

DID DONALD TRUMP RECEIVE A MANDATE FOR SWEEPING CHANGE IN 2024?

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Donald Trump and his supporters offered claims of an historic mandate to provide critical legitimacy for the extraordinary changes the president initiated immediately after taking office. Did he actually receive such a mandate? The data show that he did not. His electoral victory was modest by historical standards, and the public did not view his election as a mandate for sweeping change and did not desire to accord the president additional power. Moreover, Trump did not campaign on many of the issues on which he took action, and the public opposed most of the president's major changes in policy, including drastically cutting or dismembering congressionally authorized agencies and programs, deporting most undocumented aliens, raising tariffs, acquiring territory, and gutting foreign aid.

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According to Samuel Huntington, “The distinctive aspect of the American Creed is its antigovernment character. Opposition to power, and suspicion of government as the most dangerous embodiment of power, are the central themes of American political thought.”¹ The logic of the American Constitution is that majorities are required for change but that it is also necessary to protect minority interests. The system of checks and balances forces most majorities to grow and broaden before they are empowered. It provides an incentive for public officials to negotiate and compromise.

Donald Trump is ignoring this constitutional imperative. Instead of persuasion, compromise, and negotiation, he employs unilateral action. To legitimate such a mode of governing in a system designed to decentralize power and in a political culture suspicious of it, the president and his supporters have claimed a broad mandate from the people.

Claiming a Mandate

Americans elected Donald Trump as president in November 2024, only the second time a president has been elected to nonconsecutive terms. The first was Grover Cleveland, elected in 1884 and 1892. On Election Night, the president-elect declared that “America has given us an unprecedented and powerful mandate.”² Later, he told *Time* magazine that “The mandate was massive.”³

The president and his supporters employed claims of an impressive mandate to provide critical legitimacy for the extraordinary changes Trump initiated immediately after taking office. For example, Elon Musk asserted in the Oval Office that “The people voted for major government reform and that’s what the people are going to get.” “They’re going to get what they voted for.”⁴ White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt proclaimed, “The president was given a mandate to implement transformative, monumental change.”⁵ Stephen Miller, the White House deputy chief of staff and perhaps the president’s most influential aide, declared “The whole will of democracy is imbued into the elected president.”⁶

The president continued to refer to his mandate in a wide range of situations. When he wanted Iran to end support for Houthi terrorists, he threatened,

To Iran: Support for the Houthi terrorists must end IMMEDIATELY! Do NOT threaten the American People, their President, who has received **one of the largest mandates in Presidential History** [bold added], or Worldwide shipping lanes. If you do, BEWARE, because America will hold you fully accountable.⁷

Three days later, when he wanted to impeach a troublesome judge, he told his followers,

This Radical Left Lunatic of a Judge, a troublemaker and agitator who was sadly appointed by Barack Hussein Obama, was not elected President - He didn’t WIN the popular VOTE (by a lot!), he didn’t WIN ALL SEVEN SWING STATES, he didn’t WIN 2,750 to 525 Counties, HE DIDN’T WIN ANYTHING! **I WON FOR MANY REASONS, IN AN OVERWHELMING MANDATE** [bold added], BUT FIGHTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION MAY HAVE BEEN THE NUMBER ONE REASON FOR THIS HISTORIC VICTORY. I’m just doing what the VOTERS wanted me to do. This judge, like many of the Crooked Judges’ I am forced to appear before, should be IMPEACHED!!! WE DON’T WANT VICIOUS, VIOLENT, AND DEMENTED CRIMINALS, MANY OF THEM DERANGED MURDERERS, IN OUR COUNTRY. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!!!⁸

Mandates

Electoral mandates can be powerful symbols in American politics, as they accord added legitimacy and credibility to the newly elected president's proposals. Moreover, concerns for both representation and political survival encourage members of Congress to support the president if they feel the people have spoken.⁹

More importantly, mandates change the premises of decisions. Following the 1932 election, the essential question became how government should act to fight the Depression, rather than whether it should act. Similarly, following the 1964 election, the dominant question in Congress was not whether to pass new social programs, but rather how many to pass and how much to increase spending. In 1981, however, the tables were turned. Ronald Reagan's victory placed a stigma on big government and exalted the unregulated marketplace and large defense efforts. Reagan had won a major victory even before the first congressional vote.

