

More Equal the Others: Race and Religion Alter Support to Countries in Conflict*

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Abstract

How does the race of those suffering alter Americans' sympathy and support for invaded countries? Moving beyond the traditional White-Black binary, this research examines how the intertwined domestic and international racialization for both Asians and Arabs creates particular penalties in support. Survey data from the late Cold War provides evidence consistent with my theory. To establish causality, I use AI-generated images to manipulate the race of a hypothetical invaded country and find White respondents are less supportive toward Arab and Asian majority countries, though majority Black countries were not penalized to the same degree. Importantly, race also biases evaluations of ostensibly material and objective country capabilities. To better mirror the real-world dynamics where publics observe both invader and invaded, I field a paired-profile conjoint on a quota-based sample of Americans. While respondents support invaded (victim) countries in general, the cross-pull of outgroup racial or religious identity substantially weakens and in some cases eliminates the support for victims of aggression. These results show that race can bias support, but also condition how people react to aggressive behavior. Identity is not so easily separable from strategic or material considerations.

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1 Introduction

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused an outpouring of global sympathy, but that sympathy had a very particular tone. Ukraine's Deputy Chief Prosecutor, David Sakvarelidze, stated how emotional it was to see 'European people with blond hair and blue eyes' being killed. David Hannan of the Telegraph noted, "They seem so like us. That is what makes it so shocking. Ukraine is a European country... War is no longer something visited upon impoverished and remote populations" (Bayoumi, 2022). Bulgaria's Prime Minister Kiril Petkov stated Ukrainian refugees were intelligent and educated, not like other refugees with "unclear pasts, who could have been even terrorists..."¹

At the same time, there was relatively little attention to the ongoing Syrian Civil War, or the Tigrayan War in Ethiopia, which has displaced more than 5 million people and killed over 600,000 (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). Remarking on the stark difference in attention, World Health Organization chief Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus stated, "I don't know if the world really gives equal attention to black and white lives...I need to be blunt and honest that the world is not treating the human race the same way. Some are more equal than others" (BBC, 2022).

Norms against overt racism are emerging (Lipsy and Zhou, 2026), but Dr. Tedros' comments suggest the world still confronts "the problem of the color line" (Du Bois, 1906). How does the identity of those suffering shape the public's sympathy and attitudes on foreign policy support? Sympathy and support for other countries are crucial matters for international politics; belligerents often appeal to the hearts and minds of outside parties in a global clash of narratives (Canetti et al., 2019; Kacowicz, 2005), since swaying these could influence the possibility of outside intervention and assistance (Blechman, 1995; Carment, James and

¹The country, neither a NATO member nor ally of the US has nevertheless received \$36.1 billion in just military aid since January of 2021 (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2023) – nearly half of the amount it provided to Afghanistan over twenty years.

Taydas, 2006; Regan, 1998).

Existing research has advanced our understanding of how race shapes international relations (Freeman, Kim and Lake, 2022; Búzás, 2021; Rosenberg, 2024; Shilliam, 2020; Henderson, 2024; DuBois, 1925), yet there are a number of issues that need further analysis. Experimental studies of race and foreign aid (Baker, 2015), humanitarian intervention (Chu and Lee, 2024), and the willingness to use force against other countries (Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2024), all manipulate race in limited binary contexts.² This is despite the fact that many of America’s major non-White allies are in Asia or the Middle East. Second, the findings are at times inconsistent. Chu and Lee (2024) find a statistical null when pitting race against religion, while Baker (2015) finds that race can improve paternalistic aid generosity for Black African countries compared to White European ones. Moreover, there have been few, if any, studies examining the scaling up or down of support after it has been committed. This is strange considering that while the public may not directly decide policy, its support is necessary for sustaining costly support over time. The major debates around military assistance to Ukraine or Israel were not about *whether* to provide support, but whether such costly support should be continued. Finally, scholars who are skeptical of racial influence often treat it as a mere alternative explanation (Snyder, 2023), even though abundant evidence shows that racial identities can distort actors’ assumed rationality (Carson, Min and Van Nuys, 2024) and shape interpretations of aggressive behavior (Duncan, 1976).

This piece has two contentions. First, the binary approach to the study of race in I.R. obscures important variation in public attitudes toward other heavily racialized groups - Asian and Arab-majority countries. As importantly, it argues that race has both a downstream effect on policy preferences of support, as well as an upstream influence on the inputs to decision making. How people evaluate material and seemingly objective aspects of a

²C.f. see Inouye and Horiuchi (2025).

country, like its military capability or its aggressive behavior, is biased by race. I develop a theoretical argument regarding the intertwined domestic and international racialization of Asian and Arab-majority countries in particular, that predicts a unique penalty in affect and support relative to White and even Black majority countries. Asians and Arabs have not only been racialized as untrustworthy and threatening, but countries from these regions have often been framed as clear, moral, and even existential dangers. Thus, in the realm of public foreign policy preferences, these countries are likely to be penalized relative to countries seen as majority White or Black.

While observational evidence in the form of late Cold War survey data is consistent with this argument, I test my theory systematically through two complementary survey experiments. In the first, I employ a vignette experiment ($n = 1,182$ White Americans) focused on how the race of an invaded country alters White Americans' feelings, evaluations, and support for that country. I use innovative AI-generated images to cue the race of the invaded country (Arab, Asian, Black, or White) while holding important confounders like regime type, religion, and alliance ties constant to better isolate the effect of race. The invaded country's democratic governance, coupled with information about the tangible stakes of the conflict, make for a harder test for the impact of race.

I find countries perceived as predominantly Asian or Arab suffer penalties in public affect and support. Not only did respondents feel far colder toward these countries, but they were also less willing to personally pay additional taxes to support assistance to these countries, and also wanted to scale back support, even though this would prolong the conflict and cost thousands of lives in the invaded country. Yet, respondents denied the role of race in their thinking. Critically, a probe at mechanisms reveals that the race of the invaded country altered how respondents evaluated supposedly objective factors like its military capability or the costs of support.

Having shown the impact of race holding other factors constant, I then field a second study

($n = 1006$) on a quota-based, representative sample of Americans in the form of a paired profile conjoint to analyze the relative importance of race as well as religion compared to other factors, and examine how the identities of the aggressor and non-aggressor shape public support. This study helps decompose the complex preferences underlying the difficult choice of which side to support (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014; Bansak et al., 2021) while mitigating social desirability bias (Horiuchi, Markovich and Yamamoto, 2022; Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026). Drawing on attributes and levels from possible conflict contingencies in the Indo-Pacific, I find that the American public does favor White countries over Asian countries, but this effect is modest compared to the strong support for invaded countries, as well as Christian countries. Crucially, however, not all invaded countries are supported equally; American support for invaded countries attenuates when the victim of aggression is Asian or non-Christian, especially for more ethnocentric respondents. When a Christian aggressor confronts a Muslim victim of aggression, the previous support for the invaded country actually disappears.

This piece makes a number of contributions. First, it is one of, if not the first, study to directly examine racial prejudice in foreign policy support toward predominantly Asian and Arab countries in conflict. It moves beyond the context of paternalistic aid or intervention and into the realm of conflict and cooperation between countries. This offers real-world implications for policy and decision-making, as there are countries in Asia and the Middle East that are major competitors and collaborators. Second, it suggests that existing works' focus on the *impacts* of race understates its influence. In showing that race alters the strategic inputs of apparently objective measures, this research shows that race influences both the upstream "inputs" of foreign policy decision-making and the downstream preferences over support. Finally, in showing how the identity of aggressors and victims alters public support for other countries, it shows that reactions to aggressive transgressions and sympathy for victims are selective (Terman and Byun, 2022; Inouye and Horiuchi, 2025; Raychaudhuri,

Mendelberg and McDonough, 2023) and biased by identity. Sympathy and support are not simply the products of *what* is happening, but also *who* it is happening to.

2 Identity and Public Support

There is a growing body of work showing that public opinion is consequential for international politics and influences foreign policy outcomes (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). Not only is the gap between elites and the public smaller than previously thought (Kertzer, 2022), but the public can alter funding allocations for defense budgets (Bartels, 1994, 1991), shape policy by altering who is elected (Tomz, Weeks and Yarhi-Milo, 2020), and cue policy positions of elected officials in ways that shift such elite’s positions (Chu and Recchia, 2022).

Identities, then, are an important factor shaping individuals’ preferences on foreign policy (Renshon and Powers, 2024). They shape people’s “worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests” (Abdelal et al., 2009, pg. 19) and more importantly, serve as the basis for ingroup or outgroup distinctions (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Abdelal et al., 2009; Wendt, 1995). For people who are often ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), heuristics of ingroup and outgroup identity make for efficient shortcuts (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974), distinguishing “us” from the other (Mercer, 1995, pg. 241), and contributing to a boundedly rational approach to decision-making around sympathy and support (Simon, 1976).

2.1 Race(s) and Foreign Policy Attitudes

Racial identities and distinctions are important not because they are grounded in any biological reality (Rattansi, 2020), but rather because people believe them to be important (Smith,

2004).³ Legacies of explicit racism and white supremacy from the colonial period have long-lasting biases regarding the value, worth, and intentions of groups of people (Du Bois, 1906; DuBois, 1925). Examples of these biases in foreign policy abound. Foreign policy advisors consistently employed racial tropes for Global South countries (Carson, Min and Van Nuys, 2024), used stereotypes as a basis to reject multilateral alliance arrangements (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002), and even recently, have described rivals like China as particularly concerning due to their non-Caucasian identity (Chan, 2019). These illustrate how race is intertwined with questions of fundamental interest in IR: “Who are ‘we’? Who are ‘they’ to whome we relate? How do ‘we’ relate to them’?” (Doty, 1993, 444). These distinctions are central for understanding public affect and willingness to support other countries in conflict.

The hierarchies in which race has been embedded (Le Melle, 2009) underpin the status differentials for various groups (Mendelberg, 2022). Ideologies of racism have constructed non-Whites as a rising threat (Stoddard, 1920; Búzás, 2013), predicted their disappearance (Brantlinger, 2003), justified enslavement (Búzás, 2021), and emphasized their degeneracy (de Gobineau, 1915). The result is that certain lives are devalued (Hua and Jamieson, 2023) and those people are essentialized in ways that shape expectations for group competition and cooperation (Henderson, 2013; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Bobo, Kluegel and Smith, 1997).

Yet we would not expect the racialization and stereotypes of one group to necessarily create identical effects on the public for different racial groups. If Japan is racialized as a yellow peril and threat perception is inflated, this should not necessarily mean majority Black or Arab countries would suffer a similar penalty in the public eye (Búzás, 2013). While this may seem straightforward, much of the existing literature does not theorize or test the impact of different racialized identities because they either manipulate race indirectly or

³There are numerous definitions of race, but most share an understanding that race is a socially constructed set of beliefs attached to the often contrived, physical distinctions or assumptions of common descent (Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva, 2008).

only study race with respect to a comparison of White and Black or White and non-White countries. On the former, consider [Mutz, Mansfield and Kim \(2021\)](#), who examine the role of the trade partner’s racial identity in support for a new trade agreement. While they argue *racially* similar countries receive a boost in public attitudes, they only manipulate such information indirectly by noting the trade partner is “similar”, “speaks English”, and “shares many of our cultural values”. While this helps capture what has been described as cultural or color-blind racism ([Kawai, 2015](#)),⁴ these are at best, indirect cues for race. These do not actually identify and alter race as it is viscerally understood with explicit labels or physical cues. More problematically, this design cannot distinguish race from cultural similarity or religion, nor does it provide any insight into how attitudes vary across the racial identities of partner states.

In cases where race is directly manipulated but in a binary format, it is difficult to glean insight into whether the negative prejudices against non-White countries are uniform or heterogeneous. [Baker \(2015\)](#) finds that race (Black/White) matters for foreign aid support, but that racial paternalism actually makes White respondents more generous to African countries compared to Eastern European ones, conditional on there being heavy oversight from the donor. However, a substantial amount of US assistance also goes to countries in the Middle East and North Africa region and to South and Southeast Asia. It is not clear if such paternalism would exist for Arab or Asian countries. A related study to this considers the role that race and religion play in altering support for humanitarian intervention and finds different results ([Chu and Lee, 2024](#)). They employ a photo prime to manipulate both the race (White or Black), and religion (Christian or Muslim) of people in civil conflict, finding that Americans show “significant bias in favor of saving Christians over Muslims, and to a lesser extent, in favor of saving White European over Black African lives” [Chu and Lee](#)

⁴Also known as ‘new racism’ or ‘differentialist racism’, this understanding of racism emerged in the 1970s and regards the post-colonial conceptualization of racism not simply rooted in biological differences but in cultural ones ([Balibar et al., 2007](#)).

(2024, pg. 3). Thus, there are inconsistent results across studies, and it remains unclear whether this bias in favor of White Europeans over Black Africans should also exist relative to Arab or Asian countries.

2.2 Beyond Black and White - Racialization and Support for Invaded countries

I argue that understanding American's support and sympathies for countries in conflict requires more specific theorization and testing of how racial identity alters support preferences and evaluation of other countries. Racialization—the process of imbuing groups with racial identities and meanings (Maass, 2023; Omi and Winant, 2014 (1994, 5)—is not uniform, and Asian and Arab peoples abroad cannot be understood by simply applying Black-White theories of race (Kim, 1999, 2022; Lajevardi and Oskooii, 2018; d'Urso, 2024).

Much theorizing on race in international relations has centered on the Black–White divide, tracing how hierarchies of White supremacy have shaped global order and individual belief (Henderson, 2024; Rosenberg, 2024). Western colonial powers cast White nations as paragons of civilization and governance (Lauren, 2018), such that “White” with “civilized” became “synonymous in everyday speech” (Du Bois, 1906, 33-34). Even today, after decolonization and the spread of norms against overt racism (Lipsy and Zhou, 2026), there are still racial double standards that benefit Whites, (Búzás and Meier, 2023). From this White supremacy flowed a particular antipathy toward blackness; Black populations have often been dehumanized as primitive, incapable, and inferior (Henderson, 2013; Vitalis, 2000), often located at the bottom of most racial hierarchies (Le Melle, 2009) or as Freeman (2024, 446) notes, being black has meant being the most “debased, materially and intellectually,” in global politics. Much of the existing scholarship on race and IR has focused rightly on the consequences of this racial divide (Vitalis, 2015; Crawford et al., 2016), and even the

contemporary mid-range theorizing and testing of race in international relations tests the possibility of a racial penalty for being black (Chu and Lee, 2024).

Yet, Asian and Arab people have also been racialized both in domestic and international politics. In the United States, Asian Americans have historically been racialized as both model minorities and yellow perils. At certain times, they are valorized as competent and assimilable, but on the other hand, seen as perpetual foreigners with irreconcilably different values (Kim, 1999; Wu, 2002; Lyman, 2000). Internationally, Asian states like Japan and China have often experienced a similar alternation of racialization; at times they are celebrated for economic efficiency and technological prowess, at other times denigrated as existential challenges to Western hegemony (Búzás, 2022; Johnston, 2024). Japan’s push for racial equality at the Treaty of Versailles and wartime propaganda promoting “Asia for Asiatics” (Brcaak and Pavia, 1994; Ma, 2000) highlight how racialized challenges to the status quo have been integral in the history of international order (Búzás, 2021).⁵ We know that when groups seen as subordinate challenge the status quo, they are seen as even more threatening (Bobo, 1999) and the concern of a “non-Caucasian” threat in the form of China (Chan, 2019) presents an important intersection of power transition and racial resentments that has not been rigorously studied (Chen, Pu and Johnston, 2013).

Arabs, often conflated with Muslims, face both religious and *racialized* prejudice. They are essentialized with negative traits like untrustworthiness, and viewed as part of a group with clear, fixed boundaries, (Garner and Selod, 2015) even as people from the Middle East and North Africa have historically been classified as White in the American census (d’Urso, 2024). This anti-Muslim resentment is not unique to America; studies consistently show antipathy against Muslims in many other countries (Findor et al., 2025; Choi, Poertner and

⁵On the home front of course, Japanese and Japanese Americans were uniquely “race-d” in ways that Germans and German Americans were not, leading to incarceration of over 120,000 people of Japanese Ancestry (Aoki, N.d.). See also how such prejudices against Asian countries undermined alliance maintenance (Búzás, 2013) and creation (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002).

[Sambanis, 2022](#)). Anti-Muslim resentment has intensified in the shadow of the Global War on Terror ([Lajevardi and Abrajano, 2019](#); [d’Urso, 2024](#)). As [Lajevardi et al. \(2023, 9\)](#) explains, Americans have begun “explicitly and implicitly associating (conflating) Muslims, Arabs, and people from the Middle East with Terrorism”, thus seeing Arabs not only as a cultural and symbolic threat ([Oskooii, Dana and Barreto, 2021](#)) but also a physical security threat. While certain Arabs may be viewed more positively, particularly those who have served with the US military or government before ([Inouye and Blair, 2025](#)), the overall sentiment toward Arabs remains particular and negative, leading to individual-level discrimination and policies meant to target Muslim majority countries ([Awan and Zempi, 2020](#)).

