

Working Class Support for Right Wing Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

This thesis studies the working-class support for right-wing nationalism in the context of the revival of right-wing nationalism around the world. Aside from being the most dangerous trend of our time, right-wing nationalism plays a divisive role among different sectors of the working class. This requires that we revise our understanding of how right-wing ideologies gain currency among the working classes. This comparative analysis of workers in the U.S. and Turkey identifies similar politics between two cases that differ significantly in their political, economic and cultural structures. White and black workers in the U.S. South have struggled over unionization, while Turkish automotive workers in Bursa received historically significant economic and political gains despite significant oppression. The initial hypothesis of this research is that workers, whether they are successful or not in their efforts use nationalism to protect their location in labor relations and secure their future. Workers use right-wing nationalism for pragmatic reasons, not for ideological reasons. The research concludes that right-wing social and political organizations, supported by capitalists, maintain social divisions among workers that have already been established. The significance of the research is to evaluate the impact of right-wing nationalism in the moment of class-for-itself and class-in-itself.

Introduction

This article explores why particular sections of the working class support right-wing nationalist ideologies and political appeals. It builds upon the findings of a research based on reviews of news articles, editorials, existing ethnographic data as well as voter choices, to see how nationalism applies as an electoral choice, which examined the influence of right-wing nationalism among factory workers in Turkey and the United States through a comparative lens. The main concern is both political and scientific in its nature. Following decade of the 2008 financial crisis, the rise of right-wing nationalist movements and authoritarian governments blamed on working class people by mainstream liberal media and academics, infamously and starkly claimed “deplorables” (The Guardian, 2016). Today similar political treatment of the working class continues in different forms, either claiming that workers don’t support the parties

which are supposed to defend their interests, and these are usually center-left or liberal left parties. Hence they are declared as irrational people without being seen within the circumstances that they are operating (Chibber, 17). Or in the same vein, working class support for right-wing authoritarian parties and demagogues are being used as a pretext to remove political support from marginalized identities, primarily transsexual people (NBC News, 2024).

Contrary to the essence of this idea, the initial hypothesis of this research was that workers use right-wing nationalism to protect their position within labor relations and to further their strategies of self-protection including job security and being part of community. Workers use right-wing nationalism for pragmatic reasons, not for ideological reasons. This hypothesis is based on the fact that workers have to work together on the factory floor no matter what their racial or national backgrounds are even though the policy of the capitalists may take advantage of the racial privilege structure and employ workers accordingly (Cole and Deskins, 1988; Lawrence, 2008).

The dilemma between the initial hypothesis and the fact necessitates a multifaceted examination of impact of right-wing nationalism among workers. Because the reason why workers support an ideology — that contradicts with their class interests essentially — can be seen in the context of labor action in its best form. Because political ideas can be most amplified as deeds in social actions. Strikes, or, in general, labor struggles, are the most transparent example for analysis of the interaction of workers' identities, needs and political practices. While Turkish workers feel glorified for Turkey producing their own Turkish brand weapons while American workers have been prideful for American steel as “both a material and a metaphor for

the construction of the nation” (Evrensel, 2024; Balay, 2014, 1). Such themes of patriotic nationalism are common among workers as the expressions of right-wing nationalism.

Interestingly, the research suggests that such forms of pride for 'patria' does not mobilize workers for open violence against workers from minority populations by itself necessarily. Rationally, if workers are prevented from working together due to reasons such as racism, this can also harm employers. Beyond such a fact, racist discrimination does not emerge to this extent even within their own ranks. According to the data obtained, although manifestations of right-wing nationalism are effective in many ways, when it comes to their own class interests, the ideological hegemony of right-wing nationalism alone is not sufficient. In other words, right-wing nationalism collaborates with working class at the moment of class-in-itself in eclectic ways as opposed to middle class. The reason to compare the styles of right-wing nationalisms of these classes is to see that while wage laborers work together and are being exploited together, middle class of a certain nationality does not have to work side by side with a person from a minority ethnic or racial background.

In this context, this paper attempts to answer the question why workers support right-wing nationalist organizations and parties. Since the matter is whether or not workers follow their interests, this paper questions the rationality to support right-wing political ideologies and political appeals behind the workers' political choices, and investigates them within their experiences in working regimes and unhinged neoliberal policies to be able to see certain vulnerabilities and have-to-do pragmatic choices. Hence, the claim of our research is that workers' support of right-wing nationalism should not be ideological necessarily, but pragmatic in its nature. Therefore for workers such a pragmatic approach opens a space to ideological right-

wing nationalism but doesn't embrace this ideology to the level of hysterical nationalism as opposed to that one can see in the case of middle classes. However, empirically speaking the research concludes that social and political organizations that are right-wing nationalist oriented with the support of capitalists maintain social divisions among workers that has already been set.

Aside from being the most dangerous trend of our time, right-wing nationalism plays a divisive role among different sectors of the working class. This requires that we revise our understanding of how right-wing ideologies gain currency among the working classes. Beyond that another significance of the research is to evaluate the impact of right-wing nationalism in the moment of class-for-itself and class-in-itself. Content and discourse analyses are essential in treating and analyzing already existing ethnographic data and news articles on events, strikes, protests, or specific events, in which workers were involved, voter choices, and statistical information to map social and political characters of the workers.

Capitalism, Nationalism and Workers in Turkey and the United States

Mainstream media and academics alike have scapegoated working class people who support right-wing authoritarian appeals without acknowledging the conditions behind this support. At the same time, their counterparts on the political right caricature the white blue-collar worker as a hard-working man, loyal to “a masculine patriotic individualism at home in rural America” (Pied, 2018, 3). However, both of these characterizations share several faulty assumptions. Firstly, they view the partial support of working class for right-wing nationalist organizations as new. However, right-wing nationalism among the ranks of the working classes has been always an issue. Secondly, it is a misrepresentation to claim that the working class is

fully supportive of right-wing nationalist leaders: while some white workers voted for Trump in the 2016 presidential elections, a considerable number of them reacted by not voting for either party (Pied, 2018, 12). Lastly, uniform portraits of the working class fail to reflect the current composition of working classes, which are significantly diverse based on nationality, race, and gender.

