Between Selective and Indiscriminate Human Rights Violations: How Rebel Groups Origins Shape Pattern of Abuses

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Abstract

Existing studies often focus on why some rebel groups engage in selective and indiscriminate abuses. In this study, I advance the narrative explaining which rebel groups lean more towards selective (discriminatory) abuses and which ones lean more heavily towards indiscriminate abuse. I argue that rebel organizational origins shape violence repertoires before conflict dynamics fully unfold. Rebel groups with non-violent origins, particularly those that emerge from political parties or civil society groups. These groups inherit community networks, local knowledge, and high political costs that constrain broad civilian victimization and facilitate more selective targeting. By comparison, groups that originate from violent parent organizations may lack such embeddedness and face lower political costs against indiscriminate coercion. Using data from the FORGE dataset, the Non-State Actor dataset, and the Rebel Human Rights Violations dataset (1990–2018), findings suggest that pre-war organizational legacies significantly shape how rebel groups treat civilian populations during armed conflict.

Keywords: rebel groups, civil war, selective violence, indiscriminate violence, civilian victimization, organizational origins, civil society, human rights violations

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Introduction

Understanding rebel attacks against the civilian population is not a novel discourse in the literature; however, oftentimes, existing studies primarily focus on rebels' lethal attacks, such as massacres, indiscriminate bombings, and terrorist attacks against non-combatants, ignoring equally important non-lethal attacks like forced displacement, civilian disappearances and movement restriction (Walsh et al., 2024).

While this emphasis on lethality has been empirically significant and productive, it obscures the broader range of violent strategies through which rebel groups coerce, punish, and govern civilian populations during civil wars, leaving out numerous opportunities for deeper empirical research questions. However, it is needful to add that one fundamental reason for this one-sided focus is the absence of relevant data.

Meanwhile, when we expand our attention beyond lethality, a very significant empirical regularity becomes further obvious: : not all insurgent groups victimize civilians in the same ways, or to the same extent. That is, Rebel groups vary widely in their treatment of civilians during civil wars (Weinstein, 2006). Although, rebel groups are more likely to commit some type of human rights (HR, henceforth) abuses than not during civil wars (Walsh et al., 2024), they differ markedly in their "repertoire" of violence (Tilly, 2010; Hoover Green, 2016). For instance, while the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Mozambican National Resistance, and Al Shabaab in Somalia systematically committed multiple abuses ranging from killings, torture, displacement, and sexual violence, grouops such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb primarily concentrated on killings and detentions, largely avoiding other forms of civilian abuses(Walsh et al., 2024). This variation raises a deeper puzzle: do some rebel groups primarily engage in indiscriminate abuses like killings, movement restriction, forced displacement, while refraining from discriminatory abuses, and vice versa ? More importantly, what groups are more likely to commit more of either discriminatory or indiscriminate abuses ?

Investigating these questions is vitally important for both theory and practice. A recent study on rebel groups' origins amplifies our understanding of how rebel groups' origins condition "how much" abuse rebels commit; however, it does not sufficiently tell us how these violations are systematically and strategically driven, given that rebel groups have different "repertoires of abuses" (Tilly, 2010). Put differently, while existing studies demonstrate that origins matter for the intensity of abuse, they do not sufficiently explain how foundational organizational legacies translate into systematically different repertoires of civilian victimization.

Some existing studies have also examined why rebels commit selective and indiscriminate violence, (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2006). Most of these studies focus overwhelmingly on wartime incentives such as territorial control, resource endowments, and military competition. These wartime incentives do not sufficiently address why some groups engage in discriminatory or indiscriminate patterns of abuse. For instance, rebel groups do not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, they enter civil war with distinct foundational origins (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020), organizational legacies, and pre-war experiences that shape how they interact with civilian populations, and deploy violence once conflict begins. In this paper, I address this gap, by focusing

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on rebel groups' origins as a central determinant of abuse patterns.

Using the lens of rebels foundational processes, I argue that rebel groups with non-violent origins, specifically those rooted in civil society, should commit more selective abuses than indiscriminate abuses for two main reasons. First, because these groups emerge from established civil society organizations, they already have built-in networks and, more importantly, localized knowledge on probable supporters and opposition (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2024), hence, they know who to attack and who not to attack. Second, their local embeddedness and relatively strong community ties further create incentives to avoid indiscriminate abuses, which would only erode their reputation and jeopardize the material and political benefits that come from the local sympathizers.

By disaggregating human rights abuses into selective and indiscriminate abuses, this study advances a theory of rebel violence rooted in organizational inheritance. I argue that rebel groups do not merely respond to wartime incentives; rather, they draw from pre-existing organizational structures, which provides varying privileges that shape rebels systematic abuses of the civilians. In doing so, this study moves beyond existing accounts that emphasize how much violence occurs to explain why some groups develop targeted, discriminatory repertoires while others rely on broad, indiscriminate coercion.

Conceptual Clarifications and Literature Review

Classifying human rights violations as either discriminatory or indiscriminate presents an inherent empirical challenge, as several forms of violence can exhibit both selective and broad targeting characteristics depending on context and intent. The Rebel Human Rights Violations (RHRV) dataset distinguishes eight types of abuse: unlawful or arbitrary killings, detentions and disappearances, torture, property violations, forcible recruitment, sexual violence, forced displacement, and restriction of movement (Walsh et al., 2024). Walsh et al. note that rebel groups develop distinct *repertoires of violence* that emphasize some abuses more than others (Walsh et al., 2024, 478), and that the causes and consequences of different violation types may differ in important ways. Building on this insight, I classify these eight violations into two theoretically grounded categories based on the degree of individual victim identification required to execute them. I classify unlawful killings, detentions, and torture as selective or discriminatory violations on the grounds that each requires prior identification of a specific target. For instance, Walsh et al. define unlawful killings as politically motivated acts directed at identifiable individuals — including assassinations of political or religious leaders as well as summary executions — explicitly excluding combat deaths and collateral civilian harm (Walsh et al., 2024). Detention and disappearances similarly involve the deliberate seizure of specific individuals for political purposes, including targeted kidnappings and political abductions. Torture by definition requires that a victim already be in the rebel group's custody. Walsh et al.'s polychoric correlation matrix shows that killings, detention, and torture are the most strongly correlated violation types, with correlations between 0.79 and 0.85 (Walsh et al., 2024, 485). This strong clustering indicates that these acts tend to occur together and reflect a common

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pattern of individualized, targeted coercion, supporting their classification as selective forms of violence.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, I classify forcible recruitment, sexual violence, property destruction, forced displacement, and restriction of movement as *indiscriminate violations* because they operate through population-level rather than individual-level targeting logics. Walsh et al. describe property violations as rebels interfering with or destroying personal property in order to punish or create fear within communities. This reflects a collective rather than individualized act of coercion. Forced displacement is explicitly defined as the use of force or threat of force to cause civilians to flee their neighborhoods, while movement restriction operates through blockades, checkpoints, and curfews that affect entire populations rather than specifically identified individuals.

