

Migrant Franchise Constellations*

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Abstract

The expansion of voting rights beyond territory and citizenship marks a major democratic development of the last fifty years. The migrant suffrage has been mostly studied from a state-centric perspective. But the rights that migrants hold emerge from specific combinations of the country of residence and the country of citizenship. From this migrant-centric perspective, what is the diagnosis of the spread and status of global migrant suffrage? We present franchise constellations as a migrant-centric framework for studying voting rights. Drawing on the most comprehensive dataset on migrant electoral rights, combined with novel data on nationality-specific restrictions, we compute almost 1.3 million dyad-year observations based on 172 countries between 1960 and 2020. Using migrant stock data, we find that at least 74 million migrants remained completely disenfranchised in 2020. Bilateral and multilateral efforts emerge as a fruitful path for addressing global migrant disenfranchisement.

Keywords: voting rights, migrants, non-citizen residents, non-resident citizens, suffrage, franchise.

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1 Introduction

The inclusion of migrants in elections is a major democratic development of the last fifty years. Traditionally, the right to vote was conditional on citizenship of and residence in the polity. In recent decades, the franchise has become increasingly available to non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens. Research on this topic mostly adopts a state-centric approach. From this scholarship we learn that at least 141 countries provide external voting rights for their non-resident citizens in national elections ([Wellman, Allen and Nyblade, 2023](#)), and at least 50 countries provide at least local voting rights for non-citizen residents ([Escobar, 2015](#)). In taking a monadic approach, with individual states as the unit of analysis, this strand of research concentrates on why states do or do not grant rights ([Finn, 2023](#); [Kayran and Erdilmen, 2021](#); [Lafleur, 2011](#); [Østergaard-Nielsen, Ciornei and Lafleur, 2019](#); [Wellman, 2021](#)).

A migrant-centric approach, in contrast, recognizes that which voting rights a migrant holds hinges on the *combination* of the country of residence and the country of citizenship. For example, a Polish citizen who is a long-term resident of Uruguay can participate in elections across all levels in Uruguay and in national elections in Poland. Conversely, a Uruguayan citizen residing in Poland cannot vote in either country¹—despite living in a democracy and being a citizen of a democracy. Each directed pairing of countries constitutes a specific franchise dyad. As the example illustrates, the direction of migration within the pair matters for voting rights. This migrant-centric perspective builds on the study of transnational political behavior ([Aydemir and Vermeulen, 2023](#); [Chaudhary, 2018](#); [Finn, 2020](#); [Goerres et al., 2025](#); [Mügge et al., 2021](#); [Peltoniemi, 2018](#); [Umpierrez De Reguero and Finn, 2024](#); [Szulecki et al., 2021](#)).

Here, we apply the term migrant as a shorthand label for those who are simultaneously non-resident citizens of one country and non-citizen residents in another.² Though there is no global population estimate with this precise definition, the closest approximation are the roughly 281 million people who have been permanently living in a country other than the one they were born in.³ In terms of population, this would jointly amount to the fourth largest country in the world—after India, China, and the United States.

¹Voting in Uruguay would require a return to the country on the day of the election.

²We recognize that not all those who are non-resident citizens in one country and non-citizen residents in another country have themselves migrated between these two countries. Conversely, not all migrants are non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens, since some adopt the citizenship of their country of residence.

³This number is based on a report by the International Organization for Migration using migrant stock data ([McAuliffe and Ochoa, 2024](#)).

The shift from a monadic state-centric to a dyadic migrant-centric approach opens descriptive questions relevant to this significant part of the world population: What share of migration pathways lead to full or no franchise? What is the share of migrants holding voting rights? And what is the share not holding any? Given that existing dyadic studies on the migrant franchise relied on a limited set of dyadic combinations (usually focusing on one country of residence or citizenship and the dyads connected to it), we do not yet know the overall state of global migrant suffrage from a migrant-centric perspective.

