Revisiting Partisan Politics of Environmental Policy: How Labour Market Outsiders Weaken Left-wing Governments' Eco-friendliness*

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Abstract

It is well documented that left-wing governments implement more stringent environmental protection measures than their right-wing counterparts. However, given the recent increase in outsiders in labour markets among left-wing voters, this conventional wisdom requires re-assessment. These voters are less likely to support environmental protection due to economic distress and the potential negative economic consequences of such policies. By analysing a panel dataset covering 27 OECD member countries from 1990 to 2015, this paper examines how the size of the outsider population conditions the relationship between government partisanship and environmental policy stringency. The empirical analysis reveals that while a small outsider population results in minimal partisan differences in environmental protection stringency, a large outsider population leads to less stringent environmental protection under left-wing governments than under their right-wing counterparts. These findings challenge the conventional view that left-wing parties are inherently more committed to environmental protection.

Keywords— environmental protection, partisanship, labour market outsiders

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Introduction

Despite the scientific consensus on their existence, imminence, and solutions, environmental issues remain a major political divide in developed countries. A vast body of empirical research has documented that left-wing voters, politicians, parties, and governments are generally more proactive in environmental protection than their right-wing counterparts (e.g., Dunlap 1975; Carter 2013; Wen et al. 2016; Garmann 2014), and that this partisan gap has been widening over time (Dunlap and McCright 2008). The fluctuating stance of the United States towards the Paris Agreement exemplifies this divide: the Republican administration led by Donald Trump announced the country's withdrawal from the agreement in 2016, a decision reversed by his Democratic successor, Joe Biden, who pledged a strong commitment to climate change mitigation during the 2020 presidential race. Biden's decision, in turn, was overturned upon the return of his rival in January 2025.

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned partisan differentiation in environmental protection is not self-evident. Conventional wisdom posits that environmental protection aligns with the preferences of young and educated voters with postmaterialist values, who constitute a significant segment of left-wing party supporters (e.g., Gethin, Martínez-Toledano and Piketty 2021), while conflicting with economic growth, a key priority of right-wing parties, thereby leading to their reluctance to advance environmental policies (e.g., Harring and Sohlberg 2017). However, given their materialist origins and *raison d'être*, left-wing parties are also constrained by the tension between environmental protection and economic imperatives. The working and lower-income groups, traditionally catered to by left-wing parties, may be less attentive to 'lofty' concerns such as environmental protection due to their immediate economic struggles (cf. Kahn and Kotchen 2011). Furthermore, they may even develop hostility towards environmental policies, given their potential adverse effects, such as regressive distributional consequences and employment risks (e.g., Ohlendorf et al. 2021; Raff and Earnhart 2022). Indeed, these concerns may have been a driving force behind the 'Yellow Vest Movement' in 2018, during which French precariat workers took to the streets to protest not only a fuel tax hike introduced by President Emmanuel Macron but also the broader

socio-economic elite's commitment to environmentalism (Rérolle 2018).

This issue warrants even greater attention in light of the rise of *outsiders* in labour markets. Figure 1 presents the trend of the average share of temporary employment across 23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries between 1990 and 2015, illustrating its steady increase. Some countries, such as the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal, have experienced particularly significant growth in temporary employment, with increases of 10 percentage points or more over the three decades (see B.4 for country-specific details). Arguably, these outsiders—workers characterized by low wages and limited employment protection (Rueda 2005)—may be more indifferent or even more hostile towards environmental protection than other working-class groups due to their heightened economic vulnerability. For instance, greenhouse gas taxation raises consumer prices, imposing disproportionate burdens on outsiders, who have little financial security. Given these materialist concerns, the increase in the number of outsiders, as depicted in Figure 1, suggests intensifying social pressures that may discourage left-wing parties from maintaining their commitment to environmental protection. In fact, a recent empirical study, contradicting conventional wisdom, found that left-wing governments tend to implement less stringent environmental policies (Tawiah 2022). This calls for a reassessment of the role of government partisanship in environmental protection, with a particular focus on the influence of outsiders.

The present paper thus aims to analyze how the size of the outsider population conditions the relationship between government partisanship and enacted environmental policies. Specifically, I hypothesize that the rise of outsiders erodes partisan differences in the stringency of environmental protection. To test this hypothesis, I analyse a panel dataset of 27 OECD member countries from 1990 to 2015. Following Tawiah (2022), the analysis employs the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) Index (Botta and Koźluk 2014), which quantitatively assesses the environmental policies of a given country by incorporating a wide range of policy instruments, such as taxation and emission standards.

My findings extend beyond the initial hypothesis: while a small outsider population results in



Figure 1: Trend of Average Share of Temporary Employment

minimal partisan differences in environmental protection stringency, a large outsider population leads to *less* stringent environmental protection under left-wing governments compared to their right-wing counterparts. This result challenges the conventional perception of left-wing parties as inherently eco-friendly. It provides broader insights into the ideological tensions between materialism and postmaterialism within contemporary left-wing politics.

Partisan Politics of Environmental Policies: Empirical and Theoretical Issues

As clarified in the introduction, empirical evidence has reinforced the argument that environmentalism plays a significant role in the left-right political divide: that is, the Left is more proactive in environmental protection than the Right. A vast body of research on voter behaviour, primarily focused on the United States (Tognacci et al. 1972; Dunlap 1975; Dunlap, Xiao and McCright 2001; Dunlap and McCright 2008; Krosnick, Holbrook and Visser 2000), but also covering Sweden

(Harring and Sohlberg 2017), suggests that left-wing voters are more likely to be environmentalists than conservatives or right-wing supporters. Existing research also indicates that left-wing and right-wing politicians or parties diverge in their stance on environmental protection, as observed through their legislative behaviour (Shipan and Lowry 2001) and party manifestos (Neumayer 2004; Carter 2013). Moreover, left-wing governments have been found to achieve better environmental outcomes than their right-wing counterparts (Neumayer 2003; Garmann 2014; Wen et al. 2016).

Nevertheless, empirical findings on this left-right environmental gap are mixed at the government-policy level. Some scholars, in line with conventional wisdom, have observed that left- and right-wing governments have pursued environmental policies differently—namely, with left-wing governments enforcing more stringent environmental protections than right-wing ones (Chang and Berdiev 2011; Gerber 2013)[1] However, a recent study by Tawiah (2022) challenges these findings. Using the EPS Index described above (Botta and Koźluk 2014), he uncovered that left-wing governments, compared to their right-wing counterparts, scored lower on the EPS Index—that is, they implemented less stringent environmental protection. Although he does not offer a compelling explanation for this pattern[2], this counterintuitive result invites further empirical and theoretical scrutiny of the partisan politics of environmental policy, particularly at the government-policy level.

Why, then, do environmental issues divide the Left and the Right in the first place? The conventional perspective begins with the theoretical premise that environmentalism is inherently linked to the rise of postmaterialism in developed societies (Inglehart 1977). Economic growth and rising levels of educational attainment have led to the emergence of new socio-economic classes, such as knowledge-based professionals, disrupting the traditional labour-bourgeois class structure. As a

[1] Chang and Berdiev (2011) examines energy regulation in OECD member countries, whereas Gerber (2013) analyzes municipalities in the state of Michigan, United States.

[2] Tawiah (2022) attributes this finding to a left-right difference in attitudes towards personal freedom. Because environmental protection entails restrictions on individual behaviour, it conflicts with the personal freedoms that left-wing parties espouse while aligning with the law-and-order principles favoured by right-wing parties. While this explanation highlights an internal ideological conflict within the postmaterialist dimension of left-wing politics, it does not empirically explore the underlying mechanisms in depth.

result, the long-standing economic redistribution conflict has faded, giving way to new political divisions that separate people based on their openness to diversity and social change versus their adherence to traditional values. As Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) describe it, this new dimension—termed the 'Green-Alternative-Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist' (GAL/TAN) axis—positions environmentalism as a key postmaterialist issue[3].

