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The Three Logics of Illiberalism and Public Support for Executive Transgressions in the Trump Era

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Abstract

Why do some citizens embrace illiberalism as a legitimate form of governance? We propose three distinct logics of illiberalism: opportunistic illiberalism, driven by partisan interests; order-seeking illiberalism, reflecting authoritarian predispositions; and transgressive illiberalism, rooted in antisocial personality traits. Using original survey data, we apply this general conceptual framework to two forms of executive transgressions in the Trump era: tolerance for Donald Trump breaking the law and support for granting him permanent emergency powers. Our results support the three logics and strongly corroborate the role of antisocial dispositions, including on a subset of non-Trump voters in our sample. In fact, in the case of lawbreaking, transgressive illiberalism accounts for more of the variance than the other two logics combined. We also find that populist attitudes predict less support for illiberal propositions, not more. Taken together, our results expand our understanding of democratic erosion and identify a potential structural vulnerability of democracy: a reservoir of morally pragmatic and irreverent citizens who will endorse illiberal governance because its intrinsically transgressive nature appeals to them.

Keywords: illiberal attitudes; dark triad; authoritarianism; democratic erosion

In a growing number of countries, some citizens appear willing to sacrifice elements of democracy if it means scoring points against 'the other side.' In the US, the reelection of President Trump and the aggressive start of his second administration have reignited concerns of democratic backsliding. Tolerance from the public towards politicians breaking the law or aggrandizing their powers raises a central question: why do some citizens accept autocratic tactics as a legitimate form of governance? At a time of great concern for liberal democracy, our understanding of the sources of illiberal attitudes remains incomplete.

Two explanations stand out in the literature. The first is partisanship and tradeoffs with liberal-democratic principles. In short, citizens privilege partisan or policy goals and tolerate norm violations by co-partisans to block candidates they perceive as ideologically distant (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2020). The second is dispositional in nature. Voters who support illiberal politicians do so because they appreciate their illiberal instincts, the explanation goes, and not in spite of them. The primary focus of this line of work is authoritarian predispositions and preference for hierarchy, and indeed, both consistently predict intolerance of dissent, support for coercive authority, and skepticism towards constraints on power (Feldman et al., 2021; Ho et al., 2015).

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These two explanations alone may not be sufficient. They portray the adoption of illiberal attitudes as either strategic or as a means to restore order. We believe this fails to capture another dispositional logic behind illiberalism: some citizens with dark personality traits, i.e., subclinical manifestations of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, embrace illiberalism because they are drawn to the transgressiveness involved with breaking liberal-democratic norms, without any prior commitment to authoritarianism and even when it clashes with their own partisan preferences. Recent research has begun to examine closely related links between antisocial personality traits, anti-democratic actions, and Trump-era political beliefs (Enders et al., 2023; Snook & Skubala, 2026). Our contribution is to situate this pathway within a broader framework of three logics of illiberalism.

From this, we propose three distinct logics behind the formation of illiberal attitudes that differ in motivation and stability: *opportunistic illiberalism*, driven by partisan goals and likely fueled by resentment; *order-seeking illiberalism*, motivated by an orientation towards hierarchy and order; and *transgressive illiberalism*, rooted in antisocial dispositions and attraction to rule-breaking itself. Using original survey data from late 2024, we empirically test these three logics on two outcomes specific to the United States under Trump: tolerance for Donald Trump breaking the law, and support for granting him permanent emergency powers. Informed by well-established literature linking the decline of liberal democracy to populism, we also consider the role of populist attitudes but see them as an ambivalent phenomenon that may either foster tolerance or rejection of illiberal tactics, depending on whether citizens interpret them as elite impunity or as a vehicle for the *volonté générale.* While our empirical measures concern two forms of executive transgression by Trump, our three logics are intended as a general conceptual framework for understanding the emergence of illiberal attitudes in the American public and potentially elsewhere. We expect the underlying mechanisms are not uniquely Trumpian.

Our findings corroborate the importance of partisanship in illiberal attitude formation, but also confirm that antisocial dispositions are at least equally powerful predictors of illiberal attitudes. The results hold in our general sample and in a subset of non-Trump voters. The effect of authoritarianism and resentment is also positive but smaller. Strikingly, populist attitudes are associated with less tolerance for our two illiberal propositions. Taken together, our study provides strong support for our three logics and especially the need to account for the moral-psychological dispositions of the public. It also highlights a structural vulnerability of American democracy, and possibly others: a reservoir of antisocial traits that nudge individuals toward illiberalism, irrespective of the partisan climate or transient disaffection with democracy.

EXPLAINING ILLIBERAL ATTITUDE FORMATION

Partisan Tradeoffs

A large body of work demonstrates that voters weigh liberal-democratic principles against their policy goals and partisan interests. Many will favor a co-partisan guilty of violating norms over a liberal alternative when the stakes are high (Carey et al., 2022; Fossati et al., 2022; Graham & Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2020; Touchton et al., 2023). Even among voters who endorse democratic principles in the abstract, only a

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minority will prioritize those principles in circumstances where their liberal values clash with their partisan loyalties (Graham & Svolik, 2020). This opportunism is likely most significant on salient issues or when the liberal alternative appears more distant, ideologically speaking (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2020). Theoretically, this tradeoff logic should also be stronger in contexts where ideological polarization is high (Lewandowsky & Jankowski, 2023). Kingzette et al. (2021) also show that the affective variant of polarization makes citizens more willing to violate basic democratic principles, by politicizing the concept of minority protections and maximizing out-party hostility.

The 2024 presidential election unfolded in a highly polarized environment. Theoretically, the perceived ideological distance between the two candidates should push supporters of the winner towards greater acceptance of illiberal tactics. Additionally, Donald Trump's reelection and the concurrent Republican trifecta produced ideal circumstances for potential tradeoffs between policy efficiency, partisan interests, and liberal-democratic principles. In line with these elements, we hypothesize the following.

