# Supplemental Information to "Birds of a Feather Govern Together"

For Online Publication

# S1 Registry data on local politicians

In this section we describe how we define our registry-based measures of ties as well as the proxies we construct to control for the expected number of ties. At the level of pairs of politicians, these proxies are basically indicators of non-missing data, but when aggregated to party-dyads or potential coalitions they also control for the size of the coalition.[10]

We define first-degree relatives as biological parents, children, siblings, and half-siblings. These relationships are identified by listing each politician's ID along with their parents' IDs using the intergenerational register, and then checking if any ID appears in both sets. To account for the decrease in identified relatives due to missing data—an issue primarily affecting older politicians from the early part of our study period—we record the count of IDs in each set (1–3) and retain both the mean and the product of these counts.

Second-degree relatives include biological grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, and half-cousins. Following a similar method as with first-degree relatives, we list the politician's ID along with those of their grandparents and parents, and then check for any shared IDs between the two sets. We exclude any pairs identified as first-degree relatives. To control for missing data, we again count the number of IDs in each set (1–7) and keep both the mean and the product of these counts.

Partners are defined as individuals who, prior to the year of government formation and prior to the first year we can observe that their two parties are governing the municipality together, had entered into a marriage or partnership (our marriage data start in 1968), excluding divorcees, or who at the time share biological or adoptive children. Politicians who eventually will meet one of these criteria are also counted as partners if they cohabited in the same apartment or single-family home before the year of government formation, based on data described in the following paragraph. Due to minimal issues with missing data in this category, we consider each pair to be a potential couple, with the control variables in our regression models reflecting the number of inter-party links examined within the potential coalition.

These binary indicators for interpersonal ties, along with their related proxies, are then aggregated to the level of party dyads and potential coalitions by summing each inter-party pair of politicians within the coalition.

# S2 Survey data on local politicians

The survey data gathered for this study were collected through a confidential web-based survey, approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Agency, which was managed using REDCap electronic data capture tools (Harris et al. 2019, 2009). The survey was distributed to all elected members of the local councils in the 290 municipalities for which an e-mail address could be retrieved either from the municipality's web page or through correspondence with a municipal administrator.

A total of 12,262 local council members were invited, corresponding to 96.7 percent of the population as defined by the Swedish Election Authority. The invitees were

[10] Our study uses sensitive, individual-level administrative data stored on a secure encrypted server as required by Statistics Sweden (SCB). Due to these security measures, we are unable to provide the data required for replication. However, we are happy to provide instructions for how to obtain the data, as well as all Stata logs, do-files, and descriptions of the variables used in our analysis. We can also assist anyone who wants to visit our research group in Sweden to replicate the results using our data.

randomly divided into 16 groups, each of which received the first invitation on a subsequent day. Two rounds of reminders were thereafter step-wise rolled out with new 16-day intervals. The data collection period ranged from November 10, 2020 to February 1, 2021. By that time, 3,925 individuals from 270 municipalities had participated in the survey, resulting in a response rate of 31.1 percent. 8 individuals participated twice, and in those cases we kept the occasion with the largest number of answered questions. No compensation was provided to the participants.

In all analyses with self-reported ties we also control for the number of potential ties. As this is synonymous with the number of self-reported ties if everyone answers positively about being acquainted, we simply remove the indicator $S_{ip}$ from Equation 3 in the main paper:

$$\text{Potential ties} = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{p=1}^{P}[p_i \neq j][p_i \in C][p \in C]w_j \tag{4}$$

To calculate the share of respondents in each party dyad who report cooperation with the other party regarding a common proposal, the budget, or even governing together, we sum the total number of positive responses, using $K_{ip}$ as a binary response for cooperation, and then divide this sum by the total number of respondents in the dyad.

$$\text{Cooperating share} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{p=1}^{P}K_{ip}[p_i \neq j][p_i \in C][p \in C]w_j}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{p=1}^{P}[p_i \neq j][p_i \in C][p \in C]w_j} \tag{5}$$