The increasing dominance of this postmaterialist spectrum, according to previous scholarship, has solidified the left-right divide on environmentalism. In his seminal work, Kitschelt (1994) argues that the materialist and postmaterialist dimensions are not entirely independent but rather interconnected through intellectual complementarity. In other words, left-wing (pro-redistribution) positions on economic issues are likely to align with the GAL pole on the postmaterialist dimension, as both reflect commitments to social inclusion and equality (cf. Häusermann et al. 2023). Conversely, right-wing (anti-redistribution) and TAN positions coalesce due to a shared resistance to these values. Particularly, left-wing parties have integrated new social strata characterized by high educational attainment and liberal values, thereby incorporating environmental concerns—albeit indirectly—into the partisan divide between the Left and Right (cf. Gethin, Martínez-Toledano and Piketty 2021).

That said, it would be premature to conclude that the emergence of the postmaterialist dimension has entirely superseded traditional left-right materialist conflicts, as economic interests may still shape left-wing parties' priorities. Inspired by the partisanship theory of Hibbs (1977), which posits that left-wing governments implement policies such as fiscal stimuli to benefit the working class, a vast body of empirical research has shown that left-right differences in economic policymaking persist despite the constraints of globalization (e.g., Roubini and Sachs 1989; Boix 1998; Rodrik 1998; Franzese 2002; Potrafke 2009). These findings suggest that left-wing parties

[3]Some scholars counter this argument by attributing environmental issues to negative externalities or market failures, which require government intervention (e.g., Buttel and Flinn 1976; King and Borchardt 1994). Given their inclination towards regulated markets, the Left is more likely to recognize these issues and advocate stringent environmental protections, which typically involve regulatory interventions. Conversely, the Right tends to resist stringent environmental protections due to concerns that market regulations will hinder macroeconomic performance. Benton (1997), a self-proclaimed *green Marxist*, echoes this perspective, emphasizing the disproportionate impact of environmental degradation on the working class.

remain attuned to their historical roots and *raison d'être* as advocates for the working class and the less well-to-do.

This enduring materialist orientation, by reinforcing the conflict between environmental goals and economic priorities, may divert left-wing parties from firm environmental commitments. Some existing research has explored this possibility. Using data from Google search trends and opinion polls in the United States, Kahn and Kotchen (2011) examines how the 2009 financial crisis affected public awareness of climate change. They found that, during the crisis, searches for 'global warming' declined. In contrast, searches for 'unemployment' increased, with these effects most pronounced in states experiencing high unemployment and strong Democratic electoral support. Wen et al. (2016) similarly argue that environmental protection is in tension with fiscal stimulus policies typically championed by left-wing governments. Their findings suggest that environmental quality tends to deteriorate under left-wing governments during periods of sluggish economic growth.

Moreover, some environmental economists, albeit not unanimously, suggest that stringent environmental policies disproportionately harm the less well-off. For instance, carbon taxes tend to have regressive distributional effects (e.g., Brännlund and Nordström 2004; Mathur and Morris 2014; Ohlendorf et al. 2021; Köppl and Schratzenstaller 2023), while environmental regulations may threaten employment by increasing production costs (e.g., Dechezleprêtre and Sato 2017; Sheriff, Ferris and Shadbegian 2019; Raff and Earnhart 2020, 2022)[4]. Despite these concerns, much of the research on environmental politics continues to emphasize the dominance of sociocultural liberals within left-wing electorates, mainly neglecting the internal conflicts that left-wing parties face between environmental protection and economic priorities (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano and Piketty 2021; Harring and Sohlberg 2017).

In summary, empirical and theoretical considerations challenge the conventional wisdom that

[4]The negative consequences of environmental protection remain a topic of debate. Regarding carbon taxes, some economists argue that they can have progressive distributional effects (Beck et al. 2015; Feindt et al. 2021). While environmental economists broadly agree that regulatory policies can negatively impact employment, some suggest that these effects are not substantial (Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih 2002; Ferris, Shadbegian and Wolverton 2014; Gray et al. 2014; Azevedo, Wolff and Yamazaki 2023).

left-wing parties are more likely to implement stringent environmental protections when in office. As discussed above, the recent findings of Tawiah (2022) suggest that left-wing governments may not necessarily prioritize environmental protection. While his study focuses on the ideological tension between personal freedom and environmental regulation, I argue that a broader conflict between materialist and postmaterialist priorities may explain left-wing parties' retreat from environmental policies. As the next section will elaborate, this left-wing dilemma is becoming increasingly urgent. Specifically, the rise of economically vulnerable groups—outsiders in labour markets—may be pressuring left-wing parties to dilute their environmental commitments.

How Outsiders Shape Left's Environmental Preferences and Policies

Some scholars argue that the recent advancement of economic globalization has given rise to and expanded a socio-economic stratum known as outsiders in labour markets. In his pioneering work on insider-outsider politics, Rueda (2005, 62) defines outsiders as those who 'are either unemployed or hold jobs characterized by low salaries and low levels of protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privileges', such as temporary workers. Existing scholarship has observed that, due to their severe material vulnerability, outsiders harbour stronger preferences for redistribution compared to the rest of the working class (Walter 2010). Moreover, it has been suggested that given their weaker organizational power, left-wing parties cannot automatically garner political support from them (Kessler-Harris 2018); instead, they must compete with far-right parties for their votes (Rovny and Rovny 2017). The increasing size of this outsider group in the commitment of left-wing parties to environmental protection, as elaborated below.

To begin with, building on previous scholarship, let us assume that supporters of left-wing parties consist of two social strata. The first is the working class or the less well-to-do. As they face greater economic hardship than employers and the more affluent, their presence incentivizes left-wing parties to pursue market intervention, such as fiscal stimulus measures and redistribu-

tion (e.g., Hibbs 1977). The second comprises individuals with higher educational attainment and employment in the service sectors (Oesch 2006). Although they may share redistributive preferences with the working class (cf. Häusermann et al. 2023; Abou-Chadi et al. 2024), they place greater emphasis on postmaterialist concerns, such as minority rights, political participation, and environmental protection (e.g., Kitschelt 1994). Their influence encourages left-wing parties to commit more substantially to environmental protection than right-wing parties, whose supporters tend to prioritize market liberalism and traditional values.

The rise of outsiders, however, is likely to shift the priorities of left-wing parties in favour of materialist agendas. To begin with, let us assume that outsiders constitute a substantial portion of the working class. As stated above, they are more likely to prioritize materialist issues over postmaterialist ones, such as environmental protection. However, the extent to which they do so is even greater than among the rest of the working class, as their material needs—such as job security, wages, and access to social welfare—are more immediate and pressing. Their economic vulnerability makes them particularly sensitive to policies that address inequality, redistribution, and social protection.

Their growing presence thus exerts pressure on left-wing parties to prioritize materialist agendas, as failing to do so could lead to electoral consequences. Suppose left-wing parties continue to focus on postmaterialist concerns at the expense of economic issues. In that case, they risk alienating the working class and outsiders, who may feel abandoned by the traditional left. This, in turn, could drive them towards far-right parties, which often capitalize on economic grievances while combining them with nationalist or protectionist rhetoric (see Oesch and Rennwald 2018; Rovny and Rovny 2017). In this way, the political landscape may undergo a significant transformation as left-wing parties are compelled to recalibrate their platforms in response to the demands of a shifting electorate.

