

Within-Group Status Hierarchy and its Impact on Latine Politics

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Abstract

Why do some Latines express political preferences that diverge from conventional wisdom concerning their political behavior? This puzzle has gained urgency amid prominent media attention on Latine voters who express Republican support and conservative policy preferences. Drawing on 33 in-depth interviews across eight cities, I introduce the concept of the *within-group status hierarchy*: a framework that theorizes how marginalized group members perceive themselves relative to other members of their marginalized group, and how this matters for their policy preferences and political behaviors. Findings from a national survey of Latines (N=1,500) suggests that Latines who see themselves as higher-status within the Latine community often engage in political group distancing, which I conceptualize as favoring stricter immigration policies, opposing aid to low-income co-ethnics, and embracing conservative stances that align more with dominant-group interests than with co-ethnic solidarity. This pattern holds even after controlling for demographics and partisanship. By shifting focus from inter-group to intra-group dynamics, this research offers a new framework for understanding how perceived status *within* an ethnoracial group can disrupt expectations of political solidarity.

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Introduction

For over a century, the Rio Grande Valley in South Texas had reliably delivered large margins of victory for the Democratic Party.¹ This heavily Latine² region, where Spanish is often the first language and families have lived for generations on both sides of the border, seemed to perfectly fit the Democratic Party's expectations—a coalition of communities that benefited from Democratic-supported social programs, families whose relatives faced immigration challenges that Republicans often promised to intensify, and working-class voters whose economic interests seemed naturally aligned with Democratic policies. For decades, the conventional wisdom in American politics held that Latines—now the largest minority voting bloc in the country—would remain reliably Democratic (Huddy, Mason and Horwitz 2016). These voters had every reason to support the Democratic Party that championed their interests (see Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991 and Abrajano and Alvarez 2010) and every reason to oppose the Republican Party that did not.

Over the last three presidential contests, however, a surprising pattern has emerged: reports of Latine voters increasingly supporting Republican candidates in heavily Latine counties all over the country that were long considered Democratic strongholds³—and national Latine vote share for Republicans jumped from 27% to 32% (Hernandez-Echevarria 2024). While recent headlines in news stories about Latine politics have

¹CBS: Texas Border County Backed Democrats for Generations; Trump Won it Decisively

²I use the word *Latine*, instead of Hispanic, Latino, Latina, or Latinx, to refer to individuals of Hispanic/Latino background with an intent of being gender-inclusive and its easier integration into the Spanish language. Data collection used the terms Hispanic, Latino and Latina as reflective of grassroots preference over gender-inclusive terms, see d'Urso and Roman Working Paper.

³Texas Observer: In The Rio Grande Valley, the Red Wave makes Landfall

raised alarms about defections from the Democratic Party, such behavior is not new—individuals with marginalized identities have long crossed partisan lines in ways that seem contrary to their group’s collective interests (Hopkins, Kaiser and Pérez 2023; Sanchez 2024). In fact, among Latines, the breakdown has been fairly cyclical: Latine voters have voted for Democrats over Republicans in all Presidential contests since before the 1980s, ranging from a low of 53% in 2004 to a high of 73% in 1996 (Hernandez-Echevarria 2024). But, over the years, about a third of Latines “defect” from the majority to support candidates across the partisan aisle who seemingly did not champion minority rights and advancement (ibid). The surprising pattern is thus not that there is a partisan upheaval among Latines, but rather that there is a gap in scholarly understanding of why this puzzle persists. My research offers a theory that pushes beyond the perception that Latines’ marginalized group identity is the defining mechanism for understanding their political behavior. Instead, I suggest the need to examine how *within-group* differences are particularly important for a pan-ethnic groups such as Latines, whose identity is defined by the U.S. Census as those sharing a common Spanish language, despite vast heterogeneity in national heritage, generational status, immigration and citizenship status, skin color, race, class, and more.

I develop a novel concept called the Latine Status Hierarchy. Rooted in Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), I offer an explanation for why these patterns develop within a marginalized identity group. Despite the marginalized group status a whole, individuals within the group may not all share the same perception of social standing vis-à-vis other members of their in-group. I theorize that when

individuals hold a perception of higher status relative to members of their in-group, the individual may then positively distance⁴ themselves from others in their identity group and express political attitudes and behaviors that reflect such distancing. This orientation may lead to political group distancing—engaging in behaviors or expressions that aim to exclude or hinder the betterment of the modal Latine (e.g., stricter immigration policy preferences, conservative identification). My research question is thus: How do perceptions of *within-group* status hierarchies shape Latine political values, behaviors, policy preferences, and ideologies?

To ascertain whether and how Latines reflect on their within-group status, I first conduct 33 semi-structured, in-depth interviews among Latines across eight cities in the mainland United States and Puerto Rico. I find evidence among my sample that Latines hold beliefs about in-group status hierarchies. That is, Latines make sense of their position in U.S. society with reference not only to other ethnoracial groups, but also to *other members of their in-group*. Respondents drew comparisons by leveraging how they viewed certain characteristics (such as immigration status, national heritage, or phenotypical features) as more or less respectable, deserving, or affording of positive reputation. These perceived hierarchies influenced attitudes on immigration, economic policy, ideology, and belonging. I use these findings to create two measures for within-group status and test them empirically.

Using an original dataset containing a representative sample of Latine respondents, I demonstrate that perceptions of higher status relative to other Latines sys-

⁴Positive distinctiveness refers to when individuals seek a favorable comparison between their in-group and relevant out-groups in order to achieve a positive social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). I extend this concept within-group: rather than comparing their group to outsiders, Latines may seek positive distinction within their group by positioning themselves above other co-ethnics.

tematically predict patterns of political distancing—even after controlling for demographic controls and partisanship. Higher-status Latines consistently express more conservative attitudes: they are more likely to believe other Latines should work harder, that some community members overuse public services, and that Latines should learn English to get ahead. These attitudinal patterns translate into policy preferences, with higher-status respondents more likely to support increased border security and reductions in aid programs targeting low-income Latines. Behaviorally, they show less solidarity through diminished support for Latino-owned businesses, reduced willingness to shield co-ethnics from immigration enforcement, and lower support for educational programs benefiting undocumented Latines.

These findings reveal a critical mechanism through which ethnic solidarity can be undermined from within marginalized communities themselves. Original survey experiments suggest that these patterns may stem from genuine status perceptions rather than experimental artifacts—priming individuals to consider their status does not artificially inflate political distancing, and conjoint analysis demonstrates that demographic characteristics alone do not automatically confer perceived status advantages. Instead, it is specifically how individuals leverage these characteristics to position themselves hierarchically within their ethnic group that drives political distancing. My findings show that within-group stratification can disrupt collective action and redirect political group loyalty towards voting behaviors and political preferences that challenge conventional wisdom.

By shifting the analytical lens from inter-group dynamics to intra-group hierarchies, this study moves beyond the well-studied insight that Latines are not a political

monolith ([Abrajano and Alvarez 2010](#); [Beltrán 2010](#); [Bonilla-Silva 2004](#); [Cadena Jr 2023](#); [Corral and Leal 2024](#); [Garcia-Rios, Pedraza and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019](#); [Gosin 2017](#); [Hickel et al. 2021](#); [Ocampo, Ocampo-Roland and Uribe 2025](#)). Instead, it advances a deeper theoretical claim: that perceived status *within* an ethnoracial group can disrupt expectations of solidarity and reshape political behavior. In particular, individuals who perceive themselves to occupy higher positions within their group's internal hierarchy may adopt ideological, attitudinal, or policy stances more aligned with dominant-group interests than with co-ethnic cohesion. This helps explain why individuals we classify as marginalized sometimes take political positions that appear incongruent with their racial or ethnic categorization. Empirically, my research contributes to the study of group and identity politics with a mixed-methods design and a novel measurement battery for within-group status, offering tools for uncovering internal stratification that have been understudied in group political behavior. Identifying and analyzing similar internal divisions among other groups like Asian or Arab Americans offers an opportunity to expand this framework of within-group status hierarchies beyond the Latine case. More broadly, my research urges scholars to take seriously how internal hierarchies shape how people see themselves *relative to their own group*, and how that perception shapes individuals' politics in turn.

Within-Group Status Hierarchy: A New Framework for Understanding Latine Political Behavior

Latines present an analytically rich case for studying within-group dynamics due to the community's internal diversity across national origins, racial identifications, lin-

guistic repertoires, and socioeconomic positioning, all of which may complicate the development of cohesive group political attitudes and behaviors (García Bedolla and Hosam 2021). In fact, the very concept of Latinidad reflects this reality: Latinidad is “a particular geopolitical experience but it also contains within it the complexities and contradictions of immigration, (post)(neo)colonialism, race, color, legal status, class, nation, language and the politics of location” (Rodriguez 2003; Padilla 1985). These internal complexities create opportunities for stratification within the community, which members may navigate by positioning themselves advantageously *within* their group, in comparison to other members of the group. In other words, the same elements that make Latinidad expansive—race, class, language, and more—also operate as axes of stratification.

My theory of a within-group status hierarchy among Latines builds on this observation. By status hierarchy, I mean that certain identity elements—such as race, skin tone, national heritage, language proficiency, citizenship status, and more—become subjectively important axes of distinction that some individuals may structure in creating relative positions of advantage and disadvantage within the broader Latine community. Importantly, these markers may not operate in isolation from one another. For example, classism may emerge within co-national communities (e.g., middle-class Mexican Americans looking down on working-class Mexican immigrants), or nativism may emerge within co-racial Latines (e.g., U.S. born Puerto Ricans may distance themselves from newly arrived immigrants of similar phenotypes). My approach therefore captures this intersectionality of identity because it accounts for how multiple dimensions of identity are held and evaluated at once.