# S3 Ethical considerations

We confirm that the survey as well as the present study as a whole complies with APSA's *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research*. In our application to the Swedish Ethical Review Agency [case number redacted for anonymity], we discussed a number of potential ethical issues regarding this type of survey, including the risk that participants may perceive survey items as too politically sensitive or too demanding of them, or that their privacy will somehow be violated. However, we deemed these concerns to be of minor weight in the present case, considering the limited number of questions included in the survey (taking approximately 10 minutes to complete), and the fact that the target group consisted of elected public officials who are already open with their political affiliation and who could choose freely which items (if any) to respond to. We informed participants about the survey and obtained their consent before the first survey item was presented. We furthermore testified that no personal data will be presented and that, if any data material is published, it will first be processed to prevent any form of reverse identification. For this reason, the number of variables from this survey that are uploaded in the replication files are kept to a minimum.

In regards to the individual-level administrative data used in the study, it can be argued that all research using such data constitutes a certain, albeit usually minor, violation of personal privacy. Either because of the risk that an unauthorized person gets access to personal data about a research subject, or because the compilation of data from several registers is a violation in itself. We therefore want to emphasize that throughout the project we have only had access to pseudononymized data stored on Statistics Sweden's MONA platform. According to the practice established by the Swedish Central Ethical Review Board, research using such data constitutes an almost non-existent violation of privacy.

# S4 Potential coalition variables

Most of our models estimated using the potential coalition framework include a vector of control variables derived from previous research. These are all operationalized as a variable $\boldsymbol{x}_{cmt}$ of the potential government coalition $c$ in the government formation opportunity occurring in municipality $m$ following the election in year $t$. Closely following Cronert and Nyman (2021, Supplementary Material), we include variables belonging to four different groups.

The factors in the first and largest group pertain to the size of the potential governing coalition and the ideological proximity of its member parties. One of the earliest propositions is that governments are more likely to form when they hold a *majority* of parliamentary seats (see Martin and Stevenson 2010). A subsequent refinement of this idea emphasizes that majority governments are especially likely to form when they are *minimal-winning coalitions*, meaning no party within the coalition can be removed without forfeiting the majority (Morgenstern and Von Neumann 1953). In such arrangements, power-related benefits are distributed among the fewest possible coalition partners. Since multiple minimal-winning coalitions often exist, scholars have proposed further refinements. These include the likelihood of formation being higher when coalitions are *connected*—comprising only ideologically adjacent parties (Axelrod 1970), when they span the *narrowest ideological range* (De Swaan 1973), when they involve the *fewest parties* among minimal-winning coalitions, or when they constitute the *minimum-winning coalition*, holding the smallest possible seat share needed for a majority (Laver and Schofield 1990).

When it comes to cabinet size, Glasgow and Golder (2015) incorporate two variables—*cabinet seat share* and *cabinet seat share squared*—to reflect a concept closely tied to the minimal-winning coalition theory: both small minority governments and large surplus majority cabinets are considered less likely to form than those with a seat share just above the 50 percent threshold. In terms of the *number of parties*, the conventional perspective suggests that, all else equal, cabinets become more probable as the number of participating parties decreases (Glasgow and Golder 2015).

Subsequent policy-centered theories, building on the work of Axelrod and De Swaan, argue that regardless of cabinet size, coalitions with wide ideological divides are less appealing to potential partners than more ideologically cohesive ones. To account for this, we follow Martin and Stevenson (2001) by including a measure of the *ideological range* between the two most ideologically distant parties in the proposed coalition along the left–right spectrum.[11] Another related argument by Laver and Schofield (1990) posits that minority governments are more likely to form when the ideological divisions within the majority opposition are substantial (Martin and Stevenson 2001). To capture this, we include a measure of the *ideological range between the most distant parties in the opposition* and incorporate an *interaction term* with the majority cabinet variable mentioned above.