Here, let us validate the micro-foundation of the discussion above with a cursory analysis. Figure 2 illustrates the association between socio-economic status and attitudes towards the trade-

off between environmental protection and economic growth in 12 countries[5], based on the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 7 (Haerpfer et al. 2020), conducted between 2017 and 2022. The WVS asked respondents whether environmental protection or economic growth should be prioritized, and the subgroup distributions of responses to this question are presented in the figure. First, Panel A depicts the association with respondents' perceptions of their own class, showing that support for economic growth vis-à-vis the environment is higher among the working and lower classes than among the upper and middle classes. Second, Panel B examines differences across occupational groups, revealing that economic growth is more favoured among service and manual workers than those in professional, technical, and higher administrative occupations. Third and finally, Panel C demonstrates the effect of respondents' income on their attitudes: the less well-off they are, the more likely they are to prioritize economic growth over environmental protection. Although the WVS, unfortunately, does not ask respondents about their employment status in detail, these findings support my assumption that outsiders prioritize materialist agendas over environmental protection[6] [7].

Beyond their mere presence, the potential adverse effects of environmental protection policies on outsiders may further discourage left-wing parties from committing to such policies. Market-based measures, such as carbon taxes, impose additional costs on households. Consumers must pay more for energy consumption and other commodities as increased production costs are passed on to prices (Wang et al. 2016). These costs disproportionately affect the less well-off, as they spend a greater proportion of their income on carbon-intensive products such as fuel and food, thereby

[5]The selected countries correspond to those covered in the subsequent main analysis from the full WVS sample. The resulting countries are Australia, Canada, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

[6]Note that I do not intend to deny that environmental issues, notably pollution, pose a survival threat to the working class (Benton 1997). Similarly, issues such as climate change are existential concerns for humanity as a whole in the long run. However, the immediacy of these rising problems is less perceptible to those experiencing economic hardship than traditional concerns such as pollution.

[7]One might question this speculation given the empirical findings of Häusermann, Kurer and Schwander (2015), which suggest that outsiders, in many cases, have high educational attainment and may adhere to liberal values, including support for environmental protection. Their argument, however, is not that the majority of outsiders are highly educated but rather that a subset of the highly educated experience outsiderness. Indeed, their empirical analysis reveals that educated outsiders tend to support social security more than educated insiders. Thus, it remains valid to conclude that outsiders as a whole prioritize materialist agendas over postmaterialist ones.



Note: The 'Priority' variable is the answer to Q111 of the WVS Wave 7. Panels A, B, and C use Q287, Q281, and Q288, respectively. For more details of the question wordings, see Appendix A

Figure 2: Socio-economic Status and Priority of Environment over Economy

exacerbating income inequality through regressive effects (Wier et al. 2005; Grainger and Kolstad 2010). Environmental protection policies may also threaten employment by raising production costs, thereby reducing employers' capacity to retain workers (Raff and Earnhart 2022). Outsiders, whose employment status is already precarious, will likely be the primary victims of such job reductions. Consequently, outsiders are likely to oppose environmental protection measures, and as their numbers grow, left-wing governments may increasingly retreat from firm environmental commitments.

In sum, the rise of outsiders will reshape the environmental preferences of left-wing parties, ultimately leading to changes in the environmental policies they implement when in office. As outsiders are primarily concerned with material survival, their increasing numbers shift the political agenda in favour of materialist issues over postmaterialist ones. Additionally, as some environmental policies may exacerbate economic hardship among the less well-off, including outsiders, their growing presence pressures left-wing parties to scale back environmental commitments. This

combination of factors results in weaker environmental preferences among left-wing parties and, consequently, less stringent environmental policies compared to a scenario where the number of outsiders remains small. If, by contrast, right-wing parties consistently oppose environmental protection, then the partisan divide on environmental policy is likely to diminish as the size of the outsider population grows. The hypotheses tested in this paper are, therefore, as follows:

Hypothesis: As the size of the outsiders increases, the effect of government partisanship on the stringency of environmental protection diminishes.

Data and Variables

Since Tawiah (2022) presents results that contradict the prevailing view at the policy level, my empirical analysis employs the same dependent variable: the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) Index, constructed by Botta and Koźluk (2014). As mentioned above, this index evaluates the overall level of environmental policy stringency in 28 OECD member countries from 1990 to 2015. The coding procedure accounts for both market-based and non-market policy instruments. The market-based policies include taxes on greenhouse gases, trading schemes for CO_2 and energy certificates, feed-in tariffs for solar and wind energy, and deposit-refund schemes. The non-market policies, by contrast, include emission standards for greenhouse gases and R&D subsidies for renewable energy. The authors first assigned scores on a seven-point scale (0–6) to each policy instrument based on predetermined criteria[8]. These scores were then averaged to produce two sub-EPS indices: one for market-based policies and another for non-market policies. Finally, these two sub-indices were averaged to construct the aggregated EPS Index. My analysis primarily relies on the aggregated EPS Index but also examines the two sub-indices to assess whether the rise of outsiders leads to differing outcomes for market-based and non-market policies.

Before introducing the independent variables, let us first examine the overall trend in the EPS Index. Figure 3 presents the average EPS Index for the countries covered in the empirical

[8]For instance, if the NO_x tax rate exceeds 4.5 MWh/tonne, a score of 6 is assigned.



Figure 3: Trend of Average EPS Index

analysis, revealing an upward trajectory. The average EPS Index, which was below one in 1990, rose to nearly three by 2015, suggesting that environmental protection has become increasingly stringent in the countries included in this study. This upward trend likely reflects the growing prominence of international environmental agreements, such as the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol.

Regarding the first independent variable, government partisanship, I employ three measures in my empirical analysis: Partisanship (PM), Partisanship (Government), and Partisanship (DPI). The construction of the first two follows the methodology of Suzuki (2023), designed to capture the partisanship of the party to which the prime minister belongs or the overall partisanship of the government in a given country-year. The data source for these measures is the *Parliaments and Governments Database* (*ParlGov Database*) compiled by Döring and Manow (2019), which assesses the left-right positioning of political parties across all European Union member states and most OECD countries[9]. The left-right positioning is measured on a scale from 0 to 10 based on

[9]More precisely, the dataset includes political parties with at least one seat in the national parliament of the respective country.

expert surveys.

Given the lag in policy implementation, the first variable (Partisanship [PM]) uses the value assigned to the prime minister's party as of 1 January of each year. However, since coalition governments are prevalent in many European countries included in my dataset, the second variable (Partisanship [Government]) is constructed as a weighted average of the values assigned to all governing parties to mitigate potential measurement errors. For ease of interpretation, both variables are categorized into a three-point scale: right-wing (0), centre (1), and left-wing (2), ensuring that the sample is evenly divided into these categories. As an additional robustness check, the third variable, Partisanship (DPI), is derived from the *execrlc* variable in Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2018), which classifies the partisanship of the chief executive's party on a left-centre-right scale[10].

Another key independent variable is the size of the outsider population in labour markets. As defined by Rueda (2005), outsiders are individuals without secure employment. While several groups may fall under this definition, my analysis operationalizes the size of the outsider population as the share of temporary employees, defined as 'wage and salary workers whose job has a predetermined termination date' (OECD 2024). The data for this measure is sourced from OECD (2017).

The covariates included in the analysis are as follows. First, I control the presence of green parties in government. A significant representation of green parties in the governing coalition is expected to increase the likelihood of stringent environmental policies, leading to higher EPS Index values. To construct this variable, I rely on the *ParlGov Database* to compute the ratio of legislative seats held by green parties[11] relative to the total number of seats held by governing parties.

