Abstract
Given the low effectiveness of economic sanctions, scholars suggest that sanctions are imposed to address the expectations of the domestic audience and the motivation is symbolic. In this article, I test the symbolic argument and look for the presence of an audience benefit for an imposition of sanctions and an audience cost for issuing of an empty threat. I find no evidence for an increase in popularity following an imposition of economic sanctions, nor a decline in popularity after an empty threat – counter to current scholarship. However, I do observe that US president are more likely to follow up on a threat of economic coercion if they have experienced a spell of decrease in approval ratings before the conflict. Thus, US presidents do play at the home crowd with economic coercion, but the crowd is indifferent.

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