A more recent perspective on the importance of a cabinet's ideological composition is offered by Glasgow and Golder (2015), who argue that the likelihood of coalition formation decreases as the ideological distance between potential coalition partners and the median parliamentary position grows. In line with their approach, we include a measure of the *ideological distance from the median*, calculated as the weighted average ideological distance of coalition members from the median, with each party's seat

[11] Single-party governments receive a score of 0 for this variable. We derive the measure from national party positions in the Chapel Hill expert survey (Polk 2017), where the empirical values range from 1.43 (the Left Party in 2010) to 8.5 (the Sweden Democrats in 2019).

share serving as its weight.

Theories also highlight that certain parties with strong bargaining leverage increase the likelihood of government formation. Commonly cited in the literature are the party occupying the *median seat* on the left–right spectrum and the *largest party*. A party that is *both the median and the largest party* may hold even greater bargaining power. The strongest bargaining position, however, belongs to a *single majority party*, which is not uncommon in Swedish municipal politics—6 percent of approximately 1,700 municipal governments formed between 1998 and 2018 were single-party majorities (SKL 2023).

To account for coalitions formed by a *single party*, regardless of whether they hold a majority, we include a dummy variable, as all inter-party relationship measures naturally score 0 for such single-party governments.

A second set of explanatory factors pertains to incumbency. Incumbency theory suggests that governments are more likely to form when they include the same parties that made up the *incumbent government* (see Martin and Stevenson 2001). In a recent development of incumbency theory, Glasgow and Golder (2015) differentiate between the incumbent coalition as a whole and the individual incumbent parties. Their analysis specifically attributes the incumbency advantage to the coalition itself; if the exact same coalition does not re-form, alternative coalitions that include some but not all of the incumbent parties are less likely to materialize. Following this framework, we incorporate a binary indicator for whether the proposed coalition consists of the *exact same parties as the previous government*, along with a second variable that counts *the number of parties in the potential coalition that were part of the incumbent government*.

Martin and Stevenson (2010) further propose that the electoral performance of the incumbent coalition influences its chances of returning to power. Their argument suggests that parties should be more inclined to re-enter or join a coalition that has performed well in the most recent election, even after accounting for shifts in seat distribution. To capture *electoral performance*, we compute the net change in seat share experienced by the parties in each potential government between the most recent election and the one preceding it. Since this effect is particularly relevant for incumbent governments, we also include an *interaction* term between the electoral performance measure and the incumbent government indicator.

A third category of factors pertains to pre-electoral relationships between parties. Martin and Stevenson (2010) argue that pre-electoral commitments to specific coalitions increase the likelihood that those coalitions will ultimately form. Due to the absence of comprehensive data on explicit pre-election statements at the local level, we instead introduce dummy variables representing the two traditional political blocs in Swedish politics. These are the *right-wing bloc*, which includes the Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Party, and the *left-wing bloc*, composed of the Social Democrats and the Left Party.[12]

Building on Skjæveland et al. (2007), we further introduce two additional variations of these bloc dummies. The *bloc-plus* variables take a value of 1 when a coalition includes all members of a given bloc, including cases where the bloc is supplemented by one or more additional parties. The *bloc-minus* variables, on the other hand, score 1 when a coalition contains some but not all parties from a given bloc along with at least one party from outside the bloc. The underlying assumption is that deviating from a pre-electoral coalition by omitting one of its members is less attractive than expanding

[12] In recent years, the Green Party has increasingly aligned with the left-wing bloc, particularly at the national level. However, in municipal politics, the Green Party is best characterized as bloc-independent (Folke 2014).

it with an additional party. Finally, we include a variable capturing *bloc-transcending coalitions*, which bring together parties from both the left-wing and right-wing blocs.

