

Localphiles: Own-state favoritism and anti-immigrant discrimination among US adults

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Abstract

Ethnic and racial diversity are thought to undermine social solidarity, resulting in underfunding of public goods. The “liberal dilemma” anticipates that immigration exacerbates this problem. However, the literature on how diversity and/or immigration influence public welfare spending has not explicitly considered the possibility of denying migrants access to public services. If lack of solidarity makes diverse populations unwilling to fund the welfare state, does that same low solidarity make them unmotivated to restrict newcomers’ access to services? Or are diverse societies characterized by salient ethnic divisions and therefore particularly likely to have rules privileging non-migrants? This paper explores public support for limits on migrant access to a rival, excludable public good. Data come from a survey of US adults asked to recommend criteria for state-administered college scholarship programs. Possible criteria included two kinds of favoritism for non-migrants, one targeting graduates of in-state high schools and the other US citizens and legal permanent residents. The combinations of criteria that respondents chose reveal a willingness to discriminate in favor of non-migrants that crosscuts the ideological and ethno-racial space. Also, support for discrimination against domestic migrants is correlated with support for similar measures against international newcomers. Neither state demographic context nor the ethnic composition of domestic or international migrant in-flows to various states predicts the rate at which US adults recommend state-level programs should prioritize non-migrants.

Ethnoracial diversity and migration are both thought to shape the welfare state. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) opened the quantitative study of the effects of diversity on public spending by pointing out the negative correlation between countries' ethno-linguistic fractionalization and their level of public spending. A similar negative correlation exists between racial fractionalization and sub-national spending in the US. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argued that diversity explained the contrast between the anemic US welfare state and the more robust social safety nets in homogeneous northern European countries.¹ Follow-up studies have confirmed the negative correlation between higher levels of ascriptive diversity and both actual levels of public spending (Soroka et al. 2016; Kuijs 2000; Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002) and individuals' willingness to fund the welfare state as measured in surveys (Rapp 2017; Eger 2010; Fullerton and Dixon 2009; Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist 2012; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023; Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport 2021; Luttmer 2001). These comparative findings dovetail with the American political development literature showing how anti-Black (Fullerton and Dixon 2009; Dyck and Hussey 2008; Gilens 1999) and anti-Hispanic (Fox 2004) attitudes have inhibited the expansion of social services in the US.

Alesina and his coauthors also pointed out that European countries, in particular, faced a possible liberal dilemma with respect to immigration. Inflows of ethnically distinct populations might undermine public support for the welfare state (Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport 2021; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023; Putnam 2007).² A large literature in political behavior confirms that most locally-born citizens of Europe and North America perceive immigrants to be less deserving of public services than non-immigrants (van Oorschot 2008). Immigration levels have some impact on attitudes toward the welfare state (Goldschmidt 2015). Yet, the research on immigration

1. In a near-contemporaneous finding, Easterly and Levine (1997) argued that high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization helped explain low growth rates, public corruption, and civil instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Another branch of the debate over economic implications of diversity deemphasizes the link between diversity and voter support for redistribution in favor of barriers to growth that are thought to be more relevant in low income and non-democratic settings, such as moral hazards preventing mutually-profitable market transactions. For more work in this vein see: Hewstone (2015), Kuijs (2000), and Habyarimana et al. (2007).

2. For contrary views, see Kymlicka and Banting (2006), Taylor-Gooby (2005), and Brady and Finnigan (2014).

and the shape of the welfare state has considerable nuance.³ First, immigration has the potential to increase the demand for public safety nets by increasing feelings of precarity in the job market (Finseraas 2008; Burgoon, Koster, and Egmond 2012; Steele and Perkins 2019). Immigration may decrease solidarity but increase precarity, resulting in competing pressures on leftist parties and redistributive policies; elite choices in light of those pressures become an important intervening variable (Taylor-Gooby 2005).⁴ Second, increased diversity—through migration or otherwise—might prompt a shift from non-excludable forms of public spending to targeted patronage goods (Quadagno 1994).

This paper focuses on one of the simplest mechanisms for shielding the welfare state from migration-related pressures: excluding newcomers from public services. Residence and time-in-residence restrictions on public services are ubiquitous in Western democracies (Cohen 2018; Lacina 2026; Maas 2013). European surveys suggest that endorsement of long waiting times for immigrant eligibility to social services is closely related to hawkish immigration attitudes (Mewes and Mau 2013; Kros and Coenders 2019).

This paper explores a series of new questions about how diversity and migration shape the welfare state via public support for limiting migrant access to social services. What is the relationship between diversity in the locally-born population and endorsement of residence-based favoritism in public services? Following the logic that diversity undermines willingness to fund public services, does reduced solidarity also diminish public appetite for restrictions favoring fellow locals? Or does baseline diversity lead to a heightened sense of chauvinism, so that barriers to newcomers' access to services increase with the heterogeneity of the long-settled population? Second, how do levels of migration influence the demand for residence-based favoritism? Third, how are the ef-

3. This literature overlaps with study of how levels of immigration change immigration policy and/or non-immigrants' attitudes toward such policies (Hopkins 2010), including immigrant eligibility for services (Waal et al. 2010) and/or political rights and civil liberties (Raijman et al. 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Coenders 2002; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003; Mau and Burkhardt 2009).

4. The emphasis on elite strategy echoes findings from literature on US politics suggesting that elites in diverse environments overcome public resistance to redistribution through bundling public spending (Rugh and Trounstein 2011) or agenda control (Glaser 2002).

fects of migration—if any—moderated by shared nationality and/or ethno-racial identity between newcomers and locals?

I conducted a survey asking US adult respondents to recommend criteria for their state's college merit scholarship program. Possible criteria included two kinds of favoritism for non-migrants, one targeting graduates of in-state high schools (and thereby discriminating against domestic migrants) and the other favoring US citizens and legal permanent residents over international immigrants. All 50 US states have merit scholarship programs for higher education and these programs mix-and-match two levels of residency-related restrictions, so that they discriminate against domestic migrants, international migrants, or both. This research set-up allows me to ask if the same people tend to favor residency restrictions at each geographic level. Also, this context provides substantial variation in terms of the ethnic demographics of migrants relative to newcomers.