However, the increase in working-class support for right-wing nationalist ideas is striking, considering that it is the same working class that once compelled the enactment of welfare state policies in pursuit of the greater social good. Based on the initial hypothesis of this research, different ways of practicing nationalism — whether it's about securing one's identity within the broader framework of nationhood or blaming others for economic decline or job loss — appear to be results of growing social and economic insecurity. The conditions that form the basis for the support of right-wing and racist politics should be sought within neoliberal policies (Davidson & Saull, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Fuller, 2023; Gandesha, 2018; Harmes, 2012; Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, 2018). David Harvey (2007) defines neoliberalism as “a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (19). This re-establishment and restoration took shape through mass privatization of the public sector, flexibilization in working conditions, and the creation of insecurity in employment.

In the face of overwhelming working regimes, the anger and resentment of the working class can be absorbed and contained by right-wing political organizations. Since this research focuses on a particular segment of the working class, mainly auto workers, whose economic and working conditions set a benchmark for the rest of the class, it is essential to understand their

work-life experiences. The post-Fordist neoliberal accumulation regime, marked by flexibility, has not been sufficiently examined as a primary reason behind this reaction from workers (Durak, 2011, 29). Increased flexibility and extended working hours, combined with high levels of precarity, often foster more conservative ideologies — ideologies that may help maintain neoliberal hegemony (Harmes, 2021, 60–61).

For this, our country case selections have a specific importance. Although the US and Turkey have structural differences such one being an industrialized and developed country, and the other being a middle-income country, dominant nationalisms show particular similarities especially regarding the republican values of founding eras, religiosity and contemporary right-wing authoritarian populist appeals and discourses (Dirilen-Gümüş, 2010; Hulse, 2025; Jolley, 2023; Roberts & Şahin, 2010). However, it is important to note that there is limited direct comparative scholarship focused solely on American and Turkish nationalism, but the topic has been reflected indirectly in multidisciplinary works. According to Roberts and Şahin (2010), research on American-Turkish relations, including diplomacy, immigration, and cultural exchange, often highlights the dominant role of American influence (508). During the Cold War, Turkey emerged as a key ally of the United States, while American consumer culture through Hollywood films and Madison Avenue marketing projected an image of prosperity that appealed to Turkish society (508).

Besides being “separated in time and space,” the founding era republican values of both nations were founded on “the common challenges of resistance to European colonialism as well as construction of post-colonial national unity” (513-14). They share similar strategies of nation building such as “suppression of political dissent; cultivation of political and cultural institutions

distinct from those of the imperial period; creation of myths, ... assertions of national “exceptionalism”; and reliance on the persistence of popular religious practices and attitudes about race and gender” (514).

While founding republican values share similarities, religiosity plays an important role in the political ideology. According to Dirilen-Gümüş (2010), religiosity affects political ideology both directly and indirectly by shaping value systems, regardless of whether they come from individualist or collectivist cultures (15). Based on the myth creation and religiosity, contemporary populist discourses—that led by Erdogan’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey and Trump’s MAGA movement (Make America Great Again) in the United States—share common themes such as “cultural symbols, national myths, and emotionally charged signifiers” (Hulse, 2021, 85). Such themes can be seen in the campaign agendas of both political movements. According to Jolley (2023), “one of the largest similarities that both former President Trump and President Erdoğan share is the manipulation of fear. This fear stems from the alleged loss of traditional values in each respective culture; however, fear and anxiety are exaggerated and securitized as an existential crisis” (26). Hence, manipulation of existing fears illustrates the existence of similar sociocultural institutions that are founded on symbols, myths and signifiers.

Beyond similarities, Turkish and American nationalisms have categorical differences. While American nationalism appears to be a successful case for civic nationalism, Turkish nationalism stands as a negative case of civic nationalism. Anthony W. Marx (1998) addresses inclusionary aspects of American nationalism. The inclusiveness of American nationalism can be supported by the study of Altıkulaç and Yontar (2019) which suggests that “the participants from

USA are better prone to global citizenship if compared with the participants from Turkey” (122). In the same vein, Yigit and Abel’s findings also demonstrates such openness of American nationalism in comparison of social acceptance in the United States and Turkey (2025, 93-4). Although Turkish nationalism is claimed to be embracing, Ince’s study (2012) demonstrates otherwise. She remarks that “Nationalism in civic education textbooks in Turkey appeared to be defined as political nationalism based upon citizenship, but in reality an ethno-cultural nationalism based upon race is promoted. The word ‘Turk’ has no racial meaning but embraces everybody who lives in Turkey, the books argued, yet throughout, the ethno-cultural definition of Turk was emphasised more than the political one” (Ince 2012, 184).

At this context, our research also aims to distill particular differences of how right-wing nationalism operates over common themes of two societies regardless of how individualist and collectivist through a macro-comparative history in a different context of time and space. Within a similar scope, it becomes important how strategic industries such as automotive and steel has been in the regions that are under conservative ideological hegemony such as Bursa and US South.

Bursa is a province which is located in the west of Turkey - one of the first capital of the Ottoman empire and its one of the primary industrial center. The movie “Strike” directed by Metin Yeğin has been screening in Turkish movie theaters is depicting the 1910 strike of Turkish, Rum and Armenian Anatolian textile workers (Yeğin and Uysal, 2010). Although Bursa textile has still an important position among Turkish industries, Bursa symbolized with steel industry — which is highly strategic for Turkish state. More accurately steel plays always a central role in any capitalist industry. Despite focusing on Renault car manufacturer in this article, for instance,

TOFAŞ (Turkish Automobile Factory Inc.), built by the owner of Koç holding—Vehbi Koç sent a letter to the head commander of Turkish Army Kenan Evren. And in this letter, he mentions that the governments came after the 1973 elections have been unable to bring the order, hence “teachers from their students, bureau chiefs from their public servants, mothers and fathers from their kids, and factory administrators from their worker are afraid of them” (Sönmez, 1992, 317). That’s being said, Koç affirms the coup and continues to advise the coup leader for what measures should be taken against communists, militant unionists, Kurds and Armenians. This letter shows how the steel is indispensable for the capitalists who have weight in their countries’ policies.

