International Relations

International Relations

Success of Economic Sanctions Threats: Coercion, Information and Commitment

Dawid Walentek Author ORCID home | opens in new tab University of Amsterdam
,
Joris Broere Utrecht University
,
Matteo Cinelli CNR-ISC – Institute for Complex Systems
,
Mark Dekker Utrecht University
,
Jonas Haslbeck University of Amsterdam
Abstract
This study examines when and why threats of economic sanctions lead to successful extraction of policy concessions. Scholars identified three hypotheses that explain success of sanction threats: the coercive, the informational and the public commitment hypothesis. The underpinning mechanisms for the hypotheses are, respectively, the economic cost of sanctions, uncertainty about the resolve of the sender and domestic audience cost for issuing empty threats. In this study, we offer an empirical test of the three hypotheses on threats effectiveness. In addition, we assess how variation in the three mechanisms affects effectiveness of threats relative to imposed sanctions. Our results show that effectiveness of threats strongly increases in economic cost to the target; however, threats become increasingly effective relative to imposed sanctions for lower uncertainty and higher domestic audience cost.
Content
Thumbnail image of content item
Comments
Log in using your APSA account or Register to comment
Comments are not moderated before they are posted, but they can be removed by the site moderators if they are found to be in contravention of our Commenting Policy – please read this policy before you post. Comments should be used for scholarly discussion of the content in question. You can find more information about how to use the commenting feature here .
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.