

Who Speaks, Who Leads: Decomposing Gender Effects in Foreign Policy Rhetoric at the UNGA*

Bimal Adhikari^{†1} and Gento Kato^{‡2}

¹*Nazarbayev University*

²*Meiji University*

July 27, 2026

Abstract

Does the gender of state leaders shape foreign policy rhetoric? We examine UN General Assembly General Debate speeches (1970-2025) through Latent Semantic Scaling to decompose the gender of the chief executive from that of the speaker at the podium, a distinction votes do not allow. The results imply that gender plays different roles at different levels. In recent decades, among democracies, women who deliver speeches are less hawkish than men, but countries led by women deliver more hawkish speeches. A woman leader's hawkishness is thus masked when she speaks for herself, surfacing only when a male delegate speaks in her place. Neither pattern appears in autocracies. These findings reconcile conflicting claims about women's peacefulness versus hawkishness in foreign policy.

Keywords: gender, foreign policy, United Nations General Assembly, text-as-data, diplomacy

*Bimal Adhikari and Gento Kato contributed equally to this work.

[†]Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations.

[‡]Senior Assistant Professor, School of Political Science and Economics.

Introduction

“A world run by women would [...] become less aggressive, adventurous, competitive, and violent.” ([Fukuyama, 1998](#), 27).

“Women leaders may act more hawkishly in the realm of foreign policy to prove that they are capable leaders [...] acting assertive, dominant, and aggressive.” ([Burns and Bowling, 2021](#), 334).

“[I]ncreases in women’s legislative representation decreases conflict behavior and defense spending, while the presence of women executives increases both.” ([Koch and Fulton, 2011](#), 1).

As these epigraphs suggest, how leaders’ gender shapes foreign policy remains contested. One strand of the literature holds that women leaders are more peaceful than men, pointing to their greater adherence to international laws and norms and a predisposition toward conflict avoidance ([Caprioli, 2000](#)). Studies in this vein find that greater women’s representation in legislatures is associated with reduced defense spending ([Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018](#)), lower civil conflict intensity ([Woo and Nam, 2024](#)), and a stronger prioritization of diplomacy over force ([Brannon, Thomas and DiBlasi, 2024](#)). Women leaders are also more supportive of human rights treaties ([Senk, Coulombe and Edry, 2024](#)), and the inclusion of women in peace negotiations increases the durability of peace ([Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018](#)). A second strand argues the opposite. Women leaders may behave more aggressively, in part because of the misogyny they confront. Ethnonationalist, religious, and right-wing terrorist groups respond violently to advances in women’s status ([Kattelman and Burns, 2023](#)), and women leaders face more domestic terrorist violence during their tenure, which can prompt greater reliance on force ([Burns and Kattelman, 2017](#)). More broadly, [Burns and Bowling \(2021, 335\)](#) contend that women-led states face a heightened risk of violating international norms because women leaders “may need to escalate disputes to demonstrate resolve” in male-dominated environments.

Yet others suggest that the office a woman holds conditions these pressures. [Koch and Fulton \(2011\)](#) find that a higher share of women in the legislature lowers defense spending and conflict behavior, whereas women executives pursue more hawkish policies. [Post and Sen \(2020,](#)

2) likewise argue that the pacifying effect of women leaders “does not operate at the executive level due to gender bias.” Women executives risk being perceived as weak if they display communal traits such as warmth or nurturing, and so adopt traits more commonly associated with male leaders “to compensate for their inherent disadvantage in such a masculinized role” (Post and Sen, 2020, 2). Threatening security environments intensify this dynamic. Public under threat prefer male leaders, a pressure that may push women executives to act preemptively and more harshly to retain office (Kim and Kang, 2022).

This debate has focused mostly on what leaders “do,” such as initiating disputes, spending on defense, or voting on UNGA resolutions, and far less on what they “say.” What work does exist on gender and political speech centers mostly on parliamentary debate, showing that women legislators take the floor less often, particularly on “hard” domains such as defense (Bäck and Debus, 2019), devote more time to women’s issues (Pearson and Dancey, 2011), and adopt a less adversarial, more evidence-based style (Hargrave and Langengen, 2021), though these differences have narrowed over time (Hargrave and Blumenau, 2022). Executive rhetoric has received even less attention, with existing studies confined to individual leaders or crisis settings. Jones (2016), for example, finds that Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical style grew more masculine as she approached the executive office.