One might expect similar negative racialization of Black-majority countries since there have also been costly military deployments in places like Somalia. Additionally, negative attitudes toward Black individuals within the U.S. could theoretically extend to Black African countries, which are often portrayed as weak, powerless, and perpetually subject to conflict or disaster ([Van der Gaag and Nash, 1987](#); [Benthall, 1993](#)). Yet, the cultural, sociotropic threat coupled with geopolitical conflicts make the antagonism toward Asian and Arab majority countries distinct from the hostility toward majority Black countries ([Oskooii, Dana and Barreto, 2021](#); [Kim, 1999](#)). Countries like China, Iran, and North Korea have consistently been portrayed as axiomatic evil threats, more akin to what [Herrmann and Fischerkeller \(1995\)](#) describes as the capable and threatening enemy “image”. Countries with large or majority Black populations may face denigration as incapable, but have rarely been portrayed as rivalrous threats. We should not presume the link between Americans’ domestic racial attitudes and their foreign policy preferences is uniform across races, as recent scholarship on this link is race-specific ([Kim, 2022](#)). The racialization of countries with large Black populations has lacked the threat coloring, magnification, and reinforcement present for predominantly Asian and Arab countries ([Lajevardi, 2021](#); [Han and Marwecki, 2023](#); [Shaver et al., 2017](#)).

As a result, I argue that Arab and Asian-majority countries are particularly likely to be penalized in the realm of foreign policy public opinion.⁶ This leads me to expect:

H_1 Hierarchies of Affect: White respondents will feel the warmest affect toward White countries, moderately warm toward Black-majority countries, and will feel cooler toward Asian and Arab majority countries.

H_2 Hierarchies of Support: White respondents will be less supportive of an invaded country, all else equal, when the country is perceived as majority Black, Asian, or Arab, compared to if it is perceived as majority White.

Beyond the contemporary racialization of different racial groups, the costliness of support may also influence the public's willingness to assist an invaded country. While most Americans may not directly serve in the military, they may understand and experience the costs of supporting other countries through increased taxes. Such costly support is where one would expect racialized beliefs about the value of life to shape to be more relevant.

H_3 Selective Costly Support: The support toward the target country depends not only on the race of that country, but on the stakes of such support. Respondents will be less willing to bear harder costs to support racial outgroup countries.

3 Motivating Patterns

3.1 Late Cold War Survey Data

I find observational evidence consistent with my theory that American's willingness to support other countries in conflict varies with the identity of the victim of aggression in three

⁶A fuller discussion and justification for the choice of these racial groups can be found in the Appendix A. Funding constraints necessitated the removal of the Latino treatment, but future research should theorize and test this treatment as well.

public surveys and one elite survey from the late Cold War.⁷ The three Chicago Councils polls are from 1982 (Figure 1 for the public sample, A4 for the elite sample) and 1986 (Figure A3). The Americans Talk Security poll (Figure A5) was from 1988. The Chicago Council polls asked whether respondents would “favor or oppose the use of U. S. troops” under various scenarios,⁸ including 1) The Peoples Republic of China invades Taiwan, 2) Iran invades Saudi Arabia, 3) Soviet and East German forces invade West Berlin. While each case is particular, these cases illustrate real-world geopolitical contingencies that vary by the racial identity of the victim: Taiwan (Asian), Saudi Arabia (Arab), and West Berlin/Western Europe (White).


Figure 1 and A3 show nearly identical patterns; there is barely any support in favor of sending troops to defend Taiwan (19% in both years) or Saudi Arabia (25% in 1982 and 26% in 1986). By contrast, there was substantial support in favor of sending troops to defend Western Europe (64% and 68%). The elite sample in Figure A4 shows even more overwhelming support for sending troops to defend Western Europe (92%) with little support for Taiwan (15%), and far less for Saudi Arabia (54%).

It is impossible to assess whether the race of the defending governments in these scenarios significantly altered support; each scenario varies not only in the race of the country under threat but also in alliance commitments (NATO versus non-allies), aggressor identity (USSR versus regional rivals), perceived strategic interests (e.g., oil in Saudi Arabia, Cold War stakes in Europe). Any of these factors, individually or in combination, could drive the observed differences. Moreover, because the survey was conducted at a particular historical moment—the late Cold War—public attitudes likely reflected the salience of U.S.–Soviet

⁷Fortunately, all of these surveys used similar questions asking about the same governments being invaded. While this is not meant to be a systematic overview of all survey data from the time, the common patterns across these surveys illustrates the descriptive variation in support that correlates with variation in race.

⁸See Appendix F.2 for details on the Americans Talk Security Survey

Figure 1: Americans' Willingness to Support Invaded Countries (1982)



Note: American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1982: General Population [Roper #31089281] (1982), $n = 1,547$ national adult sample.

rivalry as much as any underlying racial predispositions.

Consequently, this observational evidence can at best, only suggest the possibility that identities like race might alter Americans' preferences on support toward countries in conflict. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that Americans' willingness to support foreign countries in conflict is not uniform across cases and highlights patterns that are plausibly identity-linked. These suggestive findings underscore the value of turning to survey experiments, which allow for precise manipulation of racial cues while holding other factors constant.

4 Survey Experiment: Image-based Race Treatment

4.1 Experimental Analysis

To test the extent to which the race of an invaded country shapes Americans' feelings and policy preferences toward that country, I deploy two survey experiments on the U.S. public. The first was a pre-registered vignette experiment ($n = 1,182$) on White Americans, using novel, AI-generated image manipulations of race (Baker, 2015; Chu and Lee, 2024; Chow and Han, 2023) to assess respondent feelings, evaluations, and support for a country experiencing an invasion.⁹ The second experiment, fielded on a quota-based sample of voting age Americans ($n = 1006$), was a two-profile conjoint that provides respondents with information about two governments in conflict, and asks respondents which of the two the U.S. should support.

Employing a vignette-based design for Study 1 focuses analytic effort on the impact of race on public affect, evaluation, and support for an invaded country. There of course, numerous other factors that could influence public support in conflict contexts, such as alliance considerations (Tomz and Weeks, 2021), regime type (Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Inouye and Horiuchi, 2025), religion (Lacina and Lee, 2013; Johns and Davies, 2012; Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026; Chu and Lee, 2024), and aggression (Rathbun, 2023). Conjoint designs allow simultaneous variation of such factors, along with the focal attribute of country race, and while this has merits discussed in Section I for Study 2, this vignette design holds such other considerations constant, helping to isolate the effect of race.

After providing consent and an initial attention check, respondents answered demographic questions and pre-treatment moderators.¹⁰ Then, respondents were block randomized based

⁹Preregistration link: <https://osf.io/st8y5/>. Due to funding uncertainties, this was fielded in two waves in October 2024, and July 2025.

¹⁰These included ethnocentrism (Bizumic, Monaghan and Priest, 2021), a scale which, as noted by Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy (2024), helps capture outgroup racial and ethnic resentment without specific men-

on partisanship into one of five vignettes about a country that had been invaded, where the only information that varied was the race of the invaded country.

I used AI to generate the racial variation in images for the invaded country. Given my theoretical interest in a conflict setting, I generated images of three male soldiers in military uniforms, rather than poor families (Baker, 2015) or children and churches (Chu and Lee, 2024). To my knowledge, there are few, if any articles that have employed AI-images in survey vignettes. This technique offers advantages in terms of systematic manipulation; unlike the face-morphing technology used in domestic studies of racial prejudice (Takeshi and Mendelberg, 2015), the researcher has greater capacity to adjust details regarding context, clothing, and climate of those in the images. AI-generated images for vignettes can also aid in conflict or sensitive research areas; one can create vignettes without exploiting an actual individual's likeness, violating their privacy. However, the use of AI for this purpose also presents other ethical challenges regarding the environment, reproducibility, and algorithmic bias, all of which are discussed in the Appendix C, and should be carefully considered.

The race treatments are shown in Figure 2, while a no-photo condition served as the control (Steinberg and McDowell, 2024). To make these race treatments, I generated a number of preliminary photos to obtain the correct image composition and setting. After finding an appropriate baseline photo, I altered the prompt to recreate the photo but change the race of the individuals shown. Finally, I made manual edits such as uniform ornamentation removal to ensure the images were as close to identical as possible.

Respondents were shown these treatments in the context of a newspaper-like vignette:

**“U.S. Considers Military Support to Invaded Country
American Support Could be Critical for the Defenders.”**

tion of American racial groups, social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994, 2013), and race-specific resentment scales for Asians (Kim, 2022) and Muslims (Lajevardi, 2017). For measurement of moderators pretreatment, see Sheagley and Clifford (2025) and d’Urso, Bonilla and Bogdanowicz (2025).



Figure 2: Treatment Photos for Country Race. *Photos were accompanied by a small text caption that read: “Defending troops prepare themselves against invaders.”*

[*treatment image / no image control*]

The defending country, shown above, is being invaded by another country attempting to gain power and resources.

Thousands of soldiers and civilians have died. Far more people have been displaced, and disruptions to trade will soon cause the prices of food and gas to increase in America.

The defending country is a **democracy** with a large **Christian** population. It also has a **capitalist**, middle-sized economy and maintains trade and diplomatic ties with the U.S. However, it **does not** have a **defense alliance with the**

U.S.

The leader of the defending country is asking for military assistance.

Respondents then proceeded to answer outcome questions of interest. First, they were asked to consider the people in the image carefully and rate how warm or cold they felt toward the government, military, and people of that country using a feeling thermometer (H1). Then, they are asked how sympathetic they feel toward the country experiencing invasion (H2).¹¹ The main support questions focused on a personal willingness to bear costs via additional taxes¹², whether they thought a hypothetical amount of support was “Too much”, “About right”, or “Not enough”, and their willingness to increase or scale back such support (H3).¹³ The questions regarding the amount of support and willingness to increase or decrease support not only mirror contemporary polling regarding aid to Ukraine (Gallop, 2025), they are theoretically useful, and have rarely, if ever, been used in studies of support for intervention. While the executive and elites are typically the ones to directly initiate military actions, the public becomes increasingly consequential as debates emerge around the amount of such assistance and whether or not such assistance should continue.¹⁴ I include and discuss additional pre-registered outcome questions, such as an index of support and acceptable levels of casualties in the Appendix G.2 and G.3.

To better understand the reasoning for people’s preferences on support, I ask mechanism

¹¹This took the form of three questions asking “how sad” they were, “how much they wanted to help” the country, and “how much sympathy they felt”. Answers ranged from 1 - not at all to 5 - A great deal.

¹²Answer options began at 0, and increased in increments of \$50 until \$250+.

¹³ Respondents were told that the US had provided military assistance and that the defending country had managed to stop, but not repel, the invasion. Then, they were told “Some leaders from both political parties support an increase in the number of U.S. troops sent to support this country. They argue it will help to shorten the war by at least one year, saving tens of thousands of lives and restoring peace. Other leaders from both political parties oppose this increase in U.S. troops, saying it will increase costs and casualties for the Americans.”

Do you think the U.S. should increase or decrease its support? Answers ranged from 1 - strongly decrease support to 5 strongly increase support.

¹⁴This is shown clearly in the debates around aid to Ukraine and Israel, and in the historic influence of the public over long-term defense spending (Bartels, 1994).

questions specifically regarding whether the US has 1) a moral obligation to defend the country, 2) how militarily capable is the defending country, 3) worry over the financial costs to the U.S. of intervention and 4) worry over the human costs of intervention to the U.S.

It is important to note that the stakes presented in this vignette create a harder test for the impact of race. Prior research has shown that the public's support for war is more readily given when the stakes are high, the cost of intervention is low, and the country is a democracy. However, it is in those arguably inconvenient cases of high-cost interventions, low-stakes conflicts, or conflicts on behalf of non-democracies where a factor like a military alliance is most influential in improving public support (Tomz and Weeks, 2021). Applying such a logic here, the clear stakes of the conflict via deaths and increased prices in the U.S. coupled with the fact that the country being invaded is a democracy, create a more challenging case for the impact of race because these other factors provide reasonable grounds to support the invaded country and potential ceiling effects. Moreover, respondents in all conditions are equally exposed to the invasion vignette. In reality, the disproportionate coverage of some conflicts over others (Dietrich and Eck, 2020), as well as the more sympathetic framing of certain conflicts and peoples over others (Hawkins, 2011; Wainaina, 2024), all plausibly contribute to potential racial biases in sympathy and support. This study presents equal coverage across conditions, whereas in the real world, it is quite plausible that this itself is the source of additional race-based bias.

5 Results

5.1 Race and Affect Toward the Invaded

To what extent does the race of a country shape the way White Americans feel toward that country? Figure 3 displays the estimated marginal means for the affect index by country




Figure 3: Estimated Marginal Means for Affect toward Invaded Country, by Race. *The Y-axis is a feeling thermometer score, ranging from 0-100. The X-axis separates respondent scores by the race of the invaded country. Thick spikes denote 90% confidence intervals; thin spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals.*

race.¹⁵ This allows for a comparison across all five survey conditions, revealing a clear penalty in feelings toward countries that are predominantly Arab and Asian compared to the no-image control group (65.4, CI: 62.5, 68.5), White-majority countries (58.8, CI: 56.6, 61.1), and Black-majority countries (58.9, CI: 56.4, 61.4). A country perceived as majority Asian was rated the lowest at 45.2 (CI: 42.5, 48.0), while a majority Arab country also suffered a substantial penalty with a rating of 53.1 (CI: 50.4, 54.7).

¹⁵These models included covariate controls like age, gender, income, education, and foreign policy orientations. I present the simple descriptive averages in Appendix A6.

These results are consistent with the hierarchies of affect H_1 as White respondents feel significantly less favorable toward Asian and Arab countries. Interestingly, White respondents' affect toward Black-majority countries was not measurably different from that toward majority White countries, and it is quite plausible that the conventional experimental studies of race in IR, which employ only a Black-White binary, would have missed these important findings and perhaps led to a naive conclusion that race is inconsequential. As this and the results discussed subsequently demonstrate, race plays an important role in shaping public sentiments and preferences on policy.


The no-photo control condition fared better than both the White and Black conditions. The decline in affect toward countries perceived as majority Asian or Arab is still substantively and statistically significant even when directly compared to countries seen as majority White as the baseline (see Appendix Figure A7). However, respondents tended to react to all treatment conditions with photos less favorably than the no-photo control. A more conservative and harder test than, would be to compare Asian and Arab treatment effects to the White race condition. While I pre-registered analyses relative to the no-photo control condition, subsequent analyses compare Asian, Arab, and Black conditions to a White baseline. This approach has been used by [Chow and Han \(2023\)](#); [Chu and Lee \(2024\)](#); [Baker \(2015\)](#). I present all of the control-based analyses in the Appendix and find that my results are even stronger and more robust when Asian and Arab treatments are compared to the no photo control (see Appendix G.3).

5.2 Race and a Penalty in Sympathy and Support

It is not just affect that is altered by race; so too are White Americans' sympathies and actual foreign policy preferences. Figure 4 presents the effect of each race treatment on the main outcomes of sympathy and support, using the White country as the baseline. These models include demographic covariates (age, gender, education, income) and controls

for respondents' foreign policy orientations to reduce measurement error and improve the precision of the estimates.

Figure 4: Effect of Race on Support for Invaded Country, Relative to White Country



Note: Thick spikes denote 90% confidence intervals; thin spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals.

White Americans are less sympathetic toward Asian countries experiencing an invasion

(-0.40 sd, SE: 0.018), as shown in (Figure 4a).¹⁶ The fact that Asian countries suffer the greatest penalty is consistent with the affect results in Figure 3. Countries seen as predominantly Arab received significantly less sympathy compared to countries where the race was not signalled (see Appendix Figure A8), but this difference is not significant relative to countries seen as predominantly White.

The remaining plots demonstrate that both countries seen as Arab and Asian majority suffer penalties in public support when invaded. When respondents were informed that the U.S. had provided some support to the invaded country, respondents were more inclined to say that such assistance was “Too much” when the invaded country was Asian (-0.131, SE 0.055) compared to when the victim of invasion was White, even though the amount of support provided to all treatment conditions was exactly the same. Figure 4c also shows that Americans were less willing to personally bear costs in support of Arab and Asian countries. When an invaded country was perceived to be majority White, White Americans were willing to pay approximately \$56 dollars of additional taxes to support the victims of invasion, but when the countries were Arab or Asian, respondents’ willingness to pay dropped by \$13.81 and \$15.55, respectively - a relative change of approximately 27.7%. This is substantively significant; for context, the U.S. has committed \$128 billion in aid to Ukraine since 2022 (Masters and Merrow, 2025), amounting to roughly \$109.82 per person over the course of 3.5 years.

