

Engineering Democracy?

An Empirical Analysis of Power-Sharing Institutions in 155 Countries from 1975 to 2015

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates how different forms of power-sharing affect democratic quality. While power-sharing has been widely promoted as a tool for stabilizing divided societies, particularly in post-conflict contexts, very few studies have systematically assessed its impact on democratic quality, and none have examined the distinct effects of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing institutions. To address this gap, this dissertation constructed a dataset of 155 countries between 1975 and 2015, and analyzed, with a two-way fixed effects model, how the three types of power-sharing influence both overall democratic quality and its institutional components. The findings of this dissertation indicate that constraining power-sharing had the most consistent and significant positive effect on democratic quality. Dispersive power-sharing showed modest but statistically insignificant benefits, while inclusive power-sharing was associated with a negative, though also insignificant, relationship with democratic quality. Further analysis demonstrated that these trends persisted regardless of the post-conflict context, challenging assumptions that such institutional arrangements are inherently less effective in fragile post-conflict environments. By disaggregating power-sharing and applying the largest dataset of its kind, this dissertation contributed new theoretical, empirical, and policy insights into how power-sharing institutions shape democratic outcomes. The findings also call into question the prevailing emphasis on political power-sharing institutions and highlight the advantages of constraining power-sharing, which remain considerably under-researched.

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I. Introduction

Since Aristotle, the consensus amongst political scientists has been that social homogeneity and political consensus are necessary prerequisites for a stable democracy. Conversely, neither tend to be present in divided societies, where deep segmental cleavages influence political organization, and thus, many have conceded that it is nearly impossible to achieve and maintain a stable democracy in such a society (Lijphart 1977, 1). However, Arend Lijphart's work on consociational democracy in the latter half of the twentieth century challenged this standard, instead demonstrating that democracy was possible in divided societies through the sharing and devolution of power, and that majoritarian systems would prove monopolistic and dangerous to minority groups (Bogaards 2006, 119).

While Lijphart originally conceived of power-sharing to explain the democratic stability present in countries like Austria and Belgium, despite their societal divisions, it has evolved into a normative theory, becoming the primary institutional arrangement recommended for all divided societies (Farag et. al. 2023, 900). Amidst post-WWII civil and ethnic conflict, power-sharing has become the “dominant conflict-solving approach” (Binningsbø 2013, 89), appearing in over two-thirds of peace agreements since 1990 (Johnson 2020, 734).

Moreover, power-sharing has been expanded and disaggregated beyond Lijphart's conceptualization, as other scholars have conceived of subtypes such as political, military, territorial, and economic power-sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015) and inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing (Strøm et. al. 2015) or focused on individual components of consociational theory such as the grand coalition and the mutual veto (Kelly 2019). Furthermore, empirical assessments have explored power-sharing's role in promoting stability, peace, and democracy (Farag et. al. 2023, 905-906).

However, despite the considerable magnitude of research conducted on power-sharing, two considerable gaps in the literature are clear. First, the effects of constraining power-sharing remain largely unexplored, both theoretically and empirically, despite its conceptualization a decade ago (Strøm et. al. 2015). Second, very few have empirically assessed the relationship between power-

sharing and democratic quality. Of those that have, Bochsler and Juon (2021) is the only known large-N, cross-national study to measure how power-sharing impacts the quality of a democracy, yet it did not consider dispersive or constraining power-sharing institutions nor post-conflict contexts.

Therefore, this dissertation aims to address these gaps and answer the following research question: *How do inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing institutions affect democratic quality, and do these effects differ in post-conflict contexts?* To answer this question, this dissertation created the largest known dataset of its kind, covering 155 countries between 1975 and 2015, to analyze the relationship between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing and democratic quality, in both general and post-conflict contexts. Furthermore, this dissertation represents the first study to ever examine these relationships.

This dissertation highlights the substantial positive impact of constraining power-sharing institutions on democratic quality, regardless of post-conflict context, and demonstrates that it should be further considered in the literature. Additionally, the results of this dissertation indicate that dispersive power-sharing is positively, but insignificantly, associated with democratic quality, and challenge many arguments in favor of inclusive power-sharing by demonstrating a negative, though statistically insignificant, relationship with democratic quality.

This dissertation is organized into the following sections: (1) the literature review, which discusses the theoretical foundations of power-sharing, the conceptualization of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing by Strøm, et. al. (2015), synthesizes prior empirical findings on the effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy, and considers how democratic quality can be evaluated; (2) the theoretical framework, which introduces the six hypotheses tested in this dissertation; (3) the methodology, which presents the data, methods, and models utilized; (4) the results, which reports the findings of the study; (5) the discussion, which interprets the results, discusses the theoretical and policy implications and how they relate to prior research, presents the limitations of the study, and introduces new avenues for future research; and (6) the conclusion, which synthesizes the findings of this dissertation.

II. Literature Review

Conceptual Foundations of Power-Sharing

Arend Lijphart's theory of *consociationalism* is credited with the theoretical conception of *power-sharing*, despite ongoing definitional debates. Inspired by the stability of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, Lijphart defined *consociational democracy* as a "government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (Lijphart 1969, 9). In such *plural* (or *divided*) *societies*, religious, ethnic, and/or linguistic differences create deep segmental cleavages and subsequently rival political subcultures, which contribute to societal instability. Lijphart argued that consociation provided an institutional alternative, as elites representing potentially antagonistic societal segments cooperate to counteract these "centrifugal tendencies" (Lijphart 1977, 3; 1969, 219-220).

Lijphart later expanded upon his original theory by outlining the four essential characteristics of consociational democracies: (1) grand coalition, (2) mutual veto, (3) proportionality, and (4) segmental autonomy. Firstly, grand coalitions refer to when leaders of significant segments govern together, and, according to Lijphart, were necessary in plural societies where "all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes" and strict majority rule would strain unity and peace (Lijphart 1977, 28). Next, the mutual veto serves as a guarantee of political protection for all segments, especially minority groups that could be outvoted in the grand coalition. The third characteristic, proportionality, ensures that not only are all segments represented, but that representation in the legislature and executive is proportional to segment size (36-38). Proportionality has often been operationalized with the proportional representation (PR) electoral system (Kelly 2019, 9), which Lijphart acknowledged was the most consociational electoral system as it provided for the fairest representation of minorities and encouraged the development of coalition governments (Lijphart 1991, 92). Finally, segmental autonomy provides minority groups with self-rule over localized concerns, such as language or religion (Lijphart 1977, 41). While it does traditionally refer to cultural autonomy (Kelly 2019, 89), Lijphart did acknowledge the considerable overlap between segmental autonomy and federalism and found the latter to be a "particularly promising method" for implementing consociational principles into a society (Lijphart 1979, 515).

Though Lijphart originally conceived of consociationalism to explain the unexpected stability of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, several other divided societies have adopted consociational elements, even if only briefly, such as Lebanon and Malaysia. Furthermore, consociationalism has expanded into a strongly normative theory, as proponents argue that it provides one of the few paths for deeply divided societies to achieve and maintain a stable democracy. Thus, proponents have advocated for the consociational engineering of societies such as Northern Ireland and post-apartheid South Africa (Andeweg 2000).

However, consociationalism has faced considerable criticism on normative, theoretical, and empirical grounds. Critics claim the institutional arrangement is futile in the face of deeply rooted, identity-based tensions and conflicts, and that it reinforces the conflict by institutionalizing the segmental cleavages and preventing the society from moving beyond them towards political integration and common citizenship (O'Leary 2005). Consociational institutions are also accused of being too rigid and inflexible, resulting in an inability to adapt to new social conditions (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). For example, guaranteeing certain groups' inclusion in governance can prevent other groups from inclusion later (Jarstad 2008).

Moreover, critics assert that consociationalism is inherently undemocratic as: (1) it does not allow for true democratic opposition, (2) it is elite-driven and encourages mass political apathy, (3) the mutual veto can result in a game of brinkmanship, (4) the multiplication of agencies makes governance less decisive and efficient, and (5) proportionality can interfere with merit (O'Leary 2005; Andeweg 2000; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad 2008). Additionally, consociational theory has faced accusations of Western bias, as many maintain that European heterogeneous societies are not easily comparable with non-Western divided societies, and thus such institutional solutions do not necessarily work in other contexts (Horowitz 1985). Some critics acknowledge that consociational institutions can be beneficial in certain divided societies but remain fundamentally opposed to their use in post-conflict settings, where the conditions necessary for the success of consociationalism tend to be absent, such as a culture of accommodation and mutual trust between opposing groups. Rather, they argue that the use of consociationalism in post-conflict settings tends to threaten peace and democracy (Roeder and Rothchild 2005).