No existing study has systematically linked leader gender to foreign policy rhetoric. If women leaders stake out positions distinct from those of men, that divergence should surface in their language. Are women more likely to voice peaceful foreign policy positions, or do they adopt assertive rhetoric to project strength in a male-dominated global arena? To answer this question, we examine the speeches delivered by country representatives at the annual General Debate of the UNGA.

What Speeches Reveal That Votes Cannot

Held each September at the opening of the UNGA session, the General Debate is a useful platform for examining gendered differences in foreign policy rhetoric. Comprising all 193 UN member states, the broadest membership of any multilateral body, the UNGA gives state

leaders a venue to articulate their positions on pressing international issues. To date, however, studies of gender and foreign policy at the UNGA have relied exclusively on voting data (e.g., [Adhikari, King and Santoso, 2025](#)).

Voting data suffer from several shortcomings. First, the three options on UNGA resolutions cannot fully capture a state's foreign policy stance. An abstention, or outright absence, need not signal indifference. It may instead reflect a weak bureaucracy ([Brazys and Panke, 2017](#)) or a strategic effort to balance relations with rival global powers ([Morse and Coggins, 2024](#)). Second, votes may reflect coercion rather than sincere preferences. Western donors have long traded aid and other side payments for votes ([Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2008](#)). Third, pressing issues are sometimes voted on repeatedly within a single session, masking broader patterns of alignment ([Voeten, 2013](#)). Fourth, a large share of resolutions is adopted by consensus without a roll call, so recorded votes capture only a small portion of UNGA activity ([Häge and Hug, 2016](#)). Some scholars address these limitations through more sophisticated uses of voting data (e.g., [Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017](#)). A growing number, however, advocate analyzing speeches, an “untapped source of information on the government's policy preferences” ([Baturu, Dasandi and Mikhaylov, 2017](#), 1).

Indeed, speeches offer a far richer understanding of a state's foreign policy stance. Votes may involve an agenda that the state may have little part in setting. Speeches convey the salience a government attaches to an issue and the frames through which it presents that issue ([Finke, 2023](#); [Kentikelenis and Voeten, 2021](#)). Nor is such rhetoric mere cheap talk. Diplomatic communication transmits credible information about intentions ([Trager, 2010](#)). Speeches also reach audiences that votes never do. General Debate addresses are widely covered by mainstream media ([Adhikari and Kato, 2024](#)) and “are generally reproduced, often in full length, in domestic media” ([Baturu and Tolstrup, 2024](#), 593), which is why leaders use them to communicate with their domestic base ([Mattes, Leeds and Carroll, 2015](#)) and to project a desired image at what some deem “the most prominent multilateral forum” ([Baturu and Gray, 2024b](#), 723). A speech, moreover, has an author. Votes are cast by the permanent mission in the name of the state as a whole, so a recorded position cannot be traced to the person at the podium. Speeches can, and who speaks shapes what is said. Heads of state and government, once rare

at the General Debate, now appear frequently, anticipating that these appearances will enhance their international prestige (Baturó and Gray, 2024a). At the podium, they favor their own priorities, talk about themselves, and speak plainly (Baturó and Gray, 2024b). Career diplomats do the opposite, with speeches that are complex, specific, and jargon-laden (Gray and Baturó, 2021).

Yet for all this attention to who speaks, no study has examined whether the gender of the speaker, or of the leadership behind the speech, shapes what is said. Speeches are precisely where gendered differences should surface, because the mechanisms theorized in the gender and foreign policy literature are audience-facing. Whether a woman leader compensates for doubts about her resolve (Koch and Fulton, 2011), balances assertive behavior abroad against feminine expectations at home (Burns and Murdie, 2018), or signals competence as both leader and woman (Burns and Bowling, 2021), she does so by managing how observers perceive her. Signaling of this kind requires an act that the audience can see. In existing work, that act is costly, taking the form of initiated disputes, defense spending, or cooperative overtures (Koch and Fulton, 2011; Burns and Bowling, 2021). Rhetoric is a cheaper and more regular signal. The General Debate gives every leader an annual, globally visible chance to display resolve, and unlike roll calls, which audiences rarely observe, its addresses are broadcast abroad and reproduced at home. If gendered pressures shape foreign policy, the General Debate is where they should be most clearly visible.

