

Paying for Defence in High-Threat Environments: Political and Economic Divides over Defence Spending Expansions in Three Ex-Axis Countries*

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Abstract

This study explores public attitudes towards increases in defence spending and potential options for funding the associated costs in three former Axis countries: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Building on existing scholarship, I hypothesize that individuals' political orientations and economic status shape their attitudes towards defence spending and their funding preferences. To test this, I conducted an original online survey—including both observational and conjoint components—in the countries in question. The results highlight the relevance of respondents' left–right self-placement in shaping divisions over defence spending: Right-leaning individuals are more supportive of increased defence expenditure than those on the left. They also indicate that left–right ideology influences funding preferences, particularly in the dichotomy between taxing high-income groups and increasing government borrowing. By contrast, individuals' economic status was not associated with their funding preferences, suggesting that defence policy is regarded as a sociotropic issue, rather than an egotropic one.

Keywords— defence spending, public opinion, conjoint experiment, ex-Axis countries

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Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, beginning in 2022, disrupted the fragile yet long-standing peace that had persisted since the end of the Cold War. To counter rising tensions, leaders of numerous Western countries have pledged to rebuild and expand their armed forces (Paterson, 2025; O’Sullivan, 2025). The growing isolationism of the United States under the second Trump administration has further reinforced these trends, resulting in a surge in defence spending, particularly in Europe and Asia (Liang et al., 2025). Former Axis countries, including Germany, Italy, and Japan, are no exception. These states share expansionist pasts that culminated in the catastrophe of the Second World War, followed by restrained or pacifist postures in post-war international politics. Nevertheless, recent developments have placed these countries under pressure to remilitarize (Noll, 2025; Giordano and Kayali, 2025; Walters, 2025), potentially placing the post-war international order at a crossroads.

Public support for increased defence spending, however, is far from unanimous, particularly in the former Axis countries, and the debate has extended to the fiscal costs involved. In Italy, the public is sharply divided, with opponents expressing concern about additional debt arising from higher spending (Orlandi, 2025), which reduces overall support (Brzozowski, 2025). In Japan, citizens are also split on both the increase and the government’s proposed tax hike to fund it, with the pacifist Article 9 of the Constitution having shaped political cleavages throughout the post-war era (Saruta, 2025).¹ Even in Germany, where support for increased defence spending is highest, politicians and the public have engaged in heated debate over suspending the ‘fiscal brake’ to meet the costs (O’Neal, 2025). Thus, both the principle of increased defence spending and its financing divide public opinion, potentially influencing the prospects for national rearmament.

Against this backdrop, this study investigates public attitudes towards increases in defence spending and potential funding options in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Building on

¹Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan renounces the sovereign right of belligerency. To this end, the maintenance of armed forces is formally prohibited; however, this is effectively violated by the Japanese government’s maintenance of the Self-Defence Forces.

previous scholarship, it examines individuals' ideology and economic status as determinants of these attitudes. Does the divide over defence spending follow the traditional left–right spectrum, or does an alternative cleavage emerge? Does the left–right divide also shape preferences over funding mechanisms, and if so, how? Does the economic divide over funding options align with ideological divisions? By addressing these questions, the present study contributes to scholarship on public opinion regarding fiscal and foreign policy, as well as ideology and partisanship.

To this end, I conducted an original online survey in July 2025 across the three countries. The survey comprised both observational and experimental components, with respondents randomly assigned to one of them. The observational arm elicited baseline attitudes towards defence spending increases and possible funding schemes, allowing for an analysis of how these attitudes correlate with political orientation and economic background. The experimental arm employed a conjoint design, focusing on funding mechanisms, to jointly test which schemes respondents found most acceptable and examine interactions between these preferences and individuals' characteristics.

The results show that political orientation—ideology or party support—strongly shapes attitudes towards defence spending and its funding. Right-leaning individuals tend to be more supportive of increased spending than those on the left. Regarding funding options, the findings suggest an ideological divide between taxing high-income groups, preferred by left-leaning respondents, and government borrowing, favoured by those on the right. By contrast, economic status does not significantly affect funding preferences. These results indicate that national defence, including its financing, is viewed primarily through an ideological and sociotropic lens rather than one of personal economic self-interest.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next two sections review relevant literature on government budgeting and foreign policy opinion. The subsequent section outlines our hypotheses on how political orientation and economic status influence attitudes towards defence spending and its funding. I then describe the survey design and present the

results, before concluding with a discussion of their implications.

Guns-versus-Butter and the Changing Threat Environment

Defence spending has been examined by a strand of research analysing public opinion on government budgets more broadly. This literature often highlights the ‘guns-versus-butter’ (GVB) dilemma: the resource trade-off between national defence and other policy areas (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Fordham and Walker, 2005; Goldsmith, 2003). Just as producing more guns means producing less butter, allocating more resources to national defence implies reduced spending on, for example, social welfare. Empirical studies report that the general public in Western democracies tends to show consistently low support for defence spending, reflecting a preference for social over military expenditure (Barnes et al., 2022; Bonica, 2015; Hübscher et al., 2023). This pattern helps to explain why, when facing fiscal pressures, governments have often targeted defence budgets for cuts (cf. Hübscher et al., 2023).

The GVB thesis, however, is not without its critics, as it rests heavily on a particular temporal context and thus risks overstating the unpopularity of defence spending. While it is true that Western governments have faced tight fiscal constraints, especially in the aftermath of COVID-19 (cf. Hale et al., 2025), the thesis implicitly assumes an era of international stability under post-Cold War American hegemony, during which defence could be politically deprioritized. Today, by contrast, challenger states such as Russia and China are destabilizing the West-led international order. This shift has heightened perceived threats among Western publics, in turn increasing support for higher defence spending (Hauenstein et al., 2021; DiGiuseppe et al., 2024). The resurgence of American isolationism, exemplified by the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, may further amplify this trend by fuelling anxieties of abandonment among the publics of allied countries.

While recent scholarship has advanced our understanding of public opinion on defence spending, it leaves several important questions underexplored. First, most studies assess whether the public supports or opposes defence expenditure, yet pay far less attention to preferences over how such spending should be financed once agreed upon. Given that governments remain under fiscal pressure, addressing this issue is essential for evaluating the political feasibility of proposed increases in defence budgets. Doing so also provides an opportunity to reassess the GVB thesis in the current high-threat environment, testing whether the public now prioritizes guns over butter. Furthermore, such an inquiry allows us to revisit the political cleavages underpinning foreign and defence policy attitudes, as elaborated below.

Ideology and Divides in Foreign and Defence Policy

Another strand of research examines defence spending within the broader study of public opinion on foreign and defence policy. Unlike the budget opinion scholarship reviewed above, this literature emphasizes the differentiated attitudes towards such policies and their determinants. For instance, demographic factors such as gender, occupation, and educational attainment have been observed to shape attitudes towards the military, the use of force, war, and defence spending (e.g., Wittkopf, 1990; Eichenberg and Stoll, 2012, 2017; Fay, 2020).² Existing studies also contend that individuals' personal beliefs influence their views on these policies. Some identify strong correlations between specific issue attitudes—such as support for NATO or perceptions of Russia—and positions on foreign and defence policy (e.g., Bartels, 1994; Eichenberg and Stoll, 2017; Thomson et al., 2023). Others propose a hierarchical structure in which more abstract beliefs, such as values and general postures, guide attitudes towards specific policy issues (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Wittkopf, 1990, 1994).

Among these personal beliefs, left–right ideology stands out as a particularly significant

²Regarding gender, women tend to exhibit consistently lower support for defence spending than men (Eichenberg and Stoll, 2012). By contrast, the effects of education vary depending on the context (Wittkopf, 1990).

determinant of foreign and defence policy attitudes. Originating in the political conflict of the French Revolution, the left–right spectrum has structured politics in developed democracies across a wide range of issues, from market intervention to lifestyle choices (e.g., Bobbio, 1995; Lewis and Lewis, 2023). Foreign and defence issues have no inherent place within this spectrum, a view supported by early studies suggesting that ideology exerted little influence on public opinion in this domain (e.g., Lippmann, 1955). However, subsequent research has consistently found that individuals on the right are more likely to embrace hawkish or belligerent positions, whereas those on the left tend to adopt dovish or pacifist stances (e.g., Holsti, 1992, 2004; Bartels, 1994; Albuyeh and Paradis, 2018; Gries and Yam, 2020; Gries, 2022; Kertzer, 2023; Prather, 2024; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2024).

More recent comparative politics scholarship has, however, complicated this straightforward ideological divide. First, an alternative cleavage has emerged, distinct from the traditional left–right axis, which primarily concerns economic redistribution (e.g., Inglehart, 1977; Ignazi, 1992). This cleavage has contributed to party system realignment and the rise of challenger parties, producing more nuanced divides in foreign and defence policy. For example, a series of studies by Wolfgang Wagner identifies an inverted-U-shaped relationship between left–right ideology and support for international activism, including military deployment: both radical right-wing and radical left-wing parties tend to oppose such actions (Wagner et al., 2017, 2018; Wagner, 2020). Moreover, these radicals have often expressed sympathy for autocratic Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, and have refused to condemn its aggression against Ukraine or to support the victim state (Braghiroli and Makarychev, 2016; Braghiroli, 2023; Thomson et al., 2023; Stolle, 2024; Fagerholm, 2024a,b).

Second, interactions between defence and economic considerations further complicate the ideological picture. This has been addressed only sporadically in the literature, most notably in the ‘guns-yield-butter’ (GYB) thesis (Whitten and Williams, 2011; Williams, 2019). In contrast to the GVB perspective, the GYB thesis posits that defence spending can stimulate the macroeconomy by creating jobs and boosting demand for goods and services. These po-

tential economic benefits can attract support from those who prioritize public responsibility for employment creation (Williams, 2019), a goal often associated with left-leaning economic agendas (e.g., Hibbs, 1977).

In sum, individuals' political orientations merit closer scrutiny for two reasons. First, given the rise of alternative cleavages, it is necessary to assess whether the traditional left-right spectrum continues to shape public opinion on defence spending and its financing, and whether newer divides do so as well. This will help identify the political fault lines surrounding current proposals for defence spending increases and allow for more accurate forecasts of their political viability. Second, focusing on ideology provides a more nuanced understanding of the left and right, which are often treated in a simplistic manner. The right, for example, encompasses both economic liberalism and cultural conservatism; examining defence policy preferences can reveal which principle takes precedence. Similarly, this approach enables us to evaluate the degree to which individuals' socio-economic status affects their preferred funding options.

Divides over Defence Spending and Its Funding³

Defence spending attitudes

Building on the literature reviewed above, I begin by examining how individuals' political orientations shape their attitudes toward defence spending. The dominant view in the scholarship posits right-wing belligerence versus left-wing dovishness (e.g., Gries and Yam, 2020; Kertzer, 2023). Gries (2022) theorizes the mechanism behind this association, drawing on political psychology research (Jost et al., 2003a,b, 2007). Psychologists argue that right-wingers are more susceptible than left-wingers to perceiving threats from outgroups. This heightened threat perception can lead to misinterpreting the intentions of such groups,

³Expressions of the hypotheses elaborated on in this section were slightly modified and different from the preregistered version.

thereby increasing support for tougher stances toward foreign countries. Partly for this reason, I hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Right-wingers are more likely than left-wingers to support increased defence spending.

A more nuanced perspective suggests an alternative cleavage. As discussed earlier, embracing radical ideologies or supporting radical/populist parties is associated with lower support for peace and security missions and NATO, as well as sympathy with Russia and antipathy towards Ukraine (e.g., Braghiroli, 2023; Stolle, 2024; Wagner et al., 2017). This pattern stems from the nature of political radicalism, which challenges the mainstream politics that have constructed and sustained the current international system. As norms and institutions such as NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations are products of mainstream politics, radicals inherently oppose these elements and often exhibit isolationist postures (Isernia et al., 2024). Given that defence spending expansions are proposed in the context of collective efforts against challenger states such as Russia, the following hypotheses arise:

Hypothesis 2a: Individuals at the extremes of the left–right spectrum are less likely than moderates to support increased defence spending.

Hypothesis 2b: Supporters of radical or populist parties are less likely than supporters of mainstream parties to support increased defence spending.

Funding option preferences

Having examined attitudes toward defence spending itself, I now turn to public preferences regarding its funding. A government must finance increased defence spending by cutting expenditure on other policies (such as social spending), raising taxes, expanding borrowing, or adopting a combination of these. As each option carries distinct distributional consequences, individuals' political orientations and economic status are likely to shape their preferences

accordingly.⁴

First, cutting spending on other policies is politically contentious. Social spending warrants particular attention, as it is a frequent target for cutbacks given its large share of national budgets in developed economies. The guns-versus-butter (GVB) thesis also highlights the trade-off between welfare and defence, reinforcing the importance of this issue. Such cuts form a left–right ideological cleavage: those on the left generally oppose them in the name of greater economic equality, while those on the right are more willing to accept them in line with economic liberalism (Alesina et al., 2018; Armingeon and Weisstanner, 2022; Busemeyer and Garritzmman, 2017; Hillen and Steiner, 2025; Margalit, 2013; Stantcheva, 2021). Differences in policy priorities—preferring ‘butter’ to ‘guns’ and vice versa—further deepen this divide (Wenzelburger and Böller, 2020). From an economic standpoint, lower-income groups are less likely to accept cuts to social spending than higher-income groups, as they benefit directly from such expenditure, whereas the latter are more likely to bear the associated tax burden (e.g., Alesina et al., 2018; Armingeon and Weisstanner, 2022). These observations yield the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: Cutting social spending to fund defence spending is less popular among left-wingers than among right-wingers.