Defenders of consociationalism often take a realist perspective, asserting that because certain collective identities (e.g., ethnicity and religion) are generally inflexible, especially once they have been mobilized by political actors, they must be accommodated rather than ignored or suppressed. They claim that critics are overly optimistic that individual rights and fraternity will be enough to dissolve such segmental cleavages (O’Leary 2005). Furthermore, critics do not consider the potentially dangerous consequences of majoritarian political systems for divided societies, where minority groups can be “democratically” and permanently excluded from governance. As concluded by Sir Arthur Lewis: “the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post,” (Lewis 1965, 164). Consociationalism, on the other hand, is often the most realistic form of democracy as there is mandated and permanent inclusion of multiple societal segments, rather than dominance by a majority group (Lijphart 1977, 48; O’Leary 2005). Even critics admit consociationalism, though imperfect in post-conflict settings, is undeniably preferable to sustained conflict, authoritarianism, and/or ethnic cleansing and genocide (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; O’Leary 2005). Lijphart also asserted that consociationalism can be abandoned relatively easily if a society no longer needs it, as seen in the Netherlands, and is thus not a permanent, inflexible system (Lijphart 1977, 52).

The concept of *power-sharing* has expanded beyond Lijphart’s framework to include all types of institutions that work to “extend the set of rulers, limit the influence of each, and make it costly for each to ignore the others,” together helping foster inclusiveness and manage segmental cleavages, especially in post-conflict settings (Strøm et. al. 2015, 168). Furthermore, scholars have also increasingly disaggregated the conception of power-sharing, theorizing various subtypes such as political, military, territorial, and economic power-sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015) and inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing (Strøm et. al. 2015); this dissertation focuses on the latter set of subtypes.

Inclusive power-sharing combines the first three consociational characteristics (grand coalition, mutual veto, and proportionality) with an inclusive military. Its purpose is to ensure “the participation of several parties or groups in particular offices or decision-making processes,” (Strøm et. al. 2015, 169; 171-172). While Lijphart did not mandate an inclusive military, it is very compatible with consociational theory; a military where a singular group is grossly

overrepresented can be dangerous due to the considerable power imbalance it creates. The logic behind inclusive power-sharing is that by increasing the number of democratic stakeholders and providing all leaders with a share in decision-making, they will be incentivized to support and maintain the regime. Furthermore, it lowers the stakes of elections as groups will always be included in governance and thus won't be as tempted to defect after a poor electoral performance (Graham et. al. 2017, 692).

Dispersive power-sharing expands upon the fourth characteristic of consociationalism, segmental autonomy, and is effectively interchangeable with federalism. Its purpose is to “divide authority among many actors in a well-defined pattern (such as territorial decentralization),” to ensure that small and localized communities are more effectively represented (Strøm et. al. 2015, 169). It consists of the following components: subnational tax, educational, and police authorities, direct elections of executive and legislature at both the provincial and municipal levels, and the representation of subnational constituencies in the central government (172-173). By providing multiple groups a stake in power and a measure of localized security and autonomy, dispersive power-sharing helps protect societal segments from tyranny by a majority group (Graham et. al. 2017, 692).

Constraining power-sharing remains the most controversial subtype, as it appears more “power-restricting” than “power-sharing.” Its purpose is to “limit the power of any party or social group and thus protect ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse,” and consists of the following components: constitutional guarantees of freedom of religious practice and freedom from religious discrimination, a ban on military legislators serving in the legislature, a ban on ethnic, religious, and/or regional parties, judicial review and tenure, and the enumeration of judicial powers in the constitution (Strøm et. al. 2015, 169; 173). Constraining arrangements force the government to share power with the judiciary, the citizenry, and civil society, because they are constrained by institutions which prevent abuse of power and protect vulnerable groups (Gates et. al. 2016, 516). Additionally, constraining power-sharing theoretically alleviates commitment problems as actors face considerable institutional obstacles if they were to renege on agreements and repress opponents (513).

Previous Empirical Research

While power-sharing has traditionally been assessed theoretically, normatively, and on a case-by-case basis, many in the field have sought to evaluate whether it truly “works.” Overall, findings indicate that power-sharing can promote stability, peace, and democracy. As of 2023, 373 research articles have investigated its effects: 229 reported positive outcomes while only 45 reported negative results (Farag et. al. 2023, 905-906). This section highlights some key empirical findings.

Although effects vary by the type of power-sharing utilized, combining multiple forms tends to yield very favorable outcomes. Multiple forms of power-sharing implemented together were shown to prolong post-conflict peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), increase the likelihood of minimalist democracy emerging post-conflict (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 64), and strengthen the rule of law in post-conflict settings (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019, 646).

Empirical findings on inclusive power-sharing were mixed. First, it is important to note that many prior studies conceived of power-sharing in different yet overlapping ways, and thus, while their results are helpful in understanding the impacts of inclusive power-sharing, it is important to note the different explanatory variables utilized in their research. *Political power-sharing*, consisting of the grand coalition/inclusion in governance and proportionality, was found to enhance post-conflict judicial independence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019, 646) and lower the likelihood of renewed civil conflict (Mattes and Savun 2009, 754). However, it was also unable to transition a society from civil war to a peaceful democracy on its own (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 103).

Within political power-sharing, highly inclusive grand coalitions were demonstrated to be significantly stabilizing for a society (Kelly 2019, 124) and correlate positively with enduring peace (Matanock 2017). On the other hand, proportional representation (PR) electoral systems demonstrated more varied results: in heterogeneous societies, it was linked, though insignificantly, to higher levels of political violence (Selway and Templeman 2012, 1558-1560) and instability (Kelly 2019, 115), but also associated with stronger democratic performance (Norris 2008, 118), better governance (Cammatt and Malesky 2012), and was the only political power-sharing component found to significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict resumption (Cammatt and

Malesky 2012, 994) and instead foster lasting peace (Mukherjee 2006). *Institutional power-sharing* is made up of the grand coalition, proportionality, and mutual veto conditions of consociationalism, and was found to perform well on most metrics of democratic quality (Bochsler and Juon 2021, 420-425; Juon and Bochsler 2022, 533).

Inclusive power-sharing, as conceived by Strøm et. al. (2015), was found to encourage in-fighting among participating groups (Bormann et. al. 2019, 93) and increase the likelihood of civil conflict, though not to a significant degree in post-conflict states (Gates et. al. 2016, 522). However, while inclusive power-sharing was found to decrease the likelihood of democratic survival in general, it significantly improved the odds of democratic survival in post-conflict societies (Graham et. al. 2017, 697-700). A component of inclusive power-sharing, an inclusive military (or *military power-sharing*), was found to consistently and significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Ottoman and Vüllers 2015, 344-345; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 84; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), though it was also associated with a significant decrease in judicial independence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019, 649).

Studies on *dispersive power-sharing* similarly indicate mixed but generally more positive effects. As with inclusive power-sharing, many studies considered similar but distinct explanatory variables from dispersive power-sharing, such as *territorial power-sharing* or *federalism*. However, these variables can be considered interchangeable as they lacked significant conceptual differences. Such institutional arrangements have been found to reduce post-peace settlement violence (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015, 344-345; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 84), especially in ethnic or territorial conflict (Bormann et. al. 2019, 97), but some studies found no significant impact (Mattes and Savun 2009, 754; Gates et. al. 2016, 522). They were further linked to timely post-conflict elections (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 84) and stronger democratic performance, compared to unitary systems (Norris 2008, 184), but were associated with a lower likelihood of democratic survival, in both general and post-conflict contexts (Graham et. al. 2017, 697-700).

Very few studies have tested the effects of *constraining power-sharing* institutions. However, those that have found strong and significant positive effects: constraining power-sharing significantly

reduced the probability of conflict (Gates et. al. 2016, 522) and increased the likelihood of democratic survival (Graham et. al. 2017, 697-700), in both post-conflict and non-post-conflict contexts.

A notable gap in the empirical literature concerns the relationship between power-sharing and democratic quality. While scholars have debated this issue on a theoretical and normative basis, only a handful of large-N, cross-national studies have empirically assessed it (Bochsler and Juon 2021; Cammet and Malesky 2012; Juon and Bochsler 2022; Norris 2008). Bochsler and Juon (2021) is the only known study to measure the impact of power-sharing on democratic quality, but their study only considered institutional power-sharing institutions, excluding dispersive and constraining institutions, which remain largely unresearched already. Furthermore, their study's dataset covered only 70 countries, of which the majority were Western democracies and non-post-conflict societies. This dissertation addresses these gaps by adopting a disaggregated model of power-sharing, which distinguishes between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining institutions. Furthermore, this dissertation employs the Democratic Matrix, a new multidimensional measure of democratic quality with a considerably broader and more up-to-date dataset.

Evaluating Democratic Quality

The task of empirically evaluating democratic quality is made exponentially more difficult by the lack of a common definition of democracy and what constitutes a “good” democracy (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020, 3). Furthermore, most agree that “democracy” can never be fully achieved, and all democracies should strive to continuously improve, especially as new contexts emerge (Dahl 1971). However, within the democracy literature, there appear to be three categories of definitions for a democracy and its necessary components: minimal or Schumpeterian, middle-range, and maximal (Lauth 2004).