Scholars have also highlighted that certain parties may deter potential coalition partners due to the high electoral costs associated with collaborating with them. This concern is particularly relevant for parties advocating 'anti-system' political positions (Martin and Stevenson 2010). In the context and time frame examined here, this dynamic is best captured by a variable indicating whether the proposed government includes the radical right party, the Sweden Democrats (SD). In a municipal context like ours, it is also pertinent to consider whether the potential coalition includes a local party, as these parties often campaign on an anti-establishment platform. More broadly, however, variations in party cultures, public perceptions, and relationships may mean that some parties are inherently more prone to fostering personal ties with others. To mitigate the risk of omitted variable bias, we therefore incorporate dummy variables not only for SD but also for each of the other seven major national parties as well as for the inclusion of at least one local party.

# S5 Additional descriptive statistics

Table S1 shows the number of interpersonal ties between each combination of parties and separately for our self-reported and registry-based measures of ties.

| | v | mp | s | c | l | m | kd | sd | oth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v | | 105 | 573 | 186 | 89 | 153 | 61 | 42 | 52 |
| mp | 105 | | 239 | 104 | 75 | 98 | 42 | 19 | 28 |
| s | 573 | 239 | | 690 | 354 | 709 | 242 | 190 | 133 |
| c | 186 | 104 | 690 | | 221 | 464 | 218 | 124 | 92 |
| l | 89 | 75 | 354 | 221 | | 309 | 117 | 56 | 51 |
| m | 153 | 98 | 709 | 464 | 309 | | 273 | 216 | 103 |
| kd | 61 | 42 | 242 | 218 | 117 | 273 | | 82 | 49 |
| sd | 42 | 19 | 190 | 124 | 56 | 216 | 82 | | 35 |
| oth | 52 | 28 | 133 | 92 | 51 | 103 | 49 | 35 | |

(a) Absolute number of self-reported ties

| | v | mp | s | c | l | m | kd | sd | oth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v | | 7 | 50 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| mp | 7 | | 13 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| s | 50 | 13 | | 43 | 16 | 34 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| c | 4 | 5 | 43 | | 15 | 19 | 4 | 11 | 4 |
| l | 3 | 0 | 16 | 15 | | 18 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| m | 8 | 6 | 34 | 19 | 18 | | 22 | 16 | 9 |
| kd | 0 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 22 | | 2 | 11 |
| sd | 2 | 1 | 10 | 11 | 2 | 16 | 2 | | 2 |
| oth | 2 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 11 | 2 | 2 |

(b) Absolute number of registry-based ties

Table S1: Number of inter-party ties

## S6 Additional results for government coalitions

This section provides additional analyses and robustness checks to support the findings presented in the main text regarding government coalition formation.

In Table S3, we present all variables included in the models from Table 4 in the main text. While the estimated models are identical, the main text omitted many variables for brevity. For transparency, we here provide a comprehensive view of all covariates included in the estimation.

In Table S4, we estimate the effects of register-based ties separately for the three distinct types analyzed: first-degree relatives, second-degree relatives, and partners. The results show a significant effect for first-degree relatives, suggesting that the main findings are not driven by ties that may have emerged due to favorable inter-party relations, such as partners. Additionally, the results for second-degree relatives show no discernible effect, indicating in line with our theoretical reasoning that the strength of these ties may be critical for how much they influence coalition formation.

In Table S5, we re-estimate the models from Table 4 using a linear model approach with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. This alternative method allows for the inclusion of potential coalition fixed effects, which is too computationally intensive to handle within our conditional logistic regression framework. The results are consistent with our main model, and remain virtually unchanged when the coalition fixed effects are added.