This framework is informed by Social Identity Theory ([Tajfel and Turner 1979](#)), which posits that individuals from a group who face an external threat may engage in behaviors to enhance the group image; behavior consist of re-defining a negative image into a positive one, challenging the negative image, or escaping the group altogether by selecting an alternate group with which to identify. Further, individuals may engage in the policing of other members such that they correct behaviors that are perceived as detrimental to the group image.

An outstanding challenge in the scholarship of Latine political behavior is that not all members of the group are eligible to engage in all of these behaviors; that is, the choice set available to individuals is in part contingent upon their relative status within the group. For example, research on colorism within Latine communities shows that darker-skinned Latines face persistent barriers to accessing forms of symbolic whiteness and inclusion into their own pan-ethnic group ([Gosin 2017](#); [Ostfeld and Yadon 2022](#)). A darker skinned Latine may not be able to challenge negative, racialized appeals about immigration by attempting to attach to a higher-status, white identity because her phenotypical presentation does not allow her to pass as white. Because lighter skin is perceived as a marker of assimilation and higher status ([Bonilla-Silva 2004](#)), darker-skinned Latines may find it more difficult to contest negative racialized appeals by aligning themselves with whiteness. Instead, she may seek to improve her standing within the community by distancing herself from other Latines who are stigmatized—expressing disapproval of undocumented immigrants, for instance—as a way of signaling relative status. My theory of a within-group status hierarchy among Latines is an intersectional approach that captures how multiple

identity elements interact to produce status hierarchies within the identity group.

Important to my theory is how perceptions of higher status tie to conservative political orientations. It may be the case that by positively distancing themselves from their perceived lower-status co-ethnics, these Latines are aspiring towards a higher-status white or American identity (Ocampo, Ocampo-Roland and Uribe 2025). Indeed, Bonilla-Silva (2004) theorized about the racial stratification that separated assimilated Latines from Latines who were “honorary white” by way of lighter skin and darker-skinned Latines who belonged to “the collective Black.” Extant literature has pointed to white-identifying Latines to be more conservative than the modal group member (Cuevas-Molina 2023; Filindra and Kolbe 2020, 2022). White or American identification (see Hickel et al. 2021) may thus be one way that some Latines positively distinguish themselves from other Latines by re-identifying with a higher-status group. Higher perceived proximity to the dominant group can reduce feelings of linked fate with co-ethnics (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015), weakening the motivation to support policies framed as benefiting the broader Latine community (e.g., immigration reform, redistributive programs). Last, social identity theory suggests that individuals who perceive themselves to be of higher status may adopt attitudes that defend their higher-status position (Tajfel and Turner 1979), aligning with conservative or exclusionary stances to maintain social distance from lower-status co-ethnics.

Qualitative Interviews


The *Within-Group Status Hierarchy* framework emerged inductively through qualitative investigation, following grounded theory methodology ([Charmaz 1990](#)) to ensure that the theory reflected real-world perceptions rather than imposed categorizations. That is, I leveraged these interviews to identify whether and how Latines were creating these in-group status distinctions and assess whether and how these distinctions arose in political thought processes. I interviewed 33 Latine adults across eight U.S. cities. Figure 1 illustrates the respondent characteristics across national heritage, race, party affiliation, and generational status. Nearly 40% of the individuals interviewed were of Mexican heritage, followed by about 20% Puerto Rican, 15% Dominican, and smaller shares of Cuban, Colombian, Ecuadorian, and mixed heritage backgrounds (including combinations such as Guatemala and Mexico or Colombia and Panama). Most respondents identified as racial “others” followed by white and Black racial identification. In terms of partisanship, Democrats made up the largest share (53%), followed by those with no party affiliation (22%), Republicans (16%), and a small number (9%) identifying with other or third parties. A little over 30% of interviewees were immigrants and 38% identified as first-generation Latines, with the remaining being second-, third-, or later-generation respondents.⁵

The interview protocol employed a phased design to organically surface status perceptions, beginning with identity exploration followed by in-group comparison exercises and concluding with political orientation assessments. This approach cap-

⁵For reference, the national breakdown of Latines in 2024 is provided using data from the [Pew Research Center](#). Roughly 60% of Latines in the U.S. are of Mexican heritage, followed by 9% being Puerto Rican and 4% each Cuban and Dominican. 68% are U.S. born, with 32% being foreign-born.

tured both cognitive (thoughts, beliefs, perceptions) and affective (emotions) descriptions of status perception while revealing implicit hierarchies through respondents' language of comparison vis-a-vis their in-group members. A post-interview questionnaire provided demographic information about the respondents, with all categories found in Appendix Table A-1.

Figure 1: Interview Respondent Characteristics



The interviews reveal that in-group status hierarchies among Latines are not only present but actively employed in how individuals discuss and make sense of political life. Rather than viewing group differences as neutral or horizontal, respondents often framed these distinctions in hierarchical terms—positioning certain characteristics, experiences, or identities as superior to others. For example, one respondent contrasted naturalized immigrants with U.S.-born Latines, arguing that the latter

hold their privilege without question, whereas immigrants must earn it: “It’s just like they say, those who are born here, they take it for granted, right? We had to earn it, yes, it’s different, right? So the one who was born [in the United States] has the benefit of having been born [in the United States]. You don’t have to win [favorability] against the citizenry. You don’t have to win [the favorability of] a group.⁶” In this way, the respondent held a belief that immigrant Latines were more hard working and also deserving of respect in the country, since those who are citizens by birth need not justify their deservingness to be in this country and thus take the privilege as innate. This framing reflects a status logic whereby respondents do not merely identify difference but assign value to it, viewing themselves or others as occupying higher or lower rungs within the group.

When asked about politics, respondents further shared how these comparisons would color their views on policy areas (e.g., immigration, economic aid) and ideological stances (e.g., more conservative despite Democratic affiliation, see [Uribe N.d.](#)). One respondent, when asked whether the U.S. government should be doing more to support Latines economically, responded: “I think, because some people just want to sit on their hands and gimme, and sometimes the people that are out there that are supposed to be helping aren’t really helping...” Although she identified as a lifelong Democrat—explaining her partisan identity as rooted in her economic class—her skepticism toward expanding aid to other Latines was not grounded in class solidarity, but in a sense of moral superiority tied to work ethic. This internal distinction between hardworking and allegedly undeserving Latines reflects how

⁶Translated from Spanish.

perceptions of in-group status can translate into more conservative policy attitudes, even among those who otherwise align with the political left.

I categorize these conversations of within-group status into three thematic dimensions: ascriptive, cultural, and socioeconomic. Ascriptive status hierarchies consist of race, phenotype, and skin tone. Extant literature shows how race in the United States has been wielded to create and solidify power among white Americans (Omi and Winant 2015; Haney-López 2006; Devos and Banaji 2005) and how it has further positioned white Americans at the top of the racial hierarchy, with Black, Asian, and Latine Americans at the bottom (Kim 2000; Zou and Cheryan 2017). Similarly, phenotype—observable characteristics of an individual, such as skin tone, hair type, nose shape, and eye color—are visual heuristics that are also linked to higher outcomes of success (Gómez 2000) and belonging (Clealand and Gutierrez 2022; Wilkinson and Earle 2013) among Latines who present more European phenotypes in the U.S. context. These varied outcomes are prominent due to the vast heterogeneity of Latine phenotypic presentation (Licea 2019); indeed, Latin American scholarship coins (and challenges) the idea of “mestizaje” in referring to the racial and ethnic mixing of European, Black, and Indigenous peoples into a new, agglomerated category (Hooker 2014; Wade 2004). In particular, skin tone is a phenotypical presentation that Latines have been found to use as political expression: indicating that your skin tone is lighter (darker) than it is in actuality is linked with more conservative (liberal) political stances (Ostfeld and Yadon 2022). Colorism—or the within-group discrimination of people of darker skin color—has also been documented against darker-skinned Latines. This has resulted in a sense of exclusion

among darker-skinned Latines from group identity as perpetuated by lighter-skinned Latines (Gosin 2017) and the belief that lighter-skinned Latines will be more likely to assimilate into higher status, mainstream white America (Bonilla-Silva 2004).

These ascriptive characteristics were discussed primarily by Black respondents in their reckoning with Latine identification. Black respondents in my sample were of Dominican heritage; despite differences in their immigration statuses, interviewees expressed overlapping narratives of exclusion and policing by other, less acculturated Dominicans. That is, despite sharing national heritage, gender, and Spanish language proficiencies with other Dominicans, their narratives highlighted how they were urged to conform to specific beauty or racial standards to earn acceptance and respect within their group. This evidence parallels findings by Clealand and Gutierrez (2022) and Gosin (2017) who find evidence of ethnic identity exclusion of Afro-Latines by non-Black Latines. Conversations with respondents revealed similar expressions of colorism and an orientation towards European phenotypes being perceived as higher status-affording. Thus, I expect that Latines who believe in ascriptive hierarchies—where darker-skinned or non-European-presenting Latines are perceived as lower in status or affording the group a more negative reputation—perceive themselves to be of higher in-group status relative to those other Latines.