At the individual level, the results suggest that pro-local measures are broadly normative: most people in every ethno-racial, political, and migrant-history subgroup thought there should be some favoritism for in-state students over out-of-state students and for US citizens/permanent residents over immigrants. Support for pro-local measures that discriminate against domestic migrants is correlated with support for discrimination against international migrants. However, attitudes toward anti-immigrant discrimination vary more by ethno-racial identity and by partisanship than attitudes toward domestic migration, likely reflecting the much greater salience of immigration compared to internal migration in the US. Strong identification with one's state and with the US are correlated with support for anti-migrant provisions. Turning to contextual factors, there is a positive correlation between the racial fractionalization of a state's non-migrant population and support for pro-local measures. This result contradicts the expectation that diverse populations show low in-group solidarity. However, this positive relationship is also not a statistically robust finding. Non-coethnic migrant inflows are weakly positively correlated with more demand for discrimination against migrants but, again, not in a convincing or consistent pattern.

The next section reviews the literature on diversity, migration and public services. Then, I argue

that the literature makes ambiguous predictions about how diversity in the non-migrant and migrant populations will influence public support for measures that limit migrant access to services. I then describe my survey on US higher education scholarships and lay out descriptive results. I then turn to individual and contextual correlates of support for anti-migrant discrimination.

1 Diversity, migration and public services

Western countries' welfare states are the product of the centralization and nationalization of social safety nets that were once provided by families, non-state institutions, and localities. Centralized provision of health care, pensions, infrastructure, and the like was both a driver of national identity and a byproduct of the same:

the development of modern social security institutions was closely linked with the development of national states, especially the formation of a territorially and socially closed society. The welfare state was fundamentally dependent on the integration efforts previously made by the national state, but at the same time it contributed to the deepening and strengthening of the bonds between citizens . . . the nation state became one of the most important organizational entities for social solidarity, because it provided the fundamentals of a political identity and social morals, which underpin redistributive social security systems (Mau and Burkhardt 2009, 213–214).

National identities underpin communities of perceived obligation (Wong 2010; Kustov 2025). The intuition that modern welfare states reflect shared ethno-national identities informs both the literatures on diversity and public spending and the widespread contention that international immigration may weaken support for redistribution and public services. Diversity is thought to undermine ethno-national solidarity and, therefore, a willingness to contribute toward redistribution and pure public goods. Homogenous societies in Northern Europe have the strongest ethnonational identities, the greatest levels of social solidarity, and the most robust welfare states. More diverse

European countries and the United States have more anemic welfare states. Within the US, more diverse cities, states, and counties have smaller public sectors compared to less diverse geographies. The cross-temporal version of this literature focuses on the effects of increases in diversity due to immigration. Non-immigrants are thought to feel limited social solidarity with newcomers. To the extent that immigrants are not assimilated into the dominate culture, their arrival heralds an increase in diversity, a decrease in social solidarity, and an eventual undermining of the welfare state. As noted above, the diminishment of the welfare state might not be inevitable since immigration may cause countervailing changes, such as an increase in feelings of precarity leading to more demands for social spending or an increase in anti-immigrant populism which will tend to curtail inflows and forcibly assimilate remaining newcomers.

One of the idiosyncrasies of this literature is that it tends not to make distinctions between immigration flows and immigrants' access to social services. This non-distinction reflects the way public policy happens to have unfolded in Western Europe, with expansion of immigration and universal access to many services prevailing simultaneously. However, migrants and non-migrants need not have the same access to social services. In fact, it is quite common, both between countries and within countries, for public programs to have a mix of migration-related criteria for various public services. In the 1990s, immigration scholars detected a trend away from nationality-based eligibility to residency-based eligibility (Soysal 1994; Mau and Burkhardt 2009), a change which had the effect of expanding immigrant access to social services in much of Western Europe. However, residence-based restrictions can, in principle, be used to limit migrant access to social services as well. The traditional distinction in the literature is between tying services to nationality and tying services to residence; residence criteria are presumed to be relatively trivial and therefore a fundamentally pro-mobility way of administering the welfare state. However, residence-related requirements on services routinely discriminate against migrants in at least two ways. First, eligibility for services (or prices or waiting times) may be tied to elapsed time in residence rather than a simple binary of residence/non-residence. Alternately, it may be impossible for newcomers to

establish residence unless they meet standards set by locals—e.g., laws that forbid residence in a jurisdiction by people deemed likely to become “public charges.”

If public services can be structured to discriminate against migrants or exclude them altogether, what are the implications for the so-called “liberal dilemma” that anticipates newcomers undermining the welfare state? First, the literature strongly suggests that rules curtailing migrant access to public services are most likely to be in-place in relatively homogenous and high solidarity settings. The literatures on migration policy, especially naturalization, government assimilation programs, and migrant access to political rights, all suggest that ethnically homogenous societies tend to be more closed to newcomers. Individuals who have stronger non-migrant identities—especially ethno-national identities—have the most restrictionist views on migration and, by extension, may be most inclined to adopt rules that favor non-migrants when it comes to the rationing of public goods. Scholarship on immigration policy also agrees that demands for restrictions on newcomers tend to be more popular and salient when inflows are increasing. Therefore, we would also expect migration increases to be associated with more support for limits on migrant access to services. The strength of that relationship is expected to be more pronounced if migrants are ascriptively dissimilar from the non-migrant population. All of these hypotheses suggest that the feedback between migration, diversity, and lower public spending may be self-interrupting. Migration—especially ascriptively dissimilar migrants going to a relatively homogenous context—will trigger demands for limiting newcomers access to services, which will prevent the erosion of solidarity by simply closing the circle of who receives the benefits of public coffers.

On the other hand, diverse societies have ungenerous welfare states and low feelings of solidarity; ethnic difference is already politically salient in those settings. Therefore, it would not be entirely surprising to find a diverse population of locals tends to limit newcomers’ access to social services. Those limits would reflect not a strong sense of solidarity among the locals but a general miserliness in the public sector. Also, in a diverse and hierarchical society, migrants affiliated with lower status groups might be especially stigmatized. Anti-migrant provisions and anti-minority

provisions might not be readily distinguished in such a setting.

In a cross-national setting, it becomes quite difficult to observe all potential scenarios of low or high diversity among non-migrants, large or small population inflows, and different ascriptive composition of inflows. I turn to the domestic context of US states to get more purchase on these variable demographic scenarios.