Our contribution lies in developing a migrant-centric framework of suffrage rights and providing new data to measure their scope. We begin with a typology of franchise constellations, capturing combinations of rights in the countries of residence and citizenship. These combinations range from full rights in both countries to no rights in either country. Following [Gerring \(2012\)](#), our empirical analyses lean into the value of description and, in doing so, engage with the normatively important topic of democratic inclusion. First, we assess how many dyadic combinations of countries fall into each franchise constellation. Accordingly, we merge novel data on nationality-specific restrictions of the non-citizen resident franchise, data on migrant electoral rights generally ([Umpierrez de Reguero, Wegschaider and Bauböck, 2025](#)), and data on regime type ([Coppedge et al., 2024](#)). With these data sources combined, we compute almost 1.3 million dyad-years including 172 countries between 1960 and 2020. While in 1960, roughly 90 percent of dyads resulted in complete disenfranchisement, that number shrank to roughly 30 percent by 2020.

Second, we estimate—to the extent possible—the share of the migrant population in each of these franchise constellations over the past few decades. For this, we combine our dyad-years with migrant stock data ([UNDESA Population Division, 2019](#)). We find that at least 74.7 million migrants remained completely disenfranchised in 2020. Among inclusive dyads, a disproportionate share reflects historical or negotiated ties between countries (e.g. Brazil and Portugal), pointing to a need for deeper integration of enfranchisement and international relations research.

2 Franchise Constellations: A Migrant-Centric Framework

Migrants' voting rights are determined by their country of residence (CR) and their country of citizenship (CC). We propose a framework covering different combinations of voting rights in both the CR and the CC. We use the term franchise dyad for combinations of specific countries, and dyad-year for a point in time for each dyad. Our dyads are directed, because the combination of the same two countries can result in different constellations. We label each dyad based on the international ISO3 code, with the first element referring to the CR and the second to the CC. For example, citizens of Singapore have local and national voting rights in Jamaica (JAM-SGP); but Jamaican citizens do not have such rights in Singapore (SGP-JAM). We use the term franchise constellation to categorize the scope of migrant suffrage for each franchise dyad. Each constellation can contain many different dyadic observations, but each dyad-year observation belongs to only one constellation. This framework builds on previous conceptual work on citizenship constellations (Bauböck, 2010) and recent empirical advances on dual citizenship (Vink, Van Der Baaren and Reichel, 2025).

Our framework distinguishes between levels of election. We include national elections of the CC and national as well as local elections in the CR.⁴ Following other examples from the literature (Østergaard-Nielsen, Ciornei and Lafleur, 2019; Wellman, 2021; Wellman, Allen and Nyblade, 2023), we only code non-resident citizen voting rights if these can be exercised from outside the country. We apply a binary code, meaning that each <<1>> stands for the existence of electoral rights and each <<0>> for the absence of electoral rights. For each dyad-year, this results in a three-digit combination covering national elections in the CR, local elections in the CR, and national elections in the CC. The resulting franchise constellations are listed in *Table 1* and are scored in descending order, reflecting their inclusiveness: (6) full migrant franchise, (5) local and external franchise, (4) full domestic franchise, (3) external-only franchise, (2) local-only franchise, (1) no franchise. More inclusive constellations are portrayed with a lighter shade in *Table 1* and subsequent visualizations.

All these constellations can be illustrated by dyads that have the United Kingdom as the CR in the year 2020. The *full migrant franchise* describes the most inclusive constellation, entailing national and local suffrage in the CR and national suffrage in the CC (1-1-1). An example

⁴We exclude local elections in the CC (because non-residents are rarely enfranchised locally in the CC) and elections at the mid-tier level (which only exist in some countries).

of this constellation would be a South African citizen residing in the United Kingdom (GBR-ZAF). South Africa provides external voting to its emigrants and, due to the Commonwealth connection, a South African citizen has access to electoral rights across all levels in the United Kingdom. At the other end of the spectrum, individuals in the *no franchise* constellation are excluded from voting in both the CC and the CR (0-0-0). An example of this constellation is the dyad of Uruguayan citizens living in the United Kingdom (GBR-URY). They cannot vote in any elections in the United Kingdom and Uruguay does not provide for external voting. This example highlights the value of the dyadic approach, as monadic datasets cannot capture this highly differentiated franchise.