Cultural elements of national heritage, language ability, citizenship, and immigration status appeared as a second categorization for within-group status differentiation. Latines trace their heritage to various countries across North, Central, and South America, and some individuals have dual heritage from their parentage. Recent work by Garcia-Rios, Pedraza and Wilcox-Archuleta (2019) shows how non-

Mexican Latines distinguish themselves from Mexicans to create positive distinction from negative, xenophobic out-group rhetoric. Individuals' experiences with immigration and citizenship also varies widely—some Latines, like early waves of Cuban immigrants, experienced immigration through welcoming policies like *Wet Foot, Dry Foot*, which once facilitated their legal immigrant status and pathway to citizenship (Forment 1989; Bishin and Klofstad 2012), while other migrants today are faced with threat of violent deportation. Last, Latines vary in their ability to speak both English and Spanish; extant literature has identified how this variation in language ability influences a sense of belonging within the Latine community such that those who speak Spanish feel heightened belonging (García Bedolla 2003; Blitvich 2019).

While interviewees more often expressed negative perspectives about national heritage out-groups, one respondent explicitly named Cubans as the group's "model minority"—invoking a framework commonly used to describe the racialized positioning of Asian Americans as comparatively more successful and thus less burdensome than other communities of color (Junn and Masuoka 2008). As she explained: "I think they use the Cuban American theory against others... Simply because again, my parents didn't have the same welfare benefits as a Cuban American did. I think historically they've been used as an example on a pedestal." This reflection illustrates how intra-group comparisons shape perceived access to resources and histories of privilege. In this case, Cubans were positioned as higher in the respondent's hierarchy as benefiting from favorable immigration policy and symbolic inclusion, leading other Latines to see them as unfairly representative of the group as a whole. Conversations about cultural elements thus shape my expectation that Latines who

endorse beliefs of hierarchies among cultural elements—where Latine migrants or undocumented Latines, who speak English with an accent, or Latines from countries disparaged by the media are seen as lower in status or affording the group a negative reputation—perceive themselves to be of higher in-group status.

Last, socioeconomic status stood out from the interviews as the third and final category. Respondents shared narratives of differentiation along the lines of education, economic class, and regional context. While education and class are long-held markers of political distinction on outcomes of partisan alignment (Campbell 1980; Lipset 1960), regional context is more politically unique to communities of color. Specifically, individuals living in highly co-ethnic contexts, such as in ethnic enclaves, exhibit unique political behaviors, such as increased political participation or high levels of partisan homogeneity (Andersson et al. 2021; Gilster, Meier and Booth 2020; Forment 1989). One respondent, for example, expressed concern that younger Latines—particularly those just entering the workforce—were undermining the group’s collective reputation through perceived laziness and lack of discipline.⁷ In distinguishing himself from this subgroup, he said: “That they are of... of this young generation who are coming to work now, that they don’t like to work. Ah, that’s something that yes, I personally have picked it up and noticed it, from about 18 years old to more or less until 25, 28 years old.” Therefore, I expect that Latines who hold beliefs of socioeconomic hierarchies—such as believing that Latines who lack a formal education or who use government financial assistance afford the group a bad reputation or are seen as lower in status—perceive themselves as higher in

⁷See Jefferson 2022 on other discussions of respectability within minority communities

in-group status.

Overall, the interviews demonstrate that within-group status hierarchies among Latines are present and embedded in how individuals understand and engage with political life. Respondents routinely described differences in phenotype, national heritage, language, citizenship, and socioeconomic status in evaluative terms—assigning greater worth or respectability to some traits over others. Furthermore, these status perceptions were not confined to social judgments but also shaped political decision-making. In these cases, status perceptions helped explain apparent contradictions in partisan alignment. Second, higher-status respondents often engaged in distancing from perceived lower-status Latines, particularly when discussing reputational concerns related to work ethic or perceived dependency. Finally, respondents did not understand group status in absolute terms or relative to out-group, non-Latines, but rather in comparison to other members of their in-group. These findings illustrate how internal hierarchies shape political discourse and behavior, as individuals navigate their group identity through a status-based logic of worth and distinction.

Hypotheses

I use this interview data of apparent within-group status hierarchies as the foundation for my hypotheses. Drawing from narratives of distancing when status markers were subjectively made important in my qualitative interviews, I develop my first two hypotheses. I expect that when Latines hold higher perceptions of status, relative to other Latines, then they should be more likely to engage in political distancing. I operationalize political distancing as a higher likelihood of expressing negative value

orientations towards other Latines, supporting nativist policies, expressing less willingness to behave in ways that support other members of the group, and identifying with a conservative ideology. The subjective importance of these elements as given by an individual is key—that is, simply having an identity in one’s repertoire may be insufficient for observable political outcomes with respect to within-group status. For instance, being of a higher economic class should not be sufficient in developing a higher status perception, but rather holding a belief that one’s standing is *better than* another (as expressed through, for example, rhetoric of laziness or dependence) is what I argue should lead to these outcomes of political distancing. I test these policies, values, behaviors, and ideology as my outcome variables.

H1: Latines with higher perceptions of their within-group status relative to other Latines will distance themselves politically from other Latines.

H2: Personal demographic status markers should have no impact on whether Latines distance themselves politically from other Latines.

To mitigate the potential for survey priming, I develop two survey experiments that assess the impact of within-group status on these outcome sets. I expect that when prompted with an experimental prime to reflect on one’s status relative to other members of the group, respondents with higher (lower) status rankings will engage in more (less) group distancing.

H3: Respondents who reflect on their own higher (lower) status will be more (less) likely to politically distance relative to respondents who do not reflect on their status.

Finally, I test whether a uniform orientation exists status markers such that some markers are perceived to afford members of the group higher status. Despite interviews generally holding consensus that status markers in respondents' identity repertoires were not indicative of political directions, I nonetheless leverage existing racial and settler-colonial hierarchies⁸. to test whether there do exist markers that group members rank as higher in status. I hypothesize that profiles with the status markers depicted in Table 1 will be rated as higher in status. I further test whether having these elements will be linked to perceptions of more conservatism and more warmth.

H4: Profiles with (without) the below high-status markers will be ranked by respondents as higher (lower) on the status hierarchy:

Attribute	High-Status Presentation
Skin Tone	Lighter
National Heritage	Cuban
Immigration History	Immigrant with citizenship
Language Proficiency	English without an accent
Government Assistance (Proxy for Income)	Has never relied on government assistance
Education	Graduate or professional degree
Location	Miami / Los Angeles

Table 1: Dimensions of Perceived High Status Among Latine Respondents

H4a: Profiles with the above high-status markers will be assessed as more likely to politically distance (more conservative) from other Latines.

⁸See (Zou and Cheryan 2017) for inter-group racial hierarchies, which I take in-group such that lighter-skin Latines may be perceived as holding higher status (Chavez-Dueñas, Adames and Organista 2014; Cleland and Gutierrez 2022; Gómez 2000). Settler-colonial hierarchies shape nativism to the extent that non-citizens and certain immigrants are may be perceived as lower status (Brown, Jones and Becker 2018; Hickel, Oskooii and Collingwood 2024; Pedraza 2014)

H4b: Profiles with the above high-status markers will be rated more warmly through a feeling thermometer.

Experimental Design

To test these hypotheses, I fielded an online survey from June 4th through June 16th 2025 on Forthright, an online survey vendor. The total sample size was 1,500 respondents, all who self-identify as Latine.⁹ The survey aimed to be nationally representative of Latines by race, education, gender, and age, but I relaxed all quotas to hit the total sample target. As a result, the analyses include survey weights.¹⁰ This study and its hypotheses were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework.¹¹

I capture perception of status in two ways. First, I ask respondents to rank themselves on a 1-7 scale: “...When considering your position within the Hispanic/Latino group, compared to other Hispanic/Latinos, where would you put yourself on this scale?”¹² Beyond an individual’s own self-ranking, I ask how a respondent perceives other members of the group to also measure their relative positioning within the group. Specifically, I crafted two different batteries to capture within-group status in an observational capacity. The first asks respondents to rank different Latine groups based on how they affect the reputation of the Latine group overall. Groups

⁹Respondents who identify as Hispanic/Latino on Forthright’s panel were invited to take the survey. They were again prompted to confirm that they are Hispanic/Latino prior to entering the survey.

¹⁰Survey weight distribution can be seen in the Appendix. Because my gender quotas do not include non-binary respondents, weighted analyses drop these respondents. All quotas for the last couple hundred responses were relaxed to hit sample target size.

¹¹<https://osf.io/d35f8>

¹²This scale is adapted from the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status.

include Latines who recently immigrated, undocumented Latines, Latines who use government financial assistance, darker skinned Latines, and more. Half of respondents received this battery of questions, which I indicate below as scaled reputation.

I further anticipated desirability bias may arise out of these questions, so I asked a parallel set of questions, with the same set of groups, to the other half of respondents. However, instead of a 1-7 scaled rank, this battery of questions were given four answer options, all with the set direction of bad reputation: “Many give Latinos a bad reputation,” “Some give Latinos a bad reputation,” “A few give Latinos a bad reputation,” and “None give Latinos a bad reputation.” Below, I refer to these as quantity reputation. I show how both of these measures compare in my analyses.