It is no surprise, then, that respondents generally wanted to decrease support to predominantly Arab and Asian countries, even though they were told that increasing support would “help to shorten the war by at least one year, saving tens of thousands of lives”. For Arab countries, there was a statistically significant shift of roughly 5% toward decreasing


¹⁶The disaggregated results for the different sympathy items are shown in Tables A15 (White baseline) and A16 (control baseline). The penalty in sympathy toward Asian countries is significant at the $p < 0.05$ level for all but one outcome and for both baseline conditions.

support.¹⁷


As a reminder, the vignette provided numerous considerations that could attenuate the effect of race. Respondents were informed that thousands had died, many more were displaced, and that the conflict would cause food and gas prices to increase. Moreover, the invaded country was described as a democracy, creating another potential source of support that could obscure the effect of race. Finally, comparing treatment conditions to the White baseline rather than to a control condition represents a conservative analytical choice that makes detecting racial effects more difficult. Despite these conservative design features, respondents imposed clear and significant penalties on predominantly Arab and Asian countries when deciding whether to support intervention.

Respondents were quick to deny the role of race in their thinking. Figure 5 shows the results of a question that asked respondents, “Which factor about the country was most important in deciding your opinion to support or not support the country?” More than half of the respondents (51.5%) selected race as the “Least important” factor, with the religion of the country coming in a distant second (16.7%). As for the most important factor for support, respondents focused on (1) the fact that the country was attacked (27.2%), (2) the (lack of) alliance relations with the U.S (20.5%), and (3) the possible costs to the U.S. of support (18.6%). These results are consistent regardless of treatment group assignment (Figure A13) and suggest respondents intuit a norm *against* using parochial identity considerations in determining their sympathies, and suggest there is a social desirability norm even in the context of sympathy considerations of foreign conflicts (Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026). Worth stressing is respondents’ tendency to rationalize their support on “objective” and “strategic” considerations for the invaded country (such as the fact that it was the victim of aggression) and for the U.S. (alliance ties and potential costs). This is consistent with existing research

¹⁷These results are presented in regression form in Appendix Table A9. The penalty for Arab and Asian countries, particularly for sympathy and support, becomes even more pronounced when using the control group as the baseline (see Appendix Table A10).



(a)



(b)

Figure 5: Respondents' Answers for Most and Least Important Factors in Support for Other Countries. Respondents choose one answer. These results are consistent regardless of treatment group assignment (Figure A13).

showing support for allies (Tomz and Weeks, 2021) and democracies (Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2024; Tomz, 2007; Inouye and Horiuchi, 2025). However, as discussed in Section 5.3, race alters even these supposedly objective considerations. Before speaking to those mechanisms underpinning how race alters support considerations, I discuss a number of robustness checks.

To address concerns about treatment uptake and respondent recollection of the vignette, I included a number of factual manipulation checks (Kane and Barabas, 2019). Reassuringly, more than 90% of respondents correctly identified the racial group of the soldiers in the image in a randomized pre-post check (see Appendix Table A2), and across all treatment conditions, more than 80% of respondents also accurately recalled that the soldiers shown were from the defending country rather than the invading one (Table A3). This increases confidence that respondents understood the vignette and recalled key information about the invasion presented.

As a further robustness check, I apply Benjamini-Hochberg correction (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) to my main results and report the results in Table A26 — my results remain robust to this correction, commonly used in political science (White et al., 2018; Kertzer, 2022; Liu and Shiraito, 2023). I also examine whether the racial treatments spilled over to influence policy preferences on non-military issues. My argument suggests that the racialization of Asian and Arab majority countries should alter feelings and support toward countries experiencing national security crises. The treatments should not alter attitudes on policies that are unrelated to such national security considerations and which lack racial primes. Policy preferences such as support for clean energy, establishing more national holidays, and greater U.N. cooperation serve as placebos. Encouragingly, while there is clear evidence that the race of an invaded country alters sympathy and support toward that country, there is no evidence that such information altered respondents' preferences on these policies (Appendix Figure A12).

Another concern is that the observed penalty in support toward the majority Asian country results from respondents simply thinking of China. However, the vast majority of respondents assigned to the Asian condition did *not* reference China in their open ended responses (Appendix G.7, Figure A14).¹⁸ Only 32 respondents (12.7% of the respondents assigned to the Asian treatment) referenced China. This suggests the findings are driven primarily by respondents who did not think of China enough to reference it explicitly. To further assess this concern, I rerun the main analysis excluding respondents who mention China and find that the results are unchanged.

These results may vary based on respondents' degree of ethnocentrism, with more ethnocentric respondents reacting negatively toward majority Asian and Arab countries and low ethnocentric respondents reacting more neutrally or favorably. Surprisingly, however, an exploratory analysis of such heterogeneity, shown in Appendix Table A17, reveals few significant interaction effects between the race treatments and ethnocentrism. There was also little heterogeneity by respondent party (Appendix Table A19) or age (Appendix Table A21). Thus, the penalties in support for majority Asian and Arab countries in conflict appear to be fairly consistent across the White sample.

5.3 Race Alters Country Evaluation

While the results show a penalty in sympathy and support for countries perceived to be predominantly Asian and Arab, how is race altering public opinion? One possibility is that racialized beliefs about status and moral worth could lead to differential perceptions of moral obligation toward other countries. However, prior research has shown that race alters how respondents interpret identical behaviors (the same actions are perceived more negatively and with more hostile intent when performed by racial outgroups (Duncan, 1976)), and

¹⁸Respondents were asked: "Please write the first three words that come to mind when you think of the country pictured above. Initial impressions or gut reactions are fine."

the racial innumeracy literature shows how race alters evaluation of seemingly objective information (Wong, 2007; Nadeau, Niemi and Levine, 1993). Thus, another possibility is that race distorts how the public perceives and evaluates other countries, meaning that inputs to decision-making that may seem objective could be colored by race.

Table 1: Mechanisms: Variation in Support, White Base

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Moral Obligation	Military Capability	Financial Cost	Human Cost
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab	−0.028 (0.021)	−0.047*** (0.017)	0.033 (0.021)	0.042** (0.019)
Asian	−0.009 (0.022)	0.011 (0.018)	−0.004 (0.020)	−0.004 (0.019)
Black	−0.004 (0.021)	−0.090*** (0.018)	−0.004 (0.021)	0.007 (0.019)
(Intercept)	−0.034 (0.057)	0.379*** (0.049)	0.506*** (0.054)	0.408*** (0.051)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.193	0.062	0.123	0.145
RSE (df = 954)	0.240	0.203	0.228	0.209

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientation.

Table 1 shows the effect of race on various mechanism questions, all normalized to a 0-1 scale relative to the White treatment group. It shows that race altered respondents' evaluation of the invaded country's capabilities and the cost associated with assisting.¹⁹ Specifically,

¹⁹When analyzed relative to the treatment group in Appendix Table A4, all race treatments suffered a penalty in moral obligation, but the largest penalty was for countries seen as predominantly Arab. Arab and Black-majority countries continued to be seen as less militarily capable.

when asked about the invaded country's military strength,²⁰ there was 5% downward shift in evaluation of military capability for the Arab country and a 9% decrease in evaluations for a Black country, relative to a White country. Evaluations for Asian countries were not statistically different from White countries. Just as importantly, however, is the finding in model 4 that Arab countries also made respondents more concerned about the human costs to the U.S. of assisting that country. Respondents who observed the Arab treatment became more worried about "the human cost (injuries or deaths) to America as a whole, that would come from the US sending troops to help a defending country".

Given that the vignettes all hold the size of the invaded country's economy constant, its regime type, its lack of alliance ties, and potential support to that country constant, these results show that race is altering how respondents evaluate seemingly objective information other countries, in addition to their support to those countries. An exploratory mediation analysis in Appendix G.8 using new taxes as the outcome suggests that the effect of race is primarily through a direct effect (\$-12.58, CI: -23.63, -0.92) though there is some evidence of a significant but substantively small indirect effect for the Arab treatment through military capability pathway (\$-1.23, CI: -2.86, -0.09) (Figure A15). While these mechanism probes are not definitive (or causally identified), they indicate that race shapes how people perceive and evaluate other countries' material capabilities.

These results, along with the finding that respondents gravitate toward material and strategic considerations when deciding on support (Figure 5), reveal that race can influence even the supposedly objective and strategic inputs to decision-making. This piece does not make claims about the consistency or magnitude of this influence, though is an avenue ripe for future research. As Table 1 suggests, this influence likely varies by race, and could likely vary by context as well. It does however, show race has both impacts on downstream

²⁰The exact wording was "Thinking of how strong this country's military is, do you think that this country's military's strength is...". Answer choices ranged from "Far below average" to "Far above average".

policy preferences as well as influence on upstream perceptions. These biased perceptions then, could serve as convenient, rational, and superficially unprejudiced justifications for supporting certain countries more than others.²¹

6 Study 2 - Conjoint Analysis

Study 1 showed that holding all else constant, country race altered support in an invaded country and shaped evaluations of seemingly objective information about that country. However, there were a number of shortcomings. First, Study 1 cannot provide insight into the *relative* importance of race compared to other considerations, like religion or regime type. Second, in reality, people observe information about *both* sides of the conflict and in doing so, also observe other information about each side's alliance ties, regime type, aggressor status, and more. This creates numerous competing and cross-cutting considerations for their support. Finally, it is clear Figure 5(b) that people were particularly sensitive to the fact that the country was *attacked*, but Study 1 does not provide any information on aggressor identity. The identity of the attacker may be tremendously consequential for when and how identity shapes support attitudes.

To address these concerns, provide insight into aggressor identity, and assess the *relative* impact of identity vis-à-vis these other factors, I fielded a paired-profile conjoint ($n = 1006$) on a quota-based sample of Americans, wherein respondents saw two, unnamed, hypothetical countries in conflict and indicated which the US should support.²²

Conjoints are well-suited to decomposing complex preferences underlying that motivate choices (Bansak et al., 2021; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014; Hainmueller,

²¹These results are consistent with the penalties that Arab and Asian countries face in being perceived as more mean or aggressive (Appendix Figure A10) and with the positive halo effect of trustworthiness and responsibility afforded to White countries (Appendix Figure A11).

²²Additional information, including the fielding window, sample representativeness, is provided in Appendix I.

Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015) while ameliorating social desirability bias (Horiuchi, Markovich and Yamamoto, 2022; Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026).²³ A paired-profile design approximates the usual binary choice that people in a third country must make when deciding which of two conflicting sides to support and is appropriate to the empirical phenomena of study (Horiuchi and Johnson, 2025), while having the added benefit of allowing me to analyze how respondents make difficult tradeoffs between attributes - like race and aggressor behavior. Conjoint designs can also create a challenging test for the importance of race. To the extent that race is understood as a bundle of sticks, signalled by a particular label (Sen and Wasow, 2016), conjoint designs separate and vary much of what might usually be in the bundle, potentially leaving less of an overall effect.

Respondents were told, “The following two governments are involved in a crisis. The US is considering action to support one of the governments involved.” They were then shown information about two hypothetical governments in a paired table format (see Figure A16 for an example). Each profile (i.e., government) includes nine attributes, drawn from theoretically and empirically important considerations for a possible kinetic contingency in the Taiwan Straits. They were then asked moderator questions such as ethnocentrism (Bizumic, Monaghan and Priest, 2021),²⁴ the strength of their racial identity (Sears and Savalei, 2006), Asian American Resentment (Kim, 2022), and Muslim American Resentment (Lajevardi, 2017).

The case selection of a contingency around these straits is both theoretically and empirically useful. First, this is one of the most salient and policy-relevant areas of potential interstate armed conflict. Given the presence of multiple nuclear-armed powers and deterrence guarantees (both formal and ambiguous), any conflict here would have global ramifications

²³Conjoint designs are increasingly popular in political science (see de la Cuesta, Egami and Imai, 2022; Ganter, 2023, for recent reviews).

²⁴I use the short form, six-item battery, and following Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy (2024), conduct a single factor analysis to create a uni-dimensional scale.

Table 2: Conjoint Attributes and Levels

Attribute	Levels
Aggressor	No, Yes
Race (largest)	Asian, Indigenous, White
Religion (largest)	Ancestor worship, Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, No religion
Democratic governance	No, Yes
U.S. security partnership	No, Ambiguous, Yes
Expected support from U.S. allies	No, Ambiguous, Yes
Military capacity	Top 5, Top 25
Trade tie with the U.S.	Top 3, Top 10
Income level	70%, 30%

Note: Trade tie with the U.S. is measured by a rank among 229 countries. Income level is the percentage of U.S. income per capita. Military capacity is measured by a rank among 145 countries.

for peace, stability, and commerce. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific region offers great variation in race and religion between potentially involved belligerents, and there are numerous historical examples of belligerents of different races, religions, and regime types squaring off and appealing for outside assistance. However, given this geographic focus, I do not include Arab as a racial category, but instead focus on respondents' reactions to Muslim in the religion attribute, to proxy for MENA people. While this is not ideal theoretically, research shows that Americans routinely conflate the two (Lajevardi and Oskooii, 2018) and that religion plays an important role in racial assignment for MENA people (d'Urso, 2024). This suggests reactions toward Muslims provide important insight into reactions toward Arabs.

Table 2 shows the attributes and levels derived from a possible contingency in the Taiwan Straits, with the main levels chosen from a conflict between China and Taiwan, along with additional race, religion, and alliance levels added for empirical and theoretical breadth. I

randomly altered these levels to generate hypothetical groups. At the bottom of this table, I asked respondents which of the two governments the US should support. Each respondent completed nine unique conjoint tasks.

The unit of analysis is *each binary choice*, rather than each profile itself. This means the quantity of interest is the “choice-level marginal mean”(Clayton et al., 2025).²⁵ I also excluded certain combinations of conjoint profiles - namely, the aggressor and US security partnership attributes. One and only government in a given pair was the aggressor, and both sides governments could not simultaneously have security partnerships with the US. Finally, I included a repeated and flipped task at the end to check for intra-respondent reliability, which was a relatively high 0.877 or 87.7% (Clayton et al., 2025).

7 Study 2 Results

7.1 A Bonus for Defenders

Recall in H2, I expect that countries that are Asian and Arab would receive less support compared to other countries, such as White ones. To assess this, I present the choice-level marginal means for each attribute and level in Figure 6.²⁶

²⁵This differs from the standard Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), which includes not only direct comparisons of two levels for a given attribute but also indirect comparisons. The AMCE sometimes results in what Abramson et al. (2024) describe as an “artificial transitivity”.

²⁶The profile-level marginal means are presented in Appendix A17, but because the “Aggressor” and “Alliance with US” are dependent on one another, the choice-level analysis is better.




Figure 6: Marginal Means for All Attributes. *The X-axis is a the marginal mean of choosing a group, ranging from 0 to 1. A .5 represents indifference of a coin toss, while marginal mean of greater than .5 demonstrates greater support and a marginal mean of less than .5 indicates less support to that country. Marginal means are color coded by attribute, with point estimates and error bars representing 95% confidence intervals.*

For this quota-based sample of Americans (i.e. not just White Americans), point estimates (dots) are shown with 95% confidence intervals (bars). Taking each attribute on its own, an estimate greater than an indifference baseline of 0.5 shows people, on average were more supportive of governments with the level specified on the right-hand side (such as democracy, or the non-aggressor). Estimates less than 0.5 show greater support for governments that had the level on the left-hand side (e.g., White or Christian).

I find that there is a small but statistically significant increase in support when a country is White, compared to when it is Asian. The marginal mean of .46 shows respondents were, on average, 8.7% more supportive of White governments relative to Asian governments in conflict.²⁷ There is a clearer penalty for Muslim countries relative to Christian ones, though given that the comparison here is not to White countries but to Christian countries, this finding should be taken as more suggestive of race, rather than directly attributable to it. Nevertheless, the marginal mean of .33 for Christian countries relative to Muslim ones shows respondents were a whopping 51.5% less likely to support an Arab / Muslim government.

The findings are consistent with H2; however, when comparing across attributes, the effect sizes of race are modest compared to factors like aggressor status, regime type, and alliance ties. As shown in the positive and significant estimates for non-aggressors, democracies, and allied governments, Americans value these considerations more than considerations of belligerent race. These other attributes appear to provide far more important bonuses for support.

7.2 Race, Religion, and Selective Support

To fully leverage the advantages of the conjoint, it is important to examine the tough tradeoffs that respondents may confront. Do they, for example, treat all victims of aggression the

²⁷This percent is the *relative* change of marginal mean from a baseline of .5, 0.46 is an 8.7% shift in support toward the White government.

same? To examine this, I consider support for the victim of aggression (*Aggressor = No*) in the context of racial and religious considerations.

My data suggest that the increase in support for victims of aggression is substantially altered by considerations of belligerent religion. In Figure 7, I present the marginal means when respondents saw a White or Christian aggressor (left-hand side) in conflict against a non-White or non-Christian aggressor (right-hand side). As before, the marginal means should be interpreted as relative changes from indifference at 0.5. If these *Aggressor* tradeoff estimates differ substantially from the overall estimate for *Aggressor*, this would suggest that race and religion would alter whether respondents are consistent in their greater support for victims of aggression.