Enfranchised in constellation: country of residence (CR) country of citizenship (CC)	national election in CR	local election in CR	national election in CC	example dyad: CR-CC-year
(6) full migrant franchise	1	1	1	GBR-ZAF-2020
(5) local+external franchise	0	1	1	GBR-POL-2020
(4) full domestic franchise	1	1	0	GBR-IND-2020
(3) external-only franchise	0	0	1	GBR-TUR-2020
(2) local-only franchise	0	1	0	GBR-DNK-2020
(1) no franchise	0	0	0	GBR-URY-2020

Table 1: Framework of franchise constellations

We describe types (2) to (5) in *Table 1* as partial franchise constellations that offer at least some opportunity of electoral participation. As their ranking could be questioned, we briefly explain our reasons. More inclusive versions of partial franchise are multi-level—meaning that the individual in the dyad can participate both in local CR elections as well as in national elections in either the CR or the CC. This applies to Polish citizens, who can vote in national elections in their CC as well as locally in the United Kingdom, and Indian citizens, who can vote in elections across all levels in the United Kingdom. Between these two, we rank the *local+external franchise* (0-1-1) higher than the *full domestic franchise* (1-1-0), as the former reflects the transnational nature of modern migration better than full enfranchisement in the CR without any voice in the CC. We chose this ranking because, if naturalization in the CR is possible and dual citizenship is tolerated by the CR and the CC, migrants in the *local+external* constellation (5: GBR-POL-2020) can upgrade their electoral rights to *full migrant franchise*—an option unavailable to those in the *full domestic* constellation (4: GBR-IND-2020).

The less inclusive version of the partial franchise means that the individual has only either local CR voting rights or national CC voting rights. For example, the *external-only franchise* applies to Turkish citizens, who have no electoral rights in the United Kingdom, but can participate in national elections in Turkey from abroad (0-0-1). Danish citizens—if they lived in the United Kingdom before 31 January 2020—fall within the *local-only franchise* and thereby have local voting rights in the United Kingdom but cannot vote from abroad in Danish elections (0-1-0). Between these two constellations, we consider the former (3: GBR-TUR-2020) as more inclusive than the latter (2: GBR-DNK-2020) as it takes migrants' transnational ties into account and as national elections are politically more important than local ones. This is especially so for migrants, since laws on immigration, residence, and citizenship are decided by national legislatures.

Close readers may have noted that our typology covers only six types, although there are eight possible combinations based on the three types of elections we consider. Of these eight logically possible combinations, we discard those as empirically not meaningful where non-citizen residents can vote in national, but not local elections in the CR (1-0-1; 1-0-0). Overall, CRs that grant voting rights at the national level also extend these rights at the local level. The exception here are countries that do not have an elected local government. For example, Barbados grants non-citizen voting rights at the national level but it lacks an elected local government. We classify these dyads as if migrants were also included in (non-existing) local elections. Thus, the aforementioned combinations (1-0-1 and 1-0-0) are subsumed by the 1-1-1 and 1-1-0 types, respectively.

The constellations framework can be also applied to other political rights or combined with citizenship regulations. Where non-citizen residents do not have voting rights, naturalization—depending on the citizenship acquisition policies—is another path toward enfranchisement. Conversely, non-resident citizens who currently hold voting rights may lose them upon acquiring the citizenship of their country of residence. Accounting for laws around citizenship acquisition and loss can provide an even fuller picture of migrants' access to electoral rights.

3 Data and Method

Since our focus is on the voting rights that migrants hold—rather than on their voting behavior—we operationalize the migrant franchise based on the letter of the law. For the same reason, we account for all years in which a franchise law was in effect, as opposed to just election years. However, in line with our migrant-centric as opposed to state-centric approach, we do not code voting rights in closed autocracies, where the franchise is meaningless even for resident citizens. A rights claim in this regime context is hollow.

For non-resident citizens, we treat observations as positive cases if the franchise exists for national executive and/or legislative elections. In addition, we consider only those cases where the franchise is granted independent of occupational status (thus, excluding cases where rights are restricted to military, diplomats, students, or other specific professions) and where it can be exercised from abroad (thus, excluding cases where non-resident citizens are required to return to the country to vote). For the non-citizen franchise in local elections, we treat observations as positive cases only if voting rights are available across the country’s main territory.⁵ Countries like Switzerland and the United States are therefore both coded as negative cases, although some cantons or municipalities have extended suffrage.

