

Beyond the Bloc: Black Voter Subgroups & Declining Democratic Support*

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Abstract

Black voters' support for Democratic presidential candidates reached a historic low in 2024, raising questions about the stability of racial partisanship in the United States. This paper evaluates three explanations for this shift; generational turnover, ideological change, and the weakening of socio-political norms discouraging Republican voting. Drawing on Cooperative Election Study data from 2020 and 2024, I find little evidence of broad ideological change: the share of Black respondents identifying as conservative, or endorsing conservative views has remained steady. Yet those who hold such views have become substantially more likely to vote Republican, signaling a potential erosion of norms rather than an expansion of conservatism resulting in voter polarization. By distinguishing the subgroups that remain Democratic supporters from those prone to swing, this study illuminates mechanisms of racial partisan change and contributes to broader debates on the durability of political identities and the conditions under which partisan realignments occur.

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1 Introduction

Police arrested Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. for the fifth time on October 19, 1960. The presidential election was less than three weeks away, and the race between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon was widely viewed to be a tossup. At the risk of losing the votes of White southern Democrats, Kennedy discreetly reached out to Coretta Scott King to express his concern regarding Dr. King's arrest. Historians attribute this gesture, along with the behind-the-scenes effort to secure King's release, to the high levels of Black voter turnout and Democratic support in northern swing states crucial to Kennedy's victory ([Branch 2007](#)). Following Kennedy's assassination, former segregationist Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson would sign into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, enshrining legal protections long sought by Black activists. Combined with the explicitly anti-Civil Rights platform of Republican nominee Barry Goldwater in 1964, these actions cemented an alignment between African Americans and the Democratic Party ([White and Laird 2020](#)).

In the decades since, Black voters have been a reliable voting bloc for Democrats. Because they vote for Democrats at rates of around 90%, high Black voter turnout is seen as key to Democratic victories in close state and federal elections; however, recent voting patterns suggest that something may be changing. [Figure 1](#) and [Table 1](#) provide initial evidence of changes in Black electoral behavior. Since reaching an all-time high in 2012, the share of Black voters voting for the Democratic presidential candidate has fallen by almost 15 percentage points, declining as much as eight points between 2020 and 2024 alone.

In the months leading up to the 2024 presidential election, numerous polls projected a sharp decline in Democratic support among Black voters ([Hopkins 2024](#); [Burn-Murcoh 2024](#)). Scholars have historically viewed such forecasts with skepticism for at least two reasons. First, Democratic vote share among Black voters has been both consistent and high for decades; anything showing otherwise was, until now, incorrect. Second, there are political incentives to sowing disunity among Democrats. Polling of Black public opinion from early 2024 was discounted because it reflected attitudes toward the presumptive nominee at the time, President Biden. Following his withdrawal,




Figure 1: Black Voter Support for Democratic Presidential Candidates, 1936-2024. Figure shows two-party (Democratic - Republican) vote share won by Democratic nominee among Black voters. Sources for estimates: 1936–56 data from Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., and Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System*; 1960–80 partisan identification data from Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections*; 1960–80 presidential preference data from Gallup Opinion Index 1980; 1984 presidential preference data from CBS/New York Times exit poll, November 1986; 1988 presidential preference data from ABC News/Capital Cities; 1988 party identification data from JCPES Gallup survey; 1992 party identification data from Home Box Office (HBO)/Joint Center Survey; 1992 presidential preference data from Voter Research and Surveys; 1996 vote data from Voter News Service; 1996 party identification data from 1996 JCPES National Opinion Poll; 2000 vote data from Voter News Service; 2000 party identification data from 2000 JCPES National Opinion Poll; 2004 vote data from Edison/Mitofsky National Exit Poll; 2004 party identification data from 2004 JCPES National Opinion Poll; 2008 vote data from National Exit Poll; 2008 party identification data from 2008 JCPES National Opinion Poll. Catalist What Happened National Crosstabs 2012-2024.

surveys showed Kamala Harris, the first Black woman to lead a major party ticket, beginning to poll better among Black registered voters than Biden had ([Brown and Sanders 2024](#)). But a few weeks into her campaign, her poll numbers leveled off, and her performance on election day was largely consistent with those estimates.

While the determinants of Black support for the Democratic Party are well documented ([White and Laird 2020](#); [Dawson 1995](#); [Frymer 2011](#)), the sources of partisan variation remain poorly understood, because it has historically been so limited ([Walton 1995](#)). The 2024 election marks an inflection point: Figure 1 shows that Democratic vote share among Black voters has now declined

Source	2020	2024	Difference
CES	93%	88%	-5
Pew	92%	85%	-8
Catalist	89%	85%	-4
Votecast	92%	84%	-8
Edison Research	91%	83%	-8

Table 1: **Survey Estimates of Black Two-Way Democratic Vote Share in 2020 & 2024.** Sources for data include the Cooperative Election Study, Pew Research Center, Catalist’s *What Happened?* Reports, the Associated Press Votecast, and Edison Research Exit Polls

in three consecutive presidential elections, falling by greater than four percentage points in a single election for the first time since 1968. This paper focuses on which segments of the Black electorate have contributed most to the decline in votes in 2024 for the Democratic Party and how durable those changes are likely to be in the future.

Which segments of the Black electorate contributed most to the inroads made by Trump in 2024? I create a detailed assessment of how Black voters are changing to assess the contribution of three potential factors: generational turnover, an increase in ideological conservatism, and weakening socio-political norms. Black Americans who came of age during or shortly after the Civil Rights Movement now cast fewer votes as a result of generational turnover. An increase in conservative identification and alignment with Republican positions would indicate that attitudes are broadly changing across the Black electorate. Weakening socio-political norms; specifically, a decline in the social pressures that have historically reinforced Democratic voting among Black Republicans and conservatives. While these factors are not mutually exclusive, they each have distinct observable implications.

To evaluate these explanations, I rely on data sources capable of capturing subgroup-level variation within the Black electorate that election surveys alone could not detect. Scientists rely on large national surveys, which ask questions about turnout, vote choice, and political attitudes, to understand population-level trends in voting behavior. Unfortunately Black voters in these surveys often number in the tens or hundreds, making it hard to study the behavior of subgroups of voters. For this reason, I use the Cooperative Election Study (CES), which includes several thousand Black

respondents, among them several hundred Republican voters in each election year. Using the CES in combination with the American Community Survey (ACS), I can calculate the net decomposition for the major parties and compare their performances with subgroups across election years. The net vote decomposition is a set of measures that, when combined, can determine which voting blocs are most significant to a party or candidate's coalition. Analyzed in their separate components, the decomposition reveals why particular blocs became more or less significant between elections.

In 2024, I observe declines in turnout and increases in support for Donald Trump across nearly all subgroups of Black voters. However, the most significant shifts occurred among middle-aged men, conservatives, Republicans, and those who hold conservative views on gender and what has become commonly known as 'White privilege.' All of these voters increased the rate at which they voted for Trump. In some cases their turnout declined less than their more Democratic counterparts. I find little evidence of widespread ideological change: the overall distribution of conservative identification remained stable. The number of respondents identifying with the conservative positions on issues like race, abortion, immigration, and gender roles remained small. More notably, my findings indicate that people with conservative positions on particular issues are becoming more likely to vote Republican. This could indicate a weakening of socio-political norms that once discouraged Republican support, particularly among younger voters for whom partisan defection now may carry less social cost.

The remainder of this article proceeds in four parts. First, I situate this study within existing literature on Black partisanship, highlighting the limits of partisan identity as a predictor of vote choice, especially across generations. I also review the role of socio-political norms in reinforcing partisan loyalty. Second, I articulate three hypotheses to explain recent electoral shifts and outline their theoretical foundations. Third, I describe the data and methodological approach used to test these hypotheses, including a novel application of net vote decomposition across Black subgroups. Finally, I present the results, evaluate the evidence for each mechanism, and discuss the broader implications for understanding Black electoral behavior and the future of the Democratic Party.

2 Sources of Change in Bloc (and Black) Politics

The behavior of a voting bloc can change over time through several mechanisms. Turnover alters a bloc's composition as new voters enter and others age out. Preferences or ideology may shift, as with evangelicals' embrace of abortion politics in the 1980s. A bloc's size and influence can also change, as seen with the declining power of union voters. Finally, norms around participation may evolve, which can change the meaning of group belonging and collective obligations. By analyzing aspects of bloc voting for Black adults, it is possible to compare evidence for different mechanisms, which I discuss in the following section.

Decades of uniform partisan voting have given researchers minimal variation to work with in attempting to understand the behavior of those few Black voters who fail to adhere to political norms (Walton 1995; Tate 1994). Additionally, polls that measure political attitudes *among* Black voters are rare (Dawson 2001; Jefferson 2024; Barreto et al. 2018). The National Black Election Study (NBES) was a large, nationally representative survey that focused exclusively on the attitudes and politics of African Americans. It ran in 1984, 1988, and 1996 and provided the empirical data behind some of our most influential works on Black political behavior (Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1990; Tate 1994; Dawson 1995). For perspective, in 1984, half of the NBES respondents were born before World War II; several individuals were even born in the 19th century, and the youngest participant in the final 1996 survey was born in 1978. In the lifetimes of these respondents, the federal government played an overt role in constructing the degree to which race explicitly factored into the legal and political rights of Black Americans. These individuals saw a federal government that had recently permitted legal segregation change its position in response to collective action demanding political incorporation and equal legal and political rights.