Hypothesis 3b: Cutting social spending to fund defence spending is less popular among lower-income groups than among higher-income groups.

Second, public attitudes may differ on the acceptability of government borrowing as a funding mechanism. Previous research indicates that left-wing individuals and parties are generally more tolerant of borrowing than their right-wing counterparts (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Boix, 1998). This divide reflects differing attitudes towards inflationary risk: left-wingers are more willing to accept inflation in exchange for expanded

⁴The Ricardian equivalence theorem suggests no difference between government borrowing and taxation, as households may reduce consumption in anticipation of future tax increases (Barro, 1974). However, empirical evidence for this theorem remains weak (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2010; Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Haug, 2020).

employment, whereas right-wingers tend to oppose it, as inflation erodes the value of financial assets. Because expanded employment benefits the unemployed and asset depreciation harms the wealthy, a similar divide exists between lower- and higher-income groups. Thus, I propose the following:

Hypothesis 4a: Allowing government borrowing to fund defence spending is less popular among right-wingers than among left-wingers.

Hypothesis 4b: Allowing government borrowing to fund defence spending is less popular among higher-income groups than among lower-income groups.

Third, preferences for tax increases are likely to depend on the type of tax. Here, I distinguish between two ideal types—progressive and regressive taxes—based on their distributional effects.

Progressive taxes, such as income taxes, impose proportionally greater burdens on higher-income earners. Increasing such taxes to fund defence spending is therefore likely to face opposition from these individuals (e.g., Stantcheva, 2021). Moreover, doing so conflicts with the economically liberal principles of right-wing ideology, potentially prompting negative reactions. This leads to two further hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5a: Raising taxes on higher-income groups to fund defence spending is less popular among right-wingers than among left-wingers.

Hypothesis 5b: Raising taxes on higher-income groups to fund defence spending is less popular among higher-income groups than among lower-income groups.

The same logic applies to regressive taxes, the second type considered here. A consumption tax, a primary example of a regressive tax, places a disproportionately heavier burden on lower-income groups, as it applies to income-inelastic consumption (cf. Korpi and Palme, 1998; Kato, 2003). Thus, funding defence spending through a consumption tax hike is likely to provoke opposition from lower-income groups and from left-wing individuals, who prior-

itize egalitarian principles. Conversely, higher-income groups are more likely to accept it, as they face a relatively lighter burden, which aligns with right-wing ideology.

Hypothesis 6a: Raising a consumption tax to fund defence spending is less popular among left-wingers than among right-wingers.

Hypothesis 6b: Raising a consumption tax to fund defence spending is less popular among lower-income groups than among higher-income groups.

Survey Design

Overview

To assess these hypotheses, I conducted an original online survey across three former Axis countries—namely Germany, Italy, and Japan. As members of the G7 summit, these countries exert significant influence within the Western bloc and on international politics. At the same time, they share an expansionist past that culminated in the catastrophe of the Second World War. This experience led to their restrained or pacifist posture in the post-war period, including opposition to nuclear proliferation.⁵ Regarding national defence, unlike the former Allied nuclear-weapon states such as the United Kingdom and France, these countries have adopted a dependent approach, relying on alliances with the United States, including its extended nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, any attempt to rearm would constitute a break with this tradition, carrying important implications for the future of the international order.

I recruited voting-age respondents (18 or older) from each of these countries via the Marketplace platform provided by PureSpectrum Inc. in late July 2025.⁶ This platform

⁵Despite their non-proliferation policies, as formalized in their NPT membership, these countries differ in certain respects. Japan has officially maintained a parliamentary resolution known as the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’, which prohibits the development, possession, and hosting of nuclear weapons, whereas Germany and Italy have hosted United States nuclear weapons on their territory under NATO’s nuclear sharing framework.

⁶<https://www.purespectrum.com/>

Table 1: Sample Sizes

Country	Observational	Experimental	Total
Germany	1,021	491	1,512
Italy	1,035	490	1,525
Japan	1,073	478	1,551

partners with public opinion research firms in more than 60 countries, enabling researchers to gather data from specific target populations. The questionnaire, designed using Qualtrics, was distributed to potential respondents through this platform in exchange for US\$1, yielding a total of 4,588 completed responses. At the survey’s launch, I set quotas by gender, age, education, and income to approximate the population structure of each country. The resulting composition of respondents is presented in Appendix B.

The survey, which included both observational and experimental components, proceeded as follows (see Figure 1). First, all respondents began with a question block covering their political attitudes, including cabinet approval, economic evaluations, and ideological positions, as well as their views of political parties in their countries. Subsequently, they were randomly assigned to either the observational or the experimental block in a 2:1 ratio. The observational study elicited their attitudes towards increased defence spending and potential funding options, whereas the experimental study focused more directly on funding preferences. Finally, all respondents completed a common question block on their demographic characteristics. The sample size for each component in each country is shown in Table 1.

Observational component

The observational arm of this survey was designed to elicit respondents’ attitudes toward increased defence spending and potential funding options, and to relate these to their political orientations and economic position. It began by introducing the setting with the following wording:




Figure 1: Flow of the Survey

Please imagine a **fictitious scenario**⁷ in which, facing growing threats to national security, as represented by Russia's military invasion of Ukraine and China's expansionist moves near Taiwan and elsewhere, the [government of the country] has recently announced a plan to **increase defence spending considerably**.

A subsequent question elicited respondents' attitudes toward this plan by asking: 'How much do you support or oppose this plan?'. Answer options were presented on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 'oppose completely' (-3) to 'support completely' (3).

The next item addressed funding preferences. Regardless of their stance on the proposed defence spending increase—except for those who answered 'do not know'—respondents were asked to indicate which funding option they considered most appropriate. The options were:

⁷The ethics committee expressed concern that the original wording might evoke negative feelings toward Russia and China; therefore, I clarified that the situation was fictitious.

1) cutting spending on social programmes; 2) raising taxes for high-income groups; 3) raising the consumption/value-added tax⁸; 4) borrowing by issuing government bonds. Appendix A provides the full English wording of this component.

Conjoint experiment

The experimental arm employs a conjoint experiment focused specifically on funding mechanisms. Following the same setting in the observational component above, I presented respondents with a pair of hypothetical funding schemes. Each scheme was randomized in terms of four attributes: social spending, consumption/value-added tax, taxes on high-income earners, and government borrowing. Each attribute had three or four levels, one of which appeared at random, as shown in Table 2. To ensure that the situation sounded realistic, I imposed restrictions to prevent unnatural combinations, such as cutting social spending by 20% while allowing a large rise in borrowing (see Table A.1 for the full list of prohibited combinations).⁹

After reading the paired funding schemes, respondents were asked to choose the option they preferred most. These responses form the primary outcome variable in the empirical analysis below. We also asked them to rate their attitudes toward each scheme on a seven-point Likert scale (−3: ‘oppose completely’ to 3: ‘support completely’) for the purpose of a robustness check. This task was repeated four times for each respondent, yielding a sample size of approximately 1,500 per country (cf. Johnson and Orme, 2003). The wording for this conjoint task is provided in Appendix A.

⁸Japanese respondents were shown ‘consumption tax’, whereas German and Italian respondents were shown ‘value-added tax’. The same applies to the conjoint experiment.

⁹As these restrictions would otherwise reduce the frequency of the “large rise” level for government borrowing, I set its probability to 0.5, while the other two levels were each assigned 0.25.

Table 2: Levels and Attributes of the Conjoint Experiment

Attributes	Levels
Social spending	Not cut
	Cut 5%
	Cut 10%
	Cut 20%
Consumption tax/VAT	Not raise
	Raise by 1 point
	Raise by 5 points
	Raise by 10 points
Taxes on high-income earners	Not raise
	Raise by 1 point
	Raise by 5 points
	Raise by 10 points
Government borrowing	Avoid extra borrowing
	Allow a slight rise in borrowing
	Allow a large rise in borrowing

Empirical Findings

Observational Findings on Defence Spending Attitudes

We begin by exploring respondents’ baseline attitudes toward increased defence spending, relying on the results from the observational component. Figure 2 plots the distributions of the answers to the defence spending question in the three countries. It demonstrates notable differences in baseline attitudes between the countries, with the German sample exhibiting greater support than the other two: 60% answered that they (completely, strongly, or somewhat) support the proposed defence spending increase in Germany, whereas only approximately 40% did so in Italy and Japan. Even between these two, Italy exhibits slightly stronger opposition than Japan (39% vs. 33%), a result consistent with the country’s traditional reluctance to meet NATO’s 2% minimum defence spending target (Orlandi, 2025).

Next, we briefly assess the association between ideology and attitudes toward defence spending. Figure 3 depicts the mean score of the defence spending attitude in each category




Figure 2: Baseline Attitudes for Proposed Defence Spending Increase

of respondents' ideological self-placement. This variable is on a seven-point Likert scale, with -3 representing the most leftist, 0 representing the centrist/neutral position, and 3 representing the most rightist. The figure suggests that right-wing respondents generally score higher than left-wing respondents, supporting Hypothesis 1. The relationship is particularly notable for Italy and Japan, while it is less pronounced in Germany, where even left-wing respondents tend to support defence spending on average, thereby raising overall support. By contrast, we do not observe a decline in defence spending support among those at the ideological extremes, a result at odds with Wagner's findings (Wagner et al., 2017, 2018; Wagner, 2020) and Hypothesis 2a.

We then examine how respondents' party support is related to their defence spending attitudes. Based on the *ParlGov* party family data (Döring and Manow, 2024) supplemented by my own coding, I categorized party support into five groups: Mainstream, Green/Ecologist, Radical/Populist, Others, and Independent (see Appendix C for details).





Figure 3: Ideology and Attitude toward Defence Spending Increase

Figure 4 depicts the mean score of the defence spending attitude in each category of this party support variable. Particularly notable is the result from the German sample: Mainstream and Green/Ecologist party supporters firmly uphold increased defence spending, while Radical/Populist party supporters are inclined toward negative attitudes. Given that the Mainstream and Radical/Populist categories include both right-wing and left-wing parties, and that the Green/Ecologist party has been considered left-wing, this result suggests an alternative cleavage orthogonal to the left–right spectrum, supporting Hypothesis 2b. However, this pattern does not appear in Italy and Japan, where party support is unrelated to defence spending attitudes overall.

To test Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b jointly, I ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models of defence spending attitudes on ideology and party support. For ideology, I included both the raw left–right self-placement score and its absolute value to capture ideological extremism. For party support, I included dummy variables for Green/Ecologist,




Note: Japan lacks Green/Ecologist parties.

Figure 4: Party Support and Attitude toward Defence Spending Increase

Radical/Populist, Other parties, and Independent, with Mainstream as the reference category. I controlled for respondents' foreign policy postures, income, education, gender, age, and working conditions. Regarding the foreign policy postures, I conducted the Blackbox scaling (Poole, 1998) and obtained two dimensions: internationalism and unilateral militarism. See Appendices D and E for the details of the posture estimation and the full results of these OLS regressions, respectively.

Figure 5 visualizes the estimated coefficients for left–right self-placement, ideological extremism, and party support. First, left–right self-placement exhibits consistently significant positive coefficients across all three countries. Given that larger values correspond to more right-wing positions, this result suggests that right-wing individuals support the proposed increase in defence spending to a greater extent than left-wing individuals, lending credibility to Hypothesis 1 and aligning with conventional wisdom. Second, ideological extremism is not statistically related to the dependent variable, contradicting Hypothesis 2a. Finally, in



Note: Transparent symbols indicate coefficients not statistically significant at the 5% level.

Figure 5: OLS Regression Coefficients of Ideology and Party Support

terms of party support, the German sample shows a statistically significant decline in defence spending support among Radical/Populist supporters compared to Mainstream supporters. This result is not replicated in Italy or Japan. Hence, Hypothesis 2b is supported only in the German context. Overall, the regression analysis mirrors the preliminary bivariate findings above.

Observational Findings on Funding Preferences

Having discussed attitudes toward defence spending, we now turn to preferences for possible funding mechanisms. As outlined above, the observational block of the questionnaire asked respondents to choose their preferred option for financing increased defence spending from four alternatives: cutting social spending, raising taxes on high-income groups, raising the consumption/value-added tax, and borrowing through government bonds.