The first category, the minimal, defines democracy as a system in which leaders are selected through competitive elections (Schumpeter 1942). This emphasis on contestation also implicitly includes the concept of popular participation, i.e., widespread suffrage, as the people must elect their leaders. While this definition does provide the mandatory requirements for all democracies,

most scholars have agreed that this definition is too limited (Lauth 2004; Dahl 1971) and is not helpful for empirically evaluating and comparing democracies.

The middle-range definition offers a far more multidimensional conception of democracy, combining procedural and certain substantive criteria for evaluating democracies. Identified democratic components include respect for civil and political freedoms, alternative sources of information, electoral participation and competition (Dahl 1971), rule of law, vertical and horizontal accountability, government responsiveness (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23-28), and non-electoral political participation in the form of robust civil society (Geissel 2016). However, one element that is often ignored amongst those who employ a middle-range definition is the perspective of citizens (Fuchs and Roller 2018). A survey of citizens in twenty established European democracies found that while citizens did relate “democracy” to the components of the middle-range definition, they also associated it with a certain level of output performance. In other words, citizens evaluated the democratic quality of their governments by the policy performance of institutions and how close their government had been able to achieve social equality and universal welfare (Pickel et. al. 2016, 646).

This output-focused conception of democracy is the maximalist definition, as it expands upon previous definitions to include the quality of results, i.e., how well citizen expectations of governance are satisfied (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 22). Proponents argue that the democratic regime is “insufficient for adequately conceptualizing what democracy is,” and instead, democracies should be additionally assessed on the level of respect for all human rights and the level of human development achieved (O’Donnell 2004, 9). While the maximalist definition of democracy is an ideal to which states should aspire, most scholars within the literature agree that this definition falls victim to “conceptually stretching” by focusing too heavily on the material conception of democracy rather than the procedural components that differentiate it from other political regimes (Sartori 1970). Thus, many maintain that democracies are fundamentally about the “procedural framework within which different policy solutions are first negotiated,” rather than “the production of certain policy achievements” (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020, 4).

This dissertation opts to focus on the middle-range definition of democracy and relies on the democratic dimensions and institutions selected by the Democracy Matrix. The Matrix defines democracy in three dimensions (political freedom, political equality, and political and legal control), five institutions (elections, civil society, media, rule of law, and accountability), and fifteen matrix fields created by the intersection of the dimensions and institutions, as seen in *Figure 1* (Lauth 2004; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020, 5-9).

Figure 1: The Matrix Fields of the Democracy Matrix

	Freedom	Equality	Control
Procedures of Decision	Free Elections	Equal Opportunity to Participate, Equal Vote	Oversight by Electoral Commission
Regulation of the Intermediate Sphere	Freedom to Organise	Equal Rights to Organise and to Act	Oversight via Associations, Political Parties and Civil Society
Public Communication	Communicative Freedoms	Equal Opportunity to Participate	Oversight by Media
Guarantee of Rights	Independence of the Judiciary, Legal Security	Equal Rights and Equal Treatment by the Judiciary	Effective Jurisprudence
Rules Settlement and Implementation	Independence of the Government, Effective Government	Equal Treatment by Parliament and Public Administration	Oversight by Parliament and Public Administration

Other projects have also attempted to conceptualize and evaluate democratic quality, but they were not considered for this dissertation. For instance, while Freedom House's reports are the most

widely read and cited reports of their kind, the project only assesses the condition of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2025), which is a small component of a democracy. The Democracy Barometer approaches the conceptualization of democratic quality very similarly to the Democracy Matrix, but it only measures 52 countries between 1990 and 2017, compared to 183 countries between 1900 to 2020 (Engler et. al. 2020; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020). Finally, V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) assesses countries on how well they perform on indicators for the five democratic varieties: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian (Coppedge et. al. 2025). V-Dem appears to be the largest data project for the measurement of democracy, but it lacks a singular definition of democracy, unlike the Democracy Matrix. Due to the project's methodology transparency and theoretical coherence, it was more effective to use the Democracy Matrix for the purposes of this dissertation.

III. Theoretical Framework

This study evaluates how inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing institutions affect democratic quality, and whether these effects differ in post-conflict settings. Drawing on the existing literature, six hypotheses were developed and tested.

Power-Sharing and Democratic Quality

Inclusive power-sharing institutions seek to integrate conflictual groups into governance by ensuring representation for all, especially minority groups often marginalized in majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1977; Strøm et. al. 2015). This inclusion theoretically strengthens democratic quality by enhancing representation, participation, and equality (Dahl 1971; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020). However, these arrangements may also reinforce the conflict between groups by institutionalizing segmental cleavages and deadlocking governments, worsening governmental efficacy. Moreover, the elite-driven nature can discourage political engagement and weaken elite accountability (O'Leary 2005; Andeweg 2000; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad 2008). Prior empirical studies show mixed results: inclusive power-sharing decreased the likelihood of democratic survival (Graham et. al. 2017), yet its political components (grand coalition, proportionality, and mutual veto) were positively associated with free and fair elections and a

democratic regime type (Juon and Bochsler 2022). Furthermore, its political components were positively associated with the following: increased representation of ethnic groups in the executive, women's political rights, representation of women in parliament, formal liberal rights, checks and balances within elite control, and confidence in the government. However, they were also associated with decreased transparency and weak institutional veto players outside of elite control, such as the judiciary (Bochsler and Juon 2021, 420-425).

Dispersive power-sharing institutions combine shared rule with self-rule in divided societies, by distributing authority across many actors and granting groups representation and autonomy (Lijphart 1977; Strøm et. al. 2015). Advocates argue this arrangement improves democratic participation, representation, and accountability by protecting minority interests and making government more responsive and accountable to local communities (Norris 2008). However, dispersive power-sharing can also further deepen societal divisions (Graham et. al. 2017), reduce administrative efficiency as governance becomes less decisive and uniform, and decrease electoral accountability (Norris 2008). Empirically, dispersive power-sharing is linked to stronger democratic performance (Norris 2008) but also decreased odds of democratic survival (Graham et. al. 2017).

Constraining power-sharing institutions are designed to prevent “the monopolization of power” and limit the government's capacity for repression (Gates et. al. 2016). Key components of constraining power-sharing include constitutionally protected group rights and judicial powers, as well as judicial review and tenure. Collectively, these features should strengthen two important democratic institutions, the rule of law and accountability, by establishing checks and balances and safeguarding minority rights (Gates et. al. 2016; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020). Additionally, constraining power-sharing was found to significantly reduce the likelihood of democratic breakdown (Graham et. al. 2017). However, this promising institutional arrangement remains understudied, particularly regarding its impact on democratic quality.

From this framework, three hypotheses emerge:

- **H1:** Inclusive power-sharing will be positively associated with democratic quality, but the estimated effect will be smaller than that for dispersive or constraining power-sharing.

- **H2:** Dispersive power-sharing will be positively associated with democratic quality.
- **H3:** Constraining power-sharing will be associated with the largest positive effect on democratic quality among the three power-sharing types, with particularly strong effects on the institutions of the rule of law and accountability.

Power-Sharing and Democratic Quality in Post-Conflict Contexts

Post-conflict environments present unique challenges for democratic development. Trust between rival groups is typically low, undermining collective governance and complicating assurances of sincere political commitments. Additionally, post-war countries often lack economic prosperity and equality, both of which are critical stabilizing factors that encourage democratic development (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Furthermore, the priority in post-conflict countries is the maintenance of peace, whereas non-post-conflict countries can afford to focus more on improving governance. Consequently, institutional arrangements tend to be more fragile in post-conflict divided societies. Thus, power-sharing institutions likely yield different effects on democratic quality in post-conflict settings.

Inclusive power-sharing aims to facilitate political integration and build trust among rival groups, suggesting it may be particularly necessary in post-conflict environments. Empirical evidence on inclusive power-sharing in post-conflict contexts is very mixed. Although democratic survival tends to be lower under inclusive power-sharing generally, it notably improves the likelihood of democratic survival in post-conflict societies (Graham et. al. 2017). Furthermore, while the political components of inclusive power-sharing were found to enhance post-conflict judicial independence, an inclusive military had a significant detrimental effect on judicial independence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019). The political components of inclusive power-sharing were also found to have a negative, though insignificant, effect on democracy, measured by the presence of free and fair elections (Juon and Bochsler 2022).

Dispersive power-sharing provides representation for groups and the protection of minority interests, which should promote stability and democracy, especially in a post-conflict context where there is a lack of trust between groups. Conversely, while it has been linked to timely

elections post-conflict (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005), dispersive power-sharing also reduces the chances of democratic survival (Graham et. al. 2017).

Constraining power-sharing institutions work to “deter the capture and abuse of government coercive capacity for factional purposes,” which is especially essential in fragile post-conflict settings (Gates et. al. 2016, 516). Unlike the other forms of power-sharing, constraining institutions explicitly focus on bolstering democratic institutions, such as accountability and the rule of law, to prevent conflict. In post-conflict settings, such institutions are highly important. For instance, enhanced rule of law has been found to stabilize peace in post-conflict countries (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019) and is an essential component of a high-quality democracy (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020). Constraining power-sharing was also positively and significantly associated with democratic survival in post-conflict settings (Graham et. al. 2017).