Additionally, I include GDP growth and GDP per capita (log-transformed) to account for economic capacity, as high-growth economies and wealthier countries are more likely to afford environmental protection. Following the argument that closer economic interdependence incentivizes

[10]The original *execrlc* variable assigns 0 to right-wing, 1 to centre, and 2 to left-wing parties. For consistency, I rescaled it to align with the measures derived from the *ParlGov Database*.
[11]Parties classified as 'Green/Ecologist' in the *ParlGov Database* are identified as green parties in this study.

countries to engage in international environmental cooperation (Neumayer 2002), I also include foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade openness as covariates. All covariates, except for the green party variable, are sourced from World Bank (2022).

The descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables are presented in Table B.1. Notably, the mean values of the partisanship variables derived from Döring and Manow (2019) are close to zero, indicating that the transformation into a three-category scale was successful. Similarly, the mean value of the partisanship measure based on Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2018) is also near zero, suggesting that right-wing, centre, and left-wing governments are evenly distributed within the sample.

Model and Methods for Estimation

The procedure outlined above resulted in the creation of a panel dataset covering 27 OECD member countries[12] over the period from 1990 to 2015, with country-years as the unit of observation. As mentioned above, the dependent variable is the EPS Index, while the main independent variables are the size of the outsider population, government partisanship, and their interaction term. Specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects model:

$$EPS_{it} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_{2,i} + \alpha_{3,t} + \beta_1 outsider_{it-1} + \beta_2 partisanship_{it} + \beta_3 outsider_{it-1} \times partisanship_{it} + \mathbf{x'_{it-1}}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \varepsilon$$

In the equation above, α_1 is the constant term, $\alpha_{2,i}$ represents country-level fixed effects, $\alpha_{3,t}$ denotes year-level fixed effects, and $\mathbf{x'_{it-1}}\boldsymbol{\beta}$ captures the control variables and their coefficients. Since my focus is not on predicting the direct effect of temporary employment on environmental

[12]The covered countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States, originally included in the EPS Index dataset, is excluded as it is not covered by the *ParlGov* dataset.

protection, the sign of the coefficient β_1 is not specified here. More critical to the analysis are the effects of partisanship and its interaction with temporary employment.

According to conventional wisdom, one would expect $\beta_2 > 0$, as left-wing governments are generally more likely to implement stringent environmental protection measures. The hypothesis tested in this paper posits that the left-right difference in environmental policy stringency diminishes as the size of the outsider population increases, leading to the expectation that $\beta_3 < 0$.

Empirical Findings

Main Finding

Table 1 presents the main results using the three different measures of partisanship. The first notable finding is that the share of temporary employment has significantly positive coefficients across all models except Model (6). This implies that an increase in temporary employment corresponds to higher EPS Index values, indicating more stringent environmental protection. Although I did not make a prior prediction regarding the effect of temporary employment itself, this positive association can be attributed to the upward trends in both the EPS Index and the share of temporary employment, as shown in Figures 1 and 3, respectively. Developed countries have pursued environmental protection in parallel with the steady rise in temporary employment driven by globalization, possibly explaining this result.

More critical to this analysis are government partisanship and its interaction with temporary employment. Table 1 consistently reports positive coefficients for government partisanship, with significance levels reaching 10% for Partisanship (PM) and Partisanship (Government). This suggests that left-wing or centrist governments are more likely to implement stringent environmental protection measures than right-wing governments, supporting conventional wisdom and contrasting with the findings of Tawiah (2022).

Next, the interaction between partisanship and temporary employment yields significantly negative coefficients at the 1% level across all models. This result, consistent with the hypothesis,

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02***	0.03***	0.02**	0.03***	0.02**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13*	0.11*				
	(0.07)	(0.06)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Government)			0.13*	0.11*		
			(0.07)	(0.07)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.01***	−0.01**		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.12	0.11
					(0.08)	(0.08)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01**	−0.01***
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		0.62		0.59		0.50
		(0.67)		(0.68)		(0.74)
GDP growth		0.02		0.02		0.02**
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.17		0.18*		0.11
		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.11)
Trade openness		−0.00		−0.00		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00		0.00*
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.07
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.06	−0.08	−0.06	−0.10	−0.07
Num. obs.	473	471	473	471	463	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 1: Main Results



Note: Based on Models (2), (4), and (6) in Table 1, respectively.

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of the Three Partisanship Variables on the EPS

demonstrates that an increase in temporary employment diminishes the positive effect of left-wing governments on environmental policy stringency.

Figure 4 visualizes the marginal effects of the three partisanship variables conditional on the share of temporary employment. Overall, the results indicate that the marginal effects decrease as temporary employment increases. When the share of temporary employment is below 10%, all three partisanship variables exhibit positive effects on the EPS Index. However, these effects are statistically insignificant, as evidenced by the 95% confidence interval (represented by the shaded area) overlapping the zero horizontal line. Thus, government partisanship does not influence the EPS Index when temporary employment remains low.

The marginal effects become negative when the share of temporary employment exceeds approximately 13%, although this effect is still statistically insignificant. However, for partisanship (PM) and DPI, the negative effect becomes significant once temporary employment surpasses 20%, indicating that under high levels of temporary employment, left-wing governments are associated with a lower EPS Index. While this result aligns with the hypothesis, it also presents a counterintu-

itive insight: where the share of outsiders is small, there is little difference in environmental policy between left- and right-wing governments. However, as the share of outsiders increases, left-wing governments become more likely to relax environmental protections relative to their right-wing counterparts—contradicting conventional assumptions.

To further illustrate the effects of partisanship, Figure 5 presents predicted values of the EPS Index under different levels of temporary employment and Partisanship (PM). The figure first shows that the predicted EPS Index increases as temporary employment rises regardless of whether a government is right-wing, centrist, or left-wing. This result likely reflects a spurious correlation between the EPS Index and temporary employment, both of which have exhibited upward trends, as demonstrated in Figures 1 and 3.

More importantly, government partisanship makes a substantive difference. The EPS Index under left-wing governments is considerably less responsive to increases in temporary employment compared to right-wing governments. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in temporary employment (6.4 percentage points) leads to a 0.17 SD increase in the EPS Index under right-wing governments. In contrast, the corresponding increase under left-wing governments is only 0.07 SD. Figure 5 also shows that when the share of temporary employment exceeds 15%, the EPS Index is lower under left-wing governments than under right-wing or centrist governments. This result runs counter to conventional expectations, suggesting that left-wing governments may resist the trend towards stricter environmental policies—casting doubt on the assumption that they are inherently more environmentally proactive.

Having established the main result, I now turn to Table 2 to examine whether the rise of outsiders affects market-based and non-market policies differently. The first three models use the Market EPS Index as the dependent variable. The interaction between temporary employment and partisanship remains significantly negative across all three partisanship variables, confirming that my main finding applies to market-based policies.

The last three models focus on the Non-Market EPS Index. Unlike the models for the Market EPS, these do not replicate the main finding. With the exception of Model (6), which uses DPI



Note: Based on Model (2) in Table 1. Values of all variables except temporary employment, Partisanship (PM), and their interaction are set to their means.

Figure 5: Prediction of EPS Based on Partisanship (PM) and Temporary Employment

to measure partisanship, the interaction term is not significantly negative. This suggests that my argument does not extend to non-market policies. While the reasons for this discrepancy remain unclear, I hypothesize that market-based policies, particularly those targeting greenhouse gases, impose direct economic costs on outsiders, making them more likely to oppose stringent environmental measures.