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Registry-based ties | 0.359*** | (0.113) | 0.383** | (0.165) | 0.382** | (0.164) | | |
| Self-reported ties | | | | | | | 0.182*** | (0.035) |
| *Proxies for expected number of ties* | | | | | | | | |
| Average number of first-degree relatives | −0.088*** | (0.028) | −0.049 | (0.038) | −0.042 | (0.038) | | |
| Product of first-degree relatives | 0.017*** | (0.005) | 0.009 | (0.007) | 0.008 | (0.007) | | |
| Average number of second-degree relatives | −0.001 | (0.002) | −0.000 | (0.003) | 0.000 | (0.003) | | |
| Product of second-degree relatives | 0.000 | (0.000) | −0.000 | (0.000) | −0.000 | (0.000) | | |
| Number of evaluated ties | 0.116*** | (0.038) | 0.067 | (0.052) | 0.057 | (0.052) | | |
| Number of evaluated survey ties | | | | | | | −0.044*** | (0.014) |
| *Potential government characteristics* | | | | | | | | |
| Minority cabinet | | | −2.088*** | (0.270) | −2.076*** | (0.270) | −1.993** | (0.925) |
| Minimal-winning coalition | | | 1.133*** | (0.115) | 1.134*** | (0.115) | 1.216*** | (0.299) |
| MWC: Connected | | | −0.145 | (0.117) | −0.139 | (0.117) | 0.478 | (0.293) |
| MWC: Narrow idoelogical range | | | −0.383*** | (0.120) | −0.383*** | (0.120) | −0.450 | (0.422) |
| MWC: Fewest parties | | | 0.625*** | (0.123) | 0.606*** | (0.123) | 0.115 | (0.293) |
| MWC: Minimum-winning coalition | | | 0.037 | (0.139) | 0.039 | (0.139) | 0.432 | (0.328) |
| Seatshare | | | 51.262*** | (4.666) | 51.502*** | (4.685) | 56.632*** | (8.934) |
| Seatshare squared | | | −43.617*** | (4.358) | −43.793*** | (4.374) | −54.641*** | (8.999) |
| Number of parties | | | −0.740*** | (0.230) | −0.728*** | (0.229) | −1.207** | (0.593) |
| Ideological range | | | −0.311*** | (0.049) | −0.312*** | (0.049) | 0.178 | (0.142) |
| Opposition ideological range | | | −0.241*** | (0.032) | −0.242*** | (0.032) | −0.297*** | (0.095) |
| Opp. ideological range × Minority cabinet | | | 0.280*** | (0.044) | 0.278*** | (0.044) | 0.326** | (0.150) |
| Ideological distance to median | | | 0.289*** | (0.080) | 0.292*** | (0.081) | 0.390* | (0.201) |
| Median party | | | −0.005 | (0.095) | −0.002 | (0.095) | −0.075 | (0.233) |
| Largest party | | | 0.603*** | (0.152) | 0.600*** | (0.152) | 0.437 | (0.309) |
| Largest party and median party | | | 0.549** | (0.263) | 0.549** | (0.264) | 0.390 | (0.654) |
| Single-party majority | | | 0.732* | (0.390) | 0.781** | (0.391) | 11.487*** | (0.965) |
| Single party | | | 0.881*** | (0.226) | 0.096 | (0.666) | −0.917 | (1.655) |
| Incumbent government | | | 1.952*** | (0.115) | 1.947*** | (0.114) | 2.115*** | (0.318) |
| Number of incumbent parties | | | 0.065 | (0.047) | 0.063 | (0.047) | 0.122 | (0.139) |
| Electoral performance | | | 3.611*** | (0.604) | 3.623*** | (0.606) | 4.264** | (1.905) |
| Electoral performance × Incumbent government | | | 4.018*** | (1.361) | 4.005*** | (1.357) | 3.152 | (2.999) |
| Right-wing bloc | | | 1.643*** | (0.187) | 1.646*** | (0.186) | 3.040*** | (0.541) |
| Right-wing bloc (minus) | | | 0.262 | (0.170) | 0.261 | (0.170) | 1.235** | (0.521) |
| Right-wing bloc (plus) | | | 1.530*** | (0.158) | 1.528*** | (0.158) | 1.544*** | (0.363) |
| Left-wing bloc | | | 1.706*** | (0.252) | 1.741*** | (0.253) | 1.981** | (0.790) |
| Left-wing bloc (minus) | | | 0.604*** | (0.204) | 0.657*** | (0.205) | 1.085* | (0.614) |
| Left-wing bloc (plus) | | | 0.983*** | (0.187) | 0.990*** | (0.187) | 0.004 | (0.607) |
| Bloc-transcending coalition | | | −1.288*** | (0.147) | −1.270*** | (0.147) | −0.946*** | (0.360) |
| Moderates | | | 0.490** | (0.248) | 0.482* | (0.246) | 0.563 | (0.642) |
| Social democrats | | | 0.208 | (0.314) | 0.183 | (0.315) | 0.261 | (0.827) |
| Liberals | | | 0.908*** | (0.239) | 0.899*** | (0.238) | 1.084* | (0.611) |
| Center party | | | 1.250*** | (0.241) | 1.220*** | (0.240) | 1.535** | (0.618) |
| Left party | | | 0.006 | (0.268) | −0.018 | (0.268) | −1.144 | (0.779) |
| Green party | | | 0.297 | (0.241) | 0.304 | (0.241) | 0.661 | (0.663) |
| Christian democrats | | | 0.751*** | (0.239) | 0.736*** | (0.238) | 1.094* | (0.609) |
| Sweden democrats | | | −2.970*** | (0.288) | −2.941*** | (0.287) | −2.542*** | (0.717) |
| Other party | | | −0.053 | (0.252) | −0.049 | (0.251) | 0.476 | (0.642) |
| *Mean difference within pairs* | | | | | | | | |
| Sex | | | | | 0.140 | (1.137) | −1.735 | (2.532) |
| Birth year | | | | | −0.010 | (0.015) | −0.022 | (0.036) |
| Foreign-born | | | | | −0.608 | (0.370) | −0.291 | (0.870) |
| Log income | | | | | −0.237 | (0.210) | −0.459 | (0.534) |
| Years of education | | | | | −0.176*** | (0.063) | −0.266 | (0.172) |
| Observations | 556,719 | | 556,719 | | 556,719 | | 92,366 | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.010 | | 0.551 | | 0.552 | | 0.510 | |
| Pot. coal. variables | No | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | |
| Similarities | No | | No | | Yes | | Yes | |
| Elections | All | | All | | All | | 2018 | |