Forcible recruitment involves coercing civilians into performing work for the organization against their will, including military service, forced labor, and child soldier conscription (Walsh et al., 2024). Unlike discriminatory violations that require prior identification of a specific target, forced recruitment operates through opportunistic seizure of available civilians. Victims are selected not necessarily because of who they are but because of where they are, making forced recruitment fundamentally leaning towards indiscriminate form of civilian abuse. Sexual violence, while sometimes targeted, is treated here as indiscriminate given evidence that armed groups use it as a broad instrument of social terror and organizational socialization rather than as a tool of individualized punishment (Cohen, 2016). Walsh et al. note that sexual violence is a subset of torture in their coding scheme, and the weakest polychoric correlation in the dataset is between movement restriction and sexual violence (0.43), suggesting the two indiscriminate categories operate through distinct but complementary mechanisms (Walsh et al., 2024, 485).

Ultimately, disaggregating these violations, though empirically contentious, provides a theoretically grounded framework for understanding rebels' patterns of civilian abuses, and it further exposes us to the systematic and strategic intent behind civilian abuses by some specific rebel groups due to their organizational roots.

Scholarship on violence against civilians has long relied on the distinction between selective and indiscriminate violence to characterize how armed groups target noncombatants. When specific individuals are targeted by insurgents particularly because of supporting or collaborating with the opposition, Kalyvas (2006) refers to this as selective violence. Meanwhile, there are certain contexts where armed actors target individuals not for their personal actions but solely based on their association with particular ethnic, religious, or political affiliations. Kalyvas (2006) classifies this violence against social categories as indiscriminate. However, more recent work has challenged this broad usage of indiscriminate violence. Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017) contend that much civilian attacks labeled as indiscriminate are actually targeted at specific social groups, and should only be considered truly indiscriminate when it lacks both behavioral and identity-based selection. Similarly, Lyall (2009) defines indiscriminate violence as attacks on entire populations without credible efforts to distinguish between combatants and civilians, further underscoring the absence of any meaningful targeting logic.

Building on this empirical distinction, I refine the logic by emphasizing that selec-

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tive abuses, refers to abuses directed at identifiable individuals or social groups based on behavioral cues, identity markers, or organizational classifications. Indiscriminate abuses, by contrast, refers to abuses that are not conditioned on either individual behavior or group identity and instead affects civilians broadly.

According to a significant number of scholars, violence is not "irrational, random, or the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups" (Valentino, 2014). There is usually a strategic logic behind it. In a much cited work, Kalyvas (2006) argues that the pattern of civilian abuses are shaped by the degree of rebels' territorial control. In a relatively dominated territory, armed groups engage in selective violence, whereas in areas where control is weak, armed groups tend to lean more to indiscriminate violence. Meanwhile, Ziemke (2008) slightly differs from Kalyvas, 2006, arguing that the "direction of control" is what actually matters, not how much control occurs. When actors are losing control, they are more likely to resort to indiscriminate violence as a way to deter civilian defection and reassert authority (Ziemke, 2008). Along these lines, Schutte (2017) draws on Boulding (1962)'s concept of diminishing military strength over distance and Kalyvas (2006)'s information asymmetries, and finds that armed groups resort to more indiscriminate targeting as they move farther from their controlled territories because distance from power centers reduces groups' ability to distinguish collaborators from noncombatants. Relatedly, Metelits (2009) examining territorial dynamics, finds that when multiple armed actors contest for dominance and resources in overlapping areas, violence against civilians tends to escalate and become more indiscriminate. Similarly, using detailed data from the U.S. military's Hamlet Evaluation System during the Vietnam War, Kalyvas and Kocher (2009) show that violence against civilians varied systematically with territorial control as insurgents relied on selective violence in areas of predominant control, while government and U.S. forces used indiscriminate violence primarily in rebel-dominated zones.

Weinstein (2006) demonstrates that rebel groups' resource endowments fundamentally shape their violence patterns: resource-rich groups with access to natural wealth or external support commit high levels of indiscriminate violence because they do not rely on civilian support, whereas resource-poor groups tend to rely on local populations and therefore employ violence more selectively and strategically. However, as insurgents gain resources and capacity, they start to shift away from indiscriminate violence and toward more selective repression and positive incentives (M Wood, 2010).

Research also demonstrates that the internal dynamics of military organizations significantly shape their use of violence against civilians. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) show that armed groups dependent on material rewards to recruit fighters, combined with weak disciplinary mechanisms, exhibited higher rates of indiscriminate violence. In the same vein, Weinstein (2006) shows that groups driven by ideological commitment typically exercise greater restraint in targeting civilians indiscriminately compared to materially motivated groups.

While these existing scholarship offers powerful explanations for variation in civilian victimization, most of these accounts largely focus on wartime conditions such as territorial control, shifting battlefield dynamics, resource endowments, and internal organizational factors when explaining whether civilian abuse is selective or indiscriminate.

What is missing, however, is how pre-war organizational legacies condition these

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strategic choices before territorial dynamics or resource flows fully unfold. Essentially, I argue that organizational origins, particularly whether groups emerge from civil society networks or violent predecessors shape violence repertoires independently of territorial control (Kalyvas, 2006) or resource control (Weinstein, 2006). In sum, beyond the lens of battlefield dynamics, this study brings into the narrative how the foundational processes of rebel groups condition their proportion of selective and indiscriminate civilian targeting.

Theoretical Argument

Rebel groups are more likely than not to commit some type of HR abuse during civil wars (Walsh et al., 2024). Existing research shows that rebel violence is rarely random. Rather, it can be strategic in the sense that it can be selective, organizationally constrained, and indiscriminately enforced (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2006; Wood et al., 2012; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, 2017).