I investigate these questions using an original survey asking US adults about migration-related restrictions on higher education scholarships. The advantage of this context is that it allows me to explore two nested levels of anti-migration provision in public spending. US higher education is characterized by restrictions related to both state residence and international immigration status. By looking at both international and domestic migration flows to various US states, I observe a range of migration scenarios and can better characterize how demographic context relates to attitudes about the welfare state.

2 Survey data

All fifty states have a state-administered merit scholarship program for higher education targeting high schoolers and recent high school graduates/GED recipients. In some cases, the funds can be used at any in-state public school; other states, such as Illinois, allow the funds to be used at any in-state school. A 2021 study of state-administered financial aid programs found that 90% of these programs are limited to state residents and 52% required US citizenship/legal permanent residence (Custer and Akaeze 2021). Note that state residency requirements are almost universal. States do vary, however, in how they define residency, with the most limited programs requiring that scholarship recipients be graduates of an in-state high school, preventing domestic migrants who have already finished grade 12 from establishing eligibility.

I asked a pool of US adults ($n = 7,240$) whether their state's existing scholarship program should discriminate in favor of in-state students:

Now we would like you to consider general guidelines for scholarships. [PROGRAM NAME] gives financial aid to students planning to attend colleges and universities in that state. If you were advising this award program, what requirements would you recommend? Please indicate for each of the criteria below whether you would recommend it be a requirement for a student to receive a scholarship, should be preferred but not required, or should not be considered.

Criteria included scholastic achievement, test scores, “US citizenship or legal permanent residence” and “Attending or attended high school in the state.” The in-state high school requirement is on the strict side of actual states’ policies.⁵

The survey experiment was fielded through the Civic Health and Institutions Project (CHIP50) between November 9, 2024 and January 10, 2025.⁶ IRB approval for research on human subjects was obtained in cooperation with CHIP50. A pre-analysis plan was filed with OSF.org in July 2024.⁷ The analysis in this paper is exploratory, however, and does not investigate any of the pre-registered hypotheses.

2.1 Why higher education?

US respondents are used to thinking about how residence relates to higher education. US state governments routinely discriminate based on residential history when it comes to public higher

5. My survey also asked whether state scholarship programs should consider “state residency.” This more lax requirement was slightly more popular than the stricter, high school-based standard. 43% of respondents said state residency should be required, 35% wanted preference for state residence and 22% said it should be disregarded. Thus, although respondents were asked separately about state residency and state high school attendance, very few people made a distinction between the two criteria. Below, I focus on whether respondents endorsed the more restrictive criteria of state high school attendance.

6. The data used in this work come from The Civic Health and Institutions Project, a 50 States Survey (CHIP50), NSF Grants SES-2241884, SES-2241885, and SES-2241886, Matthew Baum, James Druckman, David Lazer, and Katherine Ognyanova, Principal Investigators. The funders and the principal investigators of the CHIP50 Project bear no responsibility for the analyses reported here or the content of the work.

The survey was administered by PureSpectrum. PureSpectrum creates its panel via quota sampling accounting for sex, race/ethnicity, age, and census region. Vendor-provided survey weights approximate national representativeness on the quota sampling variables as well as urbanicity. I do not consider the weights here.

7. The anonymized pre-analysis plan is available at https://osf.io/etqh5/overview?view_only=dca845eedd2848f5b0756c349b826355.

education. Sub-national government discrimination against internal migrants in a variety of other realms, including K–12 education, has been ruled unconstitutional (McCann 2017).

In addition to considerations of plausibility, my focus on higher education was chosen in order to deemphasize dimensions of perceived deservingness that may be correlated with migration histories but are probably not relevant to feelings of solidarity and obligation. In the study of redistribution and welfare state utilization, the acronym “CARIN” captures five known dimensions of perceived deservingness: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity, and Need (van Oorschot and Roosma 2017). The “I for Identity” in CARIN captures imagined communities of solidarity—diversity and migration are thought to undermine shared identities and, therefore, the sense that the surrounding community is deserving of public assistance. My focus on merit scholarships for higher education is meant to deemphasize the Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, and Need aspects of the CARIN criteria.

“Control” refers to the degree to which someone’s need for services is seen to be a product of circumstances outside their control. “Attitude” refers to greater willingness to help people who are perceived to be compliant and grateful. Students pursuing higher education after a successful high school career have demonstrated self-discipline and conformity to pro-social norms. Also, because the scholarship programs are described as including merit based criteria, the respondents can presume that successful applicants will have demonstrated pro-social behaviors.

A scholarship fund for high school seniors also sidesteps the correlation between place of residence and “Reciprocity.” Perceived deservingness increases according to recipients’ past economic contributions (van Oorschot 2000, 37). However, adolescent educational subsidies always go to people who have minimal workforce or tax history. An adult’s residential history might be taken as a gauge of their personal commitment to a place and be relevant to forward-looking reciprocity. By contrast, adolescents’ residential history typically reflects choices made by others. Favoring in-state adolescents on the grounds that their parents may have paid more state taxes violates an injunction against treating people differently on the basis of their parents’ choices (Perry 2006,

23).

I abstract away from the final component of CARIN, “Need,” by focusing on a merit scholarship competition rather than a means-tested program. US states have different levels of average wealth. Therefore, respondents might use information about a student’s state of residence to make inferences about financial need. The focus on merit-based educational funding discourages respondents from considering financial circumstances.

Finally, in some non-educational domains—e.g., political office, government contracting, or civil service hiring—length of residence can arguably lead to better outcomes from an existing resident’s point-of-view. People who have longer histories of residence may have specialized local knowledge or extensive personal networks nearby. Those qualities might make them especially effective as public servants, contractors, or employees. In higher education, residential history may likewise play some role in student success. However, that relationship is more speculative and any difference in student outcomes has only tangential implications for the state’s existing residents.

In short, focusing on scholarships for higher education minimizes factors correlated with both deservingness and migration history, such as labor force participation, in order to isolate the strength of local and national solidarities.

3 Top line results

Figure 1 shows the survey results in aggregate, by respondent’s race/ethnicity, individual history of migration (living in the state of their birth; born in the US but living outside the state of their birth; born outside the US), and according to partisan affiliation. Most respondents saw discrimination based on state residence as reasonable. Forty percent recommended that only in-state high schoolers should be eligible for funding and an additional 35% indicated these students should have preference. Just a quarter of respondents said that attending an in-state high school should

not be a criteria. Disaggregating respondents by race, birthplace, or partisanship, a majority in every subgroup endorsed a requirement or preference for students from in-state high schools. People who were born in the US but were not living in their birth state were the least supportive of the in-state high school requirement (37% in favor of a requirement; 33% calling for a preference; 30% recommending in-state high school be disregarded), slightly behind individuals born outside the US (38%/40%/22%).

