Perversions of Accountability? Mayors, Reelection, and Criminal Groups

Examining the impact of mayoral reelection on the criminal-state relationships, I investigate how electoral dynamics influence collusion between politicians and illicit groups. Reelection may encourage accountability, yet also foster politician-criminal ties. Using a multi-period difference-in-differences design in Mexico, I find that reelection reduces violence against politicians due to decreased incentives for criminal intervention. Yet, amidst power struggles between criminal and political factions, violence against politicians can surge as power is restructured. Further, I employ a regression discontinuity design to examine the mechanisms of this theory, showing that reelection in crime-affected areas correlates with a reduction in homicides, likely from decreased inter-criminal rivalry. This research unveils the complexities of institutional changes in criminal-political dynamics, emphasizing tailored security approaches and highlighting the challenges voters face in holding elected officials accountable.