Importantly, these batteries arose out of my interviews. While interviewees highlighted numerous categories along ascriptive, socioeconomic, and cultural axes through which they expressed positive distancing from other group members, there is no theoretical expectation suggesting that any one category holds more or less weight in perceptions of higher status—though future scholarship could explore whether some categories hold more weight than others for each individual Latine. I therefore collapse these categories into one variable that captures the average score of each respondent.

The survey consisted of two experiments, each experiment with distinct dependent variables. The first experiment included a joint ranking question followed by an open-ended reflection of a respondent’s perception of their status within the group. Thus, the treatment both captured a quantifiable measure and open-ended text. Respondents were then asked a set of outcome variables. Half of the respondents were

randomly assigned to this treatment condition with equal probability. In the control condition, respondents were asked the set of dependent variables before being asked about their perception of status, thereby ensuring that I capture their perception of status within the group without the respondent being primed on the outcome variables.

I ask four sets of outcome variables—political values, policy preferences, political behaviors, and ideology—as political outcomes that interview respondents reflected on while considering their within-group status perceptions. The three policy questions ask about immigration, security at the U.S.-Mexico border, and aid to low-income Latines. The political values questions ask about whether Latines should work harder for their economic well-being, whether Latines take too much from goods and services, and whether Latines should learn English in order to succeed in this country. The final set ask about political behaviors, specifically whether respondents would express support for a bill that provides scholarships for Latines, whether respondents would refrain from reporting a minor crime done by a Latine to protect against potential immigration consequences, and whether they would support Latine-owned businesses because they are Latine-owned. Last, the ideology question is a standard 1-7 scale, from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The full text for these questions can be found in the Appendix.

The second experiment is a conjoint experiment. Respondents are presented with four tasks, each a single profile of a Latine. Profiles have eight identity elements: skin tone, national heritage, immigration history, language proficiency, income (specifi-

cally, use of government financial assistance), education, and their location.¹³ Each element had four possible attributes (except gender, where intersex is omitted to have two attributes of Latino or Latina). Each attribute is shown with equal probability. The full list of attributes is presented in the Appendix.

At the bottom of each profile, respondents were asked three questions. They were first asked to rank the profile viewed on the same status scale that they used to rank themselves earlier in the survey. They were also asked to select where on the ideological scale (1-7) they would place the profile, as well as a feeling thermometer where higher values indicate more favorability towards the profile. Because all respondents completed the same conjoint module following random assignment to treatment order, the conjoint tasks are orthogonal to the treatment manipulation of the first experiment and can be analyzed independently. Language of both survey experiments can be found in the Appendix.


Results

First, I present the descriptive findings of the three independent variables that capture within-group status. Figure 2 depicts the distributions of a respondent's self-perception of within-group status from the first survey experiment. Lower values on the right closer to 1 indicate that a respondent sees themselves as lower in status than other Latines, whereas higher values on the left closer to 7 indicate that they see

¹³See Table ?? for a list of elements, presented alongside the attribute theorized to be of higher status.

themselves as higher in status relative to other members of their in-group.¹⁴ At first glance, there a high degree of ranking oneself at the midpoint—that is, respondents see themselves as neither having higher nor lower status than other members of the group. There is also a slight skew in favor of ranking oneself lower in status than higher in status.

Figure 2: Violin Plot of Self-Perception of Within-Group Status



This distribution suggests that there may be low statistical power to detect differences in my outcome variables and reduces discriminatory validity due to relatively few respondents sharing perceptions of higher status and clustering at the midpoint. Additional measurement strategies of my two alternate forms of status are thus important to bolster the conceptual leverage of this self-ranking measure.

Figure 3 visualizes the different status rankings that respondents gave to other members of their in-group, again ordered from lowest to highest ratings. Many respondents ranked groups clustered around the midpoint, indicating that many ranked these groups as neither high nor low status, relative to other Latines. However, un-


¹⁴I reverse code this here from how it was presented in the survey for cohesiveness across status rankings. That is, having a higher perception of one's own status relative to other members of the group parallels having a lower perception of status for other minoritized Latine groups relative to one's own. In this way, higher values across the status metrics should have a uniform direction in their relationship with political distancing.

documented Latine immigrants are of particular note. Here, the median value is not 4, like most of the other groups, but rather 5, and the third quartile reaches towards the lowest indicated value of status. This indicates that perceptions of undocumented Latines reflected considerably lower status and suggests that a substantial share of respondents placed undocumented Latine immigrants at or near the bottom of the status hierarchy. This finding is plausible given the current context surrounding the negative rhetoric and vilification of undocumented Latine immigrants from political elites, the media, and Americans themselves.

The average rating across all eight measures shows a fairly symmetrical distribution clustered near the midpoint, with a slightly higher probability of indicating the highest status than the lowest status. This distribution is likely due to the responses of the *white European phenotype* and *English with an accent* questions having higher ratings, which are congruent with racial and settler-colonial hierarchies. Perceptions of Latines who receive government financial assistance were slightly lower, with upper quartiles reaching higher into the lower status end of the scale. Meanwhile, group members described as appearing white/European or speaking English with an accent received median status ratings around 3 with a first quartile of 2, suggesting that these groups were viewed more favorably than the other groups presented.

A second measurement approach to within-group status captures an important difference: instead of asking respondents to rank the groups, a random portion of respondents received a 1-4 scale with a pre-set direction of *bad reputation*. Figure 4 visualizes the distributions of this measure. This question wording was written to attempt a reduction of desirability bias in responses.

Figure 3: Violin Plot of Scaled Perceptions of Within-Group Status



Perceptions of how frequently undocumented group members harm the in-group's reputation were markedly more negative than assessments of any other group. The median rating for undocumented individuals was 3, with the upper quartile reaching the scale's maximum of 4, indicating that many respondents believed this subgroup often contributes to a negative in-group reputation. In contrast, the average score

across all groups had a median of 2.43 and a mean of 2.24. These findings suggest that undocumented status is seen as uniquely stigmatizing, mirroring the pattern observed in the earlier status ratings.

Other groups formed distinct tiers. Ratings for Latines lacking formal education, recent Latine immigrants, Latine recipients of government assistance, Latines with

Figure 4: Violin Plot of Quantity Perceptions of Within-Group Status



darker skin, and Central Americans formed a consistent mid-tier cluster. Each of these subgroups had a median rating of 2, suggesting that respondents generally saw that only a few members of these groups were viewed as harming the group's reputation. In contrast, Latines described as looking white or European or those who speak English with an accent were seen as rarely damaging the group's reputation. Both had a median rating of 1 and mean scores of 1.74 and 1.76, respectively—the lowest among all groups assessed.

The violin plots are ordered by the median rating for each group, facilitating comparison across question formats. Notably, the relative ordering of groups—from higher to lower perceived status—remains consistent across the two types of question wordings. This alignment suggests that respondents interpret both question formats similarly, and that perceptions of in-group status are relatively stable regardless of how the question is framed.

Status Battery Findings

My first Hypothesis stipulates that respondents having a higher self-perception of status as compared to other Latines will politically distance from other Latines. Additionally, my second Hypothesis suggests that an individual's personal status markers—ascriptive markers of race (white), skin tone (lighter) and phenotype (European), cultural markers of high English proficiency, national heritage from Cuba, Mexico, or Puerto Rico, and being in the U.S. for multiple generations, and socioeconomic markers of education (lower¹⁵), income (wealthier), and living in a heavily

¹⁵Education is coded such that higher values indicate higher levels of education.


co-ethnic context—should not have an impact on whether the respondent politically distances themselves from other Latines. Recall that my argument indicates that having such status markers in one's repertoire should, on its own, not be sufficient in explaining political distancing. Rather, it is the subjective importance given to such markers that would activate the expected behaviors and beliefs.

Figure 5 presents a coefficient plot of the models used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. The variable of interest is the averaged scaled status question, though it includes demographic controls not visible in the plot for race (white), European phenotype, skin tone, income, education, co-ethnic context¹⁶, English proficiency, heritage (Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican), age, gender, and political party (Republican). To be consistent with my theoretical expectations, the status measure should have a positive relationship with each dependent variable such that higher values indicate that respondents perceive different in-group members to be afforded lower status. Similarly, ideology is coded such that higher values indicate more conservative identification on a 1 to 7 scale. In this way, respondents are framing their status in direct relationship with other members of their in-group by ranking them as lower on the hierarchy.

In nearly all of the outcome variables, Hypothesis 1 holds: having more negative status rankings about members of the in-group is statistically related to a host of political distancing measures in the anticipated direction. At the highest magnitude are the outcomes that suggest Latines should learn English and that Latines take too much from goods and services. Latines who rank the status of other members of their in-group as lower also believe that the government should not expand aid to

¹⁶Respondents who indicated that their zip code is above 50% Latine are coded as living in a high co-ethnic context.

Figure 5: Coefficient Plot of Scaled Reputational Status Questions (Averaged) across Political Distancing Outcomes



lower income Latines, increase border security, not provide scholarships to Latines, would not refrain from reporting a minor crime to prevent possible immigration consequences, and would not support Latine-owned businesses because they are Latine-owned. Additionally, these respondents would indicate that Latines need to work harder in order to get ahead in this country. Preferencing skilled Latine immigrants over other Latine immigrants and ideology does not reach statistical significance, the latter likely due to controlling for party identification.