Just over half of respondents (51%) thought their state's scholarship program should require US citizenship or permanent residence. Only 16% thought this criteria should be disregarded. Like in-state residence, there was no sub-group in which a majority said that US citizenship/permanent residence should not be considered. Support for an immigration status requirement was lower among people born outside the US (40%) than respondents born in the US (50–54%), and more popular among Republicans (63%) than Democrats and political independents (42–46%).

Figure 1 implies that residence-related restrictions or preferences on public goods are broadly seen as desirable among US respondents. Even among immigrants, minorities, and left-wing party members, relatively few people favor completing delinking eligibility for services from a history of time in place.

Favoritism for in-state high schoolers is perhaps less polarizing across demographic cleavages than the immigration status restrictions, although both kinds of pro-local preferences have majority support. When respondents are grouped by race/ethnicity, there is only a seven percentage point gap between Hispanic respondents, who were the least likely to recommend requiring attendance of an in-state high school (36%) and Asian-American respondents, who were the most likely to say that in-state high school should not be a criteria (43%). White (39%) and African American respondents (40%) were about equally likely to say in-state high school should be required.

Gaps in ethno-racial groups' endorsement of the citizenship requirement were larger. Citizenship criteria were least likely to be endorsed by Hispanic and Asian American respondents: 41% of each group said only citizens and legal permanent residents should be eligible for schol-

Figure 1: Respondent reactions to possible criteria for state-administered higher education scholarships





Figure 2: Residence, immigration status or both?



arships. At the other extreme, 55% of non-Hispanic White respondents wanted to require citizenship/permanent residence. Note that Asian Americans were the most likely to say in-state high school should be required but were at the other end of the spectrum for immigration status requirements. African American respondents were at 49% saying that citizenship/legal permanent residence should be mandatory.

Americans with different partisan preferences were also closer together in their views of state residency criteria than on citizenship and ethno-racial identity. The share of Republicans who said in-state high school should be a requirement was 44%, compared to 34% of independents and 38% of Democrats, for a range of ten percentage points. That spread was smaller than the 17–21 percentage point difference between the rate at which Republicans said citizenship/permanent residence should be required (63%) and the rate at which independents (46%) or Democrats (42%) said the same.

4 Immigration, residence, or both?

Figure 2 compares survey respondents' preferences for two different combinations of scholarship program requirements: should state merit scholarships consider immigration status, attendance of an in-state high school, both factors or neither? For convenience, the responses are simplified here to show the proportion of respondents who said that there should be a preference or requirement for each criteria. These bar graphs give a sense of whether respondents saw residence requirements at subnational and national levels as complementary or competing policies.

In the full sample of respondents, the majority affirmed both criteria: 66% of respondents said that US citizens and permanent residents should have a preference or sole eligibility for scholarships and also said that in-state high schoolers should have preference or sole eligibility for the same program. Just 8% wanted to disregard both criteria, recommending the state scholarship program should not consider immigration status or attendance at an in-state high school. 17% said that US citizens and permanent residents should have preference or sole eligibility for scholarships but recommended disregarding whether a student went to high school in-state. 9% said in-state high schoolers should have at least a preference for state scholarships but did not want the program to consider immigration status.

In every ethno-racial subgroup, a majority of respondents favor at least some preference for both citizens/permanent residents and in-state high schoolers. African Americans were the most likely to endorse both kinds of preferences (70%), followed by non-Hispanic Whites (67%). Among both African Americans and non-Hispanic Whites, the second most popular combination of responses was to affirm the relevance of immigration status but not in-state high school. This combination was chosen by 16% of Black Americans and 19% of non-Hispanic White Americans. Among Asian American and Hispanic respondents, the combination of two kinds of anti-migration preferences remains the most popular response (64% of Asian Americans and 60% of Hispanic Americans). The fall-off relative to Black and White Americans is due to an increased

tendency to recommend no residence-related preferences (12–13% of respondents compared to 7% of Black and White respondents) or to want only favoritism for in-state high schoolers. Again, these results suggest that immigration-related policies are racialized in a different manner than domestic-migration related preferences.

The combination of two levels of preferences for non-migrants is also the most popular policy option among respondents divided by birthplace and by political partisanship. Republicans stand out somewhat in being almost uniformly in favor of some kind of anti-migration requirement, with just 4% of these respondents recommending that neither immigration status nor in-state high school attendance be a consideration.

5 Individual correlates

Table 1 shows OLS regressions of respondents rating of preferences for in-state high schoolers or US citizens/permanent residents (1=Should not be considered, 2=Preference, 3=Requirement). The first two models compare support for state high school requirements to individuals' approval of preferences for citizens/legal permanent residents. The first model controls only for respondents' state of residence. The second adds birthplace, self-reported ethnoracial identity, sex, age, income, partisanship, and education level.⁸

The first two models in Table 1 affirm that residence restrictions at a national and sub-national level are complementary rather than competing measures. In both models, a one point higher rating of the immigration status criteria correlates with about a one-third of a point greater rating given to the in-state high school criteria. National and subnational favoritism in favor of non-migrants tend to appeal to the same individuals.

8. Age is measured in years; income is a 1–10 scale for total household income; partisanship is a seven-point scale with Strong Democrats assigned the lowest values; education level is a five-point scale.