Hypothesis 1: *Trump voters and right-leaning respondents should be more accepting of President Trump's use of illiberal tactics,* ceteris paribus.

Affect and Resentment

Extremism and right-wing populism have long been associated with feelings of resentment, both in the US and cross-nationally, via mechanisms like racial status threat, nostalgic deprivation, and perceptions of loss or exploitation (Gest et al., 2018; Parker & Lavine, 2024). Some of the efforts aiming to explain the role of affect in political behavior have highlighted relative deprivation and present–past comparisons (Gidron & Hall, 2020; Versteegen, 2024; Gest et al., 2018) but also affective intelligence and core emotions such as anger and anxiety (Marcus et al., 2019; Rico et al., 2017), significance-quest dynamics (Kruglanski et al., 2022), and perpetual ingroup victimhood orientation (Noor et al., 2012; Schori-Eyal et al., 2017). These different theories and explanations differ in their underlying assumptions and triggers. In some cases, the trigger may reflect anxieties around demographic change; in others, negative affect might be the result of perceived economic or cultural decline (Parker & Barreto, 2013; Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Sides et al., 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Nonetheless, these lines of work share a family resemblance in pointing to resentment as the common affective product of democratically corrosive attitudes.

In our framework, resentment leads to a form of emotional readiness to endorse illiberal measures as a maladaptive coping response to perceived decline and hostility towards out-groups. In the present study, we operationalize resentment using Bimber et al.'s (2024) very short scale of feelings of being devalued, which they define as the perception of losing out, decline, or loss of well-being in the trajectory of history, and we hypothesize the following.

Hypothesis 2: *Higher levels of resentment, operationalized via feelings of being devalued, should be positively associated with greater support for President Trump's use of illiberal tactics.*

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Authoritarian Predispositions

Authoritarian predispositions have long been central to explanations of political behavior. In recent years, research has examined their role in the formation of illiberal attitudes. Unlike partisan tradeoffs or even resentment, this approach considers illiberalism less as an opportunistic instrument and more as an end in itself. Two related but distinct norm-conforming psychological orientations dominate this literature: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.

Right-wing authoritarianism is classically understood as an orientation involving social conformity versus personal autonomy (Feldman, 2003; Feldman et al., 2021). It comprises three subdimensions i.e., punitiveness and intolerance, adherence to traditional norms, and submission to authority (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). Consistent with post-World War II research on authoritarianism, higher right-wing authoritarianism scores predict intolerance of dissent, as well as support for coercive authority and restrictions on civil liberties (Feldman, 2020; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). Authoritarians are also disproportionally associated with prejudice broadly conceived, including antisemitism, xenophobia, and opposition to civil rights (Cohen & Smith, 2016; Feldman et al., 2021; Stenner, 2005).

On the other hand, social dominance orientation reflects a preference for hierarchy and inequality among social groups (Ho et al., 2015). Whereas right-wing authoritarianism is rooted in conformity and sensitivity to threat, social dominance orientation stems from a competitive worldview and dominance motives (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). Individuals high in social dominance orientation tend to oppose egalitarian reforms, endorse hierarchical social arrangements, and view ingroup-outgroup relationships as strictly zero-sum. While the two constructs are conceptually distinct, social dominance orientation is similarly implicated in the kinds of democratically corrosive attitudes predicted by authoritarianism *stricto sensu*.

Despite their conceptual differences, these predispositions affect political attitudes and behaviors in similar ways across contexts. Empirically, both right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are associated with support for illiberal or right-wing populist candidates in France, Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, Latin America, and the US (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Bakker et al., 2016; Cohen & Smith, 2016; Van Assche et al., 2019; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). In the US, authoritarian predispositions both predict support for expanding the powers of the executive but also warrantless wiretapping, media censorship, torture, and restrictions on criticism of the president (Feldman, 2020; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).

This literature underpins what scholars have described as the dispositional logic behind support for illiberalism. Unlike citizens who tolerate norm violations simply to advance their partisan interests, some citizens actively welcome candidates whose illiberal instincts align with their own (Feldman et al., 2021; Ho et al., 2015). Arguably, in the Trumpian case, illiberalism may well be the policy itself and not merely a means to accomplish certain policy goals. In line with these elements, we propose the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: *Respondents scoring high on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation should express greater support for President Trump's use of illiberal tactics.*

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Subclinical Antisocial Dispositions

Partisan tradeoffs, resentment, and authoritarian predispositions likely represent major pathways into illiberal attitudes. Alone, however, they may be insufficient. Recent personality research has focused on a different cluster of traits known as the "Dark Triad of personality." While the Dark Triad was not developed with politics in mind, we are convinced 'dark traits' can help clarify political attitudes and behaviors, including illiberal ones. Unlike authoritarian predispositions, the traits in question are devoid of prior ideological commitments, and are instead characterized, *inter alia*, by manipulativeness, self-aggrandizement, and an attraction to rule-breaking.

Paulhus and Williams (2002) introduced the concept of the Dark Triad as a cluster of three empirically overlapping but separate traits that share both adaptive and maladaptive elements. The Triad consists of subclinical manifestations of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy; traits generally regarded as exploitative (Thomaes et al., 2018) and socially aversive (Hogan & Hogan, 1997). The term 'subclinical' here should be understood as referring to milder, non-diagnosable and generally more functional variants of these otherwise pathological personality disorders (Furnham et al., 2013).

Of the three members, psychopathy is the most malignant (Rauthmann & Kolar, 2012). It is characterized by grandiosity, disregard for rules and poor behavioral controls, callousness, impulsivity, manipulativeness, deception, social deviance, fearlessness and thrill-seeking (Board & Fritzon, 2005; Furnham et al., 2013; Hare, 1985; Hart et al., 2018; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Narcissism correlates with grandiosity, lack of empathy, entitlement, exploitiveness, exhibitionism, a maladaptive reactivity to outside criticism, and unstable relationship patterns (Raskin & Hall, 1979). Lastly, Machiavellianism is defined as a "duplicitous interpersonal style" characterized by cynicism, pragmatic morality, and manipulativeness (Jones & Paulhus, 2009, p. 93). Machiavellians prioritize their own interests and rely heavily on deception, cheating, betrayal, and even coercion. Compared to their psychopathic and narcissistic homologues, however, they appear to be less prone to overt aggression.