Furthermore, there is strong evidence for Hypothesis 2, such that the demographic markers included are not nearly as consistently statistically significant in shaping the outcome variables. A full list of coefficients and standard errors is presented in the

Appendix. With few exceptions, the theorized status markers—race, skin tone, phenotype, income, education, co-ethnic context, language ability, and heritage—do not reach statistical significance alongside my measure of status that is included in the models. Among ascriptive characteristics, race (Black) is positively associated with support for scholarships, and a European phenotype predicts support for aid to low-income individuals. Heritage is also significant, with negative effects across aid to low income, scholarships, support for business, and ideology. Income is negatively associated with support for business, while education is significant in shaping attitudes toward working harder and learning English. Last, English proficiency is significant across three models: aid to low income, learn English, and support business. Finally, and most consistently, the Republican variable is highly significant across all three tables—controlling for partisan identity, perception of status is still strongly significant in predicting values, policy preferences, and political behaviors.

Figure 6 presents the coefficient plot for the averaged scaled status measure, controlling for race (white), age, gender (female), income, education, and party identification (Republican). Across all models, the relationship between the reputation quality index is positive and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance—once again supporting theoretical expectations for Hypothesis 1. Respondents who believe more subgroup members damage Latines’ reputation are more likely to favor increased border security, believe Latines take too much from public goods and services, and think Latines should learn English to get ahead in this country. This pattern also holds for economic distancing—those with higher quantity status scores oppose scholarships for Latines and government assistance to low-income Latines.

Behavioral distancing is also evident: these respondents are less likely to refrain from reporting a minor crime to protect a Latine individual from immigration consequences and are less inclined to support Latine-owned businesses. They are also more likely to endorse individualized narratives of mobility, agreeing that Latines need to work harder to get ahead.

Figure 6: Coefficient Plot of Quantity Reputational Status Questions (Averaged) across Political Distancing Outcomes



The coefficient for reputation quantity remains significant in nine of the ten models, with ideology being the only exception. In line with Hypothesis 2, the demographic markers of status are far less consistent. Race (Black) appears significant in the model for support for scholarships, while a European phenotype significantly predicts support for aid to low-income individuals, scholarships, and support for

Latino-owned businesses. Heritage (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican) has negative effects on aid to low income, support for business, and ideology. Education reduces support for aid, scholarships, and support for business, while income predicts greater support for border security and work harder attitudes. Skin tone reaches significance only once, predicting opposition to skilled immigration. English proficiency, in contrast to other models, does not consistently shape outcomes here. Most notably, Republican identification remains a dominant predictor, with large and significant effects across nearly every outcome. These findings can be found in the Appendix. Taken together, these results underscore that the perception of quantity-based status is a robust and consistent predictor of political values and behaviors, as well, above and beyond demographic and partisan controls.

Taken together, these results indicate that reputational assessments of in-group members—particularly those framed in terms of quantity or prevalence—carry meaningful implications for how respondents evaluate and distance themselves from the broader Latine community. These findings also largely parallel the scaled reputational status battery, though more variation is apparent with this measure.


Experimental Findings

I fielded a set of survey experiments designed to probe the relationship between in-group status and political distancing. While these experimental tests offer a useful extension, I nonetheless emphasize that my theoretical expectations center on the importance of status perceptions themselves—rather than whether such perceptions can be externally activated in order for political distancing to occur.

Hypothesis 3 posits that respondents who reflect on their own higher (lower) status will be more (less) likely to distance relative to respondents in the control condition. Figure 7 presents the findings of the first survey experiment which primed a respondent to reflect on their in-group status. I interact the treatment with the self-perception of status ranking because all respondents were asked to reflect on their own status perceptions, but the treatment itself was the priming via their reflection prior to receiving the set of political outcomes (see Figure X in the Appendix for a visual of treatment flow). However, I do not find support for these hypotheses. One reason is that there may be considerable desirability bias in this self-ranking of status. That is, respondents may feel that it is socially unacceptable and therefore resistant to explicit status comparisons with other members of their co-ethnic in-group. This bias may especially be the case when there is no rapport between the survey respondent and an interviewer. Alternatively, these null findings could mean that my measure of self-perceived status is not adequately capturing the concept of within-group status (as may have been evidenced by the anchoring in the distribution), or it may be the case that these two concepts are truly statistically unrelated.

I turn next to the results of my conjoint experiment to test Hypothesis 4. Recall that in this experiment, I vary respondent characteristics of skin tone, national heritage, English proficiency, immigration history, use of government financial assistance, education, community context, and gender. Figure 8 presents the coefficient plot of the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of each profile's attributes on a respondent's indication of where they would rank the profile's within-group status. Higher values indicate higher likelihood of indicating higher status.

Figure 7: Effect of Priming Reflection on Self-Perception of Status on Political Distancing Measures




For Hypothesis 4, I expect that profiles with (without) the reference category high-status markers will be ranked by respondents as higher (lower) on the status hierarchy. The reference attribute is listed above each grouping. Nearly none of the findings provide support for this Hypothesis. The only two groups that indicate a significantly lower status placement are Latines who do not speak any English and those who currently rely on government financial assistance.

In some ways, this finding lends support to Hypothesis 2—that individual demographic status markers should have no impact on whether Latines distance themselves politically from other Latines. When respondents view profiles of fellow in-group members, the demographic characteristics seemingly hold no weight in the status

rating of the profile, despite what current scholarship knows as providing better outcomes of success because of existing racial and settler colonial hierarchies (Arce, Murguia and Frisbie 1987; Asante-Muhammad, Perez and Buell 2021). This finding may also lend support that it is the needed subjective importance given to such identity characteristics—that is, not just having them, but believing the qualities one has to be better than those that other in-group members have for reputational or sociopolitical standing—that is necessary for political distancing.

Next, I look at whether respondents change their belief about a profile’s ideo-


Figure 8: Coefficient Plot for the Average Marginal Component Effects of Status Markers on Ranked Status



logical stance based on these status markers. Figure 9 presents these results. Hypothesis 4a suggests that profiles containing high-status markers will be assessed as more likely to politically distance (more conservative) than profiles without the high-status markers. Higher values indicate higher likelihood of indicating more conservative ideological placement. Hypothesis 4a is not supported: only being of Mexican heritage and having light (as opposed to the lightest indicated) skin tone appear as being ranked as more liberal than the reference, high-status profiles. While some coefficients appear to be in the right direction (all the skin tone and national heritage attributes), others remain theoretically unexpected (indicating that undocumented profiles are perceived to be more conservative than profiles born in the United States).


Finally, I ask respondents to share their favorability towards profiles with a feeling thermometer. Higher values in Figure 10 indicate higher favorability and warmth towards the profile. Hypothesis 4b posits that profiles with the reference category high-status markers will be rated more warmly through a feeling thermometer. Similar to the other two outcome variables on the conjoint, my findings are null. That is, no status markers seem to be any more or less influential in a respondent's perceptions of favorability towards a given profile. The singular exception—and just marginally—is that of Salvadoran profiles, who have respondents feeling slightly less favorable towards them than Cuban profiles. Overall, these findings indicate that these particular status markers hold little to no weight in whether individual Latine respondents see others as higher or lower in status than they are, ideologically more liberal or conservative, or feel more or less favorable towards them.

Figure 9: Coefficient Plot for the Average Marginal Component Effects of Status Markers on Ideological Placement



Again, these findings share some alignment with the results confirming Hypothesis 2 in that most status markers in and of themselves seem to hold little explanatory power on political distancing. Individuals may need to give subjective importance to their given markers—or see that particular markers on other individuals are offering some reputational cost, either through a given context or by the individuals themselves, in order to adopt beliefs regarding these in-group members.

Figure 10: Coefficient Plot for the Average Marginal Component Effects of Status Markers on Warmth towards the Profile



Discussion

The observational findings provide compelling evidence for my *Within-Group Status Hierarchy* framework and its ability to explain patterns of political distancing within the Latine community. Across both measurement approaches—scaled rankings and reputational quantity assessments—respondents consistently demonstrated awareness of internal status hierarchies that extend beyond demographic characteristics. The data reveals that Latines systematically differentiate between subgroups within

their community, with undocumented immigrants consistently ranked at the bottom of perceived status hierarchies and those with European phenotypes or English proficiency ranked at the top. This stratification mirrors broader patterns of colorism and assimilationist ideologies while highlighting how these dynamics operate within marginalized communities themselves.

The consistency of these rankings across different question formats strengthens confidence in the underlying theoretical framework. Whether asked to directly rank status or assess reputational damage, respondents produced remarkably similar hierarchies that place European appearance, English proficiency, and legal status as key markers of within-group status. Further, the fact that these perceptions emerged even when respondents were given opportunities to provide neutral or mid-point responses suggests that status consciousness within the Latine community is widespread and meaningful to individual identity formation.

Perhaps most importantly, I find that these perceived hierarchies have tangible political consequences. Higher-status perceptions correlate systematically with policy preferences that disadvantage other Latines—from supporting increased border security to opposing aid programs specifically designed to benefit Latine communities. This pattern holds across multiple domains of political behavior, suggesting that within-group status hierarchies operate as a cohesive concept rather than isolated attitudes on specific issues. The findings thus support the core theoretical claim that perceived status within ethnic groups can disrupt expectations of solidarity and reshape political behavior in ways that align with dominant-group rather than co-ethnic interests. These dynamics are not confined to partisan lines—Democrats as

well as Republicans demonstrate political distancing when they perceive themselves as occupying a higher-status position relative to other members of their Latine community.