On the other, the United States is the second largest world producer of motor vehicles, and fourth largest producer of steel in 2020 (OICA, WorldSteel). And major automotive companies concentrated in the US South. The neoliberal economic structure, accompanied by racist structural violence that have shaped labor relations in the US South historically. Nissan, as a company, the political establishment at both federal and local levels, and business advocacy groups also played a critical role in encouraging elements of right-wing nationalism among workers, just like in Turkey. In this sense, Nissan’s production and market capacities, the company’s discriminatory practice in recruiting workers, combine with the anti-union climate of the US South, practices of the federal government and racist structural violence are matters here along with both Smyrna and Canton workers’ social and political characteristics. Only three of Nissan’s 43 plants worldwide are not unionized, one of them is in Canton, Mississippi and two in Tennessee (The Guardian, 2017). The anti-union climate of the US is most entrenched in the US South due to low labor costs and taxes. In 1980, the company announced its plans to start

building its first plant in the U.S. in Smyrna, they spent \$660 million.¹ Tennessee was one of the first U.S. states to adopt right to work laws in its constitution in 1946, followed by its enactment statute in 1947. Mississippi passed the statute in 1954, then constitutionally adopted it in 1960 (NCSL). Mississippi and Tennessee rank 31st and 16th in the Business Tax Climate Index (Tax Foundation, 2019), and neither state has adopted a state minimum wage which means they use the federal minimum wage of \$7.25 (NCSL). Beyond all, the Nissan company benefits from federal and local tax policies in the South: “Mississippi handed Nissan nearly \$1.3 billion in state and local subsidies to build the Canton plant in 2001” (In These Times, 2014).

With 169,236 sales, and a 6,400 strong workforce that includes 5,000 assembly line workers, Oyak Renault is central to the Turkish domestic economy and its position in the global economy. Besides that, Renault automobiles have been the most popular cars in 2017 and 2018 (Tüik, 2017, 2018).² In 2018, Nissan Motor Company, globally in alliance with Renault and Mitsubishi, ranked 5th among automotive producers, controlling 9.35% of the American market (Statista, 2019). Nissan Smyrna workers produces more than 640,000 cars and SUVs, and the company seeks to expand in Smyrna (Nashville Business Journal, 2017). In 2018, Nissan Smyrna approved a \$158 million dollar upgrade (Murfreesboro Daily News Journal. 2018). The chairman of Nissan North America, José Muñoz, said "We've literally increased our production in the last six years by more than 80 percent. We've increased the number of employees 75

¹ This encouraged other car manufacturers, such as German manufacturers BMW and Mercedes-Benz in the 1990s, and the Korean Hyundai and Kia in the 21st century, to place their plants in the South, where labor costs and unions are lower and weaker than in the upper Midwest (Minchin, 2017).

² 15.1% of the 64,238 automobiles produced in May 2017 and 18.6% of 36,788 in February 2018 belong to Renault.

percent. It couldn't be better... We just need more Smyrnas all around” (Nashville Business Journal, 2017).

All in all, this section examines how capitalism and nation-building to shape working-class experiences and ideologies in Turkey and the United States. While structural differences exist, their dominant nationalisms exhibit strong similarities particularly in founding myths, religiosity, and right-wing populist discourses to absorb working-class anger and resentment. The resurgence of right-wing nationalism among workers reflects deeper insecurities born of neoliberal economic transformations. In the context of the automotive industry, this section suggests how flexible labor regimes, anti-union climates, and state-capital alliances foster conservative political tendencies. By grounding nationalism in localized labor experiences from Bursa to the U.S. South the analysis underscores that working-class support for right-wing nationalism is less a matter of ideology than of lived material conditions. Ultimately, understanding these experiences across different contexts helps shed light on how nationalism and capitalism constitute a stable hegemonic order together.

Labor Regimes and Workers in Bursa, Mississippi and Tennessee

The Oyak Renault and Textile Workers in Bursa

The AKP provides an opportunity for analyzing class representation differently in the case of the working poor classes, specifically with respect to the party's desire to control them (Doğan, 2016, 246). Social classes exist twice, in 'distributions of material properties' and 'the contrasted classifications and representations produced by agents on the basis of a practical knowledge of these distributions' (Bourdieu, 2013, 296). Generally speaking, younger Turkish

workers have become more conservative and nationalist than in the past. In 2017, 46% of Turkish steel workers defined themselves primarily with their religion, as opposed to 14% with their class. By contrast, in 2008, it was 24% for the former, and 43% for the latter (Birleşik Metal, 2008, Öngel, 2017). In 2017, union workers who voted for AKP and MHP identified themselves with their religion, 69% and 48%, respectively (Öngel, 2017, 74). Therefore, this increase in religious identification among workers has accompanied by AKP's manipulation of class identities.

These dynamics are similarly present in Bursa and among Bursa's working classes. Members of the Bursa of Birleşik Metal³ rank third (51.7%) in identifying with their religion, after only Kocaeli (66.2%) and Gebze (55.1%) (75).⁴ Although no public statistics are available regarding worker profiles at the Bursa Oyak Renault factory, interviews with Renault workers show that the Bursa Oyak Renault workers are also not independent of the general political and social climate of the country, and generally tend to favor AKP, MHP, and the Republican People's Party (CHP) (Tali, 2016). Even though one worker said that most of the workers shifted from MHP to İYİ Party (Good Party), this does not mean that workers abandoned nationalist politics (Özkurt, 2018). The İYİ Party is a Turkish nationalist party that was led by a former MHP deputy and former minister of interior affairs, Meral Akşener. Besides seeking to appeal to younger generations, the party's politics are not different from MHP. Political campaigns for the March 31, 2019 local elections show that Renault workers showed a significant interest to AKP's candidate, Mustafa Bozbey, for mayor of the Bursa municipality (Bursadabugün, 2019). This

³ *United Steel Workers' Union*

⁴ Similarly extensive data was not present on the TMU website (Türk Metal Araştırma ve Eğitim Merkezi).

shows how workers pragmatically, and significantly relate themselves to mainstream political candidates.