Our analyses build on four datasets.⁶ First, we draw on the *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)* dataset (Coppedge et al., 2024) to construct our sample. We include countries for which a regime classification is available in *V-Dem*, as this is the basis for identifying closed autocracies which we code as <<0>> for any given election level. Second, we combine this with the *GLOBALCIT Migrant Electoral Rights Dataset (MER)* (Umpierrez de Reguero, Wegschaider and Bauböck, 2025) to determine the presence or absence of electoral rights for each country-year observation. A key benefit of this dataset is that the data on non-citizen resident and non-resident citizen franchise are collected based on the same coding rules. The information is based on the letter of the law as of the first of January each year. Since this dataset includes only countries still in existence in 2020, countries whose sovereignty is widely undisputed, and countries with a population of at least 250,000, this slightly shrinks the sample. This dataset covers the years 1960 to 2020—a period which encompasses the rise of the franchise of both non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens. After merging *V-Dem* and *MER*, our analysis draws on data from

⁵Accordingly, we discount divergences in special territories, like the Åland islands in Finland.

⁶Please see the data availability statement in *Appendix 1*.

172 countries. *Appendix 2* lists all countries in the sample.

To generate the dyads, we additionally require information on cases where the non-citizen franchise is restricted to specific nationalities. Examples of these specific regulations include the highly fractured franchise in the United Kingdom, the local franchise for European Union citizens, and the Nordic local franchise. To account for these cases, we created a novel dataset listing all the nationality-specific franchise pairings, the years during which the respective rules were active (between 1960 and 2020), the level of elections, and the legal source.⁷ This additional dataset was compiled based on information contained in *MER* as well as the original legal texts specifying the nationality conditions.⁸ We refer to country pairings involving such specific rules as special dyads.

We then generate the dyad-years, meaning combinations of CRs and CCs for specific years. For each year, we combine every country with all other countries in the dataset. As in our conceptual framework, our empirical dyads are directed, meaning that a pairing of two countries appears twice in the same year (so that each is once CC and CR). Pairings where a country is matched with itself are removed. In case of missing data on any of the three voting rights indicators used to classify the dyad into a constellation, that dyad-year observation will not be classified or appear in our analyses. As noted before, in the exceptional cases where there are no local elections in CR, we classify the dyad as if the same franchise applied in national and local elections. The lack of local elections in CC has no impact on our dyads since these are excluded from our framework. In total, we generate 1,286,406 dyad-year observations. Of those, 21,738 observations (1.7 percent) are based on special dyadic combinations.

In the final step, we account for the migrant population within each dyad. Ideally, we would have detailed information on the number of non-citizen residents by nationality in each country. The best approximation of this is the UN Migrant Stock data, compiled by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs ([UNDESA Population Division, 2019](https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2025-fb517)) and available in five-year intervals starting from 1990. This dataset reports the number of foreign-born individuals residing in each country by country of birth. This can lead both to overestimates and underestimates of the number of migrants based on our definition. In terms of overestimates, the classification

⁷If a country merely proclaims a reciprocal franchise for non-citizen residents in its constitution without passing subsequent legislation specifying the affected nationalities or signing bilateral or multilateral agreements to this effect, then we do not consider this a positive case. An example is the 2011 Constitution of Morocco.

⁸*Appendix 3* provides further detail on data collection.

is based on country of birth, which does not necessarily correspond to citizenship status. As a result, the dataset also includes those who moved abroad and subsequently naturalized in the residence country. Furthermore, this dataset includes individuals below the voting age. In terms of underestimates, the data does not account for the second generation—individuals born abroad to migrant parents—who sometimes have only the citizenship of their parent’s origin country. The population estimates should therefore be interpreted as indicating orders of magnitude, rather than providing precise counts of migrants eligible to vote either in the CC or CR. Despite the shortcomings, the UN Migrant Stock data has been an important source for scholars of transnationalism (Burgess and Tyburski, 2020; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen, 2020), especially because the systematic data collection across countries allows for global and longitudinal comparisons.

4 Diagnosing the State of Migrant Suffrage

Building on our framework of franchise constellations, we diagnose the extent of migrant suffrage from a migrant-centric perspective. First, we categorize all dyad-year observations into the six franchise constellations. Second, since such cross-dyad analyses obscure within-dyad changes, we show transitions within dyadic combinations over time. Third, we shift our analysis toward the migrant populations situated within franchise dyads.