At subclinical levels, the behavioral outcomes of the three members of the Triad often overlap (Furnham et al., 2013; McHoskey et al., 1998). For that reason, many studies treat them as a monolith and collapse them into a single index. The strongest empirical similarities appear between psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Furnham et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2010), and psychopathy and narcissism (Furnham & Trickey, 2011; Furnham et al., 2013). What mainly distinguishes the latter two is that psychopathy involves greater impulsivity and disinhibition, whereas narcissism revolves around self-enhancement. Given this heterogeneity, Furnham et al. (2013) argue that each member of the Triad should still be measured separately to better discriminate their independent contributions to political and social outcomes. We report both approaches in this study, with separate indices in the main text, and a collapsed index in the supporting material showing results virtually unaffected.

Political scientists have increasingly integrated this literature into their own work. Studies show that dark traits predict ideological extremism, conservative preferences, prejudice, belief in specific conspiracy theories, and even support for political violence (Arvan, 2013; Duspara & Greitemeyer, 2017; Enders et al., 2023; Gøtzsche-Astrup,

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2021; Jonason, 2014; Klofstad et al., 2025; Nai & Young, 2024). However, while both authoritarian predispositions and antisocial dispositions involve attraction to hierarchy and dominance, they differ sharply in their relationship to rules. On the one hand, authoritarianism gravitates around a need for order, conformity, and authority, implying a deference to rules and norms perceived as rightful. On the other hand, antisocial dispositions are characterized by moral pragmatism and the willingness to reject or transgress rules altogether.

Research suggests a connection between narcissism and lower support for democracy and democratic institutions (Cichocka et al., 2024; Marchlewska et al., 2019, 2022), but systematic evidence extending beyond narcissism has until recently remained comparatively scarce. Snook and Skubala (2026) recently showed links between dark personality traits and support for curbing civil liberties, gerrymandering, and political violence. Together with related work on antisocial traits and Trump-era political beliefs (Enders et al., 2023), this literature points to a pathway between dark traits and illiberalism, likely driven by the shared attraction individuals with dark personality traits exhibit towards rule-breaking and transgression (e.g., see Bennett & Kneuer, 2024).

Hypothesis 4: *Support for President Trump's use of illiberal tactics should be positively associated with dark personality traits.*

The Ambivalence of Populism

Populism and illiberalism have become quasi-synonymous in political commentary and a significant portion of academic literature. Yet, populism presents a particularly ambivalent case with respect to illiberalism. Our goal here is not to argue for the democratically corrosive elements of populism, or for the view that populism can serve as a corrective to unresponsive democratic institutions. Rather, we want to highlight the inherent tension within populist attitudes, and their implication for attitudes towards liberal democracy.

On one view, populism can sometimes echo authoritarianism by treating majority rule as absolute and rejecting even the slightest constraints on the *volonté générale* (Mudde, 2021; Müller, 2016; Pappas, 2019). From this perspective, institutional guardrails against radical majoritarianism, such as independent courts, guarantees against the tyranny of the majority, and checks on the powers of the executive, are recast as illegitimate obstacles to the will of the people. Accordingly, populism overlaps with authoritarianism and has therefore been treated as a natural companion to illiberalism (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, we believe it is important to distinguish them: authoritarianism primarily reflects a preference for social order, conformity and deference to authority. By contrast, populist attitudes often emerge from frustrated democratic aspirations.

Concerns about corruption and the notion that the elites do not play by the same rules are common to most if not all variants of populism. As a result, seeing politicians exempt themselves from the rule of law and resorting to authoritarian tactics may actually reinforce the belief that elites do not, in fact, play by the same rules, and amplify resistance to the kinds of tactics considered in this article (Furedi, 2021; Urbinati, 2019). Consistent with this, Çarkoğlu and Elçi (2023) find a negative

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association between populist attitudes and tolerance for illiberalism in the Turkish case. Our view, in a nutshell, is that populist attitudes could *constrain* illiberal instincts at least as much as they might *enable* them. If citizens interpret illiberal tactics as necessary instruments of the popular will, as suggested by the question wording in our survey instrument, we expect tolerance to increase. If instead the same tactics are framed as elite impunity, tolerance should decrease. We propose the following.

Hypothesis 5: *Populist attitudes should be associated with greater tolerance for President Trump's use of illiberal tactics if the latter are framed as serving the popular will.*

THE THREE LOGICS OF ILLIBERALISM

The literature reviewed suggests several pathways to illiberal attitudes. We have considered four: partisan tradeoffs, resentment, authoritarian predispositions, and subclinical antisocial dispositions. While considering them separately would surely provide insights into illiberal attitude formation, we observe notable differences in their intrinsic motivations and stability, and believe that they can be organized into three overarching logics (see Table 1).

Both partisan tradeoffs and symbolic expressions of illiberalism resulting from high resentment are opportunistic in nature. They are both subject to the whims of the current political environment and the political stakes of the day, and may be activated by outside cues, e.g. elite communication, campaigns, perceived decline, negative ads, or a rise in affective polarization. Conversely, their effects are likely to dwindle with parametric changes in the political environment. Lower levels of political polarization and outgroup hostility, greater responsiveness of democratic institutions, less incendiary elite communication, and improving perceptions of personal and collective outcomes should all disincentivize the endorsement of illiberal propositions, such as those tested in this study. In that way, partisanship and negative affect represent a transient and goal-oriented pathway to illiberal attitudes, which we call *opportunistic illiberalism*.