Merely winning an election does not provide a president a mandate, however. Every election produces a winner, but mandates are much less common. Even large electoral victories such as Richard Nixon's in 1972 and Ronald Reagan's in 1984 carry no guarantee that Congress and others will interpret the results as mandates from the people to support the president's programs.

The most straightforward evidence of a mandate is that a clear majority of the populace has shown through its votes that it supports certain policies proposed by the winning candidate. Yet by their very nature, elections rarely provide clear indications of the public's thinking on individual proposals. If presidential elections are to provide majority support for specific policies, the following conditions must be met: (1) voters must have opinions on policies; (2) voters must know candidates' stands on the issues; (3) candidates must offer voters the alternatives the voters desire; (4) there must be a large turnout of voters; (5) voters must vote on the basis of issues; and (6) one must be able to correlate voter support with voters' policy views.

The first five conditions are rarely met, if ever.¹⁰ For this reason it is difficult to discern the relationship between voters' policy preferences and a president's victory at the polls. When asked about his mandate in 1960, John F. Kennedy reportedly replied, "Mandate, schmandate. The mandate is that I am here and you're not."¹¹

Even landslide elections are difficult to interpret. For example, Stanley Kelley found that in Lyndon Johnson's victory in 1964, issues gave the president his base of support and concerns over the relative competence of the candidates won the swing vote for him. In 1972, however, the question of competence dominated the election. Although traditional domestic issues associated with the New Deal were salient, they actually favored George McGovern, not the landslide winner, Richard Nixon.¹²

In addition, there are two complicating factors. First, there may be no majority opinion on an issue, even among those who have an opinion. Public opinion polls often force respondents to choose one of a restricted number of possible answers. But opinion on any issue is probably quite fragmented, providing no majority opinion to identify.

Second, voters may be concerned with several issues in an election, but they have only one vote with which to express their views. Citizens may support one candidate's position on some issues yet vote for another candidate because of concern for other issues or general evaluations of performance. In 1984 voters preferred Walter Mondale to Ronald Reagan on the issues of defense spending, aid to the contras, environmental protection, protection of civil rights, and helping the poor and disadvantaged, but most voted for Reagan for president.¹³ When they cast their ballots, voters signal only their choice of candidate, not their choice of the

candidates' policies. One should be cautious in inferring support for specific policies from the results of this process, for the vote is a rather blunt instrument for expressing voters' views.

Did Donald Trump win a mandate for sweeping change, including the use of unilateral power to effect this change? Given the history of presidential elections and the nature of voting behavior, we should be skeptical. To answer the question, we must examine the data.

Data and Methods

As we have seen, Donald Trump has made extraordinary claims of a mandate for his policies. There is no official definition for an electoral mandate, but in common usage it refers to the public decisively voting in support not only of a candidate but also of the new president's policies.

How do we know a mandate when we see one? We could examine media portrayals¹⁴ or broad understandings¹⁵ of an electoral victory, which have been particularly useful in studying Congress's response or popular understandings of an election outcome. For purposes of democratic legitimacy, however, it is best to examine the election results and what voters were thinking as they cast their votes and in the immediate aftermath of the election. (We must extend our focus to the aftermath because the president raised issues on which he did not campaign but on which he claimed a mandate.)

The best way to determine the public's thinking is through analyzing high quality public opinion polls. Fortunately, there are now many high-quality polls, so we can triangulate our findings and be less subject to the misdirection of outliers. All the data I reference are in the public domain, and both the data and methods are straightforward and transparent.

Overall Election Results

We can start with the overall election results. Trump won slightly less than a majority of the vote, 49.8 percent. Administration officials often note that the president received nearly 77 million votes but ignore the fact that 78.4 million voters did not vote for him.¹⁶

Trump won about 1.5 percent more of the vote than Kamala Harris. This margin is one of the smallest since 1824. There were 50 presidential elections in the 200 years preceding 2024. In 40 of them, the winning candidate received a larger percentage of the vote than Trump did. Only in five of these elections—1844 (1.4 percent), 1880 (0.1 percent), 1884 (0.7 percent), 1960 (0.2 percent),¹⁷ and 1968 (0.7 percent)—did the winning candidate have a smaller margin of victory than did Trump in 2024. Of course, in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016, the winner actually lost the popular vote. Thus, Trump did more poorly than 80 percent of his predecessors in the era of mass voting.