Beyond the workers' support for the right-wing nationalist parties, specifically in Bursa, events in workers' social lives shows another side of their right-wing nationalism engagement with. One can easily find a rank-and-file member of the Turkish Metal Union (TMU - *Türk Metal Sendikası*) in the Ülkü Ocakları (*Bozkurtlar*/Greywolves)⁵ local chapters in Bursa (Bursada Bugün, 2012; Evrensel, 2016; Sendika.org, 2009). Many racist mob attacks that have included workers have been organized through these networks. The manifestation of daily stress and anger can be seen at soccer events, in which Bursaspor's fan club, Bursa Teksas, plays a role.^{6 7} The majority of Bursa automotive workers, including the Renault workers, are members of this fan club (Bursada Bugün, 2015). The provocative character of soccer culture has provided a hot bed for patriarchal and racist attitudes. The fan club joined in an attack that was predominantly organized by Greywolves on the Yavuz Sultan Selim neighborhood, which is mostly dominated by Kurds. After a march by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)⁸ in support of the hunger strikes of Kurdish political prisoners, approximately 130 Bursa Teksas fan club members joined this attack with weapons and doner kebab knives (Bursa Şehir Medya, 2012; Demokrat Haber, 2012). However, the fan club also changes its attitude towards social justice concerns when it matters for workers. During the strike, soccer fans went to support Oyak-

⁵ The organization has committed several lynchings, racist mob attacks, and massacres against ethnic and religious minorities throughout the most of history of Turkey.

⁶ Bursaspor (Bursa Soccer Club), the province's soccer team was founded in 1963 (Bursaspor Tarihi).

⁷ Bursa Teksas, *Bursa Texas*, is the leading fan club of Bursaspor founded in 1967.

⁸ BDP is a predecessor of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) as a representative of Kurdish politics at the level of the national politics.

Renault workers in front of the factory with the slogan: “Teksas is here, where is the Turkish Metal (Union)” (Bursada Bugün, 2015). Like most workers, the heavy industry workers of Turkey demand wages that allow them to afford basic life standards.⁹ Without this, workers complain about the current wages and policies of the factory administration.

The younger generation’s affiliation with right-wing parties stems from the neoliberal hegemonic regime, which has created an extremely conservative and pragmatic generation. According to the report of DISKAR, “Renault workers have the following characteristics like all workers, these workers are also largely in debt, they are in the grip between loans and unemployment” (Akkaya, 2016, 74). Workers worry about family relationships: their household partners are afraid that workers may lose their jobs because of striking (74). Working conditions in the factory amplify these overwhelming pressures. The Oyak Renault factory produces a car in only 57 seconds (Özkurt, 2015). One Renault worker, who worked at a hood band for 12 years, said “When I first came here, we were 61 people in two production teams of the band. As of now two production teams, we are 29 people, and we are doing same work” (Arabacı, 2015, 187). As one man noted: “There are a lot of friends, who recently had surgery, waiting in the line to work in those sectors that you went for” (188). Therefore, repressive nature of neoliberal work regime has been shaped the social character of workers who support right-wing nationalism and these phenomena cannot be understood independent of one another.

Despite the suffering endured by workers under such conditions, the neoliberal regime is consolidated through the alliance of the TMU, Turkish Employers' Association of Metal

⁹ Generally speaking, they characterize their living standard as being able to gas up their cars to have a trip with their families and they can go for a meal with their families at least twice in a month. These are indispensable for them.

Industries (MESS), and the state, and workers continue to support right-wing nationalist ideologies, movements, and politicians. It is a widely known reality that members of TMU attacked leftists who were distributing flyers that call for workers to stand for their rights. Although members of the union were encouraged by high-ranking union officials to do so, rank-and-file workers were involved in these attacks. Workers' nationalist attacks are mostly limited to the boundaries of their factories. It is known that TMU organized workers' attacks on the HDP (pro-Kurdish party) headquarters in Bursa on several occasions, drawing upon nationalist anger against Kurds (Sarıkaya, 2015; Youtube, 2015). However, the attack took place in an apartment building that housed several socialist parties that align with Kurdish national demands. Importantly, nationalist attack did not target these offices, but just pillaged the office of HDP, which shows that directing as a form of manipulation has a crucial place in these attacks. Because the socialist parties are not perceived as "separatist,"¹⁰ as is HDP, their offices were not directly attacked. However, in the propaganda pamphlets of right-wing nationalist organization, socialist parties have been framed as separatist, traitors, and satellites of foreign powers. Most strikingly, when the nationalist mob was hanging a flag on the roof of the HDP office, a police officer helped them (Youtube, 2015). In that sense, its direction by state or civil entities determines the occurrence and target of the attack for the Renault workers.

The behaviors of Bursa's textile workers differ markedly from the Renault workers. Following Coşkun, one has to acknowledge the different manifestations of right-wing

¹⁰ Separatism is a pejorative word that has been used to label anyone or any groups that supports Kurdish rights in Turkey.

nationalism in different classes, such as the working classes and middle classes, due to their different locations in the production process, society, and place (Coşkun, 2013, 200).¹¹

Moreover, while the ideological elements of right-wing nationalism vary across classes, it also varies within classes. In Coşkun's study, right-wing nationalism from Turkish textile workers against Kurdish workers manifest as 'experienced other(ization)' (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 63-4; Coşkun, 2013, 204). Middle class nationalism has framed Kurds as people who are 'earning unjustly' rather than defining them as only 'separatists' which was assigned by the nationalist climate of the country (Coşkun, 2013, 204-5). By contrast, Erdoğan's study, the working characterization of the notion "poverty" illuminates the social limits of right-wing nationalism among textile workers, and misery is not only a question of poverty, but also of cultural representation (Erdoğan, 2011, 32). The statistical data collected by Coşkun shows that while 41% of Zonguldak miners say that it would be better if the administrators are Turkish, only 29% of textile workers do so. With respect to whether or not Turkish bosses should be nationalist, 25% of miners, and 12% of textile workers agreed. The idea that nationalist ideas can unite workers is supported by 52% of miners and 36% of textile workers (Coşkun, 2013, 205). As such, the nationalist practices of the Turkish-Sunni heavy industry workers can be seen as similar to nationalist practices of the middle classes. Thus, one may identify how spatial characteristics of both industries differ due to economic injustices that are embedded in the inequality in the neoliberal economic order.

¹¹ At this point, he disagrees with Laclau. For Laclau (1977), it would be meaningless to try to understand any ideological element with class belonging, which disregards the role of the class characteristic power apparatus, nationally and internationally, in the ideological hegemony.

The argument here is that textile workers from different nationalities share a culture of poverty, such that notions of “unjust earning” are not part of right-wing nationalist attacks against Kurds. Because the nature of textile industry does not require educated, highly skilled workers, individual workers are not indispensable, creating precarious work and job insecurity. This encourages workers to accept lower earnings, since demanding wage increases or organizing for such purpose would be dangerous. At the same time that the union complains about workers that do not join union demonstrations, 300 workers out of 2000 workers from a factory joined a union-organized nationalist demonstration. As a result, Coşkun argues that workers’ nationalism differs from middle class’ nationalism because of the class characteristics of their daily life, and their spatial experience with ‘the other’ (Coşkun, 2013, 206).