From this framework, three further hypotheses emerge:

- **H4:** In post-conflict settings, inclusive power-sharing will continue to be positively associated with democratic quality, but the effect will be smaller.
- **H5:** In post-conflict settings, dispersive power-sharing will continue to be positively associated with democratic quality, but the effect will be smaller.
- **H6:** In post-conflict settings, constraining power-sharing will maintain its strong positive association with democratic quality.

IV. Methodology

A dataset was constructed by merging the Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraints (IDC) Power-Sharing Dataset (Ziff, et. al. 2024b; 2024c) with the Democracy Matrix Dataset (Lauth, Schlenkrich, and Wahman 2021), to investigate the impact of power-sharing on democratic quality. Unmatched country-year observations were excluded.

The new dataset covers 155 countries between 1975 and 2015, and includes 22 variables, with 5,869 observations. This dataset appears to be the largest ever used to investigate the impacts of power-sharing on democratic quality, and the first-ever combination of these two datasets. Of 733 missing values, only control variables were affected; rows with missing explanatory or dependent

variables were dropped. Missingness seemed to be random, rather than concentrated for specific countries or years.

Dependent Variables

The Democracy Matrix Dataset provided the key dependent variable for this study: democratic quality (Lauth, Schlenkrich, and Wahman 2021). The Matrix conceives of democratic quality in three dimensions, five democratic institutions, and fifteen matrix fields (*Figure 1*), with indices for each, and an aggregate measure. They also included trade-off and contextual measurements of democracy dimensions (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2020).

For the purposes of this study, the variables focused on were the **aggregate democratic quality index** (*total_index_core*), comprised of all indicators, and the sub-indices representing the five key democratic institutions (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2021). These variables provided a suitable level of aggregation for this dissertation's aims, while still allowing for specific institutional qualities to be examined.

- **Quality of elections index** (*decision_inst_index_core*) measures whether elections are free and competitive, whether all citizens have equal voting rights, and whether there is independent supervision of elections
- **Quality of parties, interest groups, and civil society index** (*intermediate_inst_index_core*) assesses whether parties and civil society organizations can form and act freely, whether all relevant interests have equal opportunities to organize and influence political decisions, and whether political parties and civic organizations can engage in oversight of the government
- **Quality of the media index** (*communication_inst_index_core*) measures whether there is freedom of expression and the press, whether there is equal access to media and information, and whether the media engages in oversight of the government
- **Quality of the rule of law index** (*rights_inst_index_core*) assesses whether there is an independent judiciary and the rule of law, whether all citizens have equal access to justice, and whether the government respects legal norms and complies with judicial decisions

- **Quality of effective power of government and horizontal accountability index** (*rules_settlement_inst_index_core*) measures whether the government can act effectively and independently, whether the legislature, executive, and administration treat all citizens equally, and whether there is legislative oversight of the government

The indices, scaled 0-1, had mean values ranging from 0.47 to 0.59, indicating moderate levels of democracy and institutional performance. Democratic quality varied significantly by country and region; higher scores were concentrated in Europe and North America, and the lowest scores were in the Middle East and North Africa, while other regions had considerable ranges (e.g., East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa), indicating diverse regime types.¹

Explanatory Variables

The IDC Power-Sharing Dataset provided the explanatory variables for this study: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing (Ziff et. al. 2024a; 2024b). These three power-sharing types were operationalized through indices. Only the aggregate indices from the IDC Power-Sharing Dataset were considered in this dissertation, not the individual indicators.

- **Inclusive power-sharing index** (*inclusive_powersharing*) includes the mandated grand coalition (or *de facto* grand coalition in non-elected governments), mutual veto provisions, reserved executive positions, reserved legislative seats, and inclusive military representation
- **Dispersive power-sharing index** (*dispersive_powersharing*) includes subnational tax, educational, and police authority, state/provincial and municipal executive and legislative legislations, and subnational consistency alignment in the central government
- **Constraining power-sharing index** (*constraining_powersharing*) includes constitutional guarantees for religious freedom and non-discrimination, a ban on military legislators, a ban on ethnic/religious/regional parties, judicial review and tenure, and enumerated judicial powers

¹ For further descriptive statistics on the dependent variables, please consult Appendices B and C.

Indicators were binary (Graham 2024), and factor analysis determined index weights. For instance, bans on ethnic/religious/regional parties and the mandated grand coalition had very low factor loadings and thus were assigned almost no weight in their respective indices (Strøm et. al. 2015, 171-173). All indices were constructed so that a negative value indicated a lack of power-sharing, while a value above zero indicated the presence of power-sharing, with higher values indicating greater magnitudes of power-sharing. Indices had means near zero, with moderate standard deviations (0.55-0.76), showing variation in power-sharing practices across cases.²

Figure 2: Adoption of (Any) Power-Sharing Institutions Over Time (1975-2015)




Figure 2 visualizes the range of the dataset used in this study by displaying the global distribution of countries that adopted at least one form of power-sharing between 1975 and 2015. The magnitude of power-sharing present in the country is demonstrated by the blue color gradient; countries shaded in green never adopted any form of power-sharing, and countries shaded in gray were not included in the dataset. The map demonstrates that power-sharing is a worldwide phenomenon.³

² For further descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables, please consult Appendix B.

³ To see the adoption of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing institutions (individually) over time, please consult Appendices D, E, and F.

Control Variables and Interaction Variable

The IDC Power-Sharing Dataset also contributed the control variables and interaction variables for this study (Ziff, et. al. 2024b; Ziff, et. al. 2024c). This study used the following control variables: (1) GDP per capita, (2) GDP growth, (3) population, (4) area, (5) ethnolinguistic fractionalization, (6) colonial history, (7) previous experience as a British colony, (8) years since democratization, and (9) past democratic breakdowns. Economic development and country size were controlled for due to their association with power-sharing and democratic quality. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization was controlled, as power-sharing arrangements are often applied in such societies. Finally, colonial and prior democratic history were controlled to mitigate endogeneity concerns, given their influence on democratic development. The selection of control variables followed other studies using the IDC Power-Sharing Dataset (Graham et. al. 2017, 696; Bormann et. al. 2019, 91) and a prior study which measured the impact of political power-sharing on democratic quality (Bochsler and Juon 2021, 420). Control variables like GDP growth, years since democratization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and area showed substantial variation. This reflects the diverse economic development, democratic longevity, ethnic diversity, and country size across units in the dataset.⁴

Furthermore, this study used an interaction variable to study whether the effects of power-sharing on democratic quality were different in post-conflict states. The interaction variable (*postConflict*) was a binary variable indicating a country's post-conflict status and was measured by whether there had been armed conflict in the last ten years.⁵ This was the same variable used by Strøm, et. al. (2015) when they observed which power-sharing institutions were most prevalent in post-conflict states (176).

Statistical Methods

⁴ For further descriptive statistics on the control variables, please consult Appendix B.

⁵ For the description of control variables and the interaction variable, please consult Appendix A.

Given the multi-period, multi-unit dataset (155 countries over 41 years), the *two-way fixed effects (TWFE)* method was chosen to identify the causal effect of various types of power-sharing on democratic quality (Bueno de Mesquita and Fowler 2021; Cunningham 2021).

To test H1-H3, the following model was applied:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 I_{it} + \beta_2 D_{it} + \beta_3 C_{it} + \gamma X_{it} + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Y_{it} = outcome of interest (e.g., the democratic quality index value)
- I_{it} , D_{it} , and C_{it} = inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing indices
- β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 = average causal effect of each power-sharing type on the outcome
- γX_{it} = vector of the control variables, and its coefficient
- α_i = country fixed effects, controlling for all time-invariant country characteristics
- λ_t = year fixed effects, controlling for global or region-wide shocks common to all countries in a given year
- ϵ_{it} = error term

To test H4-H6, the following model was applied:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 I_{it} + \beta_2 D_{it} + \beta_3 C_{it} + \beta_4 PC_{it} + \beta_5 (I_{it} \cdot PC_{it}) + \beta_6 (D_{it} \cdot PC_{it}) + \beta_7 (C_{it} \cdot PC_{it}) + \gamma X_{it} + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Y_{it} = outcome of interest
- I_{it} , D_{it} , and C_{it} = power-sharing indices
- β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 = average causal effect of each power-sharing type on the outcome, when a country is not post-conflict ($PC_{it} = 0$)
- β_4 = effect of post-conflict status on outcome, without power-sharing
- PC_{it} = status as a post-conflict state
- β_5 , β_6 , and β_7 = additional change in the effect of each power-sharing type on the outcome, when a country is post-conflict ($PC_{it} = 1$)
- γX_{it} = vector of the control variables, and its coefficient
- α_i = country fixed effects

- λ_t = year fixed effects
- ϵ_{it} = error term

TWFE regression models were run in R, using the *fixest* package (Berge 2019), and standard errors were clustered at the country-level.