According to the census, today, half of the Black population was born after 1990, ushering in a cohort too young to vote in Obama's first election or to have experienced 20th-century race-conscious policies (DeSante and Smith 2020). In addition to living in a different political moment, the Black community has grown more stratified by income and education (Wacquant 2008). Likewise, the degree to which people participate in Black cultural institutions has declined. Amid these

different generational experiences, it would stand to reason that younger Black voters today might develop different political attitudes and behavior.

2.1 Cohort Change

Because partisanship develops early in life and typically remains stable unless disrupted by significant social upheavals (Campbell et al. 1960), generations play a critical role in shaping social and political change (Ryder 1985). While conventional wisdom associates aging with growing more conservative, Black Americans over the age of 50 remain among the most active and committed voters in the Democrats' coalition. The solidarity forged through the collective struggles of the Jim Crow era and the Civil Rights Movement helped anchor a race-conscious political identity, unifying 20th-century Black voters around the Democratic Party (Dawson 2001; McAdam 1999; Tate 1994; Lee 2002). However, as the distance from these formative decades grows, it becomes critical to examine how their influence persists, evolves, or fades in contemporary Black politics. Black institutions and cultural spaces contribute to cross-generational unity (Harris-Lacewell 2010) while the unique political, racial, and economic experiences can threaten inter-generational understanding (DeSante and Smith 2020; Watts 2024; Cohen 2010; Gillespie 2009).

Black voters today include those with memories of legal segregation; it also includes those whose first political memories developed during Obama's presidency.¹ The ideological convergence in racial attitudes—Black Americans became more racially conservative, while White Americans became more liberal—meant that concerning racial attitudes “Differences between the oldest and youngest adults *within* a race are now greater than the differences *between* the races among those younger than forty-five (Hochschild, Weaver and Burch 2012: p.130).” With a less racially polarized electorate, more Black candidates are winning in districts where Black voters are not the majority. To succeed in this environment, Black political elites employ different strategies from their predecessors. Whereas earlier generations of Black leaders centered racial identity and justice in a manner that would be viewed today as a pro-Black archetype, today's political landscape

¹My cousin's son (born 2008) asked when he was a small child if there had *ever* been a White president.

encourages the adoption of deracialized campaign strategies deemed necessary to win voters of all races (Gillespie 2009). These strategies involve downplaying structural racism (Bonilla-Silva and Ray 2009), endorsing neoliberal or free-market economic principles (Cohen 2010; Spence 2011), or even engaging in rhetorical practices that are critical of their racial group, a tactic known as racial distancing (Stephens-Dougan 2020).

In some instances, Black Americans are just as likely to hold critical views of other Blacks as individuals from other races, especially when it comes to cultural values and work ethic (Nunnally and Carter 2012) contributing to generational cleavages (Cohen 2010; Zimmerman 2025; Spence 2011). The strategy of racial distancing contributes to the scrutiny of Black youth for their culture and lack of economic self-sufficiency at a time where opportunities for individual progress are *perceived* as more abundant than for previous generations (Cohen 2010). The stigmatization of Black youth by co-racial elders and the non-Black public alike occurs despite their more elevated involvement in civic and community life when compared to their racial peers (Levine 2007). All the while, research also shows that Black youth report a greater degree of feelings that elected officials care little about their interests. They disagree with statements like “everyone has an equal chance to succeed in the United States (Cohen 2010).” More recently, half of Black young adults say they do not have the “full and equal rights and protections that others have in this country (Cohen 2024).” These generational divides—rooted in conflicting perceptions of opportunity, institutional cynicism, and cultural expression—may also help explain diverging partisan behavior among Black Americans.

Because the most Democratic-aligned generation of Black voters just preceded Baby Boomers (Luks and Elms 2005), elements of generational disunity were detected even before support peaked during Obama’s presidency (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Luks and Elms (2005) uses Age-Period-Cohort (APC) models to show that Democratic support peaked among the generation born between 1935 and 1950. This generation would have been aged 15-30 during the passage of the Voting Rights Act, making this expansion of civil liberties central to the formation of the cohort’s partisan identity. They summarize their findings that “the further away one is from the socializing influence

of experiencing the Civil Rights movement during young adulthood, either backward or forward in time, the more likely one is to identify as a Republican. (Luks and Elms 2005: p.747).” The solidarity forged through the collective struggles of the Jim Crow era and the Civil Rights Movement anchored a race-conscious political identity that unified 20th-century Black voters around the Democratic Party (Dawson 2001; McAdam 1999; Tate 1994; Lee 2002). However, as the distance from these formative decades grows, it becomes critical to examine how their influence persists—or fades—in Black politics. Black institutions and cultural spaces can contribute to cross-generational unity (Harris-Lacewell 2010), while generationally-based political, racial, and economic experiences can threaten intergenerational understanding (DeSante and Smith 2020; Watts 2024; Cohen 2010; Gillespie 2009; Valentino and Brader 2011).

2.2 Realignment

The Black public votes overwhelmingly for Democrats even though a large number identify as conservative. In 2000, as many as 50% of Black survey respondents identified as conservative but voted for Democrats at a rate of 80% (Philpot 2017; White and Laird 2020). This so-called *partisanship ideology paradox* has generated debates about why ideology is a poor indicator of partisanship for Black voters (Jefferson 2024; Philpot 2017; White and Laird 2020). While I weave the details of this debate throughout this paper, I focus here on factors that may have recently increased the number of conservative or Republican identifiers (even if voting patterns remained constant), before reviewing factors that may have reduced the tendency for conservatives to vote Republican, even amid constant rates of ideological identification.

Almost as soon as Black support coalesced around the Democratic Party, scholars of Black politics speculated that economic self-interest would soon become a source of partisan division among the increasingly stratified Black bloc (Wilson 1978). Dawson (1995) and Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1990) showed that, despite the increasing economic division in the 1980s, group identity played a profound role in Black voters’ political considerations. This reasoning suggested that for Black Americans, thinking primarily in terms of group interest rather than self-interest

served as a clarifying heuristic for political behavior. Although linked fate is a well-established measure developed to explain African American political thought, subsequent research shows that it drives opinion convergence only on explicitly racial issues (Tate 1994; White 2007). Linked fate's greater influence on racial issues may explain why it is more impactful for the highly educated, whose education may encourage a broader conception of racial issues. Similarly, if these individuals have spent more time among whites, they may see more issues through a racial lens than their peers in predominantly Black spaces. Finally, this reasoning suggests that "as perceptions of racial group interests become less able to predict individual utility, perceptions of racial group interests are less likely to be considered. As this becomes the case for more African Americans, political diversity within the black community will increase" (Dawson 1995). As mentioned above, given the weakening and decline of race-conscious federal programs since the 1980s, the usefulness of this heuristic for political decisions may have declined, even as the importance of group identity continues to play a significant role in other aspects of a person's life. The decline of race-conscious programs is also associated with rightward shifts since the 1980s among African Americans (Tate 2010).

The increasing significance of race-based identity politics is a well-documented shift in American electoral behavior (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2019; Tesler 2020). However, measuring racial attitudes across racial groups on a single survey is complicated. Political scientists developed today's most commonly used questions for measuring racial attitudes to measure White racial attitudes, and these are the questions commonly used for respondents of all races. The Racial Resentment Scale is a battery of items developed in the post-Civil Rights anti-Black views among White respondents (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Researchers have raised concerns about its validity in the context of today's racial politics, particularly among generations born after the 1970s, and how to best interpret the scale among non-White respondents (Kam and Burge 2018; Davis and Wilson 2021; DeSante and Smith 2020). Still, some research does indicate that the scale has value in predicting instances of Black support for Trump in recent elections (Sommer and Franco 2024). While less common on surveys, questions developed with Black respondents in mind indicate

that individuals are increasingly placing greater responsibility on individuals, rather than structural forces, for the social disparities between Black and White individuals (Smith 2014). Writing in 2010, Tate (2010) speculated that a robust protest response could potentially bring Black political attitudes back to the left of the Democratic party. If support for Black Lives Matter in 2020 is any indication, Black support for the movement increased slightly and was more resilient to temporal declines than that of any other racial group (Horowitz, Hurst and Braga 2023). This boost may have helped motivate younger Black voters who did not turn out in 2024 to do so in 2020.

Measures used to quantify conservative attitudes are similarly challenging to interpret for Black respondents. For example, for Black Americans, measures of authoritarianism can pick up on attitudes and behaviors shaped by historical experiences of racial subordination and the behaviors needed to navigate marginalized status rather than reflecting an authoritarian orientation per se (Pérez and Hetherington 2014). Even the measures most closely associated with electoral behavior—ideology and partisan identification—are far less predictive of vote choice among African Americans than most would assume (Jefferson 2024). While ideological heterogeneity within the Black electorate has been well-documented prior to Barack Obama’s presidency (Philpot 2017; Tate 2010), his candidacy and subsequent presidency garnered historically high levels of support from Black voters across the ideological spectrum. At the peak of this alignment, 82 percent of Black conservatives identified as Democrats (White and Laird 2020). According to the CES, as recently as 2020, 55 percent of Black respondents who identified as “very conservative” still voted for the Democratic presidential nominee (Schaffner 2020).