Authoritarian predispositions and antisocial dispositions are much less situational. They correspond to deep-seated personality configurations and are, by definition, more stable over the course of a lifetime. Beyond their common dispositional nature, however, they differ in substantial ways with respect to their intrinsic motivations. Authoritarian individuals aspire to greater norm-conformity, highly vertical social arrangements, and obedience to authority. They embrace coercive authority if it helps contain perceived threats. As a result, they may see democracy and its restraints as an obstacle to the kind of order and social arrangements they seek. While this orientation is quite stable, individuals may be further activated into illiberalism with perceived threats, especially those made to the social order or group relations. We call this logic *order-seeking illiberalism*.

Unlike authoritarian predispositions, antisocial dispositions are anti-normative. Setting aside the distinctions between Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy, individuals with dark personality traits generally do not crave order as do authoritarians. In fact, the three are defined in literature by a common attraction to transgression, a strong aversion towards norms, and the very notion of rules is flexible to them at best. Most importantly, they are not bound by the sort of moral reciprocity that is inherent

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to liberal democracy. Of the three logics we describe, we expect this one to be by far the most stable. We call it *transgressive illiberalism*. Empirically, the difference between our two dispositional logics should be most pronounced under low-threat conditions and when illiberal propositions are framed as transgressions rather than pro-order.

Table 1. The Three Logics of Illiberalism

Logic	Type	Stability	Core Motivation	Transgressiveness	Associated Predictors
Opportunistic	Situational	Elastic	Realize policy goals; score points against outgroups; address sources of resentment	Strategic / non-specific	Partisan congruence with illiberal leader; high resentment; high polarization (macro level)
Order-seeking	Dispositional	Stable but sensitive to threat perceptions	Seek order, hierarchy, obedience; suppress outgroups	Low / extrinsic	Right-wing authoritarianism; social dominance orientation
Transgressive	Dispositional	Highly stable	Attraction to transgression and dominance; no commitment to authoritarianism or partisan goals required	High / intrinsic (especially high for psychopathy, likely conditional for Machiavellians)	Dark traits

Together, our three logics of illiberalism clarify how illiberal attitudes can result from situational and likely reversible factors, like the rise of partisan hostility and resentment, but also enduring ones, like authoritarian and antisocial tendencies. Of course, the three logics described in Table 1 represent ideal types and are likely not entirely mutually exclusive in practice. We also recognize that the associated predictors listed for each logic may not be exhaustive. The logics classify motivations rather than people or scales, and their associated predictors may overlap or operate partially through one another. Importantly, however, our framework invites future research to consider an element of illiberal attitude formation that has until now been underappreciated: a durable reservoir of dark traits that nudge some citizens towards embracing illiberalism, likely for its transgressive quality, even as polarization cools down or resentment subsides.

METHODS

This study is based on a survey fielded between November 25, 2024 and January 8, 2025 with 1,059 respondents, using an online questionnaire programmed in Qualtrics. Respondents were recruited through the Qualtrics panel provider. The target population consisted of US eligible voters. Screening criteria required that participants be US citizens, at least 18 years of age, and eligible to vote. The sample was quota-matched to US Census benchmarks on gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, household income, region, and education (for respondents aged 25+).

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Predictors and Control Variables

Ideology We measured ideology by asking respondents to place themselves on an eleven-point left–right scale ranging from 0 = left to 10 = right.

Trump vote Respondents were asked who they voted for in the 2024 presidential election. We coded Trump voters as 1 and all other categories as 0. We use vote choice to capture direct alignment with the name actor and ideology to capture broader political congruence.

Populist attitudes We use Akkerman et al. (2014)'s eight-item populism scale. Responses were recorded on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) and averaged into index scores. Cronbach's alpha = 0.82.

Political interest We measured political interest on a four-point scale (1 = not at all interested, 4 = very interested).

Feelings of being devalued We measure resentment using Bimber et al. (2024)'s three-item FBD scale. Respondents indicated agreement on seven-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with the following statements: "Today's society often makes me feel worthless"; "Society exploits people like me"; and "People like me are not valued the same way as before." Cronbach's alpha = 0.82.

Right-wing authoritarianism We use Bizumic and Duckitt (2018)'s six-item Very Short Authoritarianism scale. Response options range from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Internal consistency in our sample is modest (Cronbach's alpha = 0.58), which is not uncommon for very short scales. We retain the measure in our main analyses and report robustness checks without it. Our substantive results remain unchanged after exclusion.

Social dominance orientation We measure social dominance orientation using the SDO7(s) short scale from Ho et al. (2015). The eight items include both dominance and anti-egalitarianism dimensions, and use seven-point response scales. Cronbach's alpha = 0.76.

Dark Triad We measure Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy using Paulhus et al. (2021)'s SD4 scale. Each item was measured on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Reliability was acceptable to excellent across subscales: Machiavellianism (alpha = 0.78), Narcissism (alpha = 0.87), and Psychopathy (alpha = 0.90).

Control variables Models also control for White identity, gender, and education.

Full question wordings for all the measures and scales used are included in the supplemental material.

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Dependent Variables

Tolerance for Trump's lawbreaking We asked respondents the following: "When Donald Trump returns to the White House in January with a strong mandate for change from voters, it's acceptable for him to break a few laws to get things done." Responses were on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

Support for Trump seeking emergency powers Respondents were also asked: "When Donald Trump is back in the White House in January, Congress should grant him permanent emergency powers to accomplish his agenda without being constrained by what the laws and the courts say." Responses were on the same seven-point scale.

RESULTS

We estimate ordinary least squares regression models to test the relationship between our predictors and our two illiberal propositions. Because diagnostics indicated heteroskedasticity (Breusch–Pagan, $p < .001$), we report heteroskedasticity-robust (HC3) standard errors in our results. The supporting material also includes a correlation matrix with all our predictors. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of effect sizes with standardized coefficients. Both models explain a substantive share of the variance (R^2 = .34 and .43 respectively). Because the data are cross-sectional, we cannot establish causal direction. The associations we report should be interpreted as only correlational. Full regression results are available in the supporting material.