The experimental results further provide valuable additional insights into the boundaries and mechanisms of these status dynamics. Two key contributions emerge from this analysis. First, when asked to rank themselves relative to other Latines, respondents consistently gravitated toward midpoint values, suggesting that within-group status perceptions may be more nuanced than simple hierarchical rankings of one's own status can capture. This pattern indicates that individuals may resist explicit status comparisons with co-ethnics, or that such comparisons require more contextual framing—such as through prompted comparisons to other group members—to elicit meaningful variation. Importantly, these self-perceptions appear resistant to priming effects, demonstrating that status consciousness may operate through more stable cognitive processes rather than experimentally-manipulated surface attitudes and are harder to alter.

Second, demographic markers have mixed, but mostly null, associations with political distancing. Respondents who indicate having exclusively European phenotypic presentations stand out as expressing the highest degrees of political distancing across a host of outcome measures. Additionally, in some cases, self-identified phenotype even out-performs self-identified race. Other markers, like language ability, skin tone, national heritage, community context, education, and income, have relatively small and largely insignificant explanatory power over the political distancing measures. These findings are consistent with the conjoint results—beyond a respondent

themselves having or not having status markers, seeing other members of the in-group with or without certain status markers seems to have little to no effect on perceptions of their co-ethnic's status within the group, ideological stance, or any feelings of warmth towards them due to these differences.

Conclusion

Though the 2016, 2020, and 2024 election results sent shockwaves through the country with how Republicans were drawing in more Latine voters than anticipated, these results were manifestations of a deeper phenomenon that conventional theories of ethnic politics have struggled to explain. My research highlights the need to understand how perceived hierarchies *within* ethnic groups reshape individual political calculations and group solidarity.

The *Within-Group Status Hierarchy* framework demonstrates that Latines do not simply position themselves relative to white Americans or other racial groups. Latines also locate themselves within complex, intersectional, and internal rankings that profoundly influence their political choices. Those who perceive themselves as occupying higher positions within this hierarchy systematically distance themselves from co-ethnic political solidarity, supporting policies and candidates that may disadvantage other Latines while potentially benefiting their own perceived status. This pattern of political distancing helps explain not only why the Rio Grande Valley shifted rightward, but also why Enrique Tarrio could lead the white supremacist, anti-immigration Proud Boys despite being Afro-Cuban or why some undocumented

immigrants might support politicians promising mass deportations—how they leverage their perceptions of in-group status may shape their politics.

Theoretically, my findings extend foundational literature in that shared demographic characteristics may not produce shared political interests (Corral and Leal 2024). By shifting the analytical lens from inter-group dynamics to intra-group hierarchies, this study moves beyond the well-trodden insight that Latines are not a political monolith to offer a more precise explanation for when and why ethnic solidarity breaks down. The *Within-Group Status Hierarchy* provides a framework for understanding how marginalized individuals sometimes make political choices that appear to contradict their group interests—choices that emerge from negotiations of multiple, sometimes competing identities and status positions.

For the study of politics in an era of increasing Latine Republican support, these findings carry relevant implications. As the United States continues its diversification and traditional ethnic coalitions become less predictable, understanding intra-group dynamics becomes increasingly crucial for both scholars and practitioners. The tools developed here—both theoretical and empirical—offer a framework for examining how perceived status hierarchies operate within other ethnic groups that are similarly as internally heterogeneous, like Asian Americans or Arab Americans. Though the cleavages discussed in this project may not be the same, the concept of within-group status hierarchy may extend beyond Latines.

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Appendix

Contents


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A1: Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents

Pseudonym	Lang	Heritage	English Fluency	Spanish Fluency	Immigration Status	Party	Sex
Adriana	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Very fluent	First Gen	None	Female
Altagracia	ES	Dominican Republic	None	Very fluent	Immigrant	Democrat	Female
Anthony	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Not very fluent	Third Gen	Democrat	Male
Boricua	ES	Puerto Rico	Moderately fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Democrat	Female
Crystal	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Fluent	First Gen	None	Female
Estrella	EN	Puerto Rico	Fluent	Fluent	NA	Democrat	Female
Fanny	EN	Mexico	Fluent	Moderately fluent	First Gen	None	Female
Jaden	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Somewhat fluent	Fourth Gen	Democrat	Male
Jess	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Not very fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Female
Johnny	EN	Mexico	Fluent	Fluent	First Gen	None	Male
Lee	EN	Dominican Republic	Very fluent	Very fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Female
Lola	EN	Dominican Republic	Very fluent	Very fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Female
Lucy	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Moderately fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Female
Luke	EN	Guatemala and Mexico	Very fluent	Fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Male
Mani	EN	Puerto Rico	Very fluent	Very fluent	NA	Republican	Male
Mano	EN	Cuba	Very fluent	Somewhat fluent	Second Gen	Other/Third Party	Male
Manolo	ES	Colombia	Not very fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Democrat	Male
Maquina	EN	Mexico	Moderately fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Other/Third Party	Male
Maria	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Very fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Female
Marichui	ES	Ecuador	None	Very fluent	Immigrant	None	Female
Mark	EN	Colombia and Panama	Very fluent	Fluent	First Gen	Republican	Male
Marlin	ES	Dominican Republic	Somewhat fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Republican	Female
Mayte	EN	Puerto Rico	Very fluent	Very fluent	NA	Democrat	Female
Melissa	EN	Dominican Republic	Very fluent	Very fluent	First Gen	Other/Third Party	Female
Nano	ES	Costa Rica	Fluent	Very fluent	Undoc	Republican	Male
Nick	EN	Ecuador	Very fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Republican	Male
Raquel	ES	Puerto Rico	Not very fluent	Very fluent	NA	None	Female
Rosa	EN	Dominican Republic	Very fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Democrat	Female
Rudy	EN	Dominican Republic	Very fluent	Very fluent	First Gen	Democrat	Male
Sam	EN	Dominican Republic	Very fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	Democrat	Female
Yay	ES	Cuba	Very fluent	Very fluent	Immigrant	None	Female
Yessenia	EN	Mexico	Very fluent	Moderately fluent	Third/Eighth Gen	Democrat	Female

Pseudonym	Race	Skin Tone	Phenotype	Education	Age	Income
Adriana	White	3	Indigenous Latin America,Europe	Some college	-	\$90,000–\$119,999
Altagracia	Latine	1	Indigenous Latin America	College graduate	50s	\$0–\$29,999
Anthony	Latine	3	Indigenous Latin America	Some college	30s	\$90,000–\$119,999
Boricua	Hispanic	3	Indigenous Latin America,Europe,Africa	College graduate	-	\$30,000–\$59,999
Crystal	Hispanic/Latine	4	Indigenous Latin America,Europe	College graduate	20s	\$90,000–\$119,999
Estrella	Latine-White	5	Indigenous Latin America	College graduate	-	\$30,000–\$59,999
Fanny	Native American	5	Indigenous Latin America	High school graduate	-	\$0–\$29,999
Jaden	Hispanic	2	Indigenous Latin America,Europe	Higher education	30s	\$120,000+
Jess	White	5	Indigenous Latin America	Some college	20s	\$120,000+
Johnny	Latine	6	Other	Higher education	20s	\$30,000–\$59,999
Lee	American	3	Indigenous Latin America	High school graduate	20s	\$60,000–\$89,999
Lola	White Hispanic	3	Europe	College graduate	20s	\$120,000+
Lucy	White	3	Europe	Some college	80s+	\$60,000–\$89,999
Luke	White	5	Indigenous Latin America	College graduate	20s	\$90,000–\$119,999
Mani	Latine	3	Indigenous Latin America,Other	Some college	40s	\$30,000–\$59,999
Mano	White	3	Indigenous Latin America,Europe	Some college	20s	\$90,000–\$119,999
Manolo	White	1	Other	Some college	70s	\$0–\$29,999
Maquina	Hispanic	1	Other	Less than high school	30s	\$0–\$29,999
Maria	White	3	Other	College graduate	20s	\$0–\$29,999
Marichui	Latino/Mestizo	3	Indigenous Latin America	Less than high school	40s	\$0–\$29,999
Mark	White	1	Indigenous Latin America,Europe	Some college	20s	\$120,000+
Marlin	Hispanic	3	Indigenous Latin America	High school graduate	-	\$0–\$29,999
Mayte	Hispanic	2	Other	College graduate	-	\$0–\$29,999
Melissa	Black	-	-	-	20s	-
Nano	Latin/Hispanic	7	Other	College graduate	30s	\$30,000–\$59,999
Nick	None	4	Indigenous Latin America	Higher education	30s	\$90,000–\$119,999
Raquel	Hispanic	3	Indigenous Latin America	College graduate	-	\$0–\$29,999
Rosa	Black	3	Europe,Africa	College graduate	20s	\$30,000–\$59,999
Rudy	Hispanic	4	Indigenous Latin America	Some college	30s	\$0–\$29,999
Sam	Black	3	Indigenous Latin America,Africa	College graduate	20s	\$30,000–\$59,999
Yay	White	1	Other	College graduate	30s	\$60,000–\$89,999
Yessenia	Latine	2	Europe,Other	Higher education	30s	\$90,000–\$119,999

A2: Survey Weights



Summary of Survey Weights

Minimum	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Quartile	Maximum
0.2886	0.5427	0.6059	0.7069	0.9631	2.1147

A3: Status Question Wording

Self-Rating of Status Language (Experimental)

In our society, there are some people who tend to be towards the top and those that are towards the bottom for many different reasons. Below is a scale where people at the top are ranked 1 and people at the bottom are ranked 7. When considering your position within the Hispanic/Latino group, compared to other Hispanic/Latinos, where would you put yourself on this scale?