One interpretation of the weak relationship between ideological and partisan self-identification and vote choice among African Americans is that conventional measures lack construct validity for African Americans (Jefferson 2024). While the critique of this measurement helps explain observed divergences of ideology and vote choice, the asymmetric changes in vote choice found in this study—such that conservative and Republican-identifying Black voters are shifting in their electoral behavior while liberal and Democratic identifiers remain stable—suggest that the change is impacting Republican-inclined voters specifically. Social norms likely suppressed the behavior

of *only* these voters such that they did not act consistent with their true politics. It is also likely that these changes manifest differently across generations.

2.3 Social Constraint

In addition to generational turnover or realignment, changes in Black socio-political norms could be a potential source of partisan realignment. As [White and Laird \(2020\)](#) argue, African American political cohesion is rooted not merely in a shared common understanding of political interests but in well-constituted norms of political behavior that reinforce Democratic partisanship. These norms were forged through community action and sacrifice during the Civil Rights Movement where participation was sustained by informal social pressures cultivated and maintained through dense social networks in a racially segregated society ([Chong 1991](#)). Because of social penalties associated with breaking from the groups' desired behavior, voters who are inclined to deviate from Black political norms will suppress these tendencies by either not voting or conforming.

While racial inequality persists and Black political norms remain, the erosion of *state* involvement with race-conscious policies (first through the tolerance and support of segregation, then of the government led efforts to alleviate racial inequities) along with the declining centrality of Black institutions and media may have weakened some of the mechanisms keeping these social norms in place. If true, these changes are likely to have a greater impact on younger generations and contribute to the rising ideological diversity among Black Americans.

The Republican Party has undergone significant reinvention with the ascendancy of Donald Trump ([Jacobson 2021](#)). First with the Tea Party movement and then with Donald Trump as leader, the party has associated itself strongly and found electoral success with once-stigmatized, overtly bigoted, and xenophobic messaging ([Parker and Towler 2019](#)). The scrambling of coalitions that has resulted herein defied electoral expectations and disrupted existing coalitions ([Valentim 2024](#)). This may have occurred in part because the reorientation of the Republican Party towards a more White working-class appeal may have also increased its appeal to Black working-class voters. It is also true that in an era when signaling was more subtle, campaigning for Black voters would have

alienated large portions of the Republican base. By embracing far-right extremists the party pursue Black voters without alienating racial conservatives in their base. Because the GOP has previously made so little effort to reach Black voters those inclined to vote for the party may be initially easy to pick up with little effort.

3 Hypotheses

Because Black voters have remained overwhelmingly Democratic and because their turnout is lower and more variable than that of Whites (Fraga 2018) both the media and campaigns focus primarily on Black turnout as the one relevant dimension of their electoral behavior. However, prioritizing turnout at the expense of all else changes a campaign fundamentally (Hersh 2015). For strategic Democrats with ample information on some voters and none on others, it could seem wise to cater first to super voters especially White swing voters who can pull votes from Republicans, second to Black super voters who are likely older and middle class, and last to irregular Black voters on whom there may be little data, who may be costly to turnout, and who are unlikely to vote Republican if they do vote (Frymer 2011). While this paper does not claim that Black voters, as a bloc, are on the verge of becoming swing voters who are equally likely to vote for either party, it is evident that their tendency to support the Democratic Party is declining. The need for greater clarity is even more important amid the debate whether non-voters were more likely to be Republicans in 2024 than Democrats (Bonica, Fordham and Tiburcio 2025).

Evidence suggests three potential sources of Republican vote increases that may co-occur to varying degrees. The first is simply cohort replacement—or turnover. Today’s oldest Black voters developed their political allegiances at the peak of the Civil Rights Movement. The Democratic Party’s willingness to align with that movement and appeal to Black voters has had a lasting impact that has transcended generations through institutions and social norms. As this cohort ages and passes away, their direct and indirect electoral power through their votes and community influence diminishes. Assuming the voting behavior of this generation reflects a ceiling of Democratic

support and no other events forestall this process, younger voters are likely to exhibit less racially distinctive behavior and become more supportive of Republicans over time.

Another possibility is that something particular is influencing the behavior of existing Black Republicans and conservatives to increasingly vote Republican. Recall that racialized social constraint is unique to Black voters and only affects those who prefer Republicans. This would be observable through Republican shifts (in turnout and vote choice) among self-identified Republicans (or conservatives), who, until recent elections, had supported Democrats on average. It could be that this social pressure is breaking down, or that today's Republican party more effectively mobilizes these voters. In either case, the effectiveness of the social pressure would have become inadequate. The third possibility is that Black voters are becoming more conservative overall, that voters who once held views associated with the Democratic party now hold views associated with the Republican party, and their voting behavior is changing as a result. If this is the case, then the number of people who identify as Republicans or conservatives should increase, as should the tendency for these individuals to hold conservative issue positions on national issues where the parties greatly differ, such as abortion or immigration. Theories that Black voters are realigning along gender, class, or educational lines assume that Black voters are similarly affected by the same cleavages emerging in the broader electorate.

These trends are not mutually exclusive and might even reinforce one another. For example, a decline in the tendency for younger voters to support Democrats may *seem* like a straightforward example of the declining influence of the racialized social constraint, but recall that the constraint only applies to those who would not otherwise conform. Therefore, generational change, absent changes in the behavior of non-Democrats, would be evidence of the first, but not the third, hypothesis.² Likewise, changes in issue position or partisanship across the Black electorate or among Black Democrats are not necessarily evidence of a diminishing constraint either. If these voters genuinely held different views in the past, then they were not previously constrained. This would be an example of the second but not the third hypothesis.

²see [Table 2](#)

Hypothesis	Expectation
Cohort Change	More Republican voter support among younger cohorts, decrease in the size and turnout of older Boomer+ cohorts
Realignment	Increase in Republican and conservative identification with increase in Republican issue position
Social Constraint	Increased tendency for Republicans and Conservatives to turnout and vote for Trump

Table 2: **Hypotheses**

If cohort change is the primary driver of Black partisan shifts, then the combination of group size and turnout will reduce Baby Boomers' portion of the electorate between 2016 and 2024. Because Baby Boomers turnout at higher rates than younger voters and are such a large portion of the Black population, this outcome is not necessarily guaranteed. Nor is it guaranteed that a decline in votes from older generations will be proportionate to the shifts in recent elections. Realignment would be indicated by an increase in ideological conservatism or Republican self-identification, or a shift in the tendency for Democrats to vote Republican. Finally, a reduction in the power of social constraint would be indicated by an increase in turnout and Republican support among Black voters who identify as Republican or conservative.

	Composition	Turnout	Vote Choice
Cohort	X	X	
Realignment	X		X
Social constraint		X	X

Table 3: **Analytic Framework** Two measures of voter behavior are associated with each hypothesis. The cohort hypothesis requires changes in composition and turnout to be observable through two factors (1) that Boomers vote more for Democrats than subsequent generations (2) that their relative portion of the Black electorate is in decline. This hypothesis would be even more compelling if generations are getting increasingly Republican over time. The realignment hypothesis requires changes in composition and vote choice to be made observable through increases in Republican and conservative identification, as well as stronger preferences for Republican positions across the electorate. Social constraint requires changes in turnout and vote choice, which are observable through increased Republican voting and higher turnout among Republican and conservative identifiers.

In Table 3 I show that it is possible to distinguish between these mechanisms and their relative

contributions to changes in voting behavior by considering the components of turnout, vote choice, and group size separately, while also accounting for how these components manifest in terms of net electoral change. Even though it might be easier to understand considerable movement among a small group of voters, a more subtle change among a large group may have a bigger impact on overall electoral trends.

4 Methodology

To better understand which subgroups of Black voters contributed most to the increases in Republican support among the Black electorate between 2020 and 2024, I decompose net vote change into composition, vote choice, and turnout using the method advanced by [Grimmer, Marble and Tanigawa-Lau \(2022\)](#), which illustrates how presidential support among White, Latino, and Black voters has changed in recent elections. They find that the only time the Black electorate has been more supportive of Democrats than in 2020 was during the Obama elections.³ This method addresses the validity challenges raised by relying on partisan or ideological self-identification, as well as the computational problems of interpreting a candidate's support based only on those who voted. Focusing on vote choice alone reveals the misleading statistic that Trump gained 1200% more support among Black voters than McCain had in 2008 ([Grimmer, Marble and Tanigawa-Lau 2022](#): p.20).

Although [Grimmer, Marble and Tanigawa-Lau \(2022\)](#) finds that in recent presidential elections, Latino voters provide more net votes to the Democratic party than the Republican party, because their approach does not decompose the electorate into the blocs most likely to have partisan cleavages, they are unable to among which groups Democratic support is strongest (or weakest). [Fraga, Velez and West \(2024\)](#) apply the net vote decomposition, using entropy balancing, to incorporate Latino-specific survey weights that enable the analysis of identifiable political and demographic subgroups using data from the 2016 and 2020 CES. The study deconstructs the Latino electorate

³Of 24 analyses, only those that use the CES's validated voter turnout measure show that Black voters contributed between 0.1 and 0.3% of the CVAP more votes to Trump in 2020 than in 2016.

by demographics, ideology, and issues to capture which subgroups became more supportive of Trump in 2020. They find that Latino voters' partisan support is more consistent with their issue positions in 2020 than in 2016 and that Trump made gains with low-SES Latinos in 2020.