Research Design and Findings

To examine how political leaders' gender shapes the foreign policy agenda in UNGA speeches, we use the UNGA Debate corpus (Jankin, Baturó and Dasandi, 2025). We restrict the analysis to 1970–2025, since the number of women chief executives and women UNGA speakers began to rise only in the 1970s; before then, only five women held either position.¹ The dataset contains 9,389 speeches in total, all in English (translated where necessary), with the annual

¹Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Gertruda Sekaninová-Čákrťová, Golda Meir, Sirmavo Bandaranaike, and Indira Gandhi.

count ranging from 68 to 195.²

Our dependent variable is the foreign policy agenda that appeared in UNGA speeches. We focus especially on extracting hawkish versus dovish agendas in resolving conflict. We measure such an agenda using Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) (Watanabe, 2021; Baturu and Gray, 2024b). Based on a given assignment of “positive” and “negative” seed words, the LSS algorithm produces speech texts’ “polarity scores based on their relative proximity to positive and negative seed words” (Watanabe, 2021, 86). We first stemmed words that appeared in the corpus and used the following positive seed words that are supposed to represent “hawkish” speeches: “coercion”, “coerciv”, “sanction”, “naval”, “arm”, “weapon”, “deter”, and “militari”. In contrast, the following word stems are used as negative (or dovish) seed words: “multilater”, “diplomaci”, “peacemak”, “peacebuild”, “cooper”, “reconcili”, “coexist”, and “negoti”. The estimation of LSS score utilized the bag of word stems (uni-grams and bi-grams) that appear 50 times or more in 25 or more speeches in the entire UNGA corpus (18,721 words in total). Higher values in the resultant LSS score indicate a more hawkish than dovish agenda in the given speech.

Figure 1 plots the distribution of LSS scores against the simple difference in counts of hawkish and dovish seed words. The LSS score correlates well with raw seed-word appearance while capturing additional variation in hawkishness that simple keyword counts miss.³ For face validity, consider two addresses from the 2022 session, both delivered as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated the agenda. President Ignazio Cassis of Switzerland condemns the invasion as a violation of the UN Charter, yet his dominant vocabulary is one of cooperation, multilateralism, and “the peaceful and lasting coexistence of peoples and States.” Prime Minister Liz Truss of the United Kingdom speaks instead of weapons and resolve, articulating that “new weapons from the United Kingdom are arriving in Ukraine” and pledging to “sustain or increase our military support” for as long as it takes. The LSS score places Cassis on the dovish side and Truss well into hawkish territory.

Our independent variables are the gender of state leaders and UNGA speakers. For the

²Speeches by representatives of the UN, EU, and Ukraine and Belarus before independence in 1990 are excluded. Dominica’s 2024 speech is added since the original dataset omitted it.

³We also estimated our models using a hawkishness score based on simple keyword counts. Online Appendix C shows that these results are largely consistent with our main ones, though noisier.




Figure 1: The relationship between foreign agenda scale by simple count and LSS

gender of state leaders, we first extracted the gender of chief executives and elected heads of state from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset and manually adjusted the values to conform with [Baturu and Gray \(2024b\)](#)'s coding of effective national leaders. For speaker gender, we drew on the coding in [Baturu and Gray \(2024b\)](#)'s replication dataset for 1970 to 2019 and hand-coded 2020 to 2025 from speaker names and countries in the UNGA corpus. See Online Appendix A for details of manual coding adjustments to our independent variables.

