When Do Opposition Political Parties Resort to Post-Election Violence?

Allegations of electoral fraud provide opposition parties with two pathways: legal alternatives such as conceding defeat or petitioning the courts and illegal options like post-election violence. This research paper examines why in the case of alleged fraud, some opposition political parties resort to violence while others do not. Using V-Dem, NELDA, and ECAV data on 4,040 post-election violent events in 40 Sub-Saharan African countries, I find that opposition parties are more likely to resort to violence when their support is geographically concentrated and polarized. These findings are robust when logic models are alternated with probit models. The study enhances our understanding of the role of mobilization structures and political opportunities in shaping collective action and post-election violence. Case studies of Kenya (2007-2008) and Ghana (2012) also illustrate how geographically polarized and concentrated party support contributes to post-election violence. The paper aims to guide policymaking on electoral violence prevention and mitigation.