Table 1: Support for residence and immigration restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	State high school		(4)	Immigration status	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Favor immigration status restrictions	0.341* (0.012)	0.335* (0.013)				
Born out of state		-0.108* (0.021)	-0.115* (0.022)		-0.026 (0.019)	
Born abroad		-0.024 (0.038)	-0.074 (0.040)		-0.154* (0.036)	
African American		0.065* (0.025)	0.092* (0.026)		0.084* (0.024)	
Asian American		0.097* (0.040)	0.076 (0.042)		-0.059 (0.038)	
Hispanic		0.052 (0.034)	0.016 (0.036)		-0.110* (0.032)	
Other racial categories		0.012 (0.053)	-0.014 (0.056)		-0.091 (0.051)	
African American, Born abroad				0.067 (0.096)		-0.193* (0.086)
African American, Born in-state				0.103* (0.031)		0.102* (0.028)
African American, Born out-of-state				-0.062 (0.046)		0.035 (0.041)
Asian American, Born abroad				0.026 (0.058)		-0.118* (0.052)
Asian American, Born in-state				0.005 (0.060)		-0.155* (0.054)
Asian American, Born out-of-state				0.056 (0.083)		-0.093 (0.075)
Hispanic, Born abroad				-0.120 (0.084)		-0.338* (0.077)
Hispanic, Born in-state				0.030 (0.045)		-0.099* (0.041)
Hispanic, Born out-of-state				-0.099 (0.061)		-0.123* (0.056)
Other, Born abroad				-0.345 (0.226)		-0.551* (0.205)
Other, Born in-state				-0.012 (0.071)		-0.087 (0.064)
Other, Born out-of-state				-0.085 (0.096)		-0.069 (0.087)
White, Born abroad				-0.072 (0.069)		-0.157* (0.062)
White, Born out-of-state				-0.113* (0.026)		-0.022 (0.024)
Male		0.006 (0.018)	0.009 (0.019)	0.010 (0.019)	0.011 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)
Age		0.025*	0.064*	0.064*	0.118*	0.117*

* $p < 0.05$

Continued on next page

Table 1: Support for residence and immigration restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	State high school		(4)	Immigration status	
		(2)	(3)		(5)	(6)
Income		(0.010) 0.020*	(0.010) 0.019	(0.010) 0.019	(0.009) -0.002	(0.009) -0.002
Party identity		(0.010) -0.010	(0.010) -0.058*	(0.010) -0.058*	(0.009) -0.145*	(0.009) -0.145*
Education level		(0.009) 0.032*	(0.010) 0.031*	(0.010) 0.032*	(0.009) -0.004	(0.009) -0.003
State fixed effects	Yes	(0.010) Yes	(0.010) Yes	(0.010) Yes	(0.009) Yes	(0.009) Yes
Observations	7167	7119	7152	7152	7143	7143
R^2	0.110	0.117	0.028	0.028	0.084	0.085

* $p < 0.05$

Models 3–6 in Table 1 use race, birthplace, age, income, education, sex and partisanship to predict support for the in-state high school and immigration status criteria in state scholarship programs. Ethnoracial identities and birthplace appear separately in Models 3 and 5 and interacted in Models 4 and 6.

Birthplace has an asymmetric relationship with support for anti-migrant scholarship provisions. US-born adults who are living outside the state of their birth are less likely than other respondents to support scholarship preferences for in-state high school students. In other words, domestic migrants show mild opposition to measures that discriminate against domestic migration. However, their support for immigration status restrictions is no different from US adults living in the state of their birth. The opposition to criteria penalizing domestic mobility does not extend to opposing anti-immigrant criteria. The negative correlation between domestic migration and support for state high school criteria holds among African American, Hispanic, and White respondents, although it is only statistically significant among Whites living outside their birth state. Domestic migrants have unexceptional views of immigration status criteria across ethno-racial identities with the exception of Hispanic Americans living outside the state of their birth, who are less inclined to endorse immigration status requirements compared to other respondents. In fact, Hispanic respondents regardless of birthplace have some aversion to the immigration status restrictions, consistent with the intuition that anti-immigrant discrimination and racial discrimination are closely associated in respondents' minds.

Interestingly, respondents born outside the US show a mirror-image asymmetry. They are no more or less likely than US-born respondents living in the state of their birth to say that in-state high schoolers should be favored by scholarship programs. They are, however, less likely to support restrictions based on immigration status. The differences between respondents born abroad and same-race respondents living in the state of their birth are statistically significant within the African American, Hispanic, and White subgroups. Asian American respondents born abroad and Asian American respondents living in the state of their birth have statistically indistinguishable

opinions on immigration status restrictions for scholarships.

Turning to ethnoracial identity, White respondents are the least supportive of state high school preferences and African American respondents are the most supportive (Model 3).⁹ The pattern of White respondents being least enthusiastic about state-based scholarship preferences mostly holds conditional on birthplace, as well. Among respondents born outside the US, Black respondents rated in-state high school requirements most highly, followed by Asian Americans, Whites, and Hispanics; none of the contrasts between respondents born abroad are statistically significant. For US-born respondents living in the state of their birth, African Americans were the most likely to favor state high school preferences, followed by Hispanic, Asian American and then White respondents; only the most extreme of these contrasts—African American versus White respondents—is statistically significant. For US-born respondents living outside the state of their birth, Asian Americans were the most likely to favor state high school preferences, followed by African Americans, Hispanics, and then White respondents; only the contrast between Asian American and White respondents is statistically distinguishable from zero.

Whites' somewhat tepid support for in-state high school preferences compared to non-White respondents is consistent with an ethnic solidarity logic. Many non-White populations are spatially clustered, so that non-White respondents are more likely than White respondents to live in a state where their coethnics' population share is higher locally than in the US as a whole. Below, I parse that logic further by including state demographics in the equation, allowing me to ask, for instance, if Whites' enthusiasm for state-based residence restrictions is higher if they are living in one of the states where the population is disproportionately White relative to the US.

African American respondents are more supportive of immigration status restrictions than any other ethnoracial subgroup (Model 5) and these differences are all statistically significant.¹⁰ Whites

9. African American respondents' greater support for state high school requirements was statistically distinguishable from the opinions of White respondents. African Americans were also a little more supportive of state high school requirements than Asian American and Hispanic respondents but these differences are not statistically significant.

10. The relatively hawkish views of African Americans mirror findings in other words. African Americans are less likely than White Americans to view immigration as a high salience issue or endorse enhanced immigration

are more likely to favor immigration status restrictions than Asian Americans (although the difference is not distinguishable from zero) and Hispanics; the gap between Hispanic and White respondents is statistically significant but the difference between Hispanic and Asian American respondents is not. Respondents born outside the US do not differ as much by race as US-born respondents. Among people born abroad, Asian respondents are the most likely to endorse immigration status restrictions and Hispanics are least likely to do so; the contrast between those end points is statistically significant but no other comparisons among foreign-born respondents are clearly different from zero. For US-born respondents, whether they live in the state or their birth or elsewhere, the ordering of enthusiasm for immigration status requirements is identical, with African Americans being the most likely to call for these criteria, followed by non-Hispanic whites, followed by Asian-Americans, with Hispanic Americans least likely to favor this criteria. This result suggests that immigration restrictions are perceived more unfavorably by Hispanics than Asian Americans and more unfavorably by both of these groups than White or Black Americans.