Figure 2 shows the trend in women national leaders and women UNGA speakers among countries delivering speeches from 1970 to 2025. The left-hand panel shows the proportions of women leaders and women speakers rising steadily from under 5% in the 1970s to around 15% in recent years.⁴ Looking at the composition of women leaders and speakers, women speakers (serving under men leaders) were the first to increase in the 1990s, and they represented the majority of UNGA-participating countries with women leaders or speakers until around 2010. Countries with women leaders have grown more common in recent years. The right-hand panel

⁴The figure with frequency on the vertical axis is presented in Online Appendix B. The pattern is virtually identical.




Figure 2: Time trend of the gender of leaders and speakers in UNGA speeches, 1970-2025 (in proportions)

shows that these leaders appear as UNGA speakers more often than male leaders in most years. When a country has both a woman leader and a woman speaker, the leader herself is almost always the one speaking. Only fourteen cases in our data involve a woman leader sending a woman non-leader to the podium.

Figure 3 then presents the average hawkishness of UNGA speeches by gender, scored by the national leader's gender in the left-hand panel and by the speaker's gender in the right. Two patterns stand out. First, there is a clear time trend in the hawkishness of UNGA speeches. The agenda remained highly hawkish during the period of the Cold War until 1989; In the 1990s and 2000s, it fluctuated from year to year, and after the 2010s, it remained relatively dovish throughout the years. Second, in recent years, women speakers tend to deliver somewhat less hawkish speeches than their male counterparts, while no consistent pattern emerges for women leaders.

Figure 3 alone cannot isolate the influence of women leaders, for at least three reasons. First, if women speakers have a generalized tendency to be less hawkish in their speeches (as the right-hand panel of the figure suggests), this may cancel out the impact of women leaders appearing as women speakers in UNGA speeches. Second, as discussed above, political lead-




Figure 3: Time trend of foreign policy agenda in UNGA speeches by gender of chiefs and speakers, 1970-2025

ers may have an incentive, regardless of gender, to deliver hawkish speeches that advance their political agendas, deviating from the broader UN goal of promoting multilateral cooperation (e.g., [Baturo and Gray, 2024a,b](#)). Since women leaders are more likely to appear as speakers than men leaders, this leader-as-speaker effect can also contaminate the observed bivariate patterns. Third, democratic and non-democratic leaders may behave differently on the international stage ([Baturo and Gray, 2024b](#)). If domestic pressures push women leaders to pursue hawkish foreign policies, those pressures reflect a gendered double bind in that women must signal resolve as capable leaders while still meeting expectations of femininity (e.g., [Burns and Bowling, 2021](#)). But the source of that bind may differ across regimes. Electoral accountability transmits public demand for defense competence to women executives in democracies (e.g., [Kim and Kang, 2022](#)), whereas in autocracies the pressure to demonstrate resolve may come from regime elites and the military.

To isolate the influence of women leaders and women speakers, we consider the multiple linear regression model with country and year fixed effects, estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered by country. We dummy-coded all three independent variables and interacted them with the autocracy dummy to capture the moderating

Table 1: Gender of leaders and speakers and foreign policy hawkisness of UNGA speeches (1970-2025)

	DV: Hawkishness LSS score			
	All years	70-89	90-09	10-25
Woman national leader	0.070 (0.075)	−0.151 (0.170)	−0.040 (0.098)	0.212* (0.089)
Woman UNGA speaker	−0.107* (0.043)	−0.028 (0.117)	−0.157* (0.062)	−0.165* (0.076)
Leader is UNGA speaker	0.187*** (0.045)	0.162 [†] (0.094)	0.178*** (0.041)	0.104* (0.045)
Woman leader x autocracy	−0.193 (0.194)	0.101 (0.340)	0.198 (0.264)	−0.420* (0.194)
Woman speaker x autocracy	0.094 (0.085)	0.034 (0.170)	0.304** (0.107)	0.134 (0.138)
Leader speaker x autocracy	−0.252*** (0.062)	−0.249* (0.117)	−0.168* (0.075)	−0.079 (0.066)
Autocracy dummy (V-Dem+)	0.267*** (0.075)	0.162 [†] (0.082)	0.074 (0.082)	0.145 (0.103)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	9389	2690	3619	3080
R ²	0.553	0.478	0.567	0.604
Adj. R ²	0.541	0.440	0.538	0.574

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$. Standard errors are clustered by countries.

effect of regime type. To code the bivariate regime type, we used `v2x_regime` from V-Dem for the available countries (coded 1 if closed or electoral autocracies, and 0 if electoral or liberal democracies) and manually filled in the missing values by referring to alternative democracy measures (See Online Appendix A.4 for specific coding results).