Like [Fraga, Velez and West \(2024\)](#), I will adapt this method to explore variations in the electoral behavior of Black voter subgroups. While [Grimmer, Marble and Tanigawa-Lau \(2022\)](#) shows no movement among Black voters toward Republicans, [Fraga, Velez and West \(2024\)](#) shows how this method can be employed for a more precise understanding of electoral dynamics within racial subgroups. This is a useful application because there is considerable speculation about the drivers of Latino partisanship. However, like the Black electorate, national surveys and polls seldom include the required samples to assess subgroups within the Latino electorate. Adopting this method provides an opportunity to assess the extent to which a particular bloc has changed in size (relative to the overall group) as well as the extent to which their voting preferences or turnout rates have changed.

$$C_t(x) = \text{Group Share}_t(x) \times \text{Turnout}_t(x) \times \text{Vote Share}_t(x, C)$$

Equation 1 decomposes the number of votes for a candidate in a particular election, C_t , into particular voting subgroups. The equation requires defining the set of voting blocs $\mathcal{X}$ as a discrete set of attributes that partition the electorate: every member of the population is assigned to a single $x \in \mathcal{X}$. Therefore, define $C_t(x)$ as the number of votes for candidate C from voting bloc x in election t normalized to the size of that subgroup population. $\text{Group Share}_t(x)$ represents the population distribution of the subgroup within the relevant electorate. For example, this could refer to Black men within the Black voting aged population (BVAP). $\text{Turnout}_t(x)$ represents the conditional turnout rate for group x in election t , and $\text{Vote Share}_t(x, C)$ represents the conditional rate at which members of group x who turned out to vote cast their ballot for candidate C . There are no inherent assumptions in this accounting of the electorate composition.

$$\text{Net Republican}(x) = (\text{Vote Share}_t(x, \text{Republican}) - \text{Vote Share}_t(x, \text{Democrat})) \\ \times \text{Turnout}_t(x) \times \text{Group Size}_t(x)$$

Equation 2 illustrates the relative importance of a particular subgroup. It takes the conventional measure of candidates' support and vote share and normalizes it by turnout and group size. One of the questions I address in this paper is the question of self-identified Black Republicans who may deviate from the remainder of the Black electorate in their preferences. Because there are so few *and* their turnout low, they are typically expected to yield few Republican votes. Net Republican(x) is the product of three terms that are closely related to the components of Equation 1. The first term is a vote difference term, $\text{Vote Share}_t(x, \text{Republican}) - \text{Vote Share}_t(x, \text{Democrat})$, which is the rate at which voters (who turnout) in subgroup x choose the Republican over the Democratic candidate in election t . The vote difference term reports if the Republican candidate wins or loses votes among subgroup x . If the vote choice difference is positive, then the Republican wins more votes among the voting bloc. If it is negative, the Democratic candidate wins more votes among this bloc. This difference is then scaled by the turnout rate $\text{Turnout}_t(x)$ and the composition term $\text{Group Size}_t(x)$. Scaling the vote margin of each bloc by its turnout and size is crucial because it weighs their vote contributions by the bloc's electoral significance in terms of votes cast.

$$\text{Diff Net}_{t,t-1}(x) = \text{Net GOP}_t(x) - \text{Net GOP}_{t-1}(x) \\ = (\text{Vote Share}_t(x, \text{GOP}) - \text{Vote Share}_t(x, \text{Dem})) \times \text{Turnout}_t(x) \times \text{Group Size}_t(x) \\ - (\text{Vote Share}_{t-1}(x, \text{GOP}) - \text{Vote Share}_{t-1}(x, \text{Dem})) \times \text{Turnout}_{t-1}(x) \times \text{Group Size}_{t-1}(x)$$

Equation 3 shows the net shift in voters between two elections and between two parties. If Equation 3 is zero, the Republican candidate won the same share of a voting subgroup in both elections. If Equation 3 is positive, it indicates that Republicans won a larger share of the overall

vote from that voting subgroup in the second election (t) than in the first ($t - 1$). The formulation above enables comparison within subgroups, allowing for the assessment of variation across categories.

Finally, I examine how the relationship between issue position and vote choice has changed over time. If the relationship between Black partisan behavior and issue position is becoming more consistent with the expectations developed based on White voter behavior, the correlation between conservative or Republican issue positions and voting for the Republican candidate should be increasing. To test this, I examine the bivariate relationship between two polarized and salient issues in the 2024 election—abortion and immigration. I first examine whether the relationship has become stronger over time. However, while the parties have had different stances on these issues for some time, immigration and abortion were more salient in the 2024 election than in previous ones. To account for the fact that this relationship should be stronger in 2024 than in other elections, I compare whether the change in the relationship strengthened more for Black voters than for the public as a whole.

5 Data

The Cooperative Election Study is an extensive, nationally representative survey that collects information about demographics and responses regarding political preferences and voting behavior, conducted over two waves: one taken before the general election and the other after ([Ansolabehere 2016](#); [Schaffner 2020, 2024](#)). An important feature of this data set is the oversampling of non-White participants, which enables subgroup analysis that is not possible with other surveys. In addition to oversampling Black respondents, the CES validates voter turnout. The 2016 CES included 7,702 Black respondents, the 2020 survey included 6,734, and the 2024 survey included 7,590. The CES provides more precise demographic data such as birth year and family income in \$10,000 increments. There are also multiple questions about partisanship, ideology, and vote choice, which are crucial for distinguishing between nuanced patterns previously discussed in

Black voter behavior.

For demographic estimates and reweighting, I use the American Community Survey for each election year, which is conducted annually by the Census.⁴ I use the ACS and entropy balancing to reweight the CES respondents by age, state of residence, gender, and education.

6 Results & Analysis

The following sections I share estimates of changes in the size, turnout, and extent of Republican voting for subgroups of Black voters. The first section examines generational turnover which provides necessary context for understanding the relative role of changing norms and issues. The second section examines changes by partisanship and ideology. The last three sections look at attitudes on race and gender, socioeconomic factors, and the relationship between partisanship and issue position over time for Black voters. To evaluate the hypotheses I consider the findings from each of these sections in the context of the findings generally.

6.1 Generation

My first hypothesis is that Black voters exhibit generational, rather than age-related, voting patterns. Therefore, as the Baby Boomers are replaced by subsequent generations, Democratic support among Black voters will decline. First, to assess the extent of generational replacement, I use data from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS), which shows that Baby Boomers and older (born before 1965) made up nearly half (47.2%) of the BVAP in 2008.⁵ At that point, only a portion of Millennials and no Gen Z were eligible to vote. By 2016, the proportion of Baby Boomers in the BVAP had fallen 10 percent, and a few Gen Z voters were eligible to vote for the first time, making up 4 percent of the BVAP. By 2024, Millennials had become the first generation to surpass Baby Boomers as the largest generational subgroup, at 30 percent. Gen X, a small generation by comparison would never comprise the largest share of the Black electorate. In

⁴I use the 2021 ACS for 2020 because the pandemic disrupted the 2020 survey, affecting results.

⁵See [Table 4](#)

relative terms, there are half as many Baby Boomers (and older) than there were during the Obama years. Because the public's expectations are so closely tied to the behavior of this generation, research tends to portray the behavior of Millennials and Gen Z as aberrant; however, it suggests that if these attitudes persist, commitment to the Democratic Party will decline (Watts 2024; DeSante and Smith 2020).

Generation	2008	2012	2016	2020	2024
Baby Boomer (and Older)	47%	41%	36%	32%	26%
Generation X	30%	28%	27%	26%	25%
Millennial	22%	29%	32%	30%	30%
Generation Z	-	-	4%	11%	18%

Table 4: Generational Composition of Black Voting Age Population Over Time The percent of the Black Voting Age Population for each generation by year. The Baby Boomer generation is typically defined as those born between 1946 and 1964, because this is the oldest generation in my analysis I group all respondents born before 1965 as Boomers+. Gen X is comprised of those born between 1965 and 1980. Millennials have birth years ranging from 1980 to 1996, and Gen Z includes individuals born after 1996, who are now eligible to vote. Baby Boomers and those older are the largest portion of the electorate until 2024, when Millennials surpassed them. *Source:* American Community Survey 2008–2024.

The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates that contrary to polling ahead of the election (and the unvalidated results in the CES), the Republican vote share for Gen Z held steady at 7.5 percent. The largest shifts occurred among middle aged voters. Millennial and Gen X shifted the most towards Republicans by 6% and 5%, respectively. Millennials have the highest baseline level of Republican voting, with 14% voting for Trump in 2024 followed by Gen X at 11%, Gen Z at 8% and Boomers at 7%.

The dark green line indicates that the proportion of the Black electorate belonging to the Baby Boomer generation decreased from 36 percent of Black voters to 27 percent, and it will continue to decline in future elections. Because composition is a dynamic measure, all other generations saw their relative proportion of the electorate increase or remain stable. Gen Z saw the largest increase, with their portion of the electorate growing from 15 to 19 percent. Gen X increased by 4 points, from 20 to 24 percent, and Millennials remained at around 28 percent of Black voters. Finally, the




Figure 2: **Decomposition and Net Vote Change by Generation 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by generation. Middle aged voters shifted significantly more towards Trump in 2024 (*left*), but because Boomers are larger, turnout more, and declined in share, a smaller shift had a more significant impact on the election outcomes (*right*). The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to yield a net vote change in 2024. *Source*: CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

light blue line shows that turnout declined for all generations especially Gen X.