We theorized an opportunistic logic behind illiberal attitude formation, driven by political congruence (here with Trump) and resentment. Empirically, partisanship matters enormously but in different ways across the two outcomes. Consistent with our expectations, we find that *Trump vote* is one of the strongest predictors in both models ($b = 0.77$, $p < .001$ for lawbreaking; $b = 1.29$, $p < .001$ for emergency powers). Interestingly, we find that subclinical psychopathy, an indicator of our transgressive logic, exceeds the effect of our partisanship variables (*Trump vote* + *ideology*) in the case of tolerance for lawbreaking. As we hypothesized, *feelings of being devalued* also predict both outcomes (lawbreaking: $b = 0.12$, $p = .003$; emergency powers: $b = 0.13$, $p = .002$), but their contribution is strikingly more modest (less than one percent of the total variance). This suggests that diffuse perceptions of social decline do in fact push citizens toward illiberal attitudes but they are far from being the main explanatory channel.

Our second logic of illiberalism centered on the role of authoritarian predispositions, which we hypothesized would fuel illiberal attitudes. Our models do produce evidence that authoritarian respondents are more supportive of illiberal actions, but the effects, like in the case of resentment, are comparatively much smaller. *Social dominance orientation* has a significant but modest effect in both models (lawbreaking: $b = 0.23$, $p < .001$; emergency powers: $b = 0.21$, $p < .001$). *Right-wing authoritarianism* is unrelated to tolerance for lawbreaking ($p = .581$), but it is a significant predictor of support for emergency powers ($b = 0.16$, $p = .005$). The null association can easily be reconciled with our framework: our second logic is motivated by order and conformity to norms i.e., true authoritarians are not oriented towards transgression.

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


Figure 1. Predictors of Tolerance for Executive Transgressions

We proposed a third logic of illiberalism, driven by subclinical antisocial personality traits. The results strongly corroborate our expectations. All three SD4 subscales are positively related to at least one outcome. In both our models, *psychopathy* comes in as a strong predictor (lawbreaking: $b = 0.57$, $p < .001$; emergency powers: $b = 0.30$, $p < .001$). *Narcissism* is also positive in both models, with a particularly large effect for the emergency powers model ($b = 0.52$, $p < .001$). The association with *Machiavellianism* is a bit more nuanced: marginal for lawbreaking ($p = .099$) but positive and significant for emergency powers ($b = 0.26$, $p = .006$). We report sample prevalence of the three traits in the supplemental material.

Lastly, we find that populist respondents are less likely to support both outcomes (lawbreaking: $b = -0.26$, $p = .006$; emergency powers: $b = -0.18$, $p = .048$), plausibly because the actions tested in our survey remind them of the very elite impunity they

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despise. Contrary to popular belief, our results suggest that anti-elite sentiment may in fact, at least in the present case, act as a democratic brake rather than a license for the erosion of democratic norms.

We assessed the relative explanatory weight of our opportunistic, order-seeking and transgressive logics using an order-invariant LMG decomposition. Variables associated with our opportunistic logic collectively explain 9 percent of the variance in tolerance for presidential lawbreaking, and 17 percent of the variance in support for permanent emergency powers. By contrast, variables behind our order-seeking logic explain roughly 6 and 8 percent in both models. Most notably, dark traits collectively account for 17 percent of the variance in the lawbreaking model—almost double the variance explained by the opportunistic logic, although the latter presently dominates the literature on illiberal attitudes—and more than the first two logics combined. In the case of our emergency-powers model, our transgressive logic accounts for 15 percent of the variance. Thus, tolerance of *illegal* actions coincides with the defiance characteristic of dark personality traits, whereas tolerance of *legal but abnormal* constitutional hardball tactics appears to be both a function of partisanship and antisocial dispositions.

Importantly, we re-ran our analyses on a subset of respondents who did not vote for Trump in the 2024 presidential election (N = 584). The results are consistent with those obtained with the full sample. Expectedly, predictors associated with the opportunistic logic display attenuated effects, with ideology and resentment falling below conventional levels of statistical significance in the case of lawbreaking. By contrast, predictors associated with our transgressive logic are remarkably stable. The effects of psychopathy and narcissism are virtually unchanged compared to the results on the full sample. Machiavellianism becomes non-significant for non-Trump voters. Because of their inherently strategic and exploitative nature, Machiavellians likely weigh norm violations more carefully against instrumental goals and may, in some contexts, show patterns that resemble opportunistic illiberalism. We subjected our findings to a range of robustness checks and found striking stability. Alternative specifications using Republican Party ID, omitting RWA (given alpha = .58), or combining the dark-trait indices are reported in the supplement and leave the findings unchanged. Taken together, the subgroup analysis suggests that our transgressive logic reflects a general disposition toward norm violations that persists even when the illiberal propositions being tested are associated with a politically incongruent actor. All complementary regression tables and plots, as well as our LMG decomposition are reported in the supporting material.

CONCLUSION

American democracy is at a crossroads. The second Trump administration's efforts to reshape the executive, challenge the rule of law, and openly disregard checks and balances have exacerbated already deep concerns about the health of US democracy. Against this backdrop, understanding why citizens tolerate and, in some cases, embrace illiberalism as a legitimate form of governance has become urgent. We addressed that question by focusing on two concrete outcomes: approval of presidential lawbreaking and support for expanding presidential authority via permanent emergency powers.

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Building on existing literature, we organized candidate predictors into three logics that underpin the formation of illiberal attitudes—opportunistic illiberalism, order-seeking illiberalism, and transgressive illiberalism—and put the framework to an empirical test with two Trump-era manifestations of illiberal governance. Our third logic in particular theorizes an enduring mechanism that until now has been underappreciated: the potential that some individuals might be drawn to illiberalism not to fulfill policy goals or because they hold anti-democratic views but because subclinical antisocial personality traits predispose them towards transgressive behavior.