Support for discrimination against domestic and international migrants does not seem to differ by sex. Support for both residence criteria is positively correlated with respondent age. Income levels have no clear role. Left-leaning partisanship is negatively correlated with support for both the in-state high school requirement and the immigration status requirement. The correlation between partisanship and views on immigration requirements is twice the size of the correlation between partisanship and views on state high school requirements, however, reflecting the starker partisan divide over immigration discussed above. Education levels have an unexpected positive correlation with support for in-state high school requirements, possibly because respondents are being asked about higher education funding which may be more salient to more highly educated people. On the other hand, there is no correlation between education levels and opinions about immigration status requirements for college scholarships.

enforcement but are as hawkish as non-Hispanic Whites (if not more so) on the question of preferred immigration levels and allocation of public resources between immigrant and non-immigrant communities (Carter 2019).

5.1 Place identity

The traditional account of the welfare state emphasizes in-group solidarity; the unwillingness to extend the social safety net to include immigrants and/or minorities reflects stronger ethnonational identity. From that point of view, it may be somewhat surprising that endorsement of discrimination against international immigrants is correlated with support for similar measures that target domestic migrants. Perhaps anti-immigrant sentiments actually reflect a more parochial loyalty? Or perhaps some people tend to have strong solidarities at multiple levels and not necessarily feel a contradiction between nested levels of solidarity?

To explore these possibilities, Table 2 adds place identity to the OLS models of support for restrictions on state scholarships. Feelings of closeness were measured based on these survey items: “People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. How close do you feel to: the US” and “the state where you live.” The possible responses were (4) “very close,” (3) “close,” (2) “not very close” and (1) “not close at all.”

Feelings of closeness to US and to one’s own state are positively correlated with supporting both migration related criteria. Somewhat surprisingly, strong national identity is correlated with support for discrimination against domestic migrants (Model 2). This result obtains in part because most people who felt close to their state also felt close to the US and vice versa; place identities at different geographic levels seem to be complementary rather than competing. I also estimated models using respondents’ feelings of closeness to the US relative to their state, calculated by subtracting closeness to the US from closeness to one’s state to obtain a comparative measure with a range of -3 to 3 . Higher numbers indicate that the respondent reported feeling closer to the US, respondents who reported feeling equally close to both places score a zero on this measure, and negative measures indicate that the respondent felt closer to their state than to the US. A strong national identity relative to state identity is not correlated with support for state-level pro-local preferences (Model 3) but it correlated with support for immigration status restrictions (Model 6).

Table 2: Support for residence and immigration restrictions on state education scholarships compared to feelings of place identity

	State high school			Immigration status		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Feels close to US	0.097*			0.128*		
	(0.012)			(0.011)		
Feels close to state		0.092*			0.071*	
		(0.011)			(0.010)	
Feels close to US cf state			-0.008			0.052*
			(0.013)			(0.011)
African American, Born abroad	0.077	0.095	0.084	-0.183*	-0.203*	-0.213*
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
African American, Born in-state	0.103*	0.101*	0.100*	0.105*	0.099*	0.102*
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
African American, Born out-of-state	-0.053	-0.034	-0.059	0.047	0.057	0.024
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Asian American, Born abroad	0.030	0.034	0.023	-0.113*	-0.110*	-0.122*
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Asian American, Born in-state	0.009	0.007	0.001	-0.146*	-0.156*	-0.159*
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Asian American, Born out-of-state	0.056	0.071	0.041	-0.078	-0.066	-0.087
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Hispanic, Born abroad	-0.142	-0.133	-0.119	-0.378*	-0.351*	-0.355*
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Hispanic, Born in-state	0.023	0.024	0.029	-0.106*	-0.108*	-0.102*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Hispanic, Born out-of-state	-0.114	-0.094	-0.091	-0.146*	-0.130*	-0.136*
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Other, Born abroad	-0.325	-0.307	-0.341	-0.526*	-0.523*	-0.561*
	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.205)
Other, Born in-state	-0.004	-0.003	-0.010	-0.077	-0.080	-0.084
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Other, Born out-of-state	-0.082	-0.053	-0.082	-0.066	-0.046	-0.087
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
White, Born abroad	-0.060	-0.055	-0.070	-0.143*	-0.143*	-0.158*
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)
White, Born out-of-state	-0.112*	-0.084*	-0.111*	-0.019	0.001	-0.035
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Male	-0.006	-0.001	0.010	-0.008	0.005	0.010
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Age	0.044*	0.053*	0.065*	0.091*	0.108*	0.112*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	0.017	0.017	0.019	-0.004	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Party identity	-0.043*	-0.050*	-0.059*	-0.125*	-0.138*	-0.141*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education level	0.032*	0.033*	0.032*	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004

* $p < 0.05$

Continued on next page

Table 2: Support for residence and immigration restrictions on state education scholarships compared to feelings of place identity

	State high school			Immigration status		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7125	7109	7093	7116	7101	7085
R^2	0.037	0.037	0.029	0.104	0.091	0.088

**p<0.05*

6 Contextual correlates

Table 3 explores how the diversity of the non-migrant and migrant populations correlate with public support for limits on migrant eligibility for services. The literature on the relationships between diversity and public spending and migration and public spending has used various measurement strategies: fractionalization indexes; migrant stocks and flows; and population shares of stigmatized groups. Because my focus is on a category of public services that carries relatively little stigma or questions of malingering, I focus on overall diversity in the sense of fractionalization. The data are from the American Community Survey for 2024 and 2014. I investigate the diversity of the non-migrant population by calculating the racial fractionalization of locally-born census takers in 2014 (locally-born being defined relative to the state). The fractionalization measure is the probability that two randomly selected individuals have the same primary ethnoracial identity (African American, Asian American, Hispanic, Native American, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or non-Hispanic White). To gauge the role of migration I note the ten year change in the percent of a state's population that is migrants (people born outside the state and/or outside the US); the percent born abroad (international migration); the percent domestic migrants (born elsewhere in the US); and change in level of racial fractionalization from 2014–24. The models also include a control for migrant population size in 2014. The individual level controls are for race, migration history, education, income, partisanship, sex, and age.