Figure 6 illustrates baseline preferences for these funding options. It shows the distributions of answers to the funding question in the three countries, with the samples divided into





Figure 6: Baseline Attitudes toward Possible Funding Options

supporters, neutrals, and opponents of the proposed defence spending increase. The most notable finding is that raising taxes on high-income groups is overwhelmingly favoured across all countries: around 50 to 60% of respondents selected this option as the most appropriate. Funding via government bonds follows, garnering support from 20 to 30%. Social spending cutbacks and consumption taxes are the least popular, supported by at most 13% and 21%, respectively. These findings are hardly surprising, given that Western publics are typically supportive of redistribution and hostile to cutbacks and broad-based tax increases.

Turning to the role of ideology, Figure 7 depicts the distributions of funding preferences by respondents' ideological self-placement. Here, the samples were divided into three groups, with the variable trichotomized into left-wing (-3 to -1), centrist (0), and right-wing (1 to 3). We observe that, although it remains the most favoured, the popularity of high-income taxation is clearly conditioned by ideology: left-wingers are its stronghold, with at least two-thirds favouring it, whereas support drops to around 40% among right-wing individuals. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 5a. The second most favoured option, government borrowing, is similarly conditioned by ideology, though in the opposite direction to Hypo-



Note: I recoded ideological self-placement so that -3 to -1 is Left, 0 is Centre, and 1 to 3 is Right.

Figure 7: Ideology and Support for Funding Options

thesis 4a: right-wingers are more likely to accept borrowing than left-wingers, particularly in Italy and Japan. The results for the remaining two options are less clear, casting doubt on Hypotheses 3a and 6a. Support for social spending cuts increases only among German right-wingers, while support for the consumption tax remains largely stable.

Figure 8 next illustrates the distributions of funding preferences by respondents' annual income. In this figure, I trichotomized income into less than €40,000, €40,000–80,000, and more than €80,000 for Germany and Italy, and less than ¥4 million, ¥4–8 million, and more than ¥8 million for Japan. Notably, the popularity of high-income taxation declines as respondents become wealthier, particularly in Germany and Italy, lending credibility to Hypothesis 5b. In a similar vein, support for social spending cuts and higher consumption/value-added tax appears to increase among richer respondents, consistent with Hypotheses 3b and 6b. Preferences for government borrowing, however, show less consistent patterns, which run counter to Hypothesis 4b.


Finally, to evaluate the hypotheses on funding preferences jointly, I ran multinomial



Figure 8: Income and Support for Funding Options

logistic regressions for each country. The dependent variable was respondents' choice of a preferred funding option, with high-income taxation set as the reference category. The primary independent variables were respondents' left-right self-placement and trichotomized income. I controlled for support for defence spending (trichotomized), ideological extremism, party support, foreign policy postures, gender, age, education, and working conditions. See Appendix F for the full regression results.

Figure 9 selectively plots the coefficients of left-right self-placement and income in each country. With high-income taxation as the reference, social spending cuts, the consumption tax, and government borrowing are symbolized by a circle, triangle, and square, respectively. First and foremost, we observe that left-right ideology strongly influences funding preferences: across the three countries, respondents are increasingly likely to favour government borrowing as they place themselves further to the right, contradicting Hypothesis 4a. In Germany, left-right self-placement is also significant for social spending cuts and the consumption tax, indicating that right-wingers are more likely to support these options over high-income taxation, consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 6a. Income, however, does



Note: Transparent symbols indicate coefficients not statistically significant at the 5% level.

Figure 9: Multinomial Logit Regression Coefficients of Ideology and Income

not exert as strong or consistent an effect as ideology. Only the Italian high-income group (earning more than €80,000 annually) shows higher support for increased value-added tax and government borrowing. In summary, the observational evidence does not confirm the hypotheses concerning income-driven effects.

Focusing on ideological effects, Figure 10 shows predicted probabilities of each funding option being chosen by respondents across the left-right spectrum, based on the multinomial logit models. Mirroring the baseline results, taxing high-income groups is the most popular option across all three countries; however, its support steadily declines as respondents place themselves further to the right. In its place, borrowing through government bonds becomes increasingly popular. By contrast, support for social spending cuts and higher consumption tax remains negligible and largely unchanged across the ideological spectrum.





Figure 10: Predicted Probabilities of Each Option by left-right Ideology

Experimental Findings on Defence Spending Attitudes

Let us continue to explore the funding preferences, this time relying on the conjoint component. As outlined above, the questionnaire asked respondents to choose one of two funding schemes, which were randomized across four attributes: social spending cuts, raising taxes on high-income groups, raising the consumption/value-added tax, and allowing increased government borrowing. I estimated the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of each level of these attributes on respondents' choices via OLS regressions (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Additionally, I estimated the interactions between the conjoint attributes and respondents' left-right ideology or income to assess the hypotheses. See Appendix G for the full results.

To begin with, Figure 11 plots the AMCEs of each conjoint level, with the reference set to the no-change level in each attribute. This figure presents consistent results across the countries. A scheme with cuts to social spending, a rise in the consumption tax, or an



Note: Transparent symbols indicate coefficients not statistically significant at the 5% level.

Figure 11: Average Marginal Component Effects of the Conjoint Attributes

increase in government borrowing is less likely to be chosen by respondents. Conversely, an increase in high-income taxes increases the likelihood that a scheme will be chosen. These results mirror the observational evidence above, which suggests that taxing higher-income groups is considered more appropriate than the other alternatives.

Next, Figure 12 visualizes how respondents' ideology conditions their choice of schemes. It plots the predicted outcome variable, given the levels of the scheme attributes and the respondents' ideology, estimated through models with interaction terms. First, we observe different patterns between the left and the right regarding social spending in Japan: while right-wing respondents remain unchanged, left-wing respondents decrease their support for the scheme as the reduction of social expenditures becomes more substantial. Second, in Japan, again, left-wing individuals decrease their support for schemes involving a significant




Figure 12: Predicted Probability of Choosing the Funding Schemes by left-right Ideology

rise in government borrowing, compared with right-wing individuals. Finally, it is observable that left-wing respondents in Germany increase their support for schemes with a more significant rise in high-income taxation, while their right-wing counterparts remain unchanged. These differences are statistically significant, as shown in the full results in Appendix G.

Meanwhile, Figure 13 shows how respondents' income moderates the effects of the conjoint levels on their choice of schemes. Unlike in the case of ideology demonstrated in the previous figure, we observe no notable moderating effects by income. For instance, Hypothesis 3b anticipates that higher-income groups would increase their support for schemes with a reduction in social spending to a greater extent than lower-income groups, which is not observable in the figure. In fact, Table G.3 in Appendix G does not report any significant interaction effects either. In summary, the conjoint analysis thus far replicates the




Figure 13: Predicted Probability of Choosing the Funding Schemes by Income

observational finding that income does not matter in shaping individuals' funding schemes for increased defence spending.

For a robustness check, I replicated the same analyses with the dummy outcome variable replaced by the rating one, the results of which are presented in Appendix G. The findings are nearly identical to those of the primary analyses in terms of the AMCEs and the moderations of ideology and income. Given these, we conclude that our findings from the conjoint analysis are robust to the choice of the outcome variable.

Summary and Discussion

We have thus far examined individual attitudes toward increased defence spending and its funding schemes, relying on an online survey with both observational and experimental components. Overall, the results underscore the salience of the left-right spectrum: the left

and the right diverge sharply over defence spending and its financing. We now summarize and discuss the findings concerning the hypotheses.

First, the observational analysis suggests that public disputes in the ex-Axis countries over defence spending itself largely follow the traditional left–right spectrum, albeit with some nuances. The evidence shows that those on the right exhibit greater support for increased defence spending than those on the left, supporting Hypothesis 1 and mirroring previous scholarship. At the same time, the evidence points to the emergence of an alternative cleavage. In Germany, supporters of radical or populist parties are less likely to endorse increased defence spending compared with supporters of mainstream parties, lending support to Hypothesis 2 b. Although we did not obtain evidence favourable to Hypothesis 2a, which posits an inverted-U relationship, these results are sufficient to illuminate the possible rise of an alternative spectrum.

Second, the observational evidence indicates that the public is also divided over the associated funding schemes, and that this divide is ideological rather than economic. Left- and right-wing respondents differ primarily over the trade-off between taxing high-income groups and expanding government borrowing, supporting Hypothesis 5a but contradicting Hypothesis 4a. By contrast, social spending cuts and higher consumption taxes are not divisive issues, as support for them is uniformly low; accordingly, Hypotheses 3a and 6a are not supported. Respondents' economic status, unexpectedly, is largely unrelated to their choices of funding schemes, contradicting Hypotheses 3 b, 4b, 5b, and 6b. This suggests that the debate is not driven by egotropic concerns. Given that taxing high-income groups is favoured even by some right-wing respondents, it appears to be the most politically feasible scheme for the governments in question. Still, such a policy would likely provoke resistance from other segments of the right.

Finally, the evidence from the conjoint experiment corroborates the findings of the observational analysis. The estimated AMCEs confirm that taxing high-income groups would garner public support, while cutting social spending, raising the consumption/value-added

tax, and increasing government borrowing would likely alienate them. Left–right ideology, however, conditions funding preferences: in some of the target countries, left-wingers were more inclined to accept high-income taxation and reject social spending cuts than right-wingers. By contrast, respondents’ income was not observed to exert such effects. These results are consistent with the hypotheses on ideology, but run counter to those on income.

Conclusion

In light of growing security tensions that place the ex-Axis countries under pressure of re-militarization, this paper has examined public attitudes toward increased defence spending and potential schemes for funding the associated costs. The author hypothesized that individuals’ ideology and economic status would shape their attitudes on these issues. This was tested through an original opinion survey combining both observational and experimental components. The results underscore the salience of left–right ideology, rather than income. These findings, I argue, carry important implications for both academic scholarship and policy debates.

First, the findings highlight the sociotropic character of defence spending. The analyses demonstrate that divides over funding schemes align more closely with the left–right spectrum than with income differences: irrespective of their income level, right-wing individuals tend to favour government borrowing, whereas left-wing respondents prefer taxation of high-income groups. This result is counterintuitive, given that funding schemes exert more direct and visible economic effects than increases in defence spending per se. Alternatively, the very ambiguity of defence spending may have shaped these outcomes. Put differently, national defence constitutes a public good, benefiting society as a whole, while individuals often fail to perceive their personal returns from it. This characteristic may shape the way citizens consider cost allocation, prompting them to decide in an ideological rather than an economic manner.

Second, the empirical results enrich our understanding of political spectra. While the relevant attitudes largely follow the traditional left–right divide, the German case reveals that proposals for increased defence spending also face opposition from radical or populist parties on both the left and the right. This echoes existing scholarship suggesting that the political landscape is increasingly multidimensional. While earlier research has primarily examined dimensions such as environmentalism and lifestyle issues (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002), the present paper demonstrates that national defence now also constitutes part of this broader set of concerns.

Third, and finally, the findings carry implications for the prospects of currently proposed defence spending expansions in the countries studied. With the exception of Germany, where approval is broad-based, the publics remain divided, with opposition particularly concentrated on the left. The results suggest that governments seeking to implement increases in defence spending could secure left-wing support by coupling them with rises in taxation of high-income groups—a strategy broadly favoured across the population. Yet this approach risks alienating right-wing proponents of expansion. To mitigate this backlash, governments may instead resort to government borrowing, although this in turn would intensify opposition among left-wingers.

Despite these contributions, the present study leaves several issues unresolved. Above all, it does not fully address the mechanisms underlying funding preferences. Future research should examine why and how right-wingers, despite their reputed commitment to fiscal discipline, accept expanded government borrowing to finance defence spending. Moreover, the present study considered only a limited set of funding schemes. Beyond taxing high-income groups or consumption, governments may draw on other sources, such as corporate taxation—indeed, the Japanese government has already announced such a plan. Future studies should therefore consider a broader range of tax instruments. Finally, some may question the focus on ex-Axis countries. Given that former Allied countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, are also pursuing defence spending increases, replicating this study

in other contexts would help determine the extent to which the findings reported here are generalizable.

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Appendix:
Paying for Defence in High-threat Environments:
Political and Economic Divides over Defence Spending
Expansions in Three Ex-Axis Countries
(Not intended for print)

A Details of the Survey Design

A.1 Wording of the observational component

Introductory text

Please imagine a **fictitious scenario** where, facing growing threats to national security, as represented by Russia's military invasion of Ukraine and China's expansionist moves near Taiwan and elsewhere, the [government of the country]¹⁰ has recently announced a plan to **increase defence spending considerably**.

Question on defence spending attitudes

How much do you **support or oppose** this plan? (Choose only one)

- Support completely (3)
- Support strongly (2)
- Support somewhat (1)
- Neither support nor oppose (0)
- Oppose somewhat (-1)
- Oppose strongly (-2)
- Oppose completely (-3)
- Do not know (99)

Question on funding preferences

You answered that you **supported/neither supported nor opposed/opposed**¹¹ the government's plan to increase defence spending.