Congressional election results also may indicate strong public support for the president. However, in 2024, the Republicans *lost* a seat in the House. They did pick up four seats in the Senate, but only one was from a competitive state (Pennsylvania).

Early Opinion

What were people thinking when they cast their votes or as Trump began his presidency? Only 48 percent of the public held a favorable view of the president at election time (Gallup poll 2024).¹⁸ A Fox News poll of registered voters taken shortly before Inauguration Day asked people, "Would you characterize Donald Trump's 2024 election victory as a mandate, or not?" Forty-two percent replied "yes," but a majority, 51 percent, responded "no." Fifty-four percent

saw the election as mostly a rejection of Biden and Harris, while only 41 percent viewed the result as an endorsement of Trump.¹⁹ Similarly, Peter Enns found that voters chose Trump not because they wanted to see his divisive policies implemented, but rather because they were frustrated with the state of the economy during Joe Biden's presidency.²⁰ In early January, a slight majority of the public, 51 percent, were pessimistic or worried about Trump's presidency.²¹

Only 32 percent believed Trump should advance his agenda and policies, even if it caused division, while 65 percent thought the president should look for opportunities to work with Democrats, even if it meant compromising.²² In another poll, 63 percent of the public wanted the president to try as best he could to work with Democratic congressional leaders to accomplish things, even if it meant disappointing people who voted for him.²³

When asked how congressional Republicans should respond to the president's initiatives, 23 percent of the people said they should support whatever Trump wants, but 77 percent replied that even his own party's members of Congress should push back when they disagreed with him.²⁴ Fifty-five percent of Republicans in the public responded that Republicans in Congress did not have an obligation to support Trump's policies with which they disagreed.²⁵

More broadly, 65 percent of the public felt it would be "too risky" to give Trump more power to deal directly with many of the nation's problems. Just 33 percent agreed that "many of the country's problems could be dealt with more effectively if Trump didn't have to worry so much about Congress or the courts." Even more Americans, 78 percent, opposed the idea of giving presidents more power in general.²⁶

By February, before Trump had been in office for a month, 57 percent of the public felt the president had already gone beyond his authority as president. Fifty-four percent wanted the next Congress to be controlled by the Democrats, to act as a check on Trump.²⁷

Campaign Issues

The best argument for Trump's claim that he was elected with a broad mandate to bring about aggressive policy change is that he always said he would. But did Trump campaign on the issues on which he acted early in his term, so he could reasonably claim a mandate to act on them? For many of the issues, he did not. For example, Trump never mentioned buying Greenland in any of his public speeches or interviews during the 2024 campaign, nor did he suggest that Canada become part of the United States or that the U.S. take back control of the Panama Canal. Of equal significance, he *never* mentioned U.S.A.I.D.,²⁸ and he certainly never said he would fire a significant percentage of the doctors and researchers at the National Institute of Health. So, voters cannot be said to have given him a mandate to act on such matters.

Elon Musk and DOGE

During the 2024 campaign, Trump made no secret of the fact that he planned to tap Elon Musk to head a government efficiency commission,²⁹ and Musk served as a top surrogate for Trump in the battleground state of Pennsylvania. Vice President JD Vance summed up the administration's argument in a recent post on Musk's social media platform X. "No one voted for Elon Musk. (They did however vote for Donald Trump who promised repeatedly to have Elon Musk root out wasteful spending in our government.)."³⁰ Musk shared Vance's post, adding emojis of the American flag and "100 percent."³¹

However, Trump never mentioned firing tens of thousands of government employees nor dismantling congressionally approved and funded programs. Moreover, an examination of TV ads in the 2024 presidential campaign exposes the weakness of the administration's claim. The

Trump campaign and outside groups backing him did not mention Musk in any of their broadcast or cable TV ads.³² (There was an expenditure of \$658 a to air an ad by rapper Eo Combs one time. The ad mentions Musk's name but not what he would be doing in a Trump administration.³³)

Instead of radical change, the top issues in their ads were immigration, inflation, crime, and taxes — many of the concerns that voters said were most important to them. According to Republican pollster Kristen Soltis Anderson, fewer than half of Trump voters identified mass firings or tariffs as a top priority. Instead, Trump voter priorities looked just like voter priorities overall: reduce the cost of living, deport criminal undocumented immigrants, secure the southern border.³⁴