At first blush, it appears that religion, rather than race, attenuates support for the victims of aggression. Even if the White government was the aggressor against an Indigenous or Asian government, the estimates of 0.73 and 0.68 are not distinguishable from the overall marginal mean of 0.72, suggesting that what at least White Americans would perceive as racial outgroup identity, As can be observed from the overlap between estimate error bars and 0.5, when a Christian government was the aggressor against a Muslim or Buddhist government, respondents became *indifferent* between the two governments. This is striking - *Aggressor* was the most influential variable for respondent choice of support, yet this bonus in support was, in two cases, entirely eliminated when religious outgroups were the victim of aggression from a Christian government.

On the tradeoff analysis for race, this apparent null effect of race belies a more complicated and interesting reality. It is quite plausible that respondent heterogeneity based on moderators like ethnocentrism - the belief that one's own ethnic group is superior (Bizumic, Monaghan and Priest, 2021) could obscure underlying variation, especially if different groups react in different and offsetting ways.²⁸ Since ethnocentrism is particularly relevant

²⁸I describe the ethnocentrism question battery in Appendix I.9.1.




Figure 7: Marginal Means of Supporting the Victim of Aggression (right-hand side) against the Aggressor (left-hand side), with a particular combination of racial and religious factors. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal bars) are shown.

in the context of ingroup and outgroup differentiation, and this study, unlike Study 1, provides respondents with the racial and religious identities of both conflicting parties, I divide respondents into equal high and low ethnocentrism bins, based on which respondents were above or below the median ethnocentrism score. The results are shown in Figure 8, with highly ethnocentric respondents shown with gray estimates and error bars, and low ethnocentric respondents shown in gold. The results are striking - high-ethnocentrism respondents' support for the non-aggressor was greatly attenuated, while low-ethnocentrism respondents were far more supportive of the non-White non-aggressor.




Figure 8: High vs. Low Ethnocentrist Respondents' Marginal Means of Supporting the Victim of Aggression that is Asian/Indigenous or non-Christian(right-hand side) against the Aggressor (left-hand side) that is White or Christian. Estimates for High Ethnocentrist respondents are shown in gray points, while estimates for Low Ethnocentrist respondents are shown in gold points. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

I observe a similar heterogeneity when respondents confronted Christian aggressors against non-Christian victims of aggression. In all cases, high-ethnocentrism respondents became much less supportive of the victims of aggression, becoming indifferent between the victim and aggressor. As before, the Christian vs. Muslim and Christian vs. Buddhist tradeoff showed the sharpest divergence, with respondents' marginal means of less than 0.5, showing slight favoring of the aggressor (though this estimate is not statistically distinguishable from 0.5.) Taken together, this figure shows that the degree to which respondents harbored views

of ethnic, racial, and cultural superiority vis-a-vis outgroups altered their support for the victims of aggression. Not only are those more racist respondents much less supportive of the non-White aggressors, but the less racist respondents are showing *greater* and counterveiling support for the Asian or Indigenous victims of aggression.²⁹

I conduct additional heterogeneity analyses in the appendix, and while White and Non-White respondents reacted fairly consistently in this tradeoff analysis (Figure A18), Christian and Non-Christian respondents sharply polarized (Figure A19). Non-Christian respondents were consistent in their support for victims of aggression regardless of belligerent race or religion. However, Christian respondents became indifferent between aggressor and non-aggressor when a Christian aggressor fought a “No religion” or “Ancestor worship” victim of aggression. Their marginal means were indistinguishable from 0.5. Moreover, Christian respondents were actually more supportive of the Christian *aggressor* when confronting a “Muslim” or “Buddhist” victim of aggression, with marginal means lower and statistically distinct from 0.5.

As with Study 1, respondents strongly denied the role of race and religion in their thinking. In Appendix Figure A20, I present the percentage of respondents who mentioned each attribute regarding which factors were “most” or “least” important for their support. I find the majority of respondents (41.7%) cited religion as the *least* important factor, followed by race (17.9%). Consistent with Study 1, respondents claimed aggressor status (39.5%) and alliance ties (16.2%) were most important for their support. However, given how race and religion played substantial roles in shaping their support, this divergence between their conjoint preferences and their expressed written considerations reveals a social desirability bias in international conflict (Inouye and Horiuchi, 2026).

²⁹This could indicate a racial sympathy toward outgroups as discussed by Chudy (2021).

8 Conclusion

Dr. Tedros questioned whether equal attention is paid to Black and White lives, raising the important question of whether the lives of people of different races are weighed and valued equally. In the hypothetical counterfactual where Ukraine was Asian or Arab, conventional international relations scholarship would lead one to expect that support and sympathy for the invaded country would be practically identical. Such support would be the result of considerations like alliance ties (Tomz and Weeks, 2021), universal moral obligation (Kertzer et al., 2014; Kreps and Maxey, 2018), threat (Walt, 1985), regime type (Snyder, 2023; Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Maoz and Russett, 1993). Existing studies of race in international politics might lead one to expect that a counterfactual where Ukraine was Black would lead to the least support (Chu and Lee, 2024; Rosenberg, 2019) or that non-Whites generally would be receive less support (Oksamytna and von Billerbeck, 2024; Rosenberg, 2023). This article makes the case that neither would be quite right; the former under-appreciates the extent to which race can bias preferences and information processing while the latter would miss the substantial variation and penalty in support toward Asian and Arab countries.

Identity is not a secondary alternative explanation to strategic or material considerations; it can be intertwined with them, distorting the way people react to military capabilities and aggressive behavior. I theorize that the interplay of domestic and international racisms and the construction of these countries as existential threats create penalties in support and negatively bias how people react to information about these countries. This research combines observational data from the Americans Talk Security study with two original survey experiments to test the theory. The late-Cold War survey shows that American respondents were more willing to provide support when the victims of invasion were White (West Berlin) than when they were Asian (Taiwan) or Arab (Saudi Arabia). To examine this more rigorously and hold confounders constant, I conducted an invasion experiment. Holding all else equal

and manipulating race through AI-generated images, White Americans feel colder toward Asian and Arab countries, report less sympathy, and are less willing to provide support through taxes. They are also more inclined to scale back support. While respondents often deny that race shapes their thinking, probing their reasoning reveals that the material and strategic considerations they cite are themselves biased by race.

To analyze how the aggressor identity alters support, shed light on the relative influence of race compared to considerations of religion, aggressive behavior, regime type, or alliance ties, and to examine how identity trades off with these other considerations, I fielded Study 2. Results show that race and religion can insulate in-group aggressors and undermine support for out-group non-aggressors. This underscores not only the effect on support preferences but its influence on how people evaluate something as apparently clear-cut as aggression.

This analysis advances the literature in several key ways. First, suggests a greater need to examine how identities like race and religion shape not only outcomes, but also the inputs into decision-making. IR theory has long focused on material considerations and coercive capabilities; identity has often been seen as a late-coming foil and alternative explanation. This research suggests the two are more entangled than previously thought (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996). Second, while existing work has shown the prevalence of racialized tropes in elite foreign policy discussions (Carson, Min and Van Nuys, 2024; Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002), additional research should take seriously how these variables, often omitted in conventional security theorizing, affect the way certain behaviors and actions are stigmatized and punished (Búzás and Bassan-Nygate, 2024). While existing research points to how allies receive preferential treatment in human rights violations (Terman and Byun, 2022), this research suggests racial and religious identity could create similar discriminatory effects (Renshon and Powers, 2024).

Another strand of questions that this research opens regards how malleable such racialized identities are, and when such parochial identities are more or less consequential. Some

research suggests alliance ties and geostrategic alignment can overcome xenophobic prejudices, at least in immigration (Wimmer et al., 2024) and refugee resettlement (Inouye and Blair, 2025), but threat construction is itself often colored by race (Búzás, 2013). Other research is examining how democratic ties are either undergirded by race (Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy, 2024) or remain significant in spite of it (Tomz and Weeks, 2013, 2025) though this debate is unresolved.

Future research should consider an oversample of Asians, Arabs, or Blacks in America, to see if the minoritized status creates transnational solidarity with other non-White peoples suffering in conflict (Bonilla and Lajevardi, 2025). Relatedly, it is important to move the study of race in IR beyond the U.S. context, and see how race alters public support in other countries (Cho, Dietrich and Inouye, 2025). Given that the racial and religious relations between groups are context-specific and historically contingent, the mechanisms may travel, but the precise dynamics between different groups may vary.

Amidst contentious policy debates around support for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, this research provides evidence that identities intersect in important but underappreciated ways with aggressor-victim dynamics and perceived capability. Normatively, we may hope that sympathy and support are shaped by *what* is happening rather than *who* is suffering. Unfortunately, this research suggests that for many Americans, who is suffering shapes what people perceive, and how they decide to help.

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9 Appendix

More Equal the Others: Race and Religion Alter Support to Countries in Conflict

Part

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A Study 1 Survey Design

The surveys were fielded using PureSpectrum, an online platform suitable for obtaining quality responses for survey experiments. For PureSpectrum's quality control, see PureSpectrum's website at <https://www.purespectrum.com/purespectrum-presents-purescore/>. They use *PureScore*, “a comprehensive, advanced machine learning[-]driven, scoring system designed to measure individual survey respondent quality” (see the link above) and block low-quality respondents or even bots.

Sampling period

The pilot study was fielded in October of 2024. Then, the remaining data was collected in July of 2025. I pre-registered my analysis plan at the OSF ([here](#)).

Quality check

In addition to using PureSpectrum's pre-screening algorithm, I filtered out low-quality responses, which Qualtrics flagged as potential bots.

Number of observations

I collected 1182 responses for this study.

Length

The median time to complete the survey is 15 minutes.


Quotas

To obtain a reasonably representative sample of Whites for this survey, I set quotas using respondents' gender (male, female), age (18-34, 35-54, 55-99), and education (with or without a university degree). Figure A2 compares each category's percentages in our sample (on the vertical axis) and those in the population (on the horizontal axis). The statistics for the population are from the Census (US Census Bureau).

Justification of Racial Group Selection

In this section, I further justify the choice of the racial categories of Arab, Asian, Black, and White.

Figure A2: Sample Representativeness by Study



Note: The horizontal and vertical axes represent the percent of each group in the population and the sample, respectively. The closer the dots are to the 45° line, the more representative the sample is of the population.

Arab

While people from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have historically been counted as “White” on the U.S. census, it is well documented that they face not only face general out-group resentment (Kinder and Kam, 2010) but also specific, negative group-specific attitudes (Oskooii, Dana and Barreto, 2021; Panagopoulos, 2006; Sides and Gross, 2013). They are often stereotyped as violent and extreme (Lajevardi and Oskooii, 2018; Oskooii, Dana and Barreto, 2021; Lajevardi, 2021).¹ Studies of immigration support both within the United States and worldwide consistently find strong biases against Muslims and those from the MENA region (d’Urso and Bonilla, 2023; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Valentino et al., 2019), in part because, as Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner (2009, pg. 848) describes, Muslims in America as doubly outcast. Not only are they a racial and religious minority (like, for example Black people and Jewish people), some Americans may also see them as culturally deviant, with behaviors or values that Americans might find “unusual or

¹Some of this is attributable to the September 11th attacks (?Davis and Silver, 2004; Lajevardi et al., 2023), though research from Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner (2009) argues that the anti-Muslim sentiment cannot just be explained by a post September 11th effect.

offensive” (like welfare recipients, illegal immigrants, and gays and lesbians).

One may ask whether such stigma is the result of these people being from the Middle East and North Africa, or whether it is rooted in their Islamic face. [d’Urso and Bonilla \(2023\)](#) shows that while White Americans focus on religion when determining who should be admitted to the U.S., the race of those in question alters the perceived viability of cultural assimilation. This suggests that it is not simply religion that explains this opposition, but rather how race and religion intersect in the perception of MENA individuals.

Asian

The inclusion of Asians for study is rooted in the history of racial prejudice against Asians in the United States as well as in the well-documented racial tropes of "Yellow Peril" which have colored American foreign policy practice in throughout the 19th and 20th centuries ([Búzás, 2013](#)). On the former, anti-Chinese sentiments led to the creation of America’s first immigration legislation through acts like the 1875 Page Act and 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Subsequent waves of Asian immigrants from Japan encountered similar racism ([Tchen and Yeats, 2014](#)), with the 1924 Immigration Act effectively violating the Gentleman’s Agreement and preventing Japanese immigration. The incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II under the unfounded guise of national security necessity ([Munson, 1941](#)) further demonstrated the impact of racial beliefs about Asians in American domestic and foreign policy.

More recently, work from D.G. [Kim \(2022\)](#) has argued that Anti-Asian attitudes can predict hawkish views toward China, though views towards Asians and Asian-Americans remain fairly stable and entrenched despite events like COVID-19 ([Kim, 2024](#); [Reny and Barreto, 2022](#)). In light of growing geopolitical tensions with China, and the growing attention on allies (i.e. Japan and Korea) and partners (Vietnam, Indonesia) ([Jung, Lee and Lee, 2021](#)), it is critically important to understand the perceptions and beliefs regarding Asian people.

Black and White

There is perhaps, less a need justify the inclusion of Black as well as White given the history of slavery in the United States and the way in which America has, from its founding, had institutionalized racial orders ([King and Smith, 2005](#)). Yet beyond the domestic realm, Whiteness has often been tied to notions of civilized governance ([Kinsella, 2022](#)) and has been a bedrock for entrenched racialized sovereign inequality ([Getachew, 2019](#); [Búzás, 2021](#)). Additional research by [Chu and Lee \(2024\)](#) and [Baker \(2015\)](#) further illustrate how the black-White binary matters for public opinion support of other countries. It also shapes which countries are seen as members and threats to the international order. According to [Brown and Scribner \(2014\)](#), “who is considered White—and conversely, who is deemed a threat to the racial order—depends on an imagined or performed investment in and proximity to the norms, ideals, practices, and discourses that uphold Whiteness and White colonial-racial rule.”

Future Research: Latino

Officially, the United States has classified Latino as an ethnicity, entailing membership in a cultural group (Bureau, 2022), though social scientists often treat Latino as a race (Mora, 2014; Pérez, Lee and Luna, 2025). Like other minoritized groups in the United States, Latinos have been racialized in a sticky hierarchy relative to Whites (Masuoka and Junn, 2013), have faced a perception as “foreigners” like Asian Americans (Zou and Cheryan, 2017), and have built a pan-ethnic identity (Mora, 2014). Race and Ethnic Politics scholars have theorized Latino racial identity alongside other groups like Asians (Pérez, Lee and Luna, 2025), so there is a strong case for including Latino as a race treatment in the future. A racial treatment for Latino was generated, however practical resource constraints necessitated the removal of one of these treatment conditions. Future research should theorize how Latinos, racialized as threats heavily in the context of migration affect public support and evaluation of countries in Central and Southern America. While countries in these regions have not been racialized as existential threats the way countries in Asia or the Middle East have been, the vilinization of migrants and asylum seekers at America’s southern border could create similar penalties in support.

B Research Ethics

Researchers have a moral imperative to protect human subjects throughout the research process. In conducting surveys, I took the utmost care to comply with standards and obligations described in the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research, and detailed in depth in the literature on ethics and survey research (e.g., Desposato, 2018; Phillips, 2021). As described below, I took multiple steps to identify and mitigate risks associated with our research.

My survey protocol went through an IRB review and approval process at the Author's institution in the US to ensure that the activities were in line with regulations regarding the protection of human subjects. I did not engage with vulnerable populations (e.g., children, prisoners), and the questions did not cover sensitive topics. I gathered no potentially identifying information through our survey. All survey data are stored in a password-protected folder accessible only to the Authors.

Consent I fielded surveys using PureSpectrum, an online marketplace linking researchers with prospective survey participants through double opt-in panels via partner companies that maintain participant samples. All interviews proceeded with consent obtained by respondents doubly opting-in to take the survey. All respondents were also informed beforehand that they always had the option to opt-out during any point in the survey.

Minimizing Risks and “Do No Harm” The Author consistently worked to abide by the “do no harm” standard, minimizing risks to human subjects while working to maximize the benefits of our research. I assessed that the potential contributions of our research project were substantial while risks were minimal.

In addition to the potentially substantial benefits of this research, our team also worked to identify and mitigate risks to interviewees. First, I considered power differentials between ourselves and research participants. All survey-takers were informed of their rights, including their ability to refuse to participate or to withdraw consent at any time. Second, before, during, and after surveys, I ensured that participants understood their responses would be held confidentially, and that no identifying information was collected or would be revealed. Third, no deception was used in the study. Fourth, I designed the surveys to reduce any possible harm. Specifically, I fielded surveys in the United States, where safety concerns were minimal.

C AI Generation of Photos

These photos were generated using free options of <https://hotpot.ai/>, using the “Portrait 2” setting, with prompts along the lines of “generate a picture of three [RACE] soldiers with neutral expressions”. Once a suitable base image was found, this became the seed image for variations for race in the generator prompts. Admittedly, AI-based image generation does not always offer precise control, so I also photoshopped images, removing extraneous uniform ornamentation and blending backgrounds to make the images more similar to one another.