Notice that migration throughout the analysis is defined relative to census takers' birthplace and not their mobility since a prior census. For example, Δ *Migrant Share* measures the share of a state's population that was not born in that state in 2024 compared to the share of the 2014 population that was not born in-state. An increase in "share born out of state" between 2014 and 2024 does not necessarily mean that the number of people who moved to that state between 2014 and 2024 exceeded the number of people who moved out of the state. The share of the state's population born elsewhere could also go up if, for example, there was a massive outflow

of locally-born people. Thus, these census data are characterizing states' populations according to the diversity of birthplace rather inter-census mobility.

In models 1–5 in Table 3, racial fractionalization is positively correlated with support for limiting access to state scholarships to in-state high schoolers. This result is contrary to the intuition that a more diverse non-migrant population would not support such restrictions thanks to reduced in-group solidarity. Increases in migrant population share and international migrant population share are positively correlated with public support for restricting higher education scholarships to in-state high schoolers ($p < 0.05$); there are also positive but statistically insignificant correlations between the change in domestic migrant population share or change in racial fractionalization and support for these restrictions.

The relationships between diversity, migration increases and support for immigration status restrictions on scholarships (Models 6–10) are likewise positive but insignificant with the exception of the change in the size of the immigrant population in Model 8. Overall, the sign on these results is consistent with the expectation that increased migration leads to increased support anti-migrant policies. Baseline levels of diversity, captured by fractionalization, are positively correlated with demand for each type of restriction on public services.

Table 3: State-level measures of migration and diversity and support for residence and immigration restrictions on state education scholarships

	State high school					Immigration status				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Race frac. locally-born 2014	0.065 (0.086)	0.114 (0.087)	0.255* (0.095)	0.081 (0.086)	0.521* (0.265)	0.056 (0.078)	0.076 (0.079)	0.175* (0.086)	0.064 (0.078)	0.083 (0.239)
Migrant share 2014	0.004 (0.099)	0.104 (0.103)	0.125 (0.102)	0.048 (0.101)	-0.131 (0.124)	0.027 (0.089)	0.067 (0.093)	0.103 (0.092)	0.048 (0.092)	0.019 (0.112)
Δ Migrant share		0.008* (0.003)					0.003 (0.002)			
Δ Intl migrant share			0.006* (0.001)					0.004* (0.001)		
Δ Domestic migrant share				0.004 (0.002)					0.002 (0.002)	
Δ Fractionalization					0.008 (0.004)					0.000 (0.004)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	7152	7152	7152	7152	7152	7143	7143	7143	7143	7143
R ²	0.018	0.020	0.022	0.019	0.019	0.078	0.078	0.079	0.078	0.078

* $p < 0.05$

7 Responses to noncoethnic migration

These results point in the direction of migration increasing public support for pro-local policy measures, albeit weakly. However, these correlations could be thanks to a large number of state-level confounds. Many of these could be measured directly and used in a two-level model of support for migration restrictions. However, unmeasurable heterogeneity in state context would likely persist.

The logic of the “liberal dilemma” argument also implies that there should be within-state variation in reactions to migration depending on the interaction of an individual’s identity and the identities of migrants. Within states experiencing an influx, the effects of migration should be more pronounced among people who do not have ethno-racial ties to most newcomers. To investigate that possibility, Table ?? reestimates support for two types of scholarship restrictions targeting migrants. The models now include state fixed effects. Within-state variation comes from comparing each respondent’s self-reported ethno-racial identity to the composition of inflows to the state between 2014 and 2024.

Table 4: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for residence restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school		(5)	(6)
	(3)	(4)				
Non-coethnic migrant share	-0.059 (0.272)	0.032 (0.279)				
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)				
Non-coethnic domestic migrant share			-0.029 (0.326)	-0.045 (0.347)		
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share			-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)		
Non-coethnic intl migrant share					-1.311 (0.824)	-1.590 (0.906)
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share					0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * African American, Born abroad		-0.002 (0.028)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * African American, Born abroad				0.006 (0.022)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * African American, Born abroad						-0.006 (0.013)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * African American, Born in-state		0.001 (0.006)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * African American, Born in-state				0.001 (0.006)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * African American, Born in-state						-0.005 (0.004)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * African American, Born out-of-state		0.014 (0.010)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * African American, Born out-of-state				0.014 (0.008)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * African American, Born out-of-state						0.003 (0.006)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Asian American, Born abroad		-0.002 (0.010)				

* $p < 0.05$

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Table 4: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for residence restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school	(4)	(5)	(6)
			(3)			
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Asian American, Born abroad				-0.009 (0.009)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Asian American, Born abroad						0.004 (0.005)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Asian American, Born in-state		-0.013 (0.011)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Asian American, Born in-state				-0.012 (0.009)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Asian American, Born in-state						-0.001 (0.005)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Asian American, Born out-of-state		-0.018 (0.016)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Asian American, Born out-of-state				-0.014 (0.014)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Asian American, Born out-of-state						-0.009 (0.007)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Hispanic, Born abroad		-0.010 (0.017)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Hispanic, Born abroad				-0.009 (0.013)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Hispanic, Born abroad						0.001 (0.008)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Hispanic, Born in-state		0.005 (0.010)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Hispanic, Born in-state				-0.003 (0.007)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Hispanic, Born in-state						0.004 (0.004)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Hispanic, Born out-of-state		0.001 (0.013)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Hispanic, Born out-of-state				0.003 (0.011)		

* $p < 0.05$

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Table 4: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for residence restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school	(4)	(5)	(6)
			(3)			
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Hispanic, Born out-of-state						-0.001 (0.006)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Other, Born abroad		-0.002 (0.160)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Other, Born abroad				-0.008 (0.207)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Other, Born abroad						-0.001 (0.073)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Other, Born in-state		0.032 (0.030)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Other, Born in-state				0.026 (0.021)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Other, Born in-state						-0.003 (0.011)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Other, Born out-of-state		-0.030 (0.041)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Other, Born out-of-state				-0.032 (0.034)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Other, Born out-of-state						-0.001 (0.017)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * White, Born abroad		0.008 (0.008)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * White, Born abroad				0.010 (0.008)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * White, Born abroad						0.002 (0.005)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * White, Born out-of-state		-0.004 (0.003)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * White, Born out-of-state				-0.005 (0.003)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * White, Born out-of-state						-0.001 (0.002)