Whether a textile or steel worker, Turkish-Sunni workers may have enmity towards Kurds. Following Marx, the divisive ideologies of the ruling classes maintain the neoliberal working regime (Marx&Engels, 1998, 67). As it can be seen from the examples, textile workers do not join nationalist actions even if their union requires it. Such passive behavior in the face of nationalist movements can be found among automotive workers as well, where the directions policies of the TMU, Greywolves, and police determine what workers are going to do. However, the unwillingness of textile workers to participate in nationalist demonstrations and the extremely passive role of Renault workers shows that the class formation, location, and spatial characteristics of the working class does not allow right-wing nationalism to consolidate its hegemony fully, and can be a part of workers’ efforts at securing the livelihoods.

After the currency crisis of the summer of 2018, the Turkish economy suffered with hikes even in the prices of basic goods (BBC News, 2018; Yackley, 2019). The crisis, and the resulting

extreme poverty, increased in unemployment, and decline in wages, blew back on the AKP-MHP alliance during the 2019 local elections, when this alliance lost two large cities, Ankara and Istanbul, after 25 years of rule by conservative parties. Even though AKP cancelled the Istanbul election results by YSK (Supreme Electoral Council), CHP (Republican People's Party) increased their lead in March, of 13,000 votes, to 777,000 (The Guardian, 2019). Moreover, AKP also lost between 6% and 10% votes in important industrial regions, where workers mostly reside, such as İstanbul, Bursa and Kocaeli (Evrensel, 2019). These examples confirm the difference between workers' use of right-wing nationalism to protect their future and workers' voting for a right-wing nationalist for purely nationalist purposes: following economic downturn, workers responded by abandoning right-wing parties.

Wildcat Strikes in Bursa

On May 15, 2015, approximately 1,500 car assembly workers out of 5,000 workers at the Oyak-Renault plant in Bursa went on a wildcat strike, an intensification of protests that began on April 14th of the same year (Evrensel, 2015). The majority of the Oyak Renault¹² workers, composed of ethnic Turkish supporters of right-wing nationalist parties, engaged in historically notable strikes in 2015 and 2017.¹³ Workers went on strike to enhance their wages to the level of Bosch workers, who had received more in the collective bargaining between TMU and MESS. This in turn sparked a national steel strike, the “Metal Fırtına” (Steel Storm) (Senem, 2017). The

¹² Oyak-Renault is a Turkish automotive producer in Bursa. It is co-owned by Oyak (Turkish Armed Forces Pension Fund) and Renault. Oyak and Renault share 49% and 51% of the company respectively (Uluslararası İş Ortaklarımız, Oyak). Furthermore, they renewed their business partnership for 27 years more (Habertürk, 6/29/18). Oyak is the abbreviation for the pension fund of the Turkish Armed Forces.

¹³ Most of Turkish steel workers in Bursa are Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria (Filizler, 2012).

strike resulted in open confrontation between workers and the TMU. Despite TMU's all mafia-like repressive tactics and right-wing nationalist ideology, workers took a determined stance against MESS, and sought to prevent their coworkers from being fired after the strike ended (Senem, 2017). Although the propaganda of state, bosses, and the union had secured the nationalist and conservative sentiments among the workers in the long term, the workers demanded that TMU exit from their factory as they sought either to form a new union, or to join United Steel Workers - Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (Birleşik Metal-İş - DİSK). One result of the strike was the disabled ideological control that has been imposed of the state, the TMU, and the MESS.

This coercive partnership structured workers' demand during wildcat strikes of 2015 and 2017. The wildcat strike of May 2015, in particular, rejected bureaucratic unionism in favor of democratic unionism (Taştan, 2015). As workers built their own committees, independent from TMU, the 2015 strike was also a practice of democracy from below. Although authorities of MESS and Turkish labor department ruled these attempts unlawful, bosses still called the workers to meet, taking advantage of judicial processes to break the workers' initiative (Evrensel, 5/14/15, 5/15/2015). However, workers continued to protest until employers agreed to improvements in wages and working conditions. Workers' persistence in their demands resulted from the factory regime consolidated by the alliance of TMU, MESS and Turkish State.

The strike ended with the partial surrender of bosses and state mediation. Renault workers gained a considerable, including performance premiums and increases in hourly and monthly wages (Senem, 2017). Although the freedom of union choice and to not to be fired any of workers, who joined the strike, was promised by bosses, those bosses started to fire militant

workers that took part in the strike in the following months (İleri Haber, 2016). The failure of the United Steel Workers to unionize workers in this context allowed to the TMU to impose itself again, despite its loss of support among the majority of workers in the factory.

The TMU's coercive role should not be as a consensual relationship with workers who viewed the union as part of formal judicial processes. Before the strike, Renault workers, along with other workers, protested against the union in the garden of a mosque located in the industrial field. The union and state responded with force and right-wing slogans. On May 5, a group of 150 people with bats, including some administrators of the union, attacked the workers with the support of undercover policemen crying "Among you, there are separatists, PKKers" (Evrensel, 2015).¹⁴ Despite these tactics, workers' reaction against the union continued calling out the vice president of TMU, Mesut Gezer: "You are the real terrorists, we don't want a terrorist union," and "The gang of TMU can't dismay us" (Bursadabugün, 2015). In response to workers' rejection of the TMU as their legitimate representative, union administrators, Radu Mavrodin, the director of human resources at Renault, the vice president of TMU, Yusuf Ziya Odabaş, termed the workers' resignation from the union as a previously alleged scenario (conspirative), and called on the company to intervene in this "unlawful" behavior (Cumhuriyet, 2016). Ultimately, although some workers joined the United Steel Workers, or they were planning to build their own union, they went back for TMU when their protests lost momentum

¹⁴ PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party

(Evrensel, 2016). However, despite the conservative and compromising actions of the Renault worker, this strike showed them when they persist, they can break the hold of a troika.¹⁵

After the workers' resistance was broken by the governorship, police, and bosses, president Erdoğan said "They want to stir the Renault factory up in Bursa" in a TMU meeting on March 8, 2016 (Evrensel, 2016). Workers found themselves at odds with his comments, rejecting his claim about their rights, even while supporting AKP. One worker said:

Personally, I voted twice for the AKP. I do not confirm this support of the President to the Turkish Metal Union. In this factory, many friends, who became members of AKP, or voted for it, joined the United Steel Workers after they resigned from the Turkish Metal. This is a constitutional right. It would have been more appropriate if the President listened the Renault workers. Despite the President's stance, many AKP friends say they will not resign from the United Steel Workers and will wait until the 2017 contract (Evrensel, 2016).