Table 1 presents our main results. As Figure 3 shows that hawkishness scores vary markedly over time, we estimated the model on the full sample and on three subsamples: the 1970s to 1980s, the 1990s to 2000s, and the 2010s onward. In democracies, the first row of the first column shows that leader gender has no significant effect on hawkishness when averaged across all periods. The second and third rows indicate that women speakers are significantly less hawkish than men speakers, and leader speakers are significantly more hawkish than non-leader speakers. Analyses of subsamples indicate that the tendencies among women speakers are driven more by speeches from more recent years, while the tendencies among leader speakers remain relatively constant across years. A second pattern stands out. In the 2010 to 2025 subsample, women leaders are significantly more hawkish than men leaders. Interaction terms

with the autocracy dummy indicate that all the above tendencies are weakened in autocracies, as the signs of the interaction terms are always the opposite of the base terms.

One concern is that our main model does not control for the factors shaping the emergence of women leaders and speakers. Countries more likely to select women may also emphasize particular agendas in UNGA speeches, making women leaders and speakers an outcome of those agendas rather than a cause. To address this, Online Appendix Table D.1 presents extended results controlling for the proportion of women in the lower house, gender quotas (V-Dem), women's rights (V-Dem), GDP per capita, and population. It shows that including potential confounders does not affect our core findings. In fact, the results slightly strengthen our main results. Women leaders are significantly more hawkish than male leaders only during 2010-2025; women speakers in general are much less hawkish than male speakers, and this tendency is stronger in more recent years. This timing fits a broader shift in the rhetorical environment. As UNGA speeches reach wider audiences in the social media era, women leaders, still outnumbered and often perceived as weaker than their male counterparts, have more reason to use hawkish, attention-grabbing rhetoric to demonstrate their resolve (see [Osnabrügge, Hobolt and Rodon, 2021](#)). Also, leader speakers are significantly more hawkish than non-leader speakers, and all these tendencies are stronger in democracies than in autocracies.

Figure 4 visualizes the average predicted hawkishness LSS scores by the gender of leaders, the gender of speakers, and regime type, providing further insight into our results.⁵ As shown on the left-side “democracy” column, when comparing “man leader & man non-leader” rows and “man leader is speaker” rows, a man leader speaker is consistently more hawkish than a man non-leader speaker across all time periods. Next, when comparing “man leader & man non-leader speaker” rows with “man leader & woman non-leader speaker” rows, we see that a woman non-leader speaker is less hawkish than a man non-leader speaker under man leader, and this tendency becomes significant only after the 1990s. Turning to the right-hand “autocracy” column, it is easy to see that the gender of the leader and speaker plays no significant role in speeches made by autocratic countries, regardless of time periods.

The harder pattern to read is the effect of women democratic leaders on hawkishness. Dur-

⁵We first split the data based on observed regime type and arbitrarily assign values of the leader's gender, speaker's gender, and speaker's leader status to make predictions.




Figure 4: Predicted hawkishness of foreign policy agenda by gender of leaders and speakers

ing 2010-2025, UNGA speeches of democratic countries with women leaders are significantly more hawkish than those with men leaders. On the other hand, the bottom-left panel of **Figure 4** implies that “women leader is speaker” is not more hawkish than “man leader is speaker”. This pattern occurs because, while women leaders make their countries’ speeches more hawkish, women speakers make their speeches less hawkish. These effects cancel each other out for a woman leader speaker. A woman leader makes a difference when a man non-leader is making speeches. When comparing the “woman leader & man non-leader speaker” row and the “man leader & man non-leader speaker” row, one can notice that the man non-leader speaker under woman leadership is significantly more hawkish than the man non-leader speaker under man leadership.