The figure on the right shows the net vote gain change by generation. Again, positive numbers indicate the percent increase for Republicans attributable to each of the generational subgroups listed on the x-axis. Because they supported Democrats by a margin of 86 points and by becoming a smaller part of the electorate and turning out less, Boomers effectively “contributed” over 4 percent to the net gain by Republicans. Even though Boomers shifted so little in vote choice, their decline in turnout and relative share contributed more to Republican gains than the larger increases among middle aged voters. Although no generation is as strongly Democratic as Boomers, no generation voted for Democrats at a rate of less than 85%. Still, the decline of Boomers portends generational changes for Democrats.

Although the impact of generational turnover has long been a consideration, in 2024 much of the speculation centered on the intersection of gender and generation. Polls showed that young Black men were reporting that they were equally likely to vote for Trump as Biden (Hopkins 2024). This came at a time when the Democratic Party’s support of Black women was increasingly well-documented (Gillespie and Brown 2019; Slaughter, Crowder and Greer 2024; Farris and Holman 2014). The shifts do not fully reveal the extent of generational or gendered differences. The gender/generational groups who vote for Trump the most are Millennial men, Gen X men, and Gen Z men at 19%, 18%, and 12%, respectively. Boomer men vote for Republicans at a slightly lower rate than Millennial women who are the most Republican Black women; 10% of them voted for Trump. Gen Z women voted for Trump at a rate of 6% and Boomer women at a rate slightly less than 5%.




Figure 3: **Decomposition and Net Vote Change by Gender 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by gender. The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to yield a net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

The dark green line shows trends similar to those seen in Figure 2, with Boomers declining and Gen Z increasing, albeit with minor differences between genders. The light blue line shows, that Gen X men had the largest decline in turnout dropping 16 points to 40 percent. Boomer women were the only group for whom turnout did not decline by at least 5%.

In this section I demonstrate that the Boomers' share of the electorate has declined significantly, loosening ties between Black voters and the Democratic Party. I have shown the extent to which the generational composition has changed, raising questions about the expectations developed during the decades of Boomer dominance. Additionally, I show that the generational dynamic is deeply gendered. Research shows that Black women turnout and vote more consistently for Democrats, but the relevance of gender gap appears most extreme at middle age (Slaughter, Crowder and Greer 2024; Farris and Holman 2014). The following sections address the reasons why this is happening. How have the political attitudes of Black voters changed to result in this shift? Are issue positions across current generations that are different from one another, or is it that something about the ways that different generations engage with politics is changing?




Figure 4: Decomposition and by Generation and Gender 2020-2024 The components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by generation and gender. Despite some variation in turnout across gender, the biggest differences are between the middle aged cohorts and everyone else. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

6.2 Partisanship and Ideology

My second and third hypotheses are that declining Democratic vote share among Black voters is primarily a function of changing attitudes and responses to social pressures. Specifically, greater willingness to vote in a manner consistent with conservative or Republican identification, greater alignment with conservative positions, or both. Recall the *partisan paradox* which states that for Black voters there is an indirect relationship between Republican identification, conservative ideology, and vote choice such that most Black Republicans and conservatives vote for Democrats despite their conservative leanings (Jefferson 2024; Philpot 2017). If Black voters are generally becoming more conservative as they increasingly vote for Republicans then there may no longer be any paradox. However, if it is primarily Republicans or conservatives whose voting behavior is changing, then this is evidence of something unique to these voters. The theory of social constraint makes clear that these voters are constrained, so a change in their behavior marked by a greater tendency for them to vote Republican, suggests a decline in the influence of social pressure.

The red line in Figure 5 shows that Trump increased his vote share primarily among Republicans and Independents in 2024. For Democrats, the Trump vote increased .5 point from 1 percent in 2020 to 1.5 percent in 2024; for Independents, it increased 5 points from 14 to 19 percent; and for Republicans, it increased 4 points from 81 percent in 2020 to 85 percent in 2024. The smaller shifts in partisan composition are also more favorable to Republicans than Democrats. The dark green line indicates that the number of Black Democrat identifiers declined by 3 points, from 69 to 66 percent of Black voters; for Independents, it increased by 2 points, from 24 to 26 percent; and for Republicans, it increased by 1 point, from 6 to 7 percent. Finally, the light blue line shows lower turnout for all Black voters. The 14 point decline in turnout among Democrats hurt Harris significantly, resulting in an 11 percent net vote gain for Trump. Among Independents, the combination of a 7 percent drop in turnout and 5 percent Trump vote increase resulted in a 1.6 percent net vote gain. For Republicans, it actually declined as a result of lower turnout. However this follows massive gains in 2020 when Black Republicans shifted an astounding 20 points in favor of Trump

from 59 percent support in 2016 to 79 percent after remaining stable from 2012 to 2016.⁶




Figure 5: **Partisan ID 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by partisan ID. The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to yield a net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

Figure 6 displays similar findings for ideology. The red line shows that Trump's support increased primarily among moderate and conservative voters. Among the liberal it remained constant at less than 1 percent and for the very liberal, it increased to 1 percent in 2024. For moderates, Trump's support increased by 4 points from 4 percent in 2020 to 8 percent in 2024; and for conservatives it increased by around 13 points from 26 to 39 percent among conservatives. For those who are very conservative, it actually declined slightly but remained around 43 percent. In terms of identification, the Black electorate became less conservative and more moderate in 2024, with virtually no decline in liberal or very liberal identification. A 3-point increase in moderate identification stemmed primarily from equivalent declines in conservative and very conservative identification. In 2024, moderates comprise 46 percent of the Black electorate; very liberal are 14 percent, liberal are 24 percent, conservatives are 11 percent, and very conservative are 5 percent.⁷ Turnout

⁶See Figure A11

⁷See Figure A4 for distribution of identification.

declined the least for the very conservative, falling 6 points to 28 percent. For all other groups, turnout declined between 11 and 13 percent. Moderates declined 13 points from 52 to 39 percent. Liberal and very liberal voters had similar turnout trends, also falling 13 points going from 57 percent to 44 in 2024. Collectively, this resulted in a net vote gain driven primarily by the increase in Trump support among moderates and liberals whose large numbers, declines in turnout and slight increase in Trump voting culminated in large relative net gains.




Figure 6: **Ideology 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by ideology. The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to yield a net change in votes in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

Republican and conservative identifying Black individuals are precisely the people whose behavior was suppressed under [White and Laird \(2020\)](#)'s theory of radicalized social constraint. These results provide mixed indications as to how constrained these voters are today with significant gains among conservatives and declines among the *very* conservative. While half of Black voters identified as conservative just 25 years ago, today only about 15 percent of Black survey respondents place themselves right of center, and even fewer, about 7 percent, identify as Republican. Because there are and remain so few Black Republicans and conservatives, there is a limit to how much change could occur if only social norms were to change. However, the decline in

identification amid an increase in Republican voting suggests that these labels could be gaining greater validity for Black voters at the same time (Jefferson 2024).

	2012	2016	2020	2024
Republicans voting for Democrats	38%	31%	20%	15%
Proportion Republican	3%	4%	6%	7%
Independents voting for Democrats	87%	73%	84%	81%
Proportion Independents	14%	19%	23%	26%
Democrats voting for Democrats	98%	97%	99%	99%
Proportion Democrats	83%	76%	70%	66%

Table 5: **Changes in Democratic support by party ID 2016-2024** This table shows the percent of Black partisans who voted for Democrats in presidential election years. The proportion of the Black electorate comprised of that partisan group. *Source:* CES (2016-2024).

Table 5 shows that the only partisan group whose partisan voting has changed over the last three elections is Black Republicans. Although conservative identifying Black voters voted equally for Democrats and Republicans as little as 20 years ago, Table 5 shows that Democratic support among Black Republicans collapsed 15 percentage points from 38 percent in 2012 to just 15 percent by 2024. On the other hand, Black Democrats' support for Democrats has increased slightly since 2016 from 97 percent to 99 percent in 2024. Although Democratic identification continued its decades-long decline, decreasing by 10 points since 2016 (Hajnal and Lee 2011), this decline coincided with a mere three-point increase in Republican identification over the same period. Further research is necessary to determine whether this is evidence for a weakening constraint, polarization, or some combination of the two.

6.3 Socioeconomic and Campaign Issues

The previous sections display growing partisan divides in the Black electorate along the lines of generation and gender. I also find evidence for a diminished effect of racialized social constraint in the increasing rate at which Black Republicans fulfill their partisanship through voting and turnout. To confirm that this is a social effect and not reflective of more conservative attitudes, I examine the change in support for conservative issues or along other social divides seen in the broader

electorate. Is there any evidence of increasing divergence in values or political beliefs, and could that be a source of partisan divide?

I first examine measures of class and status, as indicated by income in [Figure 7](#) and education in [Figure 8](#). Income and education measure similar yet different things, and examining them together can add clarity. Beginning with [Figure 7](#) the red line shows that those making less than \$10,000 per year shifted the most to Trump in 2024 moving a total of 9 points from 3 percent in 2020 to 12 percent in 2024; the next highest bracket makes from \$10,000 to \$50,000 which shifted 1 point from 6 percent in 2020 to 7 percent in 2024; those making \$50,000 to \$100,000 shifted 5 points from 7 percent in 2020 to 12 percent in 2024; and those making over \$100,000 shifted 2 points from 6 percent in 2020 to 8 percent in 2024. There was little change in the composition of these groups, and turnout declined over 10 percent for all brackets except for those making over \$100,000; their turnout fell by 4 points. Education is examined in [Figure 8](#). Here, the red line shows that Trump's support increased by similar ranges, from 2.5 to 4 points across all levels of education and from similar baselines in 2020 of 7 percent. The green line shows an increase in those with a college degree and slight declines among those with no or some college. Those with college educations maintained the same levels of turnout while turnout for those without a college degree dropped by half from 35% to 18% in 2024. These result in large net vote gains for Trump in 2024, among the non college educated and net-vote losses among those with college degrees. Together these results show greater differences in vote choice by income than by education but that higher turnout is associated with the highest levels of income and education.