At the same time, the Turkish state plays a salient role in weakening workers' struggle. Even though some of the workers did not find the President's stance satisfying, workers were careful not to politicize the ongoing events. Another worker expressed his apolitical stance:

We have eyes neither on the wealth of bosses, nor their status. Our only aim is to live and to work humanely by taking our rights fully in order to gain, and to make gained. There is an order. None of them can say that the passenger will overthrow the captain and govern the ship. Everybody says I'm going to reach the shore in safe. In doing so, there is no conservative, no leftist, no atheist, that does not bind us. But this is a reality. Our slogans, our ideas are free and not binding (Arabacı, 2015, 186).

¹⁵ In terms of coercive mechanisms, lawful mechanisms, or ideological and cultural mechanisms, are present in both Turkey and the US, although different at levels of institutionalization and the level of state involvement. In Turkey's case, the TMU, bosses and the state can be assessed as a troika alliance. In this alliance, the government is more likely to involve in a case if the local authorities, aka Turkish Metal Union and bosses, cannot handle the labor grievance.

Despite the accommodationist sentiments seen in workers' statements, workers are aware of the overarching power relations in the factory regime. According to these relations, they are careful about what they say to the outsiders about their thoughts on politics and ongoing struggle.

Workers' caution about 'being political' is significant as it shows that there is a limited understanding about this troika. Similar workers who organized and took wildcat actions against TMU and MESS, limited themselves to being apolitical. However, declaring an apolitical stance is *also* a political stance that reaffirms the existing working regime. Of course, the reactions of workers vary according to moments of struggle, changing conditions, or the people who were interviewed. But while the workers have ideas that favor the existing order and the state, these examples illustrate some gaps in the ideological hegemony of the state; workers in these strikes were more likely to be open to endorse the acts of the political leadership of the state rather than other parties of this troika. This shows that there is a contradiction for workers to understand the relationship between the state and the collaboration of TMU and MESS. Although workers defer to the authority of the state, their reasons are not clear, as the workers learned that their unity allows them the power to stand against the collaboration of TMU and MESS. Here, the puzzle is whether workers do not confront state authority because they believe that they are unable to cope with it, or because they actually believe in the permanentness of the state. These answers are not mutually exclusive.

However, it is reasonable to assume the former over the latter, as it better explains the rational tendency of the workers to assert their interests and still engage in right-wing nationalist action. Because one may notice that the President Erdoğan spoke after the crackdown on workers from the security forces and the local governance, and even then AKP-supporting workers were

divided as a result of the speech. This means that workers did not find the speech of the highest official of the state satisfactory even if their actions were disrupted. However, this association with the country is still processed through a right-wing nationalist, conservative lens.

Post-Fordism and Precarity: Labor Regimes at Nissan Smyrna and Nissan Canton

Although the Trump administration is often characterized as economically nationalist, the administration's economic policies do not differ, in essence, from neoliberalism. While Trump's protectionist steel tariff policy increased tariffs on import and export cars, General Motors announced plans to cut 15,000 jobs in the United States and Canada (AP News, 2018).

Protectionism is not enough, by itself, to reverse a neoliberal agenda that has been developing for decades. Despite the Trump administration's pressure on GM, the company shut down the plants in Ohio and Indiana (Gruenberg, 2019). As in the Turkish case, the socio-economic conditions of U.S. workers are getting worse under an administration that proclaims its support for 'just labor.'

In this context, white blue-collar workers in the United States feel marginalized, besieged, and ridiculed as "backward" by the national media (Hochschild, 2016). Hochschild's (2016) research on blue-collar Louisianians' support for right-wing candidates demonstrates how their support can be understood as an emotional reaction against the people they think are responsible for the economic and environmental devastation of their communities. Hochschild conceptualizes such support as "emotional self-interest" in which people attach themselves to Trump's speech with a joyous feeling (Hochschild, 2016, 228). In that sense, Donald Trump appears as an image of honesty, and a problem-solver, not a problem-seeker.

As a part of the focus, data about electoral choices, racial and religious identities in both Canton and Smyrna reveal the effects of neoliberal regime, the 2008 financial crisis, and association with right-wing nationalism nationally. While Canton is 71.2% black and 22.3% white, Smyrna is 68.4% white and 13.7% black. In Canton, the population by 2010 was divided religiously with 30% being evangelical Protestants, and only 5.9% black Protestant denominations; in Smyrna, 27.2% of the population is evangelical Protestant and 0.7% black Protestant denominations. In both counties, there were significant increases the number of evangelical Protestants between 2000 to 2010. While the numbers of evangelical Protestants doubled in Canton, and increased 40% in Smyrna, however, the numbers of —religious individuals also increased to 50% in Canton, and surpassed 50% in Smyrna. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and deepening effects of the neoliberal policies in the workers' lives, both religious and non-religious identities showed significant increase. These changes in religious identities were accompanied by shifts in voting patterns: people lost faith in both parties. In both counties, the Democrats and Republicans lost votes in 2016, as compared to 2012. Democrats lost 2.5% and Republicans 1.3% of their 2012 votes in Smyrna. For Canton, these were 1.2% and 1.1%, respectively. However, Republicans are dominant in both Canton and Smyrna, although the party recorded its biggest increase between 2000 and 2004, in Smyrna, when it gained 8% more vote. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and resulting nationalist atmosphere galvanized nationalist feelings among American voters (City-Data Smyrna-Canton). It is essential to note just as in the Turkish case, that workers' political tendencies cannot be understood independently of the general political climate. In that sense, workers are connected to developments in national

politics, and have reacted nationalistically. However, the recent fall in the voting support for both parties could be counted as a sign of reaction to the political establishment.