Recent work shows people struggle to differentiate artificially generated faces from real ones (Hulzebosch, Ibrahimi and Worring, 2020; Nightingale et al., 2021; Tucciarelli et al., 2022), and by keeping the prompting and root images identical, one can create highly similar images.

My procedure closely resembles that described by Schwitter (2025), though I generated my images prior to learning of this working paper. Nevertheless, both my process and that described in this working paper focus on the generation of a baseline image, the creation of image alternatives, and then a validation process. As noted above, I manually adjust images to maximize their similarity by removing extraneous details.

C.1 Promises and Perils of AI Generated Vignettes

Using AI to generate images for survey experiments offers significant advantages, including a dramatic expansion of design possibilities and increased accessibility for researchers. However, several limitations must be considered, such as potential biases, reproducibility issues, and environmental costs.

C.1.1 Promises

Systematic Manipulation AI-generated images allow researchers to create highly comparable visual materials for vignette experiments. Images sourced from the internet often are imperfect comparisons for one another because of uncontrollable differences. By contrast, AI tools can generate a series of images from a single “seed” or base image, which leads to highly comparable images. This can improve the internal validity of studies, as researchers can precisely manipulate visual cues of identity (race, gender, age) at low cost.

From an international relations standpoint, these tools can also be used to create specific, controlled scenarios relevant for foreign policy. Researchers can easily represent conflict zones, humanitarian crises, or different archetypes of leaders (e.g., authoritarian versus democratic, or varying racial backgrounds) in a standardized manner. This systematic control allows for cleaner inferences about how framing or identity impact threat perception, conflict support, and international cooperation. As a practical matter, the ability to quickly generate numerous treatment options during the pre-test or design phases significantly streamlines the research process.

Accessibility These tools are also widely accessible and often free or low-cost, which can democratize research by enabling academics at under-resourced institutions to conduct image-based experiments as easily as those at highly resourced ones.

Ethical Advantages AI-tools also allow for the study of dangerous scenarios like conflict or crises without the use of real people's images, likeness, or situation. This avoids exploiting the suffering of real individuals for scientific study and avoids concerns about privacy for individuals pictured in such images.

C.1.2 Perils

At the same time, there are important limitations to consider.

Realism and Consistency AI models can sometimes produce unrealistic or inconsistent renderings, particularly with complex elements like hands or text (Schwitter, 2025). While this issue is diminishing with rapid advancements in AI, researchers must still carefully validate and, if necessary, manually adjust images.

Algorithmic Bias Another possible issue is the bias in the kinds of images that are likely to be generated, or likely to be generated well. AI models require large amounts of existing data to train on, and this could create a bias toward reproducing images in the style of what already exists.

Reproducibility A pitfall not mentioned by Schwitter (2025) but which became apparent in this project is the dynamic nature of AI models poses a challenge for reproducibility. As the models evolve, update, or are retired, it is not a guarantee that the images generated will be reproducible to the exact degree. An identical prompt can lead to multiple different results on the same day, to say nothing of what may occur when models are updated. To ensure replicability, researchers must make the exact images used in their studies available, rather than relying on prompts alone.

Environmental Ethics A final consideration has less to do with the images themselves but rather the environmental considerations of using AI in general. While not unique to generating images for survey experiments, the use and training of AI comes with well-documented environmental costs (Wu et al., 2022; Van Wynsberghe, 2021). Researchers should be mindful of these broader implications when choosing to rely on these tools.

D Wording of Key Questions

Sympathy Index This sympathy index averages respondents answers to the three sympathy outcome questions that followed:

How much would you feel the following?

- Sadness for those who are suffering in this country.
- A desire to help those who are suffering in this country.
- Sympathy for those who are suffering in this country.

Answer choices ranged from (1) None at all to (5) A great deal.

Amount of Support Respondents were told:

Experts believe that every year about 20,000 civilians in the defending country are killed or wounded from this invasion.

The U.S. sent troops, money, and equipment to help this country. Thanks to this, the defending country has put up a strong defense and stopped the invader's advance. However, they have not pushed out the invaders.

On average, one in ten U.S. troops sent overseas have been injured or killed.

When it comes to sending U.S. troops and support, do you think the amount of U.S. assistance is ...

Answer choices were: (1) Too much, (2) About right, (3) Not enough.

Change Support Respondents were told:

Some leaders from both political parties support an increase in the number of U.S. troops sent to support this country. They argue it will help to shorten the war by at least one year, saving tens of thousands of lives and restoring peace.

Other leaders from both political parties oppose this increase in U.S. troops, saying it will increase costs and casualties for the Americans.

Do you think the U.S. should increase or decrease its support?

Answer choices ranged from (1) Strongly decrease support to (5) Strongly increase support.

E Manipulation Checks

E.1 Manipulation Checks and Latent Racial Schema

The race-based factual manipulation check reveals the images successfully primed respondents to think of the intended racial groups. Table A2 reveals 90% of respondents correctly remembered the race of the people in the image they had been shown. The highest pass rate was for the Asian image at 97% while the White treatment image had the lowest, at a still quite reasonable 81%. When respondents guessed incorrectly for the White condition, they tended to guess “Arab” suggesting that if my analyses yield conservative results. If the White treatment was even “Whiter” and respondents did not confuse it for the penalized “Arab” category, it is likely that the contrasts between the White treatment group and the remaining racial groups would be even larger. This gives me confidence that the AI images are effective in signaling the race of countries in a vignette experiment.

One potential concern is that because the vignette showed soldiers in uniform, respondents may have assumed the soldiers were from the invading country rather than the invaded country. This would prime the context of aggression and threat rather than support. I present the results of the other manipulation checks in Table A3, which not only show whether people correctly identified the shown country as the invaded country, but also addresses important confounders with race - regime type and religion. I find 86.8% of all respondents correctly remembered that the people shown in the survey were the invaded country, not the invading country. Additionally, respondents were generally consistent in remembering that the country shown was a democracy, with about 80% of all respondents correctly remembering this fact.

Usually, manipulation checks are final checks to ensure treatments work properly; they rarely provide insights in themselves. However, there were two factual manipulation checks that revealed interesting patterns based on racial treatment. Despite the fact that a large Christian population was constant across conditions, the pass rates of this were much lower for Asian (58.9%) and Arab (50.0%) countries compared to the Control (74.7%) and White condition (80.0%). This may be because the combination of Christian and Arab or Christian and Asian are less schema consistent than White and Christian and that people may, despite the information provided to them, still be employing schema-consistent heuristics to assume religion. Inferentially, this means I cannot fully rule out the possibility that religion may still be altering respondent affect and policy preferences for the invaded country, at least for the respondents who were not sufficiently attentive to this detail. However, this potential influence is at least attenuated relative to a context in which religion is not specified at all, and I am at least able to provide some sense for the extent to which this is occurring.

The second finding from the manipulations is that those who saw the White soldiers were much more likely to pass the democracy manipulation check relative to all other respondents. On average, respondents had a pass rate for the democracy check of about 77.4%. However, when respondents saw the White soldiers, 85.6% of respondents correctly remembered the invaded country was a democracy. This means that respondents had a prior link in their mind

between the regime type of the country, and race of that country - a finding consistent with Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy (2024). I consider these findings to be a feature of studying race in the context of an experiment - even when “objective” features about a country are held constant, respondents still make assumptions about other aspects of the country on the basis of race, suggesting that race is indeed a bundle of sticks (Sen and Wasow, 2016) that can alter how people evaluate and feel toward other countries. One final note is that when taken together, the White treatment condition consistently showed higher pass rates for all factual manipulation checks. Whether it was the invasion rate (91.1%), the Christian population rate (80%), or the democracy rate (85.6%), respondents were more accurate in their recall.

While the small sample size mean only some of the differences between White and Asian / Arab for the Christian manipulation check are statistically significant, this does present a preliminary pattern that respondents were either more attentive to the White condition, or had more schema-consistent information in the White condition, making it easier for them to pass these checks. Out of concerns for post-treatment bias however, I do not drop the respondents who failed these attention checks (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres, 2018).

Table A2: Pass Rates for Race Checks by Treatment Group with Summary (Including Control)

Race	Treated	Passed	Pass Rate (%)
Asian	252	244	97
Arab	244	224	92
Black	246	224	91
White	261	212	81
Control	179	NA	NA
Total Treated	1003	904	90

Table A3: Pass Rates for FMC Manipulation Checks by Treatment Group


Treatment Group	Total Respondents	Passed Defender (%)	Passed Christian (%)	Passed Democracy (%)
control	179	82.7	77.7	78.8
arab	244	87.3	48.0	70.9
asian	252	81.0	54.4	64.7
black	246	88.6	66.7	75.6
white	261	87.4	80.1	81.2
Total	1182	85.5	64.8	74.0

F Additional Cold War Survey Data

F.1 Chicago Council Polling

Polling from 1982 and 1986 reveals similar differences in support for the deployment of troops depending on the particular scenario. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs fielded surveys asking respondents “about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. (United States) troops in other parts of the world.” They were asked if they “Would you favor or oppose the use of U. S. troops” if various countries or governments were invaded. Figure 1 and A3 show nearly identical patterns; there is barely any support in favor of sending troops to defend Taiwan (19% in both years) or Saudi Arabia (25% in 1982 and 26% in 1986). By contrast, there was overwhelming support in favor of sending troops to defend Western Europe (64% and 68%).


Figure A3: Americans’ Willingness to Support Invaded Countries (1986)



Note: American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1987: General Public [Roper #31089291], $n = 1,585$ national adult sample.


The 1982 survey also asked identical question to a sample of elites. Figure A4

Figure A4: American Elites' Willingness to Support Invaded Countries (1982)



(a) China invades Taiwan

(b) Iran invades Saudi Arabia



(c) USSR invades Western Europe

Note: American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1982: Leaders [Roper #31089282] (1982). The Opinion Leader sample is made up of the following groups of leaders: Administration (11), Congress (53), Business (63), Labor (28), Media (52), Education (56), Religion (42), Special Interest (19), Special Foreign Policy (17).

F.2 Americans Talk Security

The Americans Talk Security Survey #9 ($n = 1,005$ registered voters) fielded over the phone in 1988 (Project, 1988).² Respondents were asked “which of the following four options is the strongest action that the United States should take—stay out of the conflict entirely, use only diplomatic and political pressure against the aggressor nation, send military supplies and aid to the country under attack, or send American troops to assist the attacked country.”

These scenarios included 1) The Peoples Republic of China invades Taiwan, 2) Iran invades Saudi Arabia, 3) Soviet and East German forces invade West Berlin.³

Top line results from these questions, shown in Figure A5, reveal that a plurality of respondents indicated a preference for the “Stay out” option in the Taiwan and Saudi Arabia

²The sample was of registered voters and exact fielding dates were September 7, 1988 - September 18, 1988.

³The full list of questions and topline summaries can be found [here](#).

Figure A5: Americans' Willingness to Support Invaded Countries (1988)



Note: Americans Talk Security #9 (1988), $n = 1,005$ registered voters. Response categories with less than 0.5% of respondents are not shown in the chart.

cases. A plurality of respondents (40%) wanted to “Stay out” if China invaded Taiwan, and 34% preferred to “Stay out” if Iran invaded Saudi Arabia. Only 8% of respondents in the Taiwan case and 18% of respondents in the Saudi Arabia case wanted to send troops. By contrast, in the West Berlin case, the plurality of respondents (38%) indicated a willingness to send troops if the USSR invaded West Berlin, and only 19% wanted to stay out.

G Additional Results

G.1 Descriptive Results

Figure A6 shows the simple descriptive affect ratings from Study 1. The affect index is the average of three separate ratings : how people felt about the civilians, military, and government of the country that was shown.

White Americans' Feelings Toward Invaded Country by Treatment






Figure A6: Feelings toward other countries for white respondents, by race of that country. *The Y-axis is a feeling thermometer score, ranging from 0-100. The X-axis separates respondent scores by the race of the invaded country. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.*

G.2 Additional Results Relative to White Baseline

The following Figure A7 show the treatment effects for other pre-registered outcomes using the White treatment group as the baseline. Figure A7(a) shows effect of race on people's affect toward the invaded country, while (b) shows support for intervention - an index of support from respondents willingness to send money, weapons, and troops to the invaded country. Plot (c) shows the public's willingness to accept American casualties in providing support to the invaded country, which ranged on a scale from 0 - No casualties to 3 - 300+ casualties.

As discussed in the main text, Asian and Arab countries suffer penalties in affect, though there is not a statistically distinguishable shift in the public's willingness to initiate support via money, weapons, or troops. When it comes to acceptable casualties, the Arab, Asian, and Black racial treatments were not significantly different from the White treatment condition, though this may be because there were strong floor effects in that roughly half of respondents (530 of the 1003 assigned to racial treatments) indicated they were not willing to accept any casualties, and this strong aversion to casualties did not differ significantly by treatment condition.

Figure A7: Effect of Race on Support for Invaded Country, White Base



Note: Thick spikes denote 90% confidence intervals; thin spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals. Each subplot shows estimated treatment effects by outcome.

G.3 Results relative to the Control Baseline


Figure A8 shows the main results from Figure 4, but using the Control group as the base rather than the White treatment group.

Generally, the penalty for Asian and Arab countries is even more pronounced across these four plots, and overall, the Black and White treatment conditions were rarely different from the control condition. This underscores the point made in the main text that using the White Treatment group as the baseline generally creates more conservative estimates for the effect of race on support for the invaded country, relative to the no-photo control.

Figure A9 show the treatment effects for other pre-registered outcomes using the Control group as the baseline. Figure A9(a) shows effect of race on people's affect toward the invaded country, while (b) shows support for intervention - an index of support from respondents willingness to send money, weapons, and troops to the invaded country. Plot (c) shows the public's willingness to accept American casualties in providing support to the invaded country, which ranged on a scale from 0 - No casualties to 3 - 300+ casualties.



Here, I find that Arab and Asian countries do suffer statistically significant decreases in support for intervention and levels of acceptable casualties. On the former, it is important to caveat this observation with the additional note that White and Black countries also received significantly less support compared to the no-photo control. However, in the case of White Americans' willingness to accept casualties to support an invaded country, Figure A9(c), respondents thought fewer casualties (roughly 20, or 20 % given the answer choice increments of 100) were acceptable for Arab and Asian countries.

Figure A8: Effect of Race on Support for Invaded Country, Control Base



Note: Thick spikes denote 90% confidence intervals; thin spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals. Each subplot shows estimated treatment effects by outcome.

Figure A9: Effect of Race on Support for Invaded Country, Control Base



Note: Thick spikes denote 90% confidence intervals; thin spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals. Each subplot shows estimated treatment effects by outcome.

Table A4 shows the results of the exploratory mechanism using the no-photo control condition as the baseline. The main difference when all racial treatments are compared to the control is that all racial treatments decreased respondents' sense of moral obligation to the invaded country. The penalty was largest for the Arab country (-0.072, SE: 0.025), though the results were still significant and negative for the Asian, Black, and White treatments. Like Table 1, the perceived military capability of Arab and Black countries is still negatively impacted.

Table A4: Mechanisms: Variation in Support, Control Base

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Moral Obligation	Military Capability	Financial Cost	Human Cost
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab	-0.070*** (0.025)	-0.038* (0.022)	0.014 (0.024)	0.025 (0.021)
Asian	-0.050* (0.026)	0.021 (0.023)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.021)
Black	-0.045* (0.025)	-0.080*** (0.023)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.021)
White	-0.041* (0.025)	0.009 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.021)
(Intercept)	0.034 (0.057)	0.395*** (0.050)	0.524*** (0.052)	0.441*** (0.048)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.178	0.048	0.113	0.141
RSE (df = 1129)	0.244	0.209	0.230	0.209

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

G.4 Negative Halo Effect of Other Attributes




Figure A10: Estimated Marginal Means of Aggressiveness and Meanness by Country Race. Each panel displays adjusted predictions from OLS models for perceived aggressiveness and meanness of the country across treatment groups. The Y-axis ranges from 1 to 9. The X-axis indicates the race of the country prime. Bars represent marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.

It is plausible that warmer affect toward other countries would be associated with other positive evaluations, such as how trustworthy or responsible the countries are. Respondent trust and responsibility evaluations are shown in Figure A11 and are consistent with these expectations. The Y-axis presents respondent scores for their rating of the people in the image. Scores originally ranged from 1-9 but have been normalized to a 0-1 scale. The ratings are separated by columns for differing races, with the means and error bars of 95% confidence intervals plotted as well.

White countries were rated as the most trustworthy of the photo treatments (6.5) and responsible (6.0) though Black countries received similar ratings. The main contrast is between these two, and evaluations of Arab and Asian countries. Asian countries had ratings that were between .9 and 1.1 lower for responsibility and trust respectively, while Arab countries were rated .6 lower for both. To put this in terms of percent change, compared to the trust score for an Asian country, the responsibility score for a White country was 16.1% higher and the trust score was about 22.45% higher.