4.1 Mapping Franchise Dyads onto Constellations

We begin by categorizing the franchise dyads—meaning combinations of CR and CC within which individuals are situated—into franchise constellations. In total, we categorized 1,286,406 franchise dyad-years (see *Figure 1*). The number of dyads fluctuates over time, reflecting new countries entering the dataset. In 1960, our dataset contains almost 14,000 franchise dyads. Most dyads (92 percent) fell into the *no franchise* constellation. By 2020, following the independence and democratization of many countries, the observations had risen to roughly 27,500. Then, the most common constellation was the *external-only* franchise, meaning that migrants could only vote in elections of their CC but not their CR. The *no franchise* constellation remained the second most common one but its share had fallen significantly (to 29 percent).




Figure 1: Migrant Franchise Dyads, 1960-2020




Figure 2: Within-Dyad Transitions Between Franchise Constellations, 1960-2020

Figure 2, to be read from left to right, displays within-dyad transitions between franchise constellations. When a franchise dyad changes, from which to which constellation does it most likely transition? Here, we cover all instances where the dyad classification changed between any given year and the subsequent year. A dyad is listed each time it changes constellations (between 1960 and 2020); dyads that stayed consistently in the same constellation are excluded




Figure 3: Estimated Migrant Population Per Constellation

from this visualization. The blue flows indicate that within-dyad changes were overwhelmingly in the direction of expansion. The most common transition was from *no franchise* toward *external-only* franchise and, to a lesser degree, *local-only franchise*. Global migrant suffrage is thus mainly driven by CCs extending voting rights at the national level. Among the few restrictions, CCs are likewise the main driver—with the largest restrictive flow from *external-only* franchise to *no franchise*. The flows in *Figure 2* clarify that the cross-dyad trend of growing migrant suffrage in *Figure 1* is not mainly the result of new, more inclusive dyads entering the dataset. Instead, existing dyadic combinations are transitioning toward greater inclusion. This holds particularly among the *local+external* franchise constellation. This transition is driven by both CR and CC, as the significant flows from *local-only* and *external-only* franchise indicate.

4.2 Combining Franchise Dyads with Migrant Stock Data

So far, we have treated all dyads as equally important. For example, the dyad of Bahamian citizens living in Luxembourg is given the same weight as the dyad of Mexican citizens living in the United States, despite the latter being numerically much more relevant. Hence, *Figure 1* does not capture the relative demographic weight of the constellations. Without accounting for the number of individuals in each dyad, we risk overemphasizing rare dyads while underrepresenting large migrant populations.

Our migrant-centric perspective calls for estimating the numbers of individuals within each of the dyads and aggregating these within the six constellations. For this purpose, we combine the dyads with migrant stock data. In *Figure 3*, we assess how many migrants are within each constellation at the start of each decade from 1990 onward.⁹ The increasing height of the stacked bar charts partly reflects the increasing number of dyads and partly the increase in the global migrant population in absolute numbers. Beyond that, this aggregation reflects the mapping of franchise dyads in *Figure 1*. In 1990, more than half of all migrants in dyads for which data is available were completely excluded from the right to vote. By 2020, this share had shrunk significantly, although disenfranchisement remained at a similar level in absolute numbers. An important caveat is that migrant stock data is not available for more than half of the dyads and missing data stock records are not randomly distributed. Democracies are both more likely to provide the franchise for non-citizen residents and to offer reliable data on their population. *Figure 3* therefore overestimates the inclusivity of global migrant suffrage.

5 Discussion

Discussions surrounding migrant suffrage or dual citizenship frequently touch on concerns that migrants would be “over-enfranchised” by holding electoral rights in more than one country (Goodin and Tanasoca, 2014).¹⁰ However, we see more reasons for concern that migrants are often under-enfranchised or completely disenfranchised. With an original dataset of 1,286,406 country-year-dyads, we diagnose that complete disenfranchisement among the migrant population continues in 2020. While the overall trend has been toward migrant suffrage expansion, there are still at least 74.7 million migrants who are completely disenfranchised.