Unsafe working conditions, speed-ups, low wages, the lack of job security, outsourcing policy and disrespect to the lifestyles of the workers demonstrate that American automotive workers, black or white, are not excluded from overwhelming oppression and exploitation that the neoliberal working regime maintains. Based on data from 2005, the Nissan Smyrna plant “builds a car in just under 16 labor hours—six fewer than the average Honda or Toyota plant, eight fewer than GM and ten fewer than Ford. Its profit per vehicle of \$2069 is the best in North America” (Brown, 2005, 135). Workers complained about work conditions at the company during the 2001 vote, saying “line speeds were too fast and people were getting injured” (Brown, 2005, 136). Conditions in the Canton plant do not differ. UAW President Dennis Williams says the Canton workers have “a lot of issues, not only health and safety, the whole issue of seniority provisions, protection that you have in the workplace... They need not only better wages, secure wages and benefits. Where employers just can’t at a stroke of a pen take away your pension or take away your health care, or say ‘OK, we’re going to give you health care but you’re going to pay \$1,200 a month for it.’ That’s having a real voice, having a contract” (Laing, 2017).

Although the company is a foreign private enterprise, it is not an obstacle for them to engage in the local state entities, and benefit from opportunities. This results for workers to pay ‘taxes to the boss.’ The nature of Japanese manufacturers coming to the US (Cole and Deskins, 1988) should also be considered here: Japanese manufacturers in the U.S. have a “consistent pattern” of locating their plants approximately 30 miles from the closest concentration of black workers. In that sense, it makes quite a bit of sense that the first Nissan factory was located in

Smyrna. The Nissan Smyrna plant employs 8,400 employees, though those employees are not representative of the local population (Nissan News, Smyrna Fact Sheet). Based on a study in 1988, black workers composed of 14% of the workforce, lower than the 19.3% black individuals in the area (Cole and Deskins, 1988). Later reports also confirm that whites are predominant in the Smyrna plant, earning \$2-\$3 per hour than the mostly black Nissan workers at Canton (Challenge, 2017; Schmitt, 2013). Although the workers of Smyrna are treated better than the workers at Canton, non-union labor at the Smyrna plant makes about \$3 an hour less in benefits than the unionized workers at General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, who are represented by the United Auto Workers (Brown, 2005). Although the CEO of the time, Jerry Benefield, denied claims that Nissan was avoiding recruiting Black workers because they are more sympathetic to the unions, the workforce as remained mostly white (Minchin, 2017).

As in the case study on the Bursa workers, one may see how the neoliberal structural violence, anti-union tactics of the company, and the unions' inability to organize led workers to adopt elements of right-wing nationalism to protect their future in both Smyrna, Tennessee and Canton, Mississippi Nissan factories. For many years, United Automobile Workers (UAW) tried to organize in both factories. In the summer 1989, 'one of the nation's most closely watched union organizing campaigns' failed when the Smyrna Nissan workers voted overwhelmingly, 1,622 to 711, against the unionization of their workplace by the United Automobile Workers (UAW) (Risen, 1989). In 2001, Smyrna workers rejected the union with 3,103 out of 4,589 votes, no better than 2:1 margins of the previous vote (Hakim, 2001). In 1989, the Smyrna workers cheered their voting for no to union as a victory for "Americanism," while they waved American flags and held a "Union Free and Proud" sign (Lawrence, 2008). When the union tried to

organize the Canton Nissan plant in 2017, it failed again, when more than 60 percent of roughly 3,500 employees rejected the union (Scheiber, 2017). In Smyrna, the 1989 and 2001 failures with the 2017 attempt in Canton demonstrate that the masculine, individualistic, and anti-union image of workers as a fundamental part of American nationalism plays an important role under the precarious conditions created by the neoliberal working order, that was accompanied by the general political-economic climate, including right to work law, media, federal tax reductions for the Southern states and racist structural violence. In that sense, the 2017 Canton workers have a significant place in the assessment of the role of right-wing nationalism in labor relations in a racially diverse population (Lind, 2017).

According to Minchin, the reasons for defeat in Smyrna were “the internal divisions with the UAW, ...staffing problems among organizers, ...Nissan’s practice of breaking workers into small teams, and Nissan’s policy of not laying off workers” (Minchin, 2017, 398). However, he also claims that the defeat of UAW should be placed in a broader context. According to Brooks, there was “an anti-union trifecta: Nissan, the Mississippi political establishment, and outside business advocacy groups” (Brooks, 2017).¹⁶ In the summer 2017 unionization drive, the racist political establishment, also got involved in the anti-union campaign against the UAW in Canton. In a WYAB talk radio show from central Mississippi, one caller urged pro-union Nissan workers

¹⁶ Similarly, workers in both Turkish and American cases sympathize with government involvement since it has a sedative and “reasonably” problem solving role. In the Turkish case, the government plays a “father” like role. Turkish workers do not recognize any other authority than the state. As a representation of ethnic nationalism, it has become natural. In addition to that, Turkey is a late capitalist country, which still carries a traditional family structure stronger than that found in the US; the interpretation of the Turkish state as a father, essentially, can be seen clearly as a continuation of the traditional family. In the US, this is a matter of extensive ideological and cultural forces, in which anti-unionism is clearly a matter of American nationalism. However, even in the American case, grievances cannot be solved without the involvement of the federal government, even if it is an agency such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), that specializes in solving labor grievances.

that they would “go right back to...picking cotton and plowing fields or digging ditches,” which prompted an enthusiastic “You got that right!” from the in-studio host (Saunders, 2017).¹⁷

Beyond that, a worker described the propaganda of the company, the local political establishment, and business advocacy groups as “You ever heard of telepathic power? It was like that... It was overwhelming. They were in our heads 24-7” (Brooks, 2017).

Other reasons which were not discussed publicly. While UAW targeted the company owners and their anti-union tactics, the bosses celebrated the fact that workers were fine with being non-union. The company claimed that workers’ wages and benefits were 37% higher than the average manufacturing worker in mid-Tennessee (Minchin, 2017). Besides the belligerent climate of anti-union politics of the time coming from the top, Minchin claimed the reasons of the union’s organizing failure stemmed from the union’s lack of organizational ability, which was also evident in the case of Canton (Minchin, 2017; Brooks, 2017).

On the other side, Christina Doss, a production technician at the Canton plant said “Nissan Canton isn’t perfect, but I think we have a pretty good company we’re working for with a good group of people... Anything that needs to be done, we could work it out ourselves. I don’t see a need for an outside mediator to come in... I just don’t see a need for it” (Laing, 2017).