Figure A11: Estimated Marginal Means of Perceived Responsibility and Trust by Country Race. *Each panel displays adjusted predictions from OLS models for how responsible and trustworthy the country was perceived to be across treatment groups. The Y-axis ranges from 1 to 9. The X-axis reflects the race of the country prime. Bars represent marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.*

G.5 Placebo Tests

Here I present the treatment effects for the race treatments interacted with respondent ethnocentrism scores. The X-axis separates out the specific policies the respondents indicated preferences for, the Y-axis plots the interaction treatment effect, and point estimates and error bars representing 95% confidence intervals are shown in color by race treatment. I also conducted a similar placebo check using the baseline race treatment effects (no interaction effect) and found similar results.






Figure A12: Treatment Effects on Non-Military Assistance Policies, White Base. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

G.6 Most and Least Important Factors by Treatment

These figures display the proportion of respondents who selected each factor as either most important or least important for determining U.S. support to a country in need, broken down by experimental treatment condition. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of five conditions that varied the racial/ethnic description of the country's population: Control (no racial information), Arab, Asian, Black, or White.



(a)



(b)

Figure A13: Respondents' Answers for Most and Least Important Factors in Support for Other Countries. Respondents choose one answer.

Figure A13 shows that respondent considerations for the most and least important fac-

tors in support varied little by treatment group. Across all conditions, the “Race of country” and “Religion of country” were the most commonly cited, “Least Important” factors. Conversely, “Attacked” was consistently rated as the most important factor across all treatment conditions, with alliance considerations and the costs of support following afterwards.

G.7 Open-end Responses

Here, I present observations from the open-ended responses from Study 1. I pay particular attention to whether or not specific countries were mentioned in each of the racial treatments.

Of the 1,003 treated respondents in Study 1, participants were asked the following question:

The people in this photo are from a different country. Please write the first three words that come to mind when you think of the country pictured above. Initial impressions or gut reactions are fine.


Most respondents provided three words, which were then coded and counted for frequency. These word counts reflect total mentions across all respondents, rather than counts per individual. The resulting word counts, shown in Figure A14, visualize the most commonly mentioned words for each treatment image.

Treatment 1 (Asian) There were 252 respondents assigned to the Asian racial condition. Of that number, very few mentioned explicit countries; more specifically, 32 respondents (12.7% of those assigned to Asian) referenced “China” or “Chinese”, 18 respondents (7.14%) mentioned North Korea, and 8 referenced Japan. Other comments here spoke to a more negative impression of the character of the people; i.e. “ Numerous respondents said they were aggressive, untrustworthy, and evil. There were far fewer positive mentions of words like loyal and strong compared to the White treatment below.

Treatment 2 (Black) To the extent that respondents identified countries or continents when observing this treatment, they focused on Africa. 64 respondents out of the 246 assigned to this category (26%) and the lack of named countries suggests that most respondents either did not think of, or are not familiar with specific countries in Africa. The most frequently mentioned words included strong (18), young (13), black (9), proud (8), disciplined (7), poor (7), serious (7), and war (7), indicating that respondents associated Black individuals with a combination of positive traits (e.g., strong, proud, disciplined) and challenging circumstances (e.g., poor, war). Additional qualitative comments often carried negative valence, describing individuals as manipulative, evil, controlling, aggressive, scary, or—less commonly—“can be good people at heart if brought up right... if they had parents that cared.”

Treatment 3 (White) As expected, respondents mentioned Europe in their comments, though only 10 out of 261 respondents (3.8%) explicitly referred to Europe. Russia was mentioned most frequently (21), followed closely by Germany (20). This then, seems to be similar with Treatment 1, improving confidence in the comparability of these treatments.

Figure A14: Most Common Words for Each Treatment Image



Note: Words were coded from the responses of all treated participants. Common stop words, special characters, and numbers were removed. Counts represent total mentions across respondents, not per respondent.

While there were some comments that the people in this country were aggressive, dominant, or mean, there were more comments that this country was responsible, would stand up for what is right, has a lot of world influence, and is generally loyal and strong.

Treatment 4 (Arab) Respondents noted that the country shown was likely in the Middle East, with 29 out of 244 respondents (11.9%) explicitly mentioning the region. Some also noted that the country was Arab or Muslim (7). Fewer countries were mentioned overall, though Iran and Saudi Arabia were each referenced 2–3 times.

Other frequently cited words reveal the traits and associations respondents attributed to this group: strong (17), men (10), Arab (8), hot (8), Iran (8), serious (7), desert (6), militant (6), people (6), and ready (6). Qualitative comments included some negative descriptors such as aggressive, mean, dangerous, or fanatical—the only treatment in which “fanatical” appeared—while other responses emphasized strength, readiness, or seriousness, highlighting a mixture of positive and negative perceptions.

G.8 Mediation Analysis

In this section, I conduct a mediation analysis for two of the mechanisms considered in the main text. While this approach is sometimes referred to as “causal mediation analysis” (Imai et al., 2011), the strong assumptions around sequential ignorability (especially regarding the “mediator-as-fixed” assumption) are extremely difficult to verify. In the present case, I use the analysis descriptively, to assess whether country race is associated with shifts in beliefs or attitudes that are typically considered separate from race itself. I focus on perceptions of the invaded country’s military capability; these results should *not* be interpreted as definitive causal claims.

Mediation analysis, in this descriptive sense, can help examine whether variation in the treatment of race is statistically linked to changes in proposed intermediary variables, and has been used in other studies of race and foreign policy (Baker, 2015).⁴

I follow the techniques outlined by Imai et al. (2011), which involves two regression equations and a simulation. The first equation puts the mediator on the left-hand side of the equation while the right-hand side includes the race treatment dummy (T_i) and a host of control variables (X_i).

$$M_i = \alpha_1 + \lambda_1 T_i + X_i \beta + \varepsilon_{i1}, \quad (1)$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + \lambda_2 T_i + \gamma M_i + X_i \beta + \varepsilon_{i2}. \quad (2)$$


In the second equation, the outcome of support for the invaded country is on the left-hand side (Y_i), while the right-hand side includes race treatment dummy (T_i), the mediator (M_i) and the pre-treatment demographic covariates and controls variables (X_i).

The estimates from these two regressions form the basis for calculating the average causal mediation effect (ACME), the portion of the treatment effect (T_i) on support for the invaded country that operates *through* the mediator (M_i). Substantively, this is the effect of the race treatment on support for the invaded country that comes *through* the particular mediator. This is made possible through the simulations, which allow for predictions of the mediator (M_i) in both treatment states and then uses this in equation 2, to predict the outcome variable (Y_i). Comparing these simulated outcomes allows the procedure to isolate the change in Y_i attributable solely to changes in the mediator, holding the treatment constant. Repeating this process thousands of times, drawing from the sampling distribution of the estimated coefficients, produces an empirical distribution of the ACME that reflects both parameter uncertainty and sampling variability.

Of course, the validity of the AMCE depends on whether or not the sequential ignorability assumption holds (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010; Imai et al., 2011). This refers to two sequential ignorability assumptions. First, “given the observed pretreatment confounders,

⁴I also use the “mediation” package in R, developed by Dustin Tingley et al: <http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/mediation/vignettes/mediation.pdf>.

Figure A15: Mediation Analysis: Race Treatment → Military Capability → Tax Support



Note: ACME and ADE estimates are shown on each path. Significance levels are denoted as: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.1$.

the treatment assignment is assumed to be ignorable, that is, statistically independent of potential outcomes and potential mediators” and second, “the mediator is ignorable given the observed treatment and pretreatment confounders” (Imai, Keele and Tingley, 2010, 312-313).

While my experimental design ensures the first part of this assumption, no experimental design, even ones that sequentially and randomly assign both T and M are able to guarantee the second half of sequential ignorability is satisfied (Imai et al., 2011). Mindful of these limitations, I include the pretreatment covariates that may be relevant for foreign policy attitudes. These include standard demographic covariates, but also respondents’ foreign policy orientations of militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism (Wittkopf, 1990; Kertzer and Zeitsoff, 2017).

Table A5: Mediation Analysis: Military Capability

Treatment	Indirect Effect (Race-biased Military Capability)	Direct Effect (Outcome)	Total Effect	Prop. Mediated
Arab vs White	-1.23* (-2.86, -0.09)	-12.58* (-23.63, -0.92)	-13.81* (-25.23, -1.80)	0.09
Asian vs White	0.29 (-0.69, 1.39)	-15.84* (-26.67, -4.51)	-15.55* (-26.27, -4.19)	-0.02
Black vs White	-2.35* (-4.48, -0.29)	-1.78 (-14.29, 10.99)	-4.12 (-16.53, 9.26)	0.57

Notes: ACME = Average Causal Mediation Effect. ADE = Average Direct Effect. Prop. Mediated = proportion of total effect explained by the mediator. Asterisks indicate significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

H Regression Results

H.1 Support Results

Table A6: Impact of Race on Support for Invaded Countries, White vs. Asian

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Asian	−13.598*** (1.810)	−0.042** (0.018)	−0.130** (0.056)	−15.946*** (6.036)	−0.038* (0.021)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	498	498	498	498	498
Adjusted R ²	0.135	0.206	0.074	0.094	0.144
Residual Std. Error (df = 490)	20.216	0.203	0.616	67.272	0.230

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A7: Impact of Race on Support for Invaded Countries, White vs. Arab

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Arab	−5.716*** (1.739)	−0.005 (0.019)	−0.085 (0.057)	−13.220** (6.077)	−0.047** (0.023)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	484	484	484	484	484
Adjusted R ²	0.101	0.150	0.080	0.068	0.094
Residual Std. Error (df = 476)	19.030	0.202	0.624	67.125	0.251

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A8: Impact of Race on Support for Invaded Countries, White vs. Black

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Black	0.041 (1.707)	0.007 (0.018)	−0.021 (0.055)	−4.111 (6.545)	−0.016 (0.022)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	488	488	488	488	488
Adjusted R ²	0.049	0.133	0.109	0.090	0.120
Residual Std. Error (df = 480)	18.863	0.200	0.607	72.337	0.240

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

While the prior tables present the simplest, isolated comparison between the Asian vs. White, Arab vs. White, and Black vs. White treatment groups, I now show the results of these treatments relative to all other conditions in Table A9, excluding the control condition. The results are substantively nearly identical.

Table A9: Impact of Race on Support for Invaded Countries, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Arab	−5.714*** (1.740)	−0.007 (0.019)	−0.092 (0.057)	−13.809** (6.078)	−0.047** (0.023)
Asian	−13.561*** (1.814)	−0.040** (0.018)	−0.131** (0.055)	−15.553*** (6.017)	−0.037* (0.021)
Black	0.043 (1.715)	0.006 (0.018)	−0.022 (0.055)	−4.122 (6.540)	−0.016 (0.022)
(Intercept)	46.320*** (4.632)	0.108** (0.047)	1.226*** (0.138)	−56.023*** (14.505)	0.129** (0.057)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.117	0.166	0.088	0.089	0.128
RSE (df = 954)	19.951	0.204	0.617	66.209	0.239

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A10: Impact of Race on Support for Invaded Countries, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Arab	−12.355*** (2.018)	−0.038* (0.021)	−0.062 (0.063)	−28.520*** (7.157)	−0.051** (0.026)
Asian	−20.267*** (2.083)	−0.071*** (0.021)	−0.101 (0.062)	−30.068*** (7.023)	−0.043* (0.024)
Black	−6.621*** (1.997)	−0.024 (0.020)	0.007 (0.062)	−18.644** (7.488)	−0.021 (0.025)
White	−6.641*** (1.922)	−0.030 (0.020)	0.029 (0.061)	−14.334* (7.543)	−0.005 (0.025)
(Intercept)	49.898*** (4.483)	0.138*** (0.045)	1.169*** (0.135)	−50.694*** (14.159)	0.099* (0.056)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.131	0.167	0.082	0.105	0.121
RSE (df = 1129)	20.012	0.205	0.619	68.182	0.241

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A11: Impact of Race on Costliest forms of Support, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Acceptable Casualties	Send Troops	Sign Petition
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Arab	−0.026 (0.025)	0.012 (0.025)	−0.007 (0.022)
Asian	−0.016 (0.024)	−0.029 (0.024)	−0.019 (0.021)
Black	−0.005 (0.025)	0.005 (0.024)	0.007 (0.021)
(Intercept)	−0.214*** (0.060)	0.022 (0.060)	−0.126** (0.053)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	920	964
Adjusted R ²	0.139	0.066	0.147
RSE	0.276 (df = 954)	0.263 (df = 910)	0.238 (df = 954)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A12: Impact of Race on Costliest forms of Support, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Acceptable Casualties (1)	Send Troops (2)	Sign Petition (3)
Arab	−0.073** (0.029)	−0.049* (0.029)	−0.039 (0.025)
Asian	−0.062** (0.029)	−0.088*** (0.028)	−0.051** (0.024)
Black	−0.051* (0.029)	−0.055* (0.028)	−0.026 (0.024)
White	−0.046* (0.028)	−0.060** (0.028)	−0.032 (0.024)
(Intercept)	−0.171*** (0.059)	0.102* (0.060)	−0.106** (0.052)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,088	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.134	0.064	0.144
RSE	0.280 (df = 1129)	0.266 (df = 1077)	0.240 (df = 1129)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A13: Impact of Race on Costliest Forms of Support, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Acceptable Casualties	Send Troops	Sign Petition
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Arab	−0.026 (0.025)	0.012 (0.025)	−0.007 (0.022)
Asian	−0.016 (0.024)	−0.029 (0.024)	−0.019 (0.021)
Black	−0.005 (0.025)	0.005 (0.024)	0.007 (0.021)
(Intercept)	−0.214*** (0.060)	0.022 (0.060)	−0.126** (0.053)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	920	964
Adjusted R ²	0.139	0.066	0.147
RSE	0.276 (df = 954)	0.263 (df = 910)	0.238 (df = 954)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A14: Impact of Race on Costliest Forms of Support, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Acceptable Casualties	Send Troops	Sign Petition
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Arab	−0.073** (0.029)	−0.049* (0.029)	−0.039 (0.025)
Asian	−0.062** (0.029)	−0.088*** (0.028)	−0.051** (0.024)
Black	−0.051* (0.029)	−0.055* (0.028)	−0.026 (0.024)
White	−0.046* (0.028)	−0.060** (0.028)	−0.032 (0.024)
(Intercept)	−0.171*** (0.059)	0.102* (0.060)	−0.106** (0.052)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,088	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.134	0.064	0.144
RSE	0.280 (df = 1129)	0.266 (df = 1077)	0.240 (df = 1129)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

H.2 Sympathy Results

In the following tables, I show the results relative to the White treatment condition (Table A15) and relative to the no-photo control (Table A16). The three sympathy items show excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.92$, 95% CI = 0.91–0.93), indicating that they measure a highly coherent underlying construct. Each item correlates strongly with the overall scale (item–total correlations ≥ 0.80), and removing any single item would reduce reliability. Using multiple measures captures distinct facets of sympathy while reducing random measurement error associated with any single item. Combining them into a single index thus provides a more stable and valid measure of the latent concept, improving precision and interpretability in subsequent analyses.

Table A15: Impact of Race on Sympathy Outcomes, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Feel Sad	Desire to Help	Feel Sympathy	Sympathy Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab	0.005 (0.020)	−0.019 (0.021)	−0.007 (0.020)	−0.007 (0.019)
Asian	−0.024 (0.020)	−0.047** (0.020)	−0.049** (0.020)	−0.040** (0.018)
Black	0.019 (0.020)	−0.013 (0.021)	0.011 (0.020)	0.006 (0.018)
(Intercept)	0.114** (0.050)	0.037 (0.051)	0.172*** (0.050)	0.108** (0.047)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.159	0.157	0.131	0.166
Residual Std. Error (df = 954)	0.218	0.228	0.221	0.204

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

Table A16: Impact of Race on Sympathy Outcomes, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Feel Sad	Desire to Help	Feel Sympathy	Sympathy Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Arab	−0.027 (0.022)	−0.063*** (0.023)	−0.023 (0.023)	−0.038* (0.021)
Asian	−0.056** (0.022)	−0.091*** (0.022)	−0.066*** (0.022)	−0.071*** (0.021)
Black	−0.012 (0.022)	−0.056** (0.023)	−0.005 (0.022)	−0.024 (0.020)
White	−0.031 (0.022)	−0.043** (0.022)	−0.016 (0.022)	−0.030 (0.020)
(Intercept)	0.159*** (0.048)	0.075 (0.049)	0.181*** (0.048)	0.138*** (0.045)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.157	0.159	0.133	0.167
Residual Std. Error (df = 1129)	0.219	0.226	0.221	0.205

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income, and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism).