Identification Assumptions

TWFE was chosen as the estimator as it can “eliminate any and all unobserved and observed time-invariant covariates correlated with the treatment variable,” via fixed effects (Cunningham 2021). Though time-variant unobserved heterogeneity persists, controlling for key covariates, such as the identified control variables, mitigates this issue. Sufficient within-country and over-time variation existed in variables.⁶ Additionally, country-level clustering corrected for arbitrary serial correlation in errors, preventing unreliable standard errors and biased estimates (Cunningham 2021). Multicollinearity was not an issue as explanatory variables were uncorrelated.⁷

However, to ensure that the TWFE estimator would provide an unbiased estimate of the average effect of power-sharing on democratic quality, *parallel trends* had to be upheld (Bueno de Mesquita and Fowler 2021). This requires that, without treatment, units in the treatment and control groups would follow parallel outcome trends over time. In the context of this study, it implies that countries adopting power-sharing would have maintained the same democratic quality levels as non-adopters, had they not adopted power-sharing.

Parallel trends can be tested with an event study, which compares treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period (Cunningham 2021). Explanatory variables were recoded as dummy variables (0 = no power-sharing; 1 = power-sharing), ignoring the magnitude of power-sharing present. Next, the event study was run comparing the correlation between being in the treatment group and the control group within each year, both before and after the treatment began. For

⁶ For the summary statistics on the explanatory and dependent variables, please consult Appendix B.

⁷ For the correlation matrix, please consult Appendix G.

parallel trends, the event study should show no treatment effect in pre-treatment years (Huntington-Klein 2025).

Figure 3: Event Study Estimates by Power-Sharing Type




Figure 3 showcases the results of this event study, which indicate that parallel trends were held. While many of the estimated effects in the pre-treatment period did deviate from zero, these effects were not statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

V. Results

Effects of Power-Sharing on Democratic Quality

Table 1 reports the results from seven regression models that incrementally added economic, demographic, and historical controls and year and country fixed effects to assess the association between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing and overall democratic quality.

Across all models, only constraining power-sharing demonstrated a positive and statistically significant relationship with democratic quality. In Model 7, the coefficient for constraining power-

sharing was $\beta = 0.073$ ($p < 0.001$), indicating that higher levels of constraining power-sharing were associated with improved democratic quality within countries over time. This positive association remained robust to the inclusion of multiple controls and fixed effects.

Table 1: Regression Output: Power-Sharing Types and Democratic Quality

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Intercept	0.502*** (0.019)	-0.304** (0.095)	-0.368 (0.186)	-0.302 (0.184)	-0.313 (0.199)		
Inclusive Power-Sharing	0.057 (0.038)	0.038 (0.023)	0.042 (0.024)	0.038 (0.023)	0.038 (0.022)	0.034 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.027)
Dispersive Power-Sharing	0.133*** (0.023)	0.081*** (0.021)	0.094*** (0.020)	0.093*** (0.019)	0.093*** (0.019)	0.090*** (0.019)	0.035 (0.023)
Constraining Power-Sharing	0.109*** (0.022)	0.131*** (0.019)	0.126*** (0.019)	0.125*** (0.019)	0.119*** (0.019)	0.102*** (0.020)	0.073*** (0.019)
GDP/capita (log)		0.101*** (0.012)	0.099*** (0.013)	0.091*** (0.014)	0.099*** (0.016)	0.098*** (0.016)	-0.013 (0.024)
GDP growth		-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
Population (log)			0.007 (0.011)	0.004 (0.010)	0.007 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.024 (0.050)
Country Size			-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization			-0.034 (0.060)	-0.023 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.056)	-0.032 (0.056)	3.967** (1.450)
No Colonial History				0.075 (0.039)	0.064 (0.039)	0.053 (0.040)	
British Colony				0.051 (0.034)	0.051 (0.035)	0.053 (0.035)	
Past Democratic Breakdowns					-0.002 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.142*** (0.037)
Years since Democratization (log)					-0.034** (0.012)	-0.035** (0.012)	-0.073*** (0.007)
Num. obs.	5869	5635	5598	5598	5581	5581	5581
R ² (full model)	0.225	0.414	0.426	0.435	0.445	0.478	0.853
R ² (proj model)						0.421	0.212
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.224	0.414	0.425	0.434	0.444	0.473	0.847
Adj. R ² (proj model)						0.420	0.211
Num. groups: year						41	41
Num. groups: country							155

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Dispersive power-sharing demonstrated a positive and statistically significant association with democratic quality across the first six models, but lost significance when country fixed effects were added. In Model 7, the coefficient for dispersive power-sharing was $\beta = 0.035$ ($p > 0.05$), indicating that higher levels of dispersive power-sharing were associated, though insignificantly, with improved democratic quality within countries over time.

Inclusive power-sharing demonstrated a positive but statistically insignificant association with democratic quality across the first six models. However, the relationship became negative when country fixed effects were added. In Model 7, the coefficient for inclusive power-sharing was $\beta = -0.013$ ($p > 0.05$), indicating that higher levels of inclusive power-sharing were associated, though insignificantly, with worsened democratic quality within countries over time.

Figure 4 presents the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from regression models examining the estimated effects of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing on the five institutions of democratic quality (elections, civil society, media, rule of law, and accountability) as well as the overall democratic quality index. The regression models used to acquire the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals included all controls and country and year fixed effects.⁸ The coefficient plot reveals that power-sharing had mixed effects on institutions of democratic quality.

Inclusive power-sharing appeared to be the most detrimental to the institutions of democratic quality, demonstrating a consistently negative impact, though the effects are all statistically insignificant ($p > 0.05$), and most coefficient estimates are generally very close to zero. The most substantial effect of inclusive power-sharing was on the rule of law; the coefficient was $\beta = -0.035$ ($p > 0.05$), indicating that higher levels of inclusive power-sharing were associated with worsened rule of law within countries over time.


On the other hand, constraining power-sharing had a consistently positive and significant relationship with all institutions of democratic quality ($p < 0.05$), indicating that higher levels of

⁸ For the full regression output, please consult Appendix H.

constraining power-sharing were associated with improved quality of elections, civil society, media, rule of law, accountability, and overall democracy. It was most beneficial for overall democratic quality ($\beta = 0.073$) and elections ($\beta = 0.071$), and the least beneficial for rule of law ($\beta = 0.040$).

Furthermore, the coefficient plot reveals that dispersive power-sharing had a consistently positive relationship with the institutions of democratic quality, though all effects were statistically insignificant ($p > 0.05$). It was most beneficial for media ($\beta = 0.047$), and the least beneficial for accountability ($\beta = 0.014$).


Figure 4: Coefficient Plot: Power-Sharing Types and Institutions of Democratic Quality



Effects of Power-Sharing on Democratic Quality in Post-Conflict Contexts

Figure 5 presents the marginal effects of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing on overall democratic quality, for post-conflict and non-post-conflict countries. The regression model used to acquire the marginal effects and confidence intervals included all controls and country and year fixed effects.⁹

Figure 5: Marginal Effects Plot: Power-Sharing Types ($\times$ Post-Conflict) and Democratic Quality



Overall, the plot demonstrates that regardless of post-conflict status, inclusive power-sharing had a negative but statistically insignificant relationship with democratic quality ($p > 0.05$), dispersive power-sharing had a positive but statistically insignificant relationship with democratic quality ($p > 0.05$), and constraining power-sharing had a positive and statistically significant relationship with democratic quality ($p < 0.05$).

⁹ For the full regression output, please consult Appendix I.

However, it is important to note the differences in marginal effects of power-sharing types between countries. Constraining power-sharing and dispersive power-sharing had a slightly stronger effect on democratic quality in non-post-conflict countries, compared to post-conflict countries. On the other hand, the estimated marginal effect of inclusive power-sharing was larger in non-post-conflict countries, and still negative. This indicates that increased inclusive power-sharing appeared to be more detrimental to democratic quality in non-post-conflict countries, compared to in post-conflict countries.

Figure 6 presents the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from regression models testing whether the impact of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing on the institutions of democratic quality differs in post-conflict settings. The regression models used to acquire the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals included all controls and country and year fixed effects.¹⁰

The coefficient plot reveals that post-conflict countries without any power-sharing had some small positive associations and some negative associations with the institutions of democratic quality, though all coefficients were statistically insignificant ($p > 0.05$). This suggests that without power-sharing, post-conflict contexts tend not to improve nor worsen institutions of democratic quality.


The interaction terms seen in the coefficient plot demonstrate how the effects of power-sharing change in post-conflict countries compared to non-post-conflict countries. While there was considerable variability in interaction effects, all remained statistically insignificant ($p > 0.05$).

Inclusive power-sharing interactions were consistently positive yet small across all institutions of democratic quality, indicating that while inclusive power-sharing tended to have negative effects in non-post-conflict settings, as seen in the previous section, these negative effects were reduced in post-conflict settings. The largest positive interaction effects are seen for overall democratic quality ($\beta = 0.013$) and accountability and civil society (both $\beta = 0.012$).