Robustness Checks

The Online Appendix presents additional robustness checks, while Appendix C provides further details on the main analysis in Table 1. Here, I re-estimate the models by sequentially adding covariates. In all specifications, the interaction between outsiders and partisanship remains significantly negative across the different partisanship variables, reinforcing the robustness of my findings.

Appendices D and E replicate this analysis for market-based and non-market policies, respect-

	Market EPS			Non-market EPS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.03*	0.03*	0.01	0.03**	0.03**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.12			0.11		
	(0.09)			(0.10)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***			−0.00		
	(0.00)			(0.01)		
Partisanship (Government)		0.12			0.10	
		(0.10)			(0.08)	
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)		−0.01**			−0.00	
		(0.01)			(0.00)	
Partisanship (DPI)			0.06			0.17**
			(0.11)			(0.07)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)			−0.01*			−0.01*
			(0.01)			(0.00)
Green party share in government	1.33	1.37	1.28	−0.06	−0.15	−0.27
	(1.42)	(1.41)	(1.58)	(0.85)	(0.89)	(0.90)
GDP growth	0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
GDP per capita	0.05	0.06	−0.03	0.29**	0.29**	0.25**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Trade openness	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Foreign direct investment	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	−0.06	−0.07	−0.06	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09
Num. obs.	471	471	440	478	478	447

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table 2: DV Decompostion: Market vs. Non-market EPS Indices

ively. Again, the main finding holds for the Market EPS, although models using DPI partisanship do not consistently yield significant interaction coefficients. This result warrants some caution in interpreting the main finding. For the Non-Market EPS, by contrast, the DPI partisanship models produce significant interaction terms, whereas those using the *ParlGov* partisanship variables do not. However, these coefficients barely reach the 10% significance threshold. Thus, the earlier speculation that left-wing parties' environmental policies are more likely to be affected in the market-based domain remains reasonable.

In Appendices F, G, H, and I, I conduct further robustness checks. First, I replace the green party share variable with a dummy variable indicating whether any green party is part of the government. Second, following Tawiah (2022), I introduce environmental performance variables (CO_2 emissions, energy consumption, renewable energy share, and resource rents) to account for the possibility that environmental policies respond to actual environmental conditions. Third, I estimate models with a lagged dependent variable. Although including a lagged dependent variable may underestimate the coefficients of other independent variables (Achen 2000), obtaining similar results would further strengthen the validity of my hypothesis. Finally, I introduce a quadratic term for temporary employment to assess potential non-monotonic effects. Only the Non-Market EPS and DPI partisanship models yield notable results, where left-right differences in non-market policies converge as temporary employment increases. Overall, these analyses corroborate the main finding.

Lastly, Appendix J assesses whether the main finding is sensitive to country-specific factors. I re-estimate the models using a country-wise Jackknife resampling approach (cf. Ren et al. 2010). The main result remains robust, particularly for the Market EPS, suggesting that country-specific factors do not drive the findings.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined how government partisanship influences the stringency of environmental protection. Previous research suggests that left-wing governments, supported by voters with postmaterialist preferences, are more likely to introduce stringent environmental policies than their right-wing counterparts. However, left-wing parties also rely on support from the less well-to-do, which increasingly includes the most vulnerable workers—outsiders in labour markets. Given their economic precarity and potential conflicts between environmental policies and their financial well-being, these outsiders may pressure left-wing governments to scale back their commitment to environmental protection.

Specifically, I hypothesized that as the size of the outsider population increases, partisan differences in environmental protection stringency would diminish. My empirical analysis, however, presents findings that extend beyond this hypothesis. Where the share of outsiders is small, government partisanship has little effect on environmental protection stringency. In contrast, when the share of outsiders is large, left-wing governments implement less stringent environmental policies than their right-wing counterparts.

This finding challenges the prevailing view that left-wing governments are inherently more committed to environmental protection. While previous research assumes that postmaterialist voters drive the environmental agenda of left-wing parties, my findings cast doubt on this assumption and suggest that the political landscape may shift in the future. At present, as exemplified by the German government led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, 'Red-Green coalitions' between left-wing parties and environmental movements are a common feature of politics in developed countries. However, the traditional and fundamental goal of left-wing parties has been to provide economic security to the less well-to-do. If, as Figure 1 suggests, economic hardship among left-wing voters is becoming increasingly severe, left-wing parties may be expected to deprioritize environmental protection in favour of addressing immediate material concerns.

If right-wing governments remain mainly indifferent to environmental protection, then this withdrawal by left-wing governments could seriously undermine ongoing efforts to combat climate

change. To avert such setbacks, preemptive measures are needed to mitigate the economic burdens associated with environmental policies, ensuring that working-class and economically vulnerable groups do not perceive green policies as threatening their livelihoods.

Despite these crucial implications, this study has several limitations. First, while this study includes an analysis of the micro-foundation, it remains cursory and preliminary. Although my findings suggest that outsiders are less supportive of environmental protection, a more rigorous examination is needed to substantiate this relationship further. Future research could employ individual-level survey experiments to disentangle the causal mechanisms at play, exploring whether outsiders' opposition stems from economic insecurity, ideological predispositions, or political mobilization by parties and interest groups. Additionally, cross-national comparisons using more granular survey data could help assess whether this pattern holds across different institutional and economic contexts.

Second, while my empirical analysis focuses on policy outcomes, it does not directly assess the environmentalist preferences of left-wing parties themselves. Future studies could gain deeper insights by analysing party manifestos, parliamentary debates, or elite interviews to understand how left-wing parties frame environmental issues and whether they adjust their rhetoric in response to growing outsider populations.

Thirdly, my finding that left-wing governments may implement less stringent environmental policies contradicts the conventional view that the Left has historically outperformed the Right in environmental governance. If left-wing governments are indeed relaxing environmental regulations to accommodate outsiders, why have they nonetheless been associated with better environmental outcomes in past studies? Future research should explore this apparent paradox by examining the relationship between policy stringency and actual environmental performance. This could involve assessing whether other policy mechanisms, such as green industrial strategies or international agreements, enable left-wing governments to achieve stronger environmental results despite potential rollbacks in regulatory measures.

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Appendix:
Revisiting Partisan Politics of Environmental Policy:
Are Left-wing Governments Always Eco-friendly?

A Question Wordings of the World Value Survey Wave 7

Q111: Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?

1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.
2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent
3. Other answer (*coded if volunteered only*)

Q287: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the

1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class

Q281: To which of the following occupational groups do you belong?

1. Professional and technical (for example: doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, accountant, nurse)
2. Higher administrative (for example: banker, executive in big business, high government official, union official)
3. Clerical (for example: secretary, clerk, office manager, civil servant, bookkeeper
4. Sales (for example: sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, insurance agent, buyer)
5. Service (for example: restaurant owner, police officer, waitress, barber, caretaker)
6. Skilled worker (for example: foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician)

7. Semi-skilled worker (for example: bricklayer, bus driver, cannery worker, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker)
8. Unskilled worker (for example: laborer, porter, unskilled factory worker, cleaner)
9. Farm worker (for example: farm laborer, tractor driver)
10. Farm proprietor, farm manager
11. Never had a job

Note: The author collapsed these 11 categories into 5 in Figure 2 (i.e., 1, 2: Prof/Tech/Admin; 3, 4, 5: Service Workers; 6, 7, 8, 9: Manual Workers; 10: Farmers; 11. Never had a job).