* $p < 0.05$

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Table 4: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for residence restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school		(5)	(6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7026	7026	7026	7026	7026	7026
R^2	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.030	0.028	0.029

** $p < 0.05$*

Table 5: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for immigration status restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school		(5)	(6)
			(3)	(4)		
Non-coethnic migrant share	-0.089 (0.246)	-0.032 (0.252)				
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)				
Non-coethnic domestic migrant share			-0.258 (0.295)	-0.165 (0.314)		
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share			-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)		
Non-coethnic intl migrant share					0.511 (0.745)	0.178 (0.818)
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share					0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * African American, Born abroad		0.059* (0.025)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * African American, Born abroad				0.046* (0.019)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * African American, Born abroad						0.003 (0.011)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * African American, Born in-state		-0.004 (0.006)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * African American, Born in-state				-0.003 (0.005)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * African American, Born in-state						-0.005 (0.004)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * African American, Born out-of-state		-0.002 (0.009)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * African American, Born out-of-state				-0.005 (0.008)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * African American, Born out-of-state						0.003 (0.005)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Asian American, Born abroad		0.006				

* $p < 0.05$

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Table 5: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for immigration status restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school		(5)	(6)
		(0.009)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Asian American, Born abroad			-0.001			
			(0.008)			
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Asian American, Born abroad					0.004	
					(0.005)	
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Asian American, Born in-state		-0.010				
		(0.010)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Asian American, Born in-state			-0.010			
			(0.008)			
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Asian American, Born in-state					-0.001	
					(0.005)	
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Asian American, Born out-of-state		-0.013				
		(0.014)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Asian American, Born out-of-state			-0.003			
			(0.013)			
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Asian American, Born out-of-state					-0.008	
					(0.006)	
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Hispanic, Born abroad		-0.017				
		(0.015)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Hispanic, Born abroad			-0.013			
			(0.012)			
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Hispanic, Born abroad					-0.004	
					(0.007)	
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Hispanic, Born in-state		-0.000				
		(0.009)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Hispanic, Born in-state			-0.006			
			(0.007)			
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Hispanic, Born in-state					0.002	
					(0.004)	
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Hispanic, Born out-of-state		0.006				
		(0.011)				

* $p < 0.05$

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Table 5: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for immigration status restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school		(5)	(6)
			(3)	(4)		
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Hispanic, Born out-of-state				0.010 (0.010)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Hispanic, Born out-of-state						0.005 (0.006)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Other, Born abroad		-0.217 (0.145)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Other, Born abroad				-0.282 (0.188)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Other, Born abroad						-0.101 (0.066)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Other, Born in-state		0.020 (0.027)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Other, Born in-state				0.025 (0.019)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Other, Born in-state						-0.011 (0.010)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * Other, Born out-of-state		-0.034 (0.037)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * Other, Born out-of-state				-0.032 (0.031)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * Other, Born out-of-state						-0.006 (0.015)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * White, Born abroad		0.006 (0.007)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * White, Born abroad				0.006 (0.007)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * White, Born abroad						0.002 (0.005)
Δ Non-coethnic migrant share * White, Born out-of-state		-0.001 (0.003)				
Δ Non-coethnic domestic migrant share * White, Born out-of-state				0.000		

* $p < 0.05$

Continued on next page

Table 5: State-level measures of non-coethnic migration and support for immigration status restrictions on state education scholarships

	(1)	(2)	State high school		(5)	(6)
			(3)	(4)		
				(0.003)		
Δ Non-coethnic intl migrant share * White, Born out-of-state						-0.001 (0.002)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7018	7018	7018	7018	7018	7018
R ²	0.085	0.087	0.085	0.087	0.085	0.086

**p*<0.05

Figure 3: Non coethnic migration




Table 4 correlates non-coethnic migration to support for measures favoring in-state high schoolers. Models 1 and 2 use the change in the population share of non-coethnic migrants, including domestic and international migrants. The second model interacts migration flows with respondents' ethno-racial identity and place of birth. The results of both Models 1 and 2 are depicted graphically in Figure 3; black circles represent the predicted difference in support for discrimination against domestic migrants associated with a 1% increase in non-coethnic migrant population share. As seen in the figure, the correlation in the full sample is close to zero. Change in the population share of non-coethnic migrants has an inconsistently signed and insignificant correlation with support for these scholarship criteria in every ascriptive subgroup. Models 3 and 4 repeat this exercise using only domestic migration with results plotted in Figure 4, with all relationships remaining null. Models 5 and 6 consider only non-coethnic international migration (see also Figure 5) and again find no statistically significant relationships.

Table 5 correlates non coethnic migrant population share—domestic, international, and combined—with support for immigration status restrictions on high education funds. The results, alone and

Figure 4: Non coethnic domestic migration





Figure 5: Non coethnic international migration



interacted with respondent ascriptive characteristics, are plotted as gray triangles in Figures 3–5. As above, correlations are small and largely statistically indistinguishable from zero.

In sum, the data do not provide strong evidence of a link between demographic context and support for limiting migrant access to public spending. The diversity of the non-migrant population is not correlated with demand for anti-migrant restrictions. Nor does the migrant stock or flow explain the level of support for pro-local restrictions on higher education. These results suggest no relationship between homogeneity among non-migrant populations and willingness to discriminate against newcomers. Instead, favoring non-migrants in allocation of public funds appears to be quite uncontroversial in a US context, endorsed by respondents from a wide variety of subgroups at both the subnational and national levels. Perhaps because of that broadly normative character, inflows of migrants to one's state are also not obviously related to demands for restricting out-of-state or non-citizen access to resources.

8 Conclusion

Despite the large literature on tensions between diversity, immigration, and the welfare state, there is relatively little scholarship on one of the most obvious populist responses to newcomers, which is to deny them access to some or all public services. We do not know if homogeneous non-migrant populations are any more or less likely to cut off migrants' access to the welfare state. We also do not know if the correlation between diverse societies and miserly welfare states is repeated in an unwillingness to extend social safety nets to newcomers.

This paper examines preferences for anti-migrant provisions in state-administered college scholarships in the US. Support for limiting domestic and international migrants' access to public services is not confined to a single ideological or racial constituency. Neither greater racial homogeneity among non-migrants nor greater heterogeneity among newcomers consistently increases support for restricting migrants' access to public benefits. This suggests that exclusionary attitudes

are not a mechanical response to local demographic conditions.

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