Our findings corroborate our three logics. Consistent with opportunistic illiberalism, partisan congruence with the illiberal leader and perceptions of social decline are central to the endorsement of illiberal propositions. Authoritarian predispositions also predict both outcomes, which corroborates the order-seeking logic, although they explain much less variance and exert smaller effects than the predictors associated with the former. Most notably, our results provide resounding evidence for the transgressive logic of illiberalism. Subclinical manifestations of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy are all associated with support for at least one of the two outcomes and, in the case of support for presidential lawbreaking, the transgressive logic accounts for more of the variance than the order-seeking and opportunistic logics combined. The results hold when restricting the analysis to a subset of non-Trump voters. This reveals a structural vulnerability of democracy that has largely evaded the attention of prior work. Beyond partisan acrimony, resentment, or disaffection with the elites, there exists a segment of the public, with no prior commitment to authoritarian ideals, that is dispositionally inclined to tolerate–if not pursue–democratic norm violations, most likely because their anti-normative personality makes them attracted to transgression. This *terreau* of antisocial dispositions will not vanish even if polarization eases or if democratic institutions become more responsive to grievances. In fact, it is almost certainly prevalent across all democracies, and the traits associated with it are unlikely to respond to outside interventions, at least in grown adults.

Our study yielded another theoretically important finding. Informed by a long tradition of research and commentary treating populism as a sibling to illiberalism, we examined the influence of populist attitudes on our two outcomes. We chose to remain agnostic regarding their exact effect given the theoretical ambivalence of populism towards democracy. Our data show populist attitudes negatively related to both illiberal propositions. This suggests that anti-elitism may foster reluctance toward pseudo-autocratic governance rather than sympathy, at least in the present US context.

Several limitations temper our conclusions. Our focus on the US as our case study, though timely, raises questions about the generalizability of our results. Because we rely on cross-sectional survey data, our ability to infer causality is greatly limited. It is possible that illiberal attitudes may both shape and be shaped by partisan alignment. A further caveat concerns measurement of our dependent variables, as our survey items explicitly reference Trump. We recognize that this might induce framing effects, and that this nuances our ability to distinguish between support for illiberal transgressions in general or by Trump specifically. Likewise, the stigma attached to endorsing lawbreaking means that our estimates may understate support for illiberalism due to

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social desirability bias. Because both dependent variables use an agree-disagree format and agreement always indicates greater tolerance, acquiescence and shared response style cannot be fully ruled out. Relatedly, dark trait batteries such as the SD4, and especially items tapping psychopathy, may be prone to under-reporting, which could make our estimates of their prevalence and predictive weight conservative. Lastly, our analysis focused on only two manifestations of illiberalism related to the rule of law and executive aggrandizement via constitutional hardball. This limits the generalizability of our conclusions to a broader set of illiberal attitudes.

The results presented in this study shed additional light on democratic backsliding. For more than a decade, research has emphasized the roles played by polarization, populism, and perceived threats, in the erosion of democratic norms. These are indeed crucial, but they are also transient and context dependent. Our study shows that they coexist alongside another equally important and much more stable problem: the absence of moral reciprocity and irreverence towards norms and rules that characterizes a non-trivial portion of the population.

Future research should investigate the mediating role of political communication by varying frames to test the conditional effects of populism and authoritarianism. It should also assess whether our predictors extend to other domains, such as judicial independence, electoral integrity, or minority rights, and whether our three logics of illiberalism hold cross-nationally and around other illiberal leaders. The Need for Chaos literature (see Arceneaux et al., 2021) offers a particularly promising extension: future studies should examine whether it adds another predictor of transgressive illiberalism or helps connect enduring dispositions to context-dependent political behavior.

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Ethical Considerations The survey used for this manuscript was exempted from review by the Institutional Review Board at California State University, Dominguez

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Hills (IRB-FY2025-65). Electronic written informed consent was obtained before participation. Participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time without penalty. No deception was used. All responses were collected anonymously and analyzed in aggregate. No identifying information about respondents was retained. Respondents who completed the survey in less than half the median soft-launch completion time were automatically excluded, and only complete responses were recorded.

Consent to Participate Participants provided electronic written informed consent before taking the survey. They were informed that their participation in the survey was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time without penalty.

Transparency Statement The authors used OpenAI's GPT-5 (version released October 2025) to assist with coding and for copy editing purposes. The authors are entirely responsible for the scientific content of this manuscript. The study was not pre-registered.

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
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

S1. Correlations Between Predictors



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S2. Full Results From Manuscript

S2.1 Regression Results with HC3 Robust SEs

	Dependent variable:	
	Tolerance for lawbreaking	Support for Trump emergency powers
	(1)	(2)
Ideology	0.042 (0.020)	0.063 (0.020)
	p = 0.037*	p = 0.002**
Trump vote	0.770 (0.122)	1.295 (0.119)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
Feelings of being devalued	0.116 (0.039)	0.126 (0.039)
	p = 0.003**	p = 0.002**
Right-wing authoritarianism	0.029 (0.053)	0.160 (0.056)
	p = 0.581	p = 0.005**
Social dominance orientation	0.226 (0.057)	0.210 (0.056)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
Psychopathy	0.570 (0.073)	0.302 (0.071)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
Narcissism	0.324 (0.078)	0.515 (0.076)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
Machiavellianism	0.164 (0.100)	0.256 (0.092)
	p = 0.099.	p = 0.006**
Populist attitudes	−0.260 (0.094)	−0.175 (0.088)
	p = 0.006**	p = 0.048*
Education	−0.054 (0.054)	−0.185 (0.050)
	p = 0.319	p < 0.001***
White	−0.097 (0.109)	−0.110 (0.102)
	p = 0.375	p = 0.284
Gender	0.001 (0.022)	0.013 (0.034)
	p = 0.974	p = 0.695
Political interest	−0.030 (0.060)	0.064 (0.060)
	p = 0.623	p = 0.283
Constant	−0.926 (0.491)	−2.182 (0.453)
	p = 0.060.	p < 0.001***
Observations	1,059	1,059
R^2	0.336	0.429
Adjusted R^2	0.328	0.422
Residual Std. Error (df = 1045)	1.632	1.574
F Statistic (df = 13; 1045)	40.695***	60.406***