H.3 Support Result Heterogeneity

Table A17: Impact of Race and Ethnocentrism on Support for Invaded Countries, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Arab	-5.780*** (1.735)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.091 (0.057)	-13.708** (6.077)	-0.047** (0.023)	-6.338*** (1.723)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.092 (0.057)	-14.142** (6.020)	-0.049** (0.023)
Asian	-13.253*** (1.827)	-0.029 (0.018)	-0.136** (0.055)	-16.028*** (6.030)	-0.036* (0.021)	-13.701*** (1.815)	-0.030* (0.018)	-0.135** (0.056)	-16.079*** (6.050)	-0.035* (0.021)
Black	0.195 (1.709)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.055)	-4.357 (6.540)	-0.015 (0.022)	0.097 (1.694)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.055)	-4.446 (6.547)	-0.016 (0.022)
Arab x Ethnocentrism						-7.604*** (2.273)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.046 (0.069)	-4.501 (7.253)	-0.032 (0.029)
Asian x Ethnocentrism						-1.803 (2.168)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.087 (0.062)	0.646 (7.502)	-0.044* (0.026)
Black x Ethnocentrism						-6.719*** (2.121)	0.006 (0.021)	-0.088 (0.061)	3.610 (8.177)	-0.026 (0.027)
Ethnocentrism	-1.777** (0.882)	-0.062*** (0.009)	0.027 (0.026)	2.737 (2.794)	-0.006 (0.010)	2.043 (1.531)	-0.064*** (0.015)	0.085** (0.043)	2.632 (6.076)	0.021 (0.019)
(Intercept)	46.714*** (4.645)	0.122*** (0.046)	1.220*** (0.138)	-56.631*** (14.496)	0.130** (0.058)	46.882*** (4.639)	0.122*** (0.046)	1.229*** (0.139)	-55.949*** (14.567)	0.138** (0.058)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.121	0.213	0.088	0.089	0.128	0.134	0.212	0.087	0.087	0.128
RSE	19.912 (df = 953)	0.198 (df = 953)	0.616 (df = 953)	66.208 (df = 953)	0.239 (df = 953)	19.760 (df = 950)	0.199 (df = 950)	0.617 (df = 950)	66.269 (df = 950)	0.239 (df = 950)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism)

Table A18: Impact of Race and Ethnocentrism on Support for Invaded Countries, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Arab	-12.516*** (2.012)	-0.043** (0.020)	-0.059 (0.063)	-28.205*** (7.141)	-0.052** (0.026)	-12.924*** (2.000)	-0.045** (0.020)	-0.058 (0.064)	-28.668*** (7.121)	-0.053** (0.026)
Asian	-20.058*** (2.082)	-0.063*** (0.020)	-0.105* (0.062)	-30.480*** (7.032)	-0.042* (0.024)	-20.309*** (2.080)	-0.064*** (0.020)	-0.101 (0.062)	-30.540*** (7.059)	-0.040* (0.024)
Black	-6.564*** (1.983)	-0.022 (0.020)	0.006 (0.062)	-18.756** (7.483)	-0.021 (0.025)	-6.477*** (1.972)	-0.022 (0.020)	0.007 (0.062)	-18.863*** (7.499)	-0.021 (0.025)
White	-6.736*** (1.928)	-0.034* (0.019)	0.031 (0.061)	-14.147* (7.533)	-0.005 (0.025)	-6.574*** (1.919)	-0.034* (0.019)	0.033 (0.061)	-14.192* (7.560)	-0.004 (0.025)
Arab x Ethnocentrism						-5.575** (2.428)	-0.017 (0.025)	0.010 (0.084)	-5.954 (9.115)	-0.020 (0.036)
Asian x Ethnocentrism						0.329 (2.332)	0.009 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.078)	-0.912 (9.299)	-0.032 (0.033)
Black x Ethnocentrism						-4.832** (2.292)	0.003 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.078)	1.856 (9.882)	-0.015 (0.035)
White x Ethnocentrism						1.992 (2.291)	-0.003 (0.025)	0.055 (0.076)	-1.853 (10.141)	0.011 (0.034)
Ethnocentrism	-1.753** (0.793)	-0.063*** (0.008)	0.029 (0.024)	3.441 (2.712)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.213 (1.709)	-0.062*** (0.020)	0.030 (0.064)	4.763 (8.304)	0.009 (0.029)
(Intercept)	50.498*** (4.499)	0.160*** (0.044)	1.160*** (0.135)	-51.872*** (14.146)	0.101* (0.056)	50.449*** (4.494)	0.160*** (0.044)	1.165*** (0.136)	-51.345*** (14.218)	0.105* (0.056)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.134	0.216	0.083	0.105	0.120	0.146	0.214	0.081	0.103	0.120
RSE	19.973 (df = 1128)	0.198 (df = 1128)	0.618 (df = 1128)	68.159 (df = 1128)	0.241 (df = 1128)	19.842 (df = 1124)	0.199 (df = 1124)	0.619 (df = 1124)	68.245 (df = 1124)	0.241 (df = 1124)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education, income and foreign policy orientations (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism)

Table A19: Impact of Race and Party on Support for Invaded Countries, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index (1)	Sympathy Index (2)	Amt. Support (3)	New Taxes (4)	↑↓ Support (5)	Affect Index (6)	Sympathy Index (7)	Amt. Support (8)	New Taxes (9)	↑↓ Support (10)
Arab	-5.497*** (1.820)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.098* (0.059)	-11.122* (6.218)	-0.047* (0.024)	-1.935 (2.554)	0.020 (0.029)	-0.202** (0.091)	-3.400 (9.656)	-0.071* (0.037)
Asian	-13.362*** (1.853)	-0.040** (0.020)	-0.130** (0.057)	-14.089** (6.305)	-0.035 (0.022)	-11.964*** (2.576)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.208** (0.084)	-12.026 (9.493)	-0.038 (0.031)
Black	0.278 (1.765)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.058)	-1.654 (6.799)	-0.006 (0.023)	1.456 (2.594)	0.014 (0.029)	0.019 (0.089)	8.929 (10.407)	0.018 (0.034)
Arab x Republican						-6.581* (3.617)	-0.045 (0.119)	0.193 (0.119)	-14.252 (12.589)	0.045 (0.048)
Asian x Republican						-2.553 (3.712)	-0.010 (0.039)	0.149 (0.115)	-3.425 (12.666)	0.005 (0.044)
Black x Republican						-2.192 (3.543)	-0.009 (0.038)	-0.052 (0.117)	-19.138 (13.592)	-0.043 (0.046)
Republican	-0.416 (1.360)	-0.052*** (0.014)	-0.105** (0.042)	-7.071 (4.502)	-0.075*** (0.017)	2.351 (2.385)	-0.037 (0.027)	-0.177** (0.081)	1.850 (9.667)	-0.077** (0.032)
(Intercept)	61.389*** (2.681)	0.471*** (0.031)	1.944*** (0.089)	46.741*** (9.153)	0.526*** (0.035)	59.920*** (2.781)	0.462*** (0.033)	1.975*** (0.098)	41.413*** (10.003)	0.525*** (0.038)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	951	951	951	951	951	951	951	951	951	951
Adjusted R ²	0.074	0.078	0.014	0.021	0.028	0.074	0.077	0.017	0.021	0.029
Residual Std. Error	20.428 (df = 943)	0.215 (df = 943)	0.641 (df = 943)	68.279 (df = 943)	0.251 (df = 943)	20.426 (df = 940)	0.216 (df = 940)	0.640 (df = 940)	68.277 (df = 940)	0.251 (df = 940)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education.)

Table A20: Impact of Race and Party on Support for Invaded Countries, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index (1)	Sympathy Index (2)	Amt. Support (3)	New Taxes (4)	↑↓ Support (5)	Affect Index (6)	Sympathy Index (7)	Amt. Support (8)	New Taxes (9)	↑↓ Support (10)
Arab	-12.316*** (2.068)	-0.038* (0.022)	-0.069 (0.065)	-27.700*** (7.454)	-0.055** (0.027)	-9.726*** (3.066)	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.135 (0.103)	-30.518*** (11.774)	-0.077* (0.042)
Asian	-20.242*** (2.101)	-0.073*** (0.022)	-0.102 (0.063)	-30.592*** (7.455)	-0.044* (0.025)	-19.860*** (3.091)	-0.056* (0.032)	-0.143 (0.097)	-38.928*** (11.536)	-0.045 (0.036)
Black	-6.598*** (2.022)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.015 (0.064)	-18.080** (7.885)	-0.016 (0.026)	-6.348** (3.109)	-0.006 (0.033)	0.082 (0.101)	-18.096 (12.393)	0.011 (0.039)
White	-6.882*** (1.947)	-0.033 (0.021)	0.026 (0.063)	-16.405** (7.911)	-0.010 (0.025)	-7.838*** (2.965)	-0.021 (0.032)	0.064 (0.101)	-26.968** (12.399)	-0.007 (0.039)
Arab x Republican						-4.763 (4.165)	-0.066 (0.044)	0.123 (0.133)	4.849 (15.049)	0.040 (0.054)
Asian x Republican						-0.660 (4.247)	-0.030 (0.043)	0.082 (0.129)	15.518 (15.094)	0.003 (0.050)
Black x Republican						-0.447 (4.100)	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.119 (0.131)	0.001 (15.975)	-0.047 (0.052)
White x Republican						1.789 (3.936)	-0.021 (0.042)	-0.069 (0.128)	19.136 (15.974)	-0.004 (0.051)
Republican	-0.282 (1.239)	-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.102*** (0.039)	-8.421* (4.312)	-0.072*** (0.015)	0.523 (3.125)	-0.017 (0.033)	-0.105 (0.100)	-16.988 (12.764)	-0.071* (0.040)
(Intercept)	67.106*** (2.813)	0.494*** (0.031)	1.892*** (0.090)	65.135*** (10.480)	0.513*** (0.037)	66.690*** (3.194)	0.477*** (0.036)	1.886*** (0.106)	69.417*** (12.816)	0.511*** (0.042)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127	1,127
Adjusted R ²	0.096	0.085	0.014	0.031	0.031	0.095	0.084	0.016	0.031	0.030
Residual Std. Error	20.418 (df = 1118)	0.215 (df = 1118)	0.641 (df = 1118)	70.716 (df = 1118)	0.253 (df = 1118)	20.425 (df = 1114)	0.215 (df = 1114)	0.640 (df = 1114)	70.729 (df = 1114)	0.253 (df = 1114)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include age, gender, education.)

Table A21: Impact of Race and Age on Support for Invaded Countries, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index (1)	Sympathy Index (2)	Amt. Support (3)	New Taxes (4)	↑↓ Support (5)	Affect Index (6)	Sympathy Index (7)	Amt. Support (8)	New Taxes (9)	↑↓ Support (10)
Arab	-5.780*** (1.723)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.086 (0.056)	-12.918** (6.161)	-0.046** (0.023)	-7.182*** (2.328)	0.010 (0.024)	-0.101 (0.073)	-4.774 (7.709)	-0.044 (0.031)
Asian	-13.355*** (1.815)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.130** (0.055)	-15.952*** (5.996)	-0.028 (0.021)	-14.656*** (2.422)	-0.037 (0.024)	-0.115 (0.076)	-2.896 (7.978)	-0.031 (0.028)
Black	-0.192 (1.704)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.054)	-4.830 (6.463)	-0.009 (0.022)	-2.352 (2.318)	0.004 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.074)	6.590 (8.617)	-0.008 (0.029)
Arab x 45+ years old						3.170 (3.459)	-0.053 (0.037)	0.033 (0.114)	-18.390 (12.515)	-0.004 (0.046)
Asian x 45+ years old						2.926 (3.672)	-0.006 (0.037)	-0.031 (0.112)	-28.409** (12.124)	0.006 (0.042)
Black x 45+ years old						4.808 (3.430)	-0.001 (0.036)	-0.035 (0.110)	-25.562** (13.028)	-0.003 (0.043)
45+ years old	-2.182* (1.298)	0.062*** (0.014)	-0.067 (0.041)	2.617 (4.334)	-0.004 (0.016)	-4.871** (2.430)	0.076*** (0.026)	-0.058 (0.079)	20.586** (9.573)	-0.004 (0.032)
(Intercept)	44.277*** (4.472)	0.167*** (0.045)	1.232*** (0.130)	-51.799*** (13.819)	0.140** (0.055)	45.387*** (4.544)	0.160*** (0.045)	1.230*** (0.133)	-58.993*** (13.935)	0.140** (0.056)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	981	981	981	981	981	981	981	981	981	981
Adjusted R ²	0.111	0.157	0.085	0.088	0.127	0.110	0.157	0.082	0.091	0.125
RSE	19.876 (df = 971)	0.205 (df = 971)	0.618 (df = 971)	66.407 (df = 971)	0.239 (df = 971)	19.888 (df = 968)	0.205 (df = 968)	0.618 (df = 968)	66.273 (df = 968)	0.240 (df = 968)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include gender, education, income.)

Table A22: Impact of Race and Age on Support for Invaded Countries, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index (1)	Sympathy Index (2)	Amt. Support (3)	New Taxes (4)	↑↓ Support (5)	Affect Index (6)	Sympathy Index (7)	Amt. Support (8)	New Taxes (9)	↑↓ Support (10)
Arab	-12.395*** (2.018)	-0.036* (0.021)	-0.057 (0.063)	-27.888*** (7.162)	-0.051** (0.026)	-10.503*** (2.903)	0.001 (0.028)	-0.031 (0.087)	-26.483*** (10.247)	-0.023 (0.037)
Asian	-20.310*** (2.081)	-0.069*** (0.021)	-0.096 (0.062)	-29.391*** (7.022)	-0.043* (0.024)	-18.240*** (2.973)	-0.048* (0.029)	-0.065 (0.088)	-24.002** (10.504)	-0.022 (0.034)
Black	-6.652*** (1.999)	-0.023 (0.020)	0.011 (0.062)	-18.150** (7.483)	-0.021 (0.025)	-5.624* (2.890)	0.00003 (0.029)	0.043 (0.087)	-14.005 (10.956)	0.002 (0.036)
White	-6.661*** (1.923)	-0.029 (0.020)	0.032 (0.061)	-14.010* (7.544)	-0.005 (0.025)	-3.232 (2.695)	-0.009 (0.028)	0.053 (0.083)	-19.048* (10.520)	0.017 (0.034)
Arab x 45+ years old	-1.139 (0.776)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.028 (0.024)	6.503** (2.629)	-0.001 (0.010)	-1.087 (0.778)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.028 (0.024)	6.423** (2.619)	-0.001 (0.010)
Asian x 45+ years old						-3.888 (4.014)	-0.083** (0.042)	-0.054 (0.128)	-2.955 (14.148)	-0.062 (0.051)
Black x 45+ years old						-4.232 (4.180)	-0.044 (0.041)	-0.063 (0.124)	-11.253 (14.015)	-0.042 (0.047)
White x 45+ years old						-1.869 (4.001)	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.069 (0.124)	-9.377 (14.811)	-0.048 (0.049)
45+ years old						-7.545* (3.867)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.043 (0.125)	12.340 (15.201)	-0.045 (0.049)
(Intercept)	1.151 (2.542)	-0.035 (0.026)	-0.147* (0.080)	-18.319** (8.225)	-0.0002 (0.032)	4.770 (3.632)	0.011 (0.037)	-0.100 (0.117)	-15.823 (14.157)	0.041 (0.046)
Constant	50.630*** (4.850)	0.116** (0.048)	1.076*** (0.145)	-62.330*** (15.458)	0.099* (0.060)	48.445*** (5.338)	0.091* (0.052)	1.049*** (0.153)	-63.357*** (16.654)	0.076 (0.064)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.130	0.167	0.084	0.108	0.120	0.130	0.167	0.081	0.108	0.118
Residual Std. Error	20.019 (df = 1128)	0.204 (df = 1128)	0.618 (df = 1128)	68.074 (df = 1128)	0.241 (df = 1128)	20.017 (df = 1124)	0.204 (df = 1124)	0.619 (df = 1124)	68.057 (df = 1124)	0.241 (df = 1124)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include gender, education, income.)