Table S3: Main analysis with all variables shown

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First-degree relatives | 0.608** | | | 0.606** |
| | (0.274) | | | (0.275) |
| Second-degree relatives | | 0.033 | | 0.027 |
| | | (0.299) | | (0.302) |
| Partners | | | 0.380 | 0.375 |
| | | | (0.269) | (0.269) |
| Observations | 556,719 | 556,719 | 556,719 | 556,719 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.552 | 0.551 | 0.551 | 0.552 |
| Pot. coal. variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Similarities | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Elections | All | All | All | All |

Table S4: Subcomponents of registry-based ties

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Registry-based ties | 0.107** | 0.068** | 0.067** | 0.068** | |
| | (0.042) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.034) | |
| Self-reported ties | | | | | 0.015*** |
| | | | | | (0.005) |
| Constant | 0.443*** | −0.291*** | −0.180 | −0.130 | −0.902*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.099) | (0.113) | (0.214) | (0.286) |
| Observations | 566,483 | 566,483 | 566,483 | 565,971 | 92,366 |
| R2 | 0.000 | 0.208 | 0.208 | 0.212 | 0.154 |
| Pot. coal. variables | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Similarities | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pot. coal. FE | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Elections | All | All | All | All | 2018 |

Table S5: Linear model with elected coded 0/100

# S7 Additional results for dyadic cooperation

This section provides supplementary analyses and robustness checks to regarding the findings on dyadic cooperation presented in the main text.