Now/Still,¹² we would like to ask you how you think the costs should be covered if the government proceeds with the plan.

¹⁰This varies depending on the target country.

¹¹This varies depending on the answer to the previous question.

¹²This varies depending on the answer to the previous question.

Which of the following funding options for the plan do you think is **the most appropriate**?
(Choose only one)

- Cut spending on social programmes (including healthcare, pensions, and welfare)
- Raise taxes for people with high incomes
- Raise consumption tax/value-added tax (on goods and services)
- Borrow money by issuing government bonds
- Do not know

A.2 Wording of the conjoint component

Introductory text

Please imagine **a fictitious scenario** where, facing growing threats to national security, as represented by Russia's military invasion of Ukraine and China's expansionist moves near Taiwan and elsewhere, the [government of the country]¹³ has recently announced a plan to **increase defence spending considerably**.

Now, suppose that the government is preparing **a scheme to pay for the increase in defence spending**. Below, you will see paired funding schemes. Each scheme shows whether and how much the government will cut **spending on social programmes** (including healthcare, pensions, and welfare), raise **taxes for people with high incomes**, raise **the consumption/value-added tax**¹⁴ (on goods and services), and **borrow money** by issuing government bonds. The two schemes in each pair may look similar, but we assure you that they are distinct.

We ask you to **review the schemes carefully and choose which of them you prefer**. We also ask you to rate **how much you support or oppose each scheme** on a scale from -3 (oppose completely) to 3 (support completely). You will do this task four times.

As the pairs of schemes are fictitious and made up just for the sake of comparison, there are no "right" or "correct" answers, so please just tell us how you feel honestly about them.

¹³This varies depending on the target country.

¹⁴This varies depending on the target country.

Conjoint task: dichotomy

Read the following summary of two funding schemes for the increase in defence spending.

	Scheme A	Scheme B
[Attribute 1]	[Level]	[Level]
[Attribute 2]	[Level]	[Level]
[Attribute 3]	[Level]	[Level]
[Attribute 4]	[Level]	[Level]

If you had to choose between them, **which of these schemes do you prefer?** (Choose only one)

- Scheme A
- Scheme B
- Do not know

Conjoint task: rating

You have chosen Scheme A/B over Scheme B/A as your preferred funding option.

Now, please **rate the level of your support** for each option by moving the following sliders from -3 (oppose completely) to 3 (support completely) **for Scheme A and Scheme B, respectively.**

Please make sure to **give higher scores to Scheme A/B** if possible.

	Oppose completely -3	Oppose strongly -2	Oppose somewhat -1	Neither support nor oppose 0	Support somewhat 1	Support strongly 2	Support completely 3	Do not know
Scheme A	[Slider]							☐
Scheme B	[Slider]							☐

A.3 Restrictions of the conjoint levels

Government borrowing	Attributes	Levels
A large rise	Social spending:	Cut 10%; Cut 20%
	Consumption tax:	Raise by 5 points; Raise by 10 points
	High-income taxes:	Raise by 5 points; Raise by 10 points
A slight rise	Social spending:	Cut 20%
	Consumption tax:	Raise by 10 points
	High-income taxes:	Raise by 10 points
Avoid extra borrowing	Social spending:	Not cut
	Consumption tax:	Not raise
	High-income taxes:	Not raise

Table A.1: List of Prohibited Combinations

B Demographic Composition of the Respondents




Figure B.1: Composition of Respondents' Gender




Figure B.2: Composition of Respondents' Income




Figure B.3: Composition of Respondents' Age




Figure B.4: Composition of Respondents' Education

C Details of the Party Support Variable

In the body of the present paper, I related respondents' party support to their attitudes toward increasing defence spending and associated funding options. Regarding party support, I used the variable that categorizes it into five groups for the sake of cross-country comparison. Here, I elaborate on the data source and the coding strategy for this variable.

The data for this variable originates from answers to a question which asked respondents which political party they support. Its precise wording is:

Aside from how you actually voted in the last election, which of the following parties do you ordinarily support? If you do not think you support any party, choose the one for which you feel most affinity or to which you feel closest. (Choose just one)

The answer options to this question list all major political parties, most of which held at least one seat in either house of the legislature in a given country as of the polling date. Nevertheless, I included some parties which had recently lost their seats, such as the Free Democratic Party in Germany, given their long-standing position in the political landscape.

As the party list differs across countries, I categorized the parties using a unified framework for the purpose of comparison. I rely on the party family variable from the *ParlGov* dataset (Döring and Manow, 2024). This variable classifies the covered parties based on their economic and cultural positions, resulting in eight primary categories: Communist/Socialist, Green/Ecologist, Social democracy, Liberal, Christian democracy, Agrarian, Conservative, and Right-wing. Besides these, the data include residual categories of Special issue and No family, making a total of ten categories. Some parties listed in the questionnaire, however, are missing from this dataset — such as the Party of Do It Yourself (*Sanseito*) in Japan — so I supplemented them with my own coding.

Finally, I simplified this *ParlGov*-based classification for assessment of the alternative cleavage suggested by Hypothesis 2a. First, I established the Mainstream category by combining the Social democracy, Liberal, Christian democracy, Agrarian, and Conservative categories. Second, by contrast, the Radical/Populist category arose from the combination of Communist/Socialist, Right-wing, and No family categories. The inclusion of the last one is due to the fact that the Five Star Movement in Italy is its only element, and this party is commonly considered populist (cf. Benasaglio Berlucci, 2021). Thirdly, I retained the Green/Environmental category, given that such parties have a dual nature in that they started as challengers but are becoming mainstream. I classified those supporting the Special issue and other parties as Others, and those without any supported parties as Independent. The full list of political parties and their categories in each country is given in Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3.

Table C.1: Political Parties in Germany

Party	ParlGov category	Simplified category
Christian Democratic/Social Union	Christian democracy	Mainstream
Alternative for Germany	Right-wing	Radical/Populist
Social Democratic Party of Germany	Social democracy	Mainstream
The Greens	Green/Ecologist	Green/Ecologist
The Left	Communist/Socialist	Radical/Populist
South Schleswig Voters' Association	Special issue	Others
Free Democratic Party	Liberal	Mainstream
Sara Wagenknecht Alliance*	Communist/Socialist	Radical Populist

Note: * denotes a party supplemented by the author's coding.

Table C.2: Political Parties in Italy

Party	ParlGov category	Simplified category
Brothers of Italy	Right-wing	Radical/Populist
Democratic Party	Social democracy	Mainstream
Five Star Movement	No family	Radical/Populist
Lega	Right-wing	Radical/Populist
Forza Italia	Conservative	Mainstream
Action*	Liberal	Mainstream
Italia Viva	Liberal	Mainstream
Green Europe	Green/Ecologist	Green/Ecologist
Us Moderates*	Conservative	Mainstream
Italian Left	Communist/Socialist	Radical/Populist
South Tyrolean People's Party	Special issue	Others
More Europe	Liberal	Mainstream
Associative Movement of Italians Abroad	Special issue	Others
Corragio Italia	Conservative	Mainstream
Union of the Centre	Christian democracy	Mainstream
South calls North*	Special issue	Others
Animalist Movement*	Special issue	Others
Progressive Party*	Social democracy	Mainstream
Valdostan Union	Special issue	Others
Campobase	Special issue	Others

Note: * denotes a party supplemented by the author's coding.

Table C.3: Political Parties in Japan

Party	ParlGov category	Simplified category
Liberal Democratic Party	Conservative	Mainstream
Constitutional Democratic Party	Social democracy	Mainstream
Japan Innovation Party	Right-wing	Radical/Populist
Komeito	Conservative	Mainstream
Democratic Party for the People	Conservative	Mainstream
Japanese Communist Party	Communist/Socialist	Radical/Populist
Reiwa Shinsengumi	Communist/Socialist	Radical/Populist
Party of Do It Yourself*	Right-wing	Radical/Populist
Social Democratic Party	Social democracy	Mainstream
Conservative Party of Japan*	Right-wing	Radical/Populist

Note: * denotes a party supplemented by the author's coding.

D Estimating Foreign Policy Postures

In the OLS and multinomial regressions, I included two variables to measure respondents' foreign policy postures, following previous scholarship which argues that values and general postures guide individual attitudes towards specific policy issues (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). These variables were estimated using a scaling method, as their ideal points in dimensions were estimated simultaneously. Here, I elaborate on the estimation strategy and discuss the results.

First, the questionnaire included several items on foreign policy, which served as the data source for subsequent estimation. Prior studies have suggested that public attitudes towards foreign policy in Western societies are structured along three dimensions: militant internationalism (MI), cooperative internationalism (CI), and isolationism (IS) (Holsti, 1992; Wittkopf, 1994; Gravelle et al., 2017). Based on these, I asked respondents to evaluate their attitudes towards statements corresponding to each. They responded on a 7-point Likert scale from -3 (disagree completely) to 3 (agree completely). The wording of the items mirrors Gravelle et al. (2017) and is as follows:

- [The country] needs a strong military to be effective in international relations. (MI)
- [The country] should take all steps, including the use of force, to prevent aggression by any expansionist power. (MI)
- The best way for [the country] to be respected in foreign affairs is to build international consensus. (CI)
- [The country] should work more through international organizations, like the UN. (CI)
- [The country's] interests are best protected by avoiding involvement with other nations. (IS)
- [The country] needs to simply mind its own business when it comes to international orders. (IS)

Using the response data to these items, I conducted Blackbox scaling to estimate the latent properties underlying the responses (Poole, 1998). This procedure shares its logic with factor analysis or principal component analysis but outperforms them in that it can include respondents with some missing responses. Figure D.1 depicts the screeplot from the scaling, which indicates that respondents' foreign policy attitudes are structured along at most two dimensions, with these two explaining 60% of the total variance.

Next, Figure D.2 visualizes the weights of each item on each dimension. These weights, akin to factor loadings in factor analysis, allow us to interpret the meaning of each dimension. The figure shows that the first dimension captures the concurrence of militant internationalism and isolationism, with items such as the use of force, a strong military, minding one's own business, and non-involvement loading heavily on it; accordingly, I labelled this dimension 'unilateral militarism'. Meanwhile, the second dimension captures the dichotomy between cooperative and militant internationalism and isolationism, a spectrum labelled 'internationalism'.





Figure D.1: Screeplot of the Blackbox Scaling



Note: The value for the first dimension was inverted for intuitive understanding.

Figure D.2: Weights of the Items on the Dimensions

E OLS Regression: Support for Defence Spending Increase

Table E.1: Full Result of OLS Regression for Defence Spending Increase, Germany

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.93*	1.06*	1.42*	1.42*
	[0.51; 1.34]	[0.62; 1.50]	[0.99; 1.85]	[0.98; 1.87]
Ideology: Self-placement	0.13*	0.12*	0.11*	0.11*
	[0.04; 0.22]	[0.03; 0.20]	[0.03; 0.20]	[0.03; 0.20]
Ideology: Extremism		-0.12		-0.00
		[-0.25; 0.01]		[-0.13; 0.13]
Party: Green/Ecologist			-0.07	-0.07
			[-0.40; 0.25]	[-0.40; 0.25]
Party: Radical/Populist			-0.96*	-0.96*
			[-1.24; -0.69]	[-1.24; -0.68]
Party: Others			0.33	0.33
			[-0.17; 0.83]	[-0.17; 0.83]
Party: Independent			-0.15	-0.15
			[-0.89; 0.60]	[-0.89; 0.60]
Internationalism	3.94*	3.88*	3.28*	3.28*
	[3.40; 4.49]	[3.33; 4.43]	[2.67; 3.90]	[2.67; 3.90]
Unlt. Militarism	2.01*	2.01*	2.05*	2.05*
	[1.34; 2.68]	[1.34; 2.68]	[1.39; 2.71]	[1.39; 2.71]
Income: €40-80K	0.35*	0.34*	0.26*	0.26*
	[0.09; 0.60]	[0.09; 0.60]	[0.00; 0.51]	[0.00; 0.51]
Income: >€80K	0.35*	0.37*	0.21	0.22
	[0.01; 0.69]	[0.02; 0.71]	[-0.13; 0.56]	[-0.13; 0.56]
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	[-0.30; 0.29]	[-0.30; 0.28]	[-0.30; 0.27]	[-0.30; 0.27]
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.20	-0.19	-0.23	-0.23
	[-0.51; 0.11]	[-0.50; 0.12]	[-0.53; 0.07]	[-0.53; 0.07]
Female	-0.30*	-0.31*	-0.34*	-0.34*
	[-0.53; -0.08]	[-0.54; -0.09]	[-0.56; -0.11]	[-0.56; -0.11]
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
	[-0.33; 0.22]	[-0.34; 0.20]	[-0.33; 0.21]	[-0.33; 0.21]
Age: 65+ y.o.	0.12	0.08	-0.03	-0.03
	[-0.27; 0.51]	[-0.30; 0.47]	[-0.41; 0.34]	[-0.41; 0.34]
Working	-0.10	-0.09	-0.12	-0.12
	[-0.43; 0.24]	[-0.42; 0.24]	[-0.44; 0.20]	[-0.44; 0.20]
R ²	0.30	0.30	0.36	0.36
Adj. R ²	0.29	0.29	0.34	0.34
Num. obs.	762	762	754	754
RMSE	1.54	1.54	1.48	1.49