Table A23: Impact of Race and Gender on Support for Invaded Countries, White Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index (1)	Sympathy Index (2)	Amt. Support (3)	New Taxes (4)	↑↓ Support (5)	Affect Index (6)	Sympathy Index (7)	Amt. Support (8)	New Taxes (9)	↑↓ Support (10)
Arab	-5.714*** (1.740)	-0.007 (0.019)	-0.092 (0.057)	-13.809** (6.078)	-0.047** (0.023)	-7.783*** (2.702)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.154* (0.082)	-10.172 (8.280)	-0.055 (0.035)
Asian	-13.561*** (1.814)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.131** (0.055)	-15.553*** (6.017)	-0.037* (0.021)	-17.743*** (2.604)	-0.080*** (0.026)	-0.207*** (0.078)	-17.317** (8.503)	-0.055* (0.030)
Black	0.043 (1.715)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.055)	-4.122 (6.540)	-0.016 (0.022)	-1.157 (2.470)	0.005 (0.027)	-0.129* (0.073)	2.234 (9.563)	-0.034 (0.031)
Arab × Female						4.310 (3.506)	-0.025 (0.037)	0.131 (0.114)	-7.258 (12.147)	0.018 (0.046)
Asian × Female						8.294** (3.632)	0.076** (0.036)	0.157 (0.111)	2.866 (12.100)	0.035 (0.041)
Black × Female						2.606 (3.436)	0.002 (0.037)	0.222** (0.110)	-12.905 (13.082)	0.038 (0.043)
Female	-0.438 (1.369)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.102** (0.043)	-3.582 (4.281)	-0.036** (0.016)	-4.218* (2.367)	0.040 (0.026)	-0.228*** (0.079)	0.653 (9.325)	-0.058* (0.031)
(Intercept)	46.320*** (4.632)	0.108** (0.047)	1.226*** (0.138)	-56.023*** (14.505)	0.129** (0.057)	48.353*** (4.789)	0.114** (0.049)	1.302*** (0.142)	-58.974*** (15.080)	0.142** (0.060)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.117	0.166	0.088	0.089	0.128	0.120	0.170	0.089	0.088	0.127
Residual Std. Error	19.951 (df = 954)	0.204 (df = 954)	0.617 (df = 954)	66.209 (df = 954)	0.239 (df = 954)	19.924 (df = 951)	0.204 (df = 951)	0.616 (df = 951)	66.241 (df = 951)	0.239 (df = 951)

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include education and income. Gender is the moderating variable.

Table A24: Impact of Race and Gender on Support for Invaded Countries, Control Baseline

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Arab	-12.355*** (2.018)	-0.038* (0.021)	-0.062 (0.063)	-28.520*** (7.157)	-0.051** (0.026)	-12.073*** (3.227)	-0.014 (0.031)	-0.027 (0.096)	-20.589* (10.679)	-0.022 (0.041)
Asian	-20.267*** (2.083)	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.101 (0.062)	-30.068*** (7.023)	-0.043* (0.024)	-22.206*** (3.130)	-0.102*** (0.031)	-0.080 (0.093)	-27.578** (10.760)	-0.023 (0.037)
Black	-6.621*** (1.997)	-0.024 (0.020)	0.007 (0.062)	-18.644** (7.488)	-0.021 (0.025)	-5.486* (3.022)	-0.016 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.088)	-8.040 (11.594)	-0.001 (0.037)
White	-6.641*** (1.922)	-0.030 (0.020)	0.029 (0.061)	-14.334* (7.543)	-0.005 (0.025)	-4.436 (2.930)	-0.022 (0.030)	0.127 (0.089)	-10.375 (11.051)	0.032 (0.037)
Arab × Female						-0.469 (4.113)	-0.043 (0.042)	-0.062 (0.127)	-14.190 (14.197)	-0.052 (0.052)
Asian × Female						3.713 (4.215)	0.059 (0.041)	-0.036 (0.125)	-4.041 (14.174)	-0.034 (0.048)
Black × Female						-2.159 (4.032)	-0.016 (0.041)	0.026 (0.124)	-19.872 (15.053)	-0.034 (0.049)
White × Female						-4.503 (3.877)	-0.017 (0.040)	-0.195 (0.123)	-6.470 (15.090)	-0.069 (0.050)
Female	-0.196 (1.256)	0.052*** (0.013)	-0.087** (0.039)	-1.482 (4.115)	-0.025* (0.015)	0.538 (3.146)	0.055* (0.032)	-0.030 (0.096)	7.819 (11.976)	0.015 (0.039)
(Intercept)	49.898*** (4.483)	0.138*** (0.045)	1.169*** (0.135)	-50.694*** (14.159)	0.099* (0.056)	49.644*** (4.777)	0.136*** (0.047)	1.148*** (0.142)	-57.189*** (16.359)	0.077 (0.059)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140
Adjusted R ²	0.131	0.167	0.082	0.105	0.121	0.132	0.170	0.083	0.104	0.119
Residual Std. Error	20.012 (df = 1129)	0.205 (df = 1129)	0.619 (df = 1129)	68.182 (df = 1129)	0.241 (df = 1129)	19.998 (df = 1125)	0.204 (df = 1125)	0.618 (df = 1125)	68.214 (df = 1125)	0.241 (df = 1125)

Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates include education, income, age, and foreign policy orientation. Gender is the moderating variable.

H.4 Benjamini-Hochberg Correction

The Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (BH) helps to address the concern of false-positive findings by controlling the false positive rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). In particular, it helps ensure that the FDR stays under the commonly set $\alpha = .05$ by “pruning” estimates found after standard hypothesis tests (Liu and Shiraito, 2023, 384). Generally, the BH method is less susceptible to false-negative conclusions because the method involves accepting, ranking, and filtering the statistically significant findings in its first step.

$$\text{FDR} \equiv \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\# \text{ false discoveries}}{\# \text{ total discoveries}} \right]$$

Table A25: Main Models Pre-Benjamini-Hochberg Correction, White Base

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Arab	−5.714*** (1.740)	−0.007 (0.019)	−0.092 (0.057)	−13.809** (6.078)	−0.047** (0.023)
Asian	−13.561*** (1.814)	−0.040** (0.018)	−0.131** (0.055)	−15.553*** (6.017)	−0.037* (0.021)
Black	0.043 (1.715)	0.006 (0.018)	−0.022 (0.055)	−4.122 (6.540)	−0.016 (0.022)
(Intercept)	46.320*** (4.632)	0.108** (0.047)	1.226*** (0.138)	−56.023*** (14.505)	0.129** (0.057)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.117	0.166	0.088	0.089	0.128
Residual Std. Error (df = 954)	19.951	0.204	0.617	66.209	0.239

Note: Reported significance levels reflect uncorrected p -values. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. This table is a replication of Table A9, for ease of comparison for the subsequent correction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates, omitted for presentation, include age, gender, education, household income, internationalism index, and military internationalism index.

Table A26: Main Models Post-Benjamini-Hochberg Correction, White Base

	Affect Index	Sympathy Index	Amt. Support	New Taxes	↑↓ Support
Arab	-5.714** (1.740)	-0.007 (0.019)	-0.092 (0.057)	-13.809* (6.078)	-0.047* (0.023)
Asian	-13.561*** (1.814)	-0.040* (0.018)	-0.131* (0.055)	-15.553** (6.017)	-0.037 (0.021)
Black	0.043 (1.715)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.055)	-4.122 (6.540)	-0.016 (0.022)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	964	964	964	964	964
Adjusted R ²	0.117	0.166	0.088	0.089	0.128

Note: Reported significance levels reflect Benjamini-Hochberg adjusted p -values to control the false discovery rate across 15 hypothesis tests (3 treatments $\times$ 5 outcomes). * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic covariates, omitted for presentation, include age, gender, education, household income, internationalism index, and military internationalism index.

I Survey Design

I.1 Study 2 Design Remarks

This conjoint was fielded in November of 2024, through PureSpectrum, an online platform suitable for obtaining quality responses for survey experiments. For PureSpectrum’s quality control, see PureSpectrum’s website at <https://www.purespectrum.com/purespectrum-resents-purescore/> (last accessed on April 14, 2025). They use *PureScore*, “a comprehensive, advanced machine learning-driven, scoring system designed to measure individual survey respondent quality” (see the link above) and block low-quality respondents or even bots. Respondents were screened out for inattentiveness with a simple attention check before answering basic demographic and attitudinal questions about age, gender, race/ethnicity, party identity, religiosity, and income.

As mentioned in the main text, respondents were presented with ten unique pairs of governments engaged in a hypothetical military crisis and asked to indicate which of the two governments they believed the U.S. should support. Each of the two hypothetical governments had nine attributes shown in Table 2. I excluded scenarios where both governments were U.S. allies, both were designated as aggressors, or both received support from U.S. allies.

Respondents completed 10 unique support choices. In each choice, they observed information about 2 unique governments in conflict, and were asked which of the two the U.S. should support. After these 10 choices, they completed what appeared to be a unique 11th task, which was actually identical to the first but with the positions of Government 1 and Government 2 flipped. This flipped choice allows me to estimate the intra-respondent reliability bias (Clayton et al., 2025), which is used to correct bias induced by measurement error in conjoint analysis (Clayton et al., 2025).⁵

The outcome of interest is whether a respondent supports Government 1 or Government 2, meaning that unit of analysis is each binary *choice* made in each conjoint task. This contrasts with the standard profile-level analysis that treats each profile as an independent observation (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Research by Horiuchi and Johnson (2025) shows that the presence of more than one profile alters respondent behavior, and as is discussed below, the profiles shown were not fully independent. Thus, the usual profile-level AMCE analysis is inappropriate.

I.2 Sampling period

I pre-tested the survey twice, the first in the summer of 2023 ($n = 285$) and again in October 2024 ($n = 276$). Then, I launched the full experiment in November 2024 ($n = 1,006$).

⁵In this study, the IRR is 0.877 or 87.7%.

I.3 Quality check

In addition to using PureSpectrum’s pre-screening algorithm, I filtered out low-quality responses, which Qualtrics flagged as potential bots. I also employed an attention check inspired by [Berinsky, Margolis and Sances \(2014\)](#). Respondents were asked: *I would like to get a sense of your consumption of political news. To demonstrate that you’ve read this much, just go ahead and select both every day and never among the options below, no matter how often you watch political news.*

- *Every day*
- *Once a week*
- *Once a month*
- *A few times a year*
- *Never*

Only respondents who successfully answered both “every day” and “never” continued through the survey.

I.4 Number of observations

I had 1006 respondents, and each respondent completed 10 distinct conjoint tasks for a total of $1006 * 10 = 10,060$ unique choices. The 11th conjoint task repeated the first, with the positions flipped, to measure intra-respondent reliability ([Clayton et al., 2025](#)).

I.5 Length

The median time to complete the survey is 14.6 minutes.

I.6 Quotas

To obtain a reasonably representative sample for the national survey, I set quotas using respondents’ gender (male, female), age (18–45, 46+), race (white, not white), and education (with or without a university degree). Figure [A2\(b\)](#) compares each category’s percentages in my sample (on the vertical axis) and those in the population (on the horizontal axis). The population statistics are from the Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau). Almost all dots are on the 45° degree line. This finding suggests that my sample is well-balanced concerning the essential demographic variables.

I.7 Financial Support

This study was supported by the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS018184). The funder played no role in any part of the design, analysis, or writeup of this project.

I.8 Question

Respondents were first given the following instructions.

In the next few minutes, we will show you hypothetical governments that are involved in a crisis with one another. This foreign policy issue is similar to situations the U.S. has faced in the past and will probably face again. Please examine each table carefully before answering the questions that follow.

On the next screen, we then said:

*The following two governments are involved in a crisis. The United States is considering action to support one of the countries involved. Please examine each table carefully and indicate which of the two governments **the US should support** in this crisis.*

Figure [A16](#) presents the sample conjoint table.

The table below describes two hypothetical governments involved in an armed conflict with each other. The United States is evaluating which government to support. Based on the information provided, please answer some questions. Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate the options you are more inclined toward.

	Government 1	Government 2
Democratic government	Yes	No
US security partnership	Ambiguous	Ambiguous
Expected support from US allies	Ambiguous	Ambiguous
Race (largest)	White	White
Military capacity (among 145 countries)	Top 5	Top 5
Religion (largest)	Ancestor worship	Muslim
Trade ties with the US (among 229 countries)	Top 3	Top 10
Aggressor	Yes	No
Income level (% of US income per capita)	75%	30%

Which government do you believe the United States should support?

Government 1

Government 2



Figure A16: A sample conjoint task.

I.9 Moderator Questions

I.9.1 Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism, the belief in the superiority of one's own ethnic group, is operationalized using six items proposed by Bizumic, Monaghan and Priest (2021). Respondents were first asked, “*What ethnic group do you see yourself as belonging to or most closely identifying with?*” They were then presented with a series of ethnocentrism items and asked to rate each on a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” “(R)” indicate reverse-coded items.

1. No matter what happens, I will always support my ethnic group and never let it down.
2. It is absolutely vital that all members of our ethnic group think and behave as one.
3. In general, I prefer doing things with people from my own ethnic group than with people from other ethnic groups.
4. I don't believe my ethnic group is any better than any other. (R)
5. I like the idea of a society in which people from completely different ethnic groups mix together freely. (R)
6. We should always be considerate of the welfare of people from other ethnic groups even if, by doing this, we may lose some advantage over them. (R)

I combine these questions into an index using single factor analysis (SS loadings = 1.496), an approach used by Rathbun, Parker and Pomeroy (2024). Respondents were then divided into high and low ethnocentrism groups based on whether they were above or below the average of this uni-dimensional score. A robustness check using a simple average of the items produced substantively similar results.

J Study 2 Additional Results

J.1 Profile-level marginal means

Figure A17 presents the profile-level marginal means for all attribute levels. Each estimate indicates the probability that a *profile* is chosen when a given attribute level is present. For example, when the attribute *U.S. security partnership* is set to “Yes,” the probability of selecting the profile is 0.58. The profile-level marginal mean reflects the weighted average of the choice-level marginal means across all relevant pairwise comparisons involving this attribute:

- “Yes” vs. “No”
- “Yes” vs. “Ambiguous”
- “No” vs. “No”
- “No” vs. “Ambiguous”
- “Ambiguous” vs. “Ambiguous”




Figure A17: Profile-level marginal means of supporting a government given a particular attribute level for the whole sample. *Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal bars) are shown.*

J.2 Heterogeneous Tradeoff Results

Unlike Study 1, Study 2 used a quota-based sample of Americans, allowing me to examine how respondent demographics like race and religion altered their responses in the conjoint experiment.




Figure A18: White vs. Non-White Respondents' Marginal Means of choosing the victim of aggression that is Asian/Indigenous or non-Christian vs. a aggressor that is white or Christian. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A18 recreates the tradeoff analysis shown in Figure 8, but separating respondents by race. Estimates for White respondents ($n = 736$, 73.2%) are shown in gray points, while estimates for non-White respondents ($n = 270$, 26.8%) are shown in gold points. I find that generally, there was little significant heterogeneity by respondent race in the tradeoff analysis. White and Non-White respondents largely favored the victims of aggression even against White aggressors, and similarly became indifferent to aggressor / non-aggressor status when

a Christian aggressor faced a Muslim or Buddhist non-aggressor. Combined with Figure 8, this suggests that at least in the United States, respondent's racial attitudes, rather than their race per se, are more influential in moderating support for victims of aggression.

Figure A19 examines the tradeoff analysis after separating respondents by religion (Christian vs. Not Christian). In the sample, religious identity is categorized as follows: 24.0% Catholic, 37.1% Protestant, 2.3% Jewish, 2.1% Muslim, 9.6% "Something else," and 25.0% unaffiliated ($N = 1,006$).




Figure A19: Christian and Non-Christian Respondents' Marginal Means of choosing the victim of aggressor that is Asian/Indigenous or non-Christian vs. the aggressor that is white or Christian. Estimates for High Ethnocentrist respondents are shown in gray points, while estimates for Low Ethnocentrist respondents are shown in gold points. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Unlike the heterogeneity results by race, this analysis reveals that Christians and Non-Christians react in polarized ways along a host of tradeoffs. Non-Christians are much more

supportive of Asian victims while Christian support for the Asian victim moderates. More strikingly, Christian respondents actually *favor* the Christian aggressor against the Muslim and Buddhist victims of aggression, while Non-Christians maintain strong support for victims of aggression regardless of religion. In fact, one of the striking patterns from this is the fact that Non-Christians in general (which in this sample, are primarily but not exclusively religious unaffiliated), are very consistent in their support for the victims of aggression. Regardless of the identities (racial or religious) of the belligerents, these respondents remained much more favorable toward the victims of aggression. This suggests that dyadic affinity between respondents and belligerents abroad reinforce or undermine support for those countries. These findings further suggest that identity should not be analyzed independently from strategic or material considerations. Rather, future research must take seriously how they interact, intersect, and alter one another.

J.3 Open Ended Responses

Most and Least Important Factors

We first create a list of custom stop words relevant to our design. These include terms such as “support,” “most,” “least,” “important,” “group,” and “very.” Second, we follow the standard preprocessing: converting all text to lowercase and removing (i) punctuation, (ii) white space, (iii) common English stop words, (iv) our custom stop words, (v) numbers, and (vi) other non-substantial responses, such as “none” or “don’t care.” These steps leave us with substantive words reflecting respondents’ most or least important attributes.

Using these cleaned text data, we classify responses based on stem words and keywords aligned with the attributes in our conjoint design. For example, for the attribute *Alliance with the US*, we include stem words such as “alli,” “ally,” “alliance,” “usa,” “united state,” and “america.” Similarly, for the attribute *Majority Religion*, we use stems, such as “religi,” “christ,” and “god.” We present the results as the percentage of respondents who mentioned each attribute.

The results are presented in Figure A20. When asked which factors were *most* important, many respondents noted aggressor status, religion (specifically Christianity), the importance of alliance status with the U.S., and a group’s democratic openness.




Figure A20: The most and least important attributes. *Note: The figure shows responses indicating which attributes respondents self-reported as “most” (left) and “least” (right) important in determining support for a government.*

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