¹⁰ For the full regression output, please consult Appendix J.

On the other hand, dispersive power-sharing interactions were primarily negative, indicating that dispersive power-sharing became less beneficial in post-conflict settings compared to non-post-conflict settings. The largest negative interaction effects are seen for accountability ($\beta = -0.030$) and elections ($\beta = -0.021$).

Figure 6: Coefficient Plot: Power-Sharing Types ($\times$ Post-Conflict) and Institutions of Democratic Quality



Constraining power-sharing demonstrated mixed results, with small positive interactions for accountability ($\beta = 0.001$), rule of law ($\beta = 0.002$), and elections ($\beta = 0.003$), but negative interactions for civil society ($\beta = -0.002$), overall democratic quality ($\beta = -0.005$), and media ($\beta = -0.013$). This suggests that constraining power-sharing's strong positive effects in non-post-conflict contexts, as established in the previous section, were diminished in post-conflict contexts for some institutions, while slightly improved in other institutions.

VI. Discussion

Interpretation of Results

The results in *Table 1* and *Figure 4* indicate mixed effects of power-sharing on democratic quality. H1 was not supported, as inclusive power-sharing was negatively associated with overall democratic quality and each of the individual democratic institutions, though these relationships were all statistically insignificant. H2 was partially supported: dispersive power-sharing was positively associated with democratic quality and its institutions, but these relationships were not statistically significant. H3 was also partially supported. While constraining power-sharing was positively, strongly, and significantly associated with overall democratic quality and its institutions, it had the weakest effect on the institution of the rule of law, despite what had been anticipated. It is important to note, however, that this effect on the rule of law was still positive and statistically significant, and of greater magnitude than that observed for dispersive or inclusive power-sharing.

However, the disappearance of significance and/or change in the direction of the association once country fixed effects were introduced for inclusive and dispersive power-sharing suggests unobserved country-level characteristics may have biased estimates and/or country fixed effects may have absorbed too much variation, thereby compromising the reliability of these specific findings. This issue will be discussed in the Complexities and Limitations section.

Figures 5 and *6* illustrated how the effects of the three power-sharing types changed in post-conflict settings and indicated that the post-conflict context did not have a significant impact on democratic quality, and previous trends continued. However, while differences between effects in post-conflict and non-post-conflict contexts were insignificant, in post-conflict contexts, inclusive power-sharing became less harmful to democratic quality, and dispersive and constraining power-sharing were relatively less beneficial. Thus, H4 was not supported, H5 was partially supported (as the relationship was still statistically insignificant), and H6 was fully supported.

Implications and Relation to Prior Research

This study was the first to consider the impact of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing on democratic quality, and how the effects change in post-conflict contexts. It expands upon Bochsler and Juon (2021), who only examined institutional power-sharing in mostly Western, non-post-conflict democracies. Therefore, this dissertation addressed a notable gap in the empirical literature, and its results have considerable implications.

This dissertation found that inclusive power-sharing had a consistently negative, though statistically insignificant, association with democratic quality and its institutions. This challenges theoretical and normative arguments for political power-sharing, which state that since such institutions ensure representation and participation for all groups, they are the best way to achieve and maintain a stable democracy in a divided society (Lijphart 1977; Andeweg 2000). These results contest previous empirical research, which found that political power-sharing performed well on most metrics of democratic quality (Bochsler and Juon 2021) and was positively associated with free and fair elections (Juon and Bochsler 2022) and improved post-conflict rule of law (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019). However, an inclusive military was a component of inclusive power-sharing. This indicates the negative impact may have been due to military power-sharing, aligning with prior findings by Hartzell and Hoddie (2019) that military power-sharing significantly and negatively affects post-conflict rule of law.

Instead, the results provide some evidence for critics' arguments that political power-sharing institutions can be detrimental to democracy (O'Leary 2005; Andeweg 2000; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad 2008). Furthermore, it reinforced prior empirical studies, such as Bochsler and Juon (2021), which found that political power-sharing was correlated with weak institutional veto players outside elite control, like the judiciary, and Juon and Bochsler (2022), which found that political power-sharing had a negative, though insignificant, effect on free and fair elections in post-conflict contexts. Additionally, this study found no significant difference in inclusive power-sharing's effects on democratic quality between post-conflict and non-post-conflict societies, though inclusive power-sharing was more detrimental in non-post-conflict societies. These results

partially aligned with Graham et al. (2017)'s finding that inclusive power-sharing was beneficial to democratic survival in post-conflict societies, but detrimental in general contexts.

In summary, policymakers should exercise caution when adopting inclusive power-sharing institutions. While it may still be the “dominant conflict-solving approach” (Binningsbø 2013, 89) and the effect on democratic quality was statistically insignificant, this dissertation demonstrates that inclusive power-sharing should not automatically be seen as the best institutional arrangement for divided societies, if the goal is to achieve a high-quality democracy.

For dispersive power-sharing, the results reinforce many of the arguments made in favor of the arrangement. Dispersive institutions showed consistently positive, though statistically insignificant, effects on democratic quality, aligning with federalist arguments about the arrangement's merits for divided societies (Norris 2008; Lijphart 1979). However, dispersive power-sharing had its weakest effect on accountability, supporting critics who argue that the multiplication of agencies can make it difficult for citizens to hold elected officials accountable (Norris 2008). The results reinforced prior studies that associated dispersive power-sharing with timely post-conflict elections (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005) and a stronger democratic performance (Norris 2008) but also challenged the finding that dispersive power-sharing was negatively associated with democratic survival (Graham, et. al. 2017).

Conversely, while dispersive power-sharing had a consistently positive impact on democratic quality, it was statistically insignificant across all models with year and country fixed effects. This indicates that whether a country adopts dispersive power-sharing will not significantly impact democratic quality. Therefore, while policymakers should still consider dispersive power-sharing when deciding how best to institutionally engineer divided societies, it is not guaranteed to positively contribute to democracy quality. Nevertheless, the democratic consequences of dispersive power-sharing remain considerably under-researched and warrant further discussion.

The results reinforce normative and empirical arguments for constraining power-sharing, adding considerable and novel evidence in their favor. Constraining power-sharing was theorized by Strøm et. al. (2015) as an inherently anti-majoritarian system meant to safeguard minority rights

in a divided society (Gates et. al. 2016), and its components explicitly focus on maintaining strong democratic institutions. The findings supported these arguments, as constraining power-sharing was positively and significantly associated with democratic quality and its institutions, in both general and post-conflict settings, and outperformed inclusive and dispersive power-sharing. It also reinforced Graham et. al (2017), which found constraining power-sharing had a strong, positive, and statistically significant impact on democratic survival in both general and post-conflict contexts. However, constraining power-sharing surprisingly had the weakest association with the rule of law, though this was still stronger than inclusive or dispersive power-sharing. This indicates that perhaps establishing a high level of rule of law requires more than constraining power-sharing institutions.

The strong, positive, and statistically significant effect of constraining power-sharing on democratic quality across all institutions and contexts is a major empirical contribution that demands more attention in power-sharing theory and from policymakers. Furthermore, these findings represent a significant theoretical contribution, as they empirically validate Strøm et al.'s (2015) framework while challenging the field's predominant focus on inclusive arrangements. The consistent significance of constraining institutions across all democratic quality measures suggests that power-sharing theory should be fundamentally reoriented toward institutional constraint rather than political inclusion. Additionally, this dissertation's results indicate that constraining institutions should be strongly considered in fragile or transitional democracies, especially in post-conflict settings.

Finally, this dissertation's contextual results challenge the argument that post-conflict societies face insurmountable barriers to establishing high-quality democracy and that power-sharing institutions will be ineffective. For instance, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) strongly advocated against adopting power-sharing in post-conflict settings and stated that it would threaten peace and democracy. However, contextual analysis showed little difference between non-post-conflict and post-conflict settings: inclusive institutions were somewhat less detrimental, while dispersive and constraining effects weakened slightly, but none of these changes were statistically significant. These results thus contest claims that power-sharing is inherently ineffective in post-conflict societies.

Complexities and Limitations

While some results aligned with the hypotheses and prior literature, many were unexpected. This section provides alternative explanations and discusses how methodological limitations may have influenced these findings.

The most surprising result was that inclusive power-sharing had a consistently negative, though insignificant, effect on democratic quality across institutions in both general and post-conflict contexts. This contradicts the positive findings of Bochsler and Juon (2021), the only prior study to measure political power-sharing's impact on democratic quality. One explanation is that inclusive power-sharing includes not only the first three consociationalism components (grand coalition, mutual veto, and proportionality) but also an inclusive military. Though the grand coalition is considered most important for establishing a "government by elite cartel" (Lijphart 1969, 9), it was assigned almost no weight in the inclusive power-sharing index due to its low factor loading (Strøm et al. 2015, 171-173; Graham 2024). Furthermore, while an inclusive military has not been empirically assessed by many, Hartzell and Hoddie (2019) found that military power-sharing had a significant, negative impact on post-conflict rule of law. Thus, the observed effects may reflect the grand coalition's low weight in the index and the inclusion of military power-sharing. This challenges the validity of Strøm et al. (2015)'s inclusive power-sharing conceptualization, or at least demonstrates it should be considered distinct from political power-sharing and consociationalism.