Building on these insights, I argue that the foundational origins of rebel organizations comes with some systematically distinct privileges and orientation as well as accountability pressures that shape how rebels target civilians. Specifically, I argue that rebel groups with non-violent parent organization, particularly, non-violent groups from civil society organizations like unions, student movements, religious groups, or political movements[1], and those that emerge from political party are more likely to employ selective abuses, whereas groups that arise from violent predecessors are more prone to indiscriminate abuse.

As highlighted earlier, the circumstances surrounding the emergence of rebel groups vary. Some organizations originate from violent predecessors, such as existing armed rebel groups, foreign militias, or armed factions, while others emerge from nonviolent foundations, including civil society organizations. These differing origins from which rebel groups emerge create an organizational pathway that conditions whether a rebel group attacks the civilians selectively or indiscriminately.

When rebel groups grow out of civil-society organizations, they tend to have "ready-made" built-in community networks that give them easier access to local supporters, resources, and recruits, revealing which people are likely to back them, (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2024). These local ties and community-based relationships are fundamentally crucial for rebels' enduring survival, particularly during periods of crisis (Parkinson, 2013). Similarly, groups that are heavily dependent on local support are substantially constrained by high political costs for indiscriminate civilians attack (Boukhars, 2020) as they cannot afford to alienate their social base; hence, they are poised to use violence sparingly and selectively. The Front for the Restoration of Democracy (FRUD) in Djibouti provides anecdotal evidence for this dynamic. Emerging from a political movement featuring the Action for the Revision of Order in Djibouti, the Front for the Restoration of Right and Equality, and the Djibouti Patriotic Resistance Front, the Front for the Restoration of Democracy (FRUD) drew heavily on Afar opposition networks for mobilization and logistical support during its fight

[1] Braithwaite and Cunningham (2020)

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with the Djibouti government, reinforcing its dependence on local networks (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2024). Consistent with this embeddedness and the constraints that come with it, the group's civilian attacks reflect a leaning toward selective abuses rather than broad indiscriminate abuses.[2] Variation in rebels' social resource bases, therefore, shapes the behavior that rebels adopt to earn civilian support (Moore, 2019).

In his analysis on why rebels engage in selective abuses, Kalyvas (2006) for instance, made us understand that the ability to discriminate between supporters and opponents depends on the availability of reliable local information about civilian allegiance, which combatants get based on their degree of territorial control. For instance, Al-Shabaab in Somalia exemplifies this dynamic. Following a decline in its territorial control and its survival became increasingly threatened, the group altered its patterns of violence toward civilians (Matfess, 2020). However, empirical cases exist where the loss of territorial control may not alter changes in the repertoire of violence (Balcells, 2017). Under circumstances where the political costs for indiscriminate attack against civilians are high, violent groups tend to exercise restraint even as their territorial control declines (Boukhars, 2020). These findings suggest that the informational advantages often associated with territorial control might be endogenous to social embeddedness, that is, the degree to which a group is deeply ingrained in local society through its pre-war networks.

Rebel groups that originate from civil society organizations tend to possess this embeddedness from the outset through their parent organizations. By inheriting pre-existing networks, such groups gain ready-made access to communities and localized knowledge of social and political allegiances (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020). For instance, the All-Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), for example, emerged directly from the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, a prominent pro-democracy student organization with extensive activist networks across the country.

Patterns of violence attributed to the ABSDF further illustrate this mechanism. The Northern Branch reportedly executed individuals accused of spying for the military government and tortured alleged collaborators (Walsh et al., 2024). While severe, these acts reflect targeted repression directed at identifiable individuals rather than indiscriminate violence against broader civilian populations. In this sense, pre-war embeddedness may substitute for territorial control as a source of informational advantage, enabling selective enforcement even in contexts of shifting battlefield dominance. This form of selective violence illustrates how embedded networks can provide the informational opportunity necessary for precise coercion. In other words, pre-war embeddedness may substitute for territorial control as a source of informational advantage, enabling selective enforcement even in contexts of shifting battlefield dominance. Social embeddedness thus facilitates a smooth access to crucial information while obscuring the lines between rebels and civilians (Moore, 2019). As a result, civil-society-origin groups may enjoy an informational advantage (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2024)that enables more discriminating forms of abuses and encourages selective, rather than indiscriminate, violence. Similarly, Stanton (2016) emphasizes that armed groups may exercise restraint strategically to preserve domestic and international legitimacy. Given their deep local roots, civil-society-origin rebels may therefore balance coercion with reputational considerations, enforcing compliance through se-

[2]Observations from Rebel Group Human Rights Dataset by Walsh et al. (2024).

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lective targeting while preserving the broader support base upon which their survival depends.

Meanwhile, rebel groups that emerge from pre-existing armed organizations—such as terrorist networks, or non state militias typically lack the dense civilian networks inherited by civil-society-origin groups and political party-origin groups. Because their parent organizations are structured around coercion rather than community representation, they enter conflict without embedded informational channels that facilitate reliable identification of supporters, defectors, or neutrals. The absence of these localized knowledge structures makes uncertainty about civilian loyalties remains high. Under such conditions, violence is more likely to be deployed indiscriminately, as coercion substitutes for information and broad punishment substitutes for selective enforcement.

Another reason civil-society-origin rebels may rely more heavily on selective rather than indiscriminate violence stems from what can be described as a non-power-seeking organizational orientation. Groups that emerge from civil society organizations often do not originate as actors primarily seeking state capture or redistribution of formal political power. Consequently, they tend to pose a comparatively lower existential threat to ruling elites than political party groups or insurgent groups that seek or compete for power redistribution [3]. The evolution of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) from the All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization (APMSO) illustrates this dynamic. Founded to advocate for the political and socioeconomic rights of the Muhajir community, APMSO cultivated extensive grassroots networks prior to the MQM's acquisition of coercive capacity. As MQM factions later engaged in violence, acts such as abductions, torture, and killings of rival activists—including members of competing political organizations as well as threats against specific journalists and sexual violence targeting female activists from rival MQM factions, were directed at clearly identifiable partisan and factional opponents, including PPP and MQM student activists and alleged collaborators [4].