Q288: On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Lowest group									Highest group
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

B Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Note
EPS	657	1.76	0.93	*EPS* from Botta and Koźluk (2014)
Market EPS	657	1.19	0.83	*EPS_MKT* from Botta and Koźluk (2014)
Non-market EPS	677	2.30	1.25	*EPS_NMKT* from Botta and Koźluk (2014)
Temporary employment	531	12.77	6.37	'share of temporary employment (dependent employment)' (OECD 2017)
Partisanship (PM)	568	0.99	0.80	Author's coding based on Döring and Manow (2019)
Partisanship (Government)	568	1.00	0.82	Ditto.
Partisanship (DPI)	603	0.97	0.94	*execrlc* from Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2018)
Green party share in government	572	0.01	0.03	Author's coding based on Döring and Manow (2019). The value refers to the share of its seats compared to all governing parties if any green party participate in the government or takes 0 otherwise.
Green party government (dummy)	572	0.07	0.26	Author's coding based on Döring and Manow (2019). The value takes 1 if any green party participate in the government or 0 otherwise.
GDP growth	656	2.45	2.97	'GDP growth (annual %)' (World Bank 2022)
GDP per capita	662	10.17	0.67	'GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)' (World Bank 2022)
Trade openness	666	73.49	35.58	'Trade (% of GDP)' (World Bank 2022)
Foreign direct investment	665	3.94	7.13	'Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)' (World Bank 2022)
CO2 emissions	677	9.00	3.77	'CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)' (World Bank 2022)
Energy consumption	677	8.20	0.44	'Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)' (World Bank 2022)
Renewable energy	677	13.15	12.66	'Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption)' (World Bank 2022)
Resource rent	671	1.02	1.91	'Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)' (World Bank 2022)

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics



Figure B.1: Distribution of the EPS index



Figure B.2: Distribution of Share of Temporary Employment

Appendix-4



Figure B.3: By-country Trend of Share of Temporary Employment



Figure B.4: By-country Trend of Temporary Employment

C Main Analyses (Detailed)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02***	0.03***	0.02**	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13*	0.13*	0.12*	0.12*	0.13**	0.13*	0.11*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		0.51					0.62
		(0.61)					(0.67)
GDP growth			0.01				0.02
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.23***			0.17
				(0.09)			(0.10)
Trade openness					−0.00		−0.00
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.06
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08	−0.06
Num. obs.	473	472	472	473	473	473	471

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table C.1: Main Results (PM Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02**	0.03***	0.02**	0.03***	0.02**	0.02**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (Government)	0.13*	0.13*	0.12*	0.12*	0.13*	0.13*	0.11*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		0.46					0.59
		(0.62)					(0.68)
GDP growth			0.02				0.02
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.23***			0.18*
				(0.09)			(0.11)
Trade openness					−0.00		−0.00
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.07
Adj. R^2	−0.08	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08	−0.06
Num. obs.	473	472	472	473	473	473	471

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table C.2: Main Results (Govt Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02**	0.02**	0.02*	0.03**	0.02*	0.02**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (DPI)	0.12	0.14*	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		0.32					0.50
		(0.68)					(0.74)
GDP growth			0.02**				0.02**
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.18*			0.11
				(0.10)			(0.11)
Trade openness					−0.00		−0.00
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00*
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.07
Adj. R^2	−0.10	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09	−0.10	−0.07
Num. obs.	463	441	462	463	463	463	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table C.3: Main Results (DPI Partisanship)

D Analyses for Market EPS Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.03*	0.03**	0.03*	0.03**	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		1.16					1.33
		(1.42)					(1.42)
GDP growth			0.01				0.01
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.14			0.05
				(0.14)			(0.18)
Trade openness					−0.00		−0.01*
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.06
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.08	−0.09	−0.09	−0.07	−0.09	−0.06
Num. obs.	473	472	472	473	473	473	471

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table D.1: Result for Maket EPS (PM Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Partisanship (Government)	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green party share in government		1.18					1.37
		(1.40)					(1.41)
GDP growth			0.01				0.01
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.14			0.06
				(0.15)			(0.18)
Trade openness					−0.00		−0.01*
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.06
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09	−0.08	−0.09	−0.07
Num. obs.	473	472	472	473	473	473	471

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table D.2: Result for Maket EPS (Govt Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Partisanship (DPI)	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)	−0.01	−0.01**	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green party share in government		1.04					1.28
		(1.56)					(1.58)
GDP growth			0.02				0.02*
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.09			−0.03
				(0.16)			(0.18)
Trade openness					−0.01*		−0.01*
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.01
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.08
Adj. R^2	−0.10	−0.09	−0.10	−0.10	−0.08	−0.10	−0.06
Num. obs.	463	441	462	463	463	463	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table D.3: Result for Maket EPS (DPI Partisanship)

E Analyses for non-Market EPS Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.03**	0.02*	0.02*	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Green party share in government		−0.13					−0.06
		(0.82)					(0.85)
GDP growth			0.02				0.02
			(0.01)				(0.02)
GDP per capita				0.31***			0.29**
				(0.08)			(0.11)
Trade openness					0.00		−0.00
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04
Adj. R^2	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09	−0.08	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09
Num. obs.	480	479	479	480	480	480	478

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table E.1: Result for Non-maket EPS (PM Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02**	0.02**	0.02*	0.03***	0.02**	0.02*	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (Government)	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		−0.21					−0.15
		(0.86)					(0.89)
GDP growth			0.02				0.02
			(0.01)				(0.02)
GDP per capita				0.32***			0.29**
				(0.09)			(0.12)
Trade openness					0.00		−0.00
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04
Adj. R^2	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09	−0.08	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09
Num. obs.	480	479	479	480	480	480	478

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table E.2: Result for Non-maket EPS (Govt Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Temporary employment	0.02*	0.02*	0.02	0.03**	0.02*	0.02	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (DPI)	0.18**	0.19**	0.17**	0.17**	0.18**	0.17**	0.17**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		−0.37					−0.27
		(0.85)					(0.90)
GDP growth			0.02**				0.02
			(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita				0.26***			0.25**
				(0.09)			(0.12)
Trade openness					0.00		0.00
					(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00	0.00
						(0.00)	(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.05
Adj. R^2	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09	−0.08	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09
Num. obs.	471	448	470	471	471	471	447

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table E.3: Result for Non-maket EPS (DPI Partisanship)

F Analyses for Lagged Dependent Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lagged DV	0.635***	0.641***	0.631***	0.654***	0.634***	0.635***	0.647***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Temporary employment	0.015***	0.014***	0.014***	0.012**	0.015***	0.014***	0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Partisanship (PM)	0.073*	0.073*	0.070*	0.077**	0.074*	0.072*	0.072*
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.004**	−0.004**	−0.004*	−0.004**	−0.004**	−0.004**	−0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Green party share in government		−0.052					0.009
		(0.463)					(0.435)
GDP growth			0.007				0.008
			(0.006)				(0.006)
GDP per capita				−0.121			−0.149
				(0.078)			(0.099)
Trade openness					−0.000		−0.001
					(0.002)		(0.002)
Foreign direct investment						0.003	0.003
						(0.002)	(0.002)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.468	0.465	0.467	0.472	0.469	0.471	0.472
Adj. R^2	0.402	0.397	0.400	0.405	0.401	0.404	0.399
Num. obs.	472	471	471	472	472	472	470