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table E.2: Full Result of OLS Regression for Defence Spending Increase, Italy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.10 [−0.30; 0.49]	0.11 [−0.32; 0.54]	0.35 [−0.07; 0.78]	0.41 [−0.05; 0.87]
Ideology: Self-placement	0.30* [0.22; 0.38]	0.30* [0.22; 0.38]	0.31* [0.23; 0.39]	0.31* [0.23; 0.39]
Ideology: Extremism		−0.01 [−0.15; 0.13]		−0.04 [−0.18; 0.10]
Party: Green/Ecologist			−1.22 [−2.44; 0.01]	−1.24* [−2.47; −0.02]
Party: Radical/Populist			−0.23 [−0.52; 0.05]	−0.22 [−0.51; 0.07]
Party: Others			−0.51 [−1.45; 0.43]	−0.52 [−1.46; 0.42]
Party: Independent			−0.86* [−1.31; −0.42]	−0.88* [−1.32; −0.43]
Internationalism	2.63* [1.67; 3.59]	2.63* [1.67; 3.60]	2.45* [1.48; 3.43]	2.46* [1.48; 3.44]
Unlt. Militarism	1.42* [0.65; 2.20]	1.43* [0.65; 2.20]	1.36* [0.58; 2.14]	1.37* [0.58; 2.15]
Income: €40-80K	0.05 [−0.23; 0.33]	0.05 [−0.23; 0.33]	0.01 [−0.27; 0.29]	0.01 [−0.27; 0.29]
Income: >€80K	0.59* [0.08; 1.09]	0.59* [0.08; 1.09]	0.49 [−0.02; 1.00]	0.49 [−0.01; 1.00]
Education: Lower tertiary	0.08 [−0.41; 0.57]	0.08 [−0.41; 0.57]	0.12 [−0.36; 0.60]	0.13 [−0.36; 0.61]
Education: Upper tertiary	−0.01 [−0.29; 0.26]	−0.01 [−0.29; 0.26]	0.01 [−0.26; 0.29]	0.02 [−0.26; 0.30]
Female	−0.02 [−0.28; 0.24]	−0.02 [−0.28; 0.24]	0.01 [−0.25; 0.27]	0.01 [−0.25; 0.28]
Age: 35-65 y.o.	−0.66* [−0.97; −0.35]	−0.66* [−0.97; −0.35]	−0.69* [−1.00; −0.38]	−0.69* [−1.00; −0.38]
Age: 65+ y.o.	−0.79* [−1.20; −0.39]	−0.79* [−1.20; −0.38]	−0.83* [−1.24; −0.42]	−0.82* [−1.24; −0.41]
Working	0.08 [−0.26; 0.43]	0.09 [−0.26; 0.43]	0.08 [−0.27; 0.43]	0.08 [−0.27; 0.43]
R ²	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.20
Num. obs.	708	708	697	697
RMSE	1.70	1.70	1.69	1.69

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table E.3: Full Result of OLS Regression for Defence Spending Increase, Japan

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.59*	0.62*	0.64*	0.67*
	[0.17; 1.00]	[0.20; 1.04]	[0.20; 1.07]	[0.22; 1.11]
Ideology: Self-placement	0.33*	0.33*	0.32*	0.33*
	[0.22; 0.43]	[0.23; 0.44]	[0.21; 0.43]	[0.22; 0.44]
Ideology: Extremism		-0.04		-0.04
		[-0.18; 0.09]		[-0.18; 0.10]
Party: Radical/Populist			-0.14	-0.14
			[-0.42; 0.13]	[-0.41; 0.14]
Party: Others			-0.08	-0.07
			[-0.75; 0.59]	[-0.75; 0.61]
Party: Independent			-0.04	-0.05
			[-0.27; 0.19]	[-0.29; 0.18]
Internationalism	1.91*	1.92*	1.91*	1.91*
	[1.05; 2.78]	[1.07; 2.78]	[1.04; 2.77]	[1.05; 2.78]
Unlt. Militarism	4.21*	4.21*	4.21*	4.21*
	[3.41; 5.02]	[3.41; 5.02]	[3.40; 5.02]	[3.40; 5.02]
Income: ¥4-8M	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10
	[-0.12; 0.33]	[-0.12; 0.33]	[-0.13; 0.33]	[-0.13; 0.32]
Income: >¥8M	-0.08	-0.09	-0.10	-0.10
	[-0.37; 0.20]	[-0.38; 0.20]	[-0.39; 0.20]	[-0.40; 0.20]
Education: Lower tertiary	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	[-0.25; 0.26]	[-0.25; 0.25]	[-0.25; 0.26]	[-0.26; 0.26]
Education: Upper tertiary	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.18
	[-0.06; 0.41]	[-0.06; 0.42]	[-0.07; 0.41]	[-0.06; 0.42]
Female	-0.24*	-0.25*	-0.24*	-0.25*
	[-0.46; -0.02]	[-0.47; -0.02]	[-0.47; -0.02]	[-0.48; -0.02]
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
	[-0.41; 0.29]	[-0.41; 0.29]	[-0.41; 0.29]	[-0.41; 0.29]
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
	[-0.45; 0.31]	[-0.45; 0.31]	[-0.45; 0.31]	[-0.46; 0.31]
Working	-0.14	-0.14	-0.13	-0.13
	[-0.37; 0.08]	[-0.37; 0.09]	[-0.36; 0.10]	[-0.36; 0.10]
R ²	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
Adj. R ²	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Num. obs.	661	661	657	657
RMSE	1.26	1.26	1.27	1.27

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

F Multinomial Logit Regression: Support for Funding Options

F.1 Full Results for Germany

Table F.1: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (1), Germany

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-2.00 (0.55)***	-0.57 (0.56)	-0.43 (0.37)
DF support: Neutral	0.58 (0.35)	-0.29 (0.48)	-0.81 (0.37)*
DF support: Oppose	-0.57 (0.39)	-1.65 (0.60)**	-0.52 (0.26)*
Ideology: Self-placement	0.42 (0.11)***	0.38 (0.13)**	0.27 (0.08)***
Income: €40-80K	-0.14 (0.31)	-0.17 (0.39)	0.03 (0.22)
Income: >€80K	0.18 (0.41)	0.17 (0.53)	0.54 (0.30)
Internationalism	-0.76 (0.72)	-0.97 (0.93)	0.89 (0.48)
Unlt. Militarism	0.08 (0.73)	-1.43 (0.93)	-0.62 (0.52)
Female	-0.14 (0.26)	0.21 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.19)
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.48 (0.30)	-1.15 (0.35)**	0.15 (0.26)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.95 (0.49)	-2.58 (0.72)***	0.18 (0.32)
Education: Lower tertiary	0.12 (0.38)	-0.64 (0.44)	-0.30 (0.24)
Education: Upper tertiary	0.99 (0.39)*	0.14 (0.44)	0.00 (0.26)
Working	0.67 (0.43)	-0.18 (0.48)	-0.13 (0.26)

Table F.2: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (2), Germany

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-2.07 (0.57)***	-0.51 (0.60)	-0.46 (0.39)
DF support: Neutral	0.58 (0.35)	-0.30 (0.48)	-0.81 (0.37)*
DF support: Oppose	-0.58 (0.39)	-1.64 (0.60)**	-0.52 (0.26)*
Ideology: Self-placement	0.41 (0.11)***	0.39 (0.14)**	0.27 (0.08)***
Ideology: Extremism	0.07 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.03 (0.11)
Income: €40-80K	-0.15 (0.31)	-0.16 (0.39)	0.03 (0.22)
Income: >€80K	0.16 (0.41)	0.18 (0.53)	0.54 (0.30)
Internationalism	-0.76 (0.72)	-0.96 (0.93)	0.90 (0.48)
Unlt. Militarism	0.08 (0.73)	-1.44 (0.93)	-0.62 (0.52)
Female	-0.14 (0.26)	0.21 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.19)
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.47 (0.30)	-1.15 (0.35)**	0.15 (0.26)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.93 (0.49)	-2.58 (0.72)***	0.18 (0.33)
Education: Lower tertiary	0.13 (0.38)	-0.65 (0.44)	-0.30 (0.25)
Education: Upper tertiary	1.00 (0.39)**	0.13 (0.44)	0.00 (0.26)
Working	0.67 (0.43)	-0.16 (0.48)	-0.13 (0.26)

Table F.3: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (3), Germany

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-1.77 (0.58)**	-0.21 (0.62)	-0.14 (0.39)
DF support: Neutral	0.60 (0.36)	-0.36 (0.51)	-0.81 (0.37)*
DF support: Oppose	-0.53 (0.41)	-1.35 (0.63)*	-0.45 (0.28)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.40 (0.11)***	0.41 (0.15)**	0.24 (0.08)**
Party: Green/Ecologist	-1.26 (0.65)	0.11 (0.52)	-0.59 (0.33)
Party: Radical/Populist	-0.21 (0.30)	-0.85 (0.44)	-0.39 (0.23)
Party: Others	2.27 (0.90)*	2.67 (0.96)**	0.72 (0.94)
Party: Independent	-0.52 (0.82)	-0.72 (1.17)	-0.41 (0.51)
Income: €40-80K	-0.14 (0.32)	-0.17 (0.41)	0.05 (0.22)
Income: >€80K	0.28 (0.41)	0.05 (0.55)	0.56 (0.31)
Internationalism	-0.72 (0.75)	-1.47 (1.03)	0.79 (0.50)
Unlt. Militarism	0.10 (0.75)	-0.82 (0.99)	-0.72 (0.53)
Female	-0.17 (0.27)	0.09 (0.35)	-0.09 (0.19)
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.54 (0.30)	-1.25 (0.36)***	0.10 (0.26)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-1.04 (0.50)*	-3.12 (0.84)***	0.06 (0.33)
Education: Lower tertiary	0.07 (0.39)	-0.75 (0.46)	-0.33 (0.25)
Education: Upper tertiary	0.97 (0.39)*	0.03 (0.45)	-0.02 (0.26)
Working	0.64 (0.44)	-0.21 (0.51)	-0.19 (0.26)

Table F.4: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (4), Germany

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-1.85 (0.59)**	-0.32 (0.65)	-0.17 (0.40)
DF support: Neutral	0.61 (0.36)	-0.33 (0.52)	-0.80 (0.37)*
DF support: Oppose	-0.53 (0.41)	-1.36 (0.63)*	-0.44 (0.28)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.40 (0.11)***	0.41 (0.14)**	0.25 (0.08)**
Ideology: Extremism	0.09 (0.17)	0.13 (0.22)	0.04 (0.12)
Party: Green/Ecologist	-1.24 (0.65)	0.14 (0.52)	-0.59 (0.33)
Party: Radical/Populist	-0.25 (0.31)	-0.91 (0.45)*	-0.41 (0.24)
Party: Others	2.27 (0.89)*	2.68 (0.96)**	0.71 (0.93)
Party: Independent	-0.50 (0.82)	-0.70 (1.17)	-0.40 (0.52)
Income: €40-80K	-0.15 (0.32)	-0.19 (0.41)	0.05 (0.22)
Income: >€80K	0.25 (0.42)	0.02 (0.55)	0.55 (0.31)
Internationalism	-0.72 (0.75)	-1.49 (1.03)	0.80 (0.50)
Unlt. Militarism	0.11 (0.75)	-0.80 (0.98)	-0.72 (0.53)
Female	-0.17 (0.27)	0.09 (0.35)	-0.08 (0.19)
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.53 (0.30)	-1.23 (0.37)***	0.11 (0.26)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-1.03 (0.50)*	-3.10 (0.84)***	0.07 (0.33)
Education: Lower tertiary	0.08 (0.39)	-0.74 (0.46)	-0.33 (0.25)
Education: Upper tertiary	0.97 (0.39)*	0.04 (0.45)	-0.02 (0.26)
Working	0.64 (0.44)	-0.23 (0.51)	-0.19 (0.26)

F.2 Full Results for Italy

Table F.5: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (1), Italy

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-1.99 (0.51)***	-2.04 (0.54)***	-1.55 (0.36)***
DF support: Neutral	0.28 (0.45)	0.81 (0.45)	0.09 (0.30)
DF support: Oppose	-0.45 (0.38)	-0.78 (0.49)	-0.46 (0.24)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.13 (0.10)	0.08 (0.11)	0.24 (0.06)***
Income: €40-80K	0.31 (0.36)	0.63 (0.42)	0.36 (0.23)
Income: >€80K	1.06 (0.50)*	1.19 (0.60)*	0.83 (0.35)*
Internationalism	-0.11 (1.09)	-1.77 (1.35)	0.25 (0.69)
Unlt. Militarism	1.30 (0.95)	3.05 (1.11)**	-0.13 (0.61)
Female	0.38 (0.33)	0.22 (0.38)	0.57 (0.21)**
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.72 (0.35)*	-1.03 (0.41)*	0.07 (0.27)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-2.45 (0.81)**	-2.21 (0.73)**	0.14 (0.35)
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.21 (0.66)	-0.15 (0.69)	-1.38 (0.63)*
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.07 (0.35)	-0.30 (0.42)	0.01 (0.22)
Working	0.42 (0.43)	0.02 (0.46)	0.30 (0.28)