Note: HC3 robust standard errors in parentheses. . p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

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S3. Robustness Checks

S3.1 Lawbreaking model, with and without RWA (HC3 robust SEs)

	Dependent variable:	
	Lawbreaking	Lawbreaking (no RWA)
	(1)	(2)
ideology	0.042 (0.020)	0.045 (0.019)
	p = 0.037*	p = 0.021*
trump_voter	0.770 (0.122)	0.782 (0.119)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
fbd	0.116 (0.039)	0.115 (0.039)
	p = 0.003**	p = 0.004**
rwa	0.029 (0.053)	
	p = 0.581	
sdo	0.226 (0.057)	0.230 (0.056)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
psychopathy	0.570 (0.073)	0.566 (0.072)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
narcissism	0.324 (0.078)	0.326 (0.078)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
machiavellianism	0.164 (0.100)	0.165 (0.099)
	p = 0.099.	p = 0.097.
populist_attitudes	−0.260 (0.094)	−0.259 (0.094)
	p = 0.006**	p = 0.006**
education	−0.054 (0.054)	−0.056 (0.053)
	p = 0.319	p = 0.294
white	−0.097 (0.109)	−0.097 (0.109)
	p = 0.375	p = 0.371
gender	0.001 (0.022)	0.001 (0.022)
	p = 0.974	p = 0.979
political_interest	−0.030 (0.060)	−0.031 (0.060)
	p = 0.623	p = 0.610
Constant	−0.926 (0.491)	−0.834 (0.453)
	p = 0.060.	p = 0.066.
Observations	1,059	1,059
R^2	0.336	0.336
Adjusted R^2	0.328	0.328
Residual Std. Error	1.632 (df = 1045)	1.631 (df = 1046)
F Statistic	40.695*** (df = 13; 1045)	44.092*** (df = 12; 1046)

Note: HC3 robust standard errors in parentheses. $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

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S3.2 Emergency powers model, with and without RWA (HC3 robust SEs)

	Dependent variable:	
	Emergency powers	Emergency powers (no RWA)
	(1)	(2)
ideology	0.063 (0.020)	0.080 (0.020)
	p = 0.002**	p < 0.001***
trump_voter	1.295 (0.119)	1.364 (0.117)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
fbd	0.126 (0.039)	0.122 (0.039)
	p = 0.002**	p = 0.002**
rwa	0.160 (0.056)	
	p = 0.005**	
sdo	0.210 (0.056)	0.233 (0.055)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
psychopathy	0.302 (0.071)	0.277 (0.070)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
narcissism	0.515 (0.076)	0.522 (0.076)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
machiavellianism	0.256 (0.092)	0.262 (0.092)
	p = 0.006**	p = 0.005**
populist_attitudes	−0.175 (0.088)	−0.171 (0.089)
	p = 0.048*	p = 0.054.
education	−0.185 (0.050)	−0.198 (0.050)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
white	−0.110 (0.102)	−0.113 (0.103)
	p = 0.284	p = 0.271
gender	0.013 (0.034)	0.013 (0.038)
	p = 0.695	p = 0.737
political_interest	0.064 (0.060)	0.059 (0.060)
	p = 0.283	p = 0.329
Constant	−2.182 (0.453)	−1.676 (0.420)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
Observations	1,059	1,059
R^2	0.429	0.424
Adjusted R^2	0.422	0.417
Residual Std. Error	1.574 (df = 1045)	1.580 (df = 1046)
F Statistic	60.406*** (df = 13; 1045)	64.139*** (df = 12; 1046)

Note: HC3 robust standard errors in parentheses. $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

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
S3.3 Models 1 and 2, replacing ideology with Republican party ID (HC3 robust SEs)

	Dependent variable:	
	Lawbreaking	Emergency powers
	(1)	(2)
republican	0.262 (0.141)	0.439 (0.143)
	p = 0.064·	p = 0.003**
trump_voter	0.670 (0.141)	1.119 (0.142)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
fbd	0.120 (0.039)	0.132 (0.039)
	p = 0.002**	p = 0.001***
rwa	0.049 (0.052)	0.188 (0.055)
	p = 0.353	p = 0.001***
sdo	0.235 (0.057)	0.222 (0.057)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
psychopathy	0.570 (0.073)	0.301 (0.071)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
narcissism	0.341 (0.078)	0.540 (0.076)
	p < 0.001***	p < 0.001***
machiavellianism	0.167 (0.100)	0.260 (0.092)
	p = 0.094·	p = 0.005**
populist_attitudes	−0.257 (0.094)	−0.170 (0.088)
	p = 0.007**	p = 0.055·
education	−0.063 (0.054)	−0.199 (0.051)
	p = 0.246	p < 0.001***
white	−0.107 (0.109)	−0.128 (0.102)
	p = 0.329	p = 0.211
gender	0.0004 (0.022)	0.013 (0.035)
	p = 0.988	p = 0.715
political_interest	−0.029 (0.060)	0.064 (0.059)
	p = 0.630	p = 0.278
Constant	−0.857 (0.497)	−2.066 (0.462)
	p = 0.085·	p < 0.001***
Observations	1,059	1,059
R^2	0.336	0.429
Adjusted R^2	0.327	0.422
Residual Std. Error (df = 1045)	1.633	1.574
F Statistic (df = 13; 1045)	40.598***	60.388***

Note: HC3 robust standard errors in parentheses. $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

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
S3.4 Lawbreaking Models



Error bars show 95% (dark) and 99% (light) CIs with HC3 robust SEs.
Models use standardized variables.

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
S3.5 Emergency Powers Models



Error bars show 95% (dark) and 99% (light) CIs with HC3 robust SEs.
Models use standardized variables.