Church attendance for Black Americans is about more than religious faith. While church attendance for Whites has increasingly become associated with Republican support over the last several decades, [Figure 9](#) seems to show that for Black Americans, it is the non-church attenders who have moved more towards Trump. There are several reasons why church attendance and Black Church attendance in particular would attenuate Republican support. First, places of worship remain largely segregated by race and ethnicity both in attendance and leadership. Free from White influence Black churches permit the development and reinforcement of Black ide-




Figure 7: **Income 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by income. The right-hand panel shows how the components culminate in net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

ology which can help parishioners collectively arrive at similar understandings of race and the political significance of being Black, and encouragement and understanding of what actions can be taken to live in a manner consistent with those values (Harris-Lacewell 2010; Wamble 2024; McAdam 1999). Black church attendees would be the group in the study most subject to Black socio-political norms. Burge (2023) finds that 48 percent of Black Church members identify as strong Democrats compared to 31 percent of secular Blacks, but are slightly less likely to identify as liberal or strongly liberal (Ruffini 2023). These findings on income and church attendance offer additional support for both prior hypotheses. In support of the generational hypothesis, those reporting less than \$10,000 in income are on average significantly younger than the ages of other income brackets, by about 4 years. In support of the social constraint and generational hypothesis Black church attendance will be associated with older voters and those who are putting themselves in an environment where political norms will be reinforced.




Figure 8: **Education 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by education. While there is little variance in vote choice across education, there is a 17 point discrepancy in change in turnout. The plurality of Black voter with no college degree had a massive decline in turnout in 2024. The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to yield a net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

Likewise Figure 9 shows that Black athiests/agnostics increased their Trump support from 2 percent in 2020 to 13 percent in 2024; the category of other shifted 7 points from 9 percent in 2020 to 16 percent in 2024; Christians shifted 7 points from 8 to 15 percent; and Christians who attend a Black church shifted 2 points from 4 to 6 percent. The composition of all groups remained relatively stable, and turnout declined, with the decline being most pronounced among Black church attendees.

6.4 Attitudes About Gender & Race

Tesler (2020) finds that political fractures over attitudes about race and gender are becoming as important to politics as race and gender identities themselves. In 2024, with Harris as a Black




Figure 9: **Religion 2020-2024** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by religion. The right-hand panel shows how the components culminate in net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

and Asian woman candidate, and Trump as a White man with sexual assault allegations and convictions, attitudes about race and gender were more salient than previously. Figure 10 shows that those who agree with the statement that “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men” shifted 20 percent in favor of Trump in 2024, but those who disagree or neither agree nor disagree shifted to a lesser degree. Given that the public is familiar with Trump’s reputation for repeated instances of sexual misconduct with women over several decades, likely, much of the public has already factored this in (Robertson and Tesler 2024). Even though attitudes on race and gender have been polarizing for several elections, this 18 percent of voters who agreed with this statement swung the most of any other group analyzed in this paper (see the distribution of responses in Appendix 12). Unfortunately because the hostile sexism battery was asked on previous surveys it is not possible to compare changes over time.

In addition to allegations of sexual assault, Trump’s previous stances on racial issues—such as




Figure 10: **Hostile Sexism 2020-2024:** Left-hand panel shows the Black electorate categorized by agreement with the statement “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.” The right-hand panel shows how the components culminate in net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

calling for the execution of the Central Park Five or referring to Mexican immigrants as drug dealers and rapists at his campaign launch in 2015 were presumed to be so hostile as to be catastrophic for non-White voter support. Scholars have come to understand that this dynamic is less than straightforward than previously thought. A significant portion of non-White voters see past these offenses but there is currently no universal consensus as to why.⁸ Like the rest of the electorate, attitudes about racial issues are predictive of voting behavior for Black voters as well, however the number of Black respondents who report conservative racial attitudes is small.⁹ Regarding the statement “race problems are rare” those who strongly agree shifted 2 points towards Trump in 2024 from 25 percent in 2020 to 27 percent in 2024. Those who agree shifted 10 points from

⁸The challenges in measuring racial attitudes across racial groups was discussed previously in subsection 2.2 (Davis and Wilson 2021).

⁹See Figure A6

29 to 39 percent. While those with the most progressive position, who strongly disagree, shifted from less than 2 percent to 4 percent in 2024. For all groups turnout fell, and there was some moderating of opinion with those who strongly disagree declining 10 points to the inclusion of more moderate positions.¹⁰ What stands out most in [Figure 10](#), is the counter-intuitive 12 point net vote gain for Trump among those with the most progressive racial attitudes. Similarly to the findings in [Figure A8](#), this category includes the majority of respondents. As a result, the net vote gain among these voters is indicative of a decline in turnout among strong Democratic voters, as well as a decline in the proportion of voters who hold this position indicated by the dark green line. However, because this decline is primarily reflected by an increase in those who “disagree” (and no increase in those who “strongly disagree”) this seems to indicate a moderating of opinions following the racial tensions in the comparison year, 2020.

To better understand this trend, I look to changes between 2016 and 2020 in the appendix.¹¹ Here respondents who disagreed with this statement are the only ones who did not shift favorably toward Trump in 2020. This suggests the shift towards Republicans was underway in 2020 among those with conservative racial attitudes. Those who strongly agree with the statement shifted from 18 percent Trump support in 2016 to 22 percent in 2020, and those who agree shifted from 19 percent Trump support in 2016 to 27 percent Trump support in 2020.¹² It is not clear why those who agree exhibited higher Trump support over these elections than those who strongly agree. Only those who disagree and strongly disagree shifted their vote choice in favor of Democrats relative to 2016 quite possibly illustrating the impact of the 2020 protests on framing racial attitudes even among Black voters.

The final position I analyze is regards to voting behavior with respect to beliefs about White advantage. The distribution of Black respondent answers to this question is even more skewed to a single response than in the previous question. When asked if “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin” 85 percent of Black respondents agree or strongly

¹⁰For a distribution of responses see [Figure A8](#).

¹¹See [Figure A21](#)

¹²Point estimates for 2020 vary because of differences in bootstrapped estimates.

agree, less than 4 percent disagree. [Figure 12](#) shows that Trump gained votes from the four most progressive responses; gaining 1 point from strongly agree from 2 percent to 3 percent support; gaining 4 points among those who agree from 13 to 9 percent support; gaining 3 points among those who say neither; 7 points from those who disagree and strongly disagree from 61 to 68 percent; and 56 to 63 percent support, respectively. Unlike [Figure 11](#), where those who hold conservative views vote for Democrats on average, Black respondents who disagree that Whites have advantages vote Republican on average. The greatest changes between 2020 and 2024, however, are in turnout which declined between 5 and 18 points. It is because of the 9 percent decline in turnout among the 60 percent of Black respondents who strongly agree in the existence of White advantage, that they, rather than more conservative respondents, are the primary driver behind a 10 point net vote increase for Trump in 2024.

6.5 Converging Views

To better understand the changes this study observes in the behavior of Black Republicans, I test for convergence in the bivariate relationship between issue position and partisanship or ideology in the last three presidential elections. If the weak link between partisanship and voting behavior that [Jefferson \(2024\)](#) and [Philpot \(2017\)](#) observe has endured, then it is possible that social constraint remains a potent inhibitor of Republican support. On the other hand, if the relationship strengthens over time, then I have found additional evidence that the Black electorate is becoming more polarized, the construct validity of partisan and ideology measures may be increasing for Black voters, and that the power of social constraint has weakened since the Obama years. I compare how this relationship has changed for Black voters and the general public. If it has changed for the general public, then that is an indication of the importance of particular issues to particular elections. However, if the strength of the relationship becomes stronger for Black voters than for the electorate as a whole, then that suggests that Black voters are acting in accordance with their ideology in ways they had not done previously.

Appendix [section A5](#) shows that across the whole electorate, a conservative position on abor-




Figure 11: **Race Problems are Rare 2020-2024:** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by the belief that racial problems are rare. Trump saw his strongest support among the 0.5 percent of respondents who strongly agreed with this statement, while 78 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed. The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to determine the net change in percent support in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

tion became increasingly associated with voting Republican and conservative identification over the past three elections, and the association was stronger and increased more for Black voters. This is consistent with research that shows conservative positions on abortion to be associated with Black Republicanism (Philpot 2017). In contrast, for White voters, conservative immigration preferences in both measures I use are strongly associated with Republican vote choice. For Black respondents, the association in both measures of conservative immigration policy support is, as expected, weaker than among the complete set of CES respondents. More importantly, the association between these views and voting Republican grows stronger from 2016 to 2024.