- 1 (at the top)
- 1
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 (at the bottom)

In 2-3 sentences, could you explain what you thought about when you answered? Which groups of Hispanic/Latinos did you consider in comparison when you rated yourself on this scale? For example, you might have thought about Hispanic/Latinos from different national heritage groups, different language proficiencies, or different immigration histories than you.

Scaled Perceptions of Within-Group Status

In general, how do you think the following groups of Hispanic/Latinos impact the reputation of the group overall?

	Latinos who recently immigrated	Undocumented Latino immigrants	Latinos who speak English with an accent	Latinos who use government financial assistance
1 (at the top, good reputation)	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	☐	☐	☐	☐
7 (at the bottom, bad reputation)	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Darker-skinned Latinos	Latinos who did not receive a formal education	Latinos from Central American countries	Latinos who look White/European
1 (at the top, good reputation)	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	☐	☐	☐	☐
7 (at the bottom, bad reputation)	☐	☐	☐	☐

Quantity Perceptions of Within-Group Status

In general, how do you think the following groups of Hispanic/Latinos impact the reputation of the group overall?

	Latinos who recently immigrated	Undocumented Latino immigrants	Latinos who speak English with an accent	Latinos who use government financial assistance
Many give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐
Some give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐
A few give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐
None give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Darker-skinned Latinos	Latinos who did not receive a formal education	Latinos from Central American countries	Latinos who look White/European
Many give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐
Some give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐
A few give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐
None give Latinos a bad reputation	☐	☐	☐	☐

A4: Dependent Variables Wording

Values

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree
Latinos should work harder to better their economic well-being	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Some Latinos take too much from public goods and services	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Latinos should learn English if they want to succeed in this country	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Policy Preferences

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree
Prioritize process for highly skilled Latinos to immigrate over other types of Latino immigrants	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Increasing security at the U.S.-Mexico border should be a national priority	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Provide more aid in the form of goods and services to low-income Latinos	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Behaviors

Thinking ahead to the future, how likely would you be to...

	Extremely unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Somewhat likely	Likely	Extremely likely
Express support for a political bill that provides scholarships for Latinos without a formal education	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Refrain from reporting a minor crime to protect another Latino from possible immigration consequences	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Support Latino-owned businesses because they are Latino-owned	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Ideology

Do you consider yourself to be a liberal or on the left, conservative or on the right, moderate or in the middle, or something else?

- Extremely liberal
- Liberal, on the left
- Moderate that leans liberal
- Moderate, in the middle
- Moderate that leans conservative
- Conservative, on the right
- Extremely conservative
- Other -----

A5: Conjoint Table of Attributes

Attribute	Values
	
Skin Tone	
National Heritage	Mexican Cuban Salvadoran Colombian
English Proficiency	Fluent, no accent Fluent, speaks with an accent Not very fluent Does not speak at all
Immigration History	Immigrant with citizenship Immigrant on the path to citizenship Undocumented Born in the United States
Government Assistance	Currently relies on government assistance Has relied on government assistance, but not anymore. Is doing well economically now Has relied on government assistance, but not anymore. Is not doing very well economically now Has never relied on government assistance
Education	High school graduate Some college, but no degree College graduate Graduate or professional degree
Where They Live	Miami Los Angeles Montgomery El Paso
Gender	Latino (M) Latina (F)

A6: Conjoint Dependent Variables

In the next section, you will see a set of characteristics describing a person, but you will not see an actual image of them.

Based on the details provided, **try to imagine what this person might look like**, and use that mental image to inform your responses. You will review and evaluate profiles for four different people in total. Please consider each one carefully before answering.

Conjoint Reflection of Profile Status

Consider the person above.

In our society, there are some people who tend to be towards the top and those that are towards the bottom for many different reasons. Below is a scale where people at the top are ranked 1 and people at the bottom are ranked 7.

When considering this person's position within the Hispanic/Latino group, **compared to other Hispanic/Latinos, where would you put this person on this scale?**

- 1 (at the top)
- 1
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 (at the bottom)

Conjoint Ideological Placement

Do you think this person is liberal or on the left, conservative or on the right, or moderate or in the middle?


- Extremely liberal
- Liberal, on the left
- Moderate that leans liberal
- Moderate, in the middle
- Moderate that leans conservative
- Conservative, on the right
- Extremely conservative

Conjoint Feeling Thermometer

Please rate your feelings towards the person above. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you feel favorable and warm towards the person, while ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you don't feel favorable towards the person. You would rate the person at 4 if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards the person.

- 1 (very unfavorable)
- 1
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 (very favorable)

A7: Survey Flow of First Experiment



A8: Reverse Causality

To assess the directionality of the relationship between within-group status perceptions and political distancing outcomes and address a form of endogeneity, I conduct a series of reverse causality models. While the main analyses conceptualize within-group status as an independent variable predicting political distancing, this set of models explores whether the reverse relationship could be driving the observed effects—that is, whether distancing attitudes are instead shaping how respondents rate the status of other Latines.

The original models, shown in Figures 5 and 6 in the main paper, use respondents' perceptions of how many subgroup members give Latines a bad reputation (i.e., “reputation quantity”) to predict political distancing. These include outcomes like support for border security, government aid, and ideological conservatism, while controlling for demographic variables. The second set of models shown below flips this structure by modeling status as the outcome and using the political distancing measures as predictors, with the same set of controls.

Across both sets of models, statistically significant relationships are present. However, the original specification (status → distancing) demonstrates stronger and more consistent effects. For example, respondents who perceive more subgroup members as harming the group's reputation are significantly more likely to support increased border enforcement ($b = 0.69$, $p \leq .001$), believe Latines take too much from goods and services ($b = 0.80$, $p \leq .001$), and oppose aid to low-income Latines ($b = 0.46$, $p \leq .001$). These effects are substantively meaningful and align with theoretical expectations.

By contrast, the reverse models produce smaller effect sizes, lower statistical significance, and consistently lower R-squared values (typically ranging from 0.02 to 0.07). While some predictors retain significance, their explanatory power is weaker and more inconsistent. For instance, “Take too much” remains a significant predictor of status perceptions, but its coefficient is smaller in magnitude than in the original model, suggesting a more modest relationship. Predictors like ideology and support for scholarships yield only marginal effects in the reverse models.

Taken together, these results suggest a directional asymmetry in the relationship: while within-group status perceptions may be correlated with political distancing attitudes, the evidence points more strongly toward a causal interpretation in which status perceptions shape political distancing—not the other way around—at least among these observational tests.

Average Quantity Status with Demographic Controls, Modeling for Reverse Causality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(Intercept)	2.23 (0.10)***	2.15 (0.09)***	2.27 (0.09)***	2.26 (0.10)***	2.16 (0.09)***	2.25 (0.09)***	2.30 (0.09)***	2.33 (0.09)***	2.24 (0.09)***	2.29 (0.10)***
Skilled Immigration	0.04 (0.01)***									
Border Security		0.07 (0.01)***								
Aid to Low Income			0.05 (0.01)***							
Work Harder				0.04 (0.01)**						
Take Too Much					0.07 (0.01)**					
Learn English						0.05 (0.01)***				
Scholarships							0.04 (0.01)**			
Refrain Report								0.03 (0.01)*		
Support Business									0.06 (0.01)***	
Ideology										0.03 (0.01)*
Race: Black	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Race: Other	-0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.04)*	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.10 (0.04)*	-0.10 (0.04)*	-0.10 (0.04)*	-0.08 (0.04)
Income	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.03 (0.01)*
Education	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Republican	0.08 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
R ²	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01
Num. obs.	719	719	719	719	719	719	719	719	719	690

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

A9: Scaled Status Models

Scaled Status Models - Baseline

Values

	Work Harder	Take Too Much	Learn English
Intercept	3.28 (0.24) ^{***}	1.78 (0.26) ^{***}	2.79 (0.26) ^{***}
Status Scaled	0.23 (0.06) ^{***}	0.41 (0.06) ^{***}	0.46 (0.06) ^{***}
R ²	0.02	0.06	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.06	0.07
Num. obs.	740	740	740

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Policy Preferences

	Skilled Immigration	Border Security	Aid to Low Income
Intercept	3.85 (0.24) ^{***}	3.11 (0.27) ^{***}	2.06 (0.24) ^{***}
Status Scaled	0.09 (0.06)	0.30 (0.06) ^{***}	0.30 (0.06) ^{***}
R ²	0.00	0.03	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	740	740	740

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Behaviors and Ideology

	Scholarships	Refrain Report	Support Business	Ideology
Intercept	2.39 (0.25) ^{***}	3.02 (0.27) ^{***}	1.98 (0.22) ^{***}	2.70 (0.26) ^{***}
Status Scaled	0.29 (0.06) ^{***}	0.27 (0.06) ^{***}	0.22 (0.05) ^{***}	0.22 (0.06) ^{***}
R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	740	740	740	701

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Scaled Status Models - Demographics