Furthermore, while dispersive power-sharing had a consistently positive relationship with democratic quality, the effect was always statistically insignificant. Contrary to expectations, post-conflict contexts did not significantly weaken power-sharing's positive effects, suggesting challenges in these settings may not be as severe as argued in the literature. Additionally, although constraining power-sharing had the anticipated strong and positive effect on democratic quality, it had the weakest effect on the rule of law, despite constraining power-sharing institutions being explicitly focused on enhancing judicial independence. Constraining power-sharing still had a positive and statistically significant association with the rule of law, and the association was of

greater magnitude than dispersive and inclusive power-sharing. However, this result was unexpected and may have been slightly skewed by other indicators that make up constraining power-sharing, such as the ban on ethnic parties and military legislators.

Despite using the largest dataset of its kind to study the relationship between power-sharing and democratic quality and a robust methodology, with fixed effects and numerous controls, the study had considerable limitations. Two-way fixed effects models cannot eliminate all time-variant unobserved heterogeneity, and 733 observations (12.5%) were missing, potentially biasing estimates (Cunningham 2021; Huntington-Klein 2025). Moreover, event study results indicated that parallel trends were held, but many pre-treatment estimated effects deviated from zero, and many post-treatment estimated effects were close to zero and/or statistically insignificant. Thus, while the parallel trends assumption cannot be formally rejected, the results introduced uncertainty about this assumption's validity and reflect potentially biased estimates of power-sharing's effect on democratic quality (Bueno de Mesquita and Fowler 2021). Further parallel trends tests should be run, such as a placebo test (Huntington-Klein 2025).

An additional limitation concerns using country fixed effects in this study. Fixed effects eliminate variation between units, leaving only variation within individual units. However, especially if there is minimal variation in the variable of interest over time, fixed effects may “over-control,” removing both bad variation (omitted variables that would bias the estimate) and good variation (the variable of interest) and resulting in measurement error (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Huntington-Klein 2025). This may have been the case in this study, as seen with the results reported in *Table 1* and *Appendix I*, which suggest that estimated effects were sensitive to controls and fixed effects.

Appendix B indicates that the inclusive power-sharing had the lowest standard deviation of the three power-sharing types, indicating less variation. Subsequently, *Table 1* reveals that inclusive power-sharing had a positive, though statistically insignificant, association with democratic quality across all models, until country fixed effects were introduced in Model 7, and the association became negative. Similarly, according to *Appendix I*, inclusive power-sharing had a positive and statistically significant association with democratic quality in post-conflict settings ($p < 0.001$)

across models until country fixed effects were introduced in Model 3, and the association became negative and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the country fixed effects may have absorbed too much variation, and there is a possibility of biased estimates.

Furthermore, while *Appendix B* demonstrates that dispersive power-sharing had the highest standard deviation of the power-sharing types, indicating the most variation, the results reported in *Table 1* and *Appendix I* suggest that country fixed effects may have absorbed too much variation for dispersive power-sharing as well. *Table 1* indicates that dispersive power-sharing had a strong, positive, and significant association with democratic quality across all models ($p < 0.001$), but this relationship became slightly weaker and statistically insignificant when country-fixed effects were introduced in Model 7. Furthermore, in *Appendix I*, dispersive power-sharing had a small, negative but statistically significant association with democratic quality in post-conflict settings ($p < 0.05$) across the models until country fixed effects were introduced in Model 3, and the association became positive and statistically insignificant. Thus, as with inclusive power-sharing, the country fixed effects may have absorbed too much variation, and there is a risk of bias.

While the relationship between constraining power-sharing and democratic quality did not experience such drastic shifts in direction and statistical significance as the other two power-sharing types, the introduction of country fixed effects in Model 7 did decrease the association's magnitude, according to *Table 1*.

The R^2 values further demonstrate that country fixed effects may have absorbed too much variation. In *Table 1*, the projected R^2 decreased from 0.421 in Model 6 to 0.212 in Model 7, when country fixed effects were added; *Appendix I* reported a nearly identical decrease from Model 2 to Model 3. However, in *Table 1*, the R^2 increased from 0.478 in Model 6 to 0.853 in Model 7, and *Appendix I* reported a nearly identical increase from Model 2 to Model 3. When the R^2 is considerably larger than the projected R^2 , this indicates that the model may have been “over-fitted” (Frost 2018), and this appears to have been the case for Model 7 and Model 3 in *Table 1* and *Appendix I*, respectively.

In summation, the limitations of this study indicate that further tests should be run on the relationship between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing and democratic quality, and that there should be further research on the proper model specifications required for analyzing this relationship. However, it is important to reiterate that the two-way fixed effects model is the standard method utilized for this type of dataset (Bueno de Mesquita and Fowler 2021; Cunningham 2021).

Further Research

As this study was the first to consider these relationships, there are numerous avenues for further research. For instance, it would be useful to disaggregate the inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing indices into individual indicators and determine whether results still hold. This would be especially important for inclusive power-sharing, as it combined elements of political power-sharing/consociationalism with military power-sharing, and thus isolating the political and military components' effects would be insightful. Furthermore, this study did not consider the interaction between multiple types of power-sharing and whether more types of power-sharing present had a stronger effect on democratic quality. As multiple forms of power-sharing have been positively associated with minimalist democracy emergence and strengthened rule of law in post-conflict settings (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015; 2019), this avenue for future research warrants attention.

Additionally, this study only considered the average effect of power-sharing on democratic quality. However, does the presence of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing impede or promote further democratization over the years? As power-sharing has often been accused of freezing and institutionalizing conflict between societal segments, subsequently deadlocking governments and harming government efficacy (O'Leary 2005; Andeweg 2000; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Jarstad 2008), investigating power-sharing institutions' long-term impact on democratic quality would be highly beneficial.

An additional possibility for future study would be to use the Democracy Barometer, Freedom House, or V-Dem datasets instead of the Democracy Matrix and see whether results would hold.

How dependent were this study's results on the way the Democracy Matrix conceptualized and measured democracy quality? This difference in datasets could help explain why Bochsler and Juon (2021), who used Democracy Barometer data, found political power-sharing to be positively correlated with most indicators of democratic quality, while this study found inclusive power-sharing to have the opposite impact. Furthermore, as these measurements largely excluded citizen perspectives on democratic quality, it would be constructive to consider citizen input in future research on power-sharing's impact on democratic quality. This additional perspective would help investigate the claim that power-sharing is an elite-driven institutional arrangement disconnected from the population.

VII. Conclusion

This dissertation sought to examine how inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing institutions influence democratic quality and whether these effects differ in post-conflict societies. By merging the IDC Power-Sharing and Democracy Matrix datasets, this study provided the most comprehensive cross-national analysis of this relationship to date, considering 155 countries from 1975 to 2015. The findings of this study were mixed and had considerable theoretical and policy implications.

Inclusive power-sharing, despite the prominence of its political components in both theory and practice, was negatively associated with democratic quality across all models, though insignificantly. This suggests that the very features thought to guarantee representation, participation, and equality may instead reinforce elite dominance and undermine the quality of democracy. While inclusive institutions remain a common component of peace agreements, the results of this dissertation caution against their automatic adoption if the goal is not just stability but high-quality democracy. However, as discussed in the prior section, the limitations of the study may have led to some bias in the estimated effects of inclusive power-sharing, and thus, further research should be done.

Dispersive power-sharing showed a consistently positive, though statistically insignificant, relationship with democratic quality, supporting many of the arguments for federalism found both

in the literature and amongst policymakers. The results indicate that dispersive power-sharing institutions may help to safeguard minority interests and broaden representation, but the statistical insignificance of the relationship indicates they are not a guarantee of high-quality democracy on their own. Constraining power-sharing, by contrast, emerged as the best institutional arrangement for democratic quality, as its positive and statistically significant effects held across models, democratic institutions, and contexts. By limiting the monopolization of power and strengthening accountability, constraining power-sharing arrangements appear to provide a firm institutional foundation for democracy. Constraining institutions have received little attention in the power-sharing literature, both theoretically and empirically, and thus, this noteworthy result indicates that it is necessary to further study these arrangements.

Furthermore, the lack of significant differences in the effects of power-sharing on democratic quality between non-post-conflict and post-conflict societies challenged the claim that power-sharing in post-conflict societies is inherently ineffective or detrimental to democracy. While inclusive arrangements continued to have a negative effect, it was slightly less detrimental in post-conflict contexts. Dispersive and constraining power-sharing institutions had weakened effects, but none of these differences were statistically significant.

In conclusion, the findings of this dissertation highlight that not all power-sharing arrangements equally advance democratic quality: constraining institutions stand out as the most consistently beneficial, dispersive institutions offer modest gains, and inclusive institutions may carry risks. These results suggest that both scholars and policymakers should carefully weigh the trade-offs of different institutional designs when fostering democracy in divided societies, and further research regarding the impact of power-sharing on democratic quality is necessary.