Mickey Fugitt, another technician and a former member of the Teamsters union at his previous job, expressed his intent to vote “no” for the 2017 union vote in Canton, recalling his past

¹⁷ This striking occasion demonstrates how national oppression mechanisms apply to the working class alongside other forms of anti-union campaigning. The inclusionary nationalism of Americanism shows its contradictory nature in moments such as these. Although racial equity is treated as an issue that has been already resolved, if one has an pro-union stance, that person doesn’t recognize an unwritten value of Americanism, for which they take your privilege of being a steel worker, or an auto worker back. If one does not celebrate the “American” values as defined by right-wing nationalists and instead act as a ‘troublemaker,’ that person may go back to “picking cotton and plowing fields or digging ditches,” which is a reference to the terrible history of slavery, sharecropping, and prison labor in the U.S.

experiences: “I’ve been in a union before, I know all about the union... I’m definitely not going to join. I don’t care if they bring it in or not. I have paid all the dues I am going to pay” (Laing, 2017).

The anti-union culture, attached to an ‘Americanism’ that frames American blue-collar workers masculine, individualist and hardworking, has played a crucial role in anti-union efforts across the country beginning with Reaganite anti-unionism (Lawrence, 2008). Being a part of the steel industry lends itself more easily to falling into the American mystification of the steel industry through the assumption of masculinity and heterosexuality. According to Anne Balay, ‘steel is both a material and a metaphor for the construction of the nation,’ and is a part of the idealization of American spirit (Balay, 2014, 1-2). This right-wing caricature of American workers, loyal to ‘a masculine patriotic individualism at home in rural America,’ sheds a light on the contradiction, between anti-unionist ideology and labor regimes (Pied, 2018, 3): Although workers are divided into small teams among assembly lines, they stand together in the factory. On top of that, the “privilege” of being an auto worker, who produces one of the most commonly used products in the United States, allows the identity of being a worker to be equated with being a part of middle class, which causes workers to render racial equity and unions as ‘progressive,’ ‘trouble-making,’ and ‘intellectualist’ images.

Prosperity, as a mythic value of Americanism, plays a role here, too. Since the 1980s, theories of democratization in the academy and among policy-makers have viewed the middle class as central to democracies. Plans to encourage democratization among authoritarian and quasi-democratic countries, it empowered some occupational categories, that do not require physical labor, but also supported industrial manufacturing jobs for the same reason. Similarly,

American unions have put forward the slogan of “more middle-class jobs” as if being a part of working class is something to be ashamed of. This dominant narrative and temporary material realities of the global north countries kept the illusion of being middle class alive for a long time. In that sense, the American national value of “prosperity” has been supported exploitative material realities. However, the 2008 financial crisis and following breakdown of the unipolar world order directed each developed industrial country, including the U.S., to take account of what they took from their workers and working people in general.

In that sense, Coşkun’s (2013) findings about the nature of right-wing nationalism among the Bursa textile workers, benefitting from Saraçoğlu’s (2011) study on nationalism in İzmir and ways of otherization, shows that critics must begin to perceive anti-unionization, and anti-minority elements of right-wing nationalism among the workers, as learned or being directly an outcome of national climate, i.e. the nationalist effect of 9/11 in the 2004 presidential elections, and the effects of neoliberal policies generally. Therefore, ‘experienced otherization’ applies to anti-union culture, too, in a way that workers don’t treat ‘unions’ as the images of “progressivism,” but they experienced (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 63-4; Coşkun, 2013, 204).

Unless UAW develops a workers’ political initiative more in addition to its economic platform, it will fail, just as many scholars have failed to properly understand right-wing politics in working class communities afflicted by neoliberal policies. Employers take advantage of all the means that racist structures and the neoliberal regime provide. The establishment of the company, political authorities, and business advocacy groups can marshal ‘anti-unionism’ with workers as a measure against unions. This demonstrates the extent to which they can use meanings, history, and propaganda. Anti-unionism is treated as an element of Americanism, as an

unwritten cornerstone of American myth of individualism. The reaction of white worker to the union is not because of the dominant narrative of ‘unionism,’ but how workers experience unions. Therefore, anti-unionism among white workers does not confirm the dominant narrative, as workers play their role as part of right-wing nationalism, that has been portrayed essentially American.

Findings and Conclusion

To sum up, the working class is not condemned to nationalism. What is often overlooked by liberal pundits and academic commentators is how the ideological apparatus of the nation-state continues to reproduce its dominance in everyday life. This study aimed to show that such dominance is not natural or automatic. Hence it requires closer attention to how state institutions, employers’ associations, and right-wing grassroots organizations shape workers’ political orientations and offer narratives that respond to their need for socio-economic security.

Throughout the article, it became clear that workers are not passive receivers of nationalist ideology. They actively position themselves within it. It is sometimes to protect their ground, sometimes because there is no other viable alternative in sight. But as soon as workers take action and gain something tangible, whether it's a wage increase, better conditions, or just solidarity through organizing, the grip of nationalist coercion begins to weaken. Nationalism loses its persuasive power when real class conflict becomes visible.

One of the core findings is that lack of union organization leaves workers more vulnerable to acting against their long-term class interests. Associating with right-wing politics can provide a temporary sense of belonging or dignity, but when a strike or unionization effort

breaks out, the contradictions between workers and bosses emerge clearly. It is in these moments that workers start questioning the nationalisms that had previously seemed to make sense. Especially in this period of rising right-wing ideological influence, we must question how privatization, flexibilization, and job insecurity are being normalized and imposed? More uncertainty creates more anger and more urgency to explain why our lives are unstable. In that search, right-wing nationalism often becomes a default answer especially when there is no credible alternative rooted in working-class experience and demands.

In short, this article shows that right-wing nationalism is not inevitable among workers. It fills a vacuum created by systemic disorganization, economic precarity, and the absence of collective politics. But it can also be challenged. When workers organize, when they see each other not as competitors or national subjects but as fellow workers in the same struggle, the ideological foundations of nationalism begin to crack.

***Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process**

During the preparation of this work the author(s) used ChatGPT in order to clarify the language in a few paragraphs, as the author's first language is not English. After using this tool/service, the author(s) reviewed and edited the content as needed and take(s) full responsibility for the content of the published article.

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