Political parties, by design, are institutions of mass mobilization that do not just cultivate electoral constituencies or build local branches, they also develop activist networks that cut across ethnic geographies. Just like civil society rooted groups, groups emerging from political parties often have advantages when it comes to local embeddedness that comes with community ties particularly because they have advocated or represented them in government (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2024). When rebel groups emerge from political parties, the pre-war political processes involving successful mobilization generates some enduring political organizational blueprints for the emerging organization (Sarbahi, 2014). These emergent rebel organizations do not just acquire internally institutionalized decision-making procedures, broad-based leadership coalitions, and diversified social ties, they become more responsive and structurally constrained by the communities from which they draw support (Sarbahi, 2014). In this sense, the transition from party to rebel organization does not dissolve civilian ties but rather transforms them, preserving the informational and relational infrastructure that community embeddedness provides (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2024). The Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) provides

[3](Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020)

[4]Text used for coding rebel torture from State Department reports Walsh et al. (2024)

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an illustrative example of how party-origin groups inherit community ties that shape their use of violence. The MFDC operated within a politically mobilized Diola community whose elites and activists were simultaneously embedded in national political institutions (Humphreys and Ag Mohamed, 2005; Foucher, 2007). Because the organization's support base was socially identifiable and politically active, indiscriminate violence carried substantial political costs and organizational risks. Consistent with these constraints, the MFDC relied on comparatively selective and limited forms of civilian targeting rather than widespread indiscriminate abuse (**?**).

Ultimately, when rebel groups inherit community ties from their parent organizations, it is empirically reasonable to expect that such groups will quite strategic in their repertoire of civilian violence. Hence, I hypothesize that :

H1: In a comparison of parented rebel group years, rebel groups whose parent organizations provide deeper pre-war connections to local communities will rely more heavily on discriminatory relative to indiscriminate violence compared to groups lacking such organizational ties.

H1a: Among rebel groups with community ties origins, those emerging from civil society organizations will exhibit stronger suppression of indiscriminate violence relative to discriminatory violence compared to those emerging from political party organizations.

However, there are groups with no preexisting organizations in the sense of a political party, civil society organization, or prior armed group. This category includes both narrowly defined parentless groups, that is, those that begin as armed organizations without a formal institutional predecessor or identifiable mobilized community, as well as groups that arise from broader ethnic or refugee populations but not from a formal organization within those communities

Meanwhile, what unites these cases is the absence of inherited institutional infrastructure. Unlike political parties or civil-society-origin groups, parentless organizations typically lack the mobilization networks, communication structures, and organizational resource endowments that pre-existing institutions transmit to their successors (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020). This means that these groups must construct these capacities from scratch. As a result, patterns of violence among parentless groups tend to be shaped more by strategic incentives and resource constraints. Hence, this category is analytically defined not by uniform behavioral outcomes, but by the shared structural condition of lacking a formal organizational predecessor.

There are a few reasons why parentless groups might engage more in discriminatory abuses than indiscriminate abuses. For example, unlike parent organizations, parentless groups tend to lack the institutionalized capacity -"ready-made" privileges (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020) that may make systematic indiscriminate violence harder to sustain. Parentless groups are formed through personal connections such as among members of the same ethnic group, refugees living in exile, or small clusters of frustrated and marginalized individuals (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020).

Given that in many cases, these groups are built on close personal ties rather than established institutions, they tend to be organizationally thin, and more likely to rely on local trust and informal communication instead of formal chains of command sys-

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tems. This kind of structure makes it easier to identify and target specific opponents, since members often know who supports or opposes them within their communities. However, it makes it harder to organize large-scale, indiscriminate violence that requires coordination. As a result, violence in parentless groups tends to be more selective and targeted, not necessarily because they are normatively restrained, but because their organizational structure favors localized enforcement over broad collective punishment. Hence, I hypothesize that

H2 Parentless rebel groups will exhibit a higher share of discriminatory violations (and a lower share of indiscriminate violations) than groups with parent organizations and violent origins.

Research Design

To assess the validity of my hypotheses, I use data on rebel groups foundational origin by Braithwaite and Cunningham (2020), the nonstate actors dataset by Cunningham et al. (2013), and the rebels' human rights abuses dataset by Walsh et al. (2024). The Rebel Group Emergence Dataset (FORGE) provides data on the organizational roots of rebel groups - a scholarly development that enables empirical investigation into the preexisting circumstances surrounding rebel groups' emergence and their interaction with the civilian population. The Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) complements the FORGE dataset, detailing information on the organizational characteristics of groups involved in conflict dynamics. The Rebel Human Rights Violations (RHRV) dataset on the other hand provides information on a wide range of abuses of civilian populations by rebel groups. The unit of analysis is rebel group-year with each observation representing human right abuse by a rebel group in a given year.

Dependent Variables

To capture the pattern of rebel human rights abuses, I model the relative composition of selective versus indiscriminate violations using Walsh et al. (2024)'s rebel groups' human rights abuses. In other words, given that I am interested in how rebels use violence, not whether they committed abuses or not, I classify violations into two categories : selective (discriminatory) violations: acts that target specific individuals, such as killings, detention, torture, or disappearances. These are politically motivated and require identifying particular people. Indiscriminate violations, on the other hand, affect broader civilian populations without clear targeting or precise differentiation, such as forced recruitment, sexual violence, displacement, restrictions on movement, or property destruction. I estimate two dependent variables (binomial and fractional models). I used these models because they measure the composition of rebel violence in different but complementary ways.

First, I estimate a binomial logit model of the number of selective violations out of the total number of violations committed in each group-year. That is, rather than simply count how many abuses a group commits, I examine the balance between these two types. For each rebel group-year in which at least one violation occurred, I calculate how many of the violations were selective compared to how many were indiscrim-

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inate. I then estimate a model that asks when a rebel group engages in civilian abuses, how likely is it to use discriminatory tactics rather than indiscriminate ones? In this model, a positive result means that a group relies more heavily on selective abuses, while a negative result means it relies more on broad, indiscriminate violence. Ultimately, with this approach, I am able to directly test whether certain types of rebel origins are associated with more selective versus more indiscriminate patterns of abuse.

Second, I also estimate a fractional logit model that directly examines the proportion of total violations that are selective. In this approach, instead of modeling the counts of selective and indiscriminate violations jointly, I compute the share of violations in each group-year that are selective, which ranges from 0 to 1. A value closer to 1 indicates that most of the group's abuses are selective, while a value closer to 0 indicates that the group relies primarily on indiscriminate tactics. The fractional logit model is appropriate for proportion outcomes because it accounts for the bounded nature of the dependent variable. Substantively, this model asks a similar question as the binomial specification: when rebel groups commit abuses, how heavily do they rely on selective violence relative to indiscriminate violence? By using both approaches, I ensure that the results are not driven by a particular modeling strategy but instead captures consistent patterns in the composition of rebel violence.