How did the public respond once Trump empowered Musk? In both December 2024 and January 2025, 53 percent of registered voters disapproved of Elon Musk playing a prominent role in the Trump administration.³⁵ Shortly before Inauguration Day, the public opposed Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy heading a task force to look for cuts in government programs.³⁶ Pluralities also disapproved of eliminating entire federal agencies and a large number of federal jobs.³⁷

After less than a month into Trump's second term, 55 percent of voters thought Musk had too much power in making decisions affecting the United States,³⁸ and 54 percent of the public thought it was a "bad thing" for Musk to play a prominent role in the government.³⁹ Americans disapproved by a similarly wide margin (52 percent to 26 percent) of Musk "shutting down federal government programs that he decides are unnecessary." Moreover, 63 percent of Americans were concerned about Musk's team getting access to their data.⁴⁰

By March, 71 percent of the public wanted Musk to have little or no influence in the Trump administration.⁴¹ Sixty percent of voters disapproved the way Musk and the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) were dealing with workers employed by the federal government. Fifty-four percent thought Musk and DOGE were hurting the country.⁴² By early April, 57 percent of voters thought Elon Musk had too much power in making decisions affecting the United States.⁴³ Fifty-seven percent of the public had an unfavorable of him.⁴⁴

What about the results of DOGE's efforts? Majorities supported the general goal of downsizing government.⁴⁵ However, 52 percent thought Trump and Musk had gone too far in their efforts to cut federal spending and 57 percent opposed firing tens of thousands of federal workers.⁴⁶ Sixty percent opposed closing the Department of Education.⁴⁷ Clear majorities opposed attempting to shut down entire US government agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.⁴⁸

Immigration

Another major initiative in the early months of the second Trump presidency focused on immigration. During the campaign, the president promised to begin to deport all undocumented immigrants immediately upon taking office. Right after the election there was a slight majority in favor of "mass deportation,"⁴⁹ but support dipped below majority support when the public was asked about the probable consequences of this policy (Table 1).

Table 1
Public Opinion on Mass Deportation of Undocumented Immigrants

Policy and Consequences	Percent Support
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The mass deportation of undocumented immigrants	52
The mass deportation of undocumented immigrants, even if it results in fewer people paying into Social Security and Medicare	48
The mass deportation of undocumented immigrants, even if the labor market is impacted negatively	47
The mass deportation of undocumented immigrants, even if it results in higher prices on goods	43
The mass deportation of undocumented immigrants, even if it results in families being separated	38

Question: “To what extent do you support or oppose the following?”

Source: Scripps News poll, November 15-17, 2024.

In December 2024, a majority of voters (55 percent) said they preferred giving most undocumented immigrants in the United States a pathway to legal status.⁵⁰ A week before Trump’s inauguration, a Fox poll, of registered voters found only 30 percent favored deporting all illegal immigrants.⁵¹ In late-January, Quinnipiac Poll found 44 percent of registered voters—still a minority—agreed with this sentiment.⁵² Other polls near the time of the inauguration found small majorities favoring deporting all immigrants in the U.S. illegally.⁵³

Opinion on immigration was fluid. By Trump’s fifth week in office, only 32 percent of the public replied all immigrants in the U.S. illegally should be deported. This group included barely half (54 percent) of Republicans and only 10 percent of Democrats.⁵⁴ The public supported deporting criminals,⁵⁵ especially violent criminals,⁵⁶ and those on public assistance.⁵⁷ However, Americans also strongly opposed deporting those with jobs, those who had not been convicted of violent crimes,⁵⁸ parents of children born in the U.S.,⁵⁹ who came to the U.S. as children (the Dreamers),⁶⁰ and those married to a U.S. citizen (Table 2). In addition, 55 percent *disapproved* of suspending applications for asylum from people seeking to live in the United States.⁶¹ The Cooperative Election Study found similar results.⁶²

Table 2
Which Immigrants in the U.S. Illegally Should Be Deported?