Values

	Work Harder	Take Too Much	Learn English
Intercept	1.31 (0.86)	2.11 (0.90)*	−0.24 (0.87)
Reputation Scaled	0.19 (0.06)**	0.29 (0.06)***	0.35 (0.06)***
Race - Black	0.05 (0.25)	0.53 (0.26)*	0.13 (0.25)
Race - Other	0.14 (0.15)	−0.03 (0.16)	0.23 (0.15)
European Phenotype	0.02 (0.16)	0.07 (0.17)	0.19 (0.16)
Skin Tone (Lighter)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Income	0.06 (0.03)*	0.04 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.03)
Education	0.09 (0.04)*	0.03 (0.04)	0.11 (0.04)**
Co-Ethnic Context (High)	0.01 (0.13)	0.03 (0.14)	−0.17 (0.13)
English Proficiency	0.11 (0.09)	−0.17 (0.10)	0.20 (0.09)*
Heritage (MX, CB, PR)	0.22 (0.13)	−0.05 (0.13)	−0.06 (0.13)
Republican	0.62 (0.16)***	1.25 (0.17)***	0.88 (0.17)***
Age	0.01 (0.00)**	0.02 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***
Female	−0.26 (0.13)*	−0.32 (0.13)*	−0.48 (0.13)***
R ²	0.11	0.18	0.22
Adj. R ²	0.10	0.16	0.21
Num. obs.	716	716	716

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Policy Preferences

	Skilled Immigration	Border Security	Aid to Low Income
Intercept	3.83 (0.88)***	1.79 (0.92)	3.07 (0.84)***
Reputation Scaled	0.07 (0.06)	0.20 (0.06)**	0.22 (0.06)***
Race - Black	−0.20 (0.26)	−0.27 (0.27)	−0.02 (0.25)
Race - Other	−0.07 (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)	0.04 (0.15)
European Phenotype	−0.01 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.17)	0.31 (0.15)*
Skin Tone (Lighter)	−0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Income	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Education	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)*
Co-Ethnic Context (High)	0.04 (0.13)	−0.04 (0.14)	−0.07 (0.13)
English Proficiency	0.10 (0.09)	0.06 (0.10)	−0.24 (0.09)**
Heritage (MX, CB, PR)	0.18 (0.13)	−0.04 (0.14)	−0.26 (0.12)*
Republican	0.33 (0.17)*	1.42 (0.18)***	0.77 (0.16)***
Age	−0.01 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)
Female	−0.25 (0.13)	−0.13 (0.13)	0.27 (0.12)*
R ²	0.03	0.17	0.12
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.15	0.10
Num. obs.	716	716	716

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Behaviors and Ideology

	Scholarships	Refrain Report	Support Business	Ideology
Intercept	2.81 (0.89)**	1.70 (0.95)	4.08 (0.79)***	2.00 (0.86)*
Reputation Scaled	0.21 (0.06)***	0.21 (0.06)**	0.14 (0.05)**	0.10 (0.05)
Race - Black	0.73 (0.26)**	0.27 (0.28)	0.27 (0.23)	-0.33 (0.24)
Race - Other	0.17 (0.16)	0.38 (0.17)*	0.05 (0.14)	0.18 (0.14)
European Phenotype	-0.06 (0.16)	0.18 (0.17)	0.22 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.15)
Skin Tone (Lighter)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Income	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)**	0.00 (0.03)
Education	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Co-Ethnic Context (High)	0.02 (0.14)	0.16 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.26 (0.12)*
English Proficiency	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.28 (0.09)***	0.02 (0.10)
Heritage (MX, CB, PR)	-0.34 (0.13)**	-0.24 (0.14)	-0.26 (0.12)*	-0.25 (0.12)*
Republican	0.82 (0.17)***	0.47 (0.18)**	0.52 (0.15)***	2.10 (0.15)***
Age	0.02 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Female	0.03 (0.13)	0.20 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)
R ²	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.26
Adj. R ²	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.25
Num. obs.	716	716	716	681

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

A10: Quantity Status Models

Quantity Status Models - Baseline

Values

	Work Harder	Take Too Much	Learn English
Intercept	3.58 (0.26)***	1.77 (0.29)***	3.95 (0.27)***
Reputation Quantity Scaled	0.34 (0.10)**	0.77 (0.12)***	0.40 (0.11)***
R ²	0.01	0.05	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.05	0.02
Num. obs.	744	744	744

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Policy Preferences

	Skilled Immigration	Border Security	Aid to Low Income
Intercept	3.22 (0.26)***	2.75 (0.28)***	2.21 (0.26)***
Reputation Quantity Scaled	0.40 (0.11)***	0.71 (0.12)***	0.45 (0.11)***
R ²	0.02	0.05	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.05	0.02
Num. obs.	744	744	744

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Behaviors and Ideology

	Scholarships	Refrain Report	Support Business	Ideology
Intercept	2.59 (0.28)***	3.36 (0.29)***	1.81 (0.24)***	3.26 (0.27)***
Reputation Quantity Scaled	0.41 (0.11)***	0.37 (0.12)**	0.45 (0.10)***	0.22 (0.11)*
R ²	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.00
Num. obs.	744	744	744	710

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Quantity Status Models - Demographics

Values (with Full Demographic Controls)

	Work Harder	Take Too Much	Learn English
Intercept	3.60 (0.82)***	3.02 (0.94)**	3.91 (0.85)***
Reputation Quantity Scaled	0.30 (0.11)**	0.77 (0.12)***	0.37 (0.11)***
Race – Black	0.13 (0.20)	–0.22 (0.23)	0.06 (0.21)
Race – Other	–0.12 (0.15)	–0.17 (0.17)	–0.15 (0.16)
European Phenotype	0.06 (0.16)	0.26 (0.18)	0.20 (0.16)
Skin Tone (Lighter)	0.05 (0.04)	–0.06 (0.05)	–0.06 (0.04)
Income	0.06 (0.03)*	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Education	–0.02 (0.04)	–0.07 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Co-Ethnic Context (High)	–0.01 (0.13)	–0.00 (0.14)	–0.12 (0.13)
English Proficiency	–0.11 (0.09)	–0.13 (0.10)	–0.10 (0.09)
Heritage (MX, CB, PR)	0.12 (0.13)	–0.01 (0.15)	–0.10 (0.13)
Republican	0.66 (0.16)***	0.80 (0.18)***	0.75 (0.16)***
Age	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)	0.03 (0.00)***
Female	–0.46 (0.12)***	–0.18 (0.14)	–0.17 (0.13)
R ²	0.09	0.11	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.07	0.10	0.12
Num. obs.	719	719	719

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Policy Preferences (with Full Demographic Controls)

	Skilled Immigration	Border Security	Aid to Low Income
Intercept	4.30 (0.86)***	1.96 (0.89)*	2.33 (0.83)**
Reputation Quantity Scaled	0.38 (0.11)***	0.68 (0.11)***	0.43 (0.11)***
Race – Black	–0.35 (0.21)	–0.47 (0.22)*	0.59 (0.20)**
Race – Other	–0.14 (0.16)	–0.12 (0.16)	–0.13 (0.15)
European Phenotype	–0.21 (0.16)	0.16 (0.17)	0.55 (0.16)***
Skin Tone (Lighter)	–0.09 (0.04)*	–0.08 (0.05)	–0.05 (0.04)
Income	0.05 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)*	–0.03 (0.03)
Education	–0.01 (0.04)	–0.07 (0.04)	–0.07 (0.04)*
Co-Ethnic Context (High)	0.04 (0.13)	–0.16 (0.14)	–0.04 (0.13)
English Proficiency	–0.01 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	–0.01 (0.09)
Heritage (MX, CB, PR)	0.03 (0.13)	0.02 (0.14)	–0.36 (0.13)**
Republican	–0.03 (0.16)	1.13 (0.17)***	0.94 (0.16)***
Age	–0.01 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)***
Female	–0.17 (0.13)	–0.24 (0.13)	0.15 (0.13)
R ²	0.04	0.17	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.16	0.12
Num. obs.	719	719	719

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Behaviors and Ideology (with Full Demographic Controls)

	Scholarships	Refrain Report	Support Business	Ideology
Intercept	0.78 (0.89)	1.61 (0.93)	2.66 (0.77)***	4.99 (0.77)***
Reputation Quantity Scaled	0.36 (0.11)**	0.26 (0.12)*	0.39 (0.10)***	0.17 (0.10)
Race – Black	0.70 (0.22)**	0.26 (0.23)	0.28 (0.19)	–0.04 (0.19)
Race – Other	–0.03 (0.16)	0.13 (0.17)	–0.06 (0.14)	–0.14 (0.14)
European Phenotype	0.43 (0.17)*	0.39 (0.18)*	0.42 (0.15)**	0.01 (0.15)
Skin Tone (Lighter)	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	–0.07 (0.04)
Income	–0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	–0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Education	–0.13 (0.04)**	–0.07 (0.04)	–0.11 (0.03)**	–0.05 (0.03)
Co-Ethnic Context (High)	–0.08 (0.14)	–0.07 (0.14)	–0.15 (0.12)	–0.12 (0.12)
English Proficiency	0.08 (0.09)	0.04 (0.10)	–0.10 (0.08)	–0.13 (0.08)
Heritage (MX, CB, PR)	–0.14 (0.14)	–0.07 (0.14)	–0.33 (0.12)**	–0.23 (0.12)
Republican	0.86 (0.17)***	0.85 (0.18)***	0.79 (0.15)***	1.92 (0.15)***
Age	0.02 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)	–0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.08 (0.13)	–0.10 (0.14)	–0.05 (0.12)	–0.15 (0.12)
R ²	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.24
Adj. R ²	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.22
Num. obs.	719	719	719	690

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$