The key difference between the fractional logit and binomial (cbind) models lies in how the dependent variable is constructed and what information is passed to the model. In the fractional logit specification for instance, if a group commits 3 discriminatory violations and 1 indiscriminate violation, the fractional dependent variable would be 3 divided by 4, or 0.75. The model therefore directly uses this percentage and estimates how different factors affect the proportion of discriminatory violence. Meanwhile, for the binomial (cbind) model, using the same example, the model would receive the values (3, 1), representing three discriminatory violations and one indiscriminate violation. The model then internally constructs the probability that any given violation is discriminatory rather than indiscriminate. In other words, rather than being given the percentage, the model calculates it itself based on the counts.

Explanatory Variables

For the explanatory variables, I use the FORGE dataset to build many binary explanatory variables. I adopt the community ties measure developed by Braithwaite and Cunningham (2020), which identifies rebel groups emerging from political parties or civil society organizations. So, the variable takes the value of 1 when a rebel group emerged at least one political party or civil society organization and takes the value of 0 if otherwise. In another analysis, I separate civil society organization from political party in order to estimate the independent effects of these specific origins.

Similarly, for the variable violent origin, that is groups that emerged from a preexisting armed organization, the current or former armed forces of the country, and or a foreign organization, I code this variable as 1 when the rebel emerged from these groups and 0 otherwise.

Again, following the FORGE dataset's classification, I also create the variable for parentless groups. Some of these groups begin as armed organizations without any identifiable institutional predecessor, and some emerged from broader ethnic or refugee communities but not from a formal organization within those communities. This variable thus takes the value of 1 when a rebel group emerged from an identifiable ethnic

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community without a formal organization, a refugee or exiled population, no preexisting organization at all or another type of non-classified organizational background and 0 otherwise.

Control Variables

I control for several factors that could influence rebels' systematic and strategic use of selective and indiscriminate civilian abuse. First, at the organizational level, these include *Rebel Strength*, which measures the relative military capacity of the rebel group vis-à-vis the government using a five-point ordinal scale derived from the Non-State Actors dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013): 1 (much weaker than government), 2 (weaker than government), 3 (approximate parity), 4 (stronger than government), and 5 (much stronger than government). *Territorial Control* is a binary indicator coded 1 when the group holds territory or maintains permanent bases within the conflict zone and 0 otherwise (Cunningham et al., 2013). Territorial control provides groups with the physical infrastructure to monitor, govern, and coerce civilian populations, and is theoretically associated with more selective targeting through improved informational access (Kalyvas, 2006). *External Support* captures whether the rebel group receives support from one or more external states, and is coded on a three-point scale: 0 (no support), 1 (alleged support), and 2 (explicit support) (Cunningham et al., 2013). External support is expected detach rebels from their local civilian support bases, thus reducing the propensity of rebels' civilian abuses (Fortna et al., 2018).

I also control for *Conflict Intensity*, derived from the UCDP Dyadic Conflict Dataset. Finally, *Conflict Duration* measures the number of years the conflict has been ongoing at the time of observation, capturing the cumulative organizational and strategic adaptations that occur as conflicts persist.

I include *GDP per capita*, drawn from the World Bank World Development Indicators, captured as the natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2015 USD, with higher values indicating wealthier states with greater institutional capacity. I also control for *Democracy*, measured using the standardized V-Dem polyarchy index, where higher values indicate greater levels of political openness and electoral competition. More democratic contexts may constrain rebel behavior through stronger civil society monitoring and greater international scrutiny of civilian abuse.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the analytic sample of 378 rebel group-years. Approximately 59 percent of these observations include at least one documented human rights violation, indicating that a majority of rebel groups in the sample engaged in some form of civilian abuse during the period of observation. On average, rebel groups committed 1.18 types of discriminatory violations and 1.00 types of indiscriminate violations, suggesting a modest overall tendency toward selective abuse.

Among the group-years in which at least one violation occurred, the mean discriminatory share of the violation repertoire is 0.645. This means that when rebel groups engaged in civilian abuse, roughly 65 percent of the violations they committed were discriminatory rather than indiscriminate in character. Civil society origin groups constitute approximately 16 percent of the sample, while parentless origin groups account for about 14 percent. Violent-origin groups make up the remaining majority and serve as the reference category in all regression models.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent Variables					
Any violation (binary)	378	0.590	0.492	0	1
Discriminatory variety (0–3)	378	1.180	1.220	0	3
Indiscriminate variety (0–5)	378	1.000	1.490	0	5
Total violation variety (0–8)	378	2.180	2.560	0	8
Violence share (discriminatory)	223	0.645	0.277	0	1
Independent Variables — Rebel Group Origins					
Civil society origin	378	0.159	0.366	0	1
Political party origin	378	0.222	0.416	0	1
Parentless origin	378	0.135	0.342	0	1
Control Variables — Organizational					
Rebel strength (1–4)	378	1.670	0.609	1	4
Territorial control (1–3)	378	1.870	0.993	1	3
External rebel support (0–2)	378	0.905	0.916	0	2
Ideology	378	0.751	0.433	0	1
Control Variables — Contextual					
Log GDP per capita	378	7.250	1.250	5.12	10.40
Democracy (standardized)	378	0.043	0.999	−1.39	1.70
Conflict intensity	378	1.140	0.342	1	2
Conflict duration	378	4.940	6.370	0	33

Notes: Sample includes N=378 group-years; composition models are estimated on the violators-only subsample. Data sources: RHRV (Walsh et al., 2024), FORGE (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020), NSA (Cunningham et al., 2013).