Types of Immigrants	Percent Support
Those who have committed violent crimes	97
Those who have committed nonviolent crimes	52
Those who arrived in the country in the last four years	44
Those who have a job	15
Those who are parents of children born in the U.S.	14
Those who came to the U.S. as children	9
Those who are married to a U.S. citizen	5

Question: “In deciding whether immigrants living in the U.S. illegally should be deported, which of the following groups should be deported?”

Source: Pew Research Center poll, February 24-March 2, 2025.

Birthright Citizenship

One of Donald Trump's clearest campaign promises was ending birthright citizenship, which grants citizenship to most children born in the United States, including those born to undocumented immigrants. Only about one-third of the public supported ending birthright citizenship. Clear majorities opposed changing the long-standing policy.⁶³

Tariffs

Shortly after the election, and in the face of Trump's frequent promises to use tariffs to rebuild American manufacturing while raising enormous amounts of revenue in the process, Americans did not support them.⁶⁴ Over the next months, as Trump threatened, imposed, paused, and raised tariffs, the public opposed his actions, with the exception of modest tariffs on China. The public clearly did not support tariffs on Mexico and Canada.⁶⁵

Taxes

In his campaign, Donald Trump promised to extend the 2017 tax cuts, and the public supported doing so. This support was at a high level of abstraction, however. The public never favored the original bill,⁶⁶ and they do not support the massive 2025 budget and tax bill which contains the extension.⁶⁷ Moreover, the public also favored raising taxes on those earning more than \$400,000 per year,⁶⁸ contrary to provisions in both the 2017 and 2025 tax bills.

Acquiring Territory

The presidents' expansive view of American power included his proposals to expand the U.S. and control the area around it. The public did not agree. Instead, large majorities disapproved of taking back the Panama Canal,⁶⁹ acquiring Greenland through purchase or the vote of its citizens,⁷⁰ and annexing Canada.⁷¹

Foreign Aid

Cutting foreign aid was an unexpected action in the early Trump presidency. Given that foreign aid has traditionally been the policy people are least likely to support,⁷² it is not surprising that majorities supported this move. What is surprising is that the majorities were so small. Approximately 45 percent of the public opposed cuts in foreign aid.⁷³

Conclusion

The absence of a mandate for transformational change is not unusual. Indeed, such a mandate rarely occurs. In almost all instances, the most a president can hope for is public support for a change in direction rather than an endorsement of details, for new priorities instead of policy particulars. What is distinctive in 2025 is the president claiming a mandate for using unilateral power for transformational change. A mandate would provide legitimacy for his unprecedented actions.

The evidence is clear that the second Trump administration did not receive a mandate for sweeping change from the American people—despite the president's claims to the contrary. Instead, he won a narrow victory in which the public signaled a desire to move in a conservative direction. They did not, however, support transforming public policy and restructuring the federal government. Americans favored tightening immigration, not mass deportations. They wanted the president to work with Congress, not govern without it. And they supported more

efficient government, not dismantling agencies. Claims of a mandate cannot legitimize the president's unprecedented exercise of unilateral power.

Notes

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promises of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1981), 33.

² www.youtube.com/watch?v=nOhQ-3caNSM

³ “Full Transcript of Donald Trump’s 2024 Person of the Year Interview with *TIME*.” time.com/7201565/person-of-the-year-2024-donald-trump-transcript/

⁴ Quoted in Emily Davis, Jeff Stein, Hannah Natanson, Lisa Rein, and Tony Romm, “Musk Team Kicks Off Federal Layoffs as White House Eyes Big Cuts,” *Washington Post*, February 12, 2025.

⁵ Quoted in Issac Arnsdorf and Natalie Allison, “In Trump’s Whirlwind First Two Months, Speed and Aggression Are the Point,” *Washington Post*, March 27, 2025.

⁶ CBS News, February 20, 2025.

⁷ Donald J. Trump, post on *Facebook*, March 15, 2025.
www.facebook.com/reel/947690890891284

⁸ Donald J. Trump, post on *Truth Social*, March 18, 2025.
truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114183576937425149

⁹ George C. Edwards III, *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), chapter 8; Lawrence J. Grossback, David A. M. Peterson, and James A. Stimson, *Mandate Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁰ George C. Edwards III, *The Public Presidency* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1983), pp. 18-23; Robert A. Dahl, “The Myth of the Presidential Mandate,” *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Autumn 1990): 355-372.

¹¹ Quoted in Everett Carl Ladd, *The Ladd Report #1* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), p. 3.

¹² Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Interpreting Elections* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 72-125.

¹³ *Los Angeles Times* poll, October 12-15, 1984; Martin P. Wattenberg, *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1984* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 154.

¹⁴ See Lawrence J. Grossback, David A. M. Peterson, and James A. Stimson, *Mandate Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Marjorie Randon Hershey, “The Meaning of a Mandate” Interpretations of ‘Mandate’ in 1984 Presidential Election Coverage,” *Polity* 27 (Winter 1994): 225-254.

¹⁵ Edwards, *At the Margins*, chapter 8.

¹⁶ Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, *Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election from Official Sources for the Election of November 5, 2024*, March 10, 2025.

¹⁷ The view that Kennedy won the popular vote is open to question. See, George C. Edwards III, *Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America*, 4th ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2024), pp. 68, 71-73.

¹⁸ Gallup poll, November 6-20, 2024.

¹⁹ Fox News poll, January 10-13, 2025, registered voters.

²⁰ Chris Stein, “Trump Victory Not a Mandate for Radical Change, Top Election Forecaster Says,” *The Guardian*, November 28, 2024.

²¹ *New York Times*/IPSOS poll, January 2-10, 2025.

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- ²² Fox News poll, January 10-13, 2025, registered voters.
- ²³ Pew Research Center poll, January 27-February 2, 2025.
- ²⁴ CBS News/YouGov poll, November 19-22, 2024.
- ²⁵ Pew Research Center poll, January 27-February 2, 2025.
- ²⁶ Pew Research Center poll, January 27-February 2, 2025.
- ²⁷ Washington Post/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025. See also CNN poll, February 13-17, 2025.
- ²⁸ Peter Baker, “Trump 2.0 Heralds an Aggressive Flexing of Power,” *New York Times*, February 10, 2025.
- ²⁹ See, for example, Hewlen Coster and Gram Slattery, “Trump Says He Will Tap Musk to Lead Government Efficiency Commission if Elected,” *Reuters*, September 6, 2025.
- ³⁰ JD Vance, Post on X, February 5, 2025.
- ³¹ Elon Musk, post on X, February 5, 2025.
- ³² AdImpact study for Politico’s West Wing *Playbook*. Published February 26, 2025.
- ³³ host2.adimpact.com/admo/viewer/231e200e-6ff9-418c-82d1-9054dc62cb4d
- ³⁴ Kristen Soltis Anderson, “Trump’s Poll Numbers Are Sagging. Here’s the Key Reason,” *New York Times*, March 17, 2025.
- ³⁵ Quinnipiac University polls, December 12-16, 2025, and January 23-27, 2025, registered voters.
- ³⁶ HarrisX/The Harris poll, January 15-16, 2025. See also AP/NORC poll, January 9-13, 2025.
- ³⁷ AP/NORC poll, January 9-13, 2025.
- ³⁸ Quinnipiac University poll, February 13-17, 2025, registered voters.
- ³⁹ CNN poll, February 13-17, 2025. But see CBS/YouGov poll Feb. 5-7, 2025.
- ⁴⁰ *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025.
- ⁴¹ *The Economist*/YouGov poll, March 1-4, 2025.
- ⁴² Quinnipiac University poll, March 6-10, 2025, registered voters.
- ⁴³ Quinnipiac University poll, April 3-7, 2025, registered voters.
- ⁴⁴ Reuters poll, March 31-April 2, 2025.
- ⁴⁵ Reuters/Ipsos polls, January 24-26 and March 31-April 2, 2025.
- ⁴⁶ Reuters polls, March 31-April 2 and April 4-6, 2025. See also CNN poll, February 13-17, 2025; *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025.
- ⁴⁷ Reuters poll, March 31-April 2, 2025; Quinnipiac University poll, March 6-10, 2025, registered voters.
- ⁴⁸ CNN poll, February 13-17, 2025; *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025; Reuters polls, March 3-4 and March 31-April 2, 2025.
- ⁴⁹ See also *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025.
- ⁵⁰ Quinnipiac University polls, December 12-16, 2024, registered voters.
- ⁵¹ Fox News poll, January 10-13, 2025, registered voters.
- ⁵² Quinnipiac poll, January 23-27, 2025, registered voters.
- ⁵³ *New York Times*/Ipsos poll, January 2-10, 2025; CBS/YouGov poll, January 15-17, 2025; YouGov poll, January 21-23, 2025.
- ⁵⁴ Pew Research Center poll, February 24-March 2, 2025.
- ⁵⁵ *New York Times*/Ipsos poll, January 2-10, 2025; AP/NORC poll, January 9-13, 2025; HarrisX/The Harris poll, January 15-16, 2025.
- ⁵⁶ See also *Washington Post* poll, February 13-18, 2025.

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- ⁵⁷ HarrisX/The Harris poll, January 15-16, 2025.
- ⁵⁸ AP/NORC poll, January 9-13, 2025.
- ⁵⁹ See also *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025.
- ⁶⁰ See also *New York Times*/Ipsos poll, January 2-10, 2025; NPR poll, February 7-10, 2025; *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025.
- ⁶¹ Pew Research Center January 27-February 2, 2025.
- ⁶² Cooperative Election Study, October 1-November 4, 2024.
- ⁶³ Quinnipiac University poll, December 12-16, 2024, and January 23-27, 2025, registered voters; AP/NORC poll, January 9-13, 2025; CBS/YouGov poll, January 15-17, 2025; Ipsos poll, January 24-26, 2025; Pew Research Center poll, January 27-February 2, 2025; Public Policy Institute of California poll, February 4-11, 2025; NPR poll, February 7-10, 2025; Reuters poll, February 13-18, 2025; *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025.
- ⁶⁴ Scripps News, November 15-17, 2024; AP-NORC poll, Reuters/Ipsos poll, December 5-9, 2024; December 9-17, 2024; Quinnipiac University poll, December 12-16, 2024, registered voters.
- ⁶⁵ New York Times/Ipsos poll, January 2-10, 2025; AP/NORC poll, January 9-13, 2025; HarrisX/The Harris poll, January 15-16, 2025; CBS/YouGov poll, January 15-17, 2025; Reuters/Ipsos polls, January 20-21, January 24-26, February 13-18, March 3-4, March 11-12, March 31-April 2, and April 4-6, 2025; YouGov poll, January 21-23, 2025; CBS/YouGov poll, February 5-7, 2025; CNN poll, February 13-17, 2025, *Washington Post*/Ipsos poll, February 13-18, 2025; Pew Research Center poll, March 24-30, 2025.
- ⁶⁶ George C. Edwards III, *Changing Their Minds?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021), 73-79.
- ⁶⁷ See, for example, Pew Research Center poll, June 2-8, 2025; *Washington Post*-Ipsos poll June 6-10, 2025; KFF Health Tracking Poll, July 8-14, 2025.
- ⁶⁸ Cooperative Election Study, October 1-November 4, 2024; *Washington Post*-Ipsos poll, June 6-10, 2025.
- ⁶⁹ Reuters/Ipsos polls, January 20-21 and March 11-12, 2025; HarrisX/The Harris poll, January 15-16, 2025; Marquette Law School poll, January 27-February 5, 2025. The Quinnipiac University poll, January 23-27, 2025, registered voters, found split results with a plurality opposing.
- ⁷⁰ Suffolk University poll, January 7-11, 2025; CBS/YouGov poll January 15-17, 2025; HarrisX/The Harris poll, January 15-16, 2025; Reuters/Ipsos polls January 20-21 and March 11-12, 2025; Quinnipiac poll of registered voters, January 23-27, 2025, registered voters; Pew Research Center poll, March 24-30, 2025.
- ⁷¹ HarrisX/The Harris poll January 15-16, 2025; Reuters/Ipsos poll, January 20-21, 2025.
- ⁷² See, for example, AP-NORC Center poll, March 16-20, 2023.
- ⁷³ Reuters/Ipsos polls, March 3-4, March 11-22, and March 31-April 2, 2025. See, David Doherty, Amanda Clare Bryan, Dina Hanania, Matthew Pajor, “The Public’s Foreign Aid Priorities: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment,” *American Politics Research* 48 (September 2020): 635-648; Vanessa Williamson, “Public Ignorance or Elitist Jargon? Reconsidering Americans’ Overestimates of Government Waste and Foreign Aid,” *American Politics Research* 47 (January 2019): 152-173