Figure 12: **White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin, 2020-2024:** Left-hand panel shows components of net votes for the Black electorate categorized by belief that White people are advantaged in the U.S. The right-hand panel illustrates how the components converge to yield a net vote change in 2024. *Source:* CES (2020-2024) and ACS (2021 and 2024).

	Composition	Turnout	Vote Choice
Cohort	✓	✓	
Realignment	-		✓
Social constraint		-	✓

Table 6: **Findings** The table above compares my results to the hypotheses stated earlier. Because Boomers are declining as a share of Black voters and remain the most strongly Democratic, I find consistent evidence for cohort change. Because I find evidence that those who hold more conservative views are voting more for Trump, but they are not growing as a share of the electorate I find mixed results for realignment. I also find mixed results for social constraint because Republican and conservative identifiers are voting more for Trump in two consecutive elections, their turnout is not increasing relative to other voters.

7 Discussion

This study finds that across nearly all subgroups Black voters turned less and voted for the Democratic candidate for president at lower rates in 2024 than they had in 2020. I find that even though their share of the electorate has not increased, that those holding conservative positions on race and especially gender were most likely to swing favorably towards Trump. I also find that in 2024 the only groups whose turnout did not decline were Baby Boomer women and college educated voters.

Although, like the per-election polls, the unvalidated CES results show sharp declines in Democratic support among younger voters, particularly men, conservatives, and Republicans, further research is necessary to understand the threat this poses Democrats in the future. It is not unlikely that this polling itself became a self-fulfilling prophesy if a data-driven and truncated campaign believed these polls and became hesitant to mobilize low-propensity Black voters for fear of mobilizing Trump supporters (Nehamas, King and Kanno-Youngs 2024). Even if this is evidence of poor campaign strategy in 2024, questions remain about why inconsistent Black voters seem to be increasingly likely to voice support for Republicans and what that could mean for the future of Black voters as a Democratic coalition. With middle aged Black voters swinging the most in their actual voting behavior, does this portend bigger changes as these voters age into a life stage where they are more likely to vote (Jennings 1979; Highton and Wolfinger 2001).

This paper makes three contributions to the study of political behavior and electoral coalitions more broadly. First, it demonstrates that declining Democratic support among Black voters can emerge not from ideological realignment but from subgroup-level variation in turnout. Second, it shows that partisan cohesion can erode without significant changes in mass opinion. Third, it underscores the importance of demographic turnover and generational context in shaping the stability of party alignments—highlighting the importance of shifts in group composition itself.

While the generational and normative shifts identified here suggest durable changes, it is important to interpret the 2024 election in context. Harris's abbreviated campaign and the absence of a competitive primary may have dampened Democratic enthusiasm and amplified existing doubts

about the party's responsiveness. A more prolonged and contested nomination process might have mitigated these effects. Meanwhile, the consolidation of support for Trump among Black Republicans and conservatives indicates a realignment at the ideological margins of the Black electorate but shows that these individuals are still not mobilized or have reservations defecting from norms. Given that Harris is a Black woman, it would be useful to understand the durability of this tendency in elections with two candidates of the same race. While it may seem surprising that Black voters could support a party associated with racial conservatism, realignment has historically occurred under similar conditions. In the 1960s when dissatisfaction with Republican Party pushed many Black voters toward the Democratic Party. Still, several factors may inhibit a comparable partisan convergence today. Most relevant to this paper are the the increasing legal challenges to race-conscious legislation and what that means to the maintenance of race-based coalitions. Secondly, a fragmented media landscape could undermine partisan solidarity particularly if fame and celebrity reward political non-conformity or contribute to the impression that Republicanism is common or accepted in the Black community.

This paper focuses on political attitudes and preferences; it does not explore the ways that electoral systems or voting regulations can disproportionately burden some voters. This paper is also unable to observe the relationship between more nuanced racial attitudes and identity such as linked fate. The strong association between disagreeing that White people have a societal advantage and increases in Republican support suggest that part of this increase stem from differences in beliefs about race and the status of Black Americans. Likewise, this study observes the 2020 and 2024 elections and is therefor susceptible to factors associated with this election. It is therefor not clear the degree to which Harris' identity or Trump's behavior as a chauvinist contributed to the strong association between hostile sexism and increases in Republican vote choice.

Although this research finds evidence supporting the decline of social sanctioning, and the electoral impact of generational replacement, future research should continue to disaggregated the Black electorate with particular attention to how attitudes and political socialization differs between subgroups of Black voters especially different generations. It may becoming the case that

the idea of a singular Black political community is a deceptive, rather than useful heuristic, but this is not to say that Black identity is any less important. Investigations into differences across generation, gender, and ideology, clarify the pluralizing claim to Black politics.

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Appendix: Supporting Information for “Beyond the Bloc”

A1 Overview

A2 2020-2024 Analysis Continued




Figure A1: **Age 2020-2024:** Inverse relationship between Republican shifts and age with the largest net vote increase among the 18-34 age bracket.

Given that today marriage has become more associated with class and status than it was in the past, I examined whether the gender-class cleavages might be more apparent when examining married and unmarried persons separately. I find that the degree of Republican preference shift differed more between single men and single women than between married men and married women, however, all subgroups shifted Republican (rather than diverging). While this analysis cannot distinguish between multiple confounders, the type of attitudes that may make Black men hostile to a Harris presidency are often described in terms of class, age, gender attitudes and relationship status. For this reason I also examine age. Figure 5 shows that for age I obtain findings similar to my analysis of generation in Figure 2 with Republican support increasing for all voters but most strongly for the youngest and turnout dipping for those of middle age.





Figure A2: **Marital Status by Gender 2020-2024:** Republican shifts differ mostly by gender with single women and single men shifting more in opposite directions. General net vote increases across all categories.

A3 Baseline Sizes

Figure A3: Distribution Partisan ID 2024



A4 2016-2020 Analysis

Here I include graphs of the 2016-2020 analysis.

Figure A4: Distribution Ideology 2024




Figure A5: Distribution Income 2024




Figure A6: Distribution Race Problems 2024

Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. (2024)




Figure A7: Distribution Color Advantage 2024




Figure A8: Distribution Hostile Sexism 2024




Figure A9: Ideology 2016-2020




Figure A10: **Ideology 2016-2020**

Figure A11: Partisan ID 2016-2020




Figure A12: Partisan Identity 2016-2020

Figure A13: Generation by Gender 2016-2020




Figure A14: Gender and Generation 2016-2020

Figure A15: Gender Marital Status 2016-2020




Figure A16: Gender and Marital Status 2016-2020

Figure A17: Age 2016-2020




Figure A18: Age 2016-2020




Figure A19: Education




Figure A20: Education 2016-2020

Figure A21: Race Problems Are Rare 2016-2020




Figure A22: **Race Problems are Rare 2016-2020**

Figure A23: Whites have advantages because of the color of their skin 2016-2020




Figure A24: Color Advantage 2016-2020

Table A1: Rep Increase Boarder Patrol (Black Subsamples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.02698	0.00427	6.31500	0.00516
2020	0.03834	0.00526	7.28400	0.00783
2024	0.01761	0.00635	2.77400	0.00101

Table A2: Consv Increase Boarder Patrol (Black Subsamples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.05735	0.00901	6.36800	0.00524
2020	0.09454	0.00860	10.99000	0.01767
2024	0.04367	0.00941	4.64000	0.00283

Table A3: Consv Increase Boarder Patrol (CES Full Samples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.26950	0.00345	78.13000	0.08639
2020	0.38092	0.00338	112.75000	0.17270
2024	0.28075	0.00447	62.76000	0.06161

A5 Conservative Issue Position and Partisanship

In order to test a growing alignment between conservative issue position and Republican/conservative identification among Black voters, I observe the extent to which issue position and partisanship change over time. To do this, I selected 2 issues on which Republicans and Democrats differ—immigration and abortion. I find no strong evidence of increasing alignment over time.

A5.1 Support for Increasing Boarder Patrol

The relationship between support for increasing Boarder Patrol agents and Republican/Conservative identification was strongest in 2020 for Black voters and the electorate overall. (Tables 1-3)

A5.2 Opposition to Expanding Legal Status

Opposition to granting legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes is most strongly associated with Republican/Conservative identification in 2024. (Tables 4-6)

A5.3 Opposition to Pro-Choice in All Cases

Opposition to always allowing a woman the right to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice is most strongly associated with Republican/Conservative identification in 2024.

Table A4: Rep LegalStat (Black Subsamples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.03227	0.00439	7.35500	0.00698
2020	0.05239	0.00674	7.77900	0.00892
2024	0.08062	0.00600	13.44000	0.02325

Table A5: Consv LegalStat (CES Subsamples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.07986	0.00924	8.64600	0.00963
2020	0.10206	0.01103	9.25100	0.01259
2024	0.10810	0.00892	12.11000	0.01898

Table A6: Consv LegalStat (CES Full Samples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.25905	0.00349	74.25000	0.07868
2020	0.38360	0.00373	102.83000	0.14790
2024	0.38469	0.00351	109.77000	0.16730

Table A7: Rep Anti-ProChoice (Black Subsamples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.04252	0.00472	9.01000	0.01045
2020	0.06991	0.00594	11.77000	0.02017
2024	0.10232	0.00660	15.52000	0.03078

Table A8: Consv Anti-ProChoice (Black Subsamples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.12704	0.00990	12.84000	0.02100
2020	0.13933	0.00969	14.37000	0.02983
2024	0.18005	0.00973	18.51000	0.04328

Table A9: Consv Anti-ProChoice (CES Full Samples)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-value	R-squared
2016	0.36858	0.00342	107.85000	0.15280
2020	0.43672	0.00332	131.61000	0.22130
2024	0.50091	0.00333	150.51000	0.27420

A6 Questions

Below I include all of the questions used in the CES for response analysis, weighting, and controls.