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Table 2: Organizational Origins and Violation Repertoire Composition: Binomial Models

(lr)2-3	*DV: Discriminatory Share of Violation Repertoire*	
	(1)	(2)
	Community Ties	Civil Society
Organizational Origins		
Community ties origin	**0.436***	
	(0.185)	
Parentless origin	**0.546*****	
	(0.154)	
Civil society origin		**1.212*****
		(0.290)
Parentless origin		**0.495****
		(0.151)
Control Variables		
Log GDP per capita	-0.076	-0.083
	(0.067)	(0.060)
Democracy (standardized)	**0.213***	0.083
	(0.097)	(0.097)
Ideology	0.080	0.123
	(0.139)	(0.139)
Rebel strength	-0.117	-0.111
	(0.140)	(0.147)
Territorial control	-0.083	-0.064
	(0.064)	(0.063)
External support	$-0.110^{\cdot}$	-0.050
	(0.059)	(0.056)
Conflict intensity	$-$**0.319****	$-$**0.352****
	(0.115)	**(0.111)**
Conflict duration	$-$**0.036*****	$-0.020^{\cdot}$
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Observations	223	166
Reference category	Violent origin	Violent origin

Notes: Binomial logit models with clustered standard errors by rebel group in parentheses. Sample restricted to rebel group-years with at least one recorded violation. Dependent variable is the binomial composition of discriminatory versus indiscriminate violation types. Positive coefficients indicate a more discriminatory violation repertoire relative to violent-origin groups. $^{\cdot}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

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Table 3: Organizational Origins and Violation Repertoire Composition: Fractional Logit Models

(lr)2-3	*DV: Discriminatory Share of Total Violations*	
	(1)	(2)
	Community Ties	Civil Society
Organizational Origins		
Community ties origin	0.586$^{\cdot}$	
	(0.303)	
Parentless origin	0.327	
	(0.293)	
Civil society origin		**1.613*****
		(0.340)
Parentless origin		0.365
		(0.242)
Control Variables		
Log GDP per capita	-0.054	-0.082
	(0.107)	(0.100)
Ideology	0.241	0.375
	(0.284)	(0.282)
Democracy (standardized)	0.257$^{\cdot}$	0.053
	(0.153)	(0.185)
Rebel strength	-0.117	-0.057
	(0.191)	(0.221)
Territorial control	-0.121	$-0.175^{\cdot}$
	(0.110)	(0.101)
External support	-0.151	0.018
	(0.105)	(0.090)
Conflict intensity	$-$**0.480***	$-$**0.542****
	(0.225)	**(0.196)**
Conflict duration	$-$**0.045****	$-$**0.039***
	(0.015)	**(0.019)**
Observations	223	166
Reference category	Violent origin	Violent origin

Notes: Fractional logit models with clustered standard errors by rebel group in parentheses. Sample restricted to rebel group-years with at least one recorded violation. Dependent variable is the proportion of total violations that are discriminatory, ranging from 0 to 1. Positive coefficients indicate a higher discriminatory share relative to violent-origin groups. $^{\cdot}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

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


Figure 1: Predicted Violation Repertoire Composition by Organizational Origin
Notes: Predicted discriminatory shares of the violation repertoire by organizational origin, estimated from fractional logit models.

Results

Results from the binomial composition models reveal a clear and theoretically consistent pattern in how organizational origins shape the structure of rebel violation repertoires. Rebel groups with community ties, that is, those emerging from political parties or civil society organizations exhibit greater reliance on selective abuses relative to violent-origin groups. In the community ties specification, these groups display approximately 55 percent higher odds of maintaining a discriminatory rather than indiscriminate violation repertoire compared to violent-origin organizations, though this effect reaches only marginal significance in the fractional logit discriminatory share specification.

I further disaggregate the categories of the independent variable (Community Ties) in order to clarify the pattern by examining the independent effect of each groups. Rebel groups originating from civil society organizations are substantially more likely to rely on discriminatory rather than indiscriminate violence compared to those with violent origin. The binomial models indicate that civil society-origin groups have roughly 3.4 times the odds of exhibiting a discriminatory repertoire compared to violent-origin groups. Substantively, this means that when civil society-origin groups engage in abuse, they are far more likely to employ selective violence targeting specific individuals or groups rather than broad, indiscriminate tactics. Importantly, the magnitude of the civil society effect substantially exceeds that of the broader community ties category, suggesting that the embeddedness mechanism is most strongly associated with civil society origins.

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Meanwhile, parentless origin groups also display a statistically significant tendency toward more discriminatory repertoires in the binomial models, with approximately 1.6 to 1.7 times higher odds of discriminatory versus indiscriminate violence relative to violent-origin groups. However, this effect does not survive the fractional logit specification, suggesting that the parentless compositional skew is sensitive to operationalization and should be interpreted with caution.

The fractional logit models, which directly examine the proportion of violations that are discriminatory, again reinforce the conclusions from the binomial composition models. Civil society-origin groups have more than five times the odds of exhibiting higher discriminatory shares compared to violent-origin groups, the strongest and most consistent finding across all specifications. The broader community ties effect is positive and in the expected direction but reaches only marginal significance in the fractional logit specification, suggesting that the civil society component of the community ties category is doing most of the explanatory work. By contrast, parentless groups do not display a statistically significant effect in the fractional logit specification.

Overall, the results indicate that organizational origins play a critical role in shaping how rebel groups target civilians. Groups that emerge from civil society institutions are much more likely to rely on targeted, selective violence, whereas organizations originating from prior armed structures rely more heavily on broader and less selective forms of coercion.

Figure 1 presents the predicted composition of violation repertoires by organizational origin, with all control variables held at their sample means. The results are consistent with the theoretical expectation that organizational origins shape not only the frequency of violations but also their composition.

Civil society origin groups display the most selective pattern of violence, with approximately **90 percent** of their predicted violations falling into the discriminatory category. This pattern is consistent with the argument that deep community embeddedness provides these groups with both the information necessary to identify specific targets and the social incentives to avoid indiscriminate tactics that could alienate their civilian support base.

Groups with broader community ties particularly those emerging from political party organizations also exhibit a predominantly discriminatory repertoire at roughly **75 percent**, though the effect is somewhat attenuated compared to purely civil society rooted organizations. This gradient supports the expectation in **H2B** that civil society origins exert a stronger restraint effect than political party origins, even though both categories fall under the broader umbrella of non-violent parent organizations. Parentless groups occupy an intermediate position at around **72 percent discriminatory**, displaying a moderately selective pattern but with a larger indiscriminate component than either civil society or community ties groups.

Violent-origin groups fall at the opposite end of the spectrum, with the **lowest predicted discriminatory share at roughly 63 percent** and the highest reliance on indiscriminate tactics. The gap between civil society and violent-origin groups approximately **27 percentage points in discriminatory share** represents a substantively large difference in how these organizations engage with civilian populations during conflict. In sum, all of these patterns provide strong visual support for the central argu-

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ment that organizational origins embedded in civilian institutions constrain the use of indiscriminate violence and encourage more selective targeting practices.

