More Parties, More Punishment of Undemocratic Candidates? Experiments on England's Ambiguous Party System

Does the number of choices offered by the party system affect whether citizens punish undemocratic behavior? I employ two innovative candidate choice experiments fielded in England to answer this question. Specifically, I implement two designs manipulating the number and effective number of parties displayed between two and three, reflecting the ambiguity of England's party system. Contrary to expectations, I find that Labour and Conservative identifiers do not defect more from undemocratic in-partisan candidates when they face three (effective) parties---Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats---rather than just the two major parties. Instead, defection from undemocratic in-partisans to the out-party drops and relocates to the Liberal Democrats even when the latter have no chance of winning. These findings highlight that more parties do not generate more defection from undemocratic politicians---and that voters prefer defecting to the option ideologically nearest to the in-party even when this option is chanceless.