Table F.6: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (2), Italy

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-2.01 (0.55)***	-1.80 (0.59)**	-1.40 (0.39)***
DF support: Neutral	0.28 (0.45)	0.77 (0.46)	0.07 (0.30)
DF support: Oppose	-0.45 (0.38)	-0.76 (0.49)	-0.46 (0.24)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.12 (0.10)	0.11 (0.12)	0.25 (0.07)***
Ideology: Extremism	0.03 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.11)
Income: €40-80K	0.31 (0.36)	0.64 (0.42)	0.36 (0.23)
Income: >€80K	1.05 (0.50)*	1.22 (0.60)*	0.84 (0.35)*
Internationalism	-0.13 (1.09)	-1.68 (1.36)	0.28 (0.69)
Unlt. Militarism	1.24 (0.96)	3.20 (1.13)**	-0.10 (0.61)
Female	0.37 (0.33)	0.23 (0.39)	0.57 (0.21)**
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.72 (0.35)*	-1.05 (0.41)*	0.07 (0.28)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-2.45 (0.81)**	-2.21 (0.73)**	0.15 (0.35)
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.21 (0.67)	-0.14 (0.69)	-1.37 (0.63)*
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.08 (0.35)	-0.30 (0.41)	0.01 (0.22)
Working	0.41 (0.43)	0.05 (0.46)	0.29 (0.28)

Table F.7: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (3), Italy

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-1.86 (0.55)***	-1.96 (0.59)***	-1.68 (0.39)***
DF support: Neutral	0.21 (0.46)	0.83 (0.47)	0.09 (0.30)
DF support: Oppose	-0.36 (0.39)	-0.86 (0.52)	-0.52 (0.25)*
Ideology: Self-placement	0.14 (0.10)	0.13 (0.12)	0.22 (0.06)***
Party: Green/Ecologist	1.02 (1.23)	-14.13 (0.00)***	1.72 (0.82)*
Party: Radical/Populist	-0.34 (0.34)	-0.77 (0.43)	0.15 (0.23)
Party: Others	-0.86 (1.09)	0.41 (0.86)	0.12 (0.63)
Party: Independent	-14.27 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.62)	-0.02 (0.39)
Income: €40-80K	0.31 (0.37)	0.78 (0.43)	0.37 (0.23)
Income: >€80K	0.99 (0.50)*	1.29 (0.62)*	0.84 (0.35)*
Internationalism	-0.37 (1.10)	-1.26 (1.39)	0.18 (0.71)
Unlt. Militarism	1.55 (0.98)	3.53 (1.17)**	-0.03 (0.61)
Female	0.40 (0.33)	0.34 (0.40)	0.55 (0.21)**
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.77 (0.37)*	-1.06 (0.43)*	0.09 (0.28)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-2.34 (0.83)**	-2.24 (0.75)**	0.22 (0.36)
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.18 (0.68)	0.02 (0.71)	-1.38 (0.63)*
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.10 (0.35)	-0.21 (0.42)	-0.02 (0.22)
Working	0.60 (0.46)	-0.01 (0.47)	0.34 (0.28)

Table F.8: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (4), Italy

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-1.87 (0.59)**	-1.71 (0.64)**	-1.52 (0.41)***
DF support: Neutral	0.21 (0.47)	0.80 (0.47)	0.07 (0.30)
DF support: Oppose	-0.36 (0.39)	-0.82 (0.53)	-0.51 (0.25)*
Ideology: Self-placement	0.13 (0.10)	0.16 (0.13)	0.23 (0.07)***
Ideology: Extremism	0.01 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.11)
Party: Green/Ecologist	1.01 (1.23)	-131.86 (0.00)***	1.64 (0.83)*
Party: Radical/Populist	-0.34 (0.34)	-0.73 (0.43)	0.18 (0.23)
Party: Others	-0.84 (1.10)	0.32 (0.88)	0.08 (0.63)
Party: Independent	-14.07 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.63)	-0.04 (0.39)
Income: €40-80K	0.30 (0.37)	0.78 (0.43)	0.37 (0.23)
Income: >€80K	0.98 (0.50)	1.31 (0.62)*	0.85 (0.35)*
Internationalism	-0.39 (1.10)	-1.14 (1.40)	0.22 (0.72)
Unlt. Militarism	1.50 (0.98)	3.64 (1.18)**	0.00 (0.62)
Female	0.39 (0.34)	0.35 (0.40)	0.55 (0.21)**
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.76 (0.37)*	-1.09 (0.43)*	0.09 (0.28)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-2.33 (0.83)**	-2.27 (0.76)**	0.23 (0.36)
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.19 (0.68)	0.04 (0.71)	-1.37 (0.63)*
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.10 (0.35)	-0.21 (0.42)	-0.01 (0.22)
Working	0.60 (0.46)	0.01 (0.47)	0.34 (0.28)

F.3 Full Results for Japan

Table F.9: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (1), Japan

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-0.50 (0.55)	-3.84 (1.16)***	-0.06 (0.46)
DF support: Neutral	0.37 (0.37)	0.79 (0.40)*	0.49 (0.31)
DF support: Oppose	-0.20 (0.37)	-0.19 (0.40)	0.23 (0.28)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.08 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)	0.36 (0.11)***
Income: ¥4-8M	-0.15 (0.33)	0.39 (0.34)	0.38 (0.26)
Income: >¥8M	-0.20 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.43)	0.11 (0.32)
Internationalism	-2.33 (1.14)*	1.74 (1.06)	0.03 (0.83)
Unlt. Militarism	3.24 (0.96)***	1.29 (1.00)	1.64 (0.74)*
Female	0.88 (0.31)**	0.17 (0.34)	-0.65 (0.26)*
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.71 (0.39)	2.16 (1.05)*	-0.25 (0.36)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.88 (0.46)	1.72 (1.08)	-0.99 (0.41)*
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.46 (0.38)	-0.32 (0.46)	0.38 (0.28)
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.09 (0.33)	0.69 (0.34)*	-0.36 (0.26)
Working	-0.14 (0.35)	-0.32 (0.36)	-0.43 (0.28)

Table F.10: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (2), Japan

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-0.57 (0.58)	-3.93 (1.16)***	-0.01 (0.47)
DF support: Neutral	0.39 (0.38)	0.80 (0.40)*	0.49 (0.31)
DF support: Oppose	-0.20 (0.38)	-0.20 (0.40)	0.23 (0.28)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.06 (0.14)	0.14 (0.14)	0.43 (0.14)**
Ideology: Extremism	0.09 (0.18)	0.14 (0.18)	-0.12 (0.17)
Income: ¥4-8M	-0.16 (0.33)	0.39 (0.35)	0.38 (0.26)
Income: >¥8M	-0.20 (0.40)	-0.04 (0.43)	0.11 (0.32)
Internationalism	-2.32 (1.14)*	1.70 (1.06)	0.03 (0.83)
Unlt. Militarism	3.20 (0.96)***	1.31 (1.00)	1.66 (0.74)*
Female	0.89 (0.31)**	0.19 (0.34)	-0.67 (0.26)*
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.70 (0.39)	2.17 (1.05)*	-0.25 (0.36)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.87 (0.47)	1.72 (1.08)	-0.98 (0.41)*
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.45 (0.38)	-0.29 (0.46)	0.37 (0.28)
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.11 (0.33)	0.68 (0.34)*	-0.35 (0.26)
Working	-0.14 (0.35)	-0.35 (0.36)	-0.42 (0.28)

Table F.11: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (3), Japan

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-0.24 (0.58)	-3.46 (1.16)**	0.07 (0.47)
DF support: Neutral	0.33 (0.39)	0.92 (0.41)*	0.48 (0.32)
DF support: Oppose	-0.20 (0.38)	-0.13 (0.40)	0.25 (0.28)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.07 (0.14)	0.15 (0.14)	0.33 (0.11)**
Party: Radical/Populist	-0.73 (0.39)	-0.48 (0.36)	-0.04 (0.26)
Party: Others	1.18 (0.92)	-0.15 (1.20)	0.44 (0.86)
Party: Independent	-0.77 (0.36)*	-0.95 (0.41)*	-0.42 (0.28)
Income: ¥4-8M	-0.17 (0.34)	0.27 (0.35)	0.36 (0.26)
Income: >¥8M	-0.28 (0.41)	-0.18 (0.43)	0.08 (0.32)
Internationalism	-2.29 (1.16)*	1.71 (1.08)	0.02 (0.83)
Unlt. Militarism	3.04 (0.97)**	1.35 (1.00)	1.68 (0.75)*
Female	1.02 (0.32)**	0.21 (0.34)	-0.62 (0.27)*
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.79 (0.40)*	2.10 (1.05)*	-0.28 (0.36)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.98 (0.47)*	1.62 (1.08)	-1.01 (0.41)*
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.36 (0.39)	-0.19 (0.46)	0.39 (0.28)
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.15 (0.34)	0.72 (0.35)*	-0.37 (0.26)
Working	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.31 (0.36)	-0.39 (0.28)

Table F.12: Full Result of Multinomial Logit Model (4), Japan

Coefficients	Social spending cut	Consumption tax	Government bonds
(Intercept)	-0.28 (0.60)	-3.51 (1.17)**	0.18 (0.48)
DF support: Neutral	0.34 (0.39)	0.92 (0.41)*	0.47 (0.32)
DF support: Oppose	-0.21 (0.38)	-0.15 (0.40)	0.25 (0.28)
Ideology: Self-placement	0.05 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	0.42 (0.14)**
Ideology: Extremism	0.06 (0.19)	0.08 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.17)
Party: Radical/Populist	-0.73 (0.39)	-0.49 (0.36)	-0.02 (0.27)
Party: Others	1.17 (0.92)	-0.14 (1.20)	0.45 (0.86)
Party: Independent	-0.75 (0.37)*	-0.93 (0.42)*	-0.46 (0.28)
Income: ¥4-8M	-0.18 (0.34)	0.26 (0.35)	0.36 (0.26)
Income: >¥8M	-0.28 (0.41)	-0.17 (0.43)	0.08 (0.32)
Internationalism	-2.27 (1.16)*	1.68 (1.08)	0.03 (0.83)
Unlt. Militarism	3.01 (0.97)**	1.36 (1.00)	1.70 (0.75)*
Female	1.03 (0.32)**	0.22 (0.34)	-0.64 (0.27)*
Age: 35-65 y.o.	-0.78 (0.40)	2.12 (1.05)*	-0.29 (0.36)
Age: 65+ y.o.	-0.97 (0.48)*	1.63 (1.08)	-1.01 (0.41)*
Education: Lower tertiary	-0.36 (0.39)	-0.18 (0.46)	0.37 (0.29)
Education: Upper tertiary	-0.16 (0.34)	0.71 (0.35)*	-0.37 (0.26)
Working	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.33 (0.36)	-0.38 (0.28)

G Conjoint Analysis

G.1 Conjoint analysis with the dummy outcome variable

Table G.1: Full Result of AMCE Estimation

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.57*	0.58*	0.56*
	[0.50; 0.64]	[0.49; 0.67]	[0.49; 0.64]
Social spending: Cut 5%	−0.03	−0.08*	−0.02
	[−0.07; 0.02]	[−0.12; −0.03]	[−0.07; 0.02]
Social spending: Cut 10%	−0.11*	−0.18*	−0.07*
	[−0.16; −0.07]	[−0.23; −0.12]	[−0.14; −0.00]
Social spending: Cut 20%	−0.20*	−0.22*	−0.13*
	[−0.25; −0.14]	[−0.29; −0.15]	[−0.18; −0.07]
Consumption tax: Raise by 1 pt	−0.04	−0.03	−0.10*
	[−0.09; 0.01]	[−0.07; 0.02]	[−0.14; −0.05]
Consumption tax: Raise by 5 pts	−0.15*	−0.10*	−0.22*
	[−0.21; −0.09]	[−0.16; −0.05]	[−0.27; −0.17]
Consumption tax: Raise by 10 pts	−0.24*	−0.17*	−0.29*
	[−0.31; −0.17]	[−0.24; −0.10]	[−0.35; −0.22]
High-income taxes: Raise by 1 pt	0.09*	0.04	0.05*
	[0.05; 0.13]	[−0.01; 0.08]	[0.01; 0.09]
High-income taxes: Raise by 5 pts	0.10*	0.09*	0.08*
	[0.05; 0.14]	[0.03; 0.14]	[0.04; 0.13]
High-income taxes: Raise by 10 pts	0.16*	0.09*	0.09*
	[0.10; 0.22]	[0.02; 0.16]	[0.04; 0.15]
Government borrowing: A slight rise	−0.05*	−0.04	−0.03
	[−0.10; −0.00]	[−0.10; 0.02]	[−0.08; 0.02]
Government borrowing: A large rise	−0.15*	−0.18*	−0.14*
	[−0.22; −0.09]	[−0.25; −0.11]	[−0.20; −0.07]
R ²	0.05	0.03	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	3704	3768	3792
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.47
N Clusters	463	471	474

