International Relations

Weaponizing Interdependence & Global Value Chains: US Export Controls on Huawei

Authors

Abstract

This paper contributes to the developing literature on weaponized interdependence by demonstrating through a case study of American export controls targeting Huawei that global value chain (GVC) analysis is a more appropriate tool to analyze the effects of weaponizing supply chains than the network topography approach. The case study examines two key chokepoints the US government has attempted to use in its campaign against Huawei: electronic design automation (EDA) software tools and chipmaking capital equipment. The still developing weaponized of interdependence framework recognizes that some chokepoints may be more durable than others. However, with its network topography, the weaponization literature has not developed the appropriate approach to evaluate interdependence involving tangible goods. This paper argues that global value chain (GVC) analysis is a superior analytic approach because it can better evaluate the operations of interdependence involving tangible goods and offers more leverage to evaluate the durability of chokepoints.

Content

Thumbnail image of Weaponization 2022 APSA paper .pdf

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