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S3.6 Models Using Collapsed Dark Triad Index



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S3.7 Models on Subset of Respondents Who Did Not Vote for Donald Trump (N = 584)



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S4. Relative Importance Analysis

S4.1 Relative Importance (LMG) — Tolerance for Presidential Lawbreaking (n=1,059)

Regressor / Group	LMG
G1 (trump_voter, ideology, fbd)	0.092
G2 (rwa, sdo)	0.060
G3 (machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy)	0.171
education	0.001
white	0.004
gender	0.000
political_interest	0.003
populist_attitudes	0.005
Proportion of variance explained (R^2): 0.336	
Total response variance: 3.962 (metrics not normalized; `rela=FALSE`)	

S4.2 Relative Importance (LMG) — Support for Permanent Emergency Powers (n=1,059)

Regressor / Group	LMG
G1 (trump_voter, ideology, fbd)	0.177
G2 (rwa, sdo)	0.079
G3 (machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy)	0.149
education	0.009
white	0.003
gender	0.001
political_interest	0.008
populist_attitudes	0.003
Proportion of variance explained (R^2): 0.429	
Total response variance: 4.285 (metrics not normalized; `rela=FALSE`)	

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S5. Additional Analyses

S5.1 Sample Prevalence of Agreement with Dark Triadic Statements (N = 1,059)




Figure S5.1. Note: Shaded areas show respondents whose average score on SD4 subscale items ranges from (4) agree to (5) strongly agree.

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S6. Consent, Survey Instrument, and Scales

Informed Consent You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted by Julien Labarre, PhD, from the Department of Political Science at California State University, Dominguez Hills. You are invited to take this survey as an eligible citizen of the United States. The purpose of this study is to collect information about Americans' news consumption habits and political preferences. If you decide to participate, you will complete a survey about your media habits, political attitudes, and demographic background. The survey includes questions about your preferred news sources, your trust in different types of media, and your views on political issues such as elections, governance, and political violence. You will also be asked about your ethnicity and gender identity. The survey takes approximately 15 minutes to complete.

The risks associated with this study are minimal and are not expected to exceed those encountered in daily life. Some questions about political or social issues may cause mild discomfort. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time without consequences. You may also skip any question you do not wish to answer and still remain in the study.

☐ I agree to participate in the study

Gender Are you… [Gender]?

1. Male
2. Female
98. Prefer not to say

Education What is your highest level of education you have completed?

1. Graduated High School or GED
2. Some college (Associate's degree, technical school, or vocational training)
3. Bachelor's degree
4. Advanced degree (M.A., PhD, etc.)

White Identity Please indicate your ethnic background:

1. White or Caucasian
2. Black or African American
3. Hispanic or Latino
4. Native American or Alaska Native
5. Multiracial or Biracial
6. Asian or Pacific Islander
95. A race or ethnicity not listed here

Social Dominance Orientation Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below. Your first feeling is generally best.

1. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom

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2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups
3. No one group should dominate in society
4. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top
5. Group equality should not be our primary goal
6. It is unjust to try to make groups equal
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups
8. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed

Scale: 1 = Strongly oppose 7 = *Strongly favor*

Right-Wing Authoritarianism Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

1. It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority
2. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity
3. God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late
4. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse
5. Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws
6. The facts on crime and public disorder show we must crack down harder on troublemakers to preserve law and order

Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree 7 = *Strongly agree*

Trump vote Who did you vote for in the 2024 presidential election?

1. Kamala Harris (D)
2. Donald Trump (R)
3. Someone else
4. I did not vote

Tolerance for Trump's Lawbreaking When Donald Trump returns to the White House in January with a strong mandate for change from voters, it's acceptable for him to break a few laws to get things done.

Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree 7 = *Strongly agree*

Support for Trump seeking emergency powers When Donald Trump is back in the White House in January, Congress should grant him permanent emergency powers to accomplish his agenda without being constrained by what the laws and the courts say.

Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree 7 = *Strongly agree*

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Feelings of Being Devalued Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

1. Today's society often makes me feel worthless
2. Society exploits people like me
3. People like me are not valued the same way as before

Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree *7 = Strongly agree*

Political Interest How interested would you say you are in politics?

1. Not at all interested
2. Not very interested
3. Fairly interested
4. Very interested

Republican Party ID Which party do you feel closest to, if any?

1. Strong Democrat
2. Not very strong Democrat
3. Lean Democrat
4. Independent or neither
5. Lean Republican
6. Not very strong Republican
7. Strong Republican

Ideology Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right)?

- 0 = Left 5 = Center 10 = Right

99. I don't know

Machiavellianism *Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree* *5 = Strongly agree*

1. It's not wise to let people know your secrets
2. Whatever it takes, you must get important people on your side
3. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful later
4. Keep a low profile if you want to get your way
5. Manipulating situations takes planning
6. Flattery is a good way to get people on your side
7. I love it when a tricky plan succeeds

Narcissism *Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree* *5 = Strongly agree*

1. People see me as a natural leader
2. I have a unique talent for persuading people
3. Group activities tend to be dull without me
4. I know that I am special because people keep telling me so

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5. I have some exceptional qualities
6. I'm likely to become a future star in some area
7. I like to show off every now and then

Psychopathy *Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree* *5 = Strongly agree*

1. People often say I'm out of control
2. I tend to fight against authorities and their rules
3. I've been in more fights than most people of my age and gender
4. I tend to dive in, then ask questions later
5. I've been in trouble with the law
6. I sometimes get into dangerous situations
7. People who mess with me always regret it

Populist Attitudes **To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

1. Politicians need to follow the will of the people
2. The people, not politicians, should make the most important policy decisions
3. Differences between elites and the people are larger than differences among the people
4. I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a professional politician
5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action
6. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil
7. What people call compromise is really selling out on principles
8. Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions

Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree *5 = Strongly agree*

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