Robustness Check

To further evaluate the robustness of my findings, I estimate logit models investigating the probability that a rebel group commits at least one discriminatory violation (columns 1 and 3) or at least one indiscriminate violation (columns 2 and 4). These models serve as robustness check for the main composition analyses by looking at whether organizational origins shape the likelihood of engaging in each violation type separately.

The results from these logit models show that civil society origin groups are significantly less likely to commit indiscriminate violations compared to violent-origin groups, but they do not differ significantly in the probability of committing discriminatory violations. This pattern only reinforces the main argument: the distinctive feature of civil society groups is not simply whether they use violence, but that they are substantially less prone to broad, indiscriminate violence. Meanwhile, parentless groups are significantly less likely to commit both discriminatory and indiscriminate violations across specifications, suggesting a more general reduction in overall violation propensity. This again brings into attention that parentless groups, given that they lack the "ready-made" structures (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020) and privileges that come with having a parent organization, face structural constraints that shape and potentially limit their patterns of violence.

Importantly, the core finding remains intact: civil society groups are less prone to indiscriminate violence, than violent origins groups. Organizational origins shape both the structure of violence and, in the case of indiscriminate abuse, the underlying probability that such tactics are used at all.

Conclusion

In this study, I seek to advance the empirical explanation of rebel civilian targeting by explaining why rebel groups vary not only in the level of violence they commit, but in the type of violence they employ against civilians. Moving beyond explanations centered solely on wartime dynamics, resources, or territorial control, I argue that the organizational foundations from which rebel groups emerge leave lasting imprints on their repertoires of abuse. Specifically, I propose that groups rooted in civil society organizations would be more likely to rely on selective, discriminatory forms of violence, while groups emerging from prior armed organizations would exhibit greater reliance on indiscriminate tactics.

The empirical evidence provides strong support for this argument. Across multiple model specifications, rebel groups originating from civil society organizations consistently demonstrate substantially higher reliance on targeted violence relative to violent-origin groups. This effect is statistically robust, and stable across the outcome variables. Similarly, groups with advantages in community ties more tend to lean more towards selective abuses, though the magnitude is smaller. On the contrary, the

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Table 4: Appendix Table 1: Organizational Origins and Violation Type — Binary Logit Models

	DV: Probability of Violation Type			
(lr)2-5	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Community Ties		Civil Society	
(lr)2-3 (lr)4-5	Discriminatory	Indiscriminate	Discriminatory	Indiscriminate
Organizational Origins				
Community ties origin	−0.145	−0.927·		
	(0.384)	(0.511)		
Civil society origin			−0.251	**−2.186****
			(0.478)	**(0.697)**
Parentless origin	**−0.934***	**−0.864***	**−0.998***	**−1.076***
	(0.424)	**(0.426)**	**(0.417)**	**(0.453)**
Control Variables				
Log GDP per capita	**0.404****	0.229	**0.307***	0.329
	(0.145)	(0.170)	**(0.146)**	(0.200)
Democracy (standardized)	**0.603****	0.272	**0.803*****	**0.637***
	(0.211)	(0.260)	**(0.213)**	**(0.267)**
Rebel strength	**0.662***	**0.749***	**0.680***	**0.778***
	(0.294)	**(0.307)**	**(0.318)**	**(0.310)**
Territorial control	**0.459***	**0.435***	**0.506****	**0.618****
	(0.191)	**(0.208)**	**(0.179)**	**(0.195)**
External support	0.071	0.201	−0.056	−0.121
	(0.196)	(0.225)	(0.184)	(0.214)
Ideology	−0.654	−0.496	−0.850·	−1.023·
	(0.464)	(0.521)	(0.493)	(0.562)
Conflict intensity	**1.599****	**1.965****	**1.707****	**2.211****
	(0.553)	**(0.640)**	**(0.619)**	**(0.712)**
Conflict duration	**0.095****	**0.114*****	**0.091***	**0.162*****
	(0.035)	**(0.029)**	**(0.039)**	**(0.042)**
Observations	378	378	294	294
Reference category	Violent origin		Violent origin	

Notes: Binary logit models with clustered standard errors by rebel group in parentheses. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is whether the rebel group committed at least one discriminatory violation (killings, detention, torture). Dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is whether the rebel group committed at least one indiscriminate violation (recruitment, sexual violence, property destruction, displacement, movement restriction). Bold coefficients indicate statistical significance at conventional levels. $^{\cdot}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

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evidence for parentless groups is weaker and less consistent, suggesting that the absence of inheritable privileges that comes with having a parent organization may not produce a clear strategic pattern.

These findings carry important implications for the study of civil conflict and human rights abuses. First, they suggest that variation in rebel violence cannot be fully understood without considering the pre-foundational processes from which rebel groups originate. Second, they challenge the assumption that indiscriminate violence is simply a function of weak control or resource scarcity. Instead, civilian abuses reflect inherited organizational privileges that emanate from the preexisting organizations of rebels.

However, limitations persist. Distinguishing between selective violence from indiscriminate abuses can be empirically challenging because some forms of abuse may also resemble elements of both targeting and broad coercion. Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017) caution that the selective versus indiscriminate distinction obscures important variation in how armed organizations actually target civilians, particularly when it pertains to identity-based targeting, in which organizations attack individuals specifically because of their membership in a social group rather than because of individual behavior or simple geographic availability. One major reason for this measurement issue arises from the nature of the available data.

Based on this data limitation, it is reasonable for researchers to rely on the most plausible theoretical classification of each abuse type, even though the strategic intent behind specific incidents may vary across contexts. Though not without limitations, the rebel groups human rights abuse dataset (Walsh et al., 2024) offers a great opportunity for this empirical exploration. Besides, this limitation does not invalidate the results. If certain violations blur the boundary between selective and indiscriminate tactics, it would have been difficult to detect systematic differences across organizational origins. The fact that strong and consistent patterns still emerge suggests that the relationship between inherited organizational privileges and repertoire composition is substantively meaningful.

Future research would benefit from a much improvised case-specific data that can precisely document not only which violation types rebel groups commit but which social groups they target with each violation type and how frequently. This study should therefore be understood as a preliminary empirical foundation that directly compares selective and indiscriminate abuses using the lens of organizational origins. By foregrounding rebel preexisting organizations, this study amplifies the importance of the foundational processes (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020) of rebel groups in shaping patterns of civilian victimization during civil wars.