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table G.2: Full Result of Mediation by Ideology

	Germany (1)	Italy (2)	Japan (3)
(Intercept)	0.62*	0.67*	0.81*
	[0.51; 0.74]	[0.50; 0.83]	[0.56; 1.06]
Social spending: Cut 5%	-0.09*	-0.06	-0.14
	[-0.17; -0.01]	[-0.14; 0.02]	[-0.29; 0.01]
Social spending: Cut 10%	-0.18*	-0.20*	-0.27*
	[-0.28; -0.09]	[-0.30; -0.10]	[-0.49; -0.05]
Social spending: Cut 20%	-0.22*	-0.30*	-0.30*
	[-0.33; -0.11]	[-0.43; -0.18]	[-0.46; -0.14]
Consumption tax: Raise by 1 pt	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.11
	[-0.18; -0.01]	[-0.13; 0.04]	[-0.26; 0.03]
Consumption tax: Raise by 5 pts	-0.23*	-0.10*	-0.36*
	[-0.35; -0.12]	[-0.19; -0.00]	[-0.50; -0.21]
Consumption tax: Raise by 10 pts	-0.34*	-0.23*	-0.37*
	[-0.47; -0.22]	[-0.36; -0.11]	[-0.60; -0.14]
High-income taxes: Raise by 1 pt	0.13*	-0.01	0.05
	[0.06; 0.20]	[-0.10; 0.08]	[-0.07; 0.17]
High-income taxes: Raise by 5 pts	0.18*	0.12*	0.14*
	[0.10; 0.26]	[0.02; 0.22]	[0.00; 0.28]
High-income taxes: Raise by 10 pts	0.28*	0.03	0.13
	[0.16; 0.39]	[-0.10; 0.15]	[-0.05; 0.32]
Government borrowing: A slight rise	-0.01	-0.09	-0.05
	[-0.09; 0.08]	[-0.18; 0.01]	[-0.18; 0.09]
Government borrowing: A large rise	-0.13*	-0.25*	-0.23*
	[-0.24; -0.01]	[-0.38; -0.12]	[-0.44; -0.01]
Ideology: Centre	-0.08	-0.16	-0.15
	[-0.25; 0.09]	[-0.45; 0.13]	[-0.43; 0.13]
Ideology: Right	-0.05	-0.13	-0.35*
	[-0.23; 0.12]	[-0.34; 0.09]	[-0.63; -0.06]
SS: Cut 5% * Centre	0.06	-0.06	0.12
	[-0.05; 0.17]	[-0.20; 0.08]	[-0.05; 0.28]
SS: Cut 10% * Centre	0.07	0.04	0.13
	[-0.06; 0.20]	[-0.12; 0.20]	[-0.12; 0.37]
SS: Cut 20% * Centre	-0.03	0.12	0.10
	[-0.18; 0.12]	[-0.10; 0.33]	[-0.09; 0.28]
SS: Cut 5% * Right	0.09	-0.02	0.16
	[-0.02; 0.20]	[-0.13; 0.09]	[-0.02; 0.34]
SS: Cut 10% * Right	0.10	0.07	0.36*
	[-0.02; 0.23]	[-0.07; 0.20]	[0.11; 0.62]
SS: Cut 20% * Right	0.10	0.12	0.26*
	[-0.05; 0.24]	[-0.05; 0.30]	[0.07; 0.46]

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
CT: Raise by 1 pt * Centre	0.02 [−0.10; 0.14]	0.02 [−0.13; 0.16]	0.00 [−0.16; 0.17]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * Centre	0.08 [−0.08; 0.24]	−0.04 [−0.21; 0.13]	0.07 [−0.09; 0.24]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * Centre	0.09 [−0.09; 0.27]	0.03 [−0.20; 0.26]	0.04 [−0.21; 0.29]
CT: Raise by 1 pt * Right	0.13* [0.00; 0.26]	0.01 [−0.10; 0.12]	0.04 [−0.13; 0.21]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * Right	0.13 [−0.02; 0.28]	−0.03 [−0.16; 0.09]	0.21* [0.03; 0.38]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * Right	0.19* [0.00; 0.37]	0.12 [−0.04; 0.28]	0.11 [−0.14; 0.36]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * Centre	0.03 [−0.07; 0.13]	0.14 [−0.02; 0.30]	−0.00 [−0.13; 0.13]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * Centre	−0.06 [−0.17; 0.06]	0.02 [−0.15; 0.19]	−0.06 [−0.22; 0.10]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * Centre	−0.10 [−0.26; 0.05]	0.13 [−0.10; 0.35]	−0.10 [−0.30; 0.11]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * Right	−0.11* [−0.21; −0.01]	0.06 [−0.05; 0.18]	−0.03 [−0.17; 0.10]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * Right	−0.16* [−0.27; −0.05]	−0.04 [−0.17; 0.10]	−0.07 [−0.23; 0.10]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * Right	−0.20* [−0.35; −0.04]	0.15 [−0.02; 0.32]	−0.00 [−0.21; 0.21]
GB: A slight rise * Centre	−0.03 [−0.15; 0.10]	0.08 [−0.10; 0.26]	−0.02 [−0.17; 0.14]
GB: A large rise * Centre	−0.07 [−0.23; 0.10]	0.20 [−0.02; 0.43]	−0.01 [−0.25; 0.22]
GB: A slight rise * Right	−0.06 [−0.18; 0.06]	0.11 [−0.02; 0.25]	0.11 [−0.06; 0.27]
GB: A large rise * Right	−0.04 [−0.20; 0.12]	0.13 [−0.04; 0.30]	0.25* [0.00; 0.49]
R ²	0.06	0.04	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.03	0.06
Num. obs.	3344	3240	2976
RMSE	0.48	0.49	0.48
N Clusters	418	405	372

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table G.3: Full Result of Mediation by Income

	Germany (1)	Italy (2)	Japan (3)
(Intercept)	0.58*	0.54*	0.55*
	[0.48; 0.69]	[0.44; 0.65]	[0.39; 0.70]
Social spending: Cut 5%	−0.02	−0.07*	−0.00
	[−0.08; 0.04]	[−0.12; −0.01]	[−0.09; 0.09]
Social spending: Cut 10%	−0.14*	−0.17*	−0.07
	[−0.20; −0.07]	[−0.24; −0.10]	[−0.20; 0.07]
Social spending: Cut 20%	−0.20*	−0.21*	−0.11
	[−0.29; −0.12]	[−0.29; −0.12]	[−0.23; 0.00]
Consumption tax: Raise by 1 pt	−0.07	−0.01	−0.13*
	[−0.15; 0.00]	[−0.07; 0.04]	[−0.21; −0.04]
Consumption tax: Raise by 5 pts	−0.18*	−0.09*	−0.19*
	[−0.27; −0.09]	[−0.16; −0.02]	[−0.28; −0.09]
Consumption tax: Raise by 10 pts	−0.29*	−0.11*	−0.25*
	[−0.39; −0.18]	[−0.20; −0.03]	[−0.38; −0.12]
High-income taxes: Raise by 1 pt	0.12*	0.03	−0.00
	[0.06; 0.18]	[−0.02; 0.09]	[−0.07; 0.07]
High-income taxes: Raise by 5 pts	0.08*	0.09*	0.03
	[0.01; 0.14]	[0.03; 0.16]	[−0.06; 0.12]
High-income taxes: Raise by 10 pts	0.18*	0.07	0.03
	[0.09; 0.26]	[−0.02; 0.15]	[−0.08; 0.15]
Government borrowing: A slight rise	−0.05	−0.03	−0.00
	[−0.12; 0.01]	[−0.10; 0.04]	[−0.11; 0.10]
Government borrowing: A large rise	−0.15*	−0.16*	−0.13
	[−0.24; −0.05]	[−0.24; −0.07]	[−0.26; 0.01]
Income: €40-80K/¥4-8M	−0.07	0.08	0.07
	[−0.23; 0.08]	[−0.13; 0.30]	[−0.12; 0.26]
Income: >€80K/¥8M	0.09	0.05	−0.05
	[−0.12; 0.31]	[−0.48; 0.59]	[−0.29; 0.20]
SS: Cut 5% * €40-80K/¥4-8M	−0.04	−0.04	−0.05
	[−0.14; 0.06]	[−0.15; 0.06]	[−0.16; 0.07]
SS: Cut 10% * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.06	0.01	−0.01
	[−0.04; 0.17]	[−0.12; 0.13]	[−0.18; 0.15]
SS: Cut 20% * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.02	−0.01	−0.07
	[−0.11; 0.15]	[−0.19; 0.17]	[−0.21; 0.07]
SS: Cut 5% * >€80K/¥8M	0.00	0.06	0.01
	[−0.11; 0.12]	[−0.18; 0.30]	[−0.12; 0.14]
SS: Cut 10% * >€80K/¥8M	−0.06	−0.02	0.11
	[−0.22; 0.10]	[−0.26; 0.21]	[−0.08; 0.30]
SS: Cut 20% * >€80K/¥8M	−0.00	−0.01	0.06
	[−0.18; 0.18]	[−0.34; 0.32]	[−0.10; 0.22]

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
CT: Raise by 1 pt * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.07 [−0.04; 0.19]	−0.06 [−0.16; 0.04]	0.01 [−0.10; 0.12]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.07 [−0.07; 0.20]	−0.07 [−0.18; 0.03]	−0.07 [−0.19; 0.06]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.11 [−0.05; 0.28]	−0.20* [−0.36; −0.04]	−0.11 [−0.27; 0.05]
CT: Raise by 1 pt * >€80K/¥8M	0.05 [−0.11; 0.21]	−0.01 [−0.24; 0.21]	0.09 [−0.04; 0.22]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * >€80K/¥8M	0.08 [−0.10; 0.25]	0.00 [−0.22; 0.23]	0.01 [−0.15; 0.16]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * >€80K/¥8M	0.04 [−0.18; 0.27]	0.01 [−0.26; 0.28]	0.03 [−0.17; 0.24]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * €40-80K/¥4-8M	−0.03 [−0.12; 0.06]	0.07 [−0.05; 0.19]	0.08 [−0.01; 0.18]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.07 [−0.03; 0.17]	0.03 [−0.10; 0.17]	0.07 [−0.05; 0.18]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.02 [−0.11; 0.16]	0.13 [−0.05; 0.32]	0.09 [−0.05; 0.23]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * >€80K/¥8M	−0.09 [−0.22; 0.04]	−0.07 [−0.33; 0.20]	0.06 [−0.06; 0.18]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * >€80K/¥8M	−0.03 [−0.16; 0.10]	−0.02 [−0.31; 0.27]	0.05 [−0.10; 0.19]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * >€80K/¥8M	−0.12 [−0.32; 0.08]	0.02 [−0.34; 0.39]	0.06 [−0.11; 0.23]
GB: A slight rise * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.04 [−0.07; 0.14]	−0.02 [−0.16; 0.12]	−0.03 [−0.16; 0.09]
GB: A large rise * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.06 [−0.09; 0.20]	−0.05 [−0.22; 0.13]	−0.03 [−0.19; 0.13]
GB: A slight rise * >€80K/¥8M	−0.05 [−0.19; 0.10]	−0.06 [−0.37; 0.25]	−0.01 [−0.17; 0.16]
GB: A large rise * >€80K/¥8M	−0.11 [−0.31; 0.08]	−0.00 [−0.41; 0.41]	0.06 [−0.14; 0.27]
R ²	0.05	0.03	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	3528	3632	3400
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.48
N Clusters	441	454	425

