronson, Rachel. 1997. Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 94–107.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Mutz, Diana C. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63(3): 425-457.
- Musgrave, Paul and Ward, S., 2023. The Tripwire Effect: Experimental Evidence Regarding US Public Opinion. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 19(4): p.orad017.
- Naoi, Megumi. 2020. Survey Experiments in International Political Economy: What We (Don't) Know About the Backlash Against Globalization. *Annual Review of Political Science* 23: 333-356.
- Mayda, Anna M. and Rodrik, Dani. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others? *European Economic Review* 49(6):1393-1430.
- Menon Anil and Osgood, Iain. 2024. The Wrong Winners: Anti-Corporate Animus and Attitudes Towards Trade. *British Journal of Political Science*. Published online 2024:1-18. doi:10.1017/S0007123424000152
- New York Times*. 2024a. Why the U.S. Is Forcing TikTok to Be Sold or Banned (Sapna Maheshwari and Amanda Holpuch), June 20.
- New York Times*. 2024b. Telegram Founder Charged with Wide Range of Crimes in France (Aurelien Breeden and Adam Satariano), August 28.
- New York Times*. 2024c. How Brazil's Experiment Fighting Fake News Led to a Ban on X (Jack Nicas and Kate Conger), August 31.
- New York Times*. 2024d. As Election Looms, Disinformation 'Has Never Been Worse' (Steven Lee Myers), October 23.

- New York Times*. 2024e. Australia Moves to Ban Young Teens from Social Media (Eve Sampson), November 7.
- New York Times*. 2024f. Trump Raises TikTok’s Hopes for a Rescue in the United States (Sapna Maheshwari), November 12.
- NPR. 2023. Federal Judge Blocks Montana’s TikTok Ban before It Takes Effect. November 30 (by Bobby Allyn)
- O’Grady, Cathleen. 2024. Psychology Study Participants Recruited Online May Provide Nonsensical Answers.” *Science* May 19.
- Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 64(3): 389–409.
- Pequeño, Antonio. 2024. Will the U.S. Ban TikTok? Here’s the Latest — And What We Know. *Forbes*, December 18.
- Pew Research Center. 2024. “Social Media Fact Sheet.” January 31. <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/?tabItem=0ec23460-3241-4a1f-89bc-0c27fb641936> (Last accessed: 24 October 2024).
- Public Attitudes to Digital Regulation: Tracker Survey. 2023. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-digital-regulation-tracker-survey/public-attitudes-to-digital-regulation-tracker-survey#survey-insights>
- Raess, Damian. 2021. The Demand-Side Politics of China’s Global Buying Spree: Managers’ Attitudes toward Chinese Inward FDI Flows in Comparative Perspective. *Review of International Political Economy* 28(6): 1555-81.
- Raess, Damian. 2023. The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization with China. In Henry Gao, Damian Raess and Ka Zeng (Eds.) *China and the WTO: A Twenty-Year Assessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 301-332).
- Raess, Damian. 2024. Disentangling Public Opposition to Chinese FDI: Trade Unions, Patient Capital and Members’ Preferences over FDI Inflows. *European Journal of International Relations* 30(1): 176-202.
- Rajivan, Prashanth and Camp, Jean. 2016. Influence of Privacy Attitude and Privacy Cue Framing on Android App Choices. Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS), June 22–24, Denver, Colorado.
- Rho, Sungmin and Tomz, Michael. 2017. Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization* 71(S1): S85-S108.
- Ross, Matthew B., Glennon, Britta M., Raviv, Berkes, Enrico G., Weinberg, Bruce A. and Lane, Julia I. 2022. Women Are Credited Less in Science Than Men. *Nature* 608: 135–145.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Slaughter, Matthew J. 2001. What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences? *Journal of International Economics* 54(2):267-292.
- Schweinberger, Tanja and Sattler, Thomas. 2023. Trade as a Foreign Policy Issue: A Bilateral Micro Perspective. In Henry Gao, Damian Raess, and Ka Zeng (Eds.) *China and the WTO: A Twenty-Year Assessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 333-359).
- Shen, Valerie and Jayson Browder. 2022. Introducing Third Way’s US-China Digital World Order Initiative, June 8.
- Singer, P.W. and Brooking, Emerson T. 2018. *LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media*. Eamon Dolan Books.

- TikTok and the War on Misinformation 2023. Available at <https://www.captechu.edu/blog/tiktok-and-war-misinformation> (accessed September 20, 2024).
- Tingley, Dustin, Xu, Christopher, Chilton, Adam, and Milner, Helen. 2015. The Political Economy of Inward FDI: Opposition to Chinese Mergers & Acquisitions. *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8(1): 27-57.
- Tomz, Michael R., and Jessica LP Weeks. 2013. Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 107(4): 849-865.
- Vergun, David. 2023. "Leaders Say TikTok Is Potential Cybersecurity Risk to U.S." U.S. Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3354874/leaders-say-tiktok-is-potential-cybersecurity-risk-to-us/> (accessed 24 October 2024)
- Wu, Nicole. 2023. Economic Competition, US-China Rivalry, and Technological Attitudes. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Zeng, Ka and Li, Xiaojun. 2019. Geopolitics, Nationalism, and Foreign Direct Investment: Perceptions of the China Threat and American Public Attitudes toward Chinese FDI. *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 12(4): 495-518.