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Appendix




Figure 2: Predicted Violation Repertoire Composition by Organizational Origin
Notes: Predicted indiscriminate shares of the violation repertoire by organizational origin, estimated from fractional logit models.

Figure 2 presents predicted indiscriminate shares by organizational origin, derived from fractional logit models with all control variables held at their sample means. From the results, civil society–origin groups exhibit dramatically lower predicted indiscriminate shares than all other types. These groups are predicted to allocate about 12 percent of their violation repertoire to indiscriminate tactics, compared to roughly 38 percent for violent-origin groups. This is about a difference of approximately 26 percentage points. Meanwhile, groups with broader community ties fall at an intermediate level of about 25 percent. Parentless groups on the other hand cluster around 28–30 percent, somewhat below violent-origin groups but well above civil society groups. Overall, the results support the constraint mechanism advanced in this paper: organizations embedded in civilian networks internalize norms of restraint that suppress indiscriminate targeting, even when violations occur.

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Table 5: Robustness Check: Organizational Origins and Violence Ratio

(lr)2-3	*DV: Discriminatory-to-Indiscriminate Violation Ratio*	
	(1)	(2)
	Civil Society	Community Ties
Organizational Origins		
Civil society origin	**0.238****	
	(0.076)	
Parentless origin	0.000	
	(0.097)	
Community ties origin		**0.156***
		(0.066)
Parentless origin		−0.015
		(0.097)
Control Variables		
Log GDP per capita	0.010	0.031
	(0.019)	(0.023)
Ideology	−0.033	−0.032
	(0.079)	(0.080)
Democracy (standardized)	**0.085****	**0.112*****
	(0.032)	**(0.029)**
Rebel strength	0.015	0.023
	(0.054)	(0.053)
Territorial control	0.027	0.053
	(0.034)	(0.033)
External support	0.004	−0.035
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Conflict intensity	−**0.214***	−**0.236***
	(0.106)	**(0.096)**
Conflict duration	−0.008	−**0.015***
	(0.006)	**(0.007)**
Observations	294	378
Reference category	Violent origin	Violent origin

Notes: Gaussian log-link models with clustered standard errors by rebel group in parentheses. Dependent variable is the Laplace-smoothed ratio of discriminatory to indiscriminate violation types, constructed as $(discriminatoryvariety + 1)/(indiscriminatevariety + 1)$. Positive coefficients indicate a higher discriminatory-to-indiscriminate ratio relative to violent-origin groups. Results are estimated on the full sample including non-violating group-years. $^{\cdot}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

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Table 6: Organizational Origins and Violation Repertoire Composition: Fractional Logit Models (Indiscriminate Share)

	DV: Indiscriminate Share of Total Violations	
(lr)2-3	(1)	(2)
	Community Ties	Civil Society
Organizational Origins		
Community ties origin	$-$**0.638***	
	(0.312)	
Civil society origin		$-$**1.699*****
		(0.334)
Parentless origin	-0.368	$-0.424^{\cdot}$
	(0.301)	(0.249)
Control Variables		
Log GDP per capita	0.042	0.060
	(0.106)	(0.098)
Democracy (standardized)	$-$**0.287***	-0.122
	(0.134)	(0.147)
Rebel strength	0.131	0.039
	(0.191)	(0.222)
Territorial control	0.094	0.135
	(0.107)	(0.096)
External support	0.162	-0.001
	(0.104)	(0.091)
Conflict intensity	$0.402^{\cdot}$	**0.417***
	(0.211)	**(0.175)**
Conflict duration	**0.044****	$0.033^{\cdot}$
	(0.015)	(0.019)
Observations	223	166
Reference category	Violent origin	Violent origin

Notes: Fractional logit models with clustered standard errors by rebel group in parentheses. Sample restricted to rebel group-years with at least one recorded violation. Dependent variable is the proportion of total violations that are indiscriminate, ranging from 0 to 1. Negative coefficients indicate a lower indiscriminate share relative to violent-origin groups. $^{\cdot}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

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Table 7: Exponentiated Coefficients (Odds Ratios) for Composition Models

	Binomial Models		*Fractional Logit Models*	
(lr)2-3 (lr)4-5	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Community Ties	Civil Society	Community Ties	Civil Society
Organizational Origins				
Community ties origin	1.547*		1.796·	
	[1.077, 2.221]		[0.993, 3.249]	
Civil society origin		3.360***		5.020***
		[1.902, 5.937]		[2.576, 9.779]
Parentless origin	1.726***	1.641**	1.387	1.441
	[1.282, 2.324]	[1.218, 2.210]	[0.791, 2.432]	[0.897, 2.317]
Control Variables				
Log GDP per capita	0.927	0.920	0.947	0.921
	[0.812, 1.058]	[0.818, 1.035]	[0.768, 1.168]	[0.758, 1.121]
Democracy (standardized)	1.237*	1.087	1.293·	1.055
	[1.021, 1.499]	[0.897, 1.316]	[0.970, 1.723]	[0.735, 1.514]
Ideology	1.083	1.131	1.272	1.455
	[0.821, 1.428]	[0.867, 1.475]	[0.717, 2.258]	[0.837, 2.531]
Rebel strength	0.890	0.895	0.890	0.945
	[0.672, 1.178]	[0.667, 1.202]	[0.597, 1.327]	[0.613, 1.457]
Territorial control	0.920	0.938	0.886	0.839·
	[0.812, 1.043]	[0.827, 1.064]	[0.717, 1.094]	[0.688, 1.024]
External support	0.896·	0.951	0.860	1.018
	[0.797, 1.007]	[0.849, 1.066]	[0.694, 1.065]	[0.854, 1.213]
Conflict intensity	0.727**	0.703**	0.619*	0.582**
	[0.580, 0.911]	[0.567, 0.873]	[0.394, 0.970]	[0.396, 0.854]
Conflict duration	0.965***	0.980·	0.956**	0.962*
	[0.946, 0.984]	[0.959, 1.002]	[0.928, 0.985]	[0.927, 0.998]
Observations	223	166	223	166
Reference category	Violent origin	Violent origin	Violent origin	Violent origin

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a higher discriminatory share relative to violent-origin groups. Columns (1)–(2) correspond to the binomial composition models in Table 2. Columns (3)–(4) correspond to the fractional logit models in Table 3. $^{\cdot}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

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