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table F.1: Result for Lagged DV (PM Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lagged DV	0.634***	0.639***	0.628***	0.651***	0.633***	0.633***	0.644***
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Temporary employment	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.011**	0.014***	0.014***	0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Partisanship (Government)	0.060*	0.060*	0.059*	0.061*	0.060*	0.059*	0.057*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)	−0.004*	−0.004*	−0.003*	−0.004*	−0.004*	−0.004*	−0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Green party share in government		−0.078					−0.017
		(0.468)					(0.439)
GDP growth			0.007				0.008
			(0.006)				(0.006)
GDP per capita				−0.115			−0.142
				(0.079)			(0.101)
Trade openness					−0.000		−0.001
					(0.002)		(0.002)
Foreign direct investment						0.003	0.003
						(0.002)	(0.002)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.467	0.464	0.467	0.471	0.468	0.470	0.471
Adj. R^2	0.401	0.396	0.399	0.404	0.400	0.403	0.397
Num. obs.	472	471	471	472	472	472	470

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table F.2: Result for Lagged DV (Govt Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Lagged DV	0.665***	0.650***	0.659***	0.680***	0.663***	0.664***	0.652***
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Temporary employment	0.017***	0.015***	0.016***	0.013**	0.016***	0.016***	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Partisanship (DPI)	0.083**	0.090**	0.082**	0.083**	0.082**	0.079**	0.084**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)	−0.005***	−0.006***	−0.005**	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Green party share in government		−0.122					−0.087
		(0.437)					(0.424)
GDP growth			0.006				0.006
			(0.006)				(0.007)
GDP per capita				−0.122			−0.136
				(0.083)			(0.104)
Trade openness					−0.000		−0.001
					(0.002)		(0.002)
Foreign direct investment						0.002	0.003
						(0.002)	(0.002)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.490	0.471	0.489	0.494	0.490	0.492	0.477
Adj. R^2	0.423	0.399	0.420	0.426	0.421	0.423	0.399
Num. obs.	462	440	461	462	462	462	439

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table F.3: Result for Lagged DV (DPI Partisanship)

G Analyses with Green Party Government Dummy

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03**	0.02**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13*	0.11*				
	(0.07)	(0.06)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Government)			0.13*	0.11		
			(0.07)	(0.07)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.01***	−0.01**		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.14*	0.11
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01***	−0.01***
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party govenment (dummy)	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
GDP growth		0.01		0.02		0.02**
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.17		0.18		0.11
		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.11)
Trade openness		−0.00		−0.00		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00*		0.00*
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.07
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.06	−0.08	−0.06	−0.09	−0.07
Num. obs.	472	471	472	471	441	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table G.1: Result for Green Party Government Dummy (EPS)

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Partisanship (PM)	0.12	0.11				
	(0.09)	(0.09)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Government)			0.14	0.12		
			(0.09)	(0.10)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.01**	−0.01**		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.09	0.06
					(0.10)	(0.11)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01**	−0.01*
					(0.00)	(0.01)
Green party govenment (dummy)	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.08
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)
GDP growth		0.01		0.01		0.02*
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.05		0.06		−0.03
		(0.17)		(0.18)		(0.18)
Trade openness		−0.01*		−0.01*		−0.01*
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.01		0.01		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.07
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.07	−0.09	−0.07	−0.09	−0.06
Num. obs.	472	471	472	471	441	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table G.2: Result for Green Party Government Dummy (Market EPS)

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03**	0.02**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13*	0.11*				
	(0.07)	(0.06)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Government)			0.13*	0.11		
			(0.07)	(0.07)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.01***	−0.01**		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.14*	0.11
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01***	−0.01***
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party govenment (dummy)	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
GDP growth		0.01		0.02		0.02**
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.17		0.18		0.11
		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.11)
Trade openness		−0.00		−0.00		−0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00*		0.00*
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.07
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.06	−0.08	−0.06	−0.09	−0.07
Num. obs.	472	471	472	471	441	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table G.3: Result for Green Party Government Dummy (Non-market EPS)

H Analyses with Environmental Performances

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.03***	0.03**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (PM)	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*	0.11*	0.12*	0.10*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CO2 emisson	−0.01				−0.04	−0.03
	(0.02)				(0.03)	(0.03)
Energy consumption		−0.01			0.12	−0.33
		(0.22)			(0.29)	(0.41)
Renewable energy			−0.00		−0.01	−0.01
			(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Resource rent				0.05***	0.06***	0.05**
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Green party share in government						0.40
						(0.72)
GDP growth						0.02
						(0.01)
GDP per capita						0.29**
						(0.13)
Trade openness						−0.00
						(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00*
						(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.09
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09	−0.07	−0.07	−0.04
Num. obs.	473	473	473	473	473	471

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table H.1: Result for Enviromental Performances (PM Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.03***	0.03**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (Government)	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*	0.11*	0.12*	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CO2 emisson	−0.01				−0.04	−0.03
	(0.02)				(0.03)	(0.03)
Energy consumption		−0.00			0.15	−0.31
		(0.22)			(0.31)	(0.43)
Renewable energy			0.00		−0.01	−0.01
			(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Resource rent				0.04***	0.06***	0.05**
				(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Green party share in government						0.38
						(0.73)
GDP growth						0.02
						(0.01)
GDP per capita						0.30**
						(0.13)
Trade openness						−0.00
						(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00*
						(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.09
Adj. R^2	−0.08	−0.09	−0.09	−0.07	−0.07	−0.04
Num. obs.	473	473	473	473	473	471

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table H.2: Result for Enviromental Performances (Govt Partisanship)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02**	0.02*	0.02*	0.02**	0.02*	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisanship (DPI)	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01**	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
CO2 emisson	−0.03				−0.06	−0.05*
	(0.03)				(0.04)	(0.03)
Energy consumption		−0.08			0.21	−0.02
		(0.26)			(0.33)	(0.39)
Renewable energy			−0.00		−0.01**	−0.01***
			(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Resource rent				0.04**	0.06***	0.06**
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Green party share in government						0.32
						(0.81)
GDP growth						0.02**
						(0.01)
GDP per capita						0.21*
						(0.12)
Trade openness						−0.00
						(0.00)
Foreign direct investment						0.00*
						(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.10
Adj. R^2	−0.10	−0.10	−0.10	−0.09	−0.08	−0.04
Num. obs.	463	463	463	463	463	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table H.3: Result for Enviromental Performances (DPI Partisanship)

I Analyses with Quadratic Temporary Employment

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	−0.03	−0.02	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Temporary employment (Sq.)	0.00*	0.00*	0.00**	0.00**	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship (PM)	0.11	0.05				
	(0.17)	(0.17)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01	0.00				
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (PM)	−0.00	−0.00				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Govt.)			−0.01	−0.01		
			(0.16)	(0.16)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Govt.)			0.01	0.01		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (Govt.)			−0.00	−0.00		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.10	0.08
					(0.18)	(0.18)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01	−0.00
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.00	−0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		0.62				0.50
		(0.65)				(0.72)
GDP growth		0.02				0.02**
		(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.13				0.06
		(0.12)				(0.12)
Trade openness		−0.00				−0.00
		(0.00)				(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.00*				0.01*
		(0.00)				(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.08
Adj. R^2	−0.07	−0.06	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08	−0.05
Num. obs.	473	471	473	473	463	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table I.1: Result for Quadratic Temporary Employment (EPS)

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08	−0.10	−0.11
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Temporary employment (Sq.)	0.00*	0.00*	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship (PM)	−0.05	−0.11				
	(0.19)	(0.19)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	0.01	0.02				
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (PM)	−0.00	−0.00				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Govt.)			−0.12	−0.12		
			(0.20)	(0.20)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Govt.)			0.03	0.03		
			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (Govt.)			−0.00	−0.00		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Partisanship (DPI)					−0.17	−0.23
					(0.24)	(0.24)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					0.02	0.03
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.00	−0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		1.30				1.28
		(1.33)				(1.38)
GDP growth		0.01				0.02*
		(0.01)				(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.00				−0.10
		(0.18)				(0.19)
Trade openness		−0.01*				−0.01**
		(0.00)				(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.01				0.01*
		(0.00)				(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.10
Adj. R^2	−0.07	−0.05	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07	−0.03
Num. obs.	473	471	473	473	463	440