Discussions

Our findings show that speeches and votes are not interchangeable evidence, and that the literature's competing portraits of women leaders are both right. On the first point, voting decisions rest largely with career diplomats and are less politicized. A speech has both a speaker and a government behind it, and it is more political. Leaders can therefore use the General Debate to demonstrate resolve in ways that votes do not allow (see [Baturu and Gray, 2024a](#)). On the second, the literature holds either that women lean toward peace or that women leaders act hawkishly to prove their strength. Our results reconcile them. When women themselves speak at the podium, their speeches are less hawkish. But democracies led by women deliver more hawkish speeches overall, regardless of who speaks, likely because these governments must address doubts about whether a woman leader is tough enough (see [Koch and Fulton, 2011](#)).

The main limitations of our study stem from scarcity. Women in executive office remain rare, and some combinations of leader and speaker gender are rarer still. The significant effect of women leaders in post-2010 democracies rests on a small number of cases, and the findings may shift substantially as more women reach executive office. Likewise, our data contain only fourteen cases in which women leaders dispatched women non-leader speakers. Therefore, our findings have little direct implication for how non-leader women speakers behave under women leadership. Despite these limitations, our findings provide several avenues for future research. First, we suggest that leaders, especially women leaders, use the visibility of the General Debate to demonstrate resolve. Future studies could test this assertion more directly by asking survey respondents whether identical hawkish language is judged differently depending on the gender of the leader behind it. Second, while leaders may want their political priorities reflected in UNGA speeches, career diplomats likely play a large role in drafting them. Interviews with speechwriters and diplomats could show how leaders shape speeches they do not themselves deliver. The gender composition of the drafting team itself could also yield further insight.

References

- Adhikari, Bimal and Gento Kato. 2024. "Russian Adventurism and Central Asian Leaders' Foreign Policy Rhetoric: Evidence From the UN General Debate Corpus." *Research & Politics* 11(2):20531680241254190.
- Adhikari, Bimal, Jeffrey King and Lie Philip Santoso. 2025. "Ties That Bind? Women Leaders' Voting Congruence in the United Nations General Assembly." *International Relations* p. 00471178251361729.
- Bäck, Hanna and Marc Debus. 2019. "When Do Women Speak? A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Gender in Legislative Debates." *Political Studies* 67(3):576–596.
- Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten. 2017. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(2):430–456.
- Baturo, Alexander and Jakob Tolstrup. 2024. "Strategic Communication in Dictatorships: Performance, Patriotism, and Intimidation." *The Journal of Politics* 86(2):582–596.
- Baturo, Alexander and Julia Gray. 2024a. "The Incentives of Leaders in International Organizations: Evidence from the UN General Assembly." *International Interactions* 50(1):138–167.
- Baturo, Alexander and Julia Gray. 2024b. "Leaders in the United Nations General Assembly: Revitalization or Politicization?" *The Review of International Organizations* 19:721–752.
- Baturo, Alexander, Niheer Dasandi and Slava Mikhaylov. 2017. "Understanding State Preferences with Text as Data: Introducing the UN General Debate Corpus." *Research & Politics* 4(2):1–9.
- Brannon, Elizabeth, Jakana Thomas and Lora DiBlasi. 2024. "Fighting for Peace? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Women's Participation in Rebel Groups on Peace Negotiations." *The Journal of Politics* 86(2):507–520.
- Brazys, Samuel and Diana Panke. 2017. "Why do States Change Positions in the United Nations General Assembly?" *International Political Science Review* 38(1):70–84.
- Burns, Courtney and Amanda Murdie. 2018. "Female Chief Executives and State Human Rights Practices: Self-Fulfilling the Political Double Bind." *Journal of Human Rights* 17(4):470–484.
- Burns, Courtney and Jeremy Bowling. 2021. "Signaling Woman and Leader: Navigating the Double Bind as a Foreign Policy Decisionmaker." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 42(4):332–351.
- Burns, Courtney and Kyle Kattelman. 2017. "Women Chief Executives: The Political Catch-22 of Counterterrorism." *Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations* 8(2):22–43.
- Caprioli, Mary. 2000. "Gendered Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1):51–68.
- Clayton, Amanda and Pär Zetterberg. 2018. "Quota Shocks: Electoral Gender Quotas and Government Spending Priorities Worldwide." *The Journal of Politics* 80(3):916–932.

- Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele. 2008. "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis." *Public Choice* 136(1):139–164.
- Finke, Daniel. 2023. "Party Ideologies and UN Debates." *Party Politics* 29(2):281–293.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1998. "Women and the Evolution of World Politics." *Foreign Affairs* pp. 24–40.
- Gray, Julia and Alex Baturo. 2021. "Delegating Diplomacy: Rhetoric Across Agents in the United Nations General Assembly." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 87(4):718–736.
- Häge, Frank and Simon Hug. 2016. "Consensus Decisions and Similarity Measures in International Organizations." *International Interactions* 42(3):503–529.
- Hargrave, Lotte and Jack Blumenau. 2022. "No Longer Conforming to Stereotypes? Gender, Political Style, and Parliamentary Debate in the UK." *British Journal of Political Science* 52(4):1584–1601.
- Hargrave, Lotte and Tone Langengen. 2021. "The Gendered Debate: Do Men and Women Communicate Differently in the House of Commons?" *Politics & Gender* 17(4):580–606.
- Jankin, Slava, Alexander Baturo and Niheer Dasandi. 2025. "Words to Unite Nations: The Complete United Nations General Debate Corpus, 1946–Present." *Journal of Peace Research* 62(4):1339–1351.
- Jones, Jennifer. 2016. "Talk "Like a Man": The Linguistic Styles of Hillary Clinton, 1992–2013." *Perspectives on Politics* 14(3):625–642.
- Kattelman, Kyle and Courtney Burns. 2023. "Unpacking the Concepts: Examining the Link Between Women's Status and Terrorism." *Journal of Peace Research* 60(5):792–806.
- Kentikelenis, Alexander and Erik Voeten. 2021. "Legitimacy Challenges to the Liberal World Order: Evidence from United Nations Speeches, 1970–2018." *The Review of International Organizations* 16:721–754.
- Kim, Nam Kyu and Alice Kang. 2022. "External Threat Environments and Individual Bias Against Female Leaders." *Political Science Research and Methods* 10(1):1–17.
- Koch, Michael and Sarah Fulton. 2011. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 73(1):1–16.
- Krause, Jana, Werner Krause and Piia Bränfors. 2018. "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace." *International Interactions* 44(6):985–1016.
- Mattes, Michaela, Brett Ashley Leeds and Royce Carroll. 2015. "Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(2):280–290.
- Morse, Julia and Bridget Coggins. 2024. "Your Silence Speaks Volumes: Weak States and Strategic Absence in the UN General Assembly." *The Review of International Organizations* 19(3):515–544.

- Osnabrügge, Moritz, Sara Hobolt and Toni Rodon. 2021. “Playing to the Gallery: Emotive Rhetoric in Parliaments.” *American Political Science Review* 115(3):885–899.
- Pearson, Kathryn and Logan Dancey. 2011. “Speaking for the Underrepresented in the House of Representatives: Voicing Women’s Interests in a Partisan Era.” *Politics & Gender* 7(4):493–519.
- Post, Abigail S and Paromita Sen. 2020. “Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Man? Female Leaders in Crisis Bargaining.” *International Interactions* 46(1):1–27.
- Senk, Kaitlin, Nicholas Coulombe and Jessica Edry. 2024. “Women’s Legislative Representation and Human Rights Treaty Ratification.” *Politics & Gender* 20(4):903–935.
- Trager, Robert. 2010. “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters.” *American Political Science Review* 104(2):347–368.
- Voeten, Erik. 2013. “Data and Analyses of Voting in the United Nations General Assembly.” *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* pp. 54–66.
- Watanabe, Kohei. 2021. “Latent Semantic Scaling: A Semisupervised Text Analysis Technique for New Domains and Languages.” *Communication Methods and Measures* 15(2):81–102.
- Woo, Byung-Deuk and Hoshik Nam. 2024. “Women and Peace Theory and Civil Conflict Intensity.” *SAGE Open* 14(2):21582440241245315.