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

G.2 Conjoint analysis with the rating outcome variable

Table G.4: Conjoint Analysis with the Rating Variable

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.83*	1.11*	0.54*
	[0.58; 1.09]	[0.74; 1.49]	[0.31; 0.77]
Social spending: Cut 5%	−0.06	−0.45*	−0.10
	[−0.22; 0.09]	[−0.63; −0.27]	[−0.25; 0.05]
Social spending: Cut 10%	−0.37*	−0.70*	−0.27*
	[−0.55; −0.19]	[−0.92; −0.48]	[−0.49; −0.04]
Social spending: Cut 20%	−0.63*	−1.00*	−0.35*
	[−0.85; −0.42]	[−1.31; −0.69]	[−0.52; −0.17]
Consumption tax: Raise by 1 pt	−0.24*	−0.22*	−0.21*
	[−0.42; −0.06]	[−0.39; −0.05]	[−0.34; −0.08]
Consumption tax: Raise by 5 pts	−0.46*	−0.34*	−0.60*
	[−0.67; −0.24]	[−0.54; −0.14]	[−0.76; −0.44]
Consumption tax: Raise by 10 pts	−0.84*	−0.61*	−0.62*
	[−1.11; −0.57]	[−0.89; −0.33]	[−0.84; −0.40]
High-income taxes: Raise by 1 pt	0.22*	0.13	0.10
	[0.07; 0.37]	[−0.05; 0.31]	[−0.02; 0.23]
High-income taxes: Raise by 5 pts	0.33*	0.19	0.20*
	[0.15; 0.51]	[−0.01; 0.40]	[0.05; 0.34]
High-income taxes: Raise by 10 pts	0.43*	0.20	0.15
	[0.21; 0.65]	[−0.11; 0.51]	[−0.02; 0.33]
Government borrowing: A slight rise	−0.17*	−0.26*	−0.07
	[−0.33; −0.00]	[−0.50; −0.02]	[−0.22; 0.08]
Government borrowing: A large rise	−0.59*	−0.56*	−0.33*
	[−0.81; −0.36]	[−0.85; −0.27]	[−0.52; −0.14]
R ²	0.04	0.03	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	3087	2858	2674
RMSE	1.65	1.71	1.28
N Clusters	434	415	396

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table G.5: Moderation by Ideology with the Rating Variable

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	1.03*	0.72	1.17*
	[0.61; 1.45]	[−0.00; 1.45]	[0.51; 1.84]
Social spending: Cut 5%	−0.28*	−0.43*	−0.67*
	[−0.53; −0.02]	[−0.79; −0.07]	[−1.19; −0.16]
Social spending: Cut 10%	−0.73*	−0.74*	−0.79*
	[−1.04; −0.41]	[−1.16; −0.32]	[−1.40; −0.18]
Social spending: Cut 20%	−0.86*	−1.10*	−0.98*
	[−1.26; −0.46]	[−1.69; −0.50]	[−1.50; −0.45]
Consumption tax: Raise by 1 pt	−0.33*	−0.07	−0.13
	[−0.62; −0.03]	[−0.42; 0.27]	[−0.56; 0.30]
Consumption tax: Raise by 5 pts	−0.61*	−0.12	−1.04*
	[−0.99; −0.24]	[−0.51; 0.27]	[−1.54; −0.53]
Consumption tax: Raise by 10 pts	−0.92*	−0.41	−0.75*
	[−1.44; −0.40]	[−0.96; 0.15]	[−1.48; −0.03]
High-income taxes: Raise by 1 pt	0.30*	0.08	−0.11
	[0.04; 0.55]	[−0.27; 0.42]	[−0.47; 0.25]
High-income taxes: Raise by 5 pts	0.43*	0.28	0.28
	[0.11; 0.75]	[−0.11; 0.68]	[−0.17; 0.74]
High-income taxes: Raise by 10 pts	0.52*	0.12	0.14
	[0.07; 0.97]	[−0.43; 0.66]	[−0.37; 0.64]
Government borrowing: A slight rise	−0.31*	−0.16	−0.30
	[−0.60; −0.02]	[−0.55; 0.22]	[−0.70; 0.09]
Government borrowing: A large rise	−0.73*	−0.44	−0.95*
	[−1.12; −0.34]	[−1.00; 0.12]	[−1.48; −0.41]
Ideology: Centre	−0.28	0.90	−0.80*
	[−0.90; 0.33]	[−0.26; 2.06]	[−1.54; −0.06]
Ideology: Right	−0.28	0.35	−0.61
	[−0.90; 0.34]	[−0.53; 1.23]	[−1.39; 0.18]
SS: Cut 5% * Centre	0.40*	−0.72*	0.68*
	[0.02; 0.78]	[−1.25; −0.20]	[0.14; 1.23]
SS: Cut 10% * Centre	0.45	−0.56	0.39
	[−0.04; 0.93]	[−1.18; 0.07]	[−0.31; 1.09]
SS: Cut 20% * Centre	0.39	−0.50	0.70*
	[−0.19; 0.97]	[−1.50; 0.49]	[0.13; 1.26]
SS: Cut 5% * Right	0.24	0.17	0.61*
	[−0.12; 0.60]	[−0.27; 0.61]	[0.03; 1.20]
SS: Cut 10% * Right	0.57*	0.33	0.73
	[0.14; 0.99]	[−0.20; 0.87]	[−0.01; 1.48]
SS: Cut 20% * Right	0.38	0.39	0.73*
	[−0.14; 0.90]	[−0.36; 1.14]	[0.10; 1.35]

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
CT: Raise by 1 pt * Centre	−0.02 [−0.44; 0.40]	−0.23 [−0.75; 0.29]	0.01 [−0.45; 0.47]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * Centre	0.15 [−0.41; 0.72]	−0.41 [−1.03; 0.21]	0.55 [−0.00; 1.10]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * Centre	0.02 [−0.68; 0.72]	−0.56 [−1.48; 0.35]	0.18 [−0.61; 0.97]
CT: Raise by 1 pt * Right	0.23 [−0.21; 0.66]	−0.13 [−0.55; 0.28]	−0.18 [−0.68; 0.33]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * Right	0.32 [−0.19; 0.83]	−0.23 [−0.71; 0.24]	0.51 [−0.08; 1.10]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * Right	0.19 [−0.50; 0.89]	−0.05 [−0.72; 0.63]	0.06 [−0.76; 0.88]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * Centre	−0.01 [−0.39; 0.36]	0.18 [−0.41; 0.77]	0.20 [−0.20; 0.59]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * Centre	−0.04 [−0.50; 0.42]	0.11 [−0.54; 0.77]	−0.21 [−0.71; 0.28]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * Centre	−0.18 [−0.76; 0.41]	0.63 [−0.33; 1.59]	0.02 [−0.55; 0.59]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * Right	−0.26 [−0.61; 0.10]	−0.05 [−0.49; 0.38]	0.22 [−0.21; 0.64]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * Right	−0.31 [−0.75; 0.13]	−0.13 [−0.63; 0.37]	−0.04 [−0.55; 0.48]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * Right	−0.12 [−0.69; 0.46]	0.01 [−0.72; 0.73]	−0.08 [−0.68; 0.52]
GB: A slight rise * Centre	0.20 [−0.23; 0.63]	−0.52 [−1.29; 0.26]	0.28 [−0.18; 0.74]
GB: A large rise * Centre	−0.02 [−0.59; 0.54]	−0.40 [−1.35; 0.55]	0.63* [0.05; 1.21]
GB: A slight rise * Right	0.28 [−0.11; 0.68]	0.01 [−0.52; 0.54]	0.34 [−0.15; 0.84]
GB: A large rise * Right	0.37 [−0.19; 0.94]	0.13 [−0.55; 0.80]	0.81* [0.18; 1.44]
R ²	0.05	0.05	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.04	0.05
Num. obs.	2915	2589	2335
RMSE	1.63	1.70	1.29
N Clusters	406	373	336

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table G.6: Moderation by Ideology with the Rating Variable

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	1.04*	1.22*	0.36
	[0.63; 1.44]	[0.76; 1.68]	[−0.13; 0.84]
Social spending: Cut 5%	−0.01	−0.44*	−0.14
	[−0.24; 0.21]	[−0.66; −0.21]	[−0.48; 0.19]
Social spending: Cut 10%	−0.56*	−0.77*	−0.48*
	[−0.83; −0.29]	[−1.05; −0.49]	[−0.94; −0.02]
Social spending: Cut 20%	−0.83*	−0.98*	−0.44
	[−1.17; −0.49]	[−1.36; −0.59]	[−0.89; 0.01]
Consumption tax: Raise by 1 pt	−0.25	−0.24*	−0.01
	[−0.53; 0.03]	[−0.45; −0.02]	[−0.29; 0.27]
Consumption tax: Raise by 5 pts	−0.59*	−0.31*	−0.33
	[−0.94; −0.23]	[−0.55; −0.06]	[−0.72; 0.05]
Consumption tax: Raise by 10 pts	−1.15*	−0.56*	−0.27
	[−1.60; −0.70]	[−0.90; −0.21]	[−0.68; 0.14]
High-income taxes: Raise by 1 pt	0.25*	0.05	0.05
	[0.04; 0.47]	[−0.17; 0.27]	[−0.18; 0.28]
High-income taxes: Raise by 5 pts	0.24	0.20	0.20
	[−0.03; 0.51]	[−0.05; 0.45]	[−0.08; 0.48]
High-income taxes: Raise by 10 pts	0.43*	0.12	0.04
	[0.15; 0.71]	[−0.25; 0.49]	[−0.28; 0.36]
Government borrowing: A slight rise	−0.24	−0.35*	0.11
	[−0.48; 0.00]	[−0.64; −0.06]	[−0.19; 0.41]
Government borrowing: A large rise	−0.77*	−0.56*	−0.19
	[−1.14; −0.39]	[−0.92; −0.21]	[−0.60; 0.22]
Income: €40-80K/¥4-8M	−0.47	0.05	0.09
	[−1.01; 0.07]	[−0.86; 0.95]	[−0.48; 0.66]
Income: >€80K/¥8M	−0.07	−2.08*	0.71
	[−0.79; 0.66]	[−3.89; −0.26]	[−0.03; 1.44]
SS: Cut 5% * €40-80K/¥4-8M	−0.15	−0.19	0.16
	[−0.49; 0.20]	[−0.63; 0.24]	[−0.24; 0.56]
SS: Cut 10% * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.37	0.03	0.37
	[−0.04; 0.78]	[−0.46; 0.51]	[−0.18; 0.93]
SS: Cut 20% * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.31	−0.29	0.13
	[−0.16; 0.79]	[−1.06; 0.47]	[−0.38; 0.64]
SS: Cut 5% * >€80K/¥8M	−0.07	0.67	−0.16
	[−0.48; 0.33]	[−0.12; 1.47]	[−0.59; 0.27]
SS: Cut 10% * >€80K/¥8M	0.11	0.68	0.07
	[−0.44; 0.65]	[−0.20; 1.57]	[−0.56; 0.71]
SS: Cut 20% * >€80K/¥8M	0.34	0.73	0.04
	[−0.30; 0.99]	[−0.41; 1.87]	[−0.52; 0.60]

	Germany	Italy	Japan
	(1)	(2)	(3)
CT: Raise by 1 pt * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.06 [−0.33; 0.44]	−0.13 [−0.54; 0.28]	−0.23 [−0.56; 0.10]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.32 [−0.16; 0.80]	−0.33 [−0.80; 0.14]	−0.27 [−0.71; 0.16]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.49 [−0.10; 1.08]	−0.45 [−1.15; 0.25]	−0.47 [−0.98; 0.04]
CT: Raise by 1 pt * >€80K/¥8M	−0.04 [−0.54; 0.46]	0.71 [−0.30; 1.72]	−0.21 [−0.64; 0.22]
CT: Raise by 5 pts * >€80K/¥8M	0.28 [−0.32; 0.88]	1.13* [0.12; 2.14]	−0.44 [−0.94; 0.07]
CT: Raise by 10 pts * >€80K/¥8M	0.72 [−0.07; 1.51]	1.26* [0.25; 2.27]	−0.50 [−1.18; 0.18]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * €40-80K/¥4-8M	−0.01 [−0.33; 0.31]	0.45* [0.00; 0.89]	0.07 [−0.21; 0.35]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.31 [−0.10; 0.73]	0.09 [−0.43; 0.60]	−0.03 [−0.38; 0.31]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.14 [−0.36; 0.64]	0.39 [−0.36; 1.13]	0.14 [−0.26; 0.54]
HT: Raise by 1 pt * >€80K/¥8M	−0.14 [−0.61; 0.32]	0.22 [−0.73; 1.17]	0.01 [−0.38; 0.40]
HT: Raise by 5 pts * >€80K/¥8M	−0.23 [−0.67; 0.21]	0.37 [−0.61; 1.35]	−0.11 [−0.52; 0.30]
HT: Raise by 10 pts * >€80K/¥8M	−0.33 [−0.99; 0.34]	0.56 [−1.04; 2.16]	0.01 [−0.48; 0.51]
GB: A slight rise * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.09 [−0.29; 0.47]	0.14 [−0.41; 0.69]	−0.15 [−0.52; 0.22]
GB: A large rise * €40-80K/¥4-8M	0.43 [−0.07; 0.94]	−0.30 [−0.98; 0.38]	−0.11 [−0.60; 0.37]
GB: A slight rise * >€80K/¥8M	0.16 [−0.27; 0.59]	0.70 [−0.45; 1.86]	−0.40 [−0.86; 0.06]
GB: A large rise * >€80K/¥8M	0.17 [−0.46; 0.80]	1.37 [−0.27; 3.01]	−0.40 [−0.96; 0.15]
R ²	0.05	0.04	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.03	0.03
Num. obs.	2991	2773	2484
RMSE	1.63	1.71	1.26
N Clusters	419	402	362

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.