Our dyadic framework draws attention to the fact that global migrant suffrage rests to a large extent on the non-resident franchise. The *no franchise* category, marking complete exclusion from voting rights, mainly declined due to countries of citizenship granting their external citizens the right to participate in national elections from abroad. This should cause pause in light of existing normative work on migrant enfranchisement, much of which views the franchise for non-resident citizens with skepticism (Bauböck, 2009; López-Guerra, 2005; Rubio-

⁹The measures of this dataset are taken mid-year. Since 2020 is an exceptional year due to the global pandemic, which also impacted migrant movements, we rely on data from mid-2019.

¹⁰As previous normative work shows, first-generation migrants credibly hold a stake in both their CR and their original CC (Bauböck, 2005).

[Marín, 2006](#)). The argument is that only those living permanently within the jurisdiction are fully subjected to the laws. Accordingly, the case for the non-citizen resident franchise is better supported in the normative literature ([Beckman, 2006](#); [Kapelner, 2025](#); [Pedroza, 2015](#)). But our analysis underlines that without non-resident citizen voting rights, most migrants would still be completely locked out of the right to vote—despite many being citizens of and residing in countries holding meaningful elections.

For empirical research, two particularly fruitful paths emerge. First, our dyadic data shows the bilateral and multilateral arena as a promising field for scholarship and activism aiming to overcome global migrant disenfranchisement. Much of the literature on migrant enfranchisement retains a focus on domestic politics (thus following a monadic logic). However, we find that special dyads—based on international agreements or historic relations between specific countries—constitute a disproportionate share of dyads with non-citizen suffrage. In the entire dyadic dataset, these special dyads play just a minor role, accounting for only 1.7 percent of all dyads. Among the dyads offering non-citizen franchise (meaning constellations 2, 5, and 6), these special dyads make up 15 percent. Second, franchise constellations may have attitudinal and behavioral implications. For example, remaining completely locked out of the right to vote for a long time could have detrimental effects on electoral participation after naturalization, when voting rights are once again available. The aim is for migrants to find their place not only in the societies, but also in the democracies in which they live. Future research, leveraging dyadic data, can assess whether long-term disenfranchisement jeopardizes integration into democracies.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Data and Code Availability Statement

This paper draws on four datasets: (1) *Varieties of Democracy* (Coppedge et al., 2024), (2) *UNDESA Migrant Stock Data* (UNDESA Population Division, 2019), (3) the *Migrant Electoral Rights Dataset (MER)* (Umpierrez de Reguero, Wegschaider and Bauböck, 2025), and (4) the *Dataset of Nationality-Conditioned Voting Rights for Non-Citizen Residents*. The first two of these datasets are publicly available. The second two datasets were collected by the author(s) and will be made publicly available when or before this note is published. In addition, we will make the full dyadic dataset available as well as the code used to generate the dyads and all figures in this paper.

Appendix 2: Sample

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea, South Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Appendix 3: Data Collection

The *GLOBALCIT Migrant Electoral Rights Dataset (MER)* captures legislation on non-citizen resident and non-resident citizen suffrage. The coding is based on legal texts, reflecting the letter of the law in each country on the first of January of the respective year. These data were collected by the authors in a multi-year process. The dataset covers 165 countries, 61 years, and includes 488 indicators. The technical details of the data structure, collection, and validation are described in another publication.

The *Dataset of Nationality-Conditioned Voting Rights for Non-Citizen Residents* was originally collected by the authors for the purpose of this research note. The starting point for collecting this dataset were a set of variables in *MER* that record whether non-citizen residents' voting rights come with a nationality condition (meaning that one must hold a specific nationality to be eligible for non-citizen voting rights). We used these variables in *MER* to identify all countries with such a condition at any point between 1960 and 2020. In the next

step, we concentrated on each identified country and consulted the legal texts that specified which nationalities were eligible for voting rights. The final dataset lists 1,304 directed pairings of countries. For each pairing, we specify: (a) the country of residence, (b) the country of citizenship, (c) the year when the eligibility condition for that nationality started, (d) the year when the eligibility condition for that nationality ended (if at all), (e) the level of elections (local, national), (f) the type of rule, and (g) the relevant legal source. The type-of-rule variable specifies whether the franchise is based on a multinational agreement (like the EU franchise), a bilateral agreement, or otherwise unilaterally granted. For the purpose of this research note, this dataset is used to compute the 21,738 special dyad-year observations.