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Table I.2: Result for Quadratic Temporary Employment (MarketEPS)

	Prime Minister		Government		DPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Temporary employment (Sq.)	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Partisanship (PM)	0.32	0.27				
	(0.26)	(0.26)				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.03	−0.03				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (PM)	0.00	0.00				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Partisanship (Govt.)			0.15	0.13		
			(0.20)	(0.19)		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Govt.)			−0.01	−0.01		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (Govt.)			0.00	0.00		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.39**	0.41**
					(0.17)	(0.19)
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.04**	−0.04*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Temporary employment (Sq.)*Partisanship (DPI)					0.00*	0.00*
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Green party share in government		−0.04		−0.13		−0.25
		(0.88)		(0.92)		(0.92)
GDP growth		0.02		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)
GDP per capita		0.26**		0.28**		0.22*
		(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.12)
Trade openness		−0.00		−0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.06
Adj. R^2	−0.09	−0.09	−0.10	−0.09	−0.09	−0.08
Num. obs.	480	478	480	478	471	447

Note: Cluster robust standard erros in parenthis *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table I.3: Result for Quadratic Temporary Employment (Non-marketEPS)



Figure I.1: Prediction of Non-market EPS based on Partisanship (DPI) and Temporary Employment

J Analyses for Country-wise Sensitivety

This section demonstrates the result of the reestimation of the main analyses with a country-wise jackknife resampling. In this procedure, I estimated each of the models with the targeted countries excluded one by one, then obtaining bias-adjusted (namely, jackknife) coefficients and their standard errors based on the original coefficients and the means of the obtained leave-one-out estimators. Suppose that $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{original}}$ is a vector of coefficients from the original estimation (ordinary square fixed effect model) and that $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{-i}$ is a vector of coefficients from a leave-one-out estimation which excludes country $i \in \{1, \cdots N\}$. The jackknife coefficients, $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{jack}}$, and their standard errors, $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{\text{jack}}$, were:

$$\boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{jack}} = \boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{original}} - (N-1)\left(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{(\cdot)} - \boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{original}}\right)$$
$$\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{\text{jack}} = \sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{-i} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{(\cdot)}\right)^2},$$

where $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{(\cdot)} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{-i}$. In Tables J.1 through J.3, each entry denotes $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{jack}}$ and $[\boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{jack}} - 1.96 \times \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{\text{jack}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{\text{jack}} + 1.96 \times \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{\text{jack}}]$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.03*	0.04*	0.03*	0.04*	0.02	0.02
	[0.01; 0.05]	[0.01; 0.06]	[0.01; 0.05]	[0.01; 0.07]	[−0.00; 0.04]	[−0.00; 0.05]
Partisanship (PM)	0.15	0.15				
	[−0.00; 0.31]	[−0.01; 0.32]				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.01*	−0.01*				
	[−0.02; −0.00]	[−0.02; −0.00]				
Partisanship (Government)			0.16	0.14		
			[−0.01; 0.32]	[−0.04; 0.32]		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.01*	−0.01		
			[−0.02; −0.00]	[−0.02; 0.00]		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.13	0.10
					[−0.05; 0.30]	[−0.07; 0.27]
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01*	−0.01*
					[−0.02; −0.00]	[−0.02; −0.00]
Green party share in government		0.80		0.79		0.75
		[−1.17; 2.76]		[−1.17; 2.75]		[−1.55; 3.05]
GDP growth		0.01		0.02		0.03*
		[−0.02; 0.05]		[−0.02; 0.05]		[0.00; 0.05]
GDP per capita		0.20		0.21		0.13
		[−0.07; 0.47]		[−0.06; 0.49]		[−0.17; 0.43]
Trade openness		−0.01*		−0.01*		−0.01
		[−0.01; −0.00]		[−0.01; −0.00]		[−0.01; 0.00]
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00		0.00
		[−0.00; 0.01]		[−0.00; 0.01]		[−0.00; 0.01]
Num. obs.	473	471	473	471	463	440

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table J.1: Country-wise Jackknife Estimation for the EPS Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.04*	0.05*	0.04	0.05*	0.03	0.03
	[0.00; 0.08]	[0.00; 0.09]	[−0.00; 0.09]	[0.00; 0.10]	[−0.01; 0.07]	[−0.02; 0.08]
Partisanship (PM)	0.22	0.25				
	[−0.05; 0.49]	[−0.08; 0.57]				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	−0.02*	−0.02				
	[−0.04; −0.00]	[−0.05; 0.00]				
Partisanship (Government)			0.22	0.23		
			[−0.08; 0.52]	[−0.11; 0.56]		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.02	−0.02		
			[−0.05; 0.00]	[−0.05; 0.00]		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.13	0.11
					[−0.18; 0.44]	[−0.18; 0.40]
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.01	−0.02
					[−0.04; 0.01]	[−0.04; 0.00]
Green party share in government		2.03		2.13		2.10
		[−2.62; 6.69]		[−2.43; 6.69]		[−3.20; 7.39]
GDP growth		0.01		0.01		0.02
		[−0.04; 0.05]		[−0.03; 0.05]		[−0.01; 0.06]
GDP per capita		0.07		0.11		0.02
		[−0.47; 0.62]		[−0.45; 0.67]		[−0.54; 0.59]
Trade openness		−0.01		−0.01		−0.01*
		[−0.02; 0.00]		[−0.02; 0.00]		[−0.02; −0.00]
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00		0.01
		[−0.01; 0.02]		[−0.01; 0.02]		[−0.01; 0.02]
Num. obs.	473	471	473	471	463	440

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table J.2: Country-wise Jackknife Estimation for the Market EPS Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Temporary employment	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02
	[−0.01; 0.05]	[−0.01; 0.06]	[−0.01; 0.05]	[−0.00; 0.06]	[−0.02; 0.04]	[−0.01; 0.05]
Partisanship (PM)	0.07	0.04				
	[−0.23; 0.37]	[−0.23; 0.32]				
Temporary employment*Partisanship (PM)	0.00	0.00				
	[−0.02; 0.02]	[−0.02; 0.02]				
Partisanship (Government)			0.08	0.05		
			[−0.13; 0.29]	[−0.16; 0.25]		
Temporary employment*Partisanship (Government)			−0.00	0.00		
			[−0.02; 0.01]	[−0.01; 0.02]		
Partisanship (DPI)					0.13	0.10
					[−0.10; 0.35]	[−0.15; 0.34]
Temporary employment*Partisanship (DPI)					−0.00	−0.00
					[−0.02; 0.01]	[−0.02; 0.02]
Green party share in government		−0.43		−0.53		−0.57
		[−2.76; 1.90]		[−2.95; 1.90]		[−2.95; 1.80]
GDP growth		0.02		0.02		0.03*
		[−0.01; 0.05]		[−0.01; 0.05]		[0.00; 0.06]
GDP per capita		0.34		0.32		0.23
		[−0.12; 0.80]		[−0.15; 0.79]		[−0.26; 0.72]
Trade openness		−0.00		−0.00		−0.00
		[−0.01; 0.00]		[−0.01; 0.00]		[−0.01; 0.00]
Foreign direct investment		0.00		0.00		0.00
		[−0.00; 0.01]		[−0.00; 0.01]		[−0.00; 0.01]
Num. obs.	473	471	473	471	463	440

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table J.3: Country-wise Jackknife Estimation for the Non-market EPS Index