Trust in the Judiciary and Partisan Reactions to Judicial Checks: Evidence from Argentina

How does judicial behavior influence public support for the judiciary? I argue that judicial checks on the government shape citizens’ attitudes about judicial institutions at large, but these effects are driven by instrumental considerations, namely partisanship. I suggest that salient judicial checks—as instances of interbranch conflicts—provide citizens with instrumental information that shapes their beliefs about the judiciary. I hypothesize that court rulings limiting the government’s power undermine support for the judiciary among individuals aligned with the incumbent, but increase support among opposition sympathizers. I exploit the timing of two judicial decisions in Argentina, which invalidated a salient judicial reform promoted by the government in 2013. Using data from a survey fielded before and after the rulings, I show that the decisions significantly decreased government supporters’ trust in the judiciary, while opposition supporters increased their trust. Suggestive evidence provides support for the proposed mechanism—that judicial checks expose citizens to instrumental information.