In Table S6, we present the full results for the analysis in Table 5, including also the covariates that were excluded from the presentation in the main text. There are only a few of these control variables which seem to matter for what parties that cooperate, which is consistent with the small increase they provide to the Adjusted $R^2$.

In Table S7, we present results from models estimating the effects of personal ties on dyadic cooperation, using separate measures for the three types of registry-based ties: first-degree relatives, second-degree relatives, and partners. The results reveal that the average effect is driven by large effects found among first-degree relatives and partners. These findings once again highlight the importance of tie strength, suggesting that closer personal relationships play a more substantial role in fostering inter-party collaboration.

| | Governed | | Cooperated | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Registry-based ties | 0.067*** | | 0.053 | | 0.044 | |
| | (0.023) | | (0.051) | | (0.053) | |
| Self-reported ties | | 0.026*** | | 0.033*** | | 0.025*** |
| | | (0.005) | | (0.004) | | (0.004) |
| *Proxies for expected number of ties* | | | | | | |
| Average number of first-degree relatives | −0.009* | | −0.006 | | 0.009 | |
| | (0.005) | | (0.018) | | (0.015) | |
| Product of first-degree relatives | 0.002* | | 0.001 | | −0.002 | |
| | (0.001) | | (0.003) | | (0.003) | |
| Average number of second-degree relatives | 0.001** | | −0.000 | | 0.001 | |
| | (0.000) | | (0.002) | | (0.001) | |
| Product of second-degree relatives | −0.000 | | −0.000 | | −0.000 | |
| | (0.000) | | (0.000) | | (0.000) | |
| Number of evaluated ties | 0.011 | | 0.011 | | −0.015 | |
| | (0.007) | | (0.025) | | (0.021) | |
| Number of evaluated survey ties | | 0.006** | | −0.004* | | −0.007*** |
| | | (0.003) | | (0.002) | | (0.002) |
| *Mean difference within pairs* | | | | | | |
| Sex | −0.002 | −0.027 | −0.022 | −0.020 | −0.035 | −0.034 |
| | (0.011) | (0.032) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Birth year | 0.000 | −0.003*** | −0.002** | −0.002* | −0.000 | −0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Foreign-born | −0.015 | −0.064** | −0.081** | −0.066** | −0.046 | −0.040 |
| | (0.010) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.030) |
| Log income | −0.003 | −0.011 | −0.048** | −0.045** | −0.042** | −0.041** |
| | (0.005) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Years of education | −0.000 | −0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 | −0.000 | 0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Constant | 0.151*** | 0.225*** | 0.437*** | 0.421*** | 0.288*** | 0.291*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Observations | 51,542 | 5,603 | 5,603 | 5,603 | 4,524 | 4,524 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.306 | 0.294 | 0.389 | 0.395 | 0.323 | 0.328 |
| Mean of dep. variable | 0.172 | 0.192 | 0.366 | 0.366 | 0.236 | 0.236 |
| Similarities | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Muni–party-dyad FE | Yes | - | - | - | - | - |
| Party-dyad FE | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Municipality FE | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample | All | All | All | All | NotGov | NotGov |
| Elections | All | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 |

Table S6: Main analysis with all variables shown

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First-degree relatives | 0.078** | | | 0.078** |
| | (0.036) | | | (0.035) |
| Second-degree relatives | | 0.029 | | 0.029 |
| | | (0.042) | | (0.043) |
| Partners | | | 0.091** | 0.094** |
| | | | (0.042) | (0.042) |
| Observations | 51,542 | 51,542 | 51,542 | 51,542 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.305 | 0.305 | 0.304 | 0.306 |
| Mean of dep. variable | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 | 0.172 |
| Muni–party-dyad FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Outcome | Gov.C. | Gov.C. | Gov.C. | Gov.C. |
| Elections | All | All | All | All |

Table S7: Subcomponents of registry-based ties