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

IX. Appendix



Appendix A: Further Variable Description

Variable Name	Variable Meaning	Variable Measurement
<i>lngdppc_WDI_PW</i>	GDP/capita (log)	Log of GDP per capita, from the World Development Indicators
<i>growth_WDI_PW</i>	GDP growth	GDP growth rate, from the World Development Indicators
<i>lnpop_WDI_PW</i>	Population (log)	Log of population, from the World Development Indicators
<i>democracy_breakdowns_BX</i>	Past democratic breakdowns	Number of past democratic breakdowns since 1800
<i>ldemocracy_age</i>	Years since democratization	Log of years since democratization
<i>nocolony</i>	No colonial history	Dummy variable for no colonial history
<i>Britcolony</i>	Former British colony	Dummy variable for a former British colony
<i>ELF</i>	Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	Index measuring the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in a society
<i>area</i>	Country size	Country area in square kilometers
<i>postConflict</i>	Post-conflict status	Dummy variable for having experienced armed conflict within the last ten years


Appendix B: Summary Statistics for Explanatory, Dependent, and Control Variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Explanatory Variables					
<i>inclusive_powersharing</i>	5869	0	0.55	-0.26	2.91
<i>dispersive_powersharing</i>	5869	0.03	0.76	-1.13	1.58
<i>constraining_powersharing</i>	5869	-0.02	0.73	-1.95	1.03
Dependent Variables					
<i>total_index_core</i>	5869	0.5	0.32	0.01	0.98
<i>decision_inst_index_core</i>	5869	0.49	0.35	0	1
<i>intermediate_inst_index_core</i>	5869	0.57	0.29	0.02	0.99
<i>communication_inst_index_core</i>	5869	0.59	0.31	0.01	1
<i>rights_inst_index_core</i>	5869	0.54	0.27	0.01	0.99
<i>rule_settlement_inst_index_core</i>	5869	0.47	0.31	0	0.99
Control Variables					
<i>lngdppc_WDI_PW</i>	5638	8.19	1.47	4.98	11.69
<i>growth_WDI_PW</i>	5669	3.66	7.12	-64.05	149.97
<i>lnpop_WDI_PW</i>	5752	16.04	1.53	12.01	21.04
<i>democracy_breakdowns_BX</i>	5814	0.44	0.78	0	4
<i>ldemocracy_age</i>	5814	3.17	1.15	0	5.38
<i>nocolony</i>	5869	0.3	0.46	0	1
<i>Britcolony</i>	5869	0.29	0.45	0	1
<i>ELF</i>	5840	0.47	0.27	0	0.98
<i>area</i>	5823	836502.05	1983043.29	680	17100000

Appendix C: Distribution of Democratic Quality by Region*Appendix D: Adoption of Inclusive Power-Sharing Institutions over Time (1975-2015)*

Appendix E: Adoption of Dispersive Power-Sharing Institutions over Time (1975-2015)*Appendix F: Adoption of Constraining Power-Sharing Institutions over Time (1975-2015)*

Appendix G: Correlation Matrix Heatmap: Power-Sharing vs. Democratic Quality



Appendix H: Regression Output: Power-Sharing and Institutions of Democratic Quality

	Democratic Quality	Elections	Civil Society	Media	Rule of Law	Accountability
Inclusive Power-Sharing	-0.013 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.030)	0.002 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.035 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.025)
Dispersive Power-Sharing	0.035 (0.023)	0.031 (0.026)	0.038 (0.022)	0.047 (0.025)	0.037 (0.019)	0.014 (0.021)
Constraining Power-Sharing	0.073*** (0.019)	0.071*** (0.021)	0.064*** (0.018)	0.059** (0.019)	0.040** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.018)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.013 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.040* (0.020)	-0.080*** (0.022)	0.001 (0.019)	0.002 (0.024)
GDP growth	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Population (log)	0.024 (0.050)	0.011 (0.055)	0.022 (0.052)	0.030 (0.060)	-0.019 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.043)
Country Size	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	3.967** (1.450)	5.627*** (1.456)	4.599*** (1.335)	4.617** (1.545)	2.217 (1.158)	3.643* (1.428)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	-0.142*** (0.037)	-0.147*** (0.035)	-0.129*** (0.033)	-0.148*** (0.038)	-0.089** (0.032)	-0.117** (0.036)
Years since Democratization (log)	-0.073*** (0.007)	-0.084*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.007)	-0.077*** (0.008)	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.059*** (0.007)
Num. obs.	5581	5581	5581	5581	5581	5581
Num. groups: year	41	41	41	41	41	41
Num. groups: country	155	155	155	155	155	155

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Appendix I: Regression Output: Power-Sharing (x Post-Conflict) and Democratic Quality

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	-0.310 (0.201)		
Inclusive Power-Sharing	0.042 [*] (0.025)	0.038 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.029)
Dispersive Power-Sharing	0.093 ^{***} (0.019)	0.091 ^{***} (0.019)	0.035 (0.023)
Constraining Power-Sharing	0.125 ^{***} (0.020)	0.106 ^{***} (0.021)	0.074 ^{***} (0.020)
Post-Conflict	-0.000 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.005 (0.018)
Inclusive × Post-Conflict	0.100 ^{***} (0.016)	0.098 ^{***} (0.016)	-0.012 (0.024)
Dispersive × Post-Conflict	-0.002 [*] (0.001)	-0.002 [*] (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
Constraining × Post-Conflict	0.007 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.025 (0.050)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
GDP Growth	-0.029 (0.055)	-0.031 (0.056)	3.962 ^{**} (1.456)
Population (log)	0.062 (0.039)	0.050 (0.040)	
Area	0.048 (0.035)	0.050 (0.035)	
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.142 ^{***} (0.037)
No Colonial History	-0.035 ^{**} (0.012)	-0.035 ^{**} (0.012)	-0.073 ^{***} (0.007)
British Colony	-0.015 (0.032)	-0.010 (0.032)	0.013 (0.017)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	0.010 (0.035)	0.009 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.019)
Years since Democratization (log)	-0.066 [*] (0.036)	-0.056 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.018)
Num. obs.	5581	5581	5581
R ² (full model)	0.447	0.479	0.853
R ² (proj model)		0.423	0.212
Adj. R ² (full model)	0.446	0.474	0.847
Adj. R ² (proj model)		0.421	0.210
Num. groups: year		41	41
Num. groups: country			155

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; [†] p < 0.1

Appendix J: Regression Output: Power-Sharing (x Post-Conflict) and Institutions of Democratic Quality

	Democratic Quality	Elections	Civil Society	Media	Rule of Law	Accountability
Inclusive Power-Sharing	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.035 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.026)
Dispersive Power-Sharing	0.035 (0.023)	0.032 (0.026)	0.040 (0.022)	0.048 (0.025)	0.037 (0.019)	0.016 (0.022)
Constraining Power-Sharing	0.074*** (0.020)	0.071** (0.022)	0.065*** (0.019)	0.061** (0.020)	0.040** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.019)
Post-Conflict	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.017)
Inclusive x Post-Conflict	0.013 (0.017)	0.011 (0.021)	0.012 (0.016)	0.006 (0.017)	0.002 (0.022)	0.012 (0.020)
Dispersive x Post-Conflict	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.030 (0.018)
Constraining x Post-Conflict	-0.005 (0.018)	0.003 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.002 (0.021)	0.001 (0.018)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.012 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.020)	-0.079*** (0.022)	0.001 (0.019)	0.003 (0.024)
GDP growth	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Population (log)	0.025 (0.050)	0.013 (0.056)	0.023 (0.052)	0.031 (0.060)	-0.019 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.043)
Country Size	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	3.962** (1.456)	5.662*** (1.459)	4.552*** (1.336)	4.562** (1.546)	2.228 (1.165)	3.628* (1.430)
Past Democratic Breakdowns	-0.142*** (0.037)	-0.146*** (0.035)	-0.130*** (0.033)	-0.149*** (0.038)	-0.089** (0.032)	-0.117** (0.036)
Years since Democratization (log)	-0.073*** (0.007)	-0.084*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.007)	-0.077*** (0.009)	-0.047*** (0.007)	-0.059*** (0.007)
Num.Obs.	5581	5581	5581	5581	5581	5581
R2	0.853	0.843	0.844	0.842	0.885	0.857
R2 Adj.	0.847	0.837	0.838	0.836	0.881	0.852
R2 Within	0.212	0.196	0.234	0.244	0.165	0.165
R2 Within Adj.	0.210	0.194	0.232	0.242	0.163	0.163
AIC	-7449.9	-5767.1	-8140.1	-7391.6	-10506.1	-7953.7
BIC	-6064.8	-4382.1	-6755.0	-6006.5	-9121.0	-6568.6
RMSE	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.11
Std.Errors	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country	by: country
FE: country	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: year	X	X	X	X	X	X

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001