A6.1 Standard Demographics

Primary demographic questions that have the same question and response forum on 2016 and 2020.
birthyr

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- In what year were you born?

gender

- Are you male or female? (2016, 2020)
 - Male
 - Female
 - skipped
 - not asked
- What is your gender (2024)
 - Man
 - Woman
 - Non-binary (2024)
 - skipped
 - not asked

educ

- 2016, 2020
- What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 - No HS
 - High school graduate
 - Some college
 - 2-year

- 4-year
 - Post-grad
 - skipped
 - not asked
-

edloan

- 2016, 2020
 - Are you currently responsible for paying off a student loan? (Please indicate yes even if your student loan is currently in deferment.)
 - Yes
 - No
 - Other
 - Don't know
 - None of these
 - skipped
 - not asked
 - No Data
-

race

- What racial or ethnic group best describes you? (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - White
 - Black
 - Hispanic
 - Asian
 - Native American
 - Middle Eastern
 - Mixed (2016), Two ore more races (2020, 2024)
 - Other
 - skipped
 - not asked

marstat

- What is your marital status? (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - Married
 - separated
 - Divorced
 - Widowed
 - Single (2016, 2020), Never married (2024)
 - Domestic Partnership
 - skipped
 - not asked

pid3

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?
 - Democrat
 - Republican
 - Independent
 - Other
 - Not sure
 - skipped
 - not asked

pid7

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- PID 7 TEXT
 - Strong Democrat
 - Not very strong Democrat
 - Strong Republican

- Not very strong Republican
 - Lean Democrat
 - Lean Republican
 - Independent
 - Not sure
 - skipped
 - not asked
-

ideo5

- 2016, 2020, 2024
 - In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?
 - Very liberal
 - Liberal
 - Moderate
 - Conservative
 - Very conservative
 - Not sure
 - skipped
 - not asked
-

urbancity

- 2020, 2024
- How would you describe the place where you live?
 - City
 - Suburb
 - Town
 - Rural area
 - other
 - N

region_post

- 2020, 2024
- In which census region do you live?
 - Northeast
 - Midwest
 - South
 - West

A6.2 Religion

In order to categorize Black respondents as members of Historically Black Churches, I combined several subcategories of Protestant, Baptist, and Methodist to the category of historically black church. The subcategories are marked with a cross.

religpew

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- What is your present religion, if any?
 - Protestant
 - Roman Catholic
 - Mormon
 - Eastern or Greek Orthodox
 - Jewish
 - Muslim
 - Buddhist
 - Hindu
 - Atheist
 - Agnostic
 - Nothing in particular
 - Something else
 - skipped
 - not asked

religpew_protestant

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- To which Protestant church or group do you belong?
 - Baptist
 - Methodist
 - Nondenominational or Independent Church
 - Lutheran
 - Presbyterian
 - Pentecostal
 - Episcopalian
 - Church of Christ or Disciples of Christ
 - Congregational or United Church of Christ
 - Holiness
 - Reformed
 - Adventist
 - Jehovah's Witness
 - Something else
 - skipped
 - not asked

religipew_baptist

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- To which Baptist church do you belong, if any?
 - Southern Baptist Convention
 - American Baptist Churches in USA
 - National Baptist Convention
 - Progressive Baptist Convention
 - Independent Baptist
 - Baptist General Conference

- Baptist Missionary Association
 - Free Will Baptist
 - General Association of Regular Baptist
 - Other Baptist
 - skipped
 - not asked
-

religipew_methodist

- 2016, 2020, 2024
 - To which Methodist church do you belong, if any?
 - United Methodist Church
 - Free Methodist Church
 - African Methodist Episcopal[†]
 - African Methodist Episcopal Zion[†]
 - Christian Methodist Episcopal Church
 - Other Methodist Church
 - skipped
 - not asked
-
-

faminc or faminc_new (2020)

- 2016, 2020, 2024
- Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?
 - Less than \$10,000
 - \$10,000 - \$19,999
 - \$20,000 - \$29,999
 - \$30,000 - \$39,999
 - \$40,000 - \$49,999

- \$50,000 - \$59,999
- \$60,000 - \$69,999
- \$70,000 - \$79,999
- \$80,000 - \$89,999
- \$90,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$119,999
- \$120,000 - \$149,999
- \$150,000 or more (2016)(2016)¹
- Prefer not to say
- \$150,000 - \$199,999
- \$200,000 - \$249,999
- \$250,000 - \$349,999
- \$350,000 - \$499,999
- \$500,000 or more
- skipped
- not asked
- \$250,000 or more

immstat

- Which of these statements best describes you? (2016, 2020)
 - Immigrant Citizen
 - Immigrant non-citizen
 - First generation
 - Second generation
 - Third generation
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Which of these statements best describes you? (2024)–(immstat)
 - I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen
 - I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen

¹ According to the CCES Guide 2016, 162 respondents answered “\$150,000 or more” but over 2,000 other respondents reported incomes above \$150,000 using the additional options.

- I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant
- My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant
- My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA
- skipped
- not asked

A6.3 Media

Media Grid–CC16 300 5, ,CC24_300

In the past 24 hours have you [read or used]

- Blog (2016)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- TV (2016)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Newspaper (2016, 2020, 2024), (CC20_300c,)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Radio (2016), Radio news (2020, 2024)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Social Media (2016, 2024), (CC20_300
 - selected

- not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Watch News (2016), TV news (2020)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Read (2016)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Newspaper
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Posted a story, photo, video, or link about politics (2016, 2020, 2024), (CC20_300d, CC24_300d)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Posted a comment about politics (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Read a story or watched a video about politics (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - selected

- not selected
- skipped
- not asked
- Followed a political event (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Forwarded a story, photo, video, or link about politics to friends (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - selected
 - not selected
 - skipped
 - not asked

A6.4 Conservative Crime Policy Support

CC16 307 Police Security

- 2016, 2020
- Do the police make you feel...?
 - Mostly safe
 - Somewhat safe
 - Somewhat unsafe
 - Mostly unsafe
 - skipped
 - not asked

CC24.321grid

Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?

- Eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders (2016, 2020)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked

- Require police officers to wear body cameras that record all of their activities while on duty (2016, 2020)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services (2016, 2020, 2024), (CC20_334c, CC24_321grid)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Increase prison sentences for felons who have already committed two or more serious or violent crimes (2016)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Decrease the number of police on the street by 10 percent, and increase funding for other public services (2020, 2024), (CC20_334d, CC24_321grid)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Ban the use of choke holds by police (2020)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Create a national registry of police who have been investigated for or disciplined for misconduct. (2020)
 - Support

- Oppose
- skipped
- not asked
- End the Department of Defense program that sends surplus military weapons and equipment to police departments (2020)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked
- Allow individuals and their families to sue a police officer for damages if the officer is found to have “recklessly disregarded” the individual’s rights (2020)
 - Support
 - Oppose
 - skipped
 - not asked

A6.5 Campaign Contact

CC24_431a)

- Did a candidate or political campaign organization contact you during the [YEAR] election? (2016, 2020, 2024), (CC20_431a, CC24_431a)
 - Yes
 - No

CC24_431a

How did these candidates or campaigns contact you?

- Check all that apply.(2016, 2020, 2024), (CC20_431b_1 -CC20_431b_4, CC24_431b_1-CC24_431b_4)
 - In person
 - * selected
 - * not selected
 - * skipped
 - * not asked
 - * No Data
 - Phone call (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - * selected

- * not selected
- * skipped
- * not asked
- * No Data
- Email or text message (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - * selected
 - * not selected
 - * skipped
 - * not asked
 - * No Data
- Letter or post card (2016, 2020, 2024)
 - * selected
 - * not selected
 - * skipped
 - * not asked
 - * No Data

A6.6 Racial Agreement

I am angry that racism exists. (2016)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- skipped
- not asked
- No Data

CC24_440_grid

White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. (2016, 2020, 2024)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree

- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- skipped
- not asked
- No Data

I often find myself fearful of people of other races. (2016)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- skipped
- not asked
- No Data

Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations (2016, 2020, 2024)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- skipped
- not asked
- No Data

A6.7 Hostile Sexism

Women seek to gain power by getting control over men. (2020, 2024) – (CC20_440c, CC24_440c)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Women are too easily offended. (2020, 2024) – (CC20_440d, CC24_440d)

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

A6.8 Vote Choice

Voted–CC24_401 Which of the following statements best describes you?

- I did not vote in the election this November
- I thought about voting this time–but didn’t.
- I usually vote, but didn’t this time.
- I attempted to vote but did not or could not.
- I definitely voted in the November 2024 General Election.

Presidential Vote (post)

- For whom did you vote for President in the United States?
 - 1 Donald Trump (Republican)
 - 2 Hillary Clinton (Democrat)
 - *Other responses 3-7, 98, 99, -1*
 - 1 Joe Biden (Democrat)
 - 2 Donald Trump (Republican)

- *Other*
- CC24_410
- 1 Kamala Harris (Democrat)
- 